Sixty years of Operational Research

European Journal of Operational Research 153 (2004) 618–623

www.elsevier.com/locate/dsw

Sixty years of Operational Research

Ken Bowen *

Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham Hill, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK

Received 10 December 2001; accepted 30 January 2003

Abstract

This paper describes the author�s experience of 60 years of Operational Research and presents some thoughts on the

nature of the work of an Operational Researcher.

� 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: History of OR; Practice of OR

1. Introduction

This is an account of the way in which my ownwork in Operational Research (OR) developed,

and what sort of mathematics has aided me. I also

discuss, in general terms, how OR elsewhere was

proceeding, how the various strands stand today,

and what, perhaps, the future may hold.

2. 1941–1946

In January 1941, I became a naval analyst in

technical radio intelligence 1 managing an opera-

tional department passing intelligence to Bletchley

Park and other authorities. Additionally, I was

* Tel.: +44-1-784443082; fax: +44-1-784430766.1 With keyed morse communications, our task was to match

transmitters (Radio-Fingerprinting) and the operators (TINA):

with other signals interest was mainly directed to their function

and purpose.

0377-2217/$ - see front matter � 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserv

doi:10.1016/S0377-2217(03)00267-4

also responsible for developing ways by which the

quality and quantity of information obtained

could be enhanced, by improvements to equip-ment and to data-handling. I did not, at the

time, see this as OR: indeed, it was not until

much later that I first heard the term and what it

implied.

Improving the operational performance of the

groups that I controlled, internally and externally,

was, I now perceive, a successful OR task. How-

ever, there were limitations on the value we couldoffer to the users of our output, since we were

never allowed to discuss the specific nature of how

they used this intelligence, let alone the reasons

why they needed it. Consequently, we could rarely

go beyond a certain routine process: feed-back was

very limited and face-to-face discussion was a rare

event.

The mathematics I needed was largely that re-lated to radio-propagation and the working of

transmitters, receivers and aerial systems. Fourier

series also came in useful. Measurement was very

much biased towards classification: had I been of

ed.

K. Bowen / European Journal of Operational Research 153 (2004) 618–623 619

the calibre of my former tutor, Henry (JHC)Whitehead 2, I might well have discovered fuzzy

sets, which I recognised immediately when I met

them 25 years later. Occasionally, I worked on

equipment problems, primarily concerned with

devices that improved the data I required. One

exception was a study of how to run a long loop of

recording wire over a drum made of threaded rods

without tension building up and the wire snapping:an analogous problem was recently discussed on a

TV programme, trying to reinvent the water rais-

ing equipment that may have been used for the

Hanging Gardens of Babylon!

3. 1946–1954

The war ended with my having a great interest

in radio equipment, and a generally diminished

recall of my university mathematics. I could have

gone back to do pure mathematical research, and I

also had the possibility of a transfer to the (new)

GCHQ at Cheltenham. However, a more attrac-

tive option was to run a small statistical group to

be concerned with the analysis of data from radioequipment under development, primarily naviga-

tional aids, direction finders and communication

systems (radar was worked on elsewhere). My

work could be described as data driven since I had

no prior knowledge of statistics as a subject area.

Mathematically, it was interesting, mainly be-

cause the distributions I dealt with were seldom

standard, but I needed little more than basic cal-culus and algebra. From an OR standpoint, it

would have been more what was called assessment,

had it not been for the closeness with which I was

able to work with the users and to incorporate

both operational and technical factors. I was able

to spend a lot of time at sea, partly on trials and

partly just getting experience of equipment in use:

this incidentally also gave me useful knowledge ofradar which I was able to use later.

Apart from statistical work, I also carried out

purely mathematical studies. The most interesting

2 Henry was in OR at the Admiralty with PMS Blackett for a

while, but he found it not to his mathematical taste and went to

Bletchley Park to work in cryptographic analysis.

of these was an attempt to select from a number ofuseable frequencies (which could be modelled as

the first n integers), a set in which no three were in

arithmetic progression (AP). Operationally, two

frequencies in use would cause interference on a

third should the three be in AP, due to non-linear

resonators inherent in a ship�s structure. The so-

lution was required for very large values of n (up

to several hundred) and the set selected was to bereasonably evenly spread over the whole range.

You will recognise this as a now-solved problem in

number theory. I did not solve it, but by a process

of successive approximations starting from 1, 2, 4,

5, 10, 11, 13, 14, 28, 29, 31, 32, 37, 38, 40, 41, . . . , Iobtained a good enough set. There were no com-

puters, and it is worth mention that, as with

complicated statistical calculations, I was depen-dent on standard calculators, punched cards and a

lot of arithmetic.

It may also be worthy of note that in many

areas of work the geometry of conics proved to be

an important aspect of the models I needed to

develop.

4. Operational Research––first comment

I first became aware of OR in 1949 from a talk

by E.C. (Bill) Williams, then Director of Opera-

tional Research, Admiralty. Like Moli�eere�s Bour-

geois Gentilhomme, who found that he had been

speaking prose all his life, I recognised what I had

been doing, albeit not yet in full context, for thepast 10 years. Helped by wise seniors, I planned

my route towards involvement in tactical and

strategic inquiry, so as to extend the equipment-

oriented OR that had been my main endeavour.

I also looked at what was happening in indus-

try, and it was very different to what was going on

in Naval Operational Research. The latter con-

centrated on tactical problems, under considerabledifficulty since there was no real (i.e. fighting) en-

vironment: games and exercises at sea were the

vehicles for getting data to add to the limited

amount of relevant wartime data (and later that

from the Korean and Suez wars) to establish

greater accuracy of estimation of Operational

performance. Industry was moving primarily on

620 K. Bowen / European Journal of Operational Research 153 (2004) 618–623

the ‘‘housekeeping’’ side: inventory control, stockcontrol and other models tended to be mechanistic

and in comparison to naval battle models, very

sophisticated. Queuing theory and reliability the-

ory were also becoming subjects in their own right.

None of this seemed relevant to the current naval

problems. Both were doing OR, but never did the

twain meet.

5. 1954–1961

For me, a key period was the Staff Course at

Greenwich in 1954, followed by a course at the

Naval Tactical School. Not only did this give me

the status of a qualified Naval Staff Officer, but it

introduced me to a range of tactical and strategicissues including ones of collaboration with the

other two services. Following this, I might have

gone on to the Department of OR, Admiralty but I

chose to stay in my R&D Establishment with the

opportunity of looking at some equipment as-

sessments in a wider context.

An important one concerned a projected peri-

scope detection radar, the potential of which Iexamined taking into account what sonar and

other underwater systems (seaborne and airborne)

could play in submarine detection. The study

showed the radar to add little to the operational

outcome of antisubmarine warfare and it was not

proceeded with.

Another looked at the need for a UHF DF

equipment, operating on the new UHF voicecommunications, helping to get aircraft safely

back to the carrier. Again there were many alter-

native aids, many of them radar, and it seemed

again that only a small operational gain would be

bought at a high price. I had however forgotten

that the old VHF DF, albeit not very accurate,

was user-friendly and the pilots loved it. In the

words of one of my Naval advisers ‘‘I agree withBowen�s analysis, but not with his conclusions’’!

The equipment was developed and I added human

factors to my list of subject areas for essential

study.

In 1956, I went to sea (a period of 18 months) as

Scientific Adviser to CinC Home Fleet/CINC-

EASTLANT. I was responsible for all naval

exercise analyses and, in one case, a major airdefence exercise, I was also a member of the ex-

ercise planning team, enabling me to set all re-

quirements for data collection. My main NATO

post was Records Officer at the Maritime Head-

quarters at Northwood: I redesigned the data

collection and analysis process and the enhanced

flow of useful intelligence to SACLANT was ac-

knowledged: at least one other NATO headquar-ters adopted a similar reorganisation. The various

analyses carried out, both for national and NATO

working, had direct impact on tactical doctrine.

From 1958 to 1961, I served as Scientific Ad-

viser to the Director of Naval Plans, Admiralty

and, in a part-time capacity, to the Chief of Am-

phibious Warfare (CAW). My concerns were now

at the strategic level; in many cases, the issuesanalysed were of 3-service concern. My task was

essentially to prepare reports and briefs for con-

sideration at Chiefs of Staff level, and I depended

heavily on analyses carried out by both opera-

tional research and equipment assessment scien-

tists.

Mathematically, there was nothing that posed

difficulties. The essential features of the work wereto know what was going on in ‘‘the corridors of

power’’, to know those who were the authorities or

experts in the many areas in which information

might be required, and to provide timely and

logically supported advice. Being ‘‘right’’ was im-

portant: the work done had a major bearing on the

Navy�s ‘‘voice’’ in debates with the other services

and on the establishing of Naval policy.Perhaps my most important contribution re-

lated to the nuclear deterrent which was now

passing from the RAF�s V-bomber force to the

Navy�s planned POLARIS submarines. The de-

terrent level was quoted as ‘‘at least 50% damage

to each and every one of a stated number of Soviet

Union cities’’. The rationale for this I found to be

non-existent: it merely stated what the RAF coulddo! By changing the statement to ‘‘an average level

of 50%’’, I showed that there could be, on that

basis, a massive saving, and such a change was

accepted in principle. This also triggered a much-

needed debate on what might be considered to

deter an attack on the UK and, further, whether

the concept of an independent nuclear deterrent


had military relevance or was purely a political/diplomatic concept related to relations (particu-

larly information exchange) with the US. Eventu-

ally, the independent UK deterrent, became the

smallest operationally viable force of POLARIS

submarines that could be deployed!

Of other tasks that affected the future, it is in-

teresting to note that tactical planning that I was

involved in for CAW had an eventual pay-off inthe efficient way in which the amphibious forces of

the Royal Marines were deployed in the Falklands

war. I was then retired from Defence, but I was

able to predict quite accurately the operations that

would be carried out (fortunately later work had

helped to ensure that the relevant forces would

survive!).

6. 1961–1967

This period was my most intense phase of de-

fence OR activity. Initially, in the Department of

OR, Admiralty, I was concentrating on simple

mathematical models in the fields of anti-subma-

rine warfare and air defence, using variants ofLanchester models of combat (differential equa-

tions of battle), and also examining vulnerability

of ships to torpedo and missile attack. My re-

sponsibility was the development of operational

models related to operations in support of friendly

nations overseas. Indonesia and Kuwait were

countries I examined in detail, the first as a po-

tential enemy, the second as an ally threatened byIraq. My most studied texts were the multivo-

lumed Times atlases: such geographical aspects as

water depths and beaches, what nations owned the

many islands and who might threaten them, were

among my many concerns.

Informally, I set up a group, including analysts

from the other services and developed conceptual

models of the diverse activities of an interventionin which the naval roole was to move, supply and

defend military units; the Royal Marines with their

helicopters and landing craft were special ele-

ments.

Everything came together, when I moved in

1965 to the new central Defence Operational

Analysis Establishment at West Byfleet, where ail

that I had ever done and learnt seemed to serve myresponsibilities for maritime warfare advice to the

MOD.

My team slowly built up to include officers of

ail three services, a few scientists with long expe-

rience in naval warfare, and some with specialist

knowledge of earlier OR studies of air and army

problems. We expanded existing models, eschew-

ing computer simulation models because of thethen difficulty of getting large enough samples, and

developed useful ‘‘games’’ to examine submarine

attack processes and airborne movement of army

units.

In 1966–1967, we carried out major studies for

the Secretary of State for Defence, a movement

study to examine the intervention potential of

existing forces and what would be needed in 10years time, and a more general appreciation of

UK capabilities in antisubmarine warfare and the

defence of major units. Both were successful

studies. Importantly, the Royal Marine compo-

nents of our defence forces were shown to be

essential.

7. Operational Research––second comment

In general, application of OR in industry and

commerce had expanded into many areas but it

had become increasingly mathematical, concen-

trating still on ‘‘shop-floor’’ activities. There was

certainly little of a strategic nature. There were

however notable exceptions in some Governmentdepartments, at the National Coal Board, in the

British Steel Corporation, and at Rolls Royce,

and, in general, there were more than enough ideas

to feed on to make membership of the OR Society

a necessity. What I gained mainly bore fruit in

strengthening my bias towards simple models for

‘‘casting light’’ and against solution-oriented op-

timisations.Linear programming was the one modelling

area that was well and truly adopted (it formed the

central modelling approach for the second stage of

the intervention movement studies referred to

above). Otherwise, ideas for modelling were de-

pendent of a large number of sources, few of them

from conventional OR areas.

622 K. Bowen / European Journal of Operational Research 153 (2004) 618–623

8. 1967–1979

My last 12 years in MOD were spent as an in-

dependent researcher. My main topic was conflict;

initially, this was a concern with understanding

how we might avert wars rather then how we

might win them. I had staff to support me, both in-

house and in universities; these worked on furtherextensions of Lanchester Theory, on fuzzy logic

and on research games.

The conflict work gradually moved into studies

of the operational research process itself: the logic

that drove this was the interdependence of conflict

and problems. Increasingly, attention got focused

on questions such as ‘‘how do we work to ensure

that we are studying the right problem?’’; ‘‘how dowe determine what models will best serve our

purpose?’’; ‘‘what limitations are there on possible

ways ahead, unless organisations also are chan-

ged?’’, and so on. Mathematics was not the key;

subject areas such as psychology and the social

sciences had relevant things to say, as had lin-

guistics, particularly related to confusions caused

by the way language was used.None of this was new, since reflection on my

own practice, and my discussions with other

practitioners, showed that we had often in effect

dealt with these questions. But our processes were

implicit not explicit, and were not fully understood

nor adequately developed.

It is not possible to cover the wide range of

inquiry that filled the years up to my formal re-tirement in 1979. Suffice it to say that I ended with

an association with many like-minded researchers

in many countries, a good working knowledge of

conflict resolution processes and of decision theo-

ries, and a certainty that except for problems that

could be fully and simply defined, mathematics

had a much more limited role to play in opera-

tional research than many believed.

9. Operational Research––third comment

The 1970s were not a good period for OR. As

needs for help with decision problems shifted to-

wards the strategic end of the spectrum, opera-

tional research tools and processes were lacking. In

defence, this was increasingly felt and the estab-lishment. I served came under increasing criticism.

Some moves towards better links between foreign

policy and defence analysts were attempted, but a

change in the emphases of OR foundered on a

general desire to hold fast to the familiar. This was

the decade when Russell Ackoff spoke out in two

papers, published and debated by the OR Society,

‘‘The future of OR is past’’ and ‘‘Resurrecting thefuture of OR’’ [1,2]. Across the board, industrial

and civil government OR included, the future did

not seem bright.

10. 1979 to date

Throughout the 1980s, at Royal Holloway, Ideveloped my own ideas on improving OR process,

particularly in problem formulation and sharpened

these through the work of a Research Assistant and

two doctoral students on contracts and other

consultancy work. I worked closely with individual

researchers elsewhere who were developing practi-

cal applications of meta and hypergames, cognitive

mapping, Strategic Choice, systems thinking andother processes that provided structure for dealing

with the largely unquantifiable aspects of prob-

lems. We were all, in effect, seeking theories of

decision aiding rather than theories of decision. We

were not trying to replace mathematical OR ap-

proaches but to understand better when various

standard modelling techniques were appropriate

and when they were not.This sort of work has continued apace and

much is now operationally available. Similar ex-

tensions of the scope of OR have also taken place

in many European countries. A Working Group,

of which I am a member, ensures that communi-

cation of ideas is widespread. I am less optimistic

about the direction in which US operational re-

search is moving.

11. Operational Research––fourth and final com-

ment

Where does OR stand today? The number of

analysts who understand the non-mathematical


structuring processes are increasing in number andindustry in particular is taking good advantage of

this, either through their own staff but also by

using the growing number of strong consultancy

groups. In government OR, similar tendencies are

seen. In the case of defence, there are still big

problems mainly because of the rapid move to-

wards concepts of interposition and humanitarian

aid. The balance needed between the so-called softand hard techniques is under urgent examination.

The greatest difficulty for OR workers today is

that, although improved methodology is available,

any process used can only carve out an m-dimen-

sional slice of an n-dimensional problem (m is

likely to be very much less than n). Different pro-

cesses are chosen by different people and although

there may always be good help given, the end re-sults will not be the same. As yet, we have only

vague understanding of the impact of the differ-

ences, although though there is nothing that seems

to be inherently inconsistent between the processes

available; techniques developed within individual

processes certainly seem to be transferable. The

logical problem is that, ultimately, the process is

an individual�s way of working and even if we tryto follow suit, we end up with our way of working

not someone else�s. We seem to need something

like a choreographer�s notation, to describe, step

by step, what we are doing.

I have elsewhere made a plea for help from puremathematics (see [3]). We already have in various

places bits of graph theory and set theory, and

ideas from topology, algebra, fuzzy logic and

much more. The structures that define the ways of

working are very complicated with feedback and

recursion everywhere. The catch-22 situation is

that operational researchers are not pure mathe-

maticians (although some, like me, may have beensuch long ago) and pure mathematicians are not

attracted by the messy, ill-defined worlds that

operational researchers live in. If this can be

overcome, maybe decision making can be helped

by OR to come to take place in a more rational,

cooperative and non-confrontational manner, with

conflict working to create desirable change with-

out destroying continuity and stability. There is noharm in having a dream.

References

[1] R.L. Ackoff, The future of operational research is past,

Journal of the Operational Research Society 30 (1979) 93–

104.

[2] R.L. Ackoff, Resurrecting the future of operational re-

search, Journal of the Operational Research Society 30

(1979) 189–199.

[3] K. Bowen, A challenge: Can mathematics aid development

of the process of operational research? IMA Journal of

Mathematics Applied in Business and Industry, 2, 73–77.

Documents

Sixty years of Operational Research