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SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem

SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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Page 1: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

SIP: Advanced TopicsDr. Dorgham Sisalem

Page 2: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

Interworking with PSTN

Page 3: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

Tekelec Confidential

Interoperability Issues

• IP-PSTN Gateways make the conversion job convert both signaling and media may be split into media and signaling gateways (MGCP/Megaco) many pains: DTMF, IVRs, overlapped dialing, national signaling dialects gateways act as UAs from SIP perspective

• Convergent Services PINT

allow Internet users to trigger PSTN services e.g., click to PSTN-dial

SPIRITS allow PSTN events to trigger Internet services e.g., Internet Call Waiting

• Sigtran - Trunk replacement Carry SS7 messages over IP Map SS7 protocols to equivalent protocols running over IP

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PSTN Gateways

• Basic building block of PSTN interworking scenarios: gateways convert signaling and media

• The gateway can be split in media and signaling components and connected through MGCP or Megaco

• They need to be found on the Internet: problem similar to that of IP routing. Methods include: Static configuration

Define which numbers belong should be routed to which gateway

TRIP routing protocol Discover dynamically which gateways are available and their characteristics

ENUM -- used to map digits into SIP URIs

Page 5: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

Tekelec Confidential

PSTN Gateways

SIP SS7/ISDN

Internal Logic

RTP/IP TDM

SIP

RTP

IP world PSTN

Page 6: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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Telephony Routing over IP (TRIP)

• Exchange of call routing information between cooperating providers

• Eouting services (e.g. ‘find cheapest gateway to China) may be provided by third parties

• Design follows IP routing protocols (BGP4, IS-IS) exploits scalable techniques: routing information is aggregated and

redistributed, incremental updates, soft-state design TRIP used to send, receive or send&receive

• References RFC2871, draft-ietf-iptel-trip

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Call Flow SIP to PSTN

• Request-URI in the INVITE contains a Telephone Number which is sent to PSTN Gateway.

• The Gateway maps the INVITE to a SS7 ISUP IAM (Initial Address Message)

• 183 Session Progress establishes early media session so caller hears Ring Tone.

• Two way Speech path is established after ANM (Answer Message) and 200 OK

Slide courtesy of Alan Johnston, WorldCom. (See reference to Alan’s SIP book.)

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PSTN GW != SIP proxy

SIP Proxy & Registrarsipforfree.com.au

[email protected]

PSTN Gatewayna.pstn.comSIP

media• PSTN gateways are adapters between two different technologies.

• From SIP perspective, PSTN gateways are SIP termination devices, i.e., SIP User Agents just like IP phones.

• PSTN gateway functionality separate from call processing logic residing at a proxy.

• Gateway operator != proxy operator.

call processing logic:

If ($destination in PSTN) then route_to_least_cost_gateway();elseif local(“sipforfree.com.au”) then lookup_registry;else proxy_to_foreign_domain(); Frequently

Misunderstood Issue

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ENUM

• Problem: caller is in PSTN (can use only digit keys) and would like to reach a SIP callee

• Answer: ENUM. Create a global directory with telephone numbers that map to SIP addresses (or e-mail, etc.).

• Lookup mechanism: DNS maps E.164 numbers to a set of user-provisioned URI

RFC2916

Page 10: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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ENUM Call Flow

Gateway with ENUM resolution

DNS/ENUM

INVITE sip:[email protected]

PSTN: +4917…

?...7.1.9.4.e164.arpa

! sip:[email protected]

•A gateway is assigned a range of E.164 numbers•DNS/ENUM helps ingress gateway to resolve SIP address from E.164 number•Typically, owner of an ENUM entry can manipulate the address association through a web provisioning interface

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Other Issues

• SIP-T: Similar to SIGTRAN Transfer SIP messages between gateways Translate as far as possible between SIP messages and SS7 messages (Invite—IAM ..) Add SS7 content as message body to SIP messages Advantage

Support trunking and SIP end devices

• DTMF Needed to control services in PSTN and phones with only a numeric pad Can be carried in:

INFO requests: This is number 1 Part of audio (RTP stream): Only works for PCMU, more efficient compression styles can not carry the tones in a correct and

reconstructable manner RTP messages describing the DTMF codes

Page 12: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

SIP Security

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Security Services

• Availability subject to Denial of Service Attacks: burdening servers with enormous

load, uploading hostile applications, physical violence difficult to beat: self vs. non-self problem

• Privacy prevents unauthorized persons from inspection of both signaling and

media can be solved using encryption problems: encryption computationally expensive; key exchange

protocols needed; no PKI available

Page 14: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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Security Services

• Message Integrity prevents unauthorized users from changing packets can be solved using Message Authentication Checks

• User Authenticity prevents unauthorized users from using someone’s else identity to fool

other users or accounting & charging systems

• Anonymity prevents other call parties from knowing who is calling

Page 15: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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Disclaimers & Problems

• Disclaimer #1: Protocol security is only a piece of the big picture; security of a system may always be compromised by naïve implementation or administration.

• Disclaimer #2: Security of a single protocol does not help; all participating protocols have to be made secure.

• Disclaimer #3: Physical security counts as well!!!

• Disclaimer #4: Security protocols cannot solve social-layer issues.

Page 16: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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Media Security

• Encryption of media content

• May take place either at IP or RTP layer

• Performance overhead considerable

• No established solutions for keying

Page 17: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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SIP Security Tools

• Need to protect registrations User A should not be allowed to register as user B

• Need to protect service usage User A should not be allowed to use the PSTN gateway

• Need to ensure the identity of the server Avoid contacting insecure servers

• Need to secure content Do not allow servers to manipulate content not meant for them

Page 18: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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SIP Security Tools

• Most commonly used security protocol: digest Based on private secret Allows to establish user identity Does not provide message integrity or privacy

• TLS – addresses shortcomings of digest, but not widely deployed yet

• End-2-end security: S/MIME

• Alternate security protocols for 3GPP

Page 19: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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SIP Digest Authentication

• Required for user identification and admission control for services.

• challenge-response using MD5

Proxy

Request

Challenge (nonce,realm)

ACK

Request w/credentials

Page 20: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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Policy based security

• Authenticate the user only for certain services Calling another VoIP user is free of

charge No need for authentication

Calling an ISDN user is not free Authenticate the user first

• Require am authentication, authorization and accounting server for: Maintaining information about the

user‘s Privileges Account information Used resources

Request

Proxy

AAA

PSTN GW

Page 21: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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Can not solve social issues!!!

SIP INVITE w/JPEG

200 OK w/JPEG

INVITE sip:[email protected] SIP/2.0Via: SIP/2.0/UDP here.com:5060From: BigGuy <sip:[email protected]>To: LittleGuy <sip:[email protected]>Call-ID: [email protected]...

SIP/2.0 200 OKVia: SIP/2.0/UDP here.com:5060From: BigGuy <sip:[email protected]>To: LittleGuy <sip:[email protected]>Call-ID: [email protected]...

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Message Security

• Users can encrypt the content of their messages to prevent SIP proxies from reading or changing the content

• Can only encrypt parts that are not used by proxies VIA, recordroute, ...

• Encryption might prevent some functions Firewall/NAT traversal

• Hop-by-Hop Signaling Security requires belief in transitive trust immense computational stress on servers if public-key used can deal with firewalls/NATs may cover entire signaling mechanisms: ipsec, TLS

• Combination of both may be used

• Keying: no established solution

Page 23: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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Peering & Inter-Provider Security

• General: To reach a wider user population providers need to cooperate, however

IP-Technology offers various attack possibilities and security hole Use chained trust relations

Provider A authenticates and authorizes his users Provider A has a trust relation with provider B All requests arriving on the secure tunnel are trusted

Secure tunnels established using TLS Similar to web security A and B exchange certificates which are authenticated either directly or through a third trusted party

• Example [email protected] would like to call to PSTN through his gateway operator

which telephone number to display at the receiver? Proxies need to link SIP address to a phone number

Remote party ID

• Fun: Allow for distinctive ringing

Not trusted calls have a distinctive ringing at the receiver

Page 24: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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Remote Party ID (RPID)

User ID/phone number database

+49-179-123123

a

INVITE sip:[email protected] From: sip:[email protected];tag=12 To: sip:[email protected]

INVITE sip:[email protected] From: sip:[email protected];tag=12 To: sip:[email protected] Remote-Party-ID: <sip:[email protected]>

SER with RPID support PSTN gateway

PSTN

Page 25: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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Problem of Trust

• Displaying proper caller ID is a legal requirement for operators. What happens if someone fakes the RPID and operator displays a wrong number? Gateway should only display caller ID issued by a trustworthy source.

• Trust needed to solve other problems too: Does the call come from a source to whom my gateway can credit international calls?

• Establishing trust to individual users within a single domain almost easy…but what if multiple domains comes in?

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Trust: Interdomain versus Intradomain

• Within single administrative domain, trust can be implemented using physical security and knowledge of identity of local users – proxy servers verify identity of local users using digest and gateways trust local proxies.

• Interdomain scenario example: iptel.org users terminate calls to US PSTN with National Gateways Inc. How do you export the trust then? The terminating provider can’t verify identity of remote users and can’t trust

information passed over the public Internet. RPID alone can’t be trusted as it can be changed anywhere on the transit. Stronger security protocols come in for interdomain operation: TLS.

Page 27: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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TLS Use for Interdomain Security

InternetPSTNOriginating domainPublic

Internet

#1#2TLS

• Assumption: target domain trusts source domain to display proper CallerID and settle incurred costs.

• Step 1: originating domain verifies identity of local user (digest). If ok, it appends RPID and uses TLS for secure inter-domain communication.

• Step 2: terminating proxy verifies incoming TLS connection against list of trustworthy domains. If ok, SIP request is forwarded to PSTN gateway.

Page 28: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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More on TLS Use

• TLS use for SIP solves other trust problems too: With trust mechanisms, interdomain accounting can be also implemented

securely Signaling can be no longer sniffed during transport.

• Security Disclaimers: Trust established hop-by-hop – it implies transitive trust along arbitrarily

long proxy chains. Remember a chains is as strong as the weakest element in it. You have to trust next-hop not to pass your requests to questionable servers.

Privacy is not end-to-end: proxy servers along the signaling path do see SIP in plain-text,

Page 29: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

SIP Service Space

Page 30: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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What’s the Killer App?

• Q: Added-value services expected to be major source of revenues. So what is the killer app?

• A: If I saw raw gold on the street I would not tell you either.

• It is believed that the convenience of integrated services will be the killer.

• Couple of examples follow...

Page 31: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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IN-like Services with SIP

• Most of IN services may be easily implemented with SIP in proxies/redirect servers/UAs:

(Un)conditional call forwarding abbreviated dialing Screening distinctive ringing call distribution call transfer etc.

• Sometimes, implementation logic may completely differ.

Televoting and IVRs likely to be replaced by Web in the long run.

Call-waiting is end-device implementation issue with no protocol support.

Music-on-hold may be played localy.

The real benefit is those services beyond IN: straight-forwardintegration with web, email, instant messaging, etc.

Page 32: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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Call Transfer

• Accomplished using the REFER method.

• The REFER method indicates that the recipient (identified by the Request-URI) should contact a third party using the contact information provided in the method.

• New header fields: Refer-To, Refer-By.

• NOTIFY method used to report on result of referral.

• Note: No changes to proxy behavior required.

• Variants: With Consultation Hold (SIP Hold and unattended transfer) Attended Transfer, I.e., with a short conference

draft-ietf-sip-cc-transfer

Page 33: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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Example: Call Transfer Call Flow

A

B

C

REFER BTo: BRefer-To: CReferred-By: A

#1

202 Accept#2#3 INVITE C

Referred-By: A

#4 200 OK

NOTIFY (OK)#6

200 OK#7

200 ACK#5

media

A is having a call with B. A decides to transfer B to C. It sends a “REFER” to B with C’s address. Eventually, A is notified on successful transfer using NOTIFY (#6).

Page 34: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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3rd Party Call Control (3pcc)

• 3pcc = Ability of a party to establish a session between other parties.

• Examples of use: a click-to-dial service within a web phone-book Operator services Scheduled calls

• Design objective: use SIP “as is”

• Solution: send “empty INVITES”, and swap replies with SDP ACKs

• Controller may issue either its own or other’s party “forged” From address. (Its real identity may be still verified using authentication.)

• Controller often called back-2-back user agent Act as two user agents acting back-2-back Manipulate messages coming from one agent before sending to the other Main state information about the two sessions

draft-rosenberg-sip-3pcc

Page 35: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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Example: 3pcc call flow

A

Controller C (e.g., co-locatedWith a web server)

B

draft-rosenberg-sip-3pcc

INV w/o SDP#1

timeline

200 SDP A1#2

ACK on-hold#3#4

INV w/o SDP

200 SDP B#5INV SDP B#6

200 SDP A2#7

200 ACK w/A2’#8

ACK#9

media

Page 36: SIP: Advanced Topics Dr. Dorgham Sisalem. Interworking with PSTN

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Answering Machine

• Old-times behavior: set-up number of rings, plug-in, if you do not answer the machine will

• Easy to mimic with SIP: AM acts as a SIP UA; you need to set-up an answer timer, let the answering machine register using your credentials; when an invitation arrives it is forked both to your phone and your answering machine

• Added value examples: Unified messaging: SIP answering machine can turn voice messages into email messages that follow you or

comprehensive web-pages (cf. voice navigation) Programmability allows to play variety of customized prompt messages:

If (caller friends) then play (“You can reach me at Venice beach or leave a message”) else play (“leave a message please”);

#1 INVITE

#2 Trying

#3 INVITE

#4 Ringing

#5 CANCEL

#6 OK#7 INVITE AM