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Size and the Structure of Authority in Canal Irrigation Systems

Author(s): Robert C. HuntSource: Journal of Anthropological Research, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Winter, 1988), pp. 335-355Published by: University of New Mexico

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JOURNAL OF

ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH

(FormerlySouthwesternJournal of Anthropology)

VOLUME 44 * NUMBER 4 * WINTER * 1988

SIZE AND THE STRUCTUREOFAUTHORITYNCANALIRRIGATION YSTEMS

RobertC. Hunt

DepartmentfAnthropology,randeisniversity, altham,A02254

It is widely ssumed hatall irrigationystemsmusthaveconstituteduthoritynd thatall large rrigationystemsmusthavecentralizeduthority. hesmallliterature hichteststhesebeliefss reviewed,ndtheresultsofa systematicomparativetudyarepre-sented.Theconceptsf"irrigationystem,"irrigationystemize,"and"irrigationystemstructurefauthority"redefined.Variables hichmeasurehese onceptsreconstructed,

and measurementsroma purposiveample redisplayed. handful fsmall rrigationsystemswithout uthoritytructureswasfound.An inspectionf the data revealsno

relationshipetweenizeandthestructuref authorityn systems angingrom700to

458,000 ha. Furthermore,n irrigationystem f458,000ha is managed y armers.Conclusions:1)irrigationystemswithoutonstituteduthorityxistand 2)large ystemsdo notrequireentral uthority.

CANAL RRIGATIONYSTEMSre generally believed to require an authoritystructuref construction ndoperation re to be successful,andalllarge r-

rigation ystems are widelyassumed o require entralizeduthority.Thesetwolargelyunconfirmedeliefsaresuperficiallylausiblendhavebeenwidelyusedby scholars o interpret rchaeological,istoric,andethnographicata.When hese propositionsreargued whichs rare),authoritys deemednec-

essaryto effectcoordinatedctionandto control ompetition:

control firrigation,ndevenperhapsnstallation, akesastrong entral

poweressential.(Linton 939:286,on the Betsileoof Madagascar)

irrigation . imposed henecessity or a closely integratedsociety, since

anelaborateystemof canals anonlybe maintainednd hewater haredoutby strictcontrol. Bushnell 957:56,on the late FormativenPeru;

emphasis added)

The more importantof these irrigationsystems must have been con-

structed and administeredby a body of irrigationofficials directed by a

335








336 JOURNAL FANTHROPOLOGICALESEARCH

centralized re-Incagovernment.Forbes 1955:8,on Peru;emphasisadded)

With he publicationfWittfogel'sOrientalDespotismn 1957,scholarsbeganto concentrate n the positiverelationshipetween centralauthorityndthesize of the irrigationystem (in spite of the fact thatWittfogel learlywas

discussingall types of hydraulicworks,not merely irrigationystems; seeMitchell1973):

Large-scale ydraulicctivity.. doesmakemanyof the technical nd

socialdemandswhichWittfogel laims or it. The mobilizationf largequantities f labor or the constructionndmaintenancef suchworks,andthe allocationfwateronanequitable asisamong ompetingom-

munities, like equirehepresenceof a superordinateuthority.Wheat-

ley 1971:298,on China; mphasis dded)

No evidencehasyet appearedoranyMaya ystemofwatercontrol o

largeastorequiretatemanagement.Bronson 978:279, n the lowland

Maya;emphasis dded)

These generalbeliefsare in the formof two nomothetic ropositions:1)allcanalrrigationystemshaveconstituteduthorityormanagementnd 2)all argecanalrrigationystemshavecentralized anagementuthority. hese

propositionsontainhreeconceptswhichreferto empiricalntities:the ir-

rigation ystem itself, the size of that system, and the authoritytructurewhichmanagesthat system. In this paperI subjectthese propositionsoconfirmationy examiningndhopefullyeducinghe uncertaintyssociatedwith them. Insofaras a particular ropositions usedto interpretdataor toserve as a foundationorotherpropositions,hen heuncertaintyhich ertains

to it is as importants its content.A majorstrategyto reducethe uncertaintywhichattachesto a general

propositions to make ts conceptsas unambiguouss possible.As theyhavebeenusedintheliterature, llthreeof the aboveconceptsare less clear han

they mightbe. No authordefinespreciselywhatis meantby "an rrigationsystem"orby "largeize,"and ew haveevenspecifiedwhatsizesystemtheyaredealingwith.Nomoreprecisearetheconceptsofcentral uthority,trongcentralpower,centralized overnment, r state management.Measuresofthese conceptshave alsobeenunclear r have beenunreliablen application

to particularata. These two sources of uncertaintynhibit urjudgment fthe internal alidity f the propositionssee CampbellndStanley1963).In

addition,he mostgeneral ormof the propositionsas beenchallenged yacase study, since supported by additionalcases, in which Netting (1974b)

proposed that an irrigation ystem can exist andpersist withoutany organized

authoritywhatsoever.








AUTHORITYN IRRIGATIONYSTEMS 337

PREVIOUSTUDIES

Systematiccomparativenalysis s the majorstrategyfor attemptingoconfirm generalizationbouta statisticalelationship.odatetherelationshipbetween size and centralizationf authorityn irrigationystems has beenexaminednfourcomparativetudies:Millon1962),Mencher1966),Kappel(1974), and Earle(1978). Eachof these studies contains argeamountsof

uncertainty.Millon's ampleconsistedof seven cases, fourof themalreadypublished

(the Sonjo,a smallchiefdomnTanganyika;he 12-GosysteminJapan;Pul

EliyanCeylon; ndGeertz's arlymaterial nBali).The threeadditionalases

were derived rom henunpublishedources(Fernea's ccount f the El Sha-bana n southern raq;anaccountof a "tribal"ystemin the Hadramaut;ndMillon's wnmaterial nseveralvillagesn the SanJuanTeotihuacanalley f

Mexico).Millonmeasured ize andauthoritytructure or these seven "rel-

ativelysmall"ystemsandconcludedhat "there s no clearrelationshipe-

tweendegreeof centralizationfauthoritynd he size of theirrigationystemor the number f persons t supports.Furthermore,he practice f irrigationhasnot,apparently,rought nysubstantialrowth f central uthority"Millon1962:56).Althoughonfined o "relativelymall ystems," hese resultschal-

lenge the generalbelief aboutthe relationshipetweensize andauthority.Millon'sonclusionsavebeenacceptedbyWolf 1966:26,n. 8), Price(1971),Lees (1973),andMitchell1973).

Mencher 1966)comparedwoareasof southIndia, ocusing n nucleation

ofvillages,centralizationfkingdoms,nd heecologyof waterworksnd and

transportnKerala ndMadras. hefound hathighly ucleatedillages,highly

developed oads,andmorehighlyntegrated ingdomswere associatedwith

theareashavingowerrainfall nd arger rrigation orks,thussupportinghe

generalbelief.

Kappel 1974)selected seventeensocietiesfrom he Outline f WorldCul-tures andmeasuredhreevariables:1)sizeanddensityofpopulation,2)size

of irrigationacilities,and(3) degreeof centralizationf decision-makingu-

thority.He concludedhatas populationize anddensity ncrease,so alsodo

politicalentralizationndthe size of irrigationystems.Earle 1978)compared isHawaiianatawith ourothersingle-villagemall

systems(PulEliya,Ifugao,Moala,andtheSonjo).He concludedhatspecific

managerialoles seemedrelatedmore o the socialmatrix han o the demands

of irrigationEarle1978:135).

The resultsof these studiesareequivocaln the casesofMillon ndKappelandweak in the cases of Mencherand Earle. Earle'ssampleexhibitsno

variationn thestructure fauthorityndverylittle n size.As a consequence,littlecanbelearned boutherelationshipetween hetwoconcepts.Mencher,in effect, does a concomitantariationtudywithinone regionof India.As

Clignet 1970)andPrzeworski ndTeune(1970)haveshown,thisresearch









designdoes not permit dentificationf all, or even the major,sourcesofvariancen the dependent ariable.

Thecomparative

tudiesby

Millon ndKappel

ave weak nternal alidity.Millondefinedhis variable f size bothas acresirrigated ndas population.Whenhe actually sed acresirrigated, owever,he in some cases measured

otherphenomena:he size of a smallkingdomn Baliand the area of tribal

politicalontrolnIraq.Thispracticentroducesmassiveuncertaintyntothe

resulting elationshipetweenthe two variables.Millon's esultshave been

questionedby Bennett(1974),who calledattentiono the smallnessof his

sampleand he limited ize rangeof theirrigationystemsstudied,andby R.

HuntandE. Hunt 1976),who raisedquestionsabouthismeasurements.

Kappel 1974:162)abelsthe variable or size "extentof

irrigation"nd

defines t as miles of canal,acresirrigated, r the system'srelativesize as

notedby ethnographers.However,his resultsare expressed n household,

village,district,andgovernment nits,therebymaking omparison iththe

original atadifficult.naddition, isvariableorauthorityefersto the whole

society,not the irrigationystem perse. Finally,f we accepthis measureof

size, Kappel's onclusionn the text does notagreewith the datapresentedonfigure13.2,"Relationshipsf SizeofIrrigationndPopulationize" Kappel1974:164).

Inconclusion,eriousproblems avebeen identifiedwiththeconceptsandtheirmeasuresas usedin thecomparativetudies,and he internal alidity fthese studies s thuscompromised.urthermore,incethesamplesused haveno knownrelationshipo anyuniverse, he externalvalidity f these studiesis alsoextremely ow. As a consequence,ittle or no "knowledge"bout he

relationshipf irrigationystemsize to the structureof authority as been

gained.

THISSTUDY

Thispaperpresentssomeof theresultsofsystematic omparativeesearch

on theauthoritytructure f canalrrigationystems.'Inorder o evaluatehelikelihoodhat the nomothetic ropositionsre correct,the conceptsof irri-

gation ystem,administrativeuthoritytructure, ndsize werenarrowlye-

fined;measurements f authoritytructureand size were constructed; ndthese variableswere measured n a smallpurposive ample.

Universe ndSample

The universe or thisstudy s confinedo canalrrigationystemsinstates.SinceWittfogel'sOrientalDespotism, iscussionsof irrigationystems with

centralized uthorityhave at least implied hat the state is involved.It is

critically mportant hat each case in the sample have the potentialto be po-

liticallycentralized, a criterion which bands and probablychiefdoms do not

meet. States have a politicalcenter (by definition), ayers of territorialadmin-

istration, and peripheral organizations(villages, kin groups, ethnic groups,








AUTHORITYNIRRIGATIONYSTEMS 339

corporations), nyof whichcouldconceivablyupply he authoritytructurefor a canalrrigationystem.Instates, then,a choicemustatleastpotentially

be madeaboutwhich evel of authoritytructurewillruna canal ystem.For ease of access to data,theuniverse orthepresentstudymustfurtherbe confined o modernnationstates. Althoughhe worldnow containswellovera hundredhousand analrrigationystems,2 ew have beendescribed.The majorityf the availabletudieshaveappearedince1970anddealwith

contemporaryonditions.Data romhistoricalnvestigationsf irrigationys-tems wouldbe a valuable ddition o this study,but since suchresearch s

very costlyand engthy, ewhavebeendone(Glick'studyofValencia1970]is the best example; he few others includeKelly[1982],Stone[1984],and

Ludden1985]).

SamplingUnit-The Irrigation ystemApersistentproblemnnomothetictudies s to finda stableunitofanalysis.

In a recent paper Kellypointedout that "theirrigation ystem"seems tofunction s the masteranalytic oncept,but it is usuallyeft undefined.He

quotesone of the few definitions f it inthe literature: An rrigationystemis anarrangementywhichwater s conveyedromasource o anareaneedingwaterto facilitate he productionf desiredcrops" Kelly1983:881,quoted

fromvan der Mere 1968:720).Vander Mere'sdescriptiontates things hatare true of irrigationystems,but it tells us nothing bout heirdiscretenessand is thereforeof no use in decidingwhere the boundaries etween such

systemsare.

Ambiguityndmultivocalityn the unit of analysis ontribute o muchun-

certaintyoirrigationystemstudies hat heirresultsareseriouslyweakened.Oneexamplemakes hisclear.Millon'somparativetudy(1962) ncludedheEl Shabana, tribalgroup n southern raqstudiedby Fernea subsequentlypublishedn 1970).Millonmeasured heirrigationystemsizebythe number

of hectares he tribeoccupied.However, raqirrigationngineers,appointedandhiredbythenation,hadsystem-wide dministrativeuthority,ndvariousunits of the tribereceivedwater from he national anals hey administered.The territory overedby the irrigationystemand ts bureaucracy as thus

vastly greater han he territory ccupied y membersof the tribe.This sit-uations intolerablennomothetictudies,for no cross-system omparisons

possible f two or moreunitsofanalysis reused. Innomothetictudieseachvariablemust be measured nidenticallyefined ystems.Wethereforemusthavea wayof identifyingarticularrrigationystems.

Since any large-scale omparativetudyis forced to rely on the extantliterature,he sampling nitusedmust be identifiablen secondary ources.

Ideally,the unit shouldbe definedso that it is also applicable o archaeologicaland historicalsources. The followingdefinition s an attemptto specifyhow to

find the boundaries of particular rrigationsystems: a canal irrigationsystemis composed of (1) a facility(gate, offtake)which takes water from a natural

channeland moves it away from its naturaldownhillcourse and (2) the sub-









sequentcontrolworks(canals,gates, fields) hatguide he waterflowing nthesurface o theagriculturallantsuntil hatwatereithersoaks ntotheearthor flows on the surfaceoutof the control

works.3

TheVariablefAdministrativeuthorityAllthe theories aboutcentralizationf control,or lack of it, concern he

organizationfpower. nthelongrunwe would ike ohaveanswers oseveralfundamentaluestions boutpower nthe contextofirrigation:Whohaspoweroverwater,andhowandwhydo theyhave thatpower?Do thosewhohave

poweroverwaterhavepoweroveranythinglse? Do thosewho have othersources of powerhave powerover waterdecisions?And,finally,s there

directionalityetweenpoweroverwaterandpoweroveranythinglse? Powerhas beennotoriouslyifficulto define,observe,andmeasure,especiallyrom

secondaryiterature.The few extendedaccountsof conflict n the irrigationliteratureeemclearlyo reflectpowerdifferencesroughto bearon rrigationdecisions Gallin 966;vander Mere1971;E. Hunt1972).While hesecaseshavestrong nternal alidity, ojustificationxists forgeneralizingrom hemto a wholevillage, o a systemas a whole,or overanysubstantialimespan(i.e., theirexternalvaliditys low).

Sincepower s problematico measureand ts measurements all but im-

possiblefromexistingsources, the emphasis n this paperwillbe on thestructureof authorityn the administrationf irrigation ystems. A nearlyuniversal ontextof power,especiallyn states, authoritymaybe definedasthelegitimate ight o wieldpower.Authoritys rarelyrrelevanto powerandat timesprobablymapsit ratherwell.Authorityan be measured elativelyeasily (compared ithpower)both nthe fieldand nthesecondaryiterature.

Thephrase"centralizeduthority"ppearsepeatedlyndiscussions fcanal

irrigation,ndyet it is rarelydefined learlyor usedconsistently.na recentarticleKelly(1983)hasbegun he taskof segmentinghismuddled rea into

separatedimensions.He notes thattwo major onceptshave beeninvolvedin previousdiscussions f centralizeduthority:1) the internal onfigurationofauthoritymong olesofa systemand 2)theexternal elationshipf these

irrigationolesto rolesinothersocial ystems,especiallyhepoliticalystemof the state. Kelly(1983:883) uggeststhe terms"centralization/decentrali-zation" o designate he dimension f internal rganization,o indicate"the

degreeto which rrigationolesarehierarchicallyonfiguredndauthorityn

irrigationaskperformances concentrated." e suggests"articulation/auton-

omy" o indicatehe degreeto which he irrigation rganizations linked o,

oris independentf, thestate.Kelly's eparationftheconceptofcentralizedauthorityntothese two dimensionss potentiallyeryuseful.Butsince theterm"centralized"ayreferto bothdimensions, suggest"concentrated

dispersed" or the endpointsof the dimensionof internalcoherence ofauthority.A system withoutconstitutedauthoritywould have a maximumof dispersed,as opposed to concentrated, authorityand might be labeled "acephalous."A

system with a constituted authoritysystem might be labeled "unified."The









nomotheticpropositionwe are investigatingtates, in effect, that all canal

irrigationystemsareunified.

The meaning f centralizeduthoritymostprominentn the literatureon-cernsthe kindof linkagebetweenthe authorityoles of anirrigationystemandexternalentities, usually he state.4This articulations at the core of

Wittfogel's heoryandis the conceptof centralized hatMillonused in his

comparativetudy.Weshouldnote, however, hatallcanalrrigationystemsin modern tates are articulatedn somewaywiththe state. Eventhe most

independentrrigationommunitiesftenhavesome sort of legal permissionto organize ndarefrequentlyuralpersons(R. Hunt1987).5This dimension

(Kelly's"articulated/autonomous")s thefocus or thispaper.Onewaytostate

the questions whetherauthorityver the decisionsandactivitieswithin heirrigationystemis locatedwithin he irrigationystemor external o it.

An administrativetructuremustcontainwork to be done andindividualsto do thework.In theadministrationfcanalrrigation,everal asks androlesareinvolved.Severaluniversallyoundwork askshavebeen dentifiedncanal

irrigation ystems, includingonstruction f the physical ystem, captureofwater fromthe environment,llocationf water oncecaptured,maintenanceof the physicalystem,conflict esolution, ndaccounting. rainage ndritualtasks are also sometimes ound.If an authoritytructure s responsibleor

these tasks, then administrativeoles must exist to performhem.Systemswithconstituted uthorityre headedby a chiefexecutiveofficer,6 efinedasthat officerresponsibleor allocation t the facilitywhere the systemtakeswaterfromnature.Various ubordinatetaffmayalso be responsibleor al-location.Someor all of the other tasks of the irrigationystem maybe per-formedby this staff. The CEOusuallymustreportto a personor personsoccupyingome role orset of roles(MinisterfIrrigation,oard fDirectors,etc.).7 All rrigationystemscontain herole of farmer.For some tasks(e.g.,maintenancendconstruction),argenumbers f workersarerequired.These

workersmaybe full-timemployeesof thesystem,theymaybe farmerspartof whose responsibilitys to do this work,or they maybe laborershired

temporarilyorthe task at hand.A featureof authority ystems is a charter or thatauthority.Allformally

constituted anal rrigationdministrativeystemshave some sort of charterfor theirauthorityo run the system. The variable harterof authority asthree valueswithempiricalontent n canal rrigationystems:national ov-ernment, rrigationommunity,ndprivate." hese termsreferto the sourceof legitimacyor the chiefexecutiveofficer's xercise of authorityver allo-

cationat the headgate.Witha national overnmentharter, he centerof the polity a ministry r

an officialconnected directlyto the head of state) has directresponsibility or

operating the irrigationsystem, appointsthe CEO, and formulatesthe rules

for operating the system. In modern times the individualswho occupy the

position of CEO in systems with a nationalgovernment charter usuallyhave

formaleducation n civil or agricultural ngineering,are paida salary n money,









andoftenappearnthe centralgovernment udget.Theytendto be urbann

life-styleandaspirationsnd oftenin residenceas well. The standards nd

sanctions ortheirperformancere set by the ministry verseeing rrigation(R. Huntn.d.b).

Systemswith anirrigationommunityharterare often called ndigenous,traditional,r community-basedBeardsley 963;Coward 976, 1979,1980;MaassandAnderson 978).Inthese cases a corporate roupof water-rightsholders theirrigationommunity)lectsorappointsheCEO,whohasdirect

responsibilityorthe operationf the headgate.This individualrequently asno formal ducationn engineeringnd s usually memberof the corporategroupand a directuser of the water himself.He mayreceive no directre-

compenseat all. The less monetized he system, the more likelythat hisrecompensewillbe inthe formof relieffrommaintenanceabor, xtra wateror land,orproduce.Onlyveryrecentlyhashisrecompense eeninthe formofmoney.Such ndividualssually reresidents fvillages rruralowns,havea ruralife-style,andhave ewsignificantrban spirations.hestandards ndsanctions orexecutinghedutiesof theofficeare determinedndcarried ut

locally ythecorporateroup.At leasttwo cases onrecord nvolvewhatmightbe calledconsortia f irrigationommunities: alencianSpainand he King'sRiver WaterAssociationn Fresno, California.n both cases a numberof

irrigationommunitiesre locatedon a riverandcombine heirefforts o dealwithvariousointmatters.While uchconsortiare notstrictlyrrigationys-tems as definedabove,theircharter f authorityroceeds rom armers,andin this sense theyarelikeirrigationommunitiesR. Huntn.d.b).

Irrigationystemswithprivate harters rerunbyindividuals ho in effectcharter hemselves.Thiscommonlyccurswhen anentrepreneurunds he

buildingfthesystem.Mostof the casesknown o meinvolve elatively ighlycapitalizedgriculturalnterprisesn LatinAmericaparticularlyugarmills)(see Barkin ndKing1970;Ronfeldt973).Suchndividualntrepreneursome

froma widevarietyofbackgrounds;heycanbemerchants,ocally eneratedcaciques political osses), or foreigncapitalists. n almostevery case, the

irrigationystemis seen as belongingo the entrepreneur,ather han o thenationor a groupof farmersR. Huntn.d.b).

Among hese types of charters,considerableariations exhibited n thenumber f tasks the CEO s responsibleor and nhow fardownthe systemthatresponsibilityxtends.Irrigationommunities re the mostdenselyor-

ganized rom this pointof view: the officeresponsibleor allocations also

responsibleormaintenance,or accounting,ndfor the early(and n some

cases nearlyall of the)stagesof conflict esolutionsee R. Hunt1978,n.d.b).Theseresponsibilitiesxtenddown o the farmerevel.Systemswithnational

governmentharters refarmorevariable. ome akeresponsibilityorevery-thing rightdown to the farmgate (the Gezira scheme in the Sudan s the primeexample of this [Dishoni 1966; Farbrother1973]). Others will only take re-

sponsibilityfor allocationand maintenanceat the main-canalevel, leaving all








AUTHORITYN IRRIGATIONYSTEMS 343

other asksandallocationndmaintenancet lower evelstootherorganizationsor to no organizationt all(see R. Huntn.d.aforanextendeddiscussion).

Thequestion

f whetheranrrigationystem

has aconstituteduthority

anbeanswered sing heconceptsdiscussed bove.Asystemwithout nauthoritysystemhas noCEO.Systemscanbe unifiedanauthorityystemwitha CEOis present)or acephalousnoauthorityystemandno CEO).

The charter f authoritys the variableused formeasuring dministrative

authoritytructurenthispaper.Charters the sourceofauthorityf thechiefexecutiveofficer,who is responsibleor carrying ut allocation ecisionsatthe head-facility.hescaleofthis variables nominal.tsvaluesas isolated ofar are (1) national overnment, 2) irrigation ommunity, nd(3) private.

Irrigationystemswitha national

orprovincial)harterof

authorityre

po-litically entralizedi.e., state-controlled).ystemswithan irrigationom-

munityharter rwitha privateharter reclearly otstate-controlled;owever

they maybe articulated ith outside nstitutions.

TheVariablefSizeThree differentmeasuresof the sizeofanirrigationystemhavebeen used

in the literature.The populationontainedwithin he boundaries f a systemhasbeenusedbyMillon1962)andEarle 1978).Thelengthofthemain anal

or the total engthofthe canalshavebeenproposed yKappel1974).Finally,the overallextent (area)of the systemhas also been used by Millon 1962)and Earle(1978). In addition,distinctionsuchas technological omplexityhavebeen attractiveo some,whileorganizationalomplexity asappealedoothers seeNetting1974a;Spooner 974;Uphoff 986).The iteraturessilent,however,on where andhow one is to measure hese features.

Use of the populationf a canal rrigationystemas a measureof its sizeis anattractiveoncept ormany easons,butthedifficultiesnconceptualizingand measuringt are very great and have not been overcome.A primary

problems decidingwhois to be counted. f one focusesonthefarmers,henone has to decidewhetherone means the landowners,he farmoperators(theyare often notone and he same),and/orhe farmworkers whomaybe

partially r totallydifferentromthe previous ategories).Anaddedcompli-cation s that within heirboundariesome canal rrigationystems containrather arge owns(andperhaps ities),fewofwhoseresidentsare connected

directlyo the water ntheirrigationanalse.g., Valencia; resno,California).Censustracts arevirtually ever drawnnterms of hydrologicaleaturesandthereforedo not differentiate etweenirrigatorsndnonirrigators.he size

of the population ithin he boundaries f anirrigationystemthusmaycor-relate withmanyotherfactors,such as technology,he priceof land,andsourcesofemployment,ather hanwith hesize of theirrigationystem tself.

Allof these difficultiesmightbe resolved,giventhe timeand resources.Atthe present,however, hepopulationfanirrigationystemis neithera clear

conceptnor one thatcan be measured rom he secondaryiterature.








344 JOURNALFANTHROPOLOGICALESEARCH

Thelengthofthemain analand he total engthof the canalsof thesystemwouldbe veryinstructivemeasures o have.At the veryleast, a ratioof theextent of the systemto lengthof canalwould ell something bout he likelymaintenance urden.9t is not clear o me thatthelengthof the canal ystemwillcorrelatewithvariationnadministrativetructure, lthought might.Butthe lengthsof canalsystemsare onlyvery rarelyreportedn the secondaryliterature,nd herefore heconcept,howevernteresting,annot econvertedinto a usefulvariable t thistime.

Overall xtent has been the usualmeaning f the size of a canal rrigationsystem. Although o one has defined t, most authorsapparentlymeanthearea of the fields rrigated y the system,measurednacres or hectares.An

advantagef this

concepts that

manyauthors or

governmentocuments)

publish figureon the extent of a system.Extentis thus both a usefulandfeasiblemeasure,althought is not theonlyusefuloneimaginable. ifficultiesneverthelessexist withpublishediguresof the extent of a given system.Thoseresponsibleora systemmaybe motivatedo inflatets extent,partic-ularly f it is a national overnmentystem. Oftena systemis designed oreachgivensize, andalthought never reaches thatsize, the designedsizecontinues o be the official ize of thatsystem.Insomesystemsthe amountof land hat s irrigatednany givenyearis a function f the amount f water

in storage.Thisis true of the 53-hectaresystemin PulEliya(Leach1961)and of a 100,000-hectareystem in northwesternMexico(Hunt1982 field

notes).What hen s the extent of thesystem-the largestnumber f hectaresthathaveever beenirrigatednthatsystem,theaveragenumber fhectares,the designednumber f hectares,or the number f hectaresunder rrigationthisseason?Toselecttheaveragenumber srepresentingheadministrativelyrelevantnumbers tempting, ndI wouldputleastemphasis nthe designedsize, for this is occasionallywildly nflated.For workingn the secondaryliterature, owever, hequestionsmoot,forvirtuallyoonerelates he source

of the numberused,much ess howthatnumbers defined.Evenmore useful han he abovefigures ormeasuringhe size of an irri-

gationsystemwouldbe a ratioof the number f canalgatesto the extent ofthe wholesystem. This wouldbe a telling igure,for it would dentify henumber f decisionpoints nthesystem(eachgatemustbe operated; nd hemoregate operations,hemoredecisionsaken)andcouldverywellserveasanindexof administrativeensity.However, uch dataarerarelyavailable.

The definition f the size of an irrigationystem must be linked o thedefinitionf the systemitself.If we areattemptingo correlate wo ormore

variables,hose variablesmustbe measured n the samebasicsamplingnit,in thiscasean irrigationystem.Thesystemwas definedntermsofa head-

facilityand the controlstructureseading he waterawayfromthe natural

drainage ystem. The administrativeuthoritywas measuredby the type ofcharterof authorityresponsiblefor thatfacility.The size of thesystem,in turn,is the extent (measuredin hectares) of the fieldswhichare irrigated rom that

head-facility. t has a ratio scale. It is very difficult o know how to relate extent









to the casualuses of termssuch as "large," extensive,"nd"huge"hatareoftenfound ntheliterature.One mportantob orthefuturewillbe tocalibrate

such intuitiveudgments bout size to a consciousmeasureof size suchasextent.

RESULTS

SystemswithNo ConstituteduthorityThe vast majority f canal rrigationystems reportedn the literature o

haveaconstituteduthoritytructure.Mexico ontainsomethingfthe orderof fifteen housand amedrrigationystems,each of whichhas a constituted

authoritysee R. Huntn.d.a).OftheirrigationystemsreportedortheUnitedStates, allhaveconstituted uthority, nd the same holds(so far)forJapan,India, nd ndonesia. he totalrecorded umber fsystemswithnoconstituted

authoritys no morethan ourteen.So to date the evidence ndicates hatthevast majority f systemshave formal uthorityrganization. ow farback ntime this condition an be extended s unknown.Netting(1974b,personalcommunication983)hasargued hata smallsystemin the SwissAlpsdoesnot now, and has not for at least eighthundred ears, hadanyconstituted

authorityo run t. Earle 1978)haspresenteddata rom ontemporaryawaii

thatcanbe interpretednthe sameway,andde losReyes(1980a,1980b)haspresentedbriefaccounts f ten smallrrigationystems nthePhilippineshichlackconstituted uthority.These systemsare allsmall n size (less than20ha)and nnumber f farmers fewerthan hirty armers).

RelationshipfSizeandType fAuthoritytructureTable1 showsthe distributionf the variable f charterypewithrespect

to the variable f size. Noteworthy re the smallestsystemwitha national

government harter,at 700 ha (inIndonesia), ndthe largestconsortium f

irrigationommunities,t458,000ha(inthe UnitedStates).Inbetween hesetwo extremesare foundbotha number f irrigationommunityhartersanda number f national overnmentharters.

The interpretationf charter f authorityhouldbe straightforward.sys-tem witha nationalovernmentharters surelycentralizedstate-controlled),whereas an irrigationommunityhartermeans that the systemis not cen-tralizedbythestate.Theinterpretationf size, however, s more difficult.Nocommentatornthe literature asso farsaidwhatsizesystemwouldbe "large"or "small."To calibratehis variablewithpreviousstatements s therefore

impossible. t does seem certain hatany system of 458,000ha wouldbeconsideredargebyeverybody.My suspicions thatmostcommentatorsouldalsoregarda systemof 10,000haas large.

The mainconclusion to be drawnfromTable 1 is that, within a very broad

range of sizes (700 ha to 458,000 ha), size alone does not determine which

type of charter s necessary to operate a canal rrigation ystem. Bothirrigation

community(localcontrol)and nationalgovernment (externalcontrol)charters









TABLE1Size and Charter

SizeNameof System Country (inhectares) Typeof Charter

SanJuan Mexico 600 irrigationommunity

Tayuban Java 700 nationalovernment

ZanjeraDanum Philippines 1,500 irrigationommunityVicenteGuerrero Mexico 1,575 irrigationommunity12-Go Japan 5,500 irrigationommunityMoncada Spain 7,000 irrigationommunityMorelia 2 Mexico 8,000 nationalovernmentNew CacheLa Poudre U.S.A. 15,400 irrigationommunity

AngatRiver Philippines 26,890 nationalovernmentRioMayo Mexico 95,973 nationalovernmentFresno U.S.A. 97,000 irrigationommunityChia-nan Taiwan 150,000 irrigationommunity

Hindiyah arrage Iraq 209,000 nationalovernment

King'sRiver U.S.A. 458,000 irrigationommunityGeziraScheme Sudan 730,300 nationalovernment

Note:Sourcesor hesedata re istedntheAppendix.

can and do operate these systems. Inother words, politicalcentralizationi.e.,state control) of canal irrigation s not necessary between 700 and 458,000hectares. Size alone is not determiningwhat form of control the system has

(withinthis range of sizes).The internalvalidityof these findings s relativelyhigh. The definitionsof a

system and of the two variablesmeasuredare fairlyclear andeasily measured

from the secondary literature. If these measures are reliableand valid, the

rangeof sizes of canal rrigation ystems whichhave eitherirrigation ommunityor nationalgovernment charters can only increase."'

There are limitations on the external validityof the findingsdue to the

definitionof the universe used for the study and to the design of the study

(see Campbelland Stanley 1963; R. Hunt 1979). The samplingstrategy was

such that the relationshipof this sample distribution o the total universe of

irrigationsystems is unknown.The sampleused in this study was purposive,and the purposes were (1) to have data that are analyzable rom secondary

literature and(2) to maximizethe range of values for each variable.It is in nosense a randomsample of anythingand therefore cannot be taken as repre-sentative of the distributionof these variablesin any universe. Because the

universe was limited to modernnationstates, it is not known to what extent

the results of this study can be extended to other kindsof states, to states in

other time periods, and to nonstate societies.









DISCUSSION

It is widelyheld hatallcanalrrigationystemsmustbe unified, nd,as wehaveseen, this s notstrictlyrue.But heprobabilityhatany rrigationystemover, say, 100 ha willbe unifieds very high ndeed.If the size of anarchae-

ologicallyr ethnographicallyescribed analrrigationystemis greater han100ha, it wouldseem safe to infer hat t has or hada unified dministrative

authoritytructure.Foranysize under50 ha, this wouldappearo be prob-lematic.

The existenceof acephalousystemschallengeshe irrigation rganizationtheorythatthe problemsnherentn sharingwaterandperforminghe work

demand constituted uthority. hequestiono be answeredwithrespecttothese smallacephalous ystems, then, is howthey deal withthe tasks thatmustbe performed. llocationmustbeaccomplished, aintenanceerformed,accounting one,andconflict esolved.Themost difficultroblemsheyfacewouldprobably e sharingwaterin times of scarcityanddealingwith freeriders.If in fact these problemsdo notexist, then the questiono answer s

whytheyareabsent,whenmuch xperienceeadsonetoexpect heiruniversaloccurrence.Targetedieldworknoneofthesesystemsshouldbe a very highpriorityor the socialanthropologyf canalrrigation.

Wittfogel rgued hatboththe constructionndoperationf largehydraulicsystemsdemandwhat n thispaperhasbeencalledpoliticallyentralizedi.e.,state-controlled)management. able1 clearly ndicates hatvery largecanal

irrigationystemscanbe effectively perated ythefarmers. flargesystemsdo not need or demand oliticalentralization,henits existence s the resultofa choice,nota generalneed. Howthenmightwe proceed o try explaining,in a generalway, the distributionf state-controlledndfarmer-managedr-

rigationystems?Oneof the first tasksis to establishwhat s meantby "large."Up to this

point he discussion asbeenalmost ntirelyree of numbers.Oneconsequenceof the studyreportedhereis the realizationhatdefiningndestablishinghesize of a system is critical or a discussionof the relationshipf size and

organization.ntuitively,t seems to methatanythingargerhan3,000-4,000ha shouldbe called arge rom hepointof view of operations.At this size and

above,morethanone settlement s virtuallyertain o be involved n usingthesystem.Avillage aneasilybetheunitofoperationfan rrigationystem,forcomplex elationshipsnd ystemsofmanagementrealreadynexistence.Whena system is composedof two or morevillages,then a differentand

probablypecial-purpose)rganizationasto exist,andwith t comeproblemsofdisciplinewithrespectto rulefollowingndrevenue R.Hunt1978,1987).

Apotentially romisingineofinquiryo explores whether hekindofstate

has an effect on the size of irrigation ystems and their type of management.

It is temptingto say thatJapanandthe UnitedStates, for example, differfrom

Mexico and India. But the concepts we use to capture those differences are









vitallymportantndnotentirely lear.While olonialismyindustrialowersmightwell havesomethingo dowiththissituation,t willclearlynotaccountforChina. ndiahas builtseveralstate-controlledrrigationystemssincein-

dependence, ndMexicoreceivedpoliticalndependencen 1821,longbeforeits largemodernsystems were even thoughtof (see Kroeber1983). The

conceptof "kind f state"has beenwithus for a long ime,andwe writeabout

agrariantates, empires, ndustrialtates, mercantiletates, etc. But as yetI see no evidence hat the dimension r dimensionswhichcapturehese dif-ferenceshavebeenclearly ormulated,much ess operationalized.nyfuture

attempt o explain omeof the variationn irrigationystemswitha variableof"typeofnation tate"mustbepreceded ytheworkofcreatinghatvariable.

Some factorsmight avor hepresenceofpoliticallyentralizedi.e., state-

controlled)ystems. The degreeto whicha state permitsstrong egitimatelocalorganizationsightbe afactor. rrigationommunitiesfanysizeinvolvemore thana handfulfvillages, mposedisciplinen theirmembers,andhave

revenue-raisingower.Somestatesmightview suchentitiesaspotentialom-

petitors orpowerandthusdiscouragehemby taking verirrigationontrolat the state level. Some other factorsmight nclude tate controlover agri-culturalproductionndknowledgeof the dynamics f ruralpolitics see R.Hunt1988).

Other actorsmightpermit

rencouragerrigation

ommunities.omestates

mighthavesuchvaried ourcesof revenueandpower hat control ver canal

irrigation ystems is not necessaryfor the maintenancef state power.Or

agriculturalevelopmentmayhavereduced heuncertaintyf thefoodsupplyto suchanextentthat he statehas ess need omanage griculturalroduction.The presenceof suchfactorsreduces he importancef state controlof canal

irrigation.Communicationechnology ffects he speedwithwhichmessagesandper-

sonnel anbe movedaroundhe rrigationystem.Theoperationsfthesystem

mightthereforebe profoundlyffectedby changes n this technology.Con-versely, theymaynot be affected,at least from hepointof viewofthe social

organizationf control.The 12-Gosystemhasbeenin operation, s an irri-

gationcommunity,ince at leastA.D.1600(Beardsley,Hall,andWard 959),andthe Valencianystemshave hadthe sameorganizationack o A.D. 1200atleast(Glick 970;Butzeret al.1985).Inbothplaces echnology aschangeda greatdealover this timeperiod,as indeedhas thepoliticalnvironment;etthe irrigation ommunity as remained he dominantrrigationnstitutionnbothsystems.It is not clear o me at thispoint hatchangesncommunication

technology ecessarilymakeanysubstantial ifferencen the formof charterthat s necessary oroperatinghese several-thousand-hectareanalrrigationsystems.

Some of the systems in Table 1 have water storage facilities under their

control, and some do not. The effect of storage on administrative rganizationin this sample is not clear, but storage is a very old phenomenon (storageworks existed in medieval Ceylon and earlier still in South India [Murphey1957; Leach1959;Ludden1985]). Storagewouldreducevariance nthe amount









of wateravailable ndwould xtendwaterusage nseasonalerms. Butstoragealsoencourages xpansion f the area rrigated,whichwouldnturn ncreasethe pressureof scarcity, hereby ncreasinghe administrativeoad. At this

point t is not clear hatstoragehas visible ffectsupon heauthoritytructureof canal rrigation.

Theconceptofpoliticalentralizationsedinthispapers ofcourse imited.It demands state, perhapsa "modern"tate.And t willnoteasilyallow ortheaccretion findependence ylocalmagnates n thefringesoffadingtates.Evenin modern tates ambiguousituationswillarise,wheremanagers f astateenterprisealso haveverystrong ocal oyalties.But even withall these

problems, t seems to me thatthe conceptof political entralizationpera-tionalized ere is close to Wittfogel's oncept, s close to the ideas that are

presentedby manyauthors,and so far seems to work well in measuringparticularases.

The resultsof thestudyreportednthispaper restrongly ounterintuitive.No canal rrigationystemoughtto be ableto exist without onstituted u-

thority.Yettheydo. Andno largecanal rrigationystemought o be able tofunctionf managed nly by farmers.Yettheydo, andvery successfully.Weshouldbe cautiouswith heassignmentf confidenceo our ntuitionsnthesematters.

CONCLUSIONS

Thispaperhasrefined heconcept firrigationystem,constructed ariablesformeasuringhe administrativeuthoritytructure ndsizeofirrigationys-tems, andmeasured hesevariablesna smallpurposive ample.Amajor oalof thisexercisewas to reduce heuncertaintyf the nomothetic ropositionsconcerninghe relationshipf size andauthoritytructurencanalrrigation.

It has beenarguedhere that(1)verysmallcanalrrigationystemscan be

operatedwithno constituted uthority;2) canalrrigationystemsof consid-

erablesize (458,000ha) canbe, andare, operatedby localirrigationom-munities;and(3) canal rrigationystemsof smallsize (700ha)canbe, and

are,runbynationalovernments. he internalalidityf these results s rather

high.Theuncertaintyf theseresults,whencomparedwithprevious tudies,is substantiallyeduced.Theirexternalvaliditys moreproblematic. heseresultsclearlychallengehe standard ropositionsbout he relationshipe-

tweencanalrrigationndthe structure f authority.

Appendix

Sources for MeasurementsListedbeloware thenamesof thesystems,datesofobservations,ndsourcesused

for the measuresof size andtypeof charter ivenon Table1.

SanJuan,Mexico;1963-64Size: author's ieldnotesCharter: author'sieldnotes

E. HuntandR. Hunt1974;R. HuntandE. Hunt1976









Tayuban,ava;1983Size: Duewel1983:19Charter: Duewel

1983:19,n. 47

ZanjeraDanum,Philippines;970sSize: Coward 979:29Charter: Coward 979:31,32

VicenteGuerrero,Mexico Unidad e Riego,Durango);982Size: author's ieldnotes,WorldBankCharter: author'sieldnotes,WorldBank

Moncada,Valencia, pain;1968Size: MaassandAnderson 978:20Charter: MaassandAnderson 978:22-23

Morelia 2, Mexico Distritode Riego#020); 1982Size: DGDUR1982,#020:28Charter: author's ieldnotes,WorldBank

12-Go,Japan; 950-54Size: Beardsley,Hall,andWard 959:133Charter: Beardsley,Hall,andWard 959:135,277-79

New CacheLaPoudre rrigation ompany, olorado,U.S.A.; 1969Size: MaassandAnderson 978:298, able7.6Charter: MaassandAnderson 978:289,313

AngatRiverIrrigationystem,Luzon,Philippines;963-64

Size: Takahashi970:49Charter: Takahashi970:49,51, 120

RioMayo,Sinaloa,Mexico Distrito e Riego#038); 1982Size: DGDUR1982,#038:5Charter: author's ieldnotes,WorldBank

FresnoIrrigation istrict,California, .S.A.; 1969Size: MaassandAnderson 978:175Charter: MaassandAnderson 978:175,179-82

Chia-nanrrigationssociation, aiwan; 968-69Size: Pasternak 972:39Charter: Pasternak 972:27n. 8, 41

Hindiyah arrageCanal,SouthIraq;1956-58Size: Fernea1970:163Charter: Fernea1970:122-23

King'sRiverWaterAssociation,California, .S.A.; 1969Size: MaassandAnderson 978:147Charter: MaassandAnderson 978:255-56

author'sieldnotes 1987GeziraScheme,Sudan;1963-64

Size: Dishoni1966:90Charter: Dishoni1966:90

NOTES

1. Several nstitutions aveprovided upportorvariouspartsof this study.TheAmericanCouncil f Learned ocietiesawardedme a Fellowshipn 1975-76,and wo









sabbaticalsromBrandeis ave beenparticularlyelpful. amgratefulo ArjunAppa-durai,SandraBarnes,andespeciallyRobertNetting or editorialndsubstantive elp.IreneWinterhas as usualbeenof greatassistance.

2. This number f systemsis an educated uess. Mexico s now known o containabout ifteen housand ameddiscrete rrigationystems, irrigatingbout5.0 x 106

ha(DGDUR 982).Manynationshavea largenumber f irrigationystems,includingJapan,hePhilippines,ndonesia,ndia,China,Russia,Spain,France, taly, he United

States, Columbia,ndPeru. Someof these nationshave argesystems,but allhavea

largenumberof smallsystems. If each of these nationshas around wo thousand

systems, which eems conservative,hen a figureof a hundredhousandystemsforthe worldas wholeseems reasonable.The number f irrigated ectares n the con-

temporaryworld s knownwithconsiderablyess uncertaintyhan he number f irri-

gation ystems (Highsmith965).3. Thereare somepotential roblemswith hisdefinition. omesystemshavemorethanone headgate,such as the 12-Go systeminJapan Beardsley,Hall,and Ward

1959).How his situationffects he definitions notknown.Another otential roblemis thatirrigationystemsas heredefined houldbe clearly solated romeach other.

However,nmanypartsoftheworld,argeareasofirrigatedandareservicedbymanyirrigationystems. The irrigatedoast of Valencia,orexample,has 120continuouskilometers firrigation, ithmany mall amedrrigationystemscoveringheterritory.A questionof interest s whetherwhathappens t the boundaries f these systemschallengeshe definition f a systempresentedhere.

4. Oneof the meanings f centralizeduthority as beenwhetherornot anadmin-istrative tructure xists. This is betterconceptualizeds the presenceor absenceofconstituted uthority. spointed utabove,another f themeaningss that heinternaladministrativetructures dense, orhighly rganized,tc. (Kelly'sdimensionf cen-tralization). hislatterdimension as notbeensystematicallytudied.

5. In the articlepublishedwith Eva Hunt n 1976, I argued hat SanJuanand Pul

Eliyahadcentralizedrrigationystems becausethe localelites were in controlof

irrigationndwerecloselyconnectedo the state. I nowbelieve hatto be anerror.6. Thisname orthe principaloleis not a very goodone, but nonebetterhasyet

beendevised.The nameI have chosenconveys(1) that the office s concernedwith

the executionof tasks, (2) that t is the highestexecutiveoffice,and(3) that t is anoffice.

7. Policy s alwaysassociatedwith unifiedrrigationystems. The policy-makingbody s often the sourceof the CEO'sauthority. hisbodymayor maynot delegatesomeor allof the decisionso be made o some smaller ubsetofpeople.Manyof thesmaller"indigenous"ystems makedecisionsbasedon "tradition,"hich s usuallysomepolicydecisionmade n thepastandawarded earlyunchangeabletatus.Littlehasbeenpublishedbout hesepolicy-makingodiesor abouthowpolicys made Anexception s Valencia,where muchattentionhas been paid o the WaterCourt seeFairenGuillen

975]).Most of theliteratures concernedwith

carryingutpolicy,notwithhowit is made.8. Another ossible alue orthisvariables provincialharter.nIndia,orexample,

the charter orthe administrativeuthorityvermanycanal ystemsis vestedinthe

provincialcalled tate)governments, ot in the nationalovernment.These are notthestate,buttheyhavemany tatelike unctions. f thequestions whetherhefarmersor anexternalpoliticaluthorityharter he system,thenclearly heIndian rovinces









(states)do so andnot the usersof the system. It mightbe argued hat the central

government elegates heauthorityo theprovinces iathe constitution. xactlyhow

this situationhouldbe measureds notyet settled nmymind.

9. It wouldbe better o measuremaintenanceurden irectly, fcourse,andamajor

problemwithstudiesof canalrrigationystems s that heamountf maintenanceork

required ndperformeds rarely tated.10. I wouldexpect that the minimalize for systems with national overnment

charterswoulddecrease.I do not expect to findsubstantiallyargersystems with

irrigationommunityharters.

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Documents

Size and the Structure of Authority in Canal Irrigation Systems.pdf