Six Party Negotiations€¦ · rhetoric and actions, produced three documents, the last of them coming in October 2007. 3 Unfortunately, none of the outcomes of these talks were implemented,

1

Six Party Negotiations

London International Model United Nations

21st Session | 2020

2


London International Model United Nations 2020

Table of Contents

Introduction Letter 3

Introduction to the Committee: 7

Committee Format & Rules of Procedure 9

Definitions 17

Timeline of Events 20

Discussion of the Problem 23

Security and International Agreements 24

Political Considerations 28

Economic Considerations 31

The Use of Sanctions 34

North Korean Nuclear Capabilities 37

Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid 37

National Strategic Outlooks 41

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 41

Japan 42

People’s Republic of China 44

Republic of Korea 45

Russian Federation 46

United States of America 47

Conclusion 49

Questions a Resolution should answer : 49

Bibliography 50

3



Source: https://asiasociety.org/switzerland/events/korean-peninsula-and-changing-global-security-landscape-basel

Introduction Letter

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the Six Party Negotiations at LIMUN 2020.

This committee carries on LIMUN’s proud tradition of running highly

relevant yet experimental simulations that further its mission of improving

young peoples’ understanding of international affairs.

In this committee, you will be challenged to be diplomats, leaders, and

states-people, capable of understanding the extraordinary depth and

nuance presented by this topic. In the present global political environment,

it is more necessary than ever that young leaders are able to see beyond

4



facile dichotomies presented by mass media and understand for themselves

the subtleties that lie behind each issue of global importance.

As such, the issue of the Korean Peninsula - one of the most pressing

security issues in modern geopolitics, as well as being one of the most

complex - is the perfect arena for you to hone your negotiating skills.

Our modified negotiations format is intended to facilitate debate that allow

delegations to outline their priorities, and focus resolution efforts on

particular areas of debate in flexible bloc alignments.

As always, this guide is intended to be just the beginning of your

preparation for the conference. We invite you to read widely beyond the

material presented here, and be prepared to defend your national interests

come February.

We wish you the best in preparing for the conference.

Yours,

Gyubin, John-Paul, & Martijn

Dais, Six-Party Negotiations

[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

5



Director - Gyubin Hwang

Dear Delegates,

My name is Gyubin, a second-year Natural Sciences student at UCL

concentrating in condensed matter physics and materials chemistry.

Despite my degree programme, I have for five years participated in and

organised numerous MUN conferences in various countries, teaching public

speaking, statecraft, and critical skills to young students along the way.

I proposed the topic of Negotiations on the Korean Peninsula, not just

because I am Korean, but because I find it genuinely fascinating. In my

not-so-objective opinion, it is one of the most nuanced topics at this year’s

edition of LIMUN. It is our goal that the debate challenges delegates to

consider not just the subtleties of international policy, but the foundation

on which our understanding of global politics rests. In a tumultuous world

where national interests and populist politics trump traditional security

concerns and geopolitical strategies, how valuable is international

cooperation, and how viable is it?

I hope that delegates leave the conference sceptical, confused, and

frustrated, and through that, drive yourselves to understand the world

better.

Best regards,

Gyubin Hwang

6



Assistant Director - John-Paul Duddy

Hello delegates!

It is with immense pride that I welcome you all to the Six Party Negotiations

on the Korean Peninsula, here at LIMUN 2020.

The topic due to be debated in this committee is undoubtedly one of the

most interesting and pressing to face the modern international system, a

factor which should lead to stimulating and fruitful debate over the course

of the weekend. That’s why I am so excited to see what innovative and

exciting ideas you all come up with in your navigation of this topic.

Finally, LIMUN is one of the best opportunities to meet new people in MUN

and this extends well beyond the committee sessions so please enjoy

yourselves and the experience. I hope I can be as helpful as possible both

before and during the conference, so please get in touch via email if there’s

anything you would like assistance on. See you all soon!

Assistant Director - Martijn Bergmann

Dear delegates,

I’m Martijn, a second-year Security Studies student at the Leiden University

in The Hague. If a word describes how I feel about this committee it would

be excitement! I hope that through the liberties you can take within this

committee that a fruitful discussion will emerge. There is so much freedom

within the discussions, but the topic is really broad, so my advice to you

would be to focus on the key topics that your country is interested in.

Lastly, I hope that you will be well researched in session to enable the other

delegates to go into a deep discussion; that you will play your role well in

order for the special dynamics of this committee to play its course well and

finally that everyone will simply have a good time. I wish you all the best

of luck in your preparation and if there are any questions, we are happy to

answer them.

Kind regards, Martijn Bergmann

7



Introduction to the Committee:

The Six Party Talks were first conceived of as Three-Party Talks, comprising

China, North Korea, and the U.S. Soon after, it was agreed that the talks

would expand to include the other key regional stakeholders in the question

of North Korean denuclearisation.1

Representatives of the six delegations sat for their first meeting in August

2003 in Beijing.2 Six successive rounds of talks, punctuated by aggressive

rhetoric and actions, produced three documents, the last of them coming

in October 2007.3 Unfortunately, none of the outcomes of these talks were

implemented, resulting in the breakdown of talks.

In April 2009, following a failed missile test by the DPRK that attempted to

place a satellite in orbit, the UN Security Council adopted a statement that

condemned the test, reiterating the conditions of Security Council

Resolution 1718.4 5 In response, the North Koreans withdrew from the Six-

Party Talks, saying in a statement that “the DPRK will never participate in

the talks any longer nor it will be bound to any agreement of the Six-Party

Talks.”6 7

1Six-Party Talks. (2011, April 8). Retrieved October 21, 2019, from https://media.nti.org/pdfs/6ptalks.pdf.

2The Six-party Talks Kicked off. (2003, August 27). Retrieved November 2, 2019, from http://www.china-

un.org/eng/zt/ch/t25488.htm.

3Six Party Talks, October 2007: Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement. (2007,

October 3). Retrieved November 2, 2019, from

https://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/Second_Phase_Actions_Oct_07.doc.

4United Nations. (2009, April 13). SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNS LAUNCH BY DEMOCRATIC

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AGREES TO ADJUST TRAVEL BAN, ASSETS FREEZE, ARMS

EMBARGO IMPOSED IN 2006 | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. Retrieved December 2, 2019, from

https://www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9634.doc.htm.

5United Nations. (2006, October 14). Resolution 1718. Retrieved from

http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1718.

6Landler, M. (2009, April 14). North Korea Says It Will Halt Talks and Restart Its Nuclear Program. Retrieved

December 2, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/15/world/asia/15korea.html?ref=global-home.

7Thomson Reuters. (2009, April 14). North Korea's statement. Retrieved December 2, 2019, from

https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-response-sb/north-koreas-statement-idUKTRE53D0PC20090414.

https://media.nti.org/pdfs/6ptalks.pdf

http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/ch/t25488.htm


https://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/Second_Phase_Actions_Oct_07.doc

https://www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9634.doc.htm

http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1718

https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/15/world/asia/15korea.html?ref=global-home

https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-response-sb/north-koreas-statement-idUKTRE53D0PC20090414

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Since then, there have been intermittent calls for the resumption of the

talks by each of the delegations.8

Scenario & Mandate

Following succeeding bilateral summits and ministerial talks with the North

Korean government, all parties involved have agreed to return to the table

in February 2020 with the stated goal of bringing peace to the Korean

Peninsula, going beyond ‘mere’ denuclearisation, the objective of past

talks.

8Soldatkin, V. (2019, April 29). Putin says U.S. guarantees unlikely to prompt North Korea to de-nuclearize.

Retrieved December 2, 2019, from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-russia/putin-says-u-s-

guarantees-unlikely-to-prompt-north-korea-to-de-nuclearize-idUSKCN1S02TP.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-russia/putin-says-u-s-guarantees-unlikely-to-prompt-north-korea-to-de-nuclearize-idUSKCN1S02TP


9



Committee Format & Rules of

Procedure

1. The Diplomats

The six countries represented are: Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea, Japan, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea,

the Russian Federation, United States of America.

Each delegation will comprise of the Permanent Representative to

the United Nations, Foreign Minister, National Security Advisor.

Delegates will not be assigned a character profile, and are each

expected to have individual perspectives backed up by research. If

so desired, delegations might coordinate internally before the

conference to agree upon areas of specialization. The committee will

challenge each delegate to lead and set the agenda within the

individual delegation as well as lead effective cross-country

negotiations across various debate formats.

Each delegate is functionally a plenipotentiary, but each delegation

is permitted a single vote for both procedural and substantive

questions.

2. Intended Objectives of the Negotiations Format

Given the numerous aspects of the topic under consideration, the

delegates must be able to decide within and between delegations

what their strategic priorities are, and debate the topic accordingly.

At the same time, the agenda-setting deliberations should not be

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time-consuming, and leave flexibility for the debate.

In addition, the format is intended for delegates to have

simultaneous negotiations - for instance, for all the Foreign

Ministers to have an unmoderated caucus over the details of a

particular clause while other delegates are in a moderated caucus.

It is also possible to have such meetings at bilateral or multilateral

levels without involving all 6 delegations present. In fact, this is

encouraged, and delegates are encouraged to formalize these

backroom negotiations through Working Agreements.

3. Outcome Documents

There are three forms of documents permissible in this committee,

as explained below:

a. Working Papers

In the process of internal negotiations, delegations may wish

to publicise their strategic priorities or negotiation terms to

the committee. This may be done in the form of Working

Papers, which differ from Working Agreements. Working

Papers may propose policies, set out areas for cooperation, or

issue a statement regarding the stance of the delegation

involved.

These papers are not binding, but are formally introduced to

the committee without procedural debate upon submission.

The content within these documents may then be referred to

during debate.

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These documents shall be known as Working Paper of the

Delegation of [Country] and observe the following format:

Preamble

Subsequently, we, the Delegation of [Country] declare the

following:

b. Working Agreements

At any point over the course of the debate, delegates are

permitted to engage in backroom negotiations with Dais

approval. These discussions should be founded on delegation

priorities, and are a means for delegations to flesh out policy

debate on a particular issue. They may involve any

combination of delegates, so long as there is one

representative from each delegation remaining in the central

chamber. Working Agreements are formal documents that act

as a written summary of the backroom negotiations.

Working Agreements may propose policies, set out areas for

cooperation, or issue a statement regarding the stance of the

parties involved.

For instance, Japan and the USA could state within an

Agreement that they commit to military cooperation through

war games and troop sharing agreements.

These agreements are not binding, but are formally

introduced to the committee without procedural debate upon

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submission. The content within these documents may then be

referred to during debate.

These documents shall be known as Working Agreements

Between [Relevant Parties] on the Question(s) of

[Given Topic(s)] and observe the following format:

Preamble

Subsequently, we, the Representatives of States agree on the

following:

Essentially, Working Agreements perform the same function

as a Working Paper, but are multilateral as opposed to

unilateral.

c. Joint Declaration

The final outcome document of the committee (if applicable)

shall be known as the Joint Declaration of the Six Parties

on the Question of the Korean Peninsula, and observe the

following format:

Preamble

Subsequently, we, the Representatives of States at the Six-

Party Negotiations at LIMUN 2020 agree to the following:

1. (Mention key points of consensus in each clause; add

things you might hope to agree on in the future if not

agreed as part of this Declaration)

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Consequently, we seal this agreement by committing to

(add closing clauses/statements)

4. Negotiation Rules of Procedure

Debate in this committee shall take the following structure, with

each cycle lasting about an hour and approximating 1 month of

negotiations in real time.

Stage of

Negotiations

Description

Stage 1: Internal

Negotiations

Unmoderated

Delegations must be separated. In this

time, diplomats will discuss their negotiation

strategies, ‘red lines’, policy priorities, and

set out a vision for how the negotiations will

proceed over the course of the conference.

Internal working papers may be written

during this time, to be presented to the

committee during the later strategies.

Motions Permissible:

- Motion to move into internal

negotiations (15min maximum)

- Motion to move into the following

stage of negotiations

- Motion to introduce a Working Paper

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(accepted without vote)

Stage 2: Agenda

setting and discussion

thereof

Moderated & Unmoderated

During this stage, all 18 delegates will be

situated in the central chamber for plenary

debate. Delegates are expected to give

quick speeches to outline their policy

priorities and stances, GSL style, without

entertaining questions. Diplomats from the

same delegation may not be on the

speaker’s list simultaneously. During this

time, delegates may motion to move into a

separate caucus or a moderated caucus.

These may be entertained simultaneously.


- Motion to move into the following

stage of negotiations

- Motion for a x-party private caucus

between [roles] of [countries]

(accepted without vote assuming all

diplomats are in favour)

- Motion for a moderated caucus on

[topic]

- Motion to introduce a Working

Agreement (accepted without vote)

Stage 3: Press briefing Moderated.

Diplomats from each delegation will select a

single representative to answer questions

15



posed by the Dais. The Dais will produce

press statements regarding the content of

these briefings.


- Motion to move into a press briefing.

One representative from each

delegation will volunteer or be

selected by the Dais. A total speaking

time of 10 minutes is set.

- Motion to move into the next cycle of

negotiations.

Voting Procedure:

- Each delegation is permitted one vote per question.

- Substantive votes require 6 votes in favour. Abstentions and

votes against will act as vetoes.

- Procedural votes require 4 votes in favour. Abstentions and

votes against are permissible.

5. Position Paper Requirements

Position papers will be compulsory for this committee due to the

complexity of the negotiations. The chairs reserve the right to

withdraw delegates from the committee prior to the beginning of

the conference if it is deemed that they are not sufficiently

prepared.

Position papers must observe the following criteria:

- 1” margins

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- 11pt, 1.5 line spacing

- No more than 2 pages in length excluding bibliography

- Clearly cited in APA style

In addition, delegations may wish to submit a Country Position

Paper following the same formatting guidelines as above but with a

maximum length of 4 pages. This is not mandatory but is

recommended for the delegates’ own benefit.

Position papers may overlap in content with the material provided in

the study guide and the addenda, but papers should add depth to

the diplomats’ and delegation’s chosen policy priorities. These

papers should not just be research, but provide creative insight into

how each diplomat will conduct their negotiations in terms of red

lines, possible concessions, and tactics. It is up to each team to

pursue specific agenda items to be debated over the course of the

conference, and it is not expected that every topic will be

thoroughly negotiated.

6. Press Updates

Over the course of the committee, press releases and international

reactions will be released to add a dynamic element to the debate.

This will be done by and at the discretion of the Dais, and delegates

will be judged on how they respond to these situations.

17



Introduction

Definitions

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) - The Convention

on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of

Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

(BTWC) prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of

bacteriological and toxin weapons. Countries must destroy or divert to

peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of

delivery within nine months after the entry into force of the convention.

The BTWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into

force on March 26, 19759.

Brinkmanship - A negotiating tactic that escalates threats in order to

achieve one’s aims. Involves the mixing of aggressive and provocative

tactics, including issuing unconditional demands, blustering, bluffing,

threatening, stalling, imposing deadlines, and even walking out of

negotiations10.

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) - The Chemical Weapons

Convention (CWC) requires each state party to declare and destroy all

chemical weapons (CW) and CW production facilities it possesses, or that

are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well as any CW

it abandoned on the territory of another state. The CWC was opened for

signature on 13 January 1993 and entered into force on 29 April 199711.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) - Opened for

signature in 1996 at the UN General Assembly, the CTBT prohibits all

nuclear testing if it enters into force. The treaty establishes the

9 NTI. (2019). North Korea. Retrieved from https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/biological-weapons-

convention-bwc/

10 https://www.jstor.org/stable/20672592

11 NTI. (2019). North Korea. Retrieved from https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/convention-

prohibition-development-production-stockpiling-and-use-chemical-weapons-and-their-destruction-cwc/

https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/biological-weapons-convention-bwc/

https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/biological-weapons-convention-bwc/

https://www.jstor.org/stable/20672592

https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/convention-prohibition-development-production-stockpiling-and-use-chemical-weapons-and-their-destruction-cwc/


18



Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to ensure the

implementation of its provisions and verify compliance through a global

monitoring system upon entry into force. Pending the treaty’s entry into

force, the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO is charged with

establishing the International Monitoring System (IMS) and promoting

treaty ratifications12.

Cryptocurrency - Electronic and decentralised currency designed to hide

transaction information13.

Deterrence - A theory that posits that nuclear weapons are intended to

deter foreign states from attacking with their own nuclear weapons,

through the potential of mutually assured destruction14.

Geneva Protocol - Formally known as the Protocol for the Prohibition of

the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of

Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, this protocol prohibits the use in war of

asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and bans bacteriological warfare.

It was opened for signature on 17 June 192515.

GLCM - Ground Launched Cruise Missile, a land-based missile that flies on

a non-ballistic, low-altitude trajectory, delivering large payloads with high

precision16.

IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency, an international organization

that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and to inhibit its

use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons. This is the agency

responsible for denuclearisation inspections17.

12NTI. (2019). North Korea. Retrieved from https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/comprehensive-

nuclear-test-ban-treaty-ctbt/

13 https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cryptocurrency.asp

14 https://www.rand.org/topics/nuclear-deterrence.html

15 NTI. (2019). North Korea. Retrieved from https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/protocol-

prohibition-use-war-asphyxiating-poisonous-or-other-gasses-and-bacteriological-methods-warfare-geneva-

protocol/

16 https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/744a/967a64d31319d7f4bea77a006de5c0d1013e.pdf

17 https://www.iaea.org/about

https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-ctbt/

https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-ctbt/

https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cryptocurrency.asp

https://www.rand.org/topics/nuclear-deterrence.html

https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/protocol-prohibition-use-war-asphyxiating-poisonous-or-other-gasses-and-bacteriological-methods-warfare-geneva-protocol/



https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/744a/967a64d31319d7f4bea77a006de5c0d1013e.pdf

https://www.iaea.org/about

19



ICBM - Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, a class of missile that has a

minimum range of 5,500 km and is typically intended to deliver nuclear

warheads. North Korea has tested missiles that could have a range of up

to 13,000km, putting the entirety of continental US within range of nuclear

weapons18.

INF Treaty - Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a treaty banning

the use of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of

between 500 and 5,500 kilometres, their launchers and associated support

structures and support equipment19.

Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization

of the Korean Peninsula - Under the Joint Declaration, the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) agree

not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use

nuclear weapons; to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes; and

not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment.

It was signed January 20th, 1992 and entered into force on February 19th,

199220.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) - An informal arrangement

established in April 1987 by an association of supplier states concerned

about the proliferation of missile equipment and technology relevant to

missiles that are capable of carrying a payload over 500 kilograms over a

300-kilometer range. Though originally intended to restrict the proliferation

of nuclear-capable missiles, the regime has been expanded to restrict the

spread of unmanned aerial vehicles21.

18 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41174689

19 https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm

20 NTI. (2019). North Korea. Retrieved from https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/joint-declaration-

south-and-north-korea-denuclearization-korean-peninsula/

21 NTI. (2019). North Korea. Retrieved from https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/missile-

technology-control-regime-mtcr/

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41174689

https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm

https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/joint-declaration-south-and-north-korea-denuclearization-korean-peninsula/


https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/missile-technology-control-regime-mtcr/

https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/missile-technology-control-regime-mtcr/

20



Nuclear Fission - The division of a heavy nucleus, such as uranium or

plutonium, into two fragments of equal mass. This process releases a large

amount of energy and is referred to when discussing atomic bombs22.

Nuclear Fusion - The fusing of the nuclei of two atoms to form a single

heavier atom, which in this process releases a large amount of energy.

These are often referred to as hydrogen bombs or thermonuclear

weapons23.

Nuclear Weapon - A nuclear weapon is a device designed to release

energy explosively as a result of nuclear fission, nuclear fusion or a

combination of the two processes. When discussing nuclear weapons, the

word kiloton and megaton (1,000 and 1,000,000 tons) are used to describe

their blast energy in the equivalence of TNT. To illustrate, the atomic bomb

dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 contained about 140 pounds of highly

enriched uranium, which released 15 kilotons of energy.24

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) - Signed

in 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is

the most widely adhered-to international security agreement. The “three

pillars” of the NPT are nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful

uses of nuclear energy25.

22 Steinberg, P. E. (2019) Nuclear fission. In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved from:

https://www.britannica.com/science/nuclear-fission

23 Conn, R. W. (2019). Nuclear fusion. In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved from:

https://www.britannica.com/science/nuclear-fusion

24Cochran, T. B., & Norris, R. S. (2019). Nuclear weapon. In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved from:

https://www.britannica.com/technology/nuclear-weapon

25 NTI. (2019). North Korea. Retrieved from https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-on-the-non-

proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/










https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/

https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/

21



Timeline of Events

1992 - Joint Declaration signed by North Korea and South Korea.

This outlines that neither state will ’test, manufacture, produce, receive,

possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons’ and establishes a mutual

inspection mechanism26.

1994 - United States of America (USA) and DPRK sign the Agreed

Framework. This bilateral document aimed to halt North Korea’s nuclear

ambitions and open up two of its secret military bases for inspection in

exchange for the provision of safer nuclear reactors and low-level

diplomatic ties with the USA27.

2003 - First Round of Negotiations takes place. DPRK entered talks

aiming to secure a normalisation in relations and a non-aggression pact

with the USA, moves both vociferously opposed by the US negotiators28.

Nonetheless, this initial Round concluded with the agreement that all

parties should be working towards a peaceful and long-term solution for a

nuclear-free Korean Peninsula whilst still respecting North Korea’s security

concerns29.

2004 (Feb) - Second Round of Negotiations are held. This Round

failed to progress much further and instead split the parties down the

middle. Whilst China and Russia both hinted at their support for the

discontinuation of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons programme but

maintenance of any other nuclear activities, the remaining parties indicated

26 Nuclear Threat Initiative. (2011, October 26). Joint declaration of South and North Korea on the

denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. Retrieved from https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/joint-

declaration-south-and-north-korea-denuclearization-korean-peninsula/.

27 Riding, A. (1994, October 22). U.S. and North Korea sign pact to end nuclear dispute. The New York Times:

Section 1, p. 5. Retrieved October 23, 2019 from TimesMachine.

28 Davenport, K. (2018, June). The Six-Party talks at a glance. Retrieved from

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/6partytalks.

29 http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t29001.htm



https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/6partytalks

http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t29001.htm

22



their support only for the complete elimination of all North Korean nuclear

activities and facilities30.

2004 (June) - Third Round of Negotiations takes place. The USA used

this Round to detail proposals for the step-by-step dismantling of North

Korea’s nuclear activities, including a three-month transitional period, with

South Korea suggesting a similar proposal. However, despite North Korean

insistence that such a move may prove workable, the parties failed to make

any notable progress31.

2005 (Feb) - North Korea confirms the existence of its nuclear

programme. Stating it necessary in order to counter the threat of US

policy towards North Korea. All other parties responded by indicating their

expectation that negotiations would resume so as to dial down the

rhetoric32.

2005 (Sept) - Fourth Round of Negotiations are held, and result in

a more constructive conclusion. All parties agreed to improve terms of

trade and energy cooperation with North Korea, and both the USA and

Japan vowed to further normalise diplomatic ties with North Korea33. In

exchange, North Korea conceded to stop moves towards nuclear weapons

and to submit to IAEA inspections34.

2005 (Nov) - Fifth Round of Negotiations prove inconclusive with

little further progress being achieved. Relations rapidly deteriorated

following the US imposition of sanctions of Banco Delta Asia, which was





32 North Korea says it has nuclear weapons and rejects talks. (2005, February 10). The New York Times.

Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/10/international/asia/north-korea-says-it-has-nuclear-

weapons-and-rejects-talks.html.

33 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (n.d.). Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks.

Retrieved from https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/6party/joint0509.html.





https://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/10/international/asia/north-korea-says-it-has-nuclear-weapons-and-rejects-talks.html


https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/6party/joint0509.html


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accused of being a money laundering front for the DPRK’s government. In

response, North Korea began testing nuclear weapons throughout 200635.

2006 - UN Security Council passes Resolution 1718. This condemns

North Korea’s nuclear tests, instructs it to cease its activities and to return

IAEA safeguards under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty36.

2009 - North Korea leaves the Negotiations. Following the test

deployment of a North Korean missile, the UN Security Council announced

its intention to increase sanctions on North Korean firms. In response,

North Korea announced its decision to leave the talks and stated that it

would not be bound by previous agreements, effectively ending

negotiations37.

2018 (Apr) - Kim Jong-un holds a summit with South Korea’s Moon

Jae-in. Here, both leaders reaffirmed their pledges to ensure a nuclear-

free Korean Peninsula38.

2018 (June) - Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump meet. In a

demonstration of a significant diplomatic thaw, the USA pledges to halt

military exercises in South Korea in exchange for the destruction of a North

Korean missile test site39.



36 United Nations. (2006, October 14). Resolution 1718. Retrieved from

http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1718.



38 North Korean Nuclear Negotiations. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/timeline/north-korean-

nuclear-negotiations.

39 North Korean Nuclear Negotiations. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/timeline/north-korean-

nuclear-negotiations.




https://www.cfr.org/timeline/north-korean-nuclear-negotiations




24



Discussion of the Problem

Security and international agreements

On the Korean peninsula, North Korea poses the most serious security

challenges for South Korea.40 The most obvious security threat is nuclear

proliferation. Ever since North Korea withdrew from the Non-proliferation

Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and its first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea has

held a nuclear threat above the South Korean population.4142 It could be

argued, though, that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is only used as a

deterrent to ensure the states’ survivability.4344

Moreover, North Korea also is not a party to the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Missile Technology Control

Regime (MTCR) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),

whilst being a state party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons

Convention (BTWC) and Geneva Protocol.45 Seeing how North Korea

has dealt with international treaties in the past, however, could the state

be trusted by the international community if they would sign a new treaty?

Considering there have been 21 United Nations Security Council

40 Rozman Leadership Changes and South Korea’s China Policy. Retrieved from the Korea

Economic Institute of America website: http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/tipping_point_full_book_final_version.pdf

41 Davenport, K. (2019). Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance. Retrieved from the Arms

Control Association website: https://www.armscontrol.org/printpdf/2566

42 Kim, S. C., & Cohen, M. D. (Eds.) (2017). North Korea and nuclear weapons: entering the new era of

deterrence. Georgetown University Press.

43 Roehrig, T. (2013). North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Future Strategy and Doctrine. Retrieved from

https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/roehrig-policy-brief-may-2013.pdf



45 NTI. (2019). North Korea. Retrieved from https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/convention-

prohibition-development-production-stockpiling-and-use-chemical-weapons-and-their-destruction-cwc/

http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/tipping_point_full_book_final_version.pdf

https://www.armscontrol.org/printpdf/2566






25



resolutions since 1993, any North Korean signed agreement might be put

into doubt by its allies and its foes.46

If these resolutions and the sanctions included in them have any

effect is a debate on itself. 49 states have been identified to have violated

the sanctions, of which 13 militarily.47 Additionally, Noland argues that

sanctions up until then had not deterred North Korea to change its course

and for a modern interpretation, Kleine-Ahlbrandt48 also argues that the

implementation of a sanction regime against North Korea has not changed

behaviour as intended by the UN and the United States.49 Are sanctions

going to change the nuclear path North Korea has taken or will they only

lead North Korean leadership to entrench their position and secretly keep

developing their nuclear arsenal? Within the powers of the UNSC, the only

other measure they would be able to take is to intervene within North

Korea, but this is realistically never going to pass the veto-holding

permanent members, but whilst looking at previous agreements, the

diplomatic route also does not seem too bright; so what else could be done?

The Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the

Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula led to the establishment of

the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC), which after 12 meetings

could not come to an agreement. After these failed negotiations, North

Korea withdrew from the NPT and as such the Joint Declaration was

overshadowed. In 1994, the Agreed Framework between the US and

46 United Nations Security Council (2019). Resolutions. Retrieved from

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0

47 Albright, D., Burkhard, S., Lach, A. & Stricker, A. (2017). Countries Involved in Violating UNSC

Resolutions on North Korea. Retrieved from the Institute for Science and International Security

website: http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/countries-involved-in-violating-unsc-resolutions-on-

north-korea/10

48 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, S. (2019, October 7). Maximum Pressure Against North Kores, RIP. 38 North.

Retrieved from https://www.38north.org/2019/10/skleineahlbrandt100719/

49 Noland, M. (2008). The (Non) Impact of UN Sanctions on North Korea. Retrieved from the

Peterson Institute for International Economics website: https://www.piie.com/publications/working-

papers/non-impact-un-sanctions-north-korea




http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/countries-involved-in-violating-unsc-resolutions-on-north-korea/10


https://www.38north.org/2019/10/skleineahlbrandt100719/

https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/non-impact-un-sanctions-north-korea


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North Korea was established, which seemingly worked in stabilizing the

situation between 1994 and 2003 when North Korea withdrew from the

NPT. A major part of this agreement breaking down is the inability of the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor North Korea’s

nuclear activities. On the other hand, during these agreements, North

Korea was continuously accused of breaking the terms of them, as they

supposedly build secret facilities striving for just the direct opposite of what

the agreements required of them.50

In April 2003, multilateral dialogue between China and North Korea

started, eventually also including the US, but eventually expanding to the

six-party negotiation format also including Japan, Russia, and South Korea.

During the fourth meeting, the parties agreed to a Statement of

Principles, which again virtually led to no practical results. In the seventh

meeting in February 2007, the parties agreed on the Initial Actions for

the Implementation of the Joint Statement. In September 2007 the

parties agreed to the Second Action Plan, which agreements were not met

until months after the deadlines initially set. After a second nuclear test in

2009, the six parties ceased to convene with each other. 51 Now talks have

started again, specifically between South Korea, the US, and North Korea,

things might seem like they are improving. History seems to be repeating

itself, however, as promises are made, but no real action is taken. It might

be necessary for one of the parties to take a bold first step towards a peace

agreement, but this would certainly be a risky political move, which might

not be realistic.

The nuclear arsenal is only a part of the security threats on the

peninsula, though. Leadership transitions in a state are shown to affect

foreign policy. This comes to light when a leader with different preferences

50 NTI. (2019). North Korea. Retrieved from https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/

51 Ibid.

https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/

27



and interests comes to power.52 South Korea has seen administrations that

were allied to the United States for a long time but recently has also been

changing to favour cooperative policies towards China as well.53

Furthermore, South Korean change of leadership has led to a rift in relations

with Japan, one of their key allies within the region. The South Korean

government decided not to renew the 2016 General Security of Military

Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which regulates the exchange of

military intelligence. When it was signed, it was disputed by the South

Korean progressives, which at the time were not in power. Those

progressives are in power now, though, which might be involved with the

decision to not renew the agreement. The US has underscored the

importance of strong alliances in this region. The only winner in this

situation seems to be China, which regards the US alliance (Japan, South

Korea and the US) in the region as a major source of asymmetric

advantage.54

China, however, can be argued that it is not such a great ally of North

Korea anymore. Various individuals have come out claiming that the

relationship is on the verge of breaking. According to Boc the Treaty of

Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, or the Alliance Treaty is

under tense strain and with its validity running until 2021, it is a big

question if it will be renewed or not. As such, North Korea has to watch the

52 Mattes, M., & Leeds, B. A., & Carrol, R. (2015). Leadership Turnover and Foreign Policy Change: Societal

Interests, Domestic Institutions, and Voting in the United Nations. International Studies Quarterly, 59(1), 280-

290.

53 Rozman Leadership Changes and South Korea’s China Policy. Retrieved from the Korea

Economic Institute of America website:


54 Panda, A. (2019, September 8). Can China take advantage of rift between South Korea and Japan?

The South China Morning Post. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3026208/can-china-take-advantage-rift-between-south-

korea-and-japan


https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3026208/can-china-take-advantage-rift-between-south-korea-and-japan

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3026208/can-china-take-advantage-rift-between-south-korea-and-japan

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relations with its key allies closely in order to correctly assess the political

situation it is in.55

Similarly, Russia has its geopolitical reasons for ensuring a stable

Korean peninsula. A conflict with either North or South Korea could spark

a multitude of scenarios, for example, refugee flows coming from the

Korean Peninsula which are fleeing an armed conflict. Additionally, nuclear

fallout from potential nuclear weapon usage could spill over to Russia,

disrupting ecological and societal aspects. Moreover, Russia has various

trade deals with both states and has an interest to counteract Chinese and

US interests within the region.56 Thus, a multitude of actors with interests

in the region are all playing their own strategic game, which has the

potential to also change on a dime. The sudden death of Kim Jong-Il in

December 2011, for example, showed the hope for a radically different

regime for South Koreans which in the end did not happen.57

Political Considerations

While noting that these varied aspects of the topic are impossible to

consider independently, there are some key considerations on the political

and diplomatic sides of the question.

One of these areas is the question of US-Japan-ROK military

cooperation. The three states have shared security interests in the Asia-

Pacific since the conclusion of World War II, among those, countering

communist and Chinese influences, maintaining economic and political

55 Boc, A. (2019, July 26). Does China’s ‘Alliance Treaty’ With North Korea Still Matter? The

Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/does-chinas-alliance-treaty-with-north-korea-

still-matter/

56 Defense Intelligence Agency. (2018). Global Nuclear Landscape 2018. Retrieved from the Defense

Intelligence Agency website:

https://dod.defense.gov/portals/1/features/2018/0218_NPR/img/Global_Nuclear_Landscape_2018_Final.pdf



https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/does-chinas-alliance-treaty-with-north-korea-still-matter/





29



stability, and addressing the question of North Korea. At the same time,

the historically fraught relationship between Japan and South Korea has

“fluctuated between comity and crisis.”58

The key arbiter between these two states has been the United States,

leveraging its close economic and political ties to both countries and

reminding them of the necessity of countering Chinese and Russian

influences with a unified front. 59 60 The present American administration,

however, has demonstrated a reluctance to step in and mediate the conflict

between two key important allies in the Indo-Pacific. 61 This has led to

deteriorating relations, a situation that is not improved by Washington’s

efforts to increase the Seoul and Tokyo’s share of the bill for maintaining

US based in their countries.62

One silver lining in this tripartite political relationship is the survival

of GSOMIA. Following months of posturing by both Japan and South Korea,

the Korean government announced on the 22nd of November that it would

renew the intelligence-sharing agreement, indicating that countering North

Korean aggression in close cooperation with Japan and the United States

remains a key strategic priority.63 North Korea reacted strongly to this

58Lind, J. (2019, November 1). Japan, South Korea, and the Politics of the Present. Retrieved November 27,

2019, from https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/japan-south-korea-and-the-politics-of-the-present/.

59Harding, R. (2019, October 24). Divided by history: why Japan-South Korea ties have soured. Retrieved

November 2, 2019, from https://www.ft.com/content/13a3ff9a-f3ed-11e9-a79c-bc9acae3b654.

60Yamaguchi, M. (2019, November 12). Japan, US say 3-way ties with South Korea are key to security.

Retrieved November 23, 2019, from https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/11/13/japan-

us-say-3-way-ties-with-south-korea-are-key-to-security/.

61Katz, K. F. (2019, March 26). When Tokyo and Seoul Fight, a Complacent Washington Loses. Retrieved

November 2, 2019, from https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/when-tokyo-and-seoul-fight-a-complacent-

washington-loses/.

62Seligman, L., & Gramer, R. (2019, November 18). Trump Presses Japan to Pay Up for U.S. Troops. Retrieved

November 25, 2019, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/18/trump-japan-south-korea-pay-united-states-

troops-billions-asia-pacific/.

63Yoshida, R., & Sugiyama, S. (2019, November 22). GSOMIA survives as South Korea reverses decision to

exit intel pact with Japan. Retrieved November 26, 2019, from

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/11/22/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-south-korea-gsomia-talks/.

https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/japan-south-korea-and-the-politics-of-the-present/

https://www.ft.com/content/13a3ff9a-f3ed-11e9-a79c-bc9acae3b654

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/11/13/japan-us-say-3-way-ties-with-south-korea-are-key-to-security/


https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/when-tokyo-and-seoul-fight-a-complacent-washington-loses/


https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/18/trump-japan-south-korea-pay-united-states-troops-billions-asia-pacific/


https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/11/22/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-south-korea-gsomia-talks/

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announcement, accusing the United States of exerting undue pressure on

the South Korean government, and invoking anti-Japan and anti-US

sentiments in South Korea. 64 65

Another key, if obscure, party in the peninsula’s security architecture

is the United Nations Command (UNC). The UNC is one of the signatories

of the Korean Armistice Agreement, and has for decades remained

responsible for monitoring the terms of the armistice.66

In recent years, however, the US-backed UNC has taken an

increasingly active role in shaping diplomacy in the region. The UNC’s

“revitalisation” campaign is seen as an American effort to maintain their

strategic interests and presence in North-East Asia after 2023, when the

operation control of troops on the peninsula is set to be transferred to

Seoul.67 Seoul is averse to an expansion of the role of the UN Command

over questions of sovereignty and maintaining control over the peace talks

with North Korea. China, too, is likely to have concerns over the proposed

revitalisation, perceiving it as a threat to its ambitions in the region.

Indeed, the UN Command is not functionally a subsidiary organ of the

United Nations. The Security Council resolution authorising the creation of

the command refers to the apparatus as a “Unified Command under the

United States of America”. This has been confirmed on numerous occasions

by various UN Secretaries-General. Former UN Secretary General Boutros

Boutros Ghali, in a 1994 letter to North Korea, wrote, “...the Security

Council did not establish the unified command as a subsidiary organ under

64Nhk. (2019, November 28). N.Korea claims US pressured South on GSOMIA. Retrieved December 1, 2019,

from https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20191128_01/.

65민심의 저주와 분노를 자아내는 외세굴종행위. (2019, November 29). Retrieved December

1, 2019, from http://www.uriminzokkiri.com/index.php?ptype=ugisa1&no=1183452.

66UN Security Council Resolution 84 (1950). (n.d.). Retrieved December 1, 2019, from

https://undocs.org/S/RES/84(1950).

67Harris, B. (2018, October 2). S Korea peace drive complicated by 'revitalisation' of UN Command. Retrieved

November 27, 2019, from https://www.ft.com/content/68a16b60-c520-11e8-8670-c5353379f7c2.

https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20191128_01/

http://www.uriminzokkiri.com/index.php?ptype=ugisa1&no=1183452

https://undocs.org/S/RES/84(1950)

https://www.ft.com/content/68a16b60-c520-11e8-8670-c5353379f7c2

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its control, but merely recommended the creation of such a command,

specifying that it be under the authority of the United States. Therefore the

dissolution of the unified command does not fall within the responsibility of

any United Nations organ but is a matter within the competence of the

Government of the United States.”68 Thus, the UNC has the authority to

take military action on the Korean peninsula without a UN Security Council

resolution, needing simply US Congressional approval. 69

As a result of its quasi-legal status under Chapter VII of the United

Nations Charter, the Command’s existence has frequently been questioned,

especially by China and North Korea.70

Economic Considerations

Like with the varied political considerations, there are a number of

economic factors which also merit consideration.

Foremost of these is the importance of trade in coal, something of

great economic and strategic importance to resource-rich North Korea. In

2013, for example, North Korea became the world’s top exporter of

anthracite, a particularly high-quality type of coal71. In the same year, the

revenue generated by the coal trade equated to 10% of North Korea’s GDP,

underlining its importance to the DPRK’s government in funding the

procurement of many basic needs72. In recent years, North Korean trading

68Kim, M. C., & Pak, C. G. (1997, May 7). DPRK Perspectives on Ending the Korean Armistice. Retrieved

from http://oldsite.nautilus.org/fora/security/4a_DPRKonKA.html#sect3.

69Salmon, A. (2019, May 8). In South Korea, a UN Command that isn't: Article. Retrieved December 1, 2019,

from https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/05/article/in-south-korea-a-un-command-that-isnt/.

70UN Live United Nations Web TV - Media - Ambassador Sin Son Ho, the Permanent Representative of the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the UN - Press Conference. (2013, June 21). Retrieved December 1,

2019, from http://webtv.un.org/media/press-conferences/watch/ambassador-sin-son-ho-the-permanent-

representative-of-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-to-the-un-press-conference/2498682301001.

71 Pavone, G., & Sun, J. (n.d.). Coal diplomacy: The political economy of North Korean coal. Retrieved from

http://gregpavone.com/dprk-coal.

72 Pavone, G., & Sun, J. (n.d.). Coal diplomacy: The political economy of North Korean coal. Retrieved from

http://gregpavone.com/dprk-coal.

http://oldsite.nautilus.org/fora/security/4a_DPRKonKA.html#sect3

https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/05/article/in-south-korea-a-un-command-that-isnt/

http://webtv.un.org/media/press-conferences/watch/ambassador-sin-son-ho-the-permanent-representative-of-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-to-the-un-press-conference/2498682301001


http://gregpavone.com/dprk-coal


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relations can be seen to have flourished, a fact no more true than with

China where trade growth of 14.1% was recorded at the beginning of last

year73, and where trade continues to expand into other areas including

natural resources and manufactured goods74.

However, it is the trading of coal in particular which is cause for

concern in some quarters given that it is listed as a sanctioned good by the

UN75. Despite insistence from the Chinese government that it is adhering

to the UN sanctions76, it has been reported that a number of Chinese

traders are buying and stockpiling North Korean coal in the hope that

improved diplomatic relations between North Korea and the other parties

will result in the easing of some sanctions and allow for export of cheaper

North Korean coal77.

Whilst this remains a phenomenon primarily between North Korean

and Chinese traders, it will be for all delegates to consider practical means

to achieving an effective solution to this issue. This will require a broader

understanding of the discussions around the use of sanctions, something

which will be explored in more detail later on.

Another area of economic importance is the realm of currency,

namely cryptocurrencies. It was announced last year that North Korea

73 Jeong-ho, L. (2019, July 24). China-North Korea trade up 14.3 per cent in first half to US$1.25 billion. South

China Morning Post. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3019940/chinas-

first-half-trade-north-korea-recovers-old-allies.

74 Perlez, J., & Huang, Y. (2017, April 13). China says its trade with North Korea has increased. The New York

Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/world/asia/china-north-korea-trade-coal-

nuclear.html.



nuclear.html.



nuclear.html.

77 Wong, S-L. (2018, May 11). Exclusive: North Korean traders offering cheap coal on hopes sanctions will

ease - Chinese traders. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-northkorea-

coal/exclusive-north-korean-traders-offering-cheap-coal-on-hopes-sanctions-will-ease-chinese-traders-

idUSKBN1IC0M1.

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3019940/chinas-first-half-trade-north-korea-recovers-old-allies


https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/world/asia/china-north-korea-trade-coal-nuclear.html






https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-northkorea-coal/exclusive-north-korean-traders-offering-cheap-coal-on-hopes-sanctions-will-ease-chinese-traders-idUSKBN1IC0M1



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intended to develop its own cryptocurrency, primarily as a means of

completing international transactions which would be otherwise impossible

under traditional financial structures thanks to UN-imposed sanctions78.

Indeed, this has become something of an established practice with other

sanctioned nations such as Russia, Venezuela and Iran expressing their

preferences towards developing cryptocurrencies79.

However, it would be potentially misleading to view cryptocurrencies

as simply a preserve of unorthodox financial practice. Indeed, many nations

or organisations might look to the potential advantages brought about by

the development of cryptocurrencies. For example, it was announced last

year that Busan, a major South Korean city, intended to liberalise its

regulatory powers to facilitate the development of cryptocurrencies and

related financial services80. It was envisioned that this would encourage

new business and job opportunities in the area and place South Korea at

the forefront of international efforts to develop crypto-companies81. Whilst

this is just one example, it does illustrate a more general picture that

crypto-mechanisms can be used to institute positive or innovative change

just as much as to circumvent sanctions, something delegates should be

mindful of when considering the future role of cryptocurrencies in their

solutions.

One final economic consideration is that of greater economic or

trading cooperation between North and South Korea, namely under a

manner similar to that of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. This was a joint

78 Krumholz, W. (2019, September 26). North Korea’s cryptocurrency shows the limits of Trump’s ‘maximum

pressure’. Business Insider. Retrieved from https://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-cryptocurrency-

shows-limits-of-trumps-maximum-pressure-2019-9?r=US&IR=T.

79 Krumholz, W. (2019, September 26). North Korea’s cryptocurrency shows the limits of Trump’s ‘maximum

pressure’. Business Insider. Retrieved from https://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-cryptocurrency-

shows-limits-of-trumps-maximum-pressure-2019-9?r=US&IR=T.

80 Meyer, R. (2019, August 2). South Korea declares partial ‘regulation-free’ zone for crypto companies.

Retrieved from https://www.coindesk.com/south-korea-declares-regulation-free-zone-for-crypto-companies.

81 Meyer, R. (2019, August 2). South Korea declares partial ‘regulation-free’ zone for crypto companies.

Retrieved from https://www.coindesk.com/south-korea-declares-regulation-free-zone-for-crypto-companies.

https://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-cryptocurrency-shows-limits-of-trumps-maximum-pressure-2019-9?r=US&IR=T




https://www.coindesk.com/south-korea-declares-regulation-free-zone-for-crypto-companies


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initiative by the two government and was launched in 2004 to establish an

industrial park just on the North Korean side of the demilitarised zone

(DMZ)82. It comprised some 124 companies and employed over 54,000

workers, most of which were North Korean83. This development was

designed to embody the essence of inter-Korean cooperation and

contributed nearly $2 billion towards the North and South Korean trading

relationship84.

However, the Kaesong Industrial Complex was beset by diplomatic

incidents on a handful of occasions, eventually closing in 2016 following

North Korean missile tests which results in a freeze in inter-Korean

relations85. Steps have since been taken to bring the two sides back

together, with Kaesong being the location for the first inter-Korean liaison

office designed to facilitate better communication and promote closer ties

in the future86. However, discussions on the re-establishment of the

Kaesong project are yet to take place, meaning it will be up for delegates

to consider how plans akin to those at Kaesong might be included in any

resolutions to the issues facing the Korean Peninsula.

The use of Sanctions

The use of economic sanctions against the North Korean government

stretches as far back as 2006 with the passing of Security Council

Resolution 1718, as mentioned earlier. Ever since, steps have been taken

by a number of countries alongside the UN to deter and punish perceived

North Korean aggression.

82 What is the Kaesong Industrial Complex?. (2016, February 10). BBC News. Retrieved from

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-22011178.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid.

86 Kim, H-J. (2018, September 14). Koreas open 1st liaison office for better communication. AP News.

Retrieved from https://apnews.com/c1bd9ffc288f4249aba90af0856568e6.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-22011178

https://apnews.com/c1bd9ffc288f4249aba90af0856568e6

35



Initial sanctions focused on prohibiting the export of military and

technological materials to North Korea as well as the freezing of financial

assets providing that they are non-essential for North Koreans’ basic

needs87. Further sanctions have since followed up to as recently as 2017,

and have banned the import and export of weapons including small arms,

authorised the inspection and seizure of prohibited goods and established

greater restrictions on government officials’ personal assets88. Crucially,

the imposition of these moves - amongst others - should not be

understated. Establishing a degree of consensus between traditionally-

opposed countries, particularly China and Russia, at the highest level of the

UN represents a potential path towards a resolution. Indeed, delegates

should keep these existing steps at the front of their minds as they seek to

reach an outcome amenable to all parties.

However, the imposition of sanctions has been far from a simple or

collective affair and major concerns remain about how this process can be

most effective or, indeed, if it is an appropriate system in the first place.

Both the Chinese and Russian governments have been accused of assisting

North Korea in evading sanctions, something which has sparked

condemnation and friction with the other parties. According to a 2019 UN

report, North Korea has increasingly used sophisticated hacking techniques

to ’steal funds from financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges’ as

a means to generate income89. This has come alongside more traditional

means such as the maritime smuggling of sanctioned goods including

87 Global Policy Forum. (n.d.). Sanctions against North Korea. Retrieved from

https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/north-

korea.html.

88 Davenport, K. (2018, April). UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea. Retrieved from

https://www.armscontrol.org/print/5653#res1718.

89 United Nations. (2019, August 30). Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874

(2009). Retrieved from https://undocs.org/S/2019/691.

https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/north-korea.html


https://www.armscontrol.org/print/5653#res1718

https://undocs.org/S/2019/691

36



refined oil and coal via the East and South China seas90. It has been

suggested that in both of these cases, alongside additional but

unmentioned ones, the North Korean government has been aided and

abetted by China and Russia. For example, in June 2019, both countries

blocked the UN Security Council’s Sanctions Committee from declaring

North Korea in breach of sanctions on the importation of refined

petroleum91. Moreover, both China and Russia have stepped up calls to

ease sanctions on North Korea as a reward for the thaw in diplomatic

rewards, a move strongly resisted by the USA in particular92.

For many, this signifies a continued effort by China and Russia to

shield North Korea from increasingly tough sanctions and demonstrates the

way to go if further progress is to be made, including in this forum. This

therefore raises questions regarding the efficacy of sanctions if they

continue to be applied improperly, particularly by those with such a key

hand in shaping them. In remarking upon the use of sanctions, delegates

should account for these challenges and consider if the direction or focus

of sanctions can be modified for greater effectiveness. Alternatively,

delegates might wish to propose solutions which divert from these

traditional methods. However, ensuring that such proposals are sufficiently

equipped to deal with the ongoing problems of successful implementation

and effect should be paramount to any such suggestions and will no doubt

heavily preoccupy delegates in the drafting of solutions.

90 Bhatiya, N. (2019, September 13). North Korea’s sanctions-busting gets more sophisticated - and more

lucrative. Retrieved from https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28186/north-korea-s-sanctions-busting-

gets-more-sophisticated-and-more-lucrative.

91 China and Russia thwart US-led bid to call out North Korea on UN sanctions violations. (2019, June 19).

South China Morning Post. Retrieved from

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3015153/china-russia-thwart-un-accusation-north-korea-

sanctions.

92 Lu, Z. (2018, September 28). US clashes with China and Russia over North Korea sanctions during UN talk.

South China Morning Post. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/2166081/united-nations-

us-odds-china-russia-over-north-korea-sanctions.

https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28186/north-korea-s-sanctions-busting-gets-more-sophisticated-and-more-lucrative


https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3015153/china-russia-thwart-un-accusation-north-korea-sanctions


https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/2166081/united-nations-us-odds-china-russia-over-north-korea-sanctions


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North Korean nuclear capabilities

The biggest threat North Korea has against its adversaries is the

power to deliver about 30 nuclear warheads which have a range of 8,100

miles.9394 North Korea has done underground tests in which it detonated a

nuclear device that released between 140 and 250 kilotons of energy. It

must be stated, however, that care is usually taken in assessing the

delivery load of North Koreas’ nuclear weapons. Kristensen and Norris

estimate that North Korean warheads would possibly yield 10 to 20 kilotons

of energy.95

With a variety of missile types and uncertainty about specific

capabilities of the North Korean nuclear missile stock, the question can be

asked of what will persuade the North Korean government to give up its

nuclear weapons? This might not even be a feasible option. On the other

hand, almost all the key actors are in possession of nuclear weapons as

well. Should anything happen to those nuclear weapons? What about

regional powers like India and Pakistan, do they play a role in this nuclear

issue? Different scenarios can be played out when thinking about the

influence of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.

Human rights and humanitarian aid

Another key concern affecting the situation on the Korean Peninsula

is the protection of human rights. According to Human Rights Watch, North

Korea remains one of the world’s foremost human rights violators, heavily

restricting freedom of expression, association, religion and so on96. Its

93 Davenport, K. (2019). Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance. Retrieved from the Arms

Control Association website: https://www.armscontrol.org/printpdf/2566

94 Wright, D. (2017, November 28). North Korea’s Longest Missile Test Yet. Union of Concerned

Scientists. Retrieved from https://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/nk-longest-missile-test-yet

95 Kristensen, H. M., & Norris, R. S., (2018) North Korean nuclear capabilities, 2018. Bulletin of the

Atomic Scientists, 74(1), 41-51

96 Human Rights Watch. (n.d.). North Korea. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/asia/north-korea.


https://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/nk-longest-missile-test-yet

https://www.hrw.org/asia/north-korea

38



totalitarian government operates an extensive surveillance network and

relies upon the use of state media and the imposition of lengthy and cruel

punishments to deter dissidence97. The UN Special Rapporteur tasked with

monitoring the human rights situation in North Korea, Tomas Ojea

Quintana, has noted that in spite of the thaw in diplomatic relations

between North Korea and the other parties, no progress has been made

regarding North Korea’s human rights record98. His report encouraged

North Korea to demonstrate greater transparency regarding kwanliso

(political prison camps) and encouraged China to account for humanitarian

consequences in its repatriation policy of North Korean escapees99.

In response, North Korea have denounced accusations of human rights

violations as untrue and part of a calculated campaign to damage its

international reputation, threatening that further criticism of North Korea’s

human rights record will prove harmful to relations100. Chinese and Russian

responses to this have been fairly muted, whilst the USA and South Korea

have maintained their policy of imposing maximum pressure on North

Korea. Most interestingly, however, is the position of the Japanese

government who opted-out of a UN resolution condemning North Korea’s

human rights abuses as a diplomatic overture designed to gain traction in

potential Tokyo-Pyongyang negotiations101.

97 North Korea’s human rights: What’s not being talked about. (2019, February 18). BBC News. Retrieved from

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-44234505.

98 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2019, June 21). North Korea: Dark clouds on the

horizon of peace without rights approach. Retrieved from

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24720&LangID=E.

99 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2019, June 21). North Korea: Dark clouds on the

horizon of peace without rights approach. Retrieved from

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24720&LangID=E.

100 Japan to opt out of U.N. motion condemning North Korea's rights abuses in apparent bid for talks on

abductions. (2019, March 13). The Japan Times. Retrieved from

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/03/13/national/japan-forgo-submitting-north-korean-human-rights-

motion-u-n-panel-bid-get-answers-abductions/#.XbB4lehKjIU.

101 Japan to opt out of U.N. motion condemning North Korea's rights abuses in apparent bid for talks on

abductions. (2019, March 13). The Japan Times. Retrieved from


https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24720&LangID=E


https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/03/13/national/japan-forgo-submitting-north-korean-human-rights-motion-u-n-panel-bid-get-answers-abductions/#.XbB4lehKjIU


39



Alongside the debate about the status of human rights in North Korea

is discussions on the provision of humanitarian aid. According to Mark

Lowcock, head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,

the need for humanitarian assistance in North Korea cannot be understated.

One particular humanitarian problem facing North Korea is food shortages

and malnutrition. According to the UN, around 10 million people - which

equates to roughly 40% of the population - face severe food shortages in

North Korea, a situation exacerbated by the recent poor harvest102. This

has left North Korea increasingly reliant on food aid as a means of feeding

its population, with contributions coming in from a range of other nations

and international organisations. In recent years, however, the number of

food aid shipments going into North Korea has declined despite the UN

regularly requesting further support with this103. For example, South

Korea’s contribution towards North Korean food aid previously totalled

almost $300 million; now, this stands at almost nothing104. This poses a

serious threat to long-term food security in North Korea and raises

questions about how the need for humanitarian assistance will be impacted

if the problem continues. Delegates may find that immediate steps are now

needed to secure the future of North Korea’s food supply, however in what

manner this takes place will no doubt be a source of debate.

Equally, the lack of clean drinking water, spread of serious disease,

medicine shortages and other significant issues continue to demand

humanitarian intervention, however efforts in this direction are often slow

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/03/13/national/japan-forgo-submitting-north-korean-human-rights-

motion-u-n-panel-bid-get-answers-abductions/#.XbB4lehKjIU.

102 Reality Check Team. (2019, June 20). North Korea: Who is sending aid?. BBC News. Retrieved from


103 Ibid.

104 Ibid.




40



to come105. For some, this is down to the fact that media coverage on North

Korea tends to be much more focused on denuclearisation efforts than on

the list of humanitarian issues. According to a 2017 study by CARE

International which looked at global media coverage on humanitarian

emergencies, the situation in North Korea ranks as the most under-

reported in the world106. By contrast, news articles assessing steps towards

a peaceful settlement on the Korean Peninsula are much more

commonplace, particularly in light of more recent efforts to secure this

outcome. Naturally, the way in which North Korea and its needs are viewed

is shaped by these narratives, something which delegates should keep in

mind when developing a rounded understanding of the topic at hand.

It must be said that a great many pages could be dedicated to the

discussion of human rights violations and humanitarian aid in North Korea

However, this would fail to recognise one overarching theme which

delegates should keep in mind as they approach this topic: how should

these issues configure with the process of securing peace on the Korean

Peninsula? For many members of the international community, it is a

matter of concern that previous and ongoing discussions have paid greater

lip-service to ’hard power’ politics, such as moves towards disarmament,

instead of ’soft power’ issues like human rights or aid provision. The Six-

Party Talks represent an opportunity to re-balance the discussion and

integrate these topics more prominently into the debate on the future of

the Korean Peninsula. The challenge for all parties will be to juggle the

competition between specificity and vagueness whilst ensuring any

resolution appropriately tackles the matter at hand.

105 King, R. R. (2018, September 4). Humanitarian engagement with North Korea - great need but increasingly

difficult. Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/analysis/humanitarian-engagement-north-korea-great-need-

increasingly-difficult.

106 Ibid.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/humanitarian-engagement-north-korea-great-need-increasingly-difficult


41



National Strategic Outlooks

In lieu of bloc positions, which are fairly malleable depending on the

particular area being discussed, this section will discuss individual

countries’ security outlooks and stances on certain key issues.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

North Korea’s strategic objectives are twofold: Firstly, to be recognised as

a nuclear state, and secondly, to normalise relations with the United States

and its allies. The calculus here has not changed in the past decade, and if

anything, has been reinforced since their nuclear weapons programme was

declared complete: What North Korea wants more than anything is a

guarantee that the US will permit its regime to exist, in exchange for which

it will not provoke or attempt to destroy the United States and its allies.107

Similarly, the United States’ key objective is for North Korea to abandon its

nuclear program verifiably and irreversibly, in exchange for which the

United States will not attempt to destabilise the regime via economic or

military means. 108

North Korea, in an effort to alleviate this negotiating catch-22, has

unsuccessfully requested security guarantees from the US.109 Indeed, this

has been a consistent theme in negotiations with the hermit state. In the

107Revere, E. J. R. (2018). U.S. Policy And Pyongyang’S Game Plan: Will We Accept A Nuclear-Armed North

Korea? U.S. POLICY AND PYONGYANG’S GAME PLAN: WILL WE ACCEPT A NUCLEAR-ARMED

NORTH KOREA? Brookings Institution. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-

content/uploads/2018/08/FP_20180823_pyongyang_game_plan.pdf

108Yanagisawa, K. (2019). The North Korea–United States Summit and Possibilities for New Security-Oriented

Thinking. Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 2(1), 357–369.

https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2019.1592708

109Kosinski, M., & Hansler, J. (2019, January 30). Talks with North Korea's top negotiator 'got nowhere' on

denuclearization, sources say. Retrieved November 27, 2019, from

https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/30/politics/north-korea-no-progress/index.html.

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/FP_20180823_pyongyang_game_plan.pdf


https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2019.1592708

https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/30/politics/north-korea-no-progress/index.html

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Six-Party Talks Joint Statement of 2005, the country “committed to

abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” in return

for the United States “affirm[ing] that it has no nuclear weapons on the

Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade [North Korea]

with nuclear or conventional weapons.” 110

Japan

In September 2019, Japan’s Ministry of Defence published its annual

defence white paper, indicating its strategic priorities in the present security

environment. In this white paper, Japan labelled China as the key ‘strategic

threat’ and ‘security concern’, ahead of Russia and North Korea.111 This is

not unexpected. China’s military modernisation, economic development,

and the historically fraught nature of the bilateral relationship is perceived

as a greater threat over the long term than the possibility of North Korean

aggression.112 Japan likely considers the North Korean situation as a key

part of its diplomatic-military machinations in relation to China and the

United States.

Indeed, recent responses to missile tests, with Prime Minister Abe going so

far as to offer talks with Kim without preconditions, have indicated that

Japan does not possess significant negotiating leverage.113 This marks a

departure from previous responses to North Korean belligerence, where

110Six-Party Talks, Beijing, China. (2005, September 19). Retrieved December 1, 2019, from https://2009-

2017.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm.

111Defense of Japan. (2019, September). Retrieved October 13, 2019, from

https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2019/DOJ2019_Full.pdf.

112Nagy, S. R. (2019, October 24). A reset in Japan-China relations? Retrieved October 27, 2019, from

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/10/24/commentary/japan-commentary/reset-japan-china-

relations/#.XbG0BJNKgWo.

113Rich, M. (2019, October 2). North Korean Missile Delivers a Message: There's Little Japan Can Do.

Retrieved November 18, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/world/asia/japan-north-korea-

missile.html.

https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm


https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2019/DOJ2019_Full.pdf

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/10/24/commentary/japan-commentary/reset-japan-china-relations/#.XbG0BJNKgWo


https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/world/asia/japan-north-korea-missile.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/world/asia/japan-north-korea-missile.html

43



Tokyo supported harsh sanctions and reaffirmed military cooperation with

America and South Korea. 114

Japan’s close economic and military relationship with the US is one of the

few constants in this volatile political environment. The two countries

recently signed a trade agreement, and military cooperation remains

strong.115 At the same time, the volatile diplomacy of the Trump

administration and its “America First” policy has worried senior Japanese

defence officials, and is a factor in Japan’s desire to bolster their Self-

Defence Forces.116

Japan’s relationship with its other strategic ally in the region, the Republic

of Korea, is fraught with historical tension. Korea’s threats to unilaterally

terminate GSOMIA along with its refusal to allow the Japanese Maritime

Self-Defence Force to fly their ensign has ‘disappointed’ Tokyo, and poses

a strategic gap in the Japan-Korea-US trilateral alliance in Northeast Asian

security.117 118

On the whole, Japan faces a wide range of threats that impacts not only

Tokyo’s national security, but the balance of power and stability of the

114Abe, S. (2017, September 17). Shinzo Abe: Solidarity Against the North Korean Threat. Retrieved

November 18, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/17/opinion/north-korea-shinzo-abe-japan.html.

115US and Japan agree initial trade deal focusing on agriculture. (2019, September 26). Retrieved October 17,

2019, from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-49834705.

116O'Connor, T. (2019, September 30). Asia's Cold War between the U.S. and China has already begun, and

Japan's on the front lines. Retrieved October 17, 2019, from https://www.newsweek.com/asia-cold-war-japan-

us-china-1460290.

117Defense of Japan. (2019, September). Retrieved October 13, 2019, from

https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2019/DOJ2019_Full.pdf.

118Hurst, D. (2018, October 12). Facing 'Rising Sun' Flag Row, Japan Withdraws From International Fleet

Review. Retrieved October 17, 2019, from https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/facing-rising-sun-flag-row-japan-

withdraws-from-international-fleet-review/.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/17/opinion/north-korea-shinzo-abe-japan.html


https://www.newsweek.com/asia-cold-war-japan-us-china-1460290



https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/facing-rising-sun-flag-row-japan-withdraws-from-international-fleet-review/


44



entire Northeast Asian region. Japan’s territorial disputes with Russia and

China might prohibit closer cooperation in the region. 119 120

People’s Republic of China

China is North Korea’s biggest trading partner, accounting for almost 90%

of North Korea’s foreign trade.121 Since the Korean War, China has aided in

the survival of the North Korean regime, and opposed harsh international

sanctions for fear of regime collapse that could lead to an unmitigated influx

of refugees across the border. However, despite their longstanding alliance,

North Korea’s missile tests and nuclear capacity has tested Beijing’s

support, resulting in China backing certain punitive UNSC resolutions.122

China’s relationship with North Korea stems from its strategic interest in

the Peninsula. It is one of Beijing’s key geopolitical priorities, regarding

North Korea as a buffer between China and the democratic, capitalist, and

US-supported South Korea. The approximately 30,000 American troops in

South Korea, along with the recent installation of THAAD, are security

concerns for China, and reducing American influence on the peninsula is a

key goal.123 China’s support for North Korea, however, is not a given. The

United States, Japan, and South Korea are three of its top 5 trading

partners, making up about 30% of total foreign trade. 124 China has no

ideological obligation to Pyeongyang. On the question of North Korea,

119RESOLVED: Japan Could Play the Russia Card Against China. (2019, March 12). Retrieved October 17,

2019, from https://www.csis.org/analysis/resolved-japan-could-play-russia-card-against-china.

120Ismail, Y., Hughes, E. S. O., Ismail, Y., & Hughes, E. S. O. (2019, October 22). Japan in a New Northeast

Asian Security Environment. Retrieved November 2, 2019, from https://intpolicydigest.org/2019/10/22/japan-

in-a-new-northeast-asian-security-environment/.

121Harak, R. (n.d.). North Korea. Retrieved December 1, 2019, from https://oec.world/en/profile/country/prk/.

122Fact Sheets & Briefs. (2018, April). Retrieved December 1, 2019, from

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea.

123Understanding the China-North Korea Relationship. (2019, June 25). Retrieved December 1, 2019, from

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship.

124Workman, D. (2019, October 27). China's Top Trading Partners. Retrieved December 1, 2019, from

http://www.worldstopexports.com/chinas-top-import-partners/.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/resolved-japan-could-play-russia-card-against-china

https://intpolicydigest.org/2019/10/22/japan-in-a-new-northeast-asian-security-environment/


https://oec.world/en/profile/country/prk/

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship

http://www.worldstopexports.com/chinas-top-import-partners/

45



economic interests would almost certainly take precedence over its

obligation to intervene in favour of North Korea. 125 126

Beijing, like Moscow, has continuously advocated for the continuation of

the Six-Party Talks, seeking to place itself as a key player in the region’s

security considerations.127

Republic of Korea

The official long-term policy of the Republic of Korea on the question of

North Korea is a peaceful reunification of the peninsula, a vision agreed

upon by the two parties in the June 15th North-South Joint Declaration in

June 2000, and reaffirmed by the Panmunjom Declaration in April 2018.128

129

South Korea’s key military partner is the United States, and Korea hosts

close to 30,000 US military personnel, in addition to maintaining close

military ties with the US Pacific Command. In addition, it has close security

ties with Japan, despite current historical tensions and trade. America’s

recent demands for Korea to increase their share of the costs of hosting the

American troops by about 400% has frayed ties between these traditional

allies. 130 In addition, the deployment of THAAD in Korea is a key question

125China and Japan's Perspectives on North Korea. (2014, October 21). Retrieved October 28, 2019, from

https://www.cfr.org/event/china-and-japans-perspectives-north-korea-0.

126Mastro, O. S. (2019, June 20). Why China Won't Rescue North Korea. Retrieved from

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2017-12-12/why-china-wont-rescue-north-korea.

127Kyodo. (2018, March 7). China wants restart of 6-party talks for N. Korea denuclearization. Retrieved from

https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2018/03/2ecb73f5bdaf-china-wants-restart-of-6-party-talks-for-n-korea-

denuclearization.html.

128Peace Agreements Digital Collection. (2000, June 15). Retrieved from

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/n_skorea06152000.pdf.

129Letter dated 6 September 2018 from the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and

the Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. (2018, September 10).

Retrieved from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1640603.

130Snyder, S. A. (2019, November 26). U.S.-South Korea Tensions: What's at Stake? Retrieved from

https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/us-south-korea-tensions-whats-stake.

https://www.cfr.org/event/china-and-japans-perspectives-north-korea-0

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2017-12-12/why-china-wont-rescue-north-korea

https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2018/03/2ecb73f5bdaf-china-wants-restart-of-6-party-talks-for-n-korea-denuclearization.html


https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/n_skorea06152000.pdf

https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1640603

https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/us-south-korea-tensions-whats-stake

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in its relationship with China, with the latter viewing the defense system as

a threat to its own sovereignty.

One of Korea’s key interests is to maintain control over the peace process,

a goal that has been frustrated by the Trump administration’s unwillingness

to empower Seoul to take charge of the process. The present Korean

administration under President Moon has been frequently blindsided by

American negotiators.131

Recently, Korea and America postponed military drills amid criticism from

North Korea and threats of retaliation. 132

Russian Federation

Russia shares a border with North Korea and as such expects to maintain

peace and stability on the peninsula, as well as avoiding involvement in

military conflicts. In addition, reducing American influence in the region is

a strategic priority of Moscow. However, the question of the Peninsula is

not at the absolute top of the list of Russia’s geopolitical priorities. Indeed,

some analysts have contended that Russia is willing to let Chinese

expansionism in Asia stand unopposed, in exchange for Chinese support for

Russian interests in Europe and the Middle East. 133

Russian diplomats have long pursued a comprehensive plan that pursues

multi-pronged approaches to settle outstanding issues, including rejecting

131Gallo, W. (2019, December 1). As North Korea's Deadline Approaches, South Pushes US for Progress.

Retrieved December 1, 2019, from https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/north-koreas-deadline-

approaches-south-pushes-us-progress.

132Al Jazeera. (2019, November 17). US, S Korea postpone joint military drills criticised by North. Retrieved

December 1, 2019, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/korea-postpone-joint-military-drills-

criticised-north-191117051807243.html.

133The National Bureau of Asian Research. (2019). The China-Russia Entente and the Korean Peninsula. The

China-Russia Entente and the Korean Peninsula. Retrieved from https://www.nbr.org/wp-

content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sr78_china_russia_entente_march2019.pdf

https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/north-koreas-deadline-approaches-south-pushes-us-progress


https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/korea-postpone-joint-military-drills-criticised-north-191117051807243.html


https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sr78_china_russia_entente_march2019.pdf


47



the use of force and unilateral sanctions. Russia has furthermore sought to

solidify its great power status by acting as a broker with the willingness and

ability to address the US military presence in Northeast Asia and thus create

a new security architecture in Northeast Asia. Indeed, Putin has been one

of the major proponents of resuming the Six-Party Talks.134 Despite

allowing UNSC sanctions to be imposed against North Korea, Russia has

allowed violations of the measures.135

United States of America

The primary American security concern under the current administration is

the destabilising rise of China. This is made sufficiently clear in the 2017

National Security Strategy, which states, “Chinese dominance risks

diminishing the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific.”136 The

United States has positioned the region as a policy priority, and maintains

a strategic forward military presence. In the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

published in June 2019, the United States affirms its commitment to

reinforce its alliances and partnerships in the region.137

The Trump administration’s stated commitment to a treaty- and rules-

based world order, however, is not necessarily consistent with its actions.

Discussions of US troop reductions in Korea and Japan, or getting them to

pay a higher share of the financial burden, have damaged American

134Kramer, A. E., & Sang-hun, C. (2019, April 25). After Meeting Kim Jong-un, Putin Supports North Korea

on Nuclear Disarmament. Retrieved November 13, 2019, from

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/world/europe/summit-kim-putin-trump-nuclear-north-korea.html.

135Rfe/rl. (2019, June 19). U.S. Punishes Russian Entity Helping North Korea Evade Sanctions. Retrieved

December 1, 2019, from https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-north-korea-sanctions/30009124.html.

136National Security Strategy of the United States of America. (2017, December). Retrieved from

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

137Department of Defense. (2019, June 1). Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. Retrieved from

https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-

STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/world/europe/summit-kim-putin-trump-nuclear-north-korea.html

https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-north-korea-sanctions/30009124.html

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf

https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF


48



credibility and commitment to regional security.138 139 In addition, America

has seemed unwilling to step up to resolve tensions between its two most

important allies in the Asia-Pacific, both of which are vital links in American

supply chains.140 141The United States in August also withdrew from the

INF, testing its first GLCM soon after.142 143

Its response to the North Korean question, at least, has been consistent -

full and verifiable denuclearisation.144 To this end, the Trump administration

has pursued leader-level diplomacy with North Korea for the first time,

highlighting unique opportunities for greater stability on the peninsula.

However, since the first summit in Singapore in June 2018, there have been

no signs that North Korea plans to give up its nuclear weapons programme.

As the Trump administration heads to the elections, its ability to reach a

credible denuclearisation agreement is likely to become a focal point.145

138Sang-hun, C., & Rich, M. (2018, May 4). Trump's Talk of U.S. Troop Cuts Unnerves South Korea and

Japan. Retrieved November 13, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/04/world/asia/south-korea-troop-

withdrawal-united-states.html.

139Samuelson, R. J. (2016, March 27). We're not a poor country, Mr. Trump. Retrieved November 13, 2019,

from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/were-not-a-poor-country-mr-trump/2016/03/27/70bbe9fc-f2bd-

11e5-85a6-2132cf446d0a_story.html.

140Boot, M. (2019, September 5). Opinion | Two of our most important allies are fighting. Trump is nowhere to

be seen. Retrieved November 24, 2019, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/two-of-our-most-

important-allies-are-fighting-trump-is-nowhere-to-be-seen/2019/09/04/8e2817c4-ce8b-11e9-87fa-

8501a456c003_story.html.

141Lee, H.-ah. (2019, October 17). U.S. urges S. Korea to renew intel pact with Japan: Pentagon. Retrieved

December 1, 2019, from https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20191018000400325.

142Pompeo, M. R. (2019, August 2). U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty on August 2, 2019 - United States

Department of State. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/u-s-withdrawal-from-the-inf-treaty-on-august-2-

2019/.

143Bugos, S. (2019, September). U.S. Completes INF Treaty Withdrawal. Retrieved from

https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-09/news/us-completes-inf-treaty-withdrawal.

144Department of Defense. (2019, June 1). Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. Retrieved from

https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-

STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF.

145Revere, E. J. R. (2018). U.S. Policy And Pyongyang’S Game Plan: Will We Accept A Nuclear-Armed North

Korea? U.S. POLICY AND PYONGYANG’S GAME PLAN: WILL WE ACCEPT A NUCLEAR-ARMED

NORTH KOREA? Brookings Institution. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-


https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/04/world/asia/south-korea-troop-withdrawal-united-states.html


https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/were-not-a-poor-country-mr-trump/2016/03/27/70bbe9fc-f2bd-11e5-85a6-2132cf446d0a_story.html


https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/two-of-our-most-important-allies-are-fighting-trump-is-nowhere-to-be-seen/2019/09/04/8e2817c4-ce8b-11e9-87fa-8501a456c003_story.html



https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20191018000400325

https://www.state.gov/u-s-withdrawal-from-the-inf-treaty-on-august-2-2019/


https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-09/news/us-completes-inf-treaty-withdrawal





49



Conclusion

The discussion of the topic presented in this guide is merely an overview of

the numerous aspects of the topic that delegates are expected to be

knowledgeable about. In approaching the negotiating table, delegates

should have a clear set of policy priorities.

Delegates are also expected to abide by their national policy strictly 100%

of the time and yet are encouraged to be flexible and decide what the world

could, and should, look like.

Questions a Resolution should

answer:

❖ What actions will lead to North Korean denuclearization?

❖ Considering all related debating points what will bring the six parties

to a solution around the negotiating table?

❖ Should the international community, specifically through the United

Nations system of organisations, take measures with respect to this

issue?

❖ How can the geopolitical tensions within the region be resolved by

the key actors within this issue,?

❖ Is a peace agreement on the Korean Peninsula feasible, if so how?

❖ What should peace look like?

❖ What should the long-term security architecture of the region look

like, and what role does each party play within it?

❖ Should North Korea be allowed to keep its nuclear arms?

50



❖ Under what conditions will sanctions on North Korea be lifted? What

steps can be taken to ensure a long-term view is taken in lifting

sanctions?

❖ Under what context can continued sanctions be justified?

❖ How can the parties involved build trust and work towards credible

achievement of their stated objectives?

❖ Given the long history of agreements that were never followed up,

how can any actions agreed upon be implemented verifiably in the

long run?

❖ How can each party have faith that other parties will not renege on

any agreements even after changes of administration?

❖ How can negotiations adopt a more rounded approach to consider

matters like human rights and humanitarian assistance?

❖ To what extent should parties be willing to concede ground on the

adherence to human rights? What role should each party be expected

to play in this?

❖ What role can economic cooperation play in facilitating a lasting peace

on the Korean Peninsula?

❖ How can forms of economic cooperation be protected against rapid

changes in inter-party relations? Should they be?

51



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