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Dr. CH. RAVI VARMA MBA-Behavioural Finance-study material
UNIT – 1
Introduction to Behavioral finance – Nature, Scope, Objectives And Applications; Investment
Decision Cycle; Judgment Under Uncertainty; Cognitive Information Perception –
Peculiarities (Biases) Of Quantitative And Numerical Information Perception –
Representativeness – Anchoring – Exponential discounting – Hyperbolic discounting.
1.1. Introduction, Nature, Scope, Objectives And Applications of Behavioral Finance
Introduction: Behavioural finance is relatively a new field which seeks to provide explanation
for people’s economic decisions. It is a combination of behavioural and cognitive
psychological theory with conventional economics and finance. Inability to maximise the
expected utility (EU) of rational investors leads to growth of behavioural finance research
within the efficient market framework. An underlying assumption of behavioural finance is
that, the information structure and characteristics of market participants systematically
influence the individual’s investment decisions as well as market outcomes. Investor, as a
human being, processes information using shortcuts and emotional filters. This process
influences financial decision makers such that they act seemingly in irrational manner, and
make suboptimal decision, violate traditional finance claim of rationality. The impact of this
suboptimal financial decision has ramification for the efficiency of capital markets, personal
wealth, and the performance of corporations. Irrational decision could be either due to
processing of wrong information or interpretation with inconsistent decisions.
Behaviour finance focuses upon how investors interpret and act on information to make
informed investment decisions. Investors do not always behave in a rational, predictable and
an unbiased manner indicated by the quantitative models. Behavioural Finance places an
emphasis upon investor behaviour leading to various market anomalies.
Definitions:
Linter G.(1998) has defined behavioural finance as “being study of how human interprets and
act on information to make informed investment decisions.”
Olsen R. (199828) asserts that “behavioural finance seeks to understand and predict
systematic financial market implications of psychological decision process.”
According to Shefrin “Behavioural Finance is the application of psychology to financial
behaviour-the behaviour of practitioner.”
According to Fromlet “Behavioural finance closely combines individual behaviour and
market phenomena and uses knowledge taken from both the psychological field and financial
theory”
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Assumptions of Behavioural Finance:
• Loss aversion: The characteristics of seeking to limit the size of the potential loss rather
than seeking to minimise the variability of the potential returns.
• Bounded rationality: The manner in which human being behave, limits their rationality.
• Denial of risk: They may know statistical odds but refuse to believe these odds.
Meaning:
Behavioural finance is a discipline that attempts to explain and increase understanding
regarding how the cognitive errors (mental mistakes) and emotions of investors influence the
decision making process. It integrates the field of psychology, sociology, and other
behavioural sciences to explain individual behaviour, to examine group behaviour, and to
predict financial markets. According to behavioural finance people are not always rational:
many investors fail to diversify trade too much, and seem to selling winners and holding
losers. Not only that, but they deviate from rationality in predictable ways.
Behaviour Finance is an integration of various fields:
Scope of Behavior Finance:
• To understand the Reasons of Market Anomalies: (Like creation of bubbles, the effect of
any event, calendar effect etc)
• To Identify Investor’s Personalities: Various new financial instruments can be developed to
hedge unwanted biases created in financial markets.
• Helps to identify the risks and their hedging strategies
• Provides an explanation to various corporate activities: Effect of good or bad news, stock
split, dividend decision etc.
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• To enhance the skill set of investment advisors: Done by better understanding of investor’s
goal, maintaining a systematic approach to advise.
Behavior finance as a science:
• Science is a systematic and scientific way of observing, recording, analyzing and
interpreting any event.
• Behavioural Finance has got its inputs from traditional finance which is a systematic and
well designed subject based on various theories.
Behavior finance as an art:
• In art we create our own rules and not work on rules of thumb as in science.
• Art helps us to use theoretical concepts in the practical world.
• Behavioural finance focuses on the reasons that limit the theories of standard finance and
also the reasons for market anomalies created.
• It provides various tailor made solutions to the investors to be applied in their financial
planning.
Objectives of Behavior Finance:
• To review the debatable issues in Standard Finance
• To protect the interest of stakeholders in volatile investment scenario
• To examine the relationship between theories of Standard Finance and Behavioral Finance.
• To analyse the influence of biases on the investment process because of different
personalities in the financial markets.
• To examine the various social responsibilities of the subject.
• To discuss emerging issues in the financial world.
• To discuss the development of new financial instruments to hedge the conventional
instruments against various market anomalies
• To get the feel of trend of changed events over years, across various economies.
• To examine the contagion effect of various events.
• An effort towards more elaborated identification of investor’s personalities.
• More elaborated discussion on optimum Asset Allocation according to behavioral aspects as
well as aspects like age, gender, income etc of the investor.
Application of Behavior Finance:
Behavioural finance actually equips finance professionals with a set of new lenses, which
allows them to understand and overcome many proven psychological traps that are present
involving human cognition and emotions. This includes corporate boards and managers,
individual and institutional investors, portfolio managers, analysts, advisors, and even policy
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makers. Behavioural traps exist and occur across all decision spectrums because of the
psychological phenomena of heuristics and biases. These phenomena and factors are
systematic in nature and can move markets for prolonged periods. It applies to:
1. Investors
2. Corporations
3. Markets
4. Regulators
5. Educations
1.2. Investment Decision Cycle
Investment decisions are not one off decisions. Public and private actors repeatedly or
continuously make choices that shape investments and have impacts on higher development
goals. The cycle is a way to conceptualize different phases of investment decision making.
Taking this step-by-step approach is proposed to improve the quality and enhance the results
of ongoing and future investment operations. The cycle distinguishes four phases. Different
organizations and approaches have further split these phases into more steps, but the overall
coverage of issues and sequence is broadly equivalent.
1. Plan Strategically : Assess, set and communicate sector priorities, and identify projects for
implementation.
2. Design Investment: Analyze context and alternatives and carry out detailed project
design.
3. Implement and Monitor: Get the job done, monitor and communicate progress towards
objectives, make necessary adjustments.
4. Evaluate and Capitalize : Review and evaluate implementation experience to inform scaling
up and future plans and projects.
1.3. Judgment under Uncertainty
Heuristics: Heuristics are referred as rule of thumb, which applies in decision making to
reduce the cognitive resources to solve a problem. These are mental shortcuts that simplify
the complex methods to make a judgment. Investor as a decision maker confronts a set of
choices within certainty and limited ability to quantify results. This leads identification and
understanding of all heuristics that affect financial decision making. Some of heuristics are
representativeness, anchoring & adjustments, familiarity, overconfidence, regret aversion,
conservatism, mental accounting, availability, ambiguity aversion and effect. Heuristics help
to make decision.
Various heuristics and biases are:
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The two systems of mind
Familiarity and related heuristics
Representativeness and related heuristics
Anchoring
Irrationality and adaptation
Hyperbolic discounting
1.3.1. Two systems of mind;
Psychologists Keith Stanovich and Richard West refer to the two systems in mind as System1
and System2
System 1 operates automatically and rapidly. It required little or no effort and is not amenable
to voluntary control.
System 2 is effortful, deliberate and slow. It required mental activities that may be demanding
including complex calculations. The operations of system 2 are associated with the subjective
experience of agency, choice, and concentration.
Causes and consequences of cognitive ease:
Jumping to conclusion (Halo Effect)
What you see is all there is
Answering an easier question
Substitute questioning: if a satisfactory answer to a hard question is not found quickly,
system 1 will find a related question that is easier and will answer it.
The Affect Heuristic: the likes and dislikes of people determine their beliefs about the world.
The affect heuristic is an example of substitution. A harder question (How do I thing about
it?) is substituted by an easier question (How do I feel about it?). it seems that the emotional
tail wags the rational dog.
The law of small numbers
Cause and chance
Magical thinking
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Wishful thinking
Bounded rationality
Cognitive ease is caused when something is displayed clearly or repeated, or printed. It is
also induced when you are in a good mood. Conversely, cognitive strain is caused when you
read instructions in a poor font or worded in a convoluted language or when you are in a
peevish mood.
1.3.2. Familiarity and related Heuristics:
People are comfortable with things that are familiar to them. The human brain often uses the
familiarity shortcut in making choices.
Familiar: people have a preference for the familiar.
Ambiguity Aversion: ambiguity aversion drives people to choose risk to uncertainty. Risk
exists when the probability distribution is known and uncertainty exists when the probability
distribution is unknown.
Diversification Heuristic: means when choices are not mutually exclusive people like to try a
little bit of everything. Ex: Buffet dining.
Functional fixation: the tendency to latch on to a single object in a habitual way is referred to
by behaviouralists as functional fixedness.
Status quo bias and Endowment effect: it implies that people are comfortable with the
familiar and would like to keep things the way they have been. The fear of regret that may
follow, if the status quo is altered, makes people resistant to change.
The endowment effect says that people tend to place greater value on what belongs to them
relative to the value they would place on the same thing, if it belongs to someone else.
1.3.3. Representativeness and related biases:
Representativeness refers to the degree of similarity that an event has with its parent
population or the degree to which an event resembles its population. Representativeness
refers to the tendency to form judgements based on stereotypes. While representativeness
may be a rule of thumb, it can also lead people astray.
Innumeracy: people have difficulty with numbers (confuse between nominal changes and real
changes called as money illusion).
Probability matching: The class of symmetric path-independent models with experimenter-
controlled events is considered in conjunction with two-choice probability learning
experiments. Various refinements of the notion of probability matching are defined, and the
incidence of these properties within this class is studied
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Conjunction Fallacy: conjunction fallacy is a variant of representativeness.
Base Rate Neglect: Base rate fallacy, or base rate neglect, is a cognitive error whereby too
little weight is placed on the base (original) rate of possibility (e.g., the probability of A given
B). In behavioral finance, it is the tendency for people to erroneously judge the likelihood of
a situation by not taking into account all relevant data and focusing more heavily on new
information without acknowledging how the new information impacts the original
assumptions.
Bayesian Updating: Named after Thomas, Bayes’ theorem addresses the question: how
should we modify our belief in the wake of additional information.
Availability, Recency, and Salience Bias: sample data are often assigned undue importance
compared to population parameters. This tendency is accentuated when the data are easily
available. More so, when the event has occurred recently and is salient.
Cognitive Information Perception
Cognitive perception includes, aside from the senses listening, seeing, smelling, tasting and
feeling, the way in which we deal with information. While perception refers to ways of
obtaining information from our environment, cognition describes processes such as
remembering, learning, solving problems and orientation.
The cognitive perspective applies a nomothetic approach to discover human cognitive
processes, but have also adopted idiographic techniques through using case studies. Cognitive
psychology is also a reductionist approach. This means that all behaviour, no matter how
complex can be reduced to simple cognitive processes, like memory or perception.
1.3.4. Anchoring:
Anchoring is a cognitive bias that describes the common human tendency to rely too heavily
on the first piece of information offered (the "anchor") when making decisions.
During decision making, anchoring occurs when individuals use an initial piece of
information to make subsequent judgments. Once an anchor is set, other judgments are made
by adjusting away from that anchor, and there is a bias toward interpreting other information
around the anchor. In the context of investing, one consequence is that market participants
with an anchoring bias tend to hold investments that have lost value because they have
anchored their fair value estimate to the original price rather than to fundamentals. As a
result, market participants assume greater risk by holding the investment in the hope the
security will go back up to its purchase price
1.4. Exponential discounting:
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In economics exponential discounting is a specific form of the discount function, used in the
analysis of choice over time (with or without uncertainty). Formally, exponential discounting
occurs when total utility is given by
Exponential discounting implies that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
at any pair of points in time depends only on how far apart those two points are. Exponential
discounting is not dynamically inconsistent.
For its simplicity, the exponential discounting assumption is the most commonly used in
economics. However, alternatives like hyperbolic discounting have more empirical support.
1.5. Hyperbolic discounting
Hyperbolic discounting refers to the tendency for people to increasingly choose a smaller-
sooner reward over a larger-later reward as the delay occurs sooner rather than later in time.
When offered a larger reward in exchange for waiting a set amount of time, people act less
impulsively (i.e., choose to wait) as the rewards happen further in the future. Put another way,
people avoid waiting more as the wait nears the present time. Hyperbolic discounting has
been applied to a wide range of phenomena. These include lapses in willpower, health
outcomes, and consumption choices over time, and personal finance decisions.
UNIT - 2
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Utility/preference Functions: Expected Utility theory (EUT) and rational thought: Decision
making under risk and uncertainty – Expected utility as a basis for decision-making –
Theories based on Expected Utility Concept – Investor rationality and market efficiency.
2.1. Expected Utility theory (EUT) and rational thought:
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) states that the decision maker (DM) chooses between risky or
uncertain prospects by comparing their expected utility values, i.e., the weighted sums
obtained by adding the utility values of outcomes multiplied by their respective probabilities.
This elementary and seemingly commonsensical decision rule raises at once the most
important questions in contemporary decision theory.
2.2. Decision making under risk and uncertainty
Decision making under certainty:
A condition of certainty exists when the decision-maker knows with reasonable certainty
what the alternatives are, what conditions are associated with each alternative, and the
outcome of each alternative. Under conditions of certainty, accurate, measurable, and reliable
information on which to base decisions is available. The cause and effect relationships are
known and the future is highly predictable under conditions of certainty. Such conditions
exist in case of routine and repetitive decisions concerning the day-to-day operations of the
business.
Decision making under risk and uncertainty
The simplest definition of risk is that it is the variability of possible returns. An important
aspect of this definition is that the actual outcome could be better or worse than.
Another popular definition is that risk = probability × impact
This definition emphasises an important aspect of risk management - i.e. that we need to
identify and assess potential sources of risk both in terms of their potential impact on the
business and how likely they are.
Finally, some authors make a distinction between risk and uncertainty:
Risk is where there are a number of possible outcomes and the probability of each
outcome is known. (For example, based on past experience of digging for oil in a
particular area, an oil company may estimate that they have a 60% chance of finding oil
and a 40% chance of not finding oil.)
Uncertainty occurs when there are a number of possible outcomes but the probability of
each outcome is not known. (For example, the same oil company may dig for oil in a
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previously unexplored area. The company knows that it is possible for them to either find
or not find oil, but it does not know the probabilities of each of these outcomes.)
When investors make choices or decisions under risk or uncertainty, they must somehow
incorporate this risk into their decision-making process. Conditions of risk occur when an
investor must make a decision for which the outcome is not known with certainty. Under
conditions of risk, the investor can make a list of all possible outcomes and assign
probabilities to the various outcomes.
Uncertainty exists when a decision maker cannot list all possible outcomes and/or cannot
assign probabilities to the various outcomes. To measure the risk associated with a decision,
the manager can examine several characteristics of the probability distribution of outcomes
for the decision.
The various rules for making decisions under risk require information about several different
characteristics of the probability distribution of outcomes: (1) the expected value (or mean) of
the distribution, (2) the variance and standard deviation, and (3) the coefficient of variation.
While there is no single decision rule that managers can follow to guarantee that profits are
actually maximized, a number of decision rules that decision makers can use to help them
make decisions under risk: (1) the expected value rule, (2) the mean–variance rules, and (3)
the coefficient of variation rule. These rules can only guide investors in their analysis of risky
decision making. The actual decisions made by a decision maker will depend in large
measure on his willingness to take on risk. Investor’s propensity to take on risk can be
classified in one of three categories: risk averse, risk loving, or risk neutral.
Expected utility theory explains how managers can make decisions in risky situations. The
theory postulates that managers make risky decisions with the objective of maximizing the
expected utility of profit. The manager's attitude for risk is captured by the shape of the utility
function for profit. If a manager experiences diminishing (increasing) marginal utility for
profit, the manager is risk averse (risk loving). If marginal utility for profit is constant, the
manager is risk neutral.
If a manager maximizes expected utility for profit, the decisions can differ from decisions
reached using the three decision rules discussed for making risky decisions. However, in the
case of a risk-neutral manager, the decisions are the same under maximization of expected
profit and maximization of expected utility of profit. Consequently, a risk-neutral decision
maker can follow the simple rule of maximizing the expected value of profit and
simultaneously also be maximizing utility of profit.
2.3. Expected utility as a basis for decision-making
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Use of research techniques to reduce uncertainty
Market research is an important means of assessing and reducing uncertainty. For example,
about the likely responses of customers to new products, new advertising campaigns and
price changes.
A number of research techniques are available:
Focus Groups
Desk research (secondary research).
Field research (primary research). This includes:
o motivational and
o measurement research.
Quantitative methods of incorporating risk and uncertainty
In addition to the research techniques, the following methods can be used to address risk or
uncertainty.
Sensitivity Analysis looks at varying key estimates to see how much safety margin we have
before the decision we are making will change. For example, based on a selling price of £5 a
project is worthwhile but if it drops by more than 10% to below £4.50, then the project
should be rejected.
Simulation is a method where random numbers are used to generate different possible
scenarios, which can then be solved. The process is re-run many times to then get an idea of
the spread of possible outcomes
Expected Values (EV) are essentially averages
Payoff tables are a simple way of showing the different possible scenarios and their
respective payoffs - i.e. the profit or loss of each.
Maximax, maximin and minimax regret are different perspectives that can be applied to
payoff tables. Once we know the different possible outcomes we can identify which decision
is best for a particular investor based on their risk aversion.
Decision Trees are a way of representing more complex decisions, probabilities and
outcomes.
In the case of uncertainty, decision science can provide very little guidance to managers
beyond offering them some simple decision rules to aid them in their analysis of uncertain
situations. Four basic rules for decision making under uncertainty are: (1) the maximax rule,
(2) the maximin rule, (3) the minimax regret rule, and (4) the equal probability rule.
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(1) The maximax rule: In decision theory, the optimistic (aggressive) decision
making rule under conditions of uncertainty. It states that the decision maker should select
the course of action whose best (maximum) gain is better than the best gain of all other
courses of action possible in given circumstances.
(2) The maximin rule: Rawls claims that people use the maximin rule to choose principles of
justice in his original position. According to the maximin rule we should compare alternatives
by the worst possible outcome under each alternative, and we should choose one which
maximize the utility of the worst outcome.
(3) The minimax regret rule: The minimax regret strategy is the one that minimises the
maximum regret. It is useful for a risk-neutral decision maker. Essentially, this is the
technique for a 'sore loser' who does not wish to make the wrong decision. 'Regret' in this
context is defined as the opportunity loss through having made the wrong decision.
(4) The equal probability rule: Two events are mutually exclusive or disjoint if they cannot
occur at the same time. The probability that Event A occurs, given that Event B has occurred,
is called a conditional probability. The conditional probability of Event A, given Event B, is
denoted by the symbol P(A. B).
2.4. Theories based on Expected Utility Concept
Expected utility theory is concerned with people’s preferences with respect to choices that
have uncertain outcomes (gambles). According to this theory, if certain axioms are fulfilled,
the subjective value of a gamble for an individual is the statistical expectation of the value the
individual assigns to the outcomes of that gamble.
Certain conditions have to be satisfied for an individual to have rational preferences. To
understand these conditions, let us introduce some notation. Suppose an individual is faced
with a choice between two outcomes, A and B. the symbol > indicates strong preference, thus
A>B means that A is always s preferred to B. The symbol ˜ indicates indifference so that A˜B
means the individual values the two outcomes equally. Finally the symbol ≥ suggests weak
preference, so that A≥B means that the individual prefers A or is indifferent between A and
B.
2.4.1. The non Neumann-Morgenstern Axioms:
According to expected utility theory, the following axioms define a rational decision maker.
These axioms are referred to as non Neumann-Morgenstern axioms as they were laid down
by John non Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern.
Completeness: The individual has well defined preferences and can always choose between
any two alternatives.
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Axiom: for every A and B either A>B or A=B or A<B
Transitivity: As an individual decides according to the completeness axiom, the individual
also decides consistently.
Axiom: For every A,B and C with A≥B and B≥C we must have A≥C
In words, if the individual prefers A to B, and B to C, then he must prefer A to C.
Independence: If two gambles are mixed with a third one, the individual will maintain the
same preference order as and when the two are presented independently of the third one.
Axiom: Let A, B and C be three lotteries with A≥B, and let t€(0,1); then tA+(1-t)
C>tB+(1-t)C
Continuity: when there are three lotteries (A, B, C) and the individual prefers A to B and B to
C, then it should be possible to mix A and C in such a manner that the individual is
indifferent between this mix and the lottery B.
Axiom: Let A, B and C be lotteries with A≥B≥C; then there exists a probability p
such that p(A+(1-p)C is equally good as B.
Omission and irrelevant Alternatives: The individual ignores irrelevant laternatives in
deciding between alternatives. For example, in evaluating two (or more) alternatives, the
individual ignores outcomes that occur with equal probability under both alternatives being
considered.
Frame Independence: The individual cares only about outcomes and the probabilities with
which they occur and not how they are presented or bundled.
2.4.2. Utility Maximization:
Utility reflects the satisfaction derived from a particular outcome – ordinarily an outcome is
represented by a “bundle” of goods. The utility function, denoted as U(*) assigns numbers to
possible outcomes such that preferred choices are assigned higher numbers. A rational
individual will consider all possible bundles of goods that satisfy his budget constraint and
then choose the bundle that maximizes his utility.
When only a single good is being considered, then ranking under certainty is simple. Given
the principle of non-satiation, the more the better. As an example, consider the utility of
wealth. Mathematically, the utility of wealth can be defined in various ways. One of the
mathematical functions commonly used is the logarithmic function. This means that the
utility derived from wealth w is U(w). Example for Logarithmic utility of wealth is
Wealth (in Rs. 10,000) U(w)=In(w)1 02 0.6931
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5 1.60947 1.945910 2.302620 2.995730 3.401250 3.9120100 4.6052
2.4.3. Expected Monetary Value:
In real world, however, there is a great deal of uncertainty about outcomes. How should one
decide when faced with risky gambles? Economists, mathematicians, and philosophers, have
long pondered over this question. For long, mathematicians had assumed that gambles are
assessed by their expected monetary value (EMV). For example, the EMV of a gamble which
pays 10,000 with probability of 0.70 and 1000 with a probability of 0.3 is:
0.7 x 10,000 + 0.3 x 1,000 = 7,300
In 1713, Nicholas Bernoulli exposed the weakness of the EMV criterion. He asked what si
the value of a gamble that pays two pounds if you toss a coin and it comes up head once, or
four pounds if it comes up heads twice in a row, or eight pounds if it come up heads twice in
a row, or eight pounds if it come up heads thrice in a row, so on and so forth? The expected
value of such a gamble is
(1/2 x 2) + (1/4 x 4) + (1/8 x 8) +… = 1+1+1…= ∞
His seems crazy because no one would pay that much for such a gamble.
2.4.4. Daniel Bernoulli’s Solution:
Daniel Bernoulli, a younger cousin of Nicholas Bernoulli, suggested a solution to that
problem 25 years later in 1738, and published it in the St. Peterburg Journal (that is why it
was called St. Peterburg paradox). Daniel suggested that the solution to the paradox was
simply that further increments in expected wealth don’t increase utility in the same
proportion. Put differently, expected wealth has diminishing marginal utility. This means that
the utility function in concave as in below example
(Diagram 2.2.)
Daniel Bernoulli argued that diminishing marginal value of wealth is what explains risk
aversion. Ex:
Wealth (Million) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Utility (units) 10 18 25 31 36 40 43
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Daniel Bernoulli offered a solution to the famous “St. Petersburg paradox”. More important
his analysis of risk attitudes in terms of preferences for wealth is still part of economic
analysis even after almost 300 years.
2.4.5. Positive Theory:
Expected utility theory proposed by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern is a
normative theory as it prescribes how people should behave rationally. A positive theory, on
the other hand, describes how people actually behave.
2.4.6. Modern Portfolio theory:
The expected utility theory says that in the face of uncertainty individuals maximize the
utility expected across possible states of the world. For a financial asset, like an equity stock,
that has innumerable possible outcomes, it is not a manageable proposition. However, if we
assume that investor are risk averse and investor preferences can be defined in terms of the
mean and variance of returns, it is possible to quantify the tradeoff between risk and return.
This is what the modern portfolio theory and the CAPM do.
Portfolio theory, originally proposed by Harry Markowitz in the 1950s, was the first formal
attempt to quantify the risk of a portfolio and develop a methodology for determining the
optimal portfolio. Prior to the development of portfolio theory, investors dealt with the
concepts of returns and risk somewhat loosely. Intuitively smart investors know the benefits
of diversification.
Harry Markowitz was the first person to show quantitatively why and how diversification
reduces risk. In recognition of his seminal contributions in this field he was awarded the
Nobel Prize in Economics in 1990.***Concept of Expected Risk, and Return of a Portfolio, Return, Risk tradeoff, efficient portfolio and efficient frontier*** -
follow SAPM material III Semester..
***Capital Asset Pricing Model, Capital Market Line and Security Market Line*** - follow SAPM material III Semester..
2.5. Investor rationality and market efficiency
According to Andrei Shliefer, any of the following three conditions will lead to market
efficiency:
1. Investor rationality
2. Independent deviation from rationality and
3. Effective arbitrage
1. Investor Rationality: Rational investors value each security at its fundamental value, the
net present value of future cash flows discounted at the risk-adjusted rate of return. When
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such investors learn something that has a bearing on fundamental values of securities, they
quickly respond to such information by bidding up the prices when the news is favourable
and bidding down the prices when the news is adverse. As a result, security prices reflect
fundamental values. The EMH is thus a consequence of equilibrium in competitive markets
thronged by rational investors.
2. Independent deviation from rationality:Remarkably, investor rationality is not a necessary
condition for the EMH. The markets can be efficient even if the investors are not rational. In
a commonly considered scenario, the irrational investors in the market trade in a random
fashion.
3. Effective Arbitrage: Even if the trading strategies of the irrational traders are correlated, a
case can be made for the EMH. This case, as argued by Milton Friedman and Eugene Fama,
is based on arbitrage, which is clearly one of the most intuitively appealing and plausible
arguments in economics. William Sharpe and Gordon Alexander define arbitrage as ‘the
simultaneous purchase and sale of the same, or essentially similar, security in two different
markets at advantageously different prices.’
Arbitrage has another implication. As irrational investors buy overpriced securities and sell
underpriced securities, they earn inferior returns compared to arbitrageurs or even passive
investors. Irrational investors lose money relative to their peers. As Milton Friedman pointed
out, since irrational investors cannot lose money forever they eventually disappear from the
market. Thus, in the long run, arbitrage and competitive selection ensure market efficiency.
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UNIT – 3
Behavioral Factors and Financial Markets: The Efficient Market Hypothesis – Fundamental
Information and Financial Markets – Information available for Market Participants and
Market Efficiency – Market Predictability – The Concept of Limits of Arbitrage Model –
Asset Management and Behavioral Factors – Active Portfolio Management; return statistics
and Sources of systematic underperformance – Fundamental information and technical
analysis – the case for psychological influence.
3.1. The Efficient Market Hypothesis:
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is an investment theory that states it is impossible to
"beat the market" because stock market efficiency causes existing share prices to always
incorporate and reflect all relevant information. According to the EMH, stocks always trade
at their fair value on stock exchanges, making it impossible for investors to either
purchase undervalued stocks or sell stocks for inflated prices. As such, it should be
impossible to outperform the overall market through expert stock selection or market timing,
and the only way an investor can possibly obtain higher returns is by purchasing riskier
investments.
1. Quick and accurate reaction to information
Defining the Forms of EMH
There are three forms of EMH: Weak, Semi-strong and Strong. Here's what each says about
the market.
Weak Form EMH: Suggests that all past information is priced into securities. Fundamental
analysis of securities can provide an investor with information to produce returns above
market averages in the short term but there are no "patterns" that exist. Therefore
fundamental analysis does not provide long-term advantage and technical analysis will not
work.
Semi-Strong Form EMH: Implies that neither fundamental analysis nor technical analysis
can provide an advantage for an investor and that new information is instantly priced in to
securities.
Strong Form EMH: Says that all information, both public and private, is priced into stocks
and that no investor can gain advantage over the market as a whole. Strong Form EMH
does not say some investors or money managers are incapable of capturing abnormally
high returns but that there are always outliers included in the averages.
2. Prices do not react to non-information
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3.2. Theoretical Challenges to the EMH:
Shortly after Jensen’s claim, the EMH was challenged, theoretically as well empirically.
Although initially the primary challenge was empirical, we will begin with the theoretical
challenges to the EMH and then turn to the empirical evidence.
The EMH has been challenged theoretically on three grounds:
Investor irrationality
Correlated investor behaviour
Limits to arbitrage
Price Behaviour
Investor Irrationality:
Attitude towards risk
non-bayesian formation of expectation
Sensitivity of Decision Making to how the problems are framed.
Correlated Investor Behaviour:
Investors tend to be overconfident and hence assume more risk.
Investors tend to extrapolate past time series and hence chase trends.
They tent to put lesser weight on base rates and more weight on new information and
hence overreact to news.
They follow market gurus and forecasts and act in a similar fashion.
Given the correlated behavior of noise traders, their actions lead to aggregate shifts in
demand.
Limits to Arbitrage: one can expect the irrationality of ‘noise traders’ to be countered by the
rationality of ‘arbitrageurs’ as the latter are supposed to be guided by fundamentals and
immune to sentiments. However, arbitrage in the real world is limited by two types of risk.
The first risk is fundamental. Buying ‘undervalued’ securities tends to be risky
because market may fall further and inflict losses. The fear of such a loss may restrain
arbitrageurs from taking large enough long positions that will push price to fully conform to
fundamentals.
The second risk is resale price risk and it arises mainly from the fact that arbitrageurs
have finite horizons. Why” there are two principal reasons.
1. Arbitrageurs usually borrow money or securities to implement their trades and therefore,
have to pay fees periodically. So they can ill-afford to keep an open position over a long
horizon.
2. Portfolio managers are evaluated every few months. This limits their horizon of arbitrage.
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Price Behavior: Given the substantial presence of noise traders whose behaviour is correlated
and the limits to arbitrage, investor sentiment does influence prices. In such a market, prices
often vary more than what is warranted by changes in fundamentals.
3.3. Empirical challenges to the EMH
Chronologically, the EMH was challenged empirically before it was criticized theoretically.
An important early challenge came from Robert Shiller’s (1981) work on stock market
volatility. Shiller showed that stock market prices fluctuate far more than could be justified
by a simple model in which prices are equated with the net present value of dividends. Shiller
made some specific assumptions about the dividend process and computed the net present
value of dividends using a constant discount rate. Though his work was criticized for mis-
specifying the fundamental value (Merton, 1987), he showed the way for a whole new area of
research.
1. Criticism of the weak form Efficiency: the proposition that past price information cannot
be used to earn excess returns was challenged by Werner DeBondt and Richard Thaler
(1985). They formed portfolios of the best and the worst performing stocks over the previous
three years, for each year since 1933. They then computed the returns on these portfolios over
the following five years. They found that loser portfolios delivered relatively high average
post-formation returns and winner portfolios deliverd relatively low average post formation
returns.
Researchers have identified some more ways to use past returns to predict future returns. An
important study by N. Hagadeesh and S. Titman (1993) looked at the momentum factor and
found that short-term trends (over a period of six months to one year) in the movements in
individual stock prices tend to predict future movements in the same direction. Thus, unlike
long-term trends which tend to reverse themselves, relatively short-term trends tend to
persist. In the wake of such evidence, even Fama admitted that stock returns can be predicted
from past returns, and this represents a departure from the conclusions reached earlier.
2. Challenge to the Semi-strong Form EMH: The evidence against the semi-strong form
efficiency seems to be even greater. Here are some of the important pieces of such evidence.
Post-Earnings Announcement Drift: in general, empirical studies have frund that the
market adjusts gradually, not rapidly, to announcement of unanticipated changes in
quarterly earnings.
Size Effect: some researchers found that small stocks yielded higher returns than the
large stocks (monthly returns in the month of January each year).
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P/E Ratios: In a pioneering study, Sanjay Basu (1977) examined the investment
performance of common stocks in relation to their P/E ratios. He found that low P/E
stocks outperformed high P/E stocks, even after adjustment for risk. Subsequent
studies found similar evidence.
Book Value – Market Value (BV/MV) Ratios: Eugene Fama and Kenneth
French(1993) evaluated the joint effects of market beta size, earnings-price ratio,
leverage and BV/MV ratio on a cross section of average returns. They found that the
BV/MV ratio and size dominated other ratios.
3. Stock prices reaction to Non-information: According to the EMH, stock prices should not
react to non-information. Shiller’s pioneering work sparked a debate relating to the volatility
of stock prices. He has presented evidence that stock prices jump around much more that
what is justified by variations in corporate dividends and cash flow (The Crash of 1987, fell
over 23 percent).
4. Inclusion in an Index: Evidence is that prices react to uninformed shifts in demand when
stocks are included in an index. When a company is included in an index like the S&P 500
Index in the U.S. or the S&P CNX Nifty Index in India, a significant number of its shares are
acquired by index funds and other funds which keep close to the index. Thus such inclusion
stimulates a substantial uninformed demand for the shares of the company, leading to a price
increase.
An Assessment of EMH:
As a normative benchmark of how the world should be, the EMH has been very
useful. In a rational world, the EMH would be true. Without the rational model as a starting
point, it would not have been possible to do research in behavioural finance.
As a descriptive model of asset markets, the report card on the EMH is mixed. The
“no-free-lunch” component of the EMH is mostly true because mutual funds and professional
investors, in general have not been able to outperform, or even match, the performance of the
relevant benchmark indices.
The “price is right” component of the EMH, however is perhaps not true – and for
many important questions, this is the more relevant component. In a very provocative article,
titled “Noise,” which appeared in the July, 1986 issue of Journal of Finance, the eminent
financial economist Fisher Black opined that, “we might define an efficient market as one in
which price is within a factor of 2 of value, i.e., the price is more than half of value and less
that twice value. That factor of 2 is arbitrary, of course.
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Rechared Thaler seriously challenged the “price is right” component. He says: “My
conclusion: the price is often wrong, and sometimes very wrong. Furthermore, when prices
diverge from fundamental value by such wide margins, the misallocation of resources can be
quite big.”
3.3. Market Predictability
Stock Market regressions:
Rt+1−rt = a+b1x1t+b2x2t+...+bkxkt+εt+1, - (1)
Rt+1 is the one-period (day, week, month,..) holding return on a stock index defined by
Rt+1 = (Pt+1 + Dt+1 − Pt)/Pt, - (2)
Pt is the stock price at the end of the period and D t+1 is the dividend paid out over the period t
to t + 1, and xit , i = 1, 2, ..., k are the factors/variables thought to be important in predicting
stock returns. Finally, rt is the return on the government bond with one period to maturity (the
period to maturity of the bond should exactly be the same as the holding period of the stock).
Rt+1 − rt is known as the excess return (return on stocks in excess of the return on the safe
asset). Note also that rt would be known to the investor/trader at the end of period t, before
the price of stocks, Pt+1, is revealed at the end of period t + 1.
Examples of possible stock market predictors are past changes in macroeconomic variables
such as interest rates, inflation, dividend yield (Dt/Pt−1), price earnings ratio, output growth,
and term premium (the difference in yield of a high grade and a low grade bond such as AAA
rated minus BAA rated bonds).
For individual stocks the relevant stock market regression is the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM), augmented with potential predictors:
Ri,t+1 = ai+b1ix1t+b2ix2t+...+bkixkt+βiRt+1+εi,t+1, - (3)
where Ri,t+1 is the holding period return on asset i (shares of firm i), defined similarly as
Rt+1. The asset-specific regressions (3) could also include firm specific predictors, such as
Rit or its higher order lags, book-to-market value or size of firm i. Under market efficiency,
as characterized by CAPM,
ai = 0, b1i = b2i = .... = bki = 0.
Only the “betas”, βi, will be significantly different from zero. Under CAPM, the value of βi
captures the risk of holding the share i with respect to the market.
Market Efficiency and Stock Market Predictability:
It is often argued that if stock markets are efficient then it should not be possible to predict
stock returns, namely that none of the variables in the stock market regression (1) should be
statistically significant. But this line of argument is not satisfactory and does not help in
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furthering our understanding of how markets operate. The concept of market efficiency needs
to be defined separately from predictability. In fact, it is easily seen that stock market returns
will be non-predictable only if market efficiency is combined with risk neutrality.
Risk Neutral Investors: Suppose there exists a risk free asset such as a government bond
with a known payout. In such a case an investor with an initial capital of At, is faced with two
options:
• Option 1: holding the risk-free asset and receiving (1 + rt)At, at the end of the next period,
• Option 2: switching to stocks by purchasing At/Pt shares and holding them for one period
and expecting to receive (At/Pt) (Pt+1 + Dt+1), at the end of period t + 1.
A risk-neutral investor will be indifferent between the certainty of (1 + rt)A t, and the his/her
expectations of the uncertain payout of option 2. Namely, for such a risk neutral investor
(1 + rt)At = E [(At/Pt) (Pt+1 + Dt+1) |It] - 4
Where It is the investor’s information at the nend of period t. This relationship is called the
“Arbitrage Condition”.
Using (2) we now have Pt+1 + Dt+1 = Pt (1 + Rt+1), and the above arbitrage condition can be
Simplifies to
E [(1 + Rt+1) |It] = (1+rt),
or
E (Rt+1 − rt |It) = 0. - 5
This result establishes that if the investor forms his/her expectations of future stock (index)
returns taking account of all market information efficiently, then the excess return, R t+1 − rt,
should not be predictable using any of the market information that are available at the end of
period t. Notice that rt is known at time t and is therefore included in It.
Hence, under the joint hypothesis of market efficiency and risk neutrality we must also have
E (Rt+1 |It) = rt.
The above set up can also be used to derive conditions under which asset prices can be
characterised as a random walk model. Suppose, the risk free rate, rt, in addition to being
known at time t, is also constant over time. Then using (4) we can also write
that equates the level of stock price to the present discounted stream of the dividends
expected to occur to the asset over the infinite future. The transversality condition rules out
rational speculative bubbles and is satisfied if the asset prices are not expected to rise faster
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than the exponential decay rate determined by the discount factor, 0 < 1/(1 + r) < 1. It is now
easily seen that if Dt follows a random walk so will Pt.
Risk averse Investors: Risk neutrality is a behavioural assumption and need not hold even if
all market information is processed efficiently by all the market participants. A more
reasonable way to proceed is to allow some or all the investors to be risk averse.
In this more general case the certain pay out, (1 + rt)At, and the expectations of the uncertain
pay out, E [(At/Pt) (Pt+1 + Dt+1) |It ], will not be the same and differ by a (possibly) time-
varying risk premium which could also vary with the level of the initial capital, At. The
extent to which excess returns can be predicted will depend on the existence of a historically
stable relationship between the risk premium, λt, and the macro and business cycle indicators
such as changes in interest rates, dividends and various business cycle indicators.
Market inefficiencies provide further sources of stock market predictability by introducing a
wedge between a “correct” ex ante measure of E (Rt+1 − rt |It), and its estimate by market
participants. Denoting the latter by ˆE (Rt+1 − rt |It) we have E (Rt+1 − rt |It) = λt + ξt,
Evidence of Stock Market Predictability: Economists have long been fascinated by the
sources of variations in the stock market. By the early 1970’s a consensus had emerged
among financial economists suggesting that stock prices could be well approximated by a
random walk model and that changes in stock returns were basically unpredictable. Fama
(1970) provides an early, definitive statement of this position. Historically, the ‘random walk’
theory of stock prices was preceded by theories relating movements in the financial markets
to the business cycle. A prominent example is the interest shown by Keynes in the variation
in stock returns over the business cycle. According to Skidelsky (1992) “Keynes initiated
what was called an ‘Active Investment Policy’, which combined investing in real assets - at
that time considered revolutionary - with constant switching between short-dated and long-
dated securities, based on predictions of changes in the interest rate”.
Recently, a large number of studies in the finance literature have confirmed that stock returns
can be predicted to some degree by means of interest rates, dividend yields and a variety of
macroeconomic variables exhibiting clear business cycle variations.
3.4. Limits of Arbitrage model:
3.5. Asset Management and behavioral factors:
Several psychological biases have been shown to affect asset prices, and two pronounced
ones are overconfidence and limited attention. Motivated by the overconfidence model of
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001), Hirshleifer and Jiang (2010) propose a
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behavioral factor, the underpriced-minus-overpriced (UMO) factor, based on firms’ external
financing activities. The new issues puzzle is well documented. Though there are possible
risk channels, the widely held views are behavioral explanations, such as “market timing”
and incitement of misvaluation. The “market timing” hypothesis suggests that managers
possess inside information about the true value of their firms and undertake equity (or debt)
issuance or repurchase to exploit pre-existing mispricing. Alternatively, managers may
manipulate earnings upward to induce overpricing before issuing shares, or manage earnings
downward to induce underpricing before a repurchase. In those circumstances, issuing firms
would be overpriced and repurchasing firms underpriced. The UMO factor is constructed by
going long on firms with debt or equity repurchases and short on firms with IPOs, SEOs, and
debt issues over the previous 24 months. They show that UMO indeed captures common
mispricing, and loadings on UMO predict the cross-section of stock returns.
We introduce another behavioral factor, the inattention-to-fundamentals (ITF) factor,
motivated by investors’ limited attention to important information about firm fundamentals.
In the fashion of Fama and French (1993), ITF is constructed on a firm characteristic, net
operating assets, which is important balance sheet information but is likely to be neglected by
investors. According to Hirshleifer et al. (2004), net operating assets measure the relative
shortfall between cumulative operating income (the accounting value added) and cumulative
free cash flow (the cash value added). When this shortfall is large, the favorable accounting
performance receives relatively little affirmation from cash performance. If investors with
limited attention focus on accounting profitability but neglect information about cash
profitability, then net operating assets measures “the extent to which reporting outcomes
provoke over-optimism.” Firms with high net operating assets will be overvalued, and firms
with low net operating assets will be undervalued. ITF is constructed by going long on low
net operating assets firms and short on high net operating assets firms, to capture common
mispricing due to investors’ limited attention to firms’ cash flows or fundamentals.
Intuitively, one might ask why there could be a factor associated with net operating assets.
One mechanism is that net operating assets is related to economic factors, and innovations in
net operating assets are systematic. Owing to limited attention, comovement in net operating
assets drives commonality in mispricing and asset returns across firms. Another channel is
systematic attention shocks. At a given time, all firms with high (low) net operating assets are
overvalued (undervalued) due to limited attention. Shifts in aggregate investor attention, or
attention shocks, therefore cause these firms to become more or less misvalued at the same
time, generating co-movement in returns. Jointly, both systematic innovations in net
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operating assets and shifts in aggregate investor attention drive return co-movement due to
common mispricing, in particular among firms with extreme net operating assets. ITF is
formed by a long-short strategy on those firms, and therefore captures common mispricing
due to investors’ limited attention to important information about firm fundamentals.
3.6. Active Portfolio Management; return statistics and Sources of systematic
underperformance
Active management is the use of a human element, such as a single manager, co-managers or
a team of managers, to actively manage a fund's portfolio. Active managers rely on analytical
research, forecasts, and their own judgment and experience in making investment decisions
on what securities to buy, hold and sell.
Investors who believe in active management do not follow the efficient market hypothesis.
They believe it is possible to profit from the stock market through any number of strategies
that aim to identify mispriced securities. Investment companies and fund sponsors believe it's
possible to outperform the market and employ professional investment managers to manage
one or more of the company's mutual funds.
The Berkeley study points out results from several other studies, indicating that nearly all
mutual funds underperform the S&P 500, net of fees. These largely refer to dual 10-year
studies that concluded in 1999 and again in 2003, each of which found that active managers,
net excess returns, under-performed the market 71% of the time.
Lesser known are two 10-year studies that concluded in 2008 and in 2013 that showed
drastically different results. These studies, produced by Vanguard and Morningstar, showed
that the annualized excess returns of active funds beat the U.S. stock market 63% of the time
(2008) and 45% of the time (2013). These studies suggest that active funds were worse than
the market 71% of the time from 1989 to 1999 but better than the market 63% of the time
from 1998 to 2008.
The Vanguard study pointed out that performance leadership among equity groups shifted
"from growth stocks to value stocks and from larger stocks to small" between 1999 and 2008
– two items that should benefit active portfolio construction. In fact, value stocks beat out
growth stocks by 35% in this period; small-caps beat large-caps by an astounding 43%. These
patterns mostly continued from 2008 to 2013.
Academic research has demonstrated that active fund managers who employ high active
share strategies will outperform in both good and bad markets when adhering to a buy-and-
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hold approach. The underperformance of active managers stems from the structural decisions
at the fund manager level, including asset bloat, closet indexing, and overdiversification,
which translate into portfolio drag. Nearly 80% of funds, however, display ample
management skill to overcome the higher fees of an actively managed strategy.
There have been six periods of prolonged underperformance since 1926 in which pure value
factors suffered over a business cycle. While growth and momentum may outperform in
certain environments, mean reversion remains one of the most powerful tools investors have
at their disposal. It is the potential for underperformance that creates the idiosyncratic risk
that value investors can take advantage of in the first place. Since 1991, there have been four
distinct windows across eight periods in which active outperformed passive strategies. Active
strategies also tend to perform better when value beats growth, international equities
outperform U.S. equities, and small-cap stocks are more attractive than large-cap stocks.
Based on the assumptions of Markowitz portfolio theory Sharpe (1964), have derived the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The importance and relevance to this thesis of the
CAPM model is derived from its terminology, i.e. its use of the Greek letters ɑ and β, which
is widely used in the context of portfolio management today. The CAPM seems to be an
attractive approach to the active portfolio management. It has, however, received extensive
criticism, particularly from Farma and French (2004), arguing against its empirical
foundation implying that most implications of the model are invalid.
The CAPM model plays an important role when selecting portfolios according to mean-
variance optimization. When using the CAPM forecasts of expected return to construct
optimal mean-variance portfolios, those portfolios will consist simply of positions in the
market and the risk free asset. In other words, optimal portfolios constructed under mean-
variance optimization will differ from the market portfolio and cash if the forecasted excess
return differ from the CAPM excess return. Thus, the expected return is
built on five factors: the risk free interest rate, the sector specific risk adjustment, the market
risk premium, a premium for exceptional market return, and an expected residual return. The
residual return is, ai, is a constant.
3.7. Fundamental information and technical analysis – the case for psychological
influence
By considering that an investor’s decision to buy or sell a stock is based on expectations. The
traditional finance view is embodied by the rational expectations model, which assumes that
investor expectations are derived from using tools such as fundamental analysis and modern
portfolio theory. These tools require making certain assumptions about the future. What
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growth rate will the firm achieve over the next three years? What is its expected return,
expected variance, and expected correlation with other assets? Even the most sophisticated
investors do not agree about which methods produce the most accurate assumptions. The
rational expectations model requires that investors resolve these uncertainties in an unbiased
and rational way, yet evidence indicate that people make biased and non rational choices
driven by emotions and cognitive errors.
This is illustrated by an experiment conducted by kuhnen and Knutson. They have subjects
play a game in which they must continuously choose between investing in a risky asset with
known probabilities for each outcome and a risk free asset. They play for money. Before
playing, positive, neutral and negative emotions are induced through seeing a possibly
provocative image and discussing it. They find that being induced with positive emotions
lead to riskier choices and more confidence in those choices. One reason for this confidence
is that they do not fully incorporate information that contradicts their prior choices.
Even those investors who use quantitative methods such as fundamental analysis can be
influenced by their mood. There is more than just unbiased numbers. Analysis includes
educated guesswork about some assumptions. Some fundamental analysis techniques are
more sophisticated than others, but they all involve in assumptions about the future.
Ex: consider the constant growth model taught to finance students around the world,
PV=D1/(K-G). investors must estimate the constant growth rate, G. Given the influence of
mood on risky and uncertain decisions, the expected value of the growth rate may become
biased. In turn, this biases the value computed in the model.
Certain effects may influence decisions of investors:
The effect of sunshine
The effect of negative emotions
The effect of optimism
The effect of sentiment
UNIT - 4
Behavioral Corporate Finance: Behavioral factors and Corporate Decision on Capital
Structure and Dividend Policy – Capital Structure dependence on market timing – systematic
approach to using behavioral factors in Corporate Decision Making. External Factors and
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Investor Behavior in mechanisms of the External Factor influence on Risk Perception and
Attitudes – Connection to Psychophysiology and Emotional Regulation. Active Portfolio
Management – The Sources of the Systematic Underperformance.
Behavioral Corporate Finance:
Behavioral corporate finance replaces the traditional rationality assumptions with behavioral
assumptions that are based on empirical evidence.
There are two broad
Behavioral corporate Finance and Capital Structure:
Modigliani-Miller tradeoff theory and Myers-Majluf pecking-order theory are the two main
approaches to capital structure.
The tradeoff theory considers the tradeoff between the tax shield provided by debt and the
financial distress associated with debt. Since interest on debt is tax-deductible, capital
structure has a bearing on the post-tax cash flows to the firm’s investors. The value of the tax
shield provided by debt is generally estimated as the product of the amount of debt and the
corporate tax rate.
According to the pecking order theory, there is a pecking order of financing which goes as
follows:
Internal finance (retained earnings)
Debt finance
External equity finance
A firm first taps retained earnings, its primary attraction is that it comes out of profits and not
much effort is required to get if. Further, the capital market ordinarily does not view the use
of retained earnings negatively.
Given the pecking order of financing, there are no well-defined target debt-equity ratios, as
there are two kinds of equity, internal and external. While the internal equity (retained
earnings)is at the top of the pecking order, the external equity is at the bottom. This explains
why highly profitable firms generally use little debt. They borrow less as they don’t need
much external finance and not because they have a low target debt-equity ratio. On the other
hand debt finance comes before external equity in the pecking order.
Behavioral considerations:
In practice, the capital structure decisions of companies are based on traditional conserations
as well as behavioral considerations. The principal behavioral factor relates to market timing,
meaning that managers take advantage of perceived market inefficiencies. They issue equity
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when it is perceived to be overvalued: they repurchase equity when it is perceived to be
undervalued. It must be emphasized that perceptions are the key and they may be sometimes
unbiased and sometimes biased.
A series of interviews conducted with chief financial officers, corporate treasurers,
consultants and financiers revealed that practitioners find the theoretical capital structure
models rather static. The interviewers pointed toward the volatility of their firms’ future cash
flows and uncertainties relating to investment opportunities and conditions in capital market.
In view of this, firms want to have flexibility to take advantage of unexpected investment and
acquisition opportunities and market mispricing.
Dividend policy:
Modigliani and Miller provided the standard neoclassical treatment for dividend policy. The
central premise of the MM framework is that the value of a firm depends solely on its
earnings power and is not influenced by the manner in which its earnings are split between
dividends and retained earnings.
The MM theory assumes a perfect capital market, wherein the following conditions are
assumed:
Information is freely available to everyone equally.
There are no taxes
Floatation and transaction costs do not exist
There are no contracting or agency costs
No one exerts enough power in the market to influence the price of security. This
means all participants are price takers.
Investments and financing decisions are independent.
The real world, however, is characterized by imperfections such as taxes on dividend income
as well as capital appreciation; floatation costs and transaction costs; informational
asymmetry; and agency conflicts.
In the wake of these imperfections, there is no single traditional view about what constitutes
appropriate dividend policy.
Why companies pay dividends:
Investor preference for dividend
Information signaling
Clientele effect
Agency costs
How managers think about dividends:
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The classic answer to this question was provided by John Lintner in 1956. Lintner’s survey, a
pioneering behavioral study, identified four facts:
1. Firms set long-run payout ratios. Mature firms with fairly stable earnings have higher
payout rations whereas rapidly growing firms have lower payout ratios.
2. Managers are concerned more about the change in the dividend than the absolute
level of dividend. Thus, paying a dividend of Rs. 10/- per share, is very important if
the previous year’s dividend per share was Rs.5/-, but not a big deal if the previous
years dividend wars Rs. 10/- per share.
3. Dividends tend to follow earnings, but dividends follow a smoother path than
earnings. Transitory changes in earnings are not likely to have an impact on dividend
payment.
4. Dividends are sticky in nature because managers are reluctant to effect dividend
changes that may have to be reversed. They are particularly concerned about having
to pull back an increase in dividend.
Mergers and Acquisitions
The traditional approach to M&A assumes that the market prices of both the acquiring form
and the target form reflect their intrinsic values, assuming that both remain as stand-alone
firms. However, a merger of the two firms is expected to generate potential synergistic gains.
If the acquiring company pays the target company the latter’s current value plus a premium,
the gains for the shareholders of the acquiring company and target company would be as
follows;
Gain to the shareholders of the acquiring company = Synergistic gains - premium paid
Gain to the shareholders of the target company = premium paid
Clearly the acquiring company will go forward with the acquisition only if the synergistic
gains exceed the premium paid. Further, since all assets are priced correctly, the combination
of cash and stock used to finance the acquisition does not matter.
Behavioral Considerations:
If markets are efficient and acquirers pay a premium which is less than the real synergistic
gains, acquisitions should create value for the shareholders of both the acquiring company
and the target company, regardless of the form of compensation. Further, the level of
acquisition activity should not be a function of the level of the stock market.
Empirical evidence, however, suggests the following:
Acquirers usually pay too much. This benefits the shareholders of the target company, but
hurts the shareholders of the acquiring company.
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CEOs fall in love with deals and don’t walk away when they should.
Mergers and acquisitions thrive during periods of stock market buoyancy.
Acquirers who pay stock compensation are more likely to do value-reducing, deals than
acquirers who pay with cash or debt.
What explains this empirical evidence which is at variance with what the theory predicts?
Several behavioral factors seem to explain the discrepancy. The important ones are;
Winners Curse in a competitive bidding situation, the participating companies rationality.
As Warren Buffet said, the thrill of the chase may blind the acquirer to the outcome
thereof. Hence the winner tends to overpay. In a way, the winner is an unfortunate
winner. This is referred to as the “winner’s curse” hypothesis.
Hubris Out of misplaced confidence, the acquirer’s management tends to overestimate the
synergies that it hopes to realize. As Daniel Kahneman et al. put it: “Mergers tend to
come in waves during periods of economic expansion. At such times, executives can
over-attribute their company’s strong performance to their own actions and abilities rather
to the buoyant economy. This can, in turn, lead them to an inflated belief in their own
talents.
Consequently many M&A decisions may be the result of hubric, as the executives
evaluating an acquisition come to believe that with proper planning and superior
management skills, they could make it more valuable. Research on post-merger
performance suggests that on average, they are mistaken.
Agency conflicts and corporate governance:
The public limited company, which is owned by a number of shareholders protected with
limited liability, has been a major organizational innovation it allows for efficient sharing of
risk among many investors and enables professional managers to run the company.
However, the public limited company given rise to possible conflicts between managers and
shareholders due to the separation of ownership and control Adam Smith had recognized,
very perceptively, the agency problem in his classical work “The wealth of Nations”
published in 1776.
Two centuries later, Michael Jensen and William Meckling provided a formal analysis of the
‘agency problem’ in their seminal paper titled “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,” published in the August 1976 issue of The Journal
of Financial Economics.
The essence of agency problem is that self-interested managers may squander corporate
resources over uneconomic, value-destroying projects and activities. This problem is more
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serious in companies that have substantial free cash flows. On the other hand, in high growth
industries where internal accruals are less than what is needed for supporting profitable
investment opportunities, managers are less likely to squander resources over uneconomic
projects.
Agency costs are borne by the principals and agents, perhaps more by the latter if the
principals are smart. Hence, it is in the interest of the principals as well as the agents to find
ways and means of minimizing the agency costs.
Divergence of Interests
As long as the firm is owned and managed by the same person, there is no room for conflict.
As the stake of managers in the ownership of the firm diminished the scope for agency
problem increases. In a joint stock company, where managers have very little stake in
ownership they are likely to act in ways that are incompatible with the interest of
shareholders.
Traditional approach to agency conflicts
To deal with agency conflicts, the traditional approach requires principals to offer contracts to
agents that provides rewards and penalties with three goals in mind.
The first goal is to induce the agent to participate by offering a contract that is at least as
attractive as the best alternative available to the agent. This goal is called the participant
constraint goal.
The second goal is to motivate the agent to act in the interest of the principal, by appropriate
rewards and penalties. This goal is known as the incentive compatibility constraint goal.
The third goal is to ensure that the agent is not overly compensated. This is called the no
overpayment constraint.
Pay for performance in practice
How well is the pay linked to performance in practice? Academic studies and other evidence
on executive compensation suggest the following;
The CEO pay doe3s not vary sufficiently in relation to performance to be congruent with
traditional theory.
CEOs of poorly performing companies do not face a significant threat of dismissal.
Despite their increased popularity, stock options are often not well designed. Although
options can be appropriate in theory, in practice they tend to be capricious, inefficient,
and very expensive.
Behavioral Phenomena
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Why pay is poorly linked to performance in practice? Two psychological factors seem to
explain this phenomenon: overconfidence and prospect theory.
Overconfidence Due to overconfidence, directors are likely to underestimate the extent of
agency conflicts and behavioral baises of executives that lead to such conflicts. Further, over-
confident directors tend to think that they can address agency conflicts better than they
actually do.
Prospect Theory People tend to overweight low probabilities associated with extreme events
and underweight high probabilities attached to moderate events.
According to prospect theory, people are risk-averse, when they face the probability of only
gains and risk-seeking when they face the prospect of only losses. The aversion to a sure loss
can wreak havoc with the incentives commonly used to resolve agency costs. To see why this
happens, let us look at auditing services.
In theory, auditors are appointed by shareholders but in practice the appointment as well as
the compensation of auditors is determined by management. So auditors can be influenced by
unscrupulous managements to issue clear opinions.
Since audit firms are partnerships not corporations, the traditional view is that audit firms
have a strong incentive to protect their reputation for integrity. Hence, it is in the best interest
of auditors to issue honest assessment rather than clear opinions when the clients do not
deserve them. Further, since a firm’s choice of auditor is an important signal, a firm that
wants to convey that its financial statements are really clean might engage an auditor with
high reputation, whose fees is likely to be high.
But there can be circumstances when audit firms may compromise their integrity, as it
happened at Arthur Andersen. Authur Andersen, a hoary accounting firm, had two divisions,
the consulting division and auditing division. During 1980s, the consulting division had
become very profitable whereas the auditing division was struggling. The compensation of
people in the auditing division lagged behind people in Andersen consulting. In response, the
auditing division began a separate consulting of its own, Authur Andersen consulting, to
compete directly with the sister division Andersen consulting. So, Andersen consulting split-
off to become Accenture. In the wake of this departure, Arthur Anderson introduced a policy
called “2X,” which required its partners to get two dollars of non-auditing work for every
dollar of auditing firm. This prompted its partners to persuade clients to engage Arthur
Andersen for both internal and external auditing services. This led to a dilution of the quality
of audits, because it introduced a potential conflict of interest. The list of Arthur Andersen’s
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audit clients included Enron, WorldCom, Wast Management Inc, Boston Market and
Sunbeam. A major scandal ensured at each of these firms.
UNIT – 5
Emotions and Decisions – Making Experimental measurement of risk-related – Measuring
Risk – Emotional mechanisms in modulating risk-taking attitude – Neurophysiology of risk
taking. Personality traits and risk attitudes in different domains.
Substance of Emotions:
Mental states such as happiness, sadness, pride, greed, anger contempt, surprise, and disgust
are commonly understood as emotions.
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Sandra Hockenbury describes an emotion as “ a complex physiological state that involve
three distinct components: a subjective experience, a physiological response, and an
expressive response.”
John Elster argues that an emotion has six observable features:
1. Cognitive antecedents: Generally an emotional response is triggered by a belief.
2. Intentional objects: Emotions relate to something like a person or situation.
3. Physiological arousal: Emotions are accompanied by change in the hormonal and nervous
system. When a person is enraged, his blood pressure tends to increase.
4. Physiological expressions: Emotions are often characterized by observable expressions
associated with how a person functions.
5. Valence: Valence, a psychological term, is used to rate feelings of pleasure and pain.
Emotions are typically rated on a scale with a neutral point in the centre and negative and
positive feelings at the two end points.
6. Action tendencies: emotions tend to produce action. A person who experiences an emotion
often feels the urge, sometimes a compulsion, to act in a certain way.
The above six features define what an emotion is and how it may be differentiated from other
mental states.
Emotions, Feelings, Affects and Moods: emotions may be differentiated from similar
constructs like feelings, moods and affect, in the field of affective neuroscience. Feelings are
subjective representation of emotions. Moods are diffused effective states that last much
longer and are usually less intense than emotions. Affect is a wider term that emcompasses
emotion, feelings and moods, even though it is commonly used interchangeably with
emotion.
Emotions may be negative or positive. Negative emotions are anger, fear, stress, sadness,
disgust, guilt, hatred, shame, contempt, embarrassment, and so on. Positive emotions are
gratitude, hope, joy, tranquility, enthusiasm, interest, inspiration, awe, amusement, love and
so on.
Theories of Emotions:
Philosophers, researchers, and psychologists have proposed different theories to explain the
what, why and how behind human emotions. The major theories of emotions may be grouped
into two main categories: physiological, and cognitive.
Physiological Theories: Physiological theories suggest that responses within the body cause
emotions.
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According to James-Langer theory, an external stimulus leads to a physiological response
which in turn leads to an emotional reaction depending on how the person interprets the
physiological response.
According to Cannon-Bard theory people feel emotions and physiological reactions (such as
trembling and sweating) simultaneously. More specifically this theory says that both the
emotion and physiological reaction occur when the thalamus sends a message to the brain in
response to a stimulus.
According to facial feedback theory, facial expressions are not only the results of our
emotions but are also capable of influencing their emotions.
Cognitive Theories: Cognitive theories argue that thoughts and other mental activities have
an important bearing on the formation of emotions.
The Schechter-Singer theory, also known as the two factor theory of emotion, is an example
of a cognitive theory of emotion. According to this theory, there are two key components of
an emotion: physical arousal and cognitive label. This theory says that a mere physical
arousal is not enough; the person must also identify the arousal in order to feel the emotion.
Richard Lazarus, an important proponent of this view, argued that emotions must have some
cognitive intentionality. According to this theory, emotion is a disturbance that occurs in the
following order:
1. Cognitive appraisal – The individual assesses the event cognitively which motivates the
emotion.
2. Physiological changes – the cognitive reaction induces biological changes such as
increased heart rate of pituitary adrenal response.
3. Action – The individual feels the emotion and decides how to react.
Types and Dimensions of Emotions:
Plutchik’s Wheel of Emotion:
Emotions have been classified into various types or categories. According to Robert Plutchik,
a psychologist who developed a psycho evolutionary theory of emotions, there are eight basic
or primary emotions: joy, trust, fear, surprise, sadness, anticipation, anger, and disgust.
Pluchik’s wheel of Emotions
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Two dimensions of Emotions:
Emotional experiences may be measured along two dimensions. Viz., valence (how negative
or positive the experience feels) and arousal (how energising or enervating the experience
feels).
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Emotions and Effective feelings:
According to Jan Pankeep, a neuroscientist, there are seven primal emotions and effective
feelings associated with them. They are:
Primal Emotions Effective FeelingsSeeking Enthusiastic
Rage AngeredFear AnxiousLust ArousalCare Tender and LovingPanic Lonely and sadPlay Joyous
Emotions and Investing:
Emotions have a bearing on risk tolerance, and risk tolerance influences portfolio selection.
Investors experience a variety of emotions as they consider alternatives, decide how much
risk to take, watch their decisions play out, assess whether the initial strategy needs
modification, and finally learn how far they have succeeded in achieving their financial
objectives.
The emotions experienced by a person with respect to investment may be expressed along an
emotional time line as shown in the below Exhibit:
Hope Anticipation Pride
Decisions ----------------------------------------------------------------- Goals
Fear Anxiety Regret
Investment decisions lie at the left end of the time line and investment goals at the right end.
According to psychologist Lola Lopes, investors experience a variety of emotions, positive
and negative. Positive emotions are shown above the time-line and negative emotions below
the time line. On the positive side, hope becomes anticipation which finally converts into
pride. On the negative side, fear turns into anxiety which finally transforms into regret.
Hope and fear have a bearing on how investors evaluate alternatives. Fear induces investors
to look at the downside of things, whereas hope causes them to look at the upside. The
downside perspective emphasises security; the upside perspective focuses on potential gains.
According to Lopes, these two perspectives reside in everyone, as polar opposites. However,
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they are often not equally matched, as one pole tends to dominate the other. The relative
importance of these conflicting emotions determines the tolerance for risk.
Personality traits and risk attitudes in different domains:
People differ in the way they resolve decisions involving risk and uncertainty, and these
differences are often described as differences in risk attitude. In the expected utility
framework and its variants, including prospect theory, such apparent differences in risk
attitude are modelled by utility functions that differ in shape, with different degrees of
concavity (convexity) to explain risk aversion (seeking). Risk attitude is the parameter that
differentiates between the utility functions of different individuals and is intended as nothing
more than a descriptive label for the concavity or convexity of the utility function. Popular
interpretations of risk attitude, however, often consider it to be a personality trait.
The consideration of risk attitude as a personality trait has undergone a similar development
as that of personality traits in general. While traits were initially defined as stable (i.e.,
situation-invariant) personality characteristics that were assumed to be the result of biological
differences or early childhood experiences, the empirical observation of low correlations
between trait-related behavior in different situations has given rise to more complex
definitions that acknowledge the situational determinants of behavior while preserving
generality in the way personality traits shape the pattern of behavior across situations.
The following two observations have been problematic for the simple expected-utility
definition of risk attitude as a personality trait. First, different methods of measuring people’s
utility functions (and thus risk attitudes) have been shown to result in different classifications
of individuals. More importantly, even when using the same assessment method, individuals
have not shown themselves to be consistently risk seeking (averse) across different domains
and situations, both in laboratory studies and managerial contexts. MacCrimmon and
Wehrung (1986, 1990) showed, for example, that managers have different risk attitudes when
making decisions involving personal versus company money or when evaluating financial
versus recreational risks. These problems limit the predictive validity of expected-utility
based assessments of risk attitude. Given the lability of expected-utility based assessments of
risk attitude, it should not be surprising that measurement scales based upon them have not
had much success in predicting people’s choices or behaviors across a range of situations.
The observed content-specificity of responses suggests that they should not be combined
across content domains. Nevertheless, the Choice Dilemma Questionnaire, a commonly used
scale, asks people for probability equivalents in twelve choice dilemmas from different
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domains of life, which are then combined into a single score that purportedly represents a
person’s risk attitude. Despite its obvious deficiencies the scale is still in use, primarily for
lack of better alternatives.
Domain Specific Risk Taking (DOSPERT):
People differ in the way they resolve decisions involving risk and uncertainty, and these
differences are often described as differences in risk attitude. In the expected utility
framework and its variants, including prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1992), such apparent differences in risk attitude are modeled by utility
functions that differ in shape, with different degrees of concavity (convexity) to explain risk
aversion (seeking). Risk attitude is the parameter that differentiates between the utility
functions of different individuals (e.g., Pratt, 1964) and is intended as nothing more than a
descriptive label for the concavity or convexity of the utility function. Popular interpretations
of risk attitude, however, often consider it to be a personality trait (Weber, 1998).
Empirical investigations have shown systematic individual, group, and cultural differences in
perceptions of the riskiness of risky choice options (Bontempo, Bottom, & Weber, 1997;
Slovic, 1998; Weber, 1988). A smaller number of studies have also documented group
differences in the perception of perceived benefits (e.g., Johnson, Wilke, & Weber, 2004).
After accounting for differences in the perception of the risk or returns of choice alternatives,
however, people's perceived-risk attitude - defined as their willingness to trade off units of
perceived risk for units of perceived return - has shown considerable cross-group and cross-
situational consistency (Weber, 1998, 2001). The domain-specificity of risk taking thus
seems to arise primarily from differences in the perception of the risks (and possibly benefits)
of choice alternatives in different content domains, while the trait (or true attitude towards
risk) that shows consistency across situations lies in the evaluation of risk (as it is perceived)
as something that is either desirable (i.e., worth giving up units of return for) or undesirable
(i.e., something that needs to be compensated by units of return) (Weber, 2001).
The Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) Scale, that allows researchers and
practitioners to assess both conventional risk attitudes (defined as the reported level of risk
taking) and perceived-risk attitudes (defined as the willingness to engage in a risky activity as
a function of its perceived riskiness) in five commonly encountered content domains, i.e.,
ethical, financial (further decomposed into gambling and investment), health/safety, social,
and recreational decisions.
Example:
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Five Factor model of Personality:
The five-factor model of personality is a hierarchical organization of personality traits in
terms of five basic dimensions: Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness,
Neuroticism, and Openness to Experience. Personality psychologists use this model to
measure the relation between these factors and their impact on risk taking and individual
decision making in various domains.
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