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BLackRock inVEstmEnt institutE
sLow tuRn ahEad? 2013 INvESTMENT OUTLOOk
[ 2 ] s L o w t u R n a h E a d ?
What Is Inside Nigel BoltonHead of European Equities, BlackRock Alpha Strategies
Peter Fisher Head of BlackRock Fixed Income Portfolio Management
Philipp HildebrandBlackRock Vice Chairman
Russ KoesterichBlackRock Chief Investment Strategist
Rick RiederChief Investment Officer, BlackRock Fundamental Fixed Income
Andrew SwanHead of Asian Equities, BlackRock Alpha Strategies
Richard UrwinHead of Investments, BlackRock Solutions Fiduciary Mandates
Ewen Cameron WattChief Investment Strategist, BlackRock Investment InstituteExEcUTIvE DIREcTOR
Lee kempler cHIEf STRATEGIST Ewen cameron Watt
ExEcUTIvE EDITORJack Reerink
BLACKROCK’S 2013 OUTLOOK FORUMSome 50 BlackRock portfolio managers exchanged views on the 2013 investing landscape at a Nov. 15–16 event organized by the BlackRock Investment Institute. Our mission: Pinpoint market trends, update our investment scenarios and gauge global policy impact on financial assets next year. To prevent the looming US “fiscal cliff” from overshadowing the forum, we offered a slightly crumpled $1 bill to the first speaker who did not mention it. Somebody won—in the end.
BLACKROCK INVESTMENT INSTITUTEThe BlackRock Investment Institute leverages the firm’s expertise across asset classes, client groups and regions. The Institute’s goal is to produce information that makes BlackRock’s portfolio managers better investors and helps deliver positive investment results for clients.
The opinions expressed are as of December 2012 and may change as subsequent conditions vary.
fIRST WORDS AND SUMMARy ......................................................................3
ScENARIO SETTING ........................................................................................... 4–5
SO WHAT DO I DO WITH My MONEy?TM .........................................6–7
POLIcy & EcONOMIcS ..................................................................................6–13 Policy—for Better or worse ....................................................................................6–8 american Exceptionalism? ..........................................................................................9 Economics of Easing ............................................................................................ 10–11 a Zero-Rate world ................................................................................................ 12–13
POLIcy & MARkETS ......................................................................................14–24 in search of Fast Rivers ..................................................................................... 14–15 caution: turn ahead ............................................................................................. 16–18 the other European story ..................................................................................19–20 Bull in the china shop ................................................................................................21 contrarian dreaming .................................................................................................. 22
known unknowns .................................................................................................23–24
INcOME INvESTING ..................................................................................... 24–32 Fixed income: invest for income ........................................................................24–25 high yield: Reluctant Risks ....................................................................................... 26 munis: dealers come to town .................................................................................. 27 Emerging market debt: Price of Fashion ..........................................................28–29 dividends: yield to growth..................................................................................30–31
Reading REits ............................................................................................................. 32
F i R s t w o R d s a n d s u m m a R y [ 3 ]
Policy will be a key force in financial markets in 2013— and a prime determinant of investment returns.
Global central banks are refocusing their efforts to jumpstart anemic growth. The patient (the global economy) has moved from the emergency room to the recovery ward—but unfortunately is still in the hospital (and racking up hefty medical bills).
A big question for 2013 is whether the wave of ultra-loose monetary policies and quantitative easing has crested. Trillions of dollars in monetary stimulus and record-low interest rates have failed to spur much credit growth and economic activity so far. But what if this changes?
Our 2013 outlook, Slow Turn Ahead?, addresses this question and assesses its impact on markets.
first Words and Summary
throttling Back The most likely candidate to pour less fuel onto the monetary fire is the US federal Reserve. The US economy is actually growing and looks to gain momentum—if, and this is a big if, Washington can bridge the “fiscal cliff” of automatic tax hikes and come up with a credible plan to address the deficit. US banks are in reasonable shape, manufacturing is rising and the housing market has turned, boosting consumer confidence and spending.
We do not expect the fed to raise rates any time soon. But it could take its foot off the monetary accelerator on signs of quickening job growth in the second half of 2013. It could stop reinvesting the interest on its massive Treasury and mortgage securities holdings as a first step. This may seem unlikely today, but we must be ready. 2013 could very well be a game of two halves.
danger in safetyMarkets need only a whiff of a fed reversal to empty some of the vast store of investor money in cash and low-yielding fixed income assets and put it into equities. Quality businesses and dividend stocks would likely underperform leveraged companies, as the influx could result in a temporary “dash for trash.”
casualties would be “safe” assets such as government bonds of the United States, Uk, Germany and other eurozone core countries. Duration has risen and convexity has fallen: not a winning combination in fixed income. It takes just a miniscule rise in yield to trigger sizable bond price losses. There is a danger in safety, especially because most investors are positioned for rates to be low for long. Limited supply of bonds may dull the pain.
Feeling goodWe feel better about the world’s economic backdrop and markets than in Standing Still…But Still Standing in July 2012. Our “Age of Separatism” investment scenario, whereby US and emerging markets outperform, gets the highest probability. This is followed by “Stop ‘N Go” with on-and-off economic growth and market gyrations. And we have upped the odds for “Go Growth” to 20%.
We have downgraded our “Nemesis” scenario to 10% because we think the risks of a credit crisis and market sell-off have receded. We do worry about reigning optimism over US exceptionalism—America’s ability to close a gaping budget hole with essentially the same cast of political characters. Much of 2013’s global investing landscape and our scenarios depend on whether Washington navigates the fiscal cliff and strikes a long-term budget deal—subjects we plan to revisit throughout the year.
FIVE FUNdAMENTALS FOR 2013
1 We have become more upbeat about the prospects for risk assets and stabilizing economic growth (albeit at low levels). Low expectations = potential upside surprises.
2 The US economy should gain momentum and help boost global growth—If Washington can avoid the “fiscal cliff” and compromise on a sustainable budget.
3 Many investors lack conviction in markets where risk taking is often punished and trends last a skinny minute. Rome—and confidence—was not built in a day.
4 The era of ultra-loose monetary policy may draw to a close, challenging “safe” fixed income assets and heralding a shift toward equities. Safety = new tail risk.
5 Income investing works in a zero-rate world—but the hunt for yield has narrowed valuations between top-quality and not-so-great income assets. Take out the garbage.
[ 4 ] s L o w t u R n a h E a d ?
scEnaRio dEscRiPtion odds assEts signPosts
Age of Separatism 35%
(Previous 35%–40%)
The US economy leads the developed world. Emerging economies—and assets—outperform. Europe recovers at a snail’s pace while china’s economy re-accelerates.
This is a renewed version of our previous Divergence scenario. We renamed it to emphasize its long-term nature—and the US economy’s potential to be a global growth locomotive.
Relative value investing and (emerging market) equities are favorites. Emerging market debt also is attractive.
}correlations between asset classes decline further.
}Relative strength of monetary and fiscal policies by individual countries.
}Washington avoids the “fiscal cliff” and outlines a credible budget deal.
Stop ‘N Go30%
(Previous 40%–45%)
Sluggish global economic growth, with false dawns in the US and emerging economies. A European recession and tight credit for those who need it. Deleveraging keeps a lid on growth and risk taking.
This is our previous Stagnation scenario. It has become the market consensus. We still give it pretty high odds. The crowd could be right.
Risk-on/risk-off rallies dominate trading. This means super short-term and super long-term strategies. The hunt for yield favors dividend stocks, emerging market debt, high yield and US commercial mortgage securities and municipal bonds.
}Scattershot growth trends and flat money multipliers.
}Haphazard policy moves to stimulate growth and achieve sustainable debt levels.
}The United States agrees on a Band-Aid budget deal.
Go Growth20%
(Previous 5%–10%)
key economies such as the United States, china and even Europe grow faster than expected. The global economy starts weaning itself off monetary stimulus.
Did we take happy pills? Maybe—but the probability of pleasant growth surprises has risen, partly because the bar is pretty low. And a lot of things can go right, too.
Gear up for a massive risk-on rally, with investor monies parked in cash, fixed income and quality stocks flowing to emerging market stocks and discounted European and Japanese equities.
}Growth in credit creation and bank lending.
}Sell-offs in short-dated instruments such as bills and commercial paper.
}A grand US budget bargain that puts its fiscal house in order and stimulates growth.
}china, Brazil and India carry out growth-boosting structural reforms.
Nemesis Redux 10%
(Previous 15%–20%)
A global recession, credit crunch, social upheaval and steep losses across asset classes. Named after the Greek goddess who punishes the proud.
We see a smaller chance of Nemesis as risks of a eurozone breakup have receded and china’s economic momentum looks to be strengthening. US and Middle East leaders hold the keys to Pandora’s Box now.
The usual suspects of US Treasuries, German bunds and the Japanese yen. Watch the danger in safety, though. Investment grade credit should do relatively well. Short-term volatility is low, so downside protection is cheap. Get it while you can.
}Populist policies of debt defaults and protectionism.
}funding markets seize up again.}Social unrest and unexpected
geopolitical crises.}Political dysfunction reigns in
Washington: No budget deal and a nasty debt ceiling fight.
}A “Grexit” or massive deposit flight rekindles fears of a eurozone breakup.
Inflate Away5%
(Previous 0%–5%)
High commodities prices and monetary easing drive up inflation around the world, effectively cutting the developed world’s debt load.
Okay, inflation is still far-fetched. Markets can turn on a dime if they get a whiff of it, though. few investors are positioned for inflation, and it could be triggered by unexpected geopolitical events. Stay tuned.
commodities and hard assets such as real estate tend to offer some protection. Sell stretched safe-haven government bonds.
}Bubbly equity markets.}Money velocity jumps.}Inflation beyond food and energy.}Washington kicks the can
down the road by agreeing on a budget deal that eliminates all fiscal drag—and ignores the deficit.
suBtRact 10% Points iF us JumPs oFF FiscaL cLiFF
add 10% Points iF us JumPs oFF FiscaL cLiFF
Scenario Setting
FUN
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NTA
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s c E n a R i o s E t t i n g [ 5 ]
Economic momentum in the world looks poised to take a modest turn for the better. See the map below.
china’s much-feared “hard landing” may be the softest in history if growth stabilizes near the current 7%-plus range. for details on china, see page 21.
The International Monetary fund (IMf) forecasts 1% fiscal global tightening in 2013—no small potatoes in a 3%–4% growth world. Europe is spreading out the austerity pain over time. The United States should see some tightening due to likely tax increases.
Japan may loosen under new political leadership. china has plenty of firepower for fiscal stimulus, but a repeat of 2009’s fireworks is unlikely.
Many key indicators for growth and risk appetite were perking up going into 2013. Sure, this was happening from a low base (and low expectations). But it does lay the groundwork for positive surprises. On balance, we see the world moving toward “good” things. See the chart on the right.
The European central Bank’s (EcB) relaxing rules on what banks can post as collateral and the recovery of the US housing market are triggering the release of some collateral that has gummed up monetary transmission.
1 We have become more upbeat about prospects for risk assets and economic growth stabilizing (albeit at low levels). Low expectations = potential upside surprises.
FUN
dA
ME
NTA
L
agE oF sEPaRatism Economic momentum around the globe, 2012
Source: BlackRock, December 2012. Notes: Economic cycle selections based on a combination of leading indicators for most developed markets. Purchasing Manager Indices used for Canada, China, India, Mexico, New Zealand, Russia and Turkey. Colors based on historical one-month forward performance of equities in a broad asset allocation model after each cycle. For example, dark blue (4) has been best for equities and dark orange (2) worst.
1 Mid-cycle Slowdown
2 Weakness
3 Potential Trough
4 Early Recovery
5 Strength
6 Potential Peak
Bad things where are we? good things
Fiscal tightening
monetary Easing
Private sector deleverages
deleveraging completed
china hard Landing
Emerging market growth
nemesis Risks above normal
nemesis Risks negligible
inflation Risk high
inflation Risk Low
2013 directioncurrent situation
Source: BlackRock, November 2012.
to a haPPiER PLacEmacroeconomic signposts for 2013
[ 6 ] s L o w t u R n a h E a d ?
Policy has created Pavlovian markets. Investors and markets are conditioned to jump whenever policymakers (fail to) act—much like Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov’s dogs salivated upon hearing a bell they identified with being fed.
Policy is the reality of the new world of investing, and 2012 was no exception:
} EcB President Mario Draghi, backed by Germany, pledged to do whatever was necessary to save the euro and buy short-term bonds of peripheral countries such as Spain and Italy. This lifesaver is called the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program. It stabilized eurozone bond yields and avoided an investment Armageddon.
} The US federal Reserve, led by chairman Ben Bernanke, launched its third round of quantitative easing (QE3)—this time with no expiration date. This further compressed yields across the bond world— and increased duration risk (the risk of sharp price declines if yields were to rise).
} china’s attempts to slow inflation and prevent a real estate bubble hit fixed asset investment—and sent global commodity markets into a swoon. Brazil intervened in trade, currency, and the energy and banking industries.
} India’s about-face in opening to foreign investment halted a rupee meltdown and equity market slide.
} Switzerland defended its euro peg and kept rates near zero. The Bank of Japan launched an asset purchase program, partly offset by the government’s hiking value-added taxes over time. The Uk kept its quantitative easing program and fiscal tightening, even in the face of rising consumer prices.
AIMING FOR THE BESTMonetary policy seems to be moving from preventing a financial sector collapse to targeting growth. The fed has explicitly linked QE3 to an improved jobs market. The Bank of England (BoE) is targeting aggregate credit with its funding for Lending Scheme.
The EcB is following with a lag—the OMT is ultimately about creating greater funding equilibrium within the eurozone.
The People’s Bank of china has shelved fiddling with banks’ required reserve ratios in favor of injecting cash into the financial system. It is also encouraging the growth of commercial bond markets.
The monetary overdose has yet to translate into sustainable economic growth. Sure, it is possible to have creditless recoveries. Think Mexico after its 1994 currency devaluation. These recoveries, however, tend to be unusually muted and led by a modest pick-up in consumer spending rather than investment, according to the March 2011 IMf paper Creditless Recoveries.
Policy–for Better or Worse
SO WHAT dO I dO WITH My MONEy?TM
Fixed income: danger in safety } Prices of safe-haven government bonds could plunge
when yields start to rise. Low yield = high price risk.
} we like global high yield and us munis for income— but do not expect much capital appreciation.
} we favor emerging market debt. in Europe, we prefer italian and spanish bonds over debt of weak European core countries.
} we are bullish on commercial mortgage-backed securities and collateralized loan obligations.
commodities: Long View } we like metals with long-term supply gaps and
agricultural commodities. china’s appetite is huge.
Equities: global smorgasbord} we like global companies with strong balance sheets,
steady cash flows and growing dividends.
} we favor high-quality us stocks, global energy and emerging markets.
} we are bullish on domestic consumption plays in Brazil and china, north asian cyclical stocks, and mexican banks and industrials.
} we like discounted exporters on Europe’s periphery and small “self-help” uk companies.
currencies: dollar Bulls} we are bullish on the us dollar due to the country’s
energy boom and long-term growth prospects.
P o L i c y & E c o n o m i c s [ 7 ]
good and Bad income} income investing remains our strategy of choice in a
zero-rate world.
} the hunt for yield has created pockets of overheating and narrowed valuations between top-quality and less desirable income assets.
} we detail the state of play in fixed income, high yield, emerging market debt, municipal bonds, dividends and real estate investment trusts on pages 24–32.
the gift of insurance} short-term implied volatility is eerily low whereas policy
uncertainties are near financial crisis levels. consider options to hedge downside and upside risks.
Pain trades} our biggest contrarian idea is buying Japanese
exporters while selling the yen.
} other pain trades include selling “safe” tobacco stocks, buying us companies with cash piles abroad, and buying securities of European and us financials.
} we have warmed up to indian equities after the country’s reforms on foreign investment. see page 22 for our contrarian picks.
Volatility Reversal? } the fire hose of monetary liquidity and investor
hunger for yield has depressed short-term volatility, so maybe a reversal will have the opposite effect.
REGULATION TIdE A tidal wave of regulation is shaking up the inner guts of global financial markets. There is Basel, volcker, vickers, Solvency II, Affordable care, environmental rules and so on. Liquidity is drying up in areas deserted by banks, upsetting fast trading strategies and curtailing funding.
Regulatory change is slowly grinding its way into financial markets. Some rules are delayed as policymakers consider the (unintended) consequences of businesses holding back investments. In addition, the flood of rulemaking principles and theories is hitting the rocks of implementation and reality in policy-setting bodies such as the financial Stability Board and the Basel committee.
Nevertheless, the regulatory change die is cast and banks are busy downsizing trading desks and cutting risk. Liquidity is drying up in credit markets, creating new risks and opportunities for investors, as detailed in Got Liquidity? in September 2012.
The new dynamics are affecting areas such as trade and project finance, unsecured lending (as deposits are now explicitly senior) and funding backed by illiquid collateral such as aircraft leasing—just check the “for sale” signs on businesses that specialize in this area.
Prices of many of these assets are drifting downward as banks are pressured to sell and potential buyers bargain hard. New players, in particular those seeking longer-duration assets, are emerging and taking on board activities previously the sole purview of banks. If successful, new markets and sources of return should arise.
EUROPEAN MyTHOLOGyEurope looks to spread out the pain of fiscal tightening— a positive development that is sensible and may halt the continent’s downward economic spiral. The focus on cyclically adjusted deficits (as opposed to calendar-based targets) by the Troika (the European commission, EcB and IMf) amounts to short-term fiscal easing. Aided by tax cuts in Germany, this may cause the eurozone to beat (extremely low) growth expectations in 2013.
Europe appears to have little maneuvering room for overt monetary easing because of paymaster Germany’s abhorrence of money printing. Like Ulysses, Draghi has tied his hands to the mast to avoid hearing the sirens of monetary easing. It is hard to see him pivot from this position.
At the same time, Draghi has studied other chapters of the Greek mythology book. He is aware of the risk of a visit by the vengeful goddess Nemesis if spiraling borrowing costs for key countries such as Spain and Italy threaten a eurozone breakup.
The best—but somewhat unlikely—scenario is a weakening euro. This should boost the region’s exports and make domestic producers in southern-tier countries more competitive. for a detailed discussion of Europe, see pages 19–20.
The legacies of the financial crisis—low economic growth, declining tax revenues, deleveraging, rising unemployment, record-low bond yields and government transfers that prop up corporate profits—add up to a central role for policy. changes in policy = changes in asset returns.
[ 8 ] s L o w t u R n a h E a d ?
2013 PoLicy 2013 inVEstmEnts
monetary Fiscal Regulation Equities Fixed income Long shot
us
a
Loose. The foot may come off the accel-erator in the second half of 2013.
cliff plunge or glide, it will be tight(er).
Tight, but the tide is slowing a bit.
Large caps. Small caps if growth perks up but mon-etary policy stays loose.
corporate bonds, cMBS, cLOs and illiquid invest-ments.
value equities and financials.
Eu
Ro
Zon
E Stealth loosening with OMT and other schemes.
Loosening by spreading austerity pain over time.
Tightening. Peripheral exporters.
Buy peripheral bonds and sell lower-quality core.
financials.
uk
Loose with a focus on credit creation.
Tight, but question marks are rising.
Tightening, the fSA shows teeth.
Small caps. Gilts do not look attractive—but are under-pinned by a flight to safety .
Diversified miners.
JaPa
n
May loosen under new central bank leadership.
May loosen after December elections.
Tight. Export stocks(while sellingyen).
as
ia
Moderately loosening in china through open market operations.
Moderately loosening. Plenty of fire power (except in India).
Relatively loose, but tightening for property.
cyclical stocks in North Asia.
BBB corporate and local currency sovereign bonds.
India equities.
Lat
am
Moderately tightening.
Loosening. Tightening (with plenty of bureaucracy).
Mexican banks and industrials. Brazilian consumption stocks.
Brazilian rates, Mexican peso, BBB corporate bonds.
wooF, wooF: ouR PaVLoVian REsPonsEs to PoLicy Expected global Policy and Possible investments in 2013
Source: BlackRock, 2012.
US CLIFF NOTESThe United States may turn the corner on growth—if Washington can avoid falling off the fiscal cliff and negotiate a long-term budget reduction plan. The market consensus has been remarkably complacent. consider:
} The elections failed to give either party a clear mandate. Divided government remains, and a high risk of political dysfunction with it. So why would we expect Washington to agree to a deal this time around?
} Higher payroll taxes and a cut in extended unemployment figures alone should shave 1% off growth in 2013 in an economy that is now putting along at a 2% stall speed. Economists have largely ignored this impact on growth.
} Staving off the cliff with a Band-Aid is not good enough. What is needed—and what markets expect—is a plan to put the nation on a sound long-term budget track.
We hope politicians will rediscover the lost art of compromise. Businesses and voters have sent strong signals to Washington to work together. If politicians remain tone deaf, the fiscal cliff will turn into a fiscal cloud overhanging markets in 2013.
If the United States dives off the cliff, however briefly, we would expect a temporary sell-off in risk assets. Ditto in case of “game of chicken” negotiations to raise the statutory debt ceiling. Investors like certainty.
P o L i c y & E c o n o m i c s [ 9 ]
US economic momentum may gain—if Washington can agree on a credible budget deal that will cut the deficit and spur growth. This is a tall order, especially considering the presidential elections essentially preserved the status quo as discussed in Now for the Hard Part: Investing After the US Elections in November 2012.
The cliff-dependent US growth story, however, has many compelling chapters:
} There is evidence banks are starting to lend as collateral values (housing prices) improve. Mortgage lending is becoming a profit center as overall net interest rate margins compress in the zero-rate world and banks cut trading activities.
} US housing appears on the mend, as detailed In the Home Stretch? The US Housing Recovery in June 2012.
} Downward earnings revisions appear to have bottomed for US companies. See the chart above on the right.
} US manufacturing gauges generally have perked up a bit. Longer term, cheap oil and gas should drive development of energy-intensive industries, build out infrastructure, improve the current account balance and perhaps increase government revenues, as detailed in US Shale Boom: A Case of (Temporary) Indigestion in July 2012.
} If Washington defies expectations and reaches a budget deal that creates certainty on taxes, business confidence and investment could jump.
} The United States is furthest along in the long and painful process of consumer and bank deleveraging (it has yet to start on public deleveraging). See the chart on the left.
We generally like equities for 2013—but we are not enamored. US companies, which sport the best metrics globally, enjoy fat profit margins. corporate profits as a percentage of GDP hit a post-WWII record of 11% this year, according to the federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Entitlements and tax breaks have created demand for products and services without burdening companies with increased output costs. Margins rise and corporate cash piles up (as does government debt). This benefit reverses once fiscal tightening sets in.
American Exceptionalism?
DE
BT-
TO-G
DP
86420-2-4-6-8
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120%
UKSpain Eurozone United StatesAverage Normal Range ■
YEARS FROM START OF CRISIS
Sources: Citigroup, US Federal Reserve, Eurostat, ONS, Bank for International Settlements and World Bank, September 2012. Notes: The zero baseline signifies a peak in private debt (2007 for Spain, 2008 for the United States and 2009 for the eurozone). Gross private debt includes total domestic credit to private sector and crossborder lending to the nonbank private sector by foreign banks. Average is computed using sample of 12 banking crises as defined in “Debt Reduction After Crises,” BIS, September 2010. Shaded area corresponds to historic average plus or minus one standard deviation.
LEadER oF thE dELEVERaging woRLdgross Private debt-to-gdP Ratios, 1980–2012
RAT
IO
Japan
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
DOWNGRADES
EuropeUnited States
2012201120102009
UPGRADES
Sources: Thomson Reuters and MSCI, November 2012. Note: Ratio of companies with upward 12-month forward earnings estimates vs. downward (three-month moving averages).
Land oF thE EaRnings uPgRadEs? analyst Earnings Revisions, 2008–2012
2 The US economy should gain momentum and help boost global growth—If Washington can avoid the “fiscal cliff” and compromise on a sustainable budget.
FUN
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[ 1 0 ] s L o w t u R n a h E a d ?
LOOKING HARd FOR GREENSHOOTS There are points of light. The fed’s three rounds of quantitative easing and other measures since 2008 amount to a “reliquification” plan for credit collateral markets. It is slow going but starting to yield some results in credit creation.
The Uk could be next. In the program to boost lending, banks swap lower-rated collateral for gilts on condition these funds are lent out. The initial tranche of £80 billion is smallish compared with £375 billion of quantitative easing. We suspect there is more to come, however, provided the original funds are drawn down. Look (very) hard at Uk private credit extension and you can see faint signs of recovery.
Ineffective money multipliers have kept a lid on inflation. credit demand is subdued and high unemployment keeps wage expectations low. This is the picture pretty much everywhere today, and the reason why we rate inflation as a low risk for now.
This also has bolstered the belief that low nominal and negative real rates are here to stay. We will question this “low for long” trade on pages 16–18.
COLLATERAL dAMAGE credit creation has been impeded by the need to fix the broken balance sheets of financial institutions. financial crises tend to render impotent traditional remedies to spur economic growth (such as lowering interest rates).
Monetary policy becomes half as effective after a financial crisis, according to Monetary policy in a downturn: Are financial crises special? by the Bank for International Settlements in September 2012. See charts on the next page.
credit ultimately is dependent on collateral, and investors have become very picky about collateral since the financial crisis. They are hoarding safe-haven assets such as US, Japanese, German and Uk bonds and avoiding the rest. This is causing the credit transmission system to gum up.
We worry about the law of unintended consequences. In a macabre version of Gresham’s Law (bad money drives out good), “good” collateral is hoarded for liability hedging or backing for centrally cleared derivatives.
Regulators—albeit unwittingly—contribute to hoarding of safe-haven assets by requiring banks to raise capital standards (shorthand for “buy bonds”) and reduce risk (ditto).
The long-term implications are clear. capital forced toward low return = capital unavailable for more profitable investment. Japan has had plenty of time to find this out.
Economics of Easing
Eurozone US
MO
NEY
MU
LTIP
LIER
2
4
6
8
10
12
2012201020082006200420022000
Japan
Sources: Thomson Reuters, Federal Reserve, ECB and BoJ, November 2012. Notes: Money multipliers calculated as broad money divided by money base. M2 is used for the United States and Japan, M3 for the eurozone.
whEn stimuLus FaLLs FLat trends in money multipliers, 1999–2012
“We see money accumulating at the centers, with difficulty of finding safe investment for it; interest rates dropping down lower than ever before; money available in great plenty for things that are obviously safe, but not available at all for things that are in fact safe, and which under normal conditions would be entirely safe … but which are now viewed with suspicion by lenders.”
Citation from a 1931 Harvard Business Review article in Essays on the Great Depression (2000) by Ben Bernanke.
central banks around the globe have embarked on asset- buying sprees to resuscitate economic growth. When referring to their monetary boosters, central bankers have been using terms such as “open-ended” and “unlimited”—something akin to swearing in a house of worship.
The unprecedented monetary easing has bloated central bank balance sheets and brought interest rates to zero. Equity markets sprinted forward on a sugar high and now need real economic growth to extend the rally. credit markets became intoxicated as zero rates intensified the global hunt for yield—and may be in for a prolonged hangover.
Trillions of dollars in monetary stimulus and record-low interest rates have failed to spur much credit growth and economic activity. Money multipliers across the world are essentially kaput. See the chart below.
P o L i c y & E c o n o m i c s [ 1 1 ]
IN SHORT SUPPLyDebt issuance is at record levels, but much consists of refinancings. Overall supply next year in the US market will be the lowest since 2009, credit Suisse estimates. See the chart on the right.
This is an under-appreciated force in markets and has kept a lid on yield rises. Among the reasons:
} Much of the record debt issuance is simply refinancing at lower rates. This has, for example, created net negative supply in markets such as the $3.7 trillion US municipal bond market.
} Global banks are still busy cleaning up their balance sheets, “encouraged” by impending rules on tighter capital standards. The top players of the past are missing in action.
} central banks are buying up government bonds and related securities under their various quantitative easing programs. for example, were the fed to keep up its purchases of mortgage-backed securities next year, it would soak up 60%–70% of gross supply and more than the entire available net supply, we estimate. This means the mortgage market would shrink considerably (excluding fed holdings).
} Dealers have reduced holdings of corporate bonds by 75% since the 2007 peak, according to the federal Reserve Bank of New york. This may reduce their risk, but it also constrains liquidity.
NET
SU
PPLY
IN B
ILLI
ON
S
-1,800
-1,200
-600
0
600
1,200
1,800
$2,400
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2013ABS ■ BAB ■ Agency MBS ■ Agency ■
Financial Corporates ■ Non-Financial Corporates ■Treasury ■ Total Fixed Income Supply
Source: Credit Suisse, October 2012. Notes: All figures are net of US Federal Reserve or Treasury purchases. 2012 and 2013 are estimates.
dEBt PaRadoxnet supply of us Fixed income, 2000–2013
United States1979
UK 1979
Iceland 1987
South Korea 1997
UK 2007
United States 2007
Sweden 1990
Italy 1974
Austria 1977
United States1973
UK 1973
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2%
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4
REAL SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES REAL SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
Without Financial Crisis With Financial Crisis
GD
P G
RO
WTH
Source: Bank for International Settlements, September 2012. Notes: Each chart shows the impact of average real short-term interest rates on the average output growth over each economic cycle. Data based on a sample of 24 developed countries. Downturns are defined as one or more years with negative GDP growth.
what’s woRsE than a cRisis? a FinanciaL cRisis interest Rates and gdP growth after downturns, 1960–2012
[ 1 2 ] s L o w t u R n a h E a d ?
Many government bonds now return negative interest after factoring in inflation, and some short-term instruments even carry negative nominal yields.
This race to the bottom intensified after the EcB cut its deposit rate (the interest banks receive for storing their funds with the EcB overnight) to zero in July. The ensuing drops in short-term rates present investors with new challenges.
Investors may dislike paying to park their cash, but should realize that protecting wealth has cost money for much of history. Think of medieval lords building fortresses and hiring knights to secure their fortunes. Modern-day cash investors have three choices:
} medieval choice Pay up (not a viable long-term strategy for most).
} duration choice Invest in longer-term securities (duration risk).
} Risky choice Invest in securities outside the AAA realm (credit risk).
Whichever is your poison, zero rates should eventually increase risk appetite. Investing at zero only makes sense when risks are high. Two caveats:
} Increased risk taking will likely happen at a glacial pace. No one expects the cash mountain to magically morph into an equity-buying wave.
} It should coincide with a rehabilitation of discredited (and discounted) collateral.
for now, income and cash flows are kings in a world that is slowly deflating. Investor hunger for yield comes as overall fixed income supply is falling, providing a powerful driver for spread products (credit trading at a premium to benchmark government bonds).
Pension funds and insurers buy and hold “safe” bonds to hedge liabilities and fulfill regulatory requirements. The raft of banking regulations discussed earlier is partly fueling bank demand for low-risk assets.
Many insurers like to diversify their asset allocation, but uncertainty over new solvency rules was keeping them wedded to the lowest-risk assets, according to a 2012 survey of European insurers co-sponsored by BlackRock. This is still the case as we exit the year with the European Solvency II insurance regulation stalled.
So much demand and so little supply: Zero rates may trigger a structural shift toward more risk taking—which bodes well for equities, selected fixed income markets and alternative investments.
MOUNTAINS OF dEBTAlas, we are not in this Nirvana yet. There is a lot more wood to chop when it comes to deleveraging. Developed countries are awash in debt, and ballooning government debt is only part of the story. you have to look at all the debt in the ecosystem. It is not a pretty picture. See the chart below.
This means we are likely in for a prolonged period of sub-par economic growth, according to academics carmen Reinhart, vincent Reinhart and kenneth Rogoff in Debt Overhangs: Past and Present. They identified 26 separate periods in which debt exceeded 90% of GDP for at least five years in 14 advanced economies. These “debt overhangs” lasted an average of 23 years and cut annual GDP growth by 1.2 percentage points.
A Zero-Rate World
Households ■Government ■Non-Financial Companies ■ Financial Institutions ■
CanadaGermany
GreeceUnited States
ItalyPortugal
EurozoneFrance
BelgiumSpain
UKJapan
Ireland 1,230646
536479
463
463448
440
396370
353
302
292
PERCENT OF GDP
Source: Credit Suisse, October 2012.
dEBt, dEBt EVERywhEREgross debt Loads in selected countries, 2012
P o L i c y & E c o n o m i c s [ 1 3 ]
Emerging economies are in much better (debt) shape than the developed world. See the chart below. This bodes well for economic growth and asset prices. Emerging market equities have underperformed US and European stocks since hitting a trough in early 2009. This will likely change, especially if we usher in the Age of Separatism.
Once asset prices begin to clear, investment returns can be spectacular given their depressed starting values. Think the aftermath of the 1997–1998 Asia crisis—or US homebuilders more recently.
In general, we are more optimistic about the world’s economic backdrop than we were a year ago. But are we optimistic for the right reasons?
Markets have behaved after this summer’s hiccups, so our judgment may be a bit clouded. call it tyranny of the present or wishful thinking; it is something investors need to discount.
Also remember it is possible to be great at forecasting economic trends—and still lose your shirt in the market. There is a growing disconnect between economics and markets since the financial crisis. Among the reasons:
} The unprecedented monetary easing and other policy actions have created an artificial market environment.
} A profound risk aversion by businesses, pension funds and individual investors after being scarred by investment losses and funding problems in the crisis.
dEBt diVERgEncEdebt-to-gdP in developed and Emerging markets, 1900–2011
0
40
20
60
80
100%
1900 19211911 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011
WWI AND GREAT DEPRESSION
(defaults, restructurings
and a few hyperinflations)
WWII(defaults, financial
repression and inflation)
1980s DEBT CRISIS(defaults,
restructurings, financial
repression, inflation and
several hyperinflations)
GREAT DEPRESSION
2008-2009 FINANCIAL CRISIS
(restructurings and financial
repression)
Emerging Markets
Developed Markets
DEB
T-TO
-GD
P
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff. Notes: Debt-to-GDP ratios are based on gross debt loads.
dELVING INTO dELEVERAGING 1. Deleveraging = less spending. This raises the specter of
deflation, even more so if governments are tapped out.
2. Less spending = less government revenues = bigger budget shortfalls.
3. Bank deleveraging after a financial crisis mutes the economic recovery.
4. When private sector debt falls, government debt typically rises because of fiscal stimulus. It happened in Japan, and it is happening in the United States.
5. This is tougher in Europe: Declining creditworthiness + high debt loads + large deficits = fiscal tightening in many countries.
6. Normally, domestic deleveraging results in an improved trade balance. It does not work so well when most of the developed world is playing this game.
7. People hoard cash in a deleveraging world to meet long-term needs. This is why it is worth watching net debt levels.
8. Not everyone has to deleverage. Those who do have an outsized impact on asset returns. Think Greece.
[ 1 4 ] s L o w t u R n a h E a d ?
– L
ES
S
PRE-CRISIS (2002 TO 2006) POST-CRISIS (2008 TO 2012)
RE
TUR
N F
OR
RIS
KM
OR
E +
ASSET CORRELATION– LESS MORE +ASSET CORRELATION– LESS MORE +
Source: BlackRock, November 2012. Notes: Return for risk is based on recent rewards to 13 asset classes versus their risk. Asset correlation denotes market-wide correlations between asset classes. The white line is a timeline of market movement in each period. Assets were less correlated and returned more for risk before the financial crisis (left chart) than after (right chart).
Risk without REwaRdmarket Returns and correlations, 2002–2006 vs. 2008–2012
We probably should use them all, from short-term momentum trades to Graham and Dodd value investing.
In Search of fast RiversOh, to be back in 2002: Markets behaved the way we knew them to for most of our lives. Risk was rewarded, diversification was real and trends were long-running.
After 2007, it became clear you do not always get paid for taking risk, most markets are highly correlated and trends last a skinny minute. See the charts below.
Increased correlations, more concentrated risks and speedy rotations will quash most risk appetites. Another downer: The perception that policymakers have “fixed” many asset prices through diktat and distorted the workings of capital markets.
cautious allocations are easy to understand with so much uncertainty and noise—but still hard to justify in terms of (likely low) future investment returns.
It also makes investing with conviction difficult. We are divided as to which investment strategies are best.
3 Many investors lack conviction in markets where risk taking is often punished and trends last a skinny minute. Rome—and confidence—was not built in a day.
FUN
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How do money managers outperform?
The answer is not necessarily by canoeing harder than others, but finding a fast river. Unfortunately, many fast rivers of the past—mega trends such as the 30-year bond bull market that could carry long-term investors to blissful retirement—have turned to silt.
Most asset classes look reasonably valued compared with their history. The big exceptions are safe-haven government bonds. See the chart at the bottom of the next page. The question is how valid these historical comparisons are in the new, post-crisis world of investing.
The real story: Stocks are not cheap; bonds are expensive.
Click for Interactive Charts
P o L i c y & m a R k E t s [ 1 5 ]
FLASH FLOOdS Investors often say they want to take on more risk, put their cash to work and sell their low-yielding bonds. But global fund flows do not show increased risk appetite as we will see on page 18. Why do investors talk the talk, yet fail to walk the walk?
The main reason: Many fast rivers have turned into flash floods, destroying everything in their path. If you happen to catch one, your ride will not last long. And if you are in the way, you are toast. few people are up for the gamble, so it is rational to wait for clear signals of a market turn.
In addition, risk has been rewarded more clearly in fixed income than in equities over the past five years. More volatile securities such as high yield outperformed within the fixed income asset class. See the chart on the right.
One reason for the disparity is that investors have focused on income-producing assets with clear cash flows. Dividend stocks (a less volatile part of the equities market) have done well, as have higher-yielding (but riskier) bonds.
Past histoRy…may BE histoRyValuations of asset classes vs. historic norm
PER
CEN
TILE
RA
NK
ING
100%
80
20
0
40
60
US
Equ
itie
s
UK
Equ
itie
s
Eur
opea
n E
quit
ies
Asi
an E
quit
ies
LatA
m E
quit
ies
Eas
tern
Eur
opea
n E
quit
ies
US
Tre
asur
ies
Ger
man
Bun
ds
UK
Gilt
s
US
Infl
atio
n E
xpec
tati
ons
UK
Infl
atio
n E
xpec
tati
ons
EXPENSIVE
AVERAGE
CHEAP
Em
ergi
ng M
arke
t D
ebt
($)
US
Hig
h Yi
eld
UK
Cor
pora
te C
redi
t
Sources: BlackRock, Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg, November 2012. Notes: Time periods range from 7 to 30 years. US Treasuries, UK gilts and German bunds represent the real yield. Equity valuations based on average of dividend yield, book values and price earnings ratios. Inflation expectations are 10-year inflation break-even rates or the difference between the yield on Treasuries/gilts and TIPS/linkers.
SLO
PE
Fixed Income Equities
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
20122011201020092008
Riskier Assets Perform Better
Riskier Assets Perform Worse
Sources: BlackRock, Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg, November 2012. Notes: Slope of a linear regression between return and volatility of selected fixed income and equity indices. A positive number indicates more volatile assets seeing higher returns and vice versa.
saFEty FiRst—in EQuitiEsReturn and Volatility for Bonds and Equities, 2008–2012
[ 1 6 ] s L o w t u R n a h E a d ?
At today’s level of intervention, even a slight change of tack would have a material effect on markets.
One phenomenon that plays into this: central bank staffers around the world have been brought up with the inflation devil. At the slightest sign of an uptick in prices or economic momentum, expect staff economists to knock on their governors’ doors and say: “We have been so extreme in easing, we need to pull back.”
This ties in with low levels of inflation around the world. Imagine if the US economy had reacted to monetary stimulus the way it used to. See the chart below.
The odds may say a clear shift in monetary policy is unlikely to happen next year…but we need to be ready. What form would a fed reversal take? It could no longer re-invest coupons on bond holdings.
Even the plan to formally tie monetary policy to desired employment and inflation rates may cause a reversal— or at least volatility. The fed seems to now target specific thresholds, which are much harder to assess than a calendar date. The fed appears increasingly prepared to risk sacrificing its inflation-fighting brief on the altar of improved employment.
The fed’s commitment to ease in a slowly growing economy—while explicitly targeting employment levels and, therefore, spending—is an invitation to inflate asset values (provided fiscal belt tightening does not hurt too much).
CURRENCIES LIGHT THE WAyUS dollar strength could herald a policy change, and also keep a lid on inflation. foreign exchange is the dog that has not barked (too loudly) in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
carry trades do not work so well in the zero-rate world, where investor and trade flows are more powerful drivers.
The prospect of US energy self-sufficiency, for example, could underpin a bullish dollar stance—and a cautious view toward countries dependent on dollar funding such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong kong and, to some extent, china. It could prove disruptive to winning trades of the previous era of dollar weakness. Think gold.
caution: Turn Ahead
inFLation nightmaREus money supply and inflation, 1980–2012
Sources: BlackRock and Haver Analytics, October 2012. Notes: Dotted lines show estimated path of CPI and broad money supply from the start of the crisis if the relationship between M2 and the monetary base had been close to the historic average of eight times rather than the current four.
BIL
LIO
NS
US Consumer Price Index
2012200219921980
US Monetary BaseUS Money Supply
0
2,500
5,000
7,500
10,000
12,500
15,000
17,500
$20,000
50
150
250
350
450
550
650
750
850
CPI I
ND
EX
Projections if Relationship with Monetary Base Were Near Historic Averages
Suppose you believe the US growth story has the potential to become a bestseller. Then the sequel (or companion piece) has to be a page turner that relates how the fed could be the first major central bank to throttle back from ultra-loose monetary policies.
QE3, also known as “QE Infinity” due to its open-ended nature, has put a lot of foam on the runway. Residential mortgage securities, in particular, took off (they have since come down to earth a bit).
The fed has led other central banks in unleashing unprecedented monetary stimuli to jump-start growth. Its actions have stunned even veteran fed watchers in their boldness and speed. “Learning by doing” is the new mantra.
Once the fiscal cloud is lifted and business investment returns, the bank may want to clean up a bit. We would not expect the fed to wallop markets with a sudden tightening. What could happen is the fed’s taking its foot off the monetary accelerator earlier than investors expect—perhaps by the end of 2013. A string of 200,000-plus nonfarm payrolls (monthly new jobs) would help.
4 The era of ultra-loose monetary policy may draw to a close, challenging “safe” fixed income assets and heralding a shift toward equities. Safety = new tail risk.
FUN
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P o L i c y & m a R k E t s [ 1 7 ]
A strong dollar would be a boon for most of the world. Europe’s export machine would become more competitive. Most emerging markets would benefit because of increased exports, but those reliant on dollar funding would suffer. Dollar-denominated commodities would stay flat or weaken a bit, lessening the risk of inflation. china would likely keep its currency pegged to the dollar, helping boost its transformation to a consumption society.
A strong dollar would be a form of global tightening. US current account deficits could shrink as its energy output grows and china stimulates domestic spending at the expense of its export machine. Take away the china trade and oil imports, and the United States runs a trade surplus.
Is this a global central banker’s pipe dream? Probably. But dreams have a way of becoming reality in markets where perceptions or sentiment often matter more than economics. Markets may pre-empt the fed, and trigger a stampede (out of fixed income) for the exits (to equities).
Safe-haven fixed income assets look very, very dangerous. With record-low yields, an uptick in inflation eats up an investor’s meager income. At the same time, duration has risen. This is a bad combination. See the table above.
“LOW FOR LONG” NO MORE?With rates this low, it takes only a miniscule rise in yield to trigger a bond price decline that wipes out a year’s worth of yield. If and when this happens, many investors who are fixed income novices are in for a rude awakening.
Sure, we have seen this movie before. US and other fixed income markets did not look particularly attractive at the start of 2012. Nominal yields were low and duration was high. yet returns were positive in all sectors—and beat other asset classes.
Things do change—and markets anticipate these changes faster than economists (and most investors). This makes for our top contrarian trend of 2013: a pick-up in US inflation concerns as housing starts recover and employment rises.
It is not a high-conviction view—at least not for now— and requires Washington to navigate the fiscal cliff and (much tougher) make progress on budget reform. Market positioning around the “low for long” idea is extreme, however, and markets tend to upset the consensus. Just look at where investors have been putting their money. See the charts on the next page.
yiELd duRation (years)
2006 2012 change 2006 2012 change
total 5.34% 1.7% -3.6% 4.46 5.02 0.6
treasury 4.79% 0.87% -3.9% 4.95 5.52 0.6
government-related 5.13% 1.47% -3.7% 3.98 5.12 1.1
agency 5.11% 1.01% -4.1% 3.55 3.87 0.3
Local authority 5.30% 3.19% -2.1% 7.78 9.72 1.9
sovereign 5.36% 2.72% -2.6% 5.83 8.19 2.4
supranational 5.02% 0.74% -4.3% 4.29 3.48 -0.8
corporate 5.66% 2.66% -3% 6.05 7.25 1.2
industrial 5.81% 2.63% -3.2% 6.64 7.74 1.1
utility 5.79% 2.97% -2.8% 7.12 9.17 2.1
Financials 5.47% 2.61% -2.9% 5.16 5.72 0.6
securitized 5.59% 2.06% -3.5% 3.6 2.93 -0.7
mBs 5.63% 2.08% -3.5% 3.46 2.92 -0.5
aBs 5.32% 0.93% -4.4% 2.77 3.21 0.4
cmBs 5.36% 1.83% -3.5% 4.83 3.17 -1.7
Losing comBination?yields and duration of us Fixed income, 2006–2012
Source: Barclays Capital. Note: Data as of year-end 2006 and end of October 2012.
[ 1 8 ] s L o w t u R n a h E a d ?
dASH FOR TRASHAsset-backed investments struggle in a world where credit and money multipliers decline. Deleveraging does not help markets clear inventories (think real estate). cash flows are king, as is ranking in the capital structure in case things go pear shaped.
By contrast, asset values can climb in places without deleveraging or in instances where monetary easing translates into accelerating economic growth.
A fed reversal could unleash a sea change in investor attitudes toward riskier assets, particularly equities. Quality companies and dividend stocks would likely underperform highly leveraged growth stocks, as the massive influx would result in a temporary “dash for trash.”
The benefits of a modest rise in inflation expectations would more than offset likely higher financing costs for most companies. The change would go hand in hand with increasing credit multipliers (exception: a spike in energy prices due to a Middle East conflict). If this were to happen, companies would start notching up revenue growth again (remember that?). This would assuage concerns that profit margins have peaked.
This is when the yield on “risk-free” US Treasuries, German bunds and other safe-haven assets could shoot up and send bond prices back to earth. What has stopped this from happening so far?
NET
FLO
WS
Other ■
Money Market ■
Balanced ■
Equity ■Bond ■
-200
-100
0
100
200
$300
Q2Q12012
Q4Q3Q2Q12011
Q32010
Q4
Source: Investment Company Institute, October 2012. Note: Flows are new fund sales plus reinvested dividends less redemptions. Data are quarterly.
Bonding with Bondsglobal Flows into actively managed Funds, 2010–2012
NET
FLO
WS
201220112010-4
-2
6
10
$12
4
2
8
0
Mortgage ■Money Market ■
Investment Grade ■
Municipal ■Emerging Market ■
Government/Corporates ■Inflation ■
High Yield ■
Government ■Broad/Aggregate ■
NET
FLO
WS
Developed Market Dividend ■ Emerging Market Dividend ■
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
$3.5
201220112010
EQUITY DIVIDEND FIXED INCOME
Source: BlackRock. Notes: Monthly net new assets. Dividend funds are 140 equity ETPs listed globally with dividend or income exposures. Data for left chart are from June 30, 2010 to Oct. 31, 2012. Data for right chart are from May 1, 2010 to Sept. 1, 2012.
incoming incomEglobal investor Flows into Exchange traded Products, 2010–2012
Huge budget deficits cause pressure to keep rates low—otherwise interest payments would spin out of control.
A bond sell-off, though logical at these yield levels, is unlikely for now given demand for yield. More likely is a period of disappointing returns and bolder managers taking more concentrated risk—with consequential risks.
P o L i c y & m a R k E t s [ 1 9 ]
The Other European Story
GAME CHANGERDelighting those who pushed for more aggressive EcB policy, Draghi has finally unveiled his “big bazooka,” the pledge to buy sovereign bonds of up to three years duration.
The OMT program is a game changer. It has limited the risk of a disorderly eurozone breakup, and has already pressured downward short-term yields in countries such as Spain and Italy.
Draghi’s backstop comes with strings attached: adherence to a plan to put government finances in order. The feared loss of sovereignty has held back Spain and others from requesting help and has kept markets on tenterhooks. The so-called conditionality is not a halfway house.
Even so, we like Italian debt in the long run and Spanish bonds in the short term. consider:
} Spain’s bank stress test was credible, in our view. In other countries, including the United States, a realistic assessment of the financial sector’s capital needs has often proved a critical turning point for investor confidence—and asset prices.
} Spain has implemented much of the structural reform to get its economy growing again. It has also shown it is willing to engage with the IMf and others. Separatism may be a real challenge to keeping to conditions set by foreign pay masters in the long run. This is partly why we focus on short-term opportunities in Spanish bonds.
The EcB is unlikely to deliver much inflation—it is just not in its DNA. Draghi has already pushed the envelope with easing measures that have gained the approval of Europe’s political leaders and (most) EcB governors.
We expect Draghi to make good on his promise to do “whatever it takes” to save the euro. This could include bringing down the discount rate to zero and pushing the bank rate into negative territory. call it easing through (attempted) depreciation.
Bringing down the euro is not easy. Dollar swap lines have largely eliminated external funding risk. Plus, the eurozone is likely to run a current account surplus in 2013. This implies little or no export of capital unless its citizens lose confidence in the euro. Even a “Grexit”—Greece leaving the monetary union—may not help. We would expect hoarding of euros in Greece and nations at risk of contagion.
The end game is a mix between debt write-offs, inflation and (phased-in) austerity. The Troika has shifted to extending deadlines for austerity. This spreads out the pain and limits the risk of a deeper recession. It is needed in a weak economy. See the map below.
0.2%
1.3%1%
-2.1%
-3.8%
-1.6%
0.8%
-0.7%
2 to 3%■
1 to 2%■
0 to 1%■
0 to -1%■
-1 to -2%■
-2 to -3%■
-3% and below■
More than 3%■
8.1%China
US
Japan
Eurozone
1.9%
0.8%
0%
gLoomy FoREcasts 2013 consensus gdP growth Expectations
Source: Thomson Reuters, Consensus Economics, November 2012. Notes: Average economist forecasts for real GDP growth in 2013.
Click for Interactive Map
[ 2 0 ] s L o w t u R n a h E a d ?
BA
SIS
POIN
TS
20122011
300
400
500
600
700
75
80
85
90
95
100
IND
EX
Eurozone Stocks
Peripheral Bonds
Sources: Thomson Reuters and MSCI, November 2012. Notes: Top chart shows the average spread of Irish, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish bonds over German bunds. Bottom chart shows performance of MSCI EMU index relative to MSCI.
nix thE VixEuropean Peripheral Bond spreads and Equities, 2011–2012
} We could end up with—and find peace with—a perpetual tango dance: Spain or another country draws toward accepting OMT help when borrowing costs spiral upward, only to pull back when yields recede.
} Italy has not gone as far as Spain in structural reforms and faces an uncertain election. Its great private wealth, however, makes this a compelling long-term bet. And its primary budget surplus already is at a level that will stabilize its debt—whereas Spain and the United States have a long way to go. See the chart above.
NEW FEAR INdEXEurope’s peripheral bond spreads have become the new “fear index,” or key indicators for risk appetite. See the chart on the right. further bond spread declines in 2013 would likely reduce risk premiums and fuel equity markets.
A Grexit is still a possibility—although it probably would require a Greek decision to call it quits. Investors, companies and policymakers have had time to get reasonably used to the idea. The actuality, however, would likely spark short-term worries about a domino effect.
further debt write-downs are all but certain in Greece and other countries drowning in debt. cyprus has been a hot spot, and banks in Ireland are still loaded down with debt. This is likely a long process of cuts, one salami slice at a time.
PRIM
AR
Y B
ALA
NCE
TO
GD
P
Spain United States
SurplusNeeded to Stabilize
Debt
GermanyItaly
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6%
20202018201620142012201020082006
Source: IMF Fiscal Monitor, October 2012. Notes: These are cyclically adjusted primary balances or overall balances adjusted for cyclical effects and excluding net interest payments. The surplus needed is the IMF estimate of the primary balance needed in 2020 to return debt-to-GDP to 2011 levels by 2030.
Enough aLREady!Primary Balances for selected countries, 2006–2020
Europe’s economic prospects are challenged, so rates are likely to stay near zero. Greece and Spain have started to cut government spending and free up labor markets. Their economies are contracting, however. They essentially are improving margins on lower volumes.
OMT is not an economic growth remedy: No insurance policy ever is. capital outflows from peripheral countries and deleveraging are severe restrictions on growth. Do not be deceived by big jumps in net exports. These often result from a collapse in domestic demand and imports. And they do not yield higher government revenues. There has to be a revival of domestic demand, spurred by exporters and export-oriented investments, to make real progress.
The eurozone’s leadership to bring this about does not appear to exist. Leadership of 17 independent European nations does. The continent’s leaders excel at procrastination, late-night summits and sweeping statements. Hastily put-together communiques have often lacked follow-through.
The harsh reality: Most policymakers will only act when markets force their hands. Their threshold for market pain, however, is much higher than the average investor’s. The pattern of the European debt crisis has been euphoria—followed by crisis.
Policymakers have been effective at avoiding Armageddon, but less adept at promoting an economic recovery. This has led to cheap valuations of European companies. This makes them attractive, especially ones that derive much of their revenues from overseas. Another booster for European risk assets: The continent’s woes are well known, so a little progress goes a long way in changing investor sentiment.
P o L i c y & m a R k E t s [ 2 1 ]
Will the dragon fly or crash-land? This has been a big question for many investors. Our answer: china’s economy will fly—albeit at lower altitudes.
The downdraft in the country’s economic growth rate looks to have reached an inflection point. Recent data are pointing to an uptick in exports, credit growth, and rising industrial output and profits. See the chart below.
This is encouraging for china, Asia…and the world. china Inc.’s margin squeeze and inventory build-up was acute in early 2012. This now seems to be abating. The economic cycle appears to be turning across Asia-ex Japan. consider:
} Monetary conditions are loosening across the region, according to BNP’s financial and Monetary conditions Index. If this persists, we would expect an uptick in industrial production. Improving economic growth has historically driven strong equity returns in Asia.
} corporate earnings revisions are edging up. See the chart above on the right. We could see them turn positive in the first quarter for the first time in two years. combined with low valuations and low expectations, this could bode well for Asian equities.
china faces big long-term challenges, as discussed in Braking China … Without Breaking the World in April 2012. These include shifting to a consumption society from an investment-driven command economy; fixing an inefficient financial system; managing stubbornly high real estate prices; staying competitive amid rapid growth in workers’ age, pay and expectations; cleaning up the environment; and addressing corruption to avoid social unrest.
Two long-term trends bolster the case for metals and agricultural commodities:
} The growth rate of chinese commodities demand may slow, but absolute consumption is set to double this decade, as detailed in Mind Your Mine! in November 2012. This is enough to keep supply/demand dynamics tight, and bodes well for producers of metals with looming long-term supply gaps, such as copper.
} china cannot feed itself. This structural trend keeps world demand for foodstuff trade high, underpinning global farmland prices, agricultural crops and equipment makers. One caution: changing weather patterns make this a volatile growth trade. Think rocketing grain prices after the US Midwest drought in 2012.
The impact of china’s recent leadership change is discussed in The Next Generation: What to Expect From China’s New Leadership by BlackRock’s Asia team in November 2012.
change will come slowly but surely. The new leadership is in place for a decade—and does not need to worry about re-election.
Bull in the china Shop
YOY
CHA
NG
E IN
CU
MU
LATI
VE P
RO
FITS
-60
-30
0
30
60
90
120%
201220112010
45
47.5
50
52.5
55
57.5
60
PMI L
EVEL
Manufacturing Activity (PMI)
Profit Growth
Sources: China National Bureau of Statistics and HSBC. Notes: Profit growth reflects the year-on-year change in the cumulative year-to-date profit level. A PMI level above 50 indicates expansion of activity.
yao ming REBound?china’s industrial Profit growth and Pmi, 2010–2012
EAR
NIN
GS
REV
ISIO
NS
Earnings Momentum Total Return (Right Axis)
YOY
RET
UR
N
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80%
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20%
20122010200820062004200220001997
Source: Thomson Reuters, November 2012. Notes: Earnings momentum is total analyst upgrades minus downgrades as a percentage of the total number of estimates. All data for Asia ex-Japan.
asia’s miRacLE gEts REaL (again)asian Equities and Earnings Revisions, 1997–2012
[ 2 2 ] s L o w t u R n a h E a d ?
contrarian Dreaming
Source: Bank of America Merrill Lynch Global Fund Manager Survey, November 2012.
POSITIONING RELATIVE TO HISTORY (Z-SCORE)
Real EstateUS Equities
EM EquitiesPharma
TechnologyGlobal Equities
BondsBanks
Eurozone EquitiesCommodities
Resource EquitiesJapan Equities
BEARISHSENTIMENT
BULLISHSENTIMENT
-1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
unLoVEd, undERownEd…with uPsidEglobal investor Positioning, november 2012
This investment idea has three main assumptions:
} The US dollar rises against the yen and other currencies because of progress on budget deficit reduction and growth powered by housing and/or consumption.
} A quick exit. Japanese stocks have not paid off in the long run. The Nikkei index is down 75% since peaking in 1989—but has seen stunning rallies in between.
} The territorial dispute with china over several uninhabited islands does not blow up.
Other pain trades include:
Buy indian Equities } The latest reforms to open up the country to investment
may be the real thing—at a time when many investors are skeptical. Our other reasons include: India’s entrepreneurship and need for infrastructure investments. A weaker or stable oil price is essential to this idea, given India’s dependence on imported energy.
} A recent government initiative to transfer subsidies and other entitlements directly into people’s bank accounts is a positive for growth. It could result in efficiency gains as the program to provide each Indian with a unique ID number expands.
Buy us stocks with overseas cash Piles These companies could repatriate cash if a larger budget deal includes a corporate tax amnesty or holiday.
Buy European Peripheral assets Talk about investor sentiment. can you say “bearish?”
sell global tobacco stocks This crowded defensive sector could get hit if Australia’s branding ban gains traction elsewhere.
We like contrarian thinking—if only to guard against “pain trades”—trades that go against the grain and could catch most investors off guard.
We already detailed the mother of all pain trades—a fed reversal and subsequent bond exodus—on pages 16–18.
Our No. 1 contrarian pick for early 2013?
Buy Japanese Equities This was by far the most popular contrarian investment idea at our 2013 Outlook forum (which makes you wonder just how contrarian it is).
Investor positioning is heavily weighted against Japan, with many fund managers underweighting the country. See the chart below. This sets the stage for a nice “pop.”
The idea would be to buy exporters and simultaneously sell yen to hedge the currency risk. Our reasoning:
} Japanese equity valuations are very, very cheap, both against their own history and relative to other markets.
} Japan could start monetary easing in earnest under new political and central bank leadership.
} This could be the year Japanese government bonds finally crumble.
} The growth slowdown in china, Japan’s main trading partner, has bottomed.
P o L i c y & m a R k E t s [ 2 3 ]
SPREAdING SECTARIAN CONFLICTconflicts in the Middle East have been the focus of global foreign policy for much of the new millennium. They have the potential to cause an oil price spike, or “energy shock.” Iran’s nuclear program still ranks as a top risk, but the re-election of President Barack Obama appears to have turned the odds in favor of a diplomatic solution.
A potentially more explosive risk is a spreading of Syria’s Sunni-Shi’ite conflict to Iraq and elsewhere. Population growth has far outpaced economic growth in the Middle East and North Africa, making this region a powder keg for years to come. This is no demographic dividend; it is a demographic detriment—unless countries manage to spur real economic growth.
FROM FISHING BOATS TO WAR SHIPS Another risk is china’s territorial dispute with Japan and other nations over uninhabited but resource-rich islands in the East and South china Seas. This is part of the story of china’s ascendency and securing of resources. The risk is the fishing boat skirmishes could turn into something far more serious.
china has allowed nationalist demonstrations that play to anti-Japanese sentiment. Now that the genie is out of the bottle, it may be difficult to put it back. Similarly, Japanese nationalist politicians may misplay their hand. US influence in the region has waned, but it appears Obama may make another push.
known Unknowns
Sources: www.policyuncertainty.com, Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg, November 2012. Notes: Left chart: The Policy Uncertainty Index uses newspaper coverage of policy-related economic uncertainty, the number of federal tax code provisions set to expire and disagreement among economic forecasters. Right chart: Volatility indices are Merrill Lynch’s MOVE index (US Treasuries), Deutsche Bank’s currency volatility index and the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s VIX index.
250
100
150
200
0
50UN
CER
TAIN
TY IN
DEX
LEV
EL
EuropeUnited States
60%
0
VOLA
TILI
TY IN
DEX
20
40
Currencies Bonds (Right Axis)Equities
600
0
200
400
SEPT. 11 ATTACKS
LEHMAN COLLAPSE
SECOND GULF WAR
US DEBT CEILING DISPUTE
EUROZONEDEBT CRISIS
BA
SIS
POIN
TS
201220092006200320001997 201220092006200320001997
it’s too QuiEt Policy uncertainty and market Volatility, 1997–2012
Short-term market volatility has been eerily low compared with political uncertainty that is at levels hit during the depths of the financial crisis in 2008. See the charts below.
The low volatility has caused many a furrowed brow among seasoned investors. The answer may be easy monetary policy and liquidity. If financial markets are underwritten (albeit precariously) by central banks and governments, there is no need for asset prices to reflect any worries. Ample liquidity, limp money multipliers and low asset price volatility appear linked.
Short-dated implied volatility in equities has been depressed in part by increased call writing—a symptom of the hunt for yield. Longer-term volatility, which is less influenced by liquidity and call writing, has remained elevated. Investors have priced the potential for extreme downside risks higher than the potential for extreme upside—which seems sensible. Similar dynamics exist in other asset markets.
The bottom line: focus on longer-term volatility and term structure. Short-term volatility trades get burnt up quickly by time value erosion, but can be cheap insurance against major market moves. Indeed, what could jolt these seemingly placid markets?
[ 2 4 ] s L o w t u R n a h E a d ?
fixed Income: Invest for Income
Most investors are desperate for income to match their liabilities. This is a tall order in a world of record-low yields and much longer lives. Result: a global hunt for yield … any yield.
This is fine—as long as you believe rates will indeed be low for a long time. This has made income investing a winner, or fast river, since the financial crisis.
It is not fine if you believe loose monetary policies will translate into growth and inflation at some point. Once markets get a whiff of this, the movement out of some of these assets will be profound.
To prepare, it is important to identify areas of value in income investing—and pockets of overvaluation or risk. One trend emerges: Some investors are sacrificing safety and liquidity just to gain a couple of basis points of yield.
In the cash business, for example, spreads between liquid instruments such a safe-haven government bonds and three-month commercial paper have been at record lows. It could make more sense to invest in liquid government securities with negative yields and allocate smaller amounts to longer-duration debt to make up for the yield loss.
The narrowing spread between quality and less desirable assets is playing out in every corner of the income world.
Investors are climbing up the risk ladder—slowly. Mandates, accounting and regulatory rules limit investment choices of institutional investors and arguably focus them on short-term results. There are signs of rethinking this, but material changes will not come overnight.
There is also a general risk aversion after the financial crisis caused steep losses in risk assets. The European debt crisis debunked the myth all eurozone sovereign bonds are created equal. Many peripheral bonds showed unprecedented price declines and volatility, with even short-term bonds diverging widely from benchmark German bunds.
OTHER KNOWN UNKNOWNSA major terrorist attack is a third risk. The US drone program has decimated Al Qaeda’s leadership, but splintered extremist groups have mushroomed in North Africa and have attracted supporters in Western countries.
Other risks include a North korean provocation against South korea or Japan. It may act up to (temporarily) regain the global spotlight and to test china’s new leadership.
POPULIST dANGERS The Italian and German elections are worth watching. A populist outcome in the former could re-ignite worries about Italy’s staying power in the eurozone. Expect no major moves toward a common banking regulator or tighter fiscal union before the outcome of the latter. See the political calendar below.
How about major policy mistakes that would throw the world back into recession? These worried us greatly a year ago. These risks appear to have receded now, or at least this is what most investors think. So perhaps there is a risk—the risk of complacency.
We discussed the disconnect between market expectations for a smooth resolution of the US fiscal cliff and pessimistic views of Washington insiders in US Election Cliffhangers in October 2012. Additionally, the European debt crisis has a way of coming back—especially if Washington comes up with a budget deal. Markets can only focus on one thing at a time.
5 Income investing works in a zero-rate world—but the hunt for yield has narrowed valuations between top-quality and not-so-great income assets. Take out the garbage.
FUN
dA
ME
NTA
L
JANFEB
MA
RA
PR
MAY
JUNJUL
AUG
SE
PO
CT
NOVDEC
2013Germany ElectionsSept. 1 and Oct. 27
Israel Elections
Jan. 22
US Debt Ceiling
Italy ElectionsApril
Iran Elections
June 14
PREPaRE FoR PoPuLism2013 Political calendar
i n c o m E i n V E s t i n g [ 2 5 ]
cushion youR Bond FaLLyields, duration and safety cushions, november 2012
Fixed income instrument
yield
(Basis Points)
duration (years)
safety cushion (Basis Points)
US Utilities (High yield) 748 4.2 178
US Industrials (High yield) 649 3.7 174
US High yield 649 3.9 169
US financials (High yield) 578 4.4 131
India 419 4.6 91
Brazil corporates 513 6.2 83
EM Americas corporates 482 6.4 75
china Aggregate 402 5.4 75
US MBS 216 3.1 71
Australia 323 4.6 70
US Securitized Assets 213 3.1 69
Malaysia 335 5.3 63
kazakhstan 349 5.7 62
Mexico corporates 438 7.2 61
US cMBS 195 3.3 59
Euro Transport Aggregate 250 4.7 53
South korea 199 3.9 52
Euro Utilities Aggregate 235 4.8 50
Euro consumer cyclical Aggregate 200 4.1 49
US cMBS AAA 153 3.2 48
US credit finance 260 5.6 47
Euro communications Aggregate 214 4.8 45
Euro capital Goods 177 4.0 44
Indonesia 345 7.9 43
Uk credit 338 7.8 43
Euro Technology Aggregate 168 3.9 43
Euro credit 196 4.6 43
US credit corp 269 7.0 38
Euro credit Basic Industry 161 4.2 38
Euro credit Energy 165 4.5 37
US credit Industrial 268 7.5 36
US credit Utility 302 8.8 34
US EM Philippines 294 9.0 33
Euro credit consumer Non-cyc 141 4.3 33
US ABS 87 3.2 28
Singapore 91 6.2 15
Hong kong 48 4.2 11
US 10-year Treasury 161 9.1 18
German 10-year Bund 138 9.0 15
Sources: Bloomberg and Barclays. Notes: Duration is adjusted for different frequency and callability. The safety cushion represents how large a yield rise (in basis points) would trigger a price decline that would wipe out one year’s worth of yield. Data as of November 30, 2012.
LOBSTER POTSMany investors are paralyzed—except when they see an opportunity to grab yielding assets that look relatively safe. Then they plunge in—with little regard for risks of default, price downside and liquidity.
Liquidity risk is under-appreciated and worrying. Many investors do not appear to grasp one simple truth: It is a lot easier to buy something than sell it, particularly when everybody else wants to sell, too.
This danger is prevalent in fixed income markets. We have likened the situation to a lobster pot: Easy to fall into, but tough to climb out of. Sure, bonds that are easier to trade often command a liquidity premium. The discount of illiquid bonds, however, often does not make up for the risk of being unable to sell them when needed (unless at a steep discount).
A multi-asset, multi-geography approach to income investing is justified. If some assets are going to win big and others lose a bit, a balanced approach is the way to go.
SAFETy CUSHIONS Most higher-yielding bonds have racked up impressive annual price gains in recent years. This is unlikely to last.
Investors in many higher-yielding fixed income markets should invest for income only—and not count on capital appreciation. This is especially true for high yield and municipal bond investors. These markets are for long-term investors, who can hold the bonds to maturity and care little about potential price volatility in between.
This is not to say fixed income markets are about to implode: The structural bid for yield underpins demand for spread products such as corporate bonds, emerging market debt and asset-backed securities.
The (relatively) high yield of these assets offers a safety cushion against interest rate spikes. It took a yield rise of just 15 basis points in the 10-year German bund to trigger a price decline that would wipe out a year’s worth of yield in late November. By contrast, it took a 178-basis-point yield spike to cause the same losses on high yield bonds of US utility companies. See the table on the right.
Governments are wallowing in debt, force-feeding banks, insurers and pension funds ever more bonds, irrespective of potential return. central banks will likely plot an exit from their ultra-loose policies in due course and take back liquidity. What prices will today’s low-yielding bills and bonds fetch when this evil day comes?
[ 2 6 ] s L o w t u R n a h E a d ?
High yield: Reluctant Risks
Sources: Credit Suisse and BlackRock, November 2012. Notes: Based on the Credit Suisse High Yield Index. The shaded areas represent the proportion of spread attributable to each factor based on BlackRock calculations. BlackRock implied default rate based on calculation to strip out risk factors not specific to high yield.
Zero rates force investors into places that are not their natural habitats. This can easily result in a mismatch between investors’ needs and their investments.
This not only sets up investors for disappointment. Inexperienced investors are also likely to bail at the first sign of trouble. This magnifies risk-on/risk-off market gyrations.
The stampede into high yield has created risks—and opportunities for smart investors. The companies issuing the bonds have not changed—they are just more in demand. Many investors who forced themselves into this market will make some money—but risk losing more than they banked on.
Exhibit 1: Investors look to sacrifice safety over yield. Spreads on bonds of ccc-rated companies are closing in on those of B-rated bonds as investors bid up these bonds in a grab for yield. Their spreads are now 70% wider in the lowest quintile since the 1980s. That said, ccc-rated bonds are arguably better value than they have been historically because of less leverage and increased market participation by large, public companies.
Exhibit 2: High yield groupies tend to make a big deal of the asset class’s juicy spreads. These indicate significant default risk—whereas companies are in great shape, they argue. We propose a bottom-up analysis of the high yield spread, whereby the excess risk premium stems from exogenous shocks such as the European debt crisis. See the charts below. viewed this way, our implied default rate was just 1.24%—again in the bottom quintile since the 1980s and half the market implied default rate. This may make sense for interest coverage (which is great by historic standards), but not for EBITDA-to-debt and other gauges.
High yield bonds offer superior yield in the zero-rate world—with relatively more safety these days:
} Demand for yield is coupled with limited supply. A large chunk of new issuance is refinancings. The refinancings allowed the market to scale a steep maturity wall this year, as many of the bonds and bank loans issued in 2005–2007 were coming due.
} High yield spreads over US Treasuries are around the 25-year average of close to 600 basis points, according to credit Suisse. Bank loans trade at around 540 basis points over LIBOR, above the 15-year average of around 440 basis points, according to Standard & Poor’s.
} current default rates are low for high yield bonds. We expect them to remain low—even if a recession hits. The financial crisis wiped out highly levered companies. Remember, though, high yield is shorthand for financing of weaker—or riskier—business models.
} The crisis also cleared out many risk takers on underwriting desks. This was helped by the entrance of more risk-averse investors into the market. Result: issuance of non-rated bonds and cccs has been 18% of the total this year—below peaks in the mid-1980s, late 1990s and mid-2000s.
That said, not everything is hunky-dory in high yield land.
800
600
0
2011 2012
SPR
EAD
IN B
ASI
S PO
INTS
200
400
4.5%
0.5
2011 2012
IMPL
IED
DEF
AULT
RAT
E
1.5
3.5
2.5
Implied European Risk Premium ■Implied Risk Premium ■
Implied Fiscal Cliff Premium ■BlackRock Implied Default Rate
Market Implied Default Rate
insidE thE sPREadhigh yield spreads and implied default Rates, 2011–2012
i n c o m E i n V E s t i n g [ 2 7 ]
The US municipal bond market tells a similar story. Munis are attractive due to:
} Their relatively high yields on an after-tax basis. A muni bond with a 3% coupon equals a taxable yield of 4.6% for US investors in the 2012 top income tax bracket.
} If taxes for the wealthy rise in 2013, muni bonds become even more attractive. We do not expect an imminent change in the market’s tax-exempt status, as discussed in US Election Cliffhangers in October 2012.
} This is another story of lots of demand and little supply. We expect the $3.7 trillion market to shrink by $25 billion a year through 2015 due to a wave of refinancings and a dearth of big infrastructure projects. Defaults are few (but trigger scary headlines).
} Prospects for tax collection in many US states are improving, boosted by job growth (albeit lackluster) and a better housing market.
So far, so good. One warning sign is the avid interest of dealers in this market. Munis have delivered attractive spreads, investor inflows have been strong, returns have been excellent and demand is far outstripping supply.
Increased dealer participation coincides with decreasing trading volumes. See the chart below on the left. Dealers keep markets functioning and provide price transparency.
So what is the catch? Let us just say dealers tend to unwind at inopportune times. Liquidity—already a challenge in a market that is half the size of the US corporate bond market, but has 40 times as many individual issues—can disappear quicker than investors may realize.
In addition, the flood of new investor money has conveniently glossed over a series of municipal bankruptcies and increased use of leverage to eke out returns. In effect, technical factors are covering up many sins of state and local budget chiefs.
This has led to unusual valuations, creating opportunities for smart investors. consider how cheap it is to go up in credit quality. It cost as little as 20 basis points to buy a 10-year Aa1-rated Washington general obligation (GO) over a A1-rated california GO in November, compared with 95 basis points a year earlier. See the chart above.
This makes it easier to separate the muni wheat from the chaff—even though the difference may not be apparent yet to many investors.
Munis: Dealers come to Town
$25
15
20
10
5
0
25%
15
20
10
5
02006 201220112010200920082007
Average Daily Volume
TRA
DIN
G V
OLU
ME
(BIL
LIO
NS)
Dealer Share (Right Axis) ■
DEA
LER
SH
AR
E
Source: Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, October 2012.
BEat thE dEaLERmuni Volumes and dealer shares, 2006–2012
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
20122011
BA
SIS
POIN
TS
2010
Source: Bloomberg, November 2012 Notes: California 5% 2022 and Washington 5% 2022 General Obligations.
mind thE (QuaLity) gaPspread Between washington and california munis, 2010–2012
[ 2 8 ] s L o w t u R n a h E a d ?
Investors have flocked to emerging market debt—mostly for good reasons. consider:
} Emerging markets generally have higher economic growth, better demographic profiles and lower private and government debt loads than the developed world, as detailed in Are Emerging Markets the Next Developed Markets? in August 2011.
} Emerging debt markets have grown up: They are much bigger and deeper than before the financial crisis. Asia, in particular, sticks out, as discussed in A Rapidly Changing Order: The Rising Prominence of Asian Debt Markets in October 2011.
} Emerging market issuers are less leveraged than their developed world counterparts. for example, 12 emerging markets ranked among the top 25 sovereigns in our BlackRock Sovereign Risk Index as of Sept. 30, 2012. countries such as Malaysia and Peru ranked higher than the Uk and france.
} New sources of (stable) domestic demand are springing up, adding to existing players such as sovereign wealth funds. Assets of emerging market pension funds jumped 83% between 2005 and 2011, while domestic insurance companies more than doubled their assets. See the chart below.
Some signs of frothy conditions are emerging. Investors lined up for Zambia’s maiden dollar bond in September, for example, and pushed down yields to below Spain’s. Small debut issues generally carry a big liquidity risk. These deals are pretty hard to get into, but can be much harder to exit. Other emerging market risks such as inflation, weak corporate governance, nationalism, local credit bubbles and china dependency are well documented.
Investor flows into emerging market debt have shown no signs of weakening. See the chart on page 18. This is the structural bid for yield that is playing out elsewhere in income investing and also speaks to the markets’ maturity.
High foreign ownership, however, generally brings volatility (hot money can cool quickly when it smells trouble) and exposes a country’s debt to the sentiments (or should we say, the whims) of global markets. It also increases credit risk: A government would much prefer to default on foreign debt rather than on debt held by its own constituents.
Emerging Debt: Price of fashion
$2,000
0
500
1,500
1,000
BIL
LIO
NS
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 20111991 1993 1995 1997
Emerging Asia ■EMEA ■Latin America ■
PENSION FUND ASSETS
2005
2011
INSURANCE ASSETS
$1,276billion
$2,741billion
Source: J.P. Morgan, October 2012.
EmERging aPPEtitE Emerging market Pension Fund and insurance assets
i n c o m E i n V E s t i n g [ 2 9 ]
50%
40
45
35
30
2007 2008 2009 2011 20122010
Spain Italy
FOR
EIG
N O
WN
ERSH
IP L
EVEL
Peru
Hungary
Mexico
Malaysia
Poland
Indonesia
Turkey
South Africa
Brazil
Thailand
0% 10 20 30 40 50 60
2007 2012
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP LEVEL
Sources: Bank of Italy, Spain Treasury Department and J.P. Morgan. Left chart: Spain 2012 data through Aug. 31 and Italy data through July 31. Right chart: 2012 data through June 30.
FoREign dEViLsForeign ownership of selected sovereign debt, 2007–2012
20%
0
-10
15
10
5
-5
-15
-20
SIX-
MO
NTH
RET
UR
N
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Currency ■Income and Capital ■
it’s thE cuRREncy, stuPidcomposition of Emerging market debt Returns, 2003–2012
Source: J.P. Morgan, October 2012. Notes: Based on the J.P. Morgan GBI-EM. Bars show six-month returns broken out by those derived from income and capital appreciation and those from currency.
Whereas many emerging markets have seen big jumps in foreign ownership, Italy and Spain have become much more reliant on domestic investors. See the charts above. This is a positive for the latter. Given yield levels, Italian and Spanish debt may now compete with emerging markets for investor monies!
Another thing to watch is the effect of foreign exchange fluctuations on local-currency bonds in emerging markets. It is typically the largest contributor to total return. See the chart on the right. know your money.
Local currency debt has two engines, one running on income and duration, the other on currency movements. The two engines often work to counterbalance, though the currency impact tends to be more volatile and cyclical. The income engine is better at adding returns for a lower contribution to risk. See the table below.
Bottom line: Local currency debt is as much an income investment as a proxy for emerging market growth (and growth cycles). Active currency management is key, and is separate from analyzing credit and interest rate risks.
Em EnginEs that couLdincome and Fx contributions to Returns and Risk, 2004–2012
Return Contribution
Risk Contribution
INCOME FX
40% 60%
25% 75%
Sources: BlackRock and J.P. Morgan, September 2012. Note: Based on performance of J.P. Morgan GBI-EM from May 2004 through September 2012.
[ 3 0 ] s L o w t u R n a h E a d ?
Investor yield appetite has put the spotlight on dividend stocks—for all the right reasons. We discussed many in Means, Ends and Dividends in March 2012, and they still hold true:
} Dividend-paying stocks tend to outperform in both bull and bear markets, according to Ned Davis research of S&P 500 stocks in the past four decades.
} Dividend growth is a great indicator of future equity returns, research by Société Générale shows. It was the single-largest contributor to nominal returns in the past 40 years across developed markets.
} companies have raised payouts in response to investor demand. An emphasis on restricted stock rather than options for executive compensation helps. Top corporate honchos are starting to appreciate the income stream in their own portfolios.
} Potential US tax increases are a worry, but US companies have tended to make investors whole by hiking dividends, according to Goldman Sachs research. Notice the recent rush of special dividends to take advantage of still-low rates.
} Income is a global theme. fast dividend growth of emerging market companies makes them an important chapter in the income story.
} Dividend payout ratios are near record lows for US and at the low end for emerging market stocks. See the chart below.
What could end the dividend renaissance prematurely? There is no obvious catalyst—except for a sudden (but unlikely) acceleration in global economic growth. This would likely lead high-quality dividend stocks to underperform in a massive risk rally.
It is, however, useful to look behind the scenes.
Exhibit 1: When selecting dividend stocks, the first rule is to pretty much ignore the yield. free cash flow, dividend growth, the payout ratio, a clean balance sheet, and earnings and revenue growth are much better indicators for success.
The key questions on yield have to be: Is the dividend safe, and is it likely to grow? This is especially true when the company offers an outsized payout.
One way to assess this is to review a company’s cash flow after capital expenditures (capex). By this measure, the dividends of both US and European resource and utility companies look stretched. In fact, US utilities are currently paying out more than covered by post-capex free cash flow. See the charts at the top of the next page.
Dividends: yield to Growth
80%
70
50
60
40
30
20
1970 1982 1992 2002 2012
Europe ex-UKUnited States Emerging Markets
PAYO
UT
RAT
IO
whEn LowER is BEttERPayout Ratios in selected Regions, 1970–2012
Source: Société Générale, October 2012. Notes: Payout ratio is the percentage of earnings paid to shareholders in the form of dividends.
i n c o m E i n V E s t i n g [ 3 1 ]
Exhibit 2: Dividend stocks, by and large, do not look pricey. Most are still trading a discount to broader market indices—albeit at shrinking premiums. Exceptions exist, including US utility stocks now trading at a premium to the S&P 500, from a sizable discount before the financial crisis.
It is nice when the market rerates an investment you hold (as long as it is upwards). But we would rather see
Source: Thomson Reuters, November 2012. Notes: EPS: 12-month forward earnings per share relative to MSCI World, rebased to 100. PE: 12-month forward price earnings ratio relative to MSCI World, expressed as a percentage.
200%
125
175
75
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
CHA
NG
E VS
. MSC
I
2012
100
150
PE
150%
50
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
CHA
NG
E VS
. MSC
I
2012
75
125
100
EPS ■
taLE oF two stockscomposition of Returns of two sample dividend stocks, 2006–2012
a higher company valuation supported by underlying strength in earnings.
consider two stocks that have made significant price gains since 2006. for the stock in the chart below on the left, the appreciation has been powered by earnings growth. for the stock on the right, the gains have resulted from an upward rerating (and, no, this is not a US utility). Which one would you rather own?
Sources: Société Générale, Thomson Reuters and MSCI, October, 2012.
7
0% 1 2 3 4 5
POST
-CA
PEX
FCF
COVE
R
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
DIVIDEND YIELD
2
0% 1 2 5 6 7
POST
- CA
PEX
FCF
COVE
R
1.5
1
0.5
0
43
DIVIDEND YIELD
Resources
Basic Industries
Healthcare
IndustrialsTelecoms
Utilities
Financials
Basic Industries
Financials
Utilities
Resources
Healthcare
Cyclical ServicesIndustrials
CyclicalConsumer
Goods Telecoms
CyclicalConsumer Goods
InformationTechnology
InformationTechnology
CyclicalServices
UNITED STATES EUROPE
diVing FoR diVidEnd coVERus and European dividend coverage and yields, october 2012
Not FDIC Insured • May Lose Value • No Bank Guarantee
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Lit. No. BII-OUTLOOK-1212 AC6430-1212
The search for yield has lit a fire under real estate investment trusts (REITs). We like to poke around in this small corner of the income universe.
} Global yields currently average about 3.7%—not bad in a zero-rate world. More importantly, we expect global dividends to grow 6%-8% annually in the next two years. UBS expects the strongest growth in Australia, Singapore and the United States.
} REITs in many countries trade at a discount to their net asset values, while earnings growth in the next two years is expected to be strong, led by US REITs, according to research firms SNL and UBS.
How do you separate the good from the not-so-good (or bad)? We put a lot of stock in analyzing leverage and payout ratios. The lower, the better. These high-quality REITs tend to generate stronger earnings growth (and returns) than others, according to Green Street Advisors.
The good news? High-quality REITs often trade at only a slight premium to their less desirable peers. See the chart on the right.
Reading REITs
20%
0
-20
-40
-60
2003 20092006 2012
Low QualityHigh QualityN
AV P
REM
IUM
10%
0
-10EAR
NIN
GS
GR
OW
TH
Source: Green Street Advisors, November 2012. Notes: High-quality US REITs have both lower-than-average leverage and lower-than-average payout ratios than low-quality ones. Payout ratios are determined by using 12-month forward adjusted funds from operations (AFFO) estimates and annualized dividends. Both groups are roughly the same size. Growth rates measured by 12-month forward AFFO estimates.
Lasting QuaLityus REits Earnings growth and naV Premiums, 2003–2012
