Silbey - 1985 - Ideals and Practices in the Study of Law

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    deals and Practices in the Study ofLaw*Susan S. Silbey

    Department ofSociology, Wellesley College

    The union of law and social science is not very old. Indeed in thehistory of human scholarship, no social science is very old. Themarriage with law, however, is more recent than the application ofsocial science to other aspects of social life. This brief existence hasbeen characterized by an uncertainty in the relationship and aperiodic need to examine the premises of a sociology of law. Inresponse to such uncertainity and the present need to examine ourpremises, this paper offers the following proposition: Despite thebroad interest of social scientists in law and the legal system as arecognizable set of practices, much research in this area suffers fromcongenital idealism. This idealism takes several forms and all areantithetical to the premises and assumptions of a scientific study oflaw. The sociology of law, I envision, is consistent with the twogreat traditions of social scientific inquiry following Marx an dWeber (Web er, 19 46; I954; 1978; Cain and Hunt, 1978). Although

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    22 Legal Studies Forummust use the perspective of the actor as THE topic of analysis.(Lofland and Lofland, l984:l 19). Thus legality is of interest, not toachieve it, but to examine, critique, transcend its takenforgrantedness. This perspective treats law as ideology by recognizingand delineating the ways in which legal behavior becomes ordinary,taken-for-granted, and thus legitimate. 17Alvin Gouldner called this process of discovery andtranscendence a democratic enterprise in which all claims comeunder scrutiny (Gouldner, l979:59), in which the world is politicalrather than necessary. The objectification of social arrangements,such as the law, is perhaps the most fundamental form ofmystification. But it is the task of a social science to transcend this,to engage in what Gouldner called the culture of critical discourse,to examine what is taken for granted (including our own study of whatis taken for granted). We study not only the present, according toGouldner,

    but also the anti-present, the critique of the present andthe assumptions it uses. . . . In other words the culture ofcritical discourse must put its hands around its own throat,and see how long it can squeeze. Culture of criticaldiscourse always moves on to auto-critique, and to theis critique of that autocritique. There is an unending regressin it, a potential revolution in permanence. . . .A social science of law on this foundation, embodies that unceasingrestlessness and (indeed) lawlessness that the ancient Greeksfirstcalled anomos and that Hegel called the bad infinty (Gouldner,l979:59-60), and which denies and challenges any form of idealism._ _ an unu

    17 cf. The key to understanding any ideology is to be able tosee what is taken as given (Brigham, 198456).