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SizeMattersinElectionAdministration
DavidC.Kimball
UniversityofMissouri‐[email protected]
BradyBaybeck
Draft Version 1.1
5/10/2012
PreparedfortheHAVAat10conference,MoritzCollegeofLaw,OhioStateUniversity
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MuchhaschangedintheadministrationofelectionsintheUnitedStatessincethepassageoftheHelpAmericanVoteAct(HAVA)in2002.Amongotherthings,HAVAledtonewvotingequipmentandstatewidevoterregistrationdatabasesformuchofthecountryanditrequirednewproceduresforprovisionalvoting.Stateandlocalelectionofficialshadtoadapttothelaw’smandates.
ThedecentralizednatureoftheAmericanfederalsystemmeansthatmostelectionproceduresaremanagedbyrelativelyautonomouscountyormunicipalofficials.Whatislessappreciatedisthatdecentralizationisassociatedwithtremendousdisparitiesinlocalelectionadministration,asthejurisdictionsvarydramaticallyintermsofthesizeofthevotingpopulationtheyserve.Localadministrationissoskewedthatlessthan5percentofthelocalelectionofficialsintheUnitedStatesserveroughlytwo‐thirdsofthevotersinanationalelection.Despiteholdinggeneralelectionsonthesameday,heavilypopulatedandsparselypopulatedlocaljurisdictionsshareverylittleincommonwhenitcomestoadministeringelections,andthishasconsequences.
SinceHAVAwasacompromise,itofferedsomethingforbothpoliticalparties.However,thisdidnotdiminishdisputesoverelectionlaws.Ifanything,HAVAspawnedmorepartisanconflictandmorescrutinyoftheelectioninfrastructureintheUnitedStates.Someofthatscrutinyshedslightonthedrasticvariationinthesizeoflocaljurisdictionsthatadministerelections,whichhasimportantandunderappreciatedconsequencesforelectionadministrationandreform.Theinteractionoflocalautonomyandsizedisparitiesleadstorealdifferencesinhowelectionsareadministered‐intheexperiencesvotershave,inthepersonnelmanagingelections,andintheadoptionanduseofinnovativepractices.
ThepassageofHAVA,andthereactiontoitfromstateandlocalelectionofficials,hasexacerbatedthesedifferences.DespitesomemeasurableimprovementsinelectionadministrationthatcanbeattributedtoHAVA,thelawhaslikelyhardenedoppositiontofurtherelectionreformsamongofficialsinthemorenumeroussmallandmedium‐sizedlocaljurisdictions.ThisispartlyduetotheincreasedcostandcomplexityofelectionadministrationthatlocalitiesmustnowabsorbasaresultofHAVA.Itisalsobecause,afterHAVA,localjurisdictionsmustcomplywithstateandfederalmandatesforsituationsthatoccurrelativelyinfrequentlyinsmalljurisdictions.Manynewfangledmethodsofcastingaballot,suchasprovisionalvotingandabsenteevoting,occurdisproportionatelyinarelativelysmallnumberofdenselypopulatedurbanandsuburbanjurisdictions.Thepartisan‐drivenlawsuitsthathaveemergedoverthesevotingproceduresarelikelyalsoconcentratedinlargejurisdictions.
Finally,thedemandforinnovationinelectionadministrationislargelyconfinedtoofficialsinthemostpopulouslocaljurisdictionsintheUnitedStates.Yet,inmanystatesthepolicyrecommendationsofthoselocalofficialsmaybedrownedoutbythemorenumerous
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officialsinotherjurisdictionswhoservevastlysmallervotingpopulations.Asaresult,policychangesthatmighthelplargejurisdictionscontendwithavast,mobileandrapidlygrowingpopulationofeligiblevotersareunlikelytobeadopted.
1. TheMagnitudeoftheSizeDisparity
WeidentifyallofthelocaljurisdictionsthatadministerelectionsintheUnitedStates,producingalistof10,499localities.Weidentifythesejurisdictionsbyfocusingontheunitswithresponsibilityforhiring,training,andmonitoringpollworkers.1Theselocalitiesvarysubstantiallyintermsofthenumberofvoterstheyserveandthusthenumberofpollworkerstheyneedtohire.Themedianjurisdictionservedslightlymorethan1,000votersinthe2008presidentialelection.HalfofthelocalelectionjurisdictionsintheUnitedStatesaresmalltownsorcountieswithveryfewelectionstaff.Atthesametime,roughlytwo‐thirdsofthevotersinthe2008electionwereservedbyjust457largejurisdictions(4%ofthejurisdictions).Putdifferently,96percentofthelocaljurisdictionsservedjustone‐thirdofthevotersin2008.Wearecertainlynottheonlyonestoobservethedramaticdisparityinthesizeoflocaljurisdictions(GronkeandStewart2008,8).Asweshowbelow,theelectionadministrationexperienceisvastlydifferentinthesetwotypesofjurisdictions.
[Figure1abouthere]
Tosimplifysomeoftheanalysesthatfollow,wedividetheuniverseoflocaljurisdictionsintothreesizecategories:small(servinglessthan1,000voters),medium(servingbetween1,000and50,000voters),andlargejurisdictions(servingmorethan50,000voters).Wechose1,000votersasonedividinglinebecausejurisdictionswithfewerthan1,000votersaregenerallysmalltownsthathavenomorethanacoupleofpollingplacesandahandfulofpollworkers.Weexpectthesejurisdictionstohaveadifferentelectionadministrationexperiencethanlargerjurisdictions.Inaddition,roughlyhalfofthejurisdictionsservedlessthan1,000votersinrecentpresidentialelections,sothisservesasanaturalbreakinthedata.Wechose50,000votersastheotherdividinglinebecausejurisdictionsservingmorethan50,000voterstendtobeindenselypopulatedmetropolitanareaswithalargecentralcity.Thus,thelargestjurisdictionshavedifferentinfrastructureandtransportationnetworksthanthemedium‐sizedjurisdictions,whicharemostlyruralandexurbancounties.Thesedimensionscharacterizewhatwedefineassmall,medium,andlargejurisdictionsinavarietyofanalysesbelow.ThesmallestjurisdictionsareprimarilyintheupperMidwestandNewEngland,withasmallernumberinthePlains.Largejurisdictions
1Electionadministrationisshared,tosomedegree,betweencountyandmunicipalofficialsinthreestates(Michigan,Minnesota,andWisconsin).Ourtotalof10,499localjurisdictionsincludesmunicipalitiesinthosethreestates.Ifoneinsteadcountsthecountyastherelevantlocaljurisdictiononthosethreestates(e.g.,KimballandKropf2006;U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission2011)thatyieldsroughly4,600localjurisdictionsadministeringelectionsintheUnitedStates.WeusebothdatasetsbelowandshowthatusingeithermethodproducesasimilarskeweddistributionofelectionresponsibilitiesintheUnitedStates.
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areconcentratedinthemajormetropolitancentersoftheUnitedStates.Figure1showsthedistributionoflocaljurisdictionsbysizebasedonthe2008election,withtheoverwhelmingmajorityinthesmallandmedium‐sizedcategories.Almosthalfofthelocaljurisdictionsareinthesmallcategory,withalmostasmanyinthemedium‐sizedcategory.Bycomparison,veryfewlocaljurisdictionsservelargevotingpopulations.
Toillustratethispoint,Figure2showsthenumberofvotersservedbyeachtypeofjurisdictioninthe2008generalelection.MostvotersintheUnitedStates(almosttwo‐thirdsofthem)areservedbylargejurisdictions.Smalllocalities,whilecomprisingalmosthalfoftheelectionjurisdictionsintheUnitedStates,onlyservedabitmorethanonepercentofvotersin2008.Examininggrowthinthevotingmarketisinstructiveaswell.Voterturnoutincreasedbyroughlyninemillionvotersbetweenthe2004and2008presidentialelections.Aboutsevenmillionofthoseadditionalvoterscameinlargejurisdictions,whiletwomillionofthegrowthinturnoutoccurredinmedium‐sizedjurisdictions.Turnoutdidnotincrease(infactitdecreasedslightly)insmalljurisdictions.Thus,thereisamassivedisparityinAmericanelectionadministration:asmallnumberoflocaljurisdictionsbearmostoftheresponsibilityforregisteringvotersandholdingelections,andtheirshareoftheburdenisincreasing.
[Figure2abouthere]
2. JurisdictionSizeandBasicDimensionsofElectionAdministration
Someofourevidencecomesfromanationalsurveyoflocalelectionofficialsconductedinearly2009andfromasurveyofstateelectionofficialsconductedinthesummerof2009.Forthesurveyoflocalofficials,wecreatedastratifiedsamplebasedonthethreejurisdictionsizecategories(small,mediumandlarge)describedabove.Toensurerepresentationofthelargestjurisdictionsalljurisdictionswithover50,000votersinthe2004generalelectionwereincludedinthesamplingframe.Werandomlysampled2,000medium‐sizedjurisdictionsand500smalljurisdictions.Alltold,oursampleframewas2,919jurisdictions.
Foreachjurisdictioninthesamplingframe,wesentthesurveytothetopelectionofficial(usuallyanelectedcountyortownclerk,oranappointedelectiondirector).Thepreferredmodewasviaawebsurvey.However,notalljurisdictionshadanemailaddress–somejurisdictionshadonlypostalmailcontacts.Thus,somelocalofficialswerecontactedbyemailtorespondtoanonlinesurveyinstrumentwhileotherofficialsweresentapapersurveyinthemail.Alltold,795surveys(27%)weresentviamail,2,104(72%)viaemail,andfor20wecouldnotobtainanycontactinformationandthereforenotypeofinstrumentwassent.Thevastmajorityofpapersurveyssentbymailwenttosmallandmedium‐sizedjurisdictions.
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Theemailsurveyincludedtworeminderstonon‐respondents.Themailsurveyincludedonefollow‐upmailingtonon‐respondents.Wereceived900surveysfromlocalelectionofficials,aresponserateof30.8%.Theresponserateforsmalljurisdictions(26%)issomewhatlowerthantheresponserateformedium(31%)andlargejurisdictions(37%).Theresponseratewasthesame(31%)forsurveyscompletedbymailandthosecompletedontheInternet.Forthestatesurvey,wesentquestionnairestoall50stateelectionofficials(usuallyaSecretaryofState)andreceivedresponsesfrom33officials.
[Table1abouthere]
Thesurveyoflocalofficialsincludedsomequestionsthatcanbeusedtodescribethemagnitudeoftheirelectionadministrationresponsibilities.InTable1wecomparethemedianjurisdictionineachsizecategoryonseveralmeasuresofelectionadministration.Thedataindicatethatthebasicdimensionsofelectionadministrationareverydifferentinlargeversussmalljurisdictions.Thetypicalsmalljurisdictionhasonepollingplace,ahandfulofpollworkers,andonestaffperson(thelocalofficial)whooverseespollingplaceoperations.Thus,inasmalljurisdictionthelocalofficialcanspendElectionDayatthelonepollingplaceandsuperviseallinteractionsbetweenvotersandpollworkers.
Atypicalmedium‐sizedjurisdictionin2008issomewhatlarger,withfivepollingplaces,40pollworkersandanadditionalstaffpersontocoordinatepollingplaceoperations.Thescaleofelectionadministrationinmedium‐sizedjurisdictionsisstillsmallenoughthatthelocalofficialcanobservethevotingexperienceateachpollingplaceonElectionDay.Electionadministrationgrowsbyatleastanorderofmagnitudewhenmovingtolargejurisdictions.Regardlessofthemetricused(pollingplaces,pollworkers,budgets)largejurisdictionsareatleast50timesbiggerthansmalljurisdictionsandroughly20timesbiggerthanmedium‐sizedjurisdictions.2Asaresult,itisimpossibleforthelocalofficialinalargejurisdictiontovisiteverypollingplaceonElectionDay.Electionofficialsinlargejurisdictionsmustdelegatemanyimportantdutiestootherstaff.
[Table2abouthere]
Weexaminesimilarmeasuresfromthe2010ElectionAdministrationandVotingSurveyinTable2andfindapproximatelythesamepatterns.Althoughvoterturnoutwaslowerinthemidtermelectionof2010,thescaleofelectionadministrationincreasesdramaticallyforlargejurisdictions.Table2alsoindicatesthatthenumberofprecinctsissubstantiallybiggerthanthenumberofpollingplacesinlargejurisdictionsbutnotinsmallerjurisdictions.Thus,thepracticeoflocatingmultipleprecinctsatthesamepollingplaceislargelyconfinedtolargejurisdictions.Asweshowbelow,thishasanimpactonthe
2Wefindverysimilarpatternswhencomparingjurisdictionsofdifferentsizesusingdataforthesameelectionfromthe2008ElectionAdministrationandVotingSurvey.
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distributionofprovisionalballots.Finally,thereisalsosomeevidenceinbothtablesofeconomiesofscale,withlargerjurisdictionsabletoservemorevotersperpollingplacethansmallerjurisdictions.Thismayresultinlowerelectionadministrationcostsonapervoterbasisinlargejurisdictions(seeHill2011).
Thebasicdimensionsmeasuredbythenumberofvoters,pollworkersandstaffonlybegintoexploretheassociationbetweenjurisdictionsizeandthetaskfacingelectionofficials.Largemetropolitanjurisdictionsshareotherfeaturesthatmakeelectionadministrationdifferentandmorechallenging.
3. JurisdictionSize,ElectoralActivityandDemographics
Inadditiontothevolumeofvoterstheymustserveingeneralelections,heavilypopulatedlocaljurisdictionsreceiveadisproportionateshareofcampaign‐relatedactivityinnationalandstatewideelections.Toparaphraseafrequentlyusedexpression,campaignsgohuntingwherethevotesare.Forexample,presidentialcampaignappearancesoccuroverwhelminglyinheavilypopulatedlocations(Althaus,Nardulli,andShaw2002,58;ChenandReeves2011,544).Theninemostvisitedcountiesinthe2008presidentialcampaignarealllargejurisdictionsbyourdefinition(ChenandReeves2011,540).Asonestudysummarizesthedata:
“Candidatevisitsareinmanywaysanurbanphenomenon,withasmallnumberofespeciallypopulatedurbanandsuburbancountiesattractingarelativelylargenumberofappearancesinanyyear.Incontrast,thevastmajorityofcountiesarelocatedinruralareas,andthesetypicallyreceiveverylittleattentionfromthecampaigns”(Althaus,Nardulli,andShaw2002,58).
Wesuspectthatotherformsofcampaigncommunication,suchastelevisionadvertising,arealsotargetedtowardthemostdenselypopulatedmediamarkets.Itisalsopossiblethatcoverageofpoliticalcampaignsintraditionalmediaoutletsisheavierinlargejurisdictions.
Inadditiontoreceivingalopsidedshareofcampaigncommunication,metropolitanregionswithapopulouscentralcitytendtodevelopknowledgecommunitiesthatattractadisproportionateshareofwealth,highlyeducatedpeople,andeconomicactivity(Shaw1997;Florida2008).Thus,denselypopulatedmetropolitanareasalsoserveasthedonorbaseforbothmajorpoliticalpartiesintheUnitedStates(Gimpel,LeeandKaminski2006).Finally,largejurisdictionstendtoproducemoreprofessionalpartyorganizationsthatserveasincubatorsforpoliticalambition.Asaresult,Gimpelandcolleagues(2011)observethatcandidatesforstatewideofficedisproportionatelyemergefromthemostdenselypopulatedcountiesintheUnitedStates.
[Figure3abouthere]
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Thenetresultofthesefindingsisthatelectionofficialsinlargejurisdictionsarelikelytoserveamoremotivatedandchargedelectorateingeneralelections.Perhapsonesymptomofthispatternisthatresidualvoteratesinpresidentialelectionstendtobesubstantiallyhigherinlesspopulatedruraljurisdictions.Figure3providesboxplotsofresidualvoteratesinthe2008presidentialelection.Thetopandbottomofeachboxindicatesthe75thand25thpercentileobservationsrespectively,whilethehorizontallineinsidetheboxdenotesthemediancase.Ashasbeenobservedinpreviouselections(AnsolabehereandStewart2005,383;Stewart2006,167),residualvotesaremuchlesscommoninlargejurisdictions.Theresidualvotefrequencyinthemediansmalljurisdictionisroughlytwiceasmuchasinthemedianlargejurisdiction.TheadoptionofnewvotingtechnologyspurredbyHAVAhassubstantiallyreducedthefrequencyofresidualvotesinpresidentialelections,particularlyinareaswithhighconcentrationsoflow‐incomeresidentsandracialandethnicminorities(Stewart2006;KropfandKimball2012).Asaresult,HAVAhassucceededinreducingtheresidualvoterateinlargejurisdictions,butnotsomuchinsmallerjurisdictions.ThemobilizinginfluenceofBarackObama’scampaigninlargejurisdictionmayaccountforsome,butcertainlynotall,ofthisempiricalpattern.AsStewart(2006,167‐168)notes,thestrongrelationshipbetweenjurisdictionsizeandresidualvotes,whichpersistsaftertheadoptionofnewvotingtechnology,deservesanexplanation.
[Figures4and5abouthere]
Asimpliedabove,denselypopulatedjurisdictionstendtohaveadifferentdemographicprofilethansmallerjurisdictions.Weexaminedatafromthe2000censustocharacterizethepopulationoflocaljurisdictionsinthe2004election.AsFigures4and5indicate,largejurisdictionstendtohaveamuchhighershareofnon‐whiteandLatinoresidentsthansmallerjurisdictions.3Largerjurisdictionsalsotendtohaveayoungerpopulation.Perhapsreflectingthecosmopolitancharacteroftheirsurroundings,electionofficialsinlargejurisdictionsareyounger,moreeducated,andmoreprofessionallyconnectedthantheircounterpartsinsmallerjurisdictions(Kimballetal.2010).
Furthermore,largejurisdictionshaveamoremobilepopulation.AsFigure6shows,largejurisdictionstendtohaveasmallerpercentageofresidentswhohavenotmovedinthepastfiveyears.MorerecentdatafromtheAmericanCommunitySurveyindicatethatmobilitymaybemorepronouncedinlargejurisdictions(BenetskyandKoerber2012).Withmorecampaignactivityandamoremobilepopulation,largejurisdictionstendtoproduceagreatershareofvoterregistrationthanexpectedgiventhesizeoftheirpopulation.Accordingtothe2008ElectionAdministrationandVotingSurvey,over77percentofthe
3Thecensuscodesraceandethnicityseparatelysothenon‐whitepercentagesinFigure4donotincludeLatinos.
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voterregistrationsreceivedinthe2008electioncyclecameinlargejurisdictions.4Amoremobilepopulationalsomakesregisteredvotersmoredifficulttotrackandproducesadisproportionateshareofproblematicvoterregistrationsinlargejurisdictions.Thesamedataindicatethatofthe19.7millionregisteredvotersontheinactivelistin2008,over80percent(nearly16million)residedinlargejurisdictions.
[Figure6abouthere]
Finally,largemetropolitanjurisdictionslikelycontainmanymoresub‐governments(suchasmunicipalities,schooldistrictsandothertaxingdistricts)thansmallerjurisdictions.Thesesub‐governmentshavetheirownelectionstoselectpublicofficials,raisetaxes,passbondissuesorchangeotherpolicies.Thismakesforalongerballot,moreprecinctsandmoreballotstylesingeneralelections,anditmakesformoreoff‐cycleelectionsinlargejurisdictions.Allofthesefeaturesoflocalgovernmentfurthercomplicatethetaskofplanningandholdingelectionsinlargejurisdictions.Insum,thenatureoflocalgovernment,demographicsandcampaignactivityproduceaddedchallengesforelectionofficialsinlargejurisdictions.Asaresult,theseofficialsaretheonesmostlikelytosupporttheneedforinnovationinelectionadministration.
4. JurisdictionSizeandDemandforInnovation
Electionofficialsinlargejurisdictionsareawareofthemorechallengingadministrativetaskstheyface.Wefirstexaminedemandforinnovationinoursurveyoflocalelectionofficialsdescribedabove.Thesurveyincludedninequestionsaboutpotentialdifficultiestheymayfaceinhiringpollworkers(suchasstaffingtherecruitmentprocess,findingenoughpollworkers,orfindingskilledpollworkers).Electionofficialsratedeachrecruitmentchallengeonascalefrom1(“notatalldifficult”)to4(“verydifficult”).Wecreateascalebyaveragingresponsestoeachoftheninequestions.5Figure7providesaboxplotofscalescoresforofficialsineachsizecategory.Asthegraphindicates,largejurisdictionsreportsubstantiallymoredifficultyinpollworkermanagementthansmallerjurisdictions.
[Figure7abouthere]
Inresponsetothesechallenges,electionofficialsinlargejurisdictionsengageinaslewofactivitiestorecruit,train,evaluate,andcompensatepollworkersthatarelargelydeemedunnecessaryandtendnottobeutilizedinsmalljurisdictions(Kimballetal.2010).Inaddition,officialsinlargejurisdictionsaremoresupportiveofreformsthatmighthelp
4Itispossiblethatthehighrateofregistrationactivityin2008wasduetotheuniquenatureoftheObamacampaignforpresident.Toaddressthatpossibility,weplanacomparableanalysisofregistrationdatafromthe2010electionwhenEACmakesthemavailablefromthe2010EAVS.5Thereliabilityofthescaleforchallengesinpollworkermanagement(Cronbach’sα)is.85.
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themcopewiththechallengingvotingpopulationtheymustserve.Forexample,officialsinlargejurisdictionsaremoresupportiveofmorestaffandresourcesforpollworkerrecruiting(Kimballetal.2010).Oursurveyoflocalofficialsincludedfourquestionsabouttheirsupportfornewvotingmethods(votecenters,earlyvoting,votingbymail,andInternetvoting)thatmayhelpthemmanagethecrushofvoterswhowouldotherwiseappearentirelyonElectionDay.Electionofficialsratedeachpolicyonascalefrom1(“StronglyOppose”)to5(“StronglyFavor”)with3servingastheneutralpoint.Wecreateascalebyaveragingresponsestoeachofthefourpolicyquestionsandwegraphtheresultsinaboxplot(seeFigure8).6Asthefigureshows,officialsinlargejurisdictionsareprimarilyonthesidefavoringthesenewvotingmethods,whileofficialsinsmalljurisdictionsaremostlyonthesideopposingthesenewvotingmethods.
[Figure8abouthere]
Asanotherexample,HAVA’sprovisionalvotingrequirementsserveasasafetyvalveforjurisdictionsdealingwithrapidandlarge‐scalechangestotheirregisteredvoterlist.Thus,itisnosurprisethatofficialsinlargejurisdictionshavemuchmorefavorableattitudestowardsprovisionalvotingthanelectionofficialsinsmalljurisdictions(Kropf,Vercellotti,andKimball2010).Thedemandforinnovationmeansthatelectionofficialsinlargejurisdictionsaremorelikelytosupportreforms,suchasHAVA,thatareintendedtohelppeoplevote.
Thecorollaryisthatofficialsinsmallerjurisdictionstendtoopposereformproposalsandtheytendtobeunhappywithnewelectionlaws.SurveysoflocalelectionofficialsobservesomehostilitytowardHAVA(e.g.,MoynihanandSilva2008)buttheyhavenotexaminedwhetherthehostilityiscomingprimarilyfromsmalljurisdictions.Anothersurveyoflocalofficialsincludedanopen‐endedquestionabouthowHAVAwasworkingintheirjurisdiction.Officialsfromsmalljurisdictionsweremuchmorelikelytooffercomments(andparticularlycriticalcomments)aboutHAVA.ManyofthenegativecommentsfocusedontheincreasedcostsoftheHAVAmandatesandtheirunhappinesswiththefederalgovernmenttellingthemhowtorunelections(KropfandKimball2012).HAVAhaslikelypolarizedattitudestowardelectionreformamonglocalofficialsbasedonthesizeoftheirjurisdiction.
5. JurisdictionSizeandInnovationinElectionAdministration
Sincetheneedforinnovationinelectionadministrationisdisproportionatelyfeltamonglargejurisdictions,weexpectthatmostinnovationinlocalelectionadministrationoccursinlargejurisdictions.Totestthishypothesis,weexaminedatafromtheElectionAssistanceCommission’sElectionAdministrationandVotingSurvey(EAVS).Thesurveyasksstate
6Thereliabilityofthescalefornewvotingmethods(Cronbach’sα)is.65.
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andlocaljurisdictionstoreportthenumberofballotscastinmajorelectionsinseveralcategories.Thus,thesurveymeasuresthefrequencyofvotingmethods(includingprovisionalvoting,absenteevoting,UOCAVAandearlyvoting)thatarealternativestothetraditionofcastingaregularballotatapollingplaceonElectionDay.WeanalyzeEAVSdatafromthe2008and2010electionstodeterminetheproportionofeachballottypecastinthethreejurisdictionsizecategories(seeTables3and4).
[Tables3and4abouthere]
TheEAVSdataindicatethatballotscastbyalternativemethodsoccurdisproportionatelyinlargejurisdictions.Forexample,eventhoughroughly70percentoftotalballotsandballotscastonElectionDayareproducedinlargejurisdictions,over90percentofprovisionalballotsandover80percentofabsenteeandUOCAVAballotsappearinlargejurisdictions.Inparticular,partiallyacceptedprovisionalballots(almost120,000in2008)andundeliverableabsenteeballots(over220,000in2008)occuralmostentirelyinlargejurisdictions.Meanwhile,mostformsofprovisionalandabsenteeballotsoccuratneardeminimislevelsinsmalljurisdictions.AmongthealternativeballotingmethodsinTables3and4,onlyearlyvotesarecastinroughproportiontotheoverallnumberofvotersineachtypeofjurisdiction.
Inthe2008electiontherewereover820,000rejectedabsenteeballotsandover500,000rejectedorpartiallyrejectedprovisionalballotsinlargejurisdictions.Giventheheightenedracialandethnicdiversityinlargejurisdictions,thesenumbersmayraiseconcernsaboutthedisparateimpactofabsenteeandprovisionalvotingintheUnitedStates.Furthermore,sinceHAVA’svotingtechnologyrequirementshavesignificantlyreducedthefrequencyofresidualvotes,provisionalandabsenteeballotsnowoutnumberresidualballotsinnationalelections(KropfandKimball2012,113‐114).Legalandpartisandisputesoverelectionadministrationandballotrecountsarenowmorelikelytofocusonthedispositionofabsenteeandprovisionalballotsratherthanresidualvotes.Thiswillfurthertheimportanceofjurisdictionsizeaselectionlitigationshouldbeconcentratedevenmoreinlargelocaljurisdictions.
OneadditionalmeasureprovidedbytheEAVSdataasksabouttheuseofelectronicpollbookstosigninvoters,updatevoterhistory,andlookuppollingplaces.In2008and2010,roughlyone‐thirdoflargejurisdictionsreportedusingelectronicpollbookswhile16percentofmedium‐sizedjurisdictionsandjust3percentofsmalljurisdictionsusedelectronicpollbooks.7Itseemsobviousthatjurisdictionsservinglargenumbersofvoters
7Electronicpollbookshavebeenadoptedstatewideinsomestates(suchasGeorgia,Maryland,andUtah).Wefindasimilarrelationshipbetweenjurisdictionsizeandtheuseofelectronicpollbookswhenthesestatesareexcludedfromtheanalysis.
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aremorelikelytoturntowardmoremoderntechnologicalmethodsofkeepingtrackofwhoisregistered.
InnovationinelectionadministrationcancomeinmanyotherformsthatarenotmeasuredbytheEAVSorothersurveys.Wecreateafinalindicatorofinnovationbyexaminingorganizationsandassociationsthatworkdirectlywithlocalelectionofficials.WeexaminedbestpracticesmanualsandotherreportsproducedbyEAC,Pew,andElectionCenterandcodedeachinstanceinwhichinnovationinlocalelectionadministrationwasrecognized(thesourcesforthisanalysisarelistedintheappendix).Alltold,werecorded315casesofrecognizedinnovation:94percentcitedlargejurisdictions,6percentcitedamedium‐sizedjurisdiction,andnonementionedasmalljurisdiction.ThissuggeststhatElectionCenterandbestpracticesguidesbasicallyprovideawayforofficialsfromlargejurisdictionstocommunicatewitheachotheraboutinnovativeadministrativepractices.Nevertheless,withinnovationsconcentratedheavilyinlargejurisdictions,thereisyetanotherreasontoexpectthatpartisanandlegaldisputesoverelectionadministrationalsotendtooccurinlargejurisdictions.
6. JurisdictionSizeandPartisanship
Thereareseveralreasonstoexpectthatpartisandisputesoverelectionlawsandadministrationtendtofocusonlargelocaljurisdictions.Ifcampaignsorlitigatorswanttohavethegreatestimpactonelectionoutcomes,thentheywilltargetjurisdictionswiththemostvoters.Amoremobilepopulationinlargejurisdictionsalsoincreasesconflictovervoterregistrationstatusandprovisionalandabsenteeballots.Finally,asLewis(2011)notes,largecitiestendtohavemorecompetitiveelections(eitherintra‐partyorinter‐party)andmoreactivepartyorganizations,additionalingredientsforelectionlawdisputes.
Oneconsequenceofthepartisanandlegalfocusonlargejurisdictionsrelatestopolarizedattitudestowardelectionreformpolicies.Republicanstendtopreferpolicies(suchasphotoidentificationrequirements)thatprotectagainstvoterfraudbutmayincreasebarrierstovoterparticipation,whileDemocratstendtopreferpolicies(suchasElectionDayregistration)thatimproveaccesstothefranchisebutmayincreaseopportunitiesforfraud(Hasen2012;KimballandKropf2012).Sincethesedisputestendtobefocusedonlargejurisdictions,wedonotexpectpolarizedpreferencesoverthesepoliciestotrickledowntoofficialsinsmallerjurisdictions.
MostlocalelectionofficialsintheUnitedStatesareaffiliatedwithoneofthetwomajorpoliticalparties,andmanyarechosenfortheirpositioninpartisanelections(KimballandKropf2006).Oursurveysofstateandlocalelectionofficialsincludedtwoquestionsaboutanti‐fraudpolicies(photoIDandno‐match,novotelaws)andtwoquestionsaboutpoliciestoincreaseaccess(ElectionDayregistrationanduniversalregistration).Eachpolicywas
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evaluatedonascalefrom1(“Stronglyoppose”)to5(“Stronglyfavor”).Wecreatedananti‐fraudscalebyaveragingresponsestotworelevantpolicyitems,andwecreatedanincreasedaccessscaleinasimilarfashion.
[Figure9abouthere]
Weplotaveragesupportforanti‐fraudpoliciesamongstateandlocalofficialsinFigure9.Wefindthatpartisandifferencesinpolicypreferencesamongelectionofficialsareevidentamongofficialsatthestatelevelandinlargejurisdictions,butnotinsmallormedium‐sizedjurisdictions.Amongofficialsservingstatesandlargelocaljurisdictions,amajorityofDemocratsopposeanti‐fraudpoliciesandamajorityofRepublicanssupportanti‐fraudpolicies.Thesepartisandifferencesarestatisticallysignificant.Amongofficialsinsmallandmedium‐sizedjurisdictionsthepartisandifferencesaresmallerandstatisticallyinsignificant.Inparticular,Democraticofficialsinlargerjurisdictionsaremoreopposedtoanti‐fraudpoliciesthantheirfellowpartisansinsmallerjurisdictions.Whenexaminingpoliciestoeaseaccesstovoterregistration,wefindalsofindthatpartisandifferencesamongelectionofficialsonlyexistforthoseservingstatesandlargejurisdictions,withRepublicanofficialsmoreopposedtothosepolicies.Giventhatelectionofficialsinlargejurisdictionstendtointernalizepartypositionsonvoteraccessandvoterintegrityissuescanonlyaddtothecontentiousnatureofelectionlawandadministrationdisputesthattakeplaceundertheirwatch.
7. JurisdictionSizeandElectionReform
Becauseoftheskeweddistributionofthesizeoflocaljurisdictions,wesuspectthatelectionreformdebatesinmanystatesaredominatedbyelectionofficialsfromsmallandmedium‐sizedjurisdictions,eventhoughtheyservearelativelysmallshareofvoters.Forexample,Missourihas116localjurisdictionsthatadministerelections.OnlytenofthelocaljurisdictionsinMissouriarelargebyourclassification,buttheyservemorethanhalfofthestate’svotersinnationalelections.OfficialsinthelargestjurisdictionshavebeenpressingforlegislationtoallowearlyvotingandtoeliminateFebruaryelections(acost‐savingmeasureforlargejurisdictions).However,accordingtostafffromthelargejurisdictionsinMissouri,theyhavebeenunsuccessfulbecauseelectionofficialsinsmallercountiesareopposedandhavemoreinfluenceinthestatecapitol.Inaddition,someMissourilegislatorsareformercountyclerksinruralpartsofthestate,whichfurtherstrengthensthehandofofficialsfromsmalljurisdictionsinlegislativedebates.
Asanotherexample,arecentstudyoftheimpactofproposedelectionreformsinColoradowasbasedonasurveyofcountyclerks(CucitiandWallis2011).ThesurveyincludedquestionsaboutpoliciessuchasmovingtheregistrationdeadlineclosertoElectionDay,votingbymail,andwhethertomailballotstovotersontheinactivelist.Eventhoughlargecountiesserveover80percentofthestate’svoters,theyareoutnumberedbysmaller
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countiesbya5‐to‐1ratio.IntheColoradopolicyanalysiseachcountyclerkwasgivenequalweight,whichhastheeffectofgivingvotersinsmallcountiesmoreinfluencethanvotersinlargecounties.Applyingsuchaunitruleinlegislatingwouldleadtopoliciesthatareopposedbyofficialswhoservethevastmajorityofthestate’svoters.
Inhowmanystatesmightelectionofficialsservinglargejurisdictionsbeatadisadvantagebeforepolicymakers?Weanswerthisbyexaminingtheratiooflargejurisdictionstosmallandmedium‐sizedjurisdictionsineachstate(seeTable5).8Stateswherelargejurisdictionsareoutnumberedbyaratioof10‐to‐1ormorearecodedasruraldominantstates.DependingonhowsizeisevaluatedinthethreeupperMidwesternstates,thereare15to18statesinthiscategory.Stateswithlessthana10‐to‐1ratiobutmorethana2‐1ratioarelabeledruraladvantagestates(17to20states).Therearesixstateswherelargejurisdictionsareatroughparitywithsmallerjurisdictions.Finally,intwourbanadvantagestates(HawaiiandNewJersey)largejurisdictionsoutnumbersmallerjurisdictionsbya2‐to‐1marginormore.
[Table5abouthere]
LegalandpoliticalconflictbetweendenselypopulatedurbanareasandlesspopulatedruralareasarenothingnewintheUnitedStates(Key1964;AnsolabehereandSnyder2008;Gross2010;GimpelandKarnes2006).Observerstendtolocatetheseconflictsaroundissuesinvolvingculturalvalues,thedistributionofgovernmentbenefits,andelectoralsupportforthetwomajorparties.Electionadministrationshouldbeaddedtothislist.Inmoststates,electionofficialsservingheavilypopulatedjurisdictionsfindthemselvesatanumericaldisadvantagewhencompetingwithotherlocalofficialstoinfluencepolicymakers.
8. ImplicationsofJurisdictionSize
Denselypopulatedlocaljurisdictionsaresubstantiallydifferentthansmallerjurisdictionsinjustabouteverymeasurableindicatorofelectionadministration.Thisisduenotonlytothesizeofthevotingpopulationtheyserve,butalsothenatureofthevotingpopulationandpoliticalcampaignsintheirareas.HAVAappearstohaveacceleratedsomeofthesedifferencesinelectionadministration.Inaddition,HAVAhaspolarizedsupportforelectionreformamonglocalelectionofficialsalongthesizedimension.
Thereareseveralimplicationsofthesefindings,forresearchers,policymakers,andthelegalandreformcommunities.Ontheresearchfront,studiesoflocalpracticesandtheviewsoflocalelectionofficialsshouldbeawareoftheimportanceofjurisdictionsize.Whenexaminingasampleoflocaljurisdictionsitwouldbewisetousearesearchdesignthat 8ThetableleavesoutDelaware(whichhasonlylargelocaljurisdictions)andConnecticut,Maine,NewHampshire,andWyoming(whichhavenolargejurisdictions).
13
stratifieslocaljurisdictionsbythesizeoftheelectorate.Inaddition,researchersusingthelocaljurisdictionastheunitofanalysistoexaminevotingbehavioroutputs(suchasturnout)ofelectionadministrationshouldconsiderweightingthedatabythesizeoftheelectorate,whichhastheeffectofcountingeachvoterequally(e.g.,Stewart2006;KropfandKimball2012).
Onthepolicyfront,policymakersshouldbeawareofhowmanyvotersalocalelectionofficialserveswhenconsideringthatofficial’sopinionaboutreformproposals.Legislatorsprobablywillnotrespondwelltotestimonyfromanurbanelectionofficialwhoclaimsthathisopinionsshouldcountonehundredtimesmorethantheviewsoftheruralcountyclerkwhowilltestifyafterhim.However,policymakersshouldappreciatethatlocalofficialswhoservemostvotersinastatehaveaddedexpertiseaboutthevotingexperiencefacingmostvotersinthatstate.Furthermore,thelawmakersshouldconsiderwhethercurrentlawsmandateuniformityinelectionadministrationattheexpenseofcommonsense.AsDougChapin(2012)recentlyargues,electionlawsshouldprovidemoreflexibilitytoallowlargejurisdictionstopursuesomeinnovations(suchasInternetvoterregistrationorelectionconsolidation)thatsmallerjurisdictionsmaynotwantorneed.Becauseofthepotentoppositiontoreformfromsmallandmedium‐sizedjurisdictions,thisapproachmayallowlargejurisdictionstogoitaloneinareaswheretheywanttomodernizeelectionadministration.Afinalapproachtothesizedisparityinelectionadministrationwouldbeforthelargejurisdictionstofindcommoncausethroughtheirownadvocacyorganization.Whilelargejurisdictionsmaybeatadisadvantagewithintheirrespectivestates,theymayfindsympatheticearsinCongressiftheyweretospeakwitha(somewhat)unifiedvoiceontheseimportantissues.
14
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Gronke,Paul,andCharlesStewartIII.2008.“BasicPrinciplesofDataCollection.”InDataforDemocracy.Washington,DC:PewCenterontheStates.
Gross,CassieA.2010.HometownInfluence:TheImpactofGeographyonStatewideCandidateSuccess.Unpublishedmanuscript:UniversityofMissouri‐St.Louis.
15
Hasen,RichardL.2012.TheVotingWars:FromFlorida2000totheNextElectionMeltdown.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.
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Kimball,DavidC.,MarthaKropfandLindsayBattles.2006.“HelpingAmericaVote?ElectionAdministration,Partisanship,andProvisionalVotinginthe2004Election.”ElectionLawJournal5:447‐461.
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Appendix
SourcesforCasesofRecognizedInnovationinLocalElectionAdministration
TheElectionCenter.2011.“2011ProfessionalPracticesProgram,”SanAntonio,TX(http://www.electioncenter.org/publications.html,accessedMarch28,2012).
TheElectionCenter.2010.“2010ProfessionalPracticesProgram,”Orlando,FL(http://www.electioncenter.org/publications.html,accessedMarch28,2012).
TheElectionCenter.2009.“2009ProfessionalPracticesProgram,”SanDiego,CA(http://www.electioncenter.org/publications.html,accessedMarch28,2012).
TheElectionCenter.2008.“2008ProfessionalPracticesProgram,”Dallas,TX(http://www.electioncenter.org/publications.html,accessedMarch28,2012).
TheElectionCenter.2007.“2007ProfessionalPracticesProgram,”NewOrleans,LA(http://www.electioncenter.org/publications.html,accessedMarch28,2012).
TheElectionCenter.2006.“2006ProfessionalPracticesProgram,”Chicago,IL(http://www.electioncenter.org/publications.html,accessedMarch28,2012).
TheElectionCenter.2005.“2005ProfessionalPracticesProgram,”BeverlyHills,CA(http://www.electioncenter.org/publications.html,accessedMarch28,2012).
TheElectionCenter.2003.“2003ProfessionalPracticesProgram,”BalHarbour,FL(http://www.electioncenter.org/publications.html,accessedMarch28,2012).
Kimball,DavidC.,BradyBaybeck,JenniferCollins‐Foley,ConnieSchmidt,andCheréMaxwell.2010.SurveyofPollWorkerTrainingPracticesbyLocalElectionOfficials.UniversityofMissouri‐St.Louis,February2010.
PewCenterontheStates.2008.DataforDemocracy.Washington,DC.
U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission.2012.FluContingencyPlans.Washington,DC.
U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission.2007.AGuidebookforRecruitingCollegePollWorkers.Washington,DC,July2007.
U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission.2007.EffectiveDesignsfortheAdministrationofFederalElections.Washington,DC,June2007.
U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission.2007.SuccessfulPracticesforPollWorkerRecruitment,Training,andRetention.Washington,DC,July2007.
U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission.2004.BestPracticesToolkit.Washington,DC.
17
Figure1NumberofLocalElectionJurisdictionsbySizeofJurisdiction
2008GeneralElection
51494893
457
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
Nu
mb
er o
f Ju
risd
ictio
ns
Small Medium Large
18
Figure2NumberofVotersbySizeofJurisdiction
2008GeneralElection
1.8 million
43 million
88 million
0
20,000,000
40,000,000
60,000,000
80,000,000
Nu
mb
er o
f V
ote
rs
Small Medium Large
19
Figure3ResidualVoteRatebySizeofJurisdiction
2008PresidentialElection
0
1
2
3
4
Re
sidu
al V
ote
Ra
te,
200
8
Small Medium Largeexcludes outside values
20
Figure4Non‐WhiteShareofPopulationbySizeofJurisdiction
Demographicdataarefromthe2000census.
0
20
40
60N
on-
wh
ite P
erce
nt
of P
opu
latio
n
Small Medium Largeexcludes outside values
21
Figure5LatinoShareofPopulationbySizeofJurisdiction
Demographicdataarefromthe2000census.
0
5
10
15
20
Latin
o P
erc
ent
of
Pop
ula
tion
Small Medium Largeexcludes outside values
22
Figure6ResidentialStabilitybySizeofJurisdiction
Demographicdataarefromthe2000census.
60
70
80
90
100P
erc
ent
who
ha
ve n
ot
mo
ved
in 5
yea
rs
Small Medium Largeexcludes outside values
23
Figure7ChallengeswithPollWorkersbySizeofJurisdiction
2008GeneralElection
1
2
3
4
Ch
alle
nges
with
Pol
l Wor
kers
Small Medium Largeexcludes outside values
24
Figure8SupportforNewVotingMethodsbySizeofJurisdiction
1
2
3
4
5
Su
ppor
t fo
r N
ew
Vot
ing
Met
hod
s
Small Medium Largeexcludes outside values
25
Figure9SupportforAnti‐FraudPoliciesbySizeofJurisdiction
SquaresrepresentRepublicanofficials.CirclesrepresentDemocraticofficials.
1
2
3
4
5S
upp
ort
for
An
ti-F
rau
d P
olic
ies
Small Medium Large StateJurisdiction Size
26
Table1TheShapeofPollingPlaceOperationsbySizeofJurisdiction
2008GeneralElection
JurisdictionSize
Small Medium Large
PollingPlaces 1 5 94
PollWorkers 5 40 753
Staffdedicatedtopollworkers
1 2 5
Ballotscast 427 4900 112,621
Budgetforpollworkeroperationsin2008
$225 $1,000 $45,000
Votersperpollingplace 427 980 1,198
Source:Kimballetal.(2010)
Figuresinthetablerepresentthemedianjurisdictionineachsizecategory.
Table2TheShapeofPollingPlaceOperationsbySizeofJurisdiction
2010GeneralElection
JurisdictionSize
Small Medium Large
PollingPlaces 1 11 84
Precincts 1 13 119
PollWorkers 7 60 600
Ballotscast 365 5,392 71,312
Votersperpollingplace 365 490 849
Figuresinthetablerepresentthemedianjurisdictionineachsizecategory.
Source:U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission(2011)
27
Table3ShareofBallotbySizeofJurisdiction
2008GeneralElection
JurisdictionSize
Small Medium Large
Totalballotscast 0.3% 29.8% 69.9%
ElectionDayballots 0.3% 30.0% 69.7%
Provisionalballotscast 0.02% 10.4% 89.6%
Provisionalballotsrejected 0.02% 15.3% 84.7%
Provisionalspartlyaccepted 0.02% 3.0% 97.0%
Provisionalscountedinfull 0.02% 9.1% 90.9%
Domesticabsenteessent 0.2% 23.0% 76.8%
Undeliverableabsentees 0.03% 5.6% 94.4%
Domesticabsenteesreturned 0.3% 22.9% 76.9%
Spoiled/replacedabsentees 0.1% 10.9% 89.0%
Domesticabsenteesrejected 0.04% 19.9% 80.1%
Domesticabsenteescounted 0.2% 22.1% 77.7%
UOCAVAballots 0.1% 17.4% 82.5%
Earlyvotingballots 0.04% 27.2% 72.7%
Figuresinthetablerepresenttheshareofballotsoccurringineachsizecategory.Source:U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission(2009)
28
Table4ShareofBallotbySizeofJurisdiction
2010GeneralElection
JurisdictionSize
Small Medium Large
Totalballotscast 0.3% 29.8% 70.0%
ElectionDayballots 0.3% 31.4% 68.3%
Provisionalballotscast 0.02% 8.9% 91.1%
Provisionalballotsrejected 0.03% 13.1% 86.9%
Provisionalspartlyaccepted none 2.0% 98.0%
Provisionalscountedinfull 0.01% 8.7% 91.3%
Domesticabsenteessent 0.2% 17.3% 82.6%
Undeliverableabsentees 0.01% 9.4% 90.6%
Domesticabsenteesreturned 0.2% 19.6% 80.3%
Spoiled/replacedabsentees 0.1% 13.2% 86.7%
Domesticabsenteesrejected 0.1% 18.0% 81.9%
Domesticabsenteescounted 0.2% 19.4% 80.4%
UOCAVAballots 0.4% 19.8% 79.8%
Earlyvotingballots 0.07% 28.7% 71.2%
Figuresinthetablerepresenttheshareofballotsoccurringineachsizecategory.Source:U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission(2011)
29
Table5RepresentationofLargeJurisdictionsinAmericanStates
SmallJurisdictions
DominateAdvantageforSmall
Jurisdictions
RoughParityAdvantagefor
LargeJurisdictionsArkansasIowaIdahoKansasKentucky
MassachusettsMichigan(muni)Minnesota(muni)
MissouriMississippiMontana
NorthDakotaNebraskaOklahoma
RhodeIslandSouthDakota
Wisconsin(muni)WestVirginia
AlabamaColoradoGeorgiaIllinoisIndianaLouisiana
Michigan(counties)Minnesota(counties)
NevadaNewMexicoNorthCarolina
OhioOregon
SouthCarolinaTennesseeTexasUtah
VirginiaWashington
Wisconsin(counties)
ArizonaCaliforniaFloridaMarylandNewYork
Pennsylvania
HawaiiNewJersey