SIRR- CH 1

Ravenswood Generating Station, on the East River waterfront, is the largest power plant in New York City.Credit: Lawrence Chernin

CHAPTER 6 | UTILITIES 106

Utilities

At night, the city is aglow: Times Squaredazzles visitors with all shades of neon;lights trace the spans of bridges from theVerrazano to the Whitestone; and streetlights illuminate the clouds of steam thatrise from the streets of Manhattan.Energyelectricity, natural gas, and steammakes so much that is iconic about New YorkCity possible. Utility networks not only bring thecitys famous skyline to life, they also run the subways, keep the city cool in summer andwarm in winter, and support every aspect ofthe economy.

Under the surface of the streets and out ofsight, layers of critical energy infrastructurepower the city. Pipelines bring natural gas fromacross the country. Power lines link the city tothe larger regional grid. Generators burn gas toproduce electricity. Steam travels from largeboiler and cogeneration facilities to buildingsthrough miles of underground conduits. Thesesystems are complex and, in many cases, oldyet most New Yorkers do not think aboutthem until they fail. However, these critical systems deserve careful consideration becausethey are vulnerable to extreme weathereventsand likely will become more vulnerable as the climate changes.

Extreme weather has always been an issue forutility networks, including in the last decade.

In 2006, a heat wave caused an extended black-out that affected approximately 250,000 Queensresidents. In 2011, Hurricane Irenes floodwaterscame close to leaving parts of Lower Manhattanin the dark. And in the summer of the same year,another heat wave led to an all-time record forcity electricity demand.

But Sandy was different. Never before had thecity experienced a weather event on this scale(the citywide blackout in the summer of 2003was a result of a software error several statesaway). During and after the storm, one-third ofthe citys electric generating capacity was tem-porarily lost. Five major electric transmissionsubstations in the city flooded and shut down.Parts of the natural gas distribution networkwere inundated. And four of six steam plants inthe city were knocked out of service.

By the time the storm passed, more than800,000 customers (representing over 2 millionNew Yorkers) were without power and 80,000customers were without natural gas service. Athird of the buildings served by the citys steamsystemincluding several major hospitalswere without heat and hot water.

Within a few days of Sandys departure fromNew York, much of the city had regained serv-ice. In some neighborhoods, however, includinglarge parts of the Rockaways and Staten Island,

outages lasted for weeks, as crews of electri-cians and plumbers went door-to-door to repairflooded equipment.

As serious as the damage to the citys energy in-frastructure was, in many ways, the impact thatthis damage had on people and businesses waseven worse. Hospitals had to be evacuated underemergency conditions when primary power waslost and backup generators failed. In high-risebuildings, elevators did not run and most tapsabove the seventh floor went dry because waterpumps had no power. Many offices were left inthe dark and without heat. The power outagecaused transit shutdowns that prevented em-ployees from going to work, even if their officeswere unaffected. The real cost of the hurricanewas measured less in repairs to energy infrastruc-ture than in the profound disruption to the exist-ing patterns of city life and commerce.

In the future, stronger storms and longer andmore intense heat waves will likely pose newchallenges to energy infrastructure. The citysenergy systemsalthough reliable during ordi-nary weather eventsneed to be upgraded.

In keeping with the overarching goals of this reportwhich are to limit the impacts of climate change while enabling New York tobounce back quickly when impacts cannot beavoidedthe City will work with utility compa-nies and regulatory bodies to improve the cur-rent approach to utility regulation andinvestment. The City will advocate for incorpo-rating risk-based preparation for low-probabilitybut high-impact events, spending capital dol-lars to harden energy infrastructure and makeutility systems more flexible, and diversifyingenergy sources. Collectively these strategieswill reduce the frequency and severity of serv-ice disruptions, while allowing for more rapidrestoration of service when these disruptionsdo occur.

How the System Works

New Yorkers spend roughly $19 billion per yearon the energy to power, heat, and cool theircity. The citys highly interdependent electricity,natural gas, and steam networks are among theoldest and most concentrated in the nation.Yet they are also still among its most reliable.These systems bring energy in bulk into the region and then transport it through layers ofinfrastructure, reducing levels of voltage (forpower) or pressure (for gas) along the way andultimately delivering energy to consumers. Tounderstand how this system works as a whole, it is first necessary to understand its constituent parts. (See graphic: Diagram of theUtility Systems)

A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK107

A steam vent in Midtown Credit: Jorge Royan


Electric SystemThe worlds first centralized electric generationand distribution system was developed in NewYork City in the 1880s, by Thomas Edison. As ofthe writing of this report, New Yorks electricitysystem has since grown to serve 3 million cus-tomersincluding 8.3 million people and250,000 businesses who consume roughly 1.4percent of all electricity produced in the UnitedStates. In summer, the grid handles peak loadsof over 11,000 megawatts (MW)almost twiceas much as the next largest city, Los Angeles.

The electric system consists of three major elements: generation, which produces electric-ity; the transmission system, which transportselectricity at high voltages to large substations;and the distribution system, which carries elec-tricity from large substations to smaller onesand ultimately to homes, businesses, and othercustomers. This system is owned, operated,and regulated by a wide array of private andpublic entities. (See graphic: Overview of Electric Industry Participants)

GenerationMultiple private companies and a public author-ity own and operate 24 plants within or directlyconnected to New York City (the in-city fleet).These plants can generate up to 9,600 MW ofpower, which is more than 80 percent of NewYork Citys peak demand (defined as the peak

level of electricity demand required on themost power-intensive days each year). Usually,only a subset of the in-city fleet will be runningat any given time, with roughly 50 percent ofthe citys needs met with cheaper electricity im-ported from Upstate New York and New Jersey.The entire in-city fleet operates only during pe-riods of peak electricity usage, such as duringsummer heat waves, when the use of air condi-tioning soars. New York City reached an historicpeak of over 11,500 MW during a heat wave inJuly 2011, when temperatures reached over 100degrees Fahrenheit for three consecutive days.

The in-city generation fleet is fueled predomi-nantly by natural gas, with many plants alsoable to burn fuel oil. All of the in-city plants arelocated along the waterfront, with more thanhalf concentrated in Astoria and Long IslandCity in Queens. Almost two-thirds of the fleet ismore than 40 years old, equipped with technol-ogy that has lower efficiency and higher airemissions than modern plants.

In addition to the in-city generating fleet, anothersmall but growing source of energy in the NewYork market is customer-sited distributed gener-ation (DG). Much of the 160 MW of DG capacityin New York consists of combined heat andpower (CHP) installations, with smaller installa-tions of renewable generation, including solarphotovoltaic panels and fuel cells. CHP installa-

tions typically are found at large residential com-plexes, hospitals, and universities. These systemsare usually in operation most of the time, replac-ing or supplementing electric power receivedfrom the grid. Some of these installations also areconfigured so they can operate independently ofthe grid during blackouts.

TransmissionLong-distance transmission lines connect thecity with up to 6,000 MW of supply from areasas near as Northern New Jersey, Long Island,and the Hudson Valley, and as far as Northernand Western New York State. Both in-city-gen-erated and imported electricity feed into ConEdisons electric grid at 24 high-voltage facilitieshousing switching and transformer equip-mentknown as transmission substations.Each of these substations routes the electricitythat powers a large number of customers orclusters of critical infrastructure. In fact, a singlesubstation in New York may support hundredsof thousands of customersnumbers thatmake New Yorks transmission system rareamong other US systems.

At the citys transmission substations, transformer equipment decreases electricalvoltages. Electricity is then sent at these lowervoltages through sub-transmission lines to areasubstations. There, smaller transformers decrease voltage once again and feed the

Natural Gas 4 pipelines* NY Facilitiessystem

560 district regulator stations

High pressuremains

Low pressuremains

Undergrounddistribution

Overheaddistribution

20% customers25% volume

80% customers75% volume

82% customers86% load

18% customers14% load

1,700+ customers

Electric

Steam

16 import lines*

24 transmissionsubstations

50 areasubstations

5 city gates

Steam pipes6 steam plants

Liquid fuels* * Originate outside NYC

24 generating facilites

Diagram of the Utility Systems

Source: OLTPS


distribution system. The New York IndependentSystem Operator (NYISO) coordinates the flowof electricity on the transmission system acrossthe state, while Con Edison operates the transmission facilities it owns in the city.

DistributionCon Edison is the primary electric utility in thecity, providing electric distribution services to allfive boroughs. The one exception is the Rockaways, which are served by the Long IslandPower Authority (LIPA), a public authority controlled by New York State. LIPA does not operate and maintain its distribution system directly. Rather, it contracts for the operationand maintenance of this system to NationalGrid. This arrangement is set to expire at theend of 2013, when a subsidiary of Public ServiceEnterprise Group (PSEG) is scheduled to takeover for National Grid for a 10-year period there-after. (See map: Electric Service Territories)

The utilities distribution systems consist offeeder lines that originate from area substa-tions, which are smaller than the transmissionsubstations described above, but are nonethe-less critical. Area substations typically serve oneor two neighborhood-level networks or loadareas of customer demand, each of which includes tens of thousands of customers.

In densely populated areas, such as Manhattanand certain portions of the other boroughs, thedistribution system that carries power from areasubstations to end users consists of under-ground network systemsthat is, systems thatoperate as a grid that can serve customers viamultiple paths. In the rest of the city, the distri-bution system consists of a combination of un-derground and overhead loop systems andradial linesthat is, systems with simpler archi-tecture, though also with fewer redundancies.These loop systems and radial lines account forabout 14 percent of load on Con Edisons distri-bution system. LIPAs system in the Rockawaysis made up exclusively of loop and radial sys-tems. (See map: Electric Distribution Systems)

Customers ultimately receive electric powerthrough service lines that are connected to their buildings electrical equipment. In manycases, high-rise buildings or campus-style com-plexes have dedicated transformer equipmentthat serves these individual customers. This equipment is typically located in vaults beneatharea sidewalks.

Natural Gas SystemNatural gas fuels approximately 65 percent ofheating and a significant percentage of cookingneeds in buildings throughout New York. It alsofuels more than 98 percent of in-city electricityproduction by power plants. A system of four

Underground Network AreasOverhead Radial and Loop System Areas

Electric Distribution Systems

Con Edison (3 Million customers)*

Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) (34,000 customers)*^

^34,000 customers in New York; LIPA also provides service to Nassau and Suffolk Counties on Long Island.*A customer is defined as a single meter ranging from a studio apartment to a skyscraper.

Electric Service Territories

Source: Con Edison, LIPA


Con Edison (3 Million customers)*

Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) (34,000 customers)*^

Underground Network AreasOverhead Radial and Loop System Areas


privately-owned interstate pipelines transportsnatural gas from the Gulf Coast, WesternCanada, and other production areas into the cityat interconnection points called city gates.

From the various city gates, high-pressure gasflows through an intra-city transmission systemknown as the New York Facilities. Gas that is des-tined for New York Citys power plants generallyis drawn at high pressure directly from the NewYork Facilities. To reach most other customers,gas is delivered through a set of regulator sta-tions that reduce the pressure of the gas andsend it into a vast network of underground dis-tribution mains. In the city, these distributionmains come in two varieties: high-pressure andlow-pressure. The low-pressure system is com-posed of cast iron and bare steel mainsout-dated infrastructure that gradually is beingreplaced by the systems operators. This systemis located mostly in the oldest parts of the city.Newer, high-pressure mains tend to be made ofcoated steel and plastic.

In New York City, Con Edison owns and operatesthe gas distribution system in Manhattan, theBronx, and parts of Northern Queens. NationalGrid owns and operates the system in the rest ofthe city. (See map: Natural Gas Service Territories)

The citys natural gas demand usually peakson cold winter days, when it can exceed the capacity of the four interstate pipeline connections. On those days, utilities ask electricgenerating plants and other large users toswitch to liquid fuels. In the next three years,pipeline capacity will expand as private compa-nies complete two new pipeline connections toserve the city, a significant advance in the Cityscleaner burning fuels initiatives.

Steam SystemThe Con Edison steam system, one of thelargest district steam systems in the world, pro-vides over 1,700 buildings in Manhattanin-cluding 10 hospitals and many of the cityslargest institutionswith energy for heat, hotwater, and, in some cases, air conditioning. Theadvantage of the steam system to customers isthat it allows them to avoid owning and main-taining their own boiler systems. Instead, thesecustomers are responsible for the easier task ofmaintaining on-site steam traps and condensatepumps. (See map: Steam Service Territory)

Six natural gas- and fuel oil-fired steam generating facilities in Manhattan, Brooklyn, andQueens can collectively produce over 10 millionpounds of steam per hour, either cogeneratingthis steam along with electricity, or producingsteam alone in massive boilers. A network of105 miles of underground pipes transports thissteam to customers.

*A customer is defined as a single meter ranging from a studio apartment to a skyscraper.

Con Edison (833,000 customers)*

National Grid (1.2 Million customers)*

Natural Gas Service Territories

Con Edison (1,700+ customers)*Con Edison (1,700+ customers)*

96th Street

Con Edison (1,700+ customers)*

96th Street

89th Street

*A customer is defined as a building or an institution.*A customer is defined as a building or an institution.*A customer is defined as a building or an institution.

Steam Service Territory

Source: Con Edison, National Grid

Source: Con Edison

Con Edison (833,000 customers)*

National Grid (1.2 Million customers)*

Con Edison (1,700+ customers)*

8


Utility RegulationA combination of private companies and publicauthorities own and operate New Yorks energysystem, which is subject to a complex system of Federal and State oversight. Within this regulatory system, different entities are respon-sible for setting reliability expectations and stan-dards, providing regulatory oversight, and formonitoring compliance with performance stan-dards. The overall goal is to ensure safe, reliable,and affordable delivery of electricity, natural gas,and steam. (See graphic: Utility Regulation)

In the electric sector, the Federal Energy Regu-latory Commission (FERC) oversees interstatetransmission rates and wholesale electricitysales, while the New York State Reliability Coun-cil (NYSRC) establishes the States electric reliability standards for the bulk power and bulktransmission systems. Subject to these stan-dards, the NYISO operates the states wholesaleelectricity market and high-voltage transmis-sion system, and monitors the reliability of thestate-wide transmission system. The New YorkState Public Service Commission (PSC) oversees all aspects of retail electric service, in-cluding the utilities rates, terms, and condi-tions of service, as well as the safety, adequacy,and reliability of the service they provide.

Reliability expectations set by regulators governthe design and operation of the electric system.In the generation and transmission system, thereliability standards are set by the NYSRC, whichrequires that the bulk power and transmissionsystem be designed so as to have an unplannedoutage no more than once in 10 years.

Con Edison, in turn, designs and operates itselectric system so that its network system, theportion of its system that serves the citys moredensely-populated areas, is able to withstandthe loss of two components within a distribu-tion network and still maintain service. In lessdensely-populated areas, the system is de-signed to withstand the loss of one component.

Oversight of the rates, terms, and conditions ofelectric service is the domain of the PSC. Onemechanism used by the PSC towards this end isthe rate case process, in which the PSC deter-mines the conditions for utility rate increases.During this process, a utility submits a filing thatcontains a justification for a rate increase, includ-ing details on capital investments that it proposesto make. The City and a variety of other stake-holders offer comments, testimony, and recom-mendations on the rate request and other relatedissues. The PSC then makes a decision about theproposed increase based on factors including

whether the rates adopted will maintain safe andadequate service for customers. The sameprocess applies to gas and steam utilities.

To measure how well the electric utilities areperforming, the PSC uses quantitative metrics.The two main metrics are the System AverageInterruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) and theCustomer Average Interruption Duration Index(CAIDI). SAIFI measures the average number ofinterruptions per customer per year, while CAIDI measures the average length of each interruption. Con Edisons SAIFI is the lowest inthe nation among large investor-owned utilities;its CAIDI, however, is above the national average. This generally reflects the fact that ConEdisons underground network systems arequite robust, suffering outages less frequentlythan typical above-ground systems but whenoutages do occur, they can take longer to address and repair than overhead disruptions.(See chart: Reliability Performance ComparisonAmong Selected US Utilities)

For the natural gas and steam utilities, regulationof system design and operations is focused onsafety. Oversight on rates and conditions of services is regulated similarly to the electric sector. In the case of the natural gas system, theFERC regulates interstate pipelines and the PSC

New York Power Authority(NYPA)

Secures energy supply for government facilities through own assets or contracts with outside suppliers

With City, co-administers program to improve energy efficiency of City government buildings

New York City Government

Enacts policies to minimize cost of the supply portfolio

Advocates for the interests of city businesses, residents, and government through PSC rate cases

Administers program to improve energy efficiency of City government buildings

Consumes electricity

Public Service Commission (PSC)

Provides broad oversight over utilities

Sets utility rates and terms of service

Con Edison

Provides electric utility service in New York City except for the Rockaways, and in Westchester County

New York State EnergyResearch and Development Authority (NYSERDA)

Creates and implements incentive programs for renewable energy and energy efficiency initiatives funded through the Systems Benefit Charge (SBC)

New York City Customers

Consume electricity

Pay electricity bills

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)

Regulates interstate gas pipelines and electric transmission

Oversees the NYISO

Regulates wholesale market

North AmericanElectric ReliabilityCorporation (NERC)

Sets reliability standards for bulk power system

New York Independent Systems Operator (NYISO)

Manages New York State high voltage transmission system

Administers wholesale electricity market

Assesses supply needs on a 10-year horizon

New York State Reliability Council (NYSRC)

Sets and monitors compliance with reliability rules for New Yorks bulk power system

Power Plant Owners andOperators

Develop, own, and operate power plants

Sell power to NYISO or directly to utility (Con Edison, LIPA, or NYPA) or large customers

Long Island Power Authority (LIPA)

Provides electric utility service in Long Island and the Rockaways

New York Governor

Nominates PSC Commissioners Nominates NYPA, LIPA, and NYSERDA board members Sets energy policy for the state

NY State non-utility participants Bulk power participants

NYC non-utility participants NYC utility providers

Overview of Electric Industry Participants

Source: OLTPS


UTILITY SERVICE RELIABILITY EXPECTATIONS REGULATORY OVERSIGHT

N/A, focus is on safetySteam

PSC regulates rates, terms, and conditions of service

PSC measures response time to leaks and leak repair backlog

N/A, focus is on safety N/ANatural Gas transmission

FERC regulates rates, terms, and conditions of service

USDOT regulates pipeline safety

Natural Gas transmission

N/A, focus is on safety PSC regulates rates, terms, and conditions of service

PSC regulates pipeline safety as USDOTs delegate

PSC measures emergency response time to leaks, leak repair backlog, damages to gas facilities, and replacement of leak-prone gas mains

PERFORMANCE MONITORING

Electric distribution

Electric generation and transmission

NYSRC requires that the probability of the loss of firm load due to system wide resource deficiencies be no more than 1 day per 10 years in accordance with Federal standards set by NERC

FERC oversees NERC and NYISO, which manages bulk electricity generation and transmission in New York

NYSRC sets reliability standards (with FERC and PSC oversight)

Compliance with NERC and NYSRC standards is monitored by the NYSRC and NYISO through reporting, audits, and investigations

Electric distribution

Con Edison designs network system to withstand the loss of two components; parts of the overhead system are designed to withstand the loss of one component (depending on location and population density)

PSC regulates rates, terms, and conditions of service

PSC measures performance using SAIFI, CAIDI, and major outage events

PSC also tracks use of remote monitoring systems and restoration times following outages

regulates local distribution companies and theprovision of retail gas service. Gas pipeline safetyis regulated by the United States Department ofTransportation (US DOT), though in New YorkState, the PSC is the US DOTs designee for thispurpose. The steam system, on the other hand,is regulated solely by the PSC. For both systems,performance metrics used by the PSC measurehow well utilities manage leaks and how quicklythey respond to reports of them (and, in the caseof the natural gas utilities, odors).

Across all of the citys energy systems, the PSC also establishes financial incentives for each utility. These incentives impose revenue adjustments for failure to achieve specifiedthresholds or target levels of performance.

Climate change and its associated risks are notconsidered with respect to virtually any aspect ofthe regulatory framework applicable to NewYorks energy system. For example, the modelsthat the NYISO runs to test whether the electricsystem will be able to meet future standards fac-tor in the possibility of future heat waves, but donot yet consider the fact that in the future, heatwaves are likely to be more frequent, more intense, and longer lasting than today, impactingelectric demand. Similarly, when the utilities de-sign their equipment, they tend to do so with acertain level of storm surge in mind. The regula-

0

100

200

300

400

500

Con Edison*

Con Edison* 0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

1st quartile 2nd quartile

3rd quartile

4th quartile

1st quartile2nd quartile

3rd quartile

4th quartile

Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI), 2009

Defined as the number of minutes an average customer interruption lasts

* Con Edison numbers include the underground network system, which is unique among compared utilitiesNote: Chart values include major storm events

System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI), 2009

Defined as the total number of customer interruptions divided by the total number of customers served

Reliability Performance Comparison Among Selected US Utilities

Source: Edison Electric Institute, NYS PSC, Team Analysis

Source: OLTPS

Utility Regulation

tors, however, do not yet require these utilities toconsider a full range of present and future stormsurge risks. When it comes to measuring perform-ance, some versions SAIDI and CAIFI metrics thatare used for the purpose actually exclude outagesthat are caused by major weather events.

What Happened During Sandy

Sandy caused unprecedented damage to NewYorks electricity and steam systems, while thecitys gas system experienced damage that wassmaller in scale and impact. In all three systems,however, damage occurred to infrastructureand customer equipment alike, leaving hun-dreds of thousands of customers without elec-tricity, tens of thousands of customers withoutnatural gas, and hundreds of the citys largestbuildings without steam for heat and hot water.

Most of the citys energy systems ultimately re-covered within a week of Sandys departure.However, in parts of the city where floodwatersinundated basements and sub-basements, ittook additional weeks to make the extensive re-pairs to homes and businesses that were nec-essary for utility service to be restored.

Electric SystemThe total number of New York customers leftwithout power as a result of Sandy ultimatelycame to 800,000, which, given that utilities de-fine a customer as a single electric meter, isequal to more than 2 million people. This is fivetimes as high as the number that lost power

during Hurricane Irene, the second most-dis-ruptive storm in recent history. Despite actionsby the utilities to protect their assets, the stormcaused serious damage to generation, trans-mission, and distribution systems, as well as tocustomer-owned equipment. While utilitiessought to restore services as quickly as possi-ble, the extent of the damage led to a complexand lengthy restoration process. Service tomost Con Edison customers was restoredwithin four days. However, some customersservice was not restored for almost two weeks,making this event the longest-duration outagein Con Edisons history. LIPAs electric servicerestoration in the Rockaways took an averageof almost 14 dayswith some customers en-during outages over a much longer period.

In the days leading up to Sandy, the utilitiestook preemptive actions to minimize potentialdowntime by protecting and preserving their in-frastructure. For example, to mitigate the im-pact of a surge (which, based on the bestavailable forecasts, would top 11 feet at theBattery in Manhattan), the utilities protectedcritical facilities with sandbags, plywood andother temporary barriers. Then, as the stormarrived on the night of October 29, Con Edisonshut down three entire networks preemp-tivelyits Bowling Green and Fulton networksin Lower Manhattan, and its Brighton Beachnetwork in Brooklynto prevent catastrophicflood damage to several clusters of under-ground distribution equipment as well as tocustomer equipment. Elsewhere, Con Edisonprepared to de-energize feeders when flooding

appeared imminent at key underground trans-former vaults. Because of the configuration ofthe network distribution system, many of thesepreemptive moves caused the loss of electricitynot only to customers in areas that were antic-ipated to be in Sandys inundation zones butalso to many customers that were expected tobe outside of those zones.

When the storm arrived, the surge exceededprojections, topping out not at 11 feet but at 14 feet (MLLW) at the Battery and overwhelm-ing many pre-storm preparations. Floodingforced several power plants and several trans-mission lines that import electricity from NewJersey to shut down, leaving New York Citymore dependent on a subset of its in-city gen-eration capacity and on the electricity supplyfrom Upstate New York. Some facilities alsowere damaged severely by Sandys surge. Thiswas true, for example, at the Brooklyn NavyYard Cogeneration plant and the Linden Cogen-eration plant. Other facilities, meanwhile, weredisconnected temporarily because of impactsto the transmission system. While the impactsto electricity supply were significant, Sandy, ul-timately, did not have the impact it might havehad, had the storm arrived during the summer.(See sidebar: Summer Demand Scenario)

Perhaps the most significant (and dramatic) im-pact that Sandy had on the operation of thetransmission and distribution systems occurredwhen the storms surge came into contact withseveral key substationsincluding substationsthat, based on earlier surge forecasts, were not


The Arverne Substation in the Rockaways was severely damaged by Sandy. Credit: LIPA

expected to be impacted. For example, in theRockaways, all four LIPA substations wereknocked out by floodwaters, resulting in wide-spread power failures throughout the peninsula.In Manhattan, Sandys surge overtopped tempo-rary protective barriers at Con Edisons East 13thStreet complex, flooding two transmission sub-stations and leading to an intense electric arc thatcould be seen from across the East River. Stormsurge also impacted a Con Edison area substationin Lower Manhattan. Across these facilities, criticalcontrol equipment was submerged in saltwater.The damaged systems made the substations in-operable, knocking out power to most of Manhat-tan south of 34th Street (with one notableexception being Battery Park City, which is sup-plied with electricity from a transmission substa-tion in Brooklyn). Finally, flooding of a transmissionsubstation in Staten Island caused a grid-levelshutdown in the western part of the borough.

Each of these substation losses impacted tensor hundreds of thousands of customers. In all,approximately 370,000 electric customers in New York City lost power due to network shutdowns and substation flooding in Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island. (See map: Electric Network ShutdownsDuring Sandy by Cause)

Lowest SupplyPost-Sandy

NormalSupply

15.3

10.9Summer peak: 11.5

October peak: 6.5

Post-Sandy peak: 4.1

4.4

6.5

5.8

9.5

Transmission imports

Capacities in thousands of MW

Electric demand

In-city generation

Post-Sandy supplywould have beeninsufficient to meet peaksummer demand

Electricity Supply and Demand BalanceAfter Sandy, New Yorkers generally focused on the impact of thestorm on the citys electricity consumers. By damaging distributionsystems and customer equipment and disrupting activity acrossNew York, the storm temporarily reduced demand for electricity inthe city by some 40 percent. What has received less attention, how-ever, is the fact that Sandy also disrupted a large number of in-citygenerators (directly and indirectly), leaving the city short of 3,000MW of capacity upon which it normally could depend (almost one-third of normal in-city capacity). In addition, due to impacts to low-lying sections of the transmission infrastructure between New Yorkand New Jersey, Sandy also left the city temporarily unable to ac-cess more than 1,400 MW of import capacity from New Jersey.

Because of the timing of Sandys arrival in late October, when elec-tricity usage tends to be relatively low, the remaining supply avail-able to the city after Sandy ended up being sufficient to supportthe citys demand at the time. However, if Sandy had come duringthe peak summer demand period, it is possible thatonce thestorm had passed and peak load had recoveredthe remainingin-city generation capacity would have been inadequate to meetthe citys demand. This, in turn, could have resulted in severe out-ages on a much wider scale than those actually caused by Sandy.This disruptive outcome is one that the city may not avoid duringfuture extreme weather events, particularly if hardening meas-ures are implemented to protect distribution infrastructure andcustomer equipment without also protecting generating assets.

Summer Demand Scenario


Flooded Transmission Substation

Flooded Area Substation

Preemptive Shutdown

Transmission System Overload

Electric Network Shutdowns During Sandy by Cause

Source: NYISO



Customers Impacted1

thousands

Overhead distribution damage

Staten Island substation flooding

1 Overlaps of customer counts exist between categories

390

88

140

223

35

30

34

24

Total: 805

Co

n E

dis

on

LIPA

Outage Cause

Brooklyn and Staten Islandtransmission system overload

Manhattan substation flooding

Preemptive shutdown of three networks(two in Manhattan and one in Brooklyn)

Customer equipment flooding

Substation flooding

Customer equipment flooding

Causes of Electric System Outages and Customer Impacts

Electrical Outage Restoration

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Manhattan

The Bronx

Staten Island

Non-Rockaways

Rockaways

Brooklyn

Que

ens

Estimate ofcustomer-side outages

630 633

525

464

277

153

128

96 1012

78 83 72

4731 25 25 24

1 A total of 805,000 customers lost power after the storm, but point-in-time daily estimates are lower because accounts went on and offline at different times

2 Increase in customer outages due to the impact of noreaster on Nov. 7

59

Point-in-time Customer Outages1 thousands

56%

35%

9%

79%

20%

1%

41%

59%

20%

80%

100%

1 4 9 13 17

Customer flood damage Overhead utility damage Network shutdown

Customer Outages by Outage Cause% of daily total

Days after Sandy

Days after Sandy



Substation disruptions also led to stresseswithin the citys bulk transmission system,which became another cause of power out-ages. For example, a day after Sandys depar-ture, a transmission system overload resultedfrom flood impacts at two transmission substa-tions in Brooklyn and Staten Island. The combi-nation of these factors and the loss of all importcapacity from New Jersey meant that the re-maining transmission line capacity from north-ern parts of the city to parts of Brooklyn andStaten Island was inadequate to support theload. As a result, Con Edison was forced to ter-minate service to 140,000 customers, includingsome customers which had lost and regainedpower just the day before. This situation per-sisted for two and half hours, until additionalgeneration (340MW from the Arthur Kill Gener-ating Station that had been undergoing sched-uled maintenance) could be brought online.

In addition to the outages caused by substationdisruptions, Sandy caused localized outages inthe citys overhead distribution system. Intenseperiods of sustained winds as well as wind gustsreaching 90 miles per hour toppled trees andpushed branches into power lines. Ultimately,140 miles of overhead lines, 1,000 poles, and 900transformers were damaged in Con Edisons system and had to be replaced or repaired. As aresult approximately two-thirds of the citys customers served by the overhead system, or390,000 customers, lost power at some point.

Within heavily flooded areas, approximately55,000 customers primarily lost power not

only because of damage to the utility systemserving them but because of damage to electrical equipment in their buildings. In many cases,these customers suffered much longer outagesdue to the extensive repairs needed on their ownequipment. Customers that were impacted byflooding in their basements included three hospitals. These hospitals eventually were forcedto evacuate patients because they were unableto rely on their backup power systems. (Seechart: Causes of Electric System Outages andCustomer Impacts)

As Sandys floodwaters receded, the utilitieswere faced with the massive task of restoringelectricity to those who had lost it. The effortsto restore electric service were centeredaround repairs to damaged transmission infra-structure and local distribution system equip-ment. Of course, before restoration couldoccur, it was necessary for the utilities to deter-mine where the need for restoration existed.The identification of system outages generallyrelies on a combination of grid monitoring tech-nology, customer complaints, and, in areas ofheavy damage, special assessment teams sentout by the utilities. Following Sandy, once theutilities assessed the location and extent ofdamage, restoration of service was prioritizedto the extent possible for facilities necessary forcritical care and public safety, City infrastruc-ture, and individual customers. (See charts: Electric Outage Restoration and Electric, Gasand Steam System Restoration Milestones)

Electric service restoration to customers con-nected to the underground distribution systemdepended on the utilities ability to reenergizeinundated substations. In most cases, duringSandy, the major electricity-carrying equipmentin these substations escaped catastrophic dam-age. In fact, most of the portions of the systemthat were damaged were restored in a matterof days. Once each substation was restored,service to the tens of thousands of customerscould be turned on almost instantaneously.

Much work remained even after the restorationof substations. While Con Edisons decision todeenergize portions of the underground distribution system in Lower Manhattan andlow-lying areas in Brooklyn and Queens preemptively reduced the extent of damage, localized areas of flooding required hundredsof underground vaults to be pumped dry. Thecombination of dewatering, the replacement ofthe many components that were damaged byinundation, and the inspections that were required prior to reenergizing turned out to bea significant undertaking for Con Edison.

Utilities from around the country sent mutualassistance crews to assist in this restoration ef-fort. For example, Con Edison brought in nearly3,400 overhead line workers (as well as over 400underground workers) from as far away as Cali-fornia. As a result of these efforts, service to themajority of overhead and underground systemcustomers was restored within a week. Due tothe sheer volume of damage across the system,it took another week to restore power to all ofCon Edisons customers who could accept it.


Oct 30 Day 1

Oct 31 Day 2

Nov 1 Day 3

Nov 2 Day 4

Nov 3 Day 5

Nov 4 Day 6

Nov 5 Day 7

Nov 6 Day 8

Nov 7 Day 9

Nov 8 Day 10

Nov 9 Day 11

Nov 10 Day 12

Nov 11 Day 13

Nov 12 Day 14

Weeks Beyond

ELECTRIC GAS

Con Edison LIPA Con Edison National Grid Con Edison

STEAM

Restoration of customers begins

Restoration complete exceptfor customer-side outages

Remaining outages in flood-damaged areas primarilydue to customer equipment

Restoration of distribution(installation of mobile substation)

Restoration of steam production

Source: Con Edison, LIPA, National Grid

Electric, Gas, and Steam System Restoration Milestones


The situation in LIPAs territory in the Rock-aways was worse. There, several substationswere so badly damaged that a mobile substa-tion unit had to be put in place while longer-term repairs were conducted. As a result, ittook 11 days after Sandy passed before LIPAcould begin to reenergize its grid. Three dayslater, LIPA was able to restore power to 10,000customers, predominantly in portions of FarRockaway, whose homes were built on higherground. The majority of customers in Rockawayneighborhoods such as Belle Harbor, RockawayBeach, and Arverne, had significant flood damage to electrical equipment in their homes and businesses, which further delayedservice restorations.

As indicated, even when power was restored todifferent parts of the citys electrical grid, customers were not able necessarily to use thatpower in their homes and businesses; this wasdue, in many cases, to significant damage tocustomer-side equipment caused by the flood-ing. In these cases, the City worked with ConEdison, LIPA, and National Grid to create an in-novative program for impacted homeownerscalled Rapid Repairs. This program, funded byFEMA, made licensed electricians available torepair customer-side electrical damage. By thetime it ended, five months after Sandy, the RapidRepairs program had helped restore service tosome 20,000 homes.

It is worth noting that, amidst the widespreadelectric outages, there were some cases wherefacilities performed well on either backup generators or CHP systems. For example, atleast five hospitals relied on backup generatorsystems in order to stay in operation during thestorm and its aftermath. Meanwhile, New YorkUniversity had success keeping key buildingson its Washington Square campus lit andheated thanks to a newly installed gas-fired

CHP system, which it was able to operate seamlessly in isolation from the grid when thegrid failed.

Natural Gas SystemOverall, the citys natural gas system fared better than its electric grid. However, even thisgenerally resilient system did not escape damage, with approximately 80,000 NationalGrid and 4,000 Con Edison customers ultimately losing service.

As was the case for the electric grid, Sandys im-pact on the citys natural gas system began witha series of preemptive steps that were taken byCon Edison and National Grid. For example, asSandy approached, the two utilities isolatedsome low-lying parts of their networks to ensurethat any intrusion of water would be limited,rather than spreading system-wide. Both Con Edi-son and National Grid also shut down several reg-ulator stations in anticipation of the storm.

As Sandys surge peaked, Con Edison and National Grid needed to take immediate action,resulting in the shutdown of still more sectionsof their respective distribution systems. In someparts of the low-pressure distribution system,the pressure of floodwaters quickly exceededthe pressure inside the gas mains, resulting inwater intrusion through cracks, holes and otherweak points. Meanwhile, in the high-pressuredistribution system, floodwaters entered somecustomer service lines. The net effect of thepreemptive actions and the inundation damagewas loss of gas service in a number of city neigh-borhoods, including Coney Island, HowardBeach, the Rockaways, Edgewater Park, LocustPoint, City Island, and portions of the East Vil-lage and South Street Seaport. Additionally,some of Con Edisons gas control and monitor-ing equipment stopped functioning, due to theloss of power and telecommunications services.

As Sandys floodwaters receded, restoration primarily depended on the removal of water fromdistribution mains, equipment and pipe inspections, and the re-lighting of customers appliances. Though this work began almost immediately, damage to some system compo-nents was extensive. For example, in the weeksfollowing the storm, National Grid had to rebuild13 miles of gas mains serving Breezy Point (whichhad also been damaged by fire) and New Dorp.

Similar to the electric grid, restoration of thegas distribution system was still, in some cases,insufficient to re-light appliances in homes andbusinesses that were damaged by floodwaters.Here again, the Citys Rapid Repairs programwas instrumental in assisting homeowners with making repairs to damaged boilers andheating systems.

Steam SystemDuring Sandy, one-third of the citys steam customers, including five acute care hospitals,experienced outages. As was the case for theelectric grid and gas distribution system,Sandys impact on the citys steam distributionsystem began with a series of preemptive stepsthat were taken by Con Edison. These includedthe closing of low-lying segments of the system, in order to avoid a damaging and potentially explosive effect called water hammer that occurs when cold floodwatersmeet hot steam pipes. Con Edison also shutdown two generating stations that were poten-tially vulnerable to inundation: East River and Brooklyn Navy Yard.

The storm surge from Sandy forced Con Edisonto shut down two more generating stations,one at 59th Street and one at 74th Street inManhattan. In total, during Sandy, the cityssteam system lost nearly 90 percent of its gen-erating capacity, resulting in a complete shut-down of the system below 14th Street. Othercustomers lost steam service when parts of theFirst Avenue distribution tunnel, which steammains, gas mains, and electric lines traverse,were flooded with 500,000 gallons of water.Moreover, some customers steam serviceswere shut down when the electric grid failed inSouthern Manhattan, and they were unable topower their buildings systems.

Following Sandy, restoration of the steam sys-tem took approximately 12 days. This was notonly because of the significant damage thathad occurred but also because of the carefultiming and sequencing required for restoration,including the repair of production capacity anddewatering of pipes, which are both necessarypreconditions for the warming and pressuriza-tion of mains.

Utility workers pumping water out of underground electric vaults post-Sandy Credit: Con Edison

Generators in the 100-Year Floodplain*

Generators in the 500-Year Floodplain

Capacity (MW)Less Than 200201 - 500501 - 1,000

More Than 1,000

PWMs 100-Year Floodplain^

PWMs 500-Year Floodplain

^The best available data for New Jersey is FEMAs Advisory Base Flood Elevation (ABFE) data.

*Data indicates categorization of a facility within floodplain boundaries only; critical equipment elevations may be above flood elevations.

Astoria Cluster:29% of in-city capacity

Long Island City Cluster:25% of in-city capacity

What Could Happen in the Future

Going forward, impacts from several types of ex-treme weather events could cause major fail-ures in the citys utility systems, which couldtake multiple days to weeks to repair. The elec-tric and steam systems face the greatest risks,with storm surge, paired with sea level rise, rep-resenting the most significant challenge. Theelectric system also could be impacted seriouslyby more frequent, longer, and intense heatwaves. The natural gas system is fairly resilientoverall, but storm surge could still pose a localized risk.

Major RisksAs Sandy demonstrated, storm surge couldcause major loss of electric and steam service.The citys underground electric and steam dis-tribution systems are vulnerable to floodwaters,as are electric and steam generating facilities.Today, 88 percent of the citys steam generatingcapacity already lies within the 100-year flood-plain. In the electric system, 53 percent of in-city electric generation capacity, 37 percent oftransmission substation capacity, and 12 percentof large distribution substation capacity lie


In-city generation by capacity 1

(24 assets)Transmission substations by load served 1,2

(24 assets)Major area substations by load served 1

(50 assets)

2050s2020s2013 2050s2020s2013 2050s2020s2013

82% 81% 78%

37% 37%

63%

37%

12%

6%4%

18% 18%

33%

14%

2%9,600 MW 11,500 MW 11,500 MW

2%

11%

26%

37%

63%53%

87%

97%

100-Year Floodplain 500-Year Floodplain Outside of Floodplain

1%

1%

Electric Assets in Current and Future Floodplains

Source: FEMA, CUNY Institute for Sustainable Cities, OLTPS

In-City Electric Generating Facilities in the Floodplain

Source: FEMA, OLTPS

1 Data indicates categorization of a facility within floodplain boundaries only; critical equipment elevations may be above flood elevations 2 Does not include transmission substations that do not serve load directly


Scale of Impact

Hazard Today 2020s 2050s Comments

Gradual

Sea level rise Minimal impact

Increased precipitation

Minimal impact

Higher average temperature

Minimal impact

Extreme Events

Storm surgeCity gates could lose monitoring/control systems; low-pressure distribution pipes could experience water infiltration

Heavy downpour Minimal impact

Heat wave Minimal impact

High winds Minimal impact

Scale of Impact


Gradual



Minimal impact


Minimal impact

Extreme Events

Storm surge Much of the critical infrastructure is in floodplains; flood risks will become worse over time

Heavy downpour Minimal impact

Heat waveIncreased risk of outages due to the impact of heat waves on peak demand and on electric infrastructure

High winds Risk of damage to overhead power lines

Risk Assessment: Impact of Climate Change on UtilitiesElectric SystemMajor Risk Moderate Risk Minor Risk

Risk Assessment: Impact of Climate Change on UtilitiesNatural Gas SystemMajor Risk Moderate Risk Minor Risk


within the 100-year floodplain. Based on thebest available sea level rise projections, thesefigures are forecast to grow by the 2050s to 97percent, 63 percent, and 18 percent, respec-tively. (See map: In-City Electric Generating Facilities in the Floodplain; see chart: ElectricAssets in Current and Future Floodplains)

For the natural gas system, the biggest risk thatstorm surge poses (both today and in the future) is to the distribution infrastructure. Although flooding in and of itself usually will notstop the flow of gas, if water enters pipes, serv-ice can be compromised. The low pressure system is particularly vulnerable to this type ofinfiltration. Further upstream, the risks are lower, since gas can continue to flow ifwater inundates a city gate or regulator station(though controls and metering equipment arenot always impervious to flooding).

Another significant risk to the citys energy systemsprimarily its electric gridcomesfrom heat waves. Historically, heat waves im-pacted the citys electric grid more frequentlyand more significantly than any other type ofweather event. For example, in 2006 a heatwave-related electrical outage in Long Island

City, Queens resulted in the loss of power to approximately 115,000 customers (or 25,000residents)some for more than a week. In thefuture, New York is likely to face longer, morefrequent, and more intense heat waves.

Heat waves create issues for the electric grid intwo ways. First, they typically lead to a signifi-cant increase in demand as the use of air con-ditioning soars. This risks an imbalancebetween demand and supply, which can lead tooutages. Second, the very temperatures thatcause increases in demand simultaneouslystrain the electric generating and distributionequipment itself. For example, a prolongedheat wave makes it difficult for electricity-carry-ing equipment (such as transformers) to dissi-pate heat, while urban heat island effects(where heat absorbed during the day is re-tained near asphalt surfaces) put particularstrain on distribution equipment located under-ground. These factors can lead to equipmentfailures and cascading disturbances in the elec-tric system.

These two risks caused by heat waves can bemitigated, to an extent, if the NYISO or utilitiesask certain customers to reduce electricity

usage (and pay them for doing so) as part of de-mand response programs. Additionally, utilitiescan implement network-wide voltage reductions (between 5 and 8 percent) to relievestress on equipment in strained networks. ConEdison employed this strategy in the summerof 2012, reducing voltage in 28 networks for ahalf day to 3 days at a time. However, if thesemeasures do not sufficiently reduce demandand equipment stress, more significant impacts could occur, including the disconnec-tion of entire neighborhoods orwhen allstrategies failcascading blackouts. (See map: Heat Wave Impact: Voltage Reduction in Con Edison Networks)

Finally, in addition to storm surge and heatwaves, the vulnerabilities of the various energysystems present a significant risk to their sistersystems, due to their interconnectivity. For example, natural gas and liquid fuels are neces-sary for the generation of much of the cityselectricity and steam. Thus, disruptions to thefuel supply chain may in turn disrupt powerand steam production. The steam system isalso vulnerable to large-scale power outages:All of the citys steam generating plants rely on electric equipment, and although backup

Scale of Impact


Gradual



Minimal impact


Minimal impact

Extreme Events

Storm surgeMost steam generation assets and parts of the distribution system are in floodplains; flood risks will become worse over time

Heavy downpour Localized outages are possible

Heat wave Minimal impact

High winds Minimal impact

Risk Assessment: Impact of Climate Change on UtilitiesSteam SystemMajor Risk Moderate Risk Minor Risk


generation is often available, switching to it requires time, meaning that the steam systemis vulnerable to depressurization during thedowntime. This is what happened during the citywide power outage of 2003, when theentire steam system was shut down for morethan five days.

Other RisksHigh winds will continue to pose a serious riskto the electric system looking forward. Sincemost wind-related damage occurs when windstopple trees and branches into power lines, thedamage tends to cause more localized outages, rather than system-wide issues. Thatsaid, hurricanes and other large storms with significant wind can lead to damage that is more widespread.

Meanwhile, for the steam system, tropicalstorms or hurricanes that bring heavy down-pours may present some of the same challengesthat surge does, though likely on a much morelocalized basis. Large volumes of water aroundsteam mains prevent condensate traps fromfunctioning properly, potentially leaving pipingvulnerable to water hammer effects that canshut down steam mains.

5% reduction is implemented as a precautionary measure; 8% reduction is implemented when there is serious stresson the network.

5% Voltage Reduction

8% Voltage Reduction

Heat Wave Impact: Voltage Reduction in Con Edison Networks

Source: OLTPS, Con Edison

Credit: Seth Pinsky


From the 19th century to today, New Yorks energy systems have evolved along with thecity that they serve. However, emerging climatethreats will necessitate a rethinking of important aspects of the systems architec-tures. At the same time, new technologies present an opportunity to modernize these systems in ways that could increase their resiliency significantly.

To this end, the City will advance a series of proposals designed to enable electricity, gas,and steam to be delivered reliably to New York-ers, even during the extreme weather eventsthat are expected in the coming decades. Theseproposals will address gaps in the regulatoryframework applicable to these systems, as wellas the infrastructure that supports them. Collectively, even as the climate changes, theseproposals will reduce the frequency and severity of service disruptions, while allowingfor more rapid restoration of service when disruptions do occur.

Strategy: Redesign the regulatory framework to support resiliency

The first set of proposals is designed to addressgaps in the regulatory framework that governsthe citys energy systems. This will assist utilitiesand regulators with identifying and appropriatelyfunding long-term capital projects that will make the electric, gas, and steam systemsmore resilient.

Initiative 1Work with utilities and regulators to develop a cost-effective system upgrade plan to address climate risks

Utilities and regulators long have employed analytical techniques to ensure adequate en-ergy supply in the event of heat waves or failureof individual pieces of equipment. However,regulators generally do not require utilities toprepare for the possibility of losing entire facili-ties to weather events such as storm surge, nordo they consider the indirect economic and societal impact of such events. This is primarilybecause current guidelines instruct utilities, indesigning their systems, to consider what isknown and measurablean approach thatdoes not address low-probability but high-impact events such as Sandy.

The City, through the Mayors Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability (OLTPS),will work with utilities, regulators, and climatescientists to adjust the existing regulatoryframework to address these shortcomings.

These changes will seek to require utilities toanalyze costs, benefits, and risks, and to upgrade their systems as appropriate to withstand the sorts of high-impact risks thatthey face not only today, but also are likely toface with increasing frequency in the future. Atthe same time, the City will seek modificationsin the ratemaking process to ensure that resiliency-related investments are given dueconsideration and that the utilities have areasonable opportunity to recover those investments, just as they now recover theirinvestments related to reliability.

Underlying all decisions on infrastructure upgrades that address extreme weather and climate change resiliency (including the type ofinvestments that the City will seek to encourageutilities to make through the aforementionedregulatory changes) is an accurate assessmentof risks. This is because not all assets need tobe protected to the same standard, given thatsome are more vulnerable or important thanothers. To avoid unnecessary rigidity, the Citywill advocate for the use of probabilistic risk assessments by regulators and utilities to helpguide the most efficient use of the utilities capital budgets.

OLTPS has taken the first steps towards devel-oping a risk assessment model that takes intoaccount storm probabilities and future surgeheights, quantifying possible customer outagesand economic losses, and thereby beginning toidentify the system assets that should be prioritized for protection. OLTPS will work withthe utilities and climate scientists to continue torefine this model, with the goal of building acost-benefit tool upon which to base stormhardening investment decisions that the PSC could incorporate into its utility regulation framework. (See sidebar: Climate Risk Model forthe Electric Sector)

Initiative 2Work with utilities and regulators to reflect climate risks in system design andequipment standards

To date, the system planning approaches anddesign standards used by New Yorks utilitiesand regulators have ensured highly reliable sys-tems in New York. However, they have not beenestablished with the goal of optimizing systemresiliency. Ultimately, the citys systems shouldbe capable not only of reliable day-to-day oper-ation, but also of remaining operational duringextreme weather events (such as hurricanes,tropical storms, and heat waves), and recover-ing quickly when parts of the system fail.

This can be achieved in part by considering climate change impacts in system planning

INITIATIVES FOR INCREASING RESILIENCY IN UTILITIES

This chapter contains a series of initiatives thatare designed to mitigate the impacts of climatechange on New Yorks utility systems. In manycases, these initiatives are ready to proceedand have identified funding sources assignedto cover their costs. With respect to these initiatives, the City intends to proceed withthem as quickly as practicable.

Certain other initiatives described in this chapter may be ready to proceed, but still donot have specific sources of funding assignedto them. In Chapter 19 (Funding), the City describes additional funding sources, which, ifsecured, would be sufficient to fund the fullfirst phase of projects and programs describedin this document over a 10-year period. The City will work aggressively on securing this funding and any necessary third-party approvals required in connection therewith(i.e., from the Federal or State governments).However, until such time as these sources aresecured, the City will proceed only with thoseinitiatives for which it has adequate funding.

Extreme climate events may be difficult to predictmore than a few days in advancebut their general patterns of occurrence are measurable.In the electric sector, these measurements cansupport analytical techniques that reveal the extent of existing and future risks and supportbetter decision-making as utilities and regulatorsdecide how much and how quickly to invest to prepare for heat waves, storm surges, andhigh wind events.

OLTPS, with support from the Analytics Divisionof the Mayors Office of Policy and Strategic Planning, has taken the first steps towards amore quantitative approach to addressing theclimate-related risks to New York Citys electricsystems. The Electric Sector Storm Surge RiskModel (ESRM), which the City is developing, contains three main modules:

1. The storm surge module, which builds onthird-party storm models and climatechange projections from the NPCC to generate hundreds of inundation scenariosand associated probabilities of occurrencefor critical electric infrastructure locations,looking at 2013, the 2020s, and the 2050s;

2. The network structure module, which mapsout the dependencies between individualsubstations and the networks they serve and compares the design elevation of eachsubstation with the surge height in each individual storm to determine whether ornot it would remain functional; and

3. The customer module, which uses thewealth of data available to the City to movepast the simple number of customers that anetwork serves towards a more nuanced un-derstanding of the networks importanceincluding the critical customers that dependon it, the amount of economic activity it supports, and, for example, the number ofhigh-rise housing units that it serves thatcontain vulnerable populations.

The model is still in the early phases of development; the examples shown here illustrate how the three modules, taken together,make it possible to develop a preliminary quantitative baseline of risks that the electric system faces. For example, Chart A demonstratesthe relationship between a given level of customer losses and the probability that this level will be met or exceeded in any one year. This analysis shows that, from this perspective,Sandy is not the worst storm that could hit the city. In fact, storms at the tail-end of the distribution, though unlikely, could result in customer losses almost four times as high asthose suffered during Sandy. The model can

also guide investment decisions. Again, by way of example, Chart B demonstrates that only five substations are likely to be responsible for 80 percent of annual expectedcustomer losses. This would suggest that resiliency investments in these substationsshould be prioritized. If the outcomes are measured in terms of Gross City Product (GCP)losses resulting from outages, the order of priority among the five substations changes but the overall list remains the same.

The next step in the development of the modelis to move beyond estimating baseline losses towards calculating the cost-effectiveness of various protection strategies and also guidingthe standards to which critical assets should be protected. Further on, strategies to address heatand wind risks could be included as well, thoughthe proper development of these elements

would require a significant commitment of engineering resources. As an example, an earlyestimate developed as a proof of concept,shown in Chart C, suggests that hardening substations against surge may be a more effective use of funds than burying overheadpower lines to protect them against wind.

The City has already been working closely withutilities and regulators to discuss these newquantitative approaches and to explore ways toincorporate them into utility decision-makingand regulationbut much more work remainsto be done. OLTPS will continue to refine theESRM, and will work with utilities and regulatorsto expand the approach to include costs of protection strategies and to incorporate heatand wind risks within a common framework.



0.2%

1,200

Thousands of customers

1,000

800

600

400

200

0

100%

Annual probability of exceedance of storm surge-related customer outages

*Outages associated with direct substation outageNote: Preliminary analysis

Example surge event:860,000 customers out

Sandy-level impact:311,000 customers out*

Customer Losses Due to Storm Surge-Related Substation Outages

Substation Alpha

37%

Substation Beta

Substation Gamma

Substation Delta

Substation Epsilon

All OtherSubstations

Total

18%

9%

9%

7%

20%

100%

2013 climate riskNote: Preliminary analysis

B.

Source: OLTPS

Estimated Total Losses by Event Probability

Estimated Average Annual Losses by Substation

A.

Climate Risk Model for the Electric Sector


5.0

5.5

9.0

9.5

10.0

14.0

3.0

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.5

4.0

4.5

1

Import capacityDR

Concrete poles

!

13.9

10.3

!

8.8

Cost/benefit ratio

5.8

Dist undergrounding HP*! !

5.8

Dist hardening retro LP**

! ! !

3.7

Substation hardening LP**! !

1.6

Mobile substations!

1.0

Flood sectionalizing !

0.7

Overhead line sectionalizing! !Dist undergrounding LP**!

Dist hardening retro HP*!

0.5

Substation hardening HP*! !

0.5

Sensing

0.4

Generation levees

0.3

Tree clearing

0.2

Submersible network protectors!

0.20.6

2050s loss averted!

Power SupplySubstationsDistribution

* High priority** Low priority

Note: Preliminary analysis for illustrative purposes only

The protective benefits of strategies below the lineexceed the cost of protection

Source: Team Analysis

Estimated Risk Reduction Potential of Protection Strategies

Credit: Stefan Klaas

C.

decisions. With regard to heat waves, for example, the City has worked with the NewYork City Panel on Climate Change (NPCC) andCon Edison to establish that an increase in average temperatures of just 1 degree Fahren-heit in New York in the years ahead could in-crease peak demand in the city by as much as175 MWa likely underestimate given that itdoes not include the impact of changes in aver-age humidity (which could increase air condi-tioner use and therefore peak demand evenfurther). The Citys goal is for the NYISO to in-corporate temperature and humidity forecastsinto the Reliability Needs Assessment used inbulk power system planning. This would allowsystem planners to make adjustments to long-term plans for resource adequacy and trans-mission reliability to ensure supply will beadequate even as the climate changes.

Design of a more resilient system will also beaccomplished in parallel by updating systemand equipment design standards. The City,therefore, will call on utilities to work with it andthe PSC to examine system designs and con-sider changes to design standards in light of thelikelihood of higher ambient peak tempera-tures, longer heat waves, extended exposureto flooding and saltwater, and stronger andmore sustained winds.

With regard to heat waves, a specific focusmust be on Con Edisons underground networks. As part of this evaluation, the City willask Con Edison and the PSC to reexamine andevaluate the strategy employed in recent yearsby which peak system demand during heatwaves has been met by reducing voltage. Inparticular, the City will ask the utility and theregulator to assess the propriety of the use ofvoltage reductions in lieu of system reinforce-ments and upgrades, as well as the potentialimplications of relying on voltage reductionsduring more frequent and longer duration heat waves.

Initiative 3Work with utilities and regulators to establish performance metrics for climate risk response

Regulators exclude performance during ex-treme weather events when evaluating utilityperformance and structuring the financial incentives associated with such evaluations.However, given the likely increases in frequencyof these weather events, the time has come forutilities to be held accountable for their per-formance before, during and after such events.

The City will work with the utilities and the PSCto develop updated resiliency metrics and real-istic performance standards, including appro-

priate incentives. Examples of performancemetrics could include, among other things, min-imum times to reach a 90 percent restorationthreshold for customers following differentclasses of weather events. The Citys expectation is that these metrics and standardswould evolve over time as climate-relatedthreats increase.

In connection with the metrics and standardsabove, the City also will call upon the PSC to require utilities to publish annual progress reports describing their preparedness for climate risks. Among the indicators describedin the annual reports could be recent and projected climate-related capital investments,including replacements of unprotected conductors in overhead networks with extensive tree coverage, replacement of castiron and bare steel gas mains in flood-proneareas, and installation of submersible underground equipment.

Strategy: Harden existing infrastructure to withstand climate events

Sandy demonstrated how the failure of keynodes in the energy distribution system canhave widespread impacts on the citys energysystems, with significant repercussions for peo-ple, businesses, and communities. To addressthis, the City will call upon the utilities to identifyhigh-priority infrastructure that is vulnerable toincreasingly common climate risks, such asfloods and heat waves, and to make the invest-ments necessary to harden that infrastructure.

Initiative 4Work with power suppliers and regulators to harden key power generators against flooding

As described above, 53 percent of New YorkCitys power plants are in the 100-year floodplain.By the 2050s, 97 percent will be. Despite this,regulators do not yet require the owners of theseplants to invest in flood-protection measures.

The City, working through OLTPS, will conveneplant owners, utilities, and regulators to worktogether to prioritize, plan, and budget for thehardening of key in-city assets. For existingplants, the City will call upon the NYSRC to develop reliability rules that would be adminis-tered and enforced by the NYISO and thatwould require select plant owners to upgradetheir facilities to withstand at least a so-called100-year flood (a flood level that has a 1 percent chance of being met or exceeded inany given year). The City will work with the

facility owners, the NYSRC, NYISO, PSC, and ConEdison to identify the selected plants based ona cost-benefit analysis developed by all of theparties, and to determine the measures thatshould be undertaken, the timeframe for completing the measures, and a method bywhich the owners could recover the costs ofsuch projects.

For new generating facilities and those undergoing substantial upgrades (such as repowering) that will be sited in the citys 500-year floodplain, the City further will callupon the PSC to require hardening to a 500-year flood elevation, or demonstration of othermeasures to be able to remain operational during, or recover quickly from, a 500-year flood event.

Initiative 5Work with utilities and the PSC to harden key electric transmission and distribution infrastructure against flooding

Transmission substations, distribution substa-tions, utility tunnels, and underground equipment are all at risk of flooding. For example, 37 percent of transmission substa-tions are in the 100-year floodplain today and63 percent are likely to be in the 100-year floodplain by the 2050s.

The City will work with utilities and regulatorsto protect these assets from future floodevents. In the case of substations, the City,working with Con Edison, LIPA, and the PSC, willprioritize investments by evaluating the rolethat each such substation plays in system relia-bility, the number and criticality of customersthat it serves (e.g., giving priority to hospitals),and the projected economic impact of its fail-ure. The Citys initial modeling suggests that 20percent of transmission-level substations areresponsible for 80 percent of annual expectedcustomer losses.

Storm hardening measures to be implementedat the selected substations will be site-specific.In some cases, depending on the substationsconfiguration, selected assets within a substa-tion could be elevated; in other cases, a combi-nation of strategies, including protecting theperimeter of the facility, could be implemented.

In the case of utility tunnels, the City will support Con Edisons proposed plans to protecteach from flooding. Finally, in the case of underground transformers and switches in thefloodplainsof which 52 percent are currentlysubmersible or water-resistantthe City will work with utilities and regulators to ad-vance the goal of replacing, over time, all



underground equipment in the 100-year floodplain with equipment that is submersibleand unaffected by saltwater.

Initiative 6Work with utilities and the PSC to hardenvulnerable overhead lines against winds

During storms, high winds and downed treesthreaten overhead electric poles, transformers,and cables. The City will work with Con Edisonand LIPA to manage these risks through treemaintenance, line strengthening, and a line re-location program.

In some cases, rerouting lines undergroundmay also be warranted, depending on the number of customers impacted and cost involved. In most cases, however, this optionwill be complicated and very expensive. OnFebruary 25, 2013, the City passed Local Law13, directing OLTPS to conduct a study examining the undergrounding of overheadpower lines in the city. Findings are to be sub-mitted to the Mayor and City Council. The studyis being conducted in partnership with Con Edison and will include an analysis of both projected costs and the expected effects ongrid reliability of more extensive underground-ing. It also will lay the foundations for includingwind risks in the overall regulatory frameworkgoverning system reliability. If appropriate, thestudy will further identify the areas of the city,if any, where undergrounding could be of particular benefit, as well as those areas whereit is viewed to be impracticable or subject togreater reliability risk.

Initiative 7Work with utilities, regulators, and gaspipeline operators to harden the naturalgas system against flooding

Although the citys gas system performed rela-tively well during Sandy, there were instanceswhere remote operation of parts of the systemfailed. Additionally, the distribution system hadlocalized outages due to water infiltration.

To ensure that future floods do not extensivelycompromise the gas system or reduce the abil-ity of Con Edison or National Grid to control andmonitor their systems, the City will work withthe PSC, pipeline companies, and utilities to de-velop plans to harden all city-gates, interfaceregulator stations, and control equipmentagainst flooding. To protect the distribution sys-tem, the City will work with the PSC, Con Edi-son, and National Grid to take steps to preventwater from infiltrating into gas pipes. In the lowpressure system this will be achieved by ex-panding existing programs to replace the baresteel and cast iron pipes that are prone to cor-

rosion, leaks, and cracks. In the high pressuresystem this will be achieved by installing back-flow prevention devices on vent lines.

Initiative 8Work with steam plant operators and the PSC to harden steam plants against flooding

Five out of six of the citys steam plants are in the floodplain today. Relocating these plants is neither practical nor cost-effective. The City, therefore, will call upon Con Edison and thePSC to increase the resiliency of these plants bytaking flood-protection measures, includingadding floodwalls, sealing building perimeters,raising equipment, and installing flood-pro-tected, natural gas-fired back-up generators asappropriate (allowing Con Edison to deliversteam even during widespread power outages).

Strategy: Reconfigure utilitynetworks to be redundant and resilient

Hardening existing infrastructure is only the firststep in making the citys energy networksstronger. In the coming years, regulated utilitiesand private companies alike should rethink theentire architecture of their systems to help theCity meet its twin goals of reducing the likelihoodof failure and ensuring that service restorationcan happen more quickly when failures do occur.

Initiative 9Work with industry partners, New YorkState, and regulators to strengthen New York Citys power supply

New York Citys 9,600 MW of power generationcan satisfy over 80 percent of peak demand,but the majority of these in-city power plantsare located in the 100-year floodplain, all de-pend on natural gas and liquid fuel supplies(which themselves are subject to supply inter-ruptions during extreme weather events), andalmost two-thirds are more than 40 years old.The City will take steps to diversify and improvethe sources of the citys power supply, and todo so in a way that will connect the city directlyto new, low-carbon generation sources (whichaddress some of the causes of climate change).

First, the City will continue to work with theNYISO to change wholesale energy rules to en-courage generation owners to repower theirolder, less efficient, and higher polluting in-citypower plants. The City already has facilitatedthe repowering of a 500 MW power plant oper-ated by NYPA in Astoria.

Second, the City will encourage the develop-

ment of new transmission lines connecting thecity to other markets and sources of supply. TheHudson Transmission Project, which recentlycommenced operation, provides a new 660 MW connection between the city and thetransmission system in the Mid-Atlantic andMidwestern regions. Additionally, the City ac-tively supported the issuance of a State permitto construct and operate a 343-mile transmis-sion line from Quebec that would allow for theimportation of 1,000 MW of clean, low carbonCanadian hydropower directly to New York City.

Third, the City will continue to explore opportu-nities to expand low-carbon electricity generationsources in the areaworking, for example, withNYPA and Con Edison on the potential develop-ment of up to 700 MW of offshore wind turbinesin the waters south of the Rockaway peninsula.The Federal government currently is reviewing aNYPA lease application for use of underwaterlands for such purposes.

Initiative 10Require more in-city plants to be able torestart quickly in the event of blackout

Many New York City power plants, includingsome of the newest ones, cannot be restartedwithout external power sources (i.e., they can-not black-start) after grid-scale outages. Thisslows the grids ability to recover. State regula-tors only recently adopted a requirement thatall new plants proposed to be built in New Yorkeither be able to provide for black-start ca-pacity or to justify why such capacity is not in-cluded. This requirement did not exist when thecitys newest plants received siting approval,while older in-city plants that do have such ca-pacity are approaching the end of their usefullives. The City, through OLTPS, therefore, willwork with generators, the PSC, the NYISO,FERC, and Con Edison to expand black-startcapabilities within the existing generation fleet.

Initiative 11Work with Con Edison and the PSC to develop a long-term resiliency plan forthe electric distribution system

While hardening existing power assets is an im-portant strategy, utilities also need to incorpo-rate resilience into their long-term expansionplans, factoring in changing patterns of loadgrowth. The City will call on Con Edison and thePSC to develop a long-term system resiliencystrategy for the in-city electric system that willseek to divest load from coastal, too-big-to-fail nodes, with a strong bias towards buildinginland, so as to diversify geographic exposure.The strategy will also seek to relieve transmis-sion limitations to large load pockets in Brook-lyn and Manhattan.


Additionally, the strategy will provide for thesystem to evolve to contend with heavy blowsfrom extreme weather events, such as stormsand heat waves. Examples of potential projectsthat could emerge from the development ofsuch a strategy could include: the creation of anew 345 kV link between Queens and the Bronxto strengthen the connection to Upstate elec-trical supplies and reduce reliance on the Asto-ria generation cluster; load divestment fromsubstations to reduce congestion in the Brook-lyn load pocket; and a new transmission corri-dor running inland between Staten Island andQueens. OLTPS will work with Con Edison, theNYISO, and the PSC to develop this strategy,outlining potential options, analyzing costs, anddeveloping a roadmap for implementation.

Initiative 12Work with utilities and regulators to minimize electric outages in areas notdirectly affected by climate impacts

Coastal flooding typically requires the shut-down of electrical feeders that could be ex-posed to floodwaters. In extremely dense areasof Lower Manhattan and Brooklyn, this canmean preemptive shutdowns of entire net-works, with large swaths of customers losingservice even if they are not directly affected by flooding.

To reduce the incidence of these so-calledsympathetic outages, the City will work withthe utilities to design and implement new net-work boundaries. In the Fulton network, for ex-ample, a reconfiguration of the network wouldallow New York Downtown Hospital, which liesoutside the 100-year floodplain, to continue toreceive electricity during a coastal flood (ratherthan losing power as occurred during Sandy).Elsewhere in coastal areas served by the under-ground system, utilities should take measureslike installing sectionalizing switches to allowmore precise control over feeder shutdownsand isolations, reducing the number of cus-tomers impacted by a shutdown. Similar princi-ples should be applied to the overhead system.For example, estimates by Con Edison indicatethat 650 or more automatic reclosers orswitches could be installed on overhead loopand radial systems citywide, each of whichcould locally have the effect of reducing by 50percent the number of customers affected by aproblem like tree branch damage to an over-head line. The City will work with Con Edisonand LIPA to identify areas for priority attention.

Initiative 13Work with utilities and regulators to implement smart grid technology to assess system conditions in real time

After an extreme weather event, the first taskof any utility is to identify the location and ex-tent of damage. Utilities usually rely on cus-tomer reports of power outages, together withon-site inspections by crews. Gathering infor-mation in this way, though, takes time and canbe delayed by problems on the ground, such asimpassable roads.

The City will call on Con Edison and LIPA to work with the New York State Smart Grid Con-sortium and stakeholders such as the USDOEto develop, demonstrate, and deploy low-costsensor technologies, along with system integra-tion, automated control, and decision-aidedtools, that would allow the two utilities to as-sess system conditions in real time and facili-tate timely dispatch of crews and equipment tothe highest priority problem locations. To mini-mize costs, utilities could prioritize coverage ofa statistically significant number of customerswith smart meters, focusing, for example, onthe 34,000 residential high-rise buildings in thecity, or could prioritize coverage of key grid lo-cations, such as at distribution sectionalizingswitches, which could be monitored with ad-vanced voltage sensors.

Initiative 14Work with utilities and regulators tospeed up service restoration for criticalcustomers via system configuration

After extreme weather events, electric utilitiesmay not be able to restore electric service to in-dividual customers until damaged customerequipment is repaired or replaced.

The City, will work with Con Edison and LIPA toidentify cost-effective ways to isolate criticalcustomers, including through installingswitches and other equipment along feedersthat supply them. In some cases, this couldallow utilities to restore service to these cus-tomers more quickly than they are able to re-store service to others on the same circuitoreven to avoid service interruption in the firstplace. The City also will evaluate whether otheroptions, such as on-site backup pow

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