SHRINKING GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY Government...SHRINKING GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY ... Economic Growth and Freedom. ShrinkingGovernmentBureaucracy ... Protection Agency and Federal

SHRINKING GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY

Reorganizing the Executive Branch to Boost Economic Growth and Freedom

Shrinking Government Bureaucracy

Proposals for Reorganizing the Executive Branchto Boost Economic Growth and Freedom

September 2017

2 Shrinking Government Bureaucracy

Table of Contents

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Executive Summary

Introduction

Environmental Protection Agency

Department of Commerce

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

Securities and Exchange Commission

National Labor Relations Board

Federal Communications Commission

Notes

About the Authors 28

Shrinking Government Bureaucracy 3

Shrinking Government BureaucracyProposals for Reorganizing the Executive Branch

to Boost Economic Growth and Freedom

Executive SummaryShrinking Government Bureaucracy is a series ofpolicy proposals by Competitive Enterprise Institute(CEI) experts to rein in America’s regulatory state,save tax dollars, boost economic growth, and lightenthe burden on job creators across the nation. Some ofthese reforms can be achieved via executive action,while others will require Congress to take backauthority from cabinet departments and agencies. Fortoo long, Congress has allowed federal agencies andregulators to gather too much power, resulting in abloated, unaccountable bureaucracy that imposes costsand hinders innovation throughout the U.S. economy.

In this series of policy proposals, CEI experts layout free market solutions to immediately streamlinegovernment operations, roll back burdensomeregulations, and properly align the structure offederal agencies with their core missions. Theserecommendations were also submitted to the WhiteHouse Office of Management and Budget in responseto its efforts under President Trump’s Executive Order13781, “Comprehensive Plan for Reorganizing theExecutive Branch.”

Regarding this effort, CEI President Kent Lassman says:“We need to ponder what the executive branch wedeserve looks like and how it aligns with our Constitutionand statutory limitations. The concrete suggestionsfound in Shrinking Government Bureaucracy providea good start toward answering that question.”

CEI experts recommend the following steps for re-thinking and reorganizing the executive branch.

Environmental Protection Agency. The U.S.Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) needs to bemade more transparent and efficient, a goal that canbe achieved while continuing to protect the nation’s

environment. Congress and the administration should require the agency to produce a transparent, intelligible budget. Many of the EPA’s regional offices and grant programs are redundant and should be abolished. Other reform priorities include improving data quality standards for new research and transferring emergency response duties to the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Department of Commerce. Private sector companies already fulfill the majority of the Commerce Department’s mission, such as conducting market research and seeking trade opportunities. Congress and the administration need to reevaluate the need for the Commerce Department, which could mean moving government activities to better qualified agencies. Priorities include privatizing the National Weather Service, transferring Marine Sanctuaries to state management, and transferring supervision of the Patent and Trademark Office to the Office of Management and Budget.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) policies unfairly make all taxpayers liable for decisions made by banks and their customers. This gives financial institutions an incentive to disregard risky behavior and provides a false sense of security to consumers. Congress and the administration should reevaluate how the mission of the FDIC addresses the needs of 21st century consumers, and lessen the risk to taxpayers. The FDIC’s coverage limit should be pared back to$100,000, with the goal of eliminating government deposit insurance entirely.

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) imposes unnecessary regulatory costs and burdens on


the financial system, small lenders, and Americanconsumers, particularly the poor and vulnerable.Further, the CFPB’s authority is unconstitutional, withlittle to no oversight from the president or Congress.The White House should work with Congress to makethe Bureau’s head directly accountable to the president,remove its supervisory role over banks and creditunions, and return authority over policing deceptivebusiness practices to the Federal Trade Commission.

Securities and Exchange Commission. The Securitiesand Exchange Commission (SEC) imposes needlessrestrictions on investors and entrepreneurs that hinderssmall businesses’ efforts to raise the capital they need.This results in fewer opportunities for businesses togrow and create jobs and fewer opportunities forAmerican households to invest and build financialsecurity. Congress and the administration should worktogether to roll back powers granted by the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts, eliminate barriers toinvestment-based crowdfunding, and transferanti-fraud authority to the Federal Trade Commission.

National Labor Relations Board. The National LaborRelations Board (NLRB) is supposed to represent the

public interest in resolving labor disputes, but it hasstrayed from its mission, becoming highly politicized.Board policy now changes at the whim of the politicalparty that holds the presidency, causing uncertaintyover important rules for businesses and workers.Congress and the administration should work togetherto eliminate the NLRB, transfer its rulemaking authorityto the Department of Labor, and move itsadjudicatory authority to federal district courts.

Federal Communications Commission. The FederalCommunications Commission’s (FCC) regulatorycontrol over media ownership, broadcast rules, theInternet, and the airwaves is stuck in the past. Congressand the administration should work together toliberalize America’s media and communicationsmarkets to encourage the development of bettertechnology at lower prices. Priorities should includelimiting the FCC’s authority over broadband networkmanagement, moving to property rights-based spectrumallocation, and folding a smaller FCC into theDepartment of Commerce. Imposing clear limits onthe FCC’s role—or even abolishing large chunks ofthe agency’s authority—is necessary if the Internet isto remain open and free.


If there were ever a book federal agencymanagers should read, it is Peter Drucker’sManaging in Turbulent Times.1 With hissignature clarity, Drucker tackles how toadapt to widespread social changes andmake sound management decisions.It was published in 1980, when newcurrencies, new institutions, and majordemographic changes were driving arevolution in our political culture.

One could be forgiven for hearing anecho today. Consider the collision ofemergent cryptocurrencies with persistentsociety-wide cybersecurity vulnerabilities.Think of the revolutionary changes in thepast two decades in communications,transportation, electronic payments, andmedicine. We are witnessing a socialredefinition of the meaning of work.

All of this dramatic change is takingplace in spite of the largest, most sclerotic,regulatory burden ever created in thehistory of governments. Today, the federalgovernment regulates and manages its waytoward more than a $1.9 trillion economicburden on theAmerican economy.2

Drucker demands that the responsive,adaptive manager ask the following:

“If we weren’t in this already, wouldwe go into it knowing what we nowknow?” And if the answer is “No,”one does not say: “Let’s makeanother study.” One says: “How can

we get out; or at least, how can westop putting additional resourcesin?”

That is good advice for policy makers.So it is a welcome development that theOffice of Management and Budget, pur-suant to an early 2017 executive order,3

has asked for public comment on how torestructure the executive branch andvarious regulatory agencies.4

The federal government’s multitudesof offices, boards, commissions, andagencies are not at all organized andsurely not suited to the task of responsiblegovernment. A description of executivebranch growth from a similar governmentexercise in 1937 remains relevant:

The Executive Branch of theGovernment of the United Stateshas thus grown up without a plan ordesign like barns, shacks, silos, toolsheds, and garages of an old farm.To look at it now, no one wouldever recognize the structure whichthe founding fathers erected acentury and a half ago to be theGovernment of the United States.5

Neither clarity nor efficiency ingovernment has improved in the pasteight decades. In fact, one could saytoday’s executive branch looks less like

The federalgovernment’smultitudes ofoffices, boards,commissions,and agenciesare not at allorganized andsurely not suitedto the task ofresponsiblegovernment.

IntroductionBy Kent Lassman, President and CEO


We need toponder what theexecutive branchwe deserve lookslike and how italigns with ourConstitutionand statutorylimitations.

a barn and more like the metaphorical manure piled inside. It is long past time for us to claim a shovel and start digging.

To aid that effort, CEI scholars are contributing to the discussion in our areas of expertise. In this series of brief policy proposals, we put forth reform ideas for specific regulatory agencies.

In the following policy proposals, CEI experts argue for significant changes to the Depression-era Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and to drastically shrink the remit of the 21st century Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. From recommendations on how to properly scope the Environmental Protection Agency and Federal Communications Commission to bringing a sense of order to the sprawling Department of Commerce, to rethinking the functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission and National Labor Relations Board, we propose concrete and readily implementable ideas. There will be much more work left to do, but it is a good start.

Organizational change is hard. It requires adjusting the expectations and behaviors of an entire ecosystem of people—from employees to customers to vendors.

Perhaps the hardest change of all is ingovernment organizations. But it is notimpossible.

The political scientist Charles Lindblomdeveloped an analytical framework for“muddling through,” in which practitionersmake successive, limited comparisonsamong alternatives and then move forwardwith a “good enough” alternative.6

With respect to regulatory agencies, wehave reached the point at which nearlyany effort to streamline is an improvement.All that is required, as Drucker wouldput it, is to stop putting additionalresources into agencies we would notchoose to create if they were not therealready. Given the scope of economicregulation in American life, evenincremental improvements to thestructure of government offer outsizedbenefits for liberty and growth.

Often, the essential question is not howwe would run the government better.Rather, we need to ponder what theexecutive branch we deserve looks likeand how it aligns with our Constitutionand statutory limitations. These concretesuggestions provide a good start towardanswering that question.


The U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency’s (EPA) budget is the mostimpenetrable of all federal departmentand agency budgets. It is long past timeto make the EPA budget at least astransparent and comprehensible as thebudgets of other federal domestic agencies.The Office of Management and Budget’s(OMB) FY 2018 budget request for theagency7 is a significant improvement interms of transparency over previousbudget requests, but there is still along way to go.8

The OMB should work with the EPA toproduce an intelligible budget. For years,the EPA has warded off congressionaloversight of agency policy making bysubmitting a budget that fails to identify:

1) Who at the EPA is spending theappropriation;

2) How they are spending it; and3) Pursuant to what statutoryauthority they are spending it.

The result is that Congress has no ideahow the EPA spends taxpayer money.In particular, lawmakers cannot discernhow much the agency spends onnondiscretionary duties, which are

assigned by Congress, versus how muchit spends on discretionary activities of itsown choosing. In submitting its annualbudget justification, the EPA should usethe same rational format employed byother agencies, which clearly identifiesthe spender, how much they spend, andthe legal basis for the spending. Onlywhen Congress can follow the moneycan it exercise its power of the purse toeffectively oversee agency policy making.

In addition, many of the EPA’s functionscould be abolished, pared back, ortransferred to other agencies withoutany negative effects on the nation’senvironmental quality.

Abolish the Office of Enforcement andCompliance Assurance and return itsfunctions to the program offices. TheEPA’s enforcement and complianceassurance functions can be better handledby officials with the relevant expertisewithin each program. Returningenforcement and compliance assuranceto the program offices will avoid inter-departmental communications problemsand delays. For example, complianceand enforcement of the Clean Air Actwould be returned to the Office of Airand Radiation.

Only whenCongress canfollow themoney can itexercise itspower ofthe purse toeffectivelyoversee agencypolicy making.

Environmental Protection AgencyFree Market Reforms to Increase Transparency and

Efficiency and Better Protect our Environment

By Myron Ebell


Abolish the EPA’s 10 regional officesand transfer their emergency responsecapabilities into the Federal EmergencyManagementAgency. The EPA’s 10regional offices duplicate much of thework of the agency’s headquarters and ofstate environmental protection agencies.The core essential function of emergencyresponse to environmental threats anddisasters can be consolidated with similarcapabilities at the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency.

Eliminate the Integrated RiskInformation System program and foldits functions into the Toxic SubstancesControl Act program. The IntegratedRisk Information System (IRIS) programhas long proven controversial because ofits failure to follow sound scientificprinciples, garnering wide criticism,including from the National Academyof Sciences. In 2016, Congress passed areform to the Toxic Substances ControlAct that includes widely acceptedscientific standards for chemicalevaluations that would improve EPA riskassessments.9 Moving IRIS functions tothe Toxic Substances Control Act programwould apply those standards and improvethe chemical risk assessments nowperformed under IRIS.

Eliminate all Healthy Communitiesand Smart Growth Programs andrelated grant programs. Deciding whatis smart growth or what is a healthycommunity and how to pursue them area state and local matter. The federal

government should not be involved inthese decisions.

Eliminate the Environmental Justiceprograms and related grant programs.It is unclear how “environmental justice”fits into the EPA’s mission to implementpublic health and safety laws. In addition,funding should not be used to fundactivist movements of any kind. Grantsfunding local activist groups and localprograms should remain local andprivately funded.

Eliminate the Environmental Educationprograms and related grant programs.The EPA should stick to its role inimplementing regulatory statutesdesigned to manage pollution, rather thanspending taxpayer dollars on such thingsas a coloring book that teaches second-graders that there are “transportationalternatives to using a car” or that urgekids to go home and “talk to their parentsabout purchasing products for the homethat are both effective and safe for theenvironment.”10 These programs are moreakin to indoctrination than promotingcritical thinking and education; thereshould be no place for them in thefederal government.

Reform EPA science programs.When the EPAwas first formed in1970, scientific knowledge about theenvironment and the environmentalimpacts of human activities was in itsinfancy. Though much has been learnedover the past 47 years, EPA science


research and regulations have notprofited from it. In fact, EPA science hasbeen transformed over the decades intoan exercise of adjusting the science tofit predetermined policy decisions. Thefollowing reforms will improve the useof science in the regulatory process:

• Apply Information Quality Actguidelines to all information usedor disseminated by the EPA, asrequired by law.

• Bar the EPA from relying onscientific studies for which theunderlying raw data are notpublic and available forindependent scrutiny.

• Review and reissue all riskassessment guidance documentswith an eye toward updatingthem with current scientificunderstanding. Compel EPA staffto operate under them, and makethem enforceable.

• Identify and review all majorscience policy (default assumption)decisions in risk assessment andupdate or eliminate them basedon current knowledge.

• Review and update the applicationof uncertainty factors in non-cancer risk assessment.

• Develop and implement conflictof interest standards forparticipation on science advisoryboards. People whose programshave received grants or haveapplied for grants from the EPAshould be barred from servingon advisory boards.

• Eliminate the consensus processfrom science advisory boards toallow for minority opinions.

• Bar the EPA from hiring theNational Academy of Sciences/National Research Council forscientific reviews unless directedby Congress.


The Departmentof Commerce’smissionstatement isa charter forgovernmentinterferencein markets.

The Department of Commerce’s missionstatement is a charter for governmentinterference in markets. It employs47,000 people directly11 and spends about$8 billion annually12 on its mission topromote “job creation and economicgrowth by ensuring fair and secure trade,providing the data necessary to supportcommerce, and fostering innovation bysetting standards and conductingfoundational research and development.”13

In practice, this means the Departmentexists to reward businesses for followingits favored policies. It provides bailouts,handouts, and the spoils of redistribution.In effect, the Department of Commerceis a boon to rent-seeking businesses.That alone should be reason for itselimination. Even taking the Departmentat its word, all of its tasks, as laid out inits mission statement, are things thathappen on their own in the generalfunctioning of markets. In addition, theDepartment’s activities that may yieldsome public benefit can be parceled outto other agencies as per the followingrecommendations.

Break up the National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration. Thesingle biggest Department of Commerceagency outside of census years is the

National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration (NOAA), which houses theNational Weather Service (NWS). NOAAsoaks up $5 billion of the Department’s$8 billion annual budget.14

NOAA is actually a strange hybrid ofNational Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration (NASA) and theEnvironmental ProtectionAgency (EPA).Like the EPA, NOAAwas created aspart of President Nixon’s departmentreorganization in 1970. Nixon said itwas needed “for better protection of lifeand property from natural hazards …for a better understanding of the totalenvironment … [and] for exploration anddevelopment leading to the intelligent useof our marine resources.”15

NOAA today boasts that it is a providerof environmental information services, aprovider of environmental stewardshipservices, and a leader in applied scientificresearch. Each of these functions couldbe provided privately, likely at lowercost and higher quality.

NOAA today consists of six main offices:1. National Weather Service;2. National Ocean Service;3. Office of Oceanic AtmosphericResearch;

Department of CommerceFree Market Reforms to Reevaluate Commerce’s

Mission and Stop Government Favoritism

By Iain Murray


The NationalWeather Servicehas a valuableproduct forwhich itshould chargeto coverits costs.

4. National Environmental SatelliteService;

5. National Marine FisheriesService; and

6. Office of Marine and AviationOperations.

Together, these form a colossal operationthat has become one of the main driversof the climate change alarm industry andas such has become harmful to futureU.S. prosperity. Its mission’s emphasison prediction and management (“tounderstand and predict changes in climate,weather, oceans, and coasts, to share thatknowledge and information with others,and to conserve and manage coastal andmarine ecosystems and resources”)seems designed around the fatal conceitof trying to plan the unpredictable.16 Thatis not to say NOAA is useless, but itscurrent organization corrupts the usefulfunctions. It needs to be broken up.

Make the National Weather Service(NWS) an independent agency with aview to privatization. The NationalWeather Service should be spun off fromthe Department of Commerce with a viewto eventual privatization. Every day, werely on weather forecasts and warningsprovided by local radio stations andcolleges that are sourced not from theNWS, but from private companies suchas AccuWeather. Repeated studies havefound that the forecasts and warningsprovided by the private companies aremore reliable than those provided bythe NWS.

In fact, those private weather services arethe result of gradual privatization of thegovernment’s weather functions. In thepast, the NWS provided radio bulletinsand even wrote weather forecasts forlocal newspapers.17 It is not necessaryfor the NWS to do that today, especiallyas privatization has improved the qualityof weather forecasts.

The most frequent argument we hearagainst privatization is that the NWSprovides the data the private companiesuse, as if privatization would entaildismantling data-gathering services.Privatizing the NWS would not meanthe end of data gathering. The goal ofprivatization is to improve services, notabolish them, by making them moreresponsive to change and innovation,while removing the burden for theirupkeep from taxpayers and placing iton customers. In a sense, the NWS iscurrently a taxpayer subsidy toAccuWeather, The Weather Channel,and others.

The NWS should be moved to a “tradingfund” status, in the model of the UnitedKingdom’s privatization. The NWS hasa valuable product for which it shouldcharge to cover its costs. With a budgetof $1 billion and an output of 1,500,000forecasts and warnings annually, theservice would only have to raise about$600 per forecast to cover its costs.18

With multiple competing radio, TV andprint outlets demanding its products, aswell as companies like Amazon that relyon just-in-time delivery, the charge for a


The variousdata centersprovide anacademicfunctionand thereforeshould betransferred touniversities.

forecast would probably be small changefor these operations, and no cost to thecasual consumer. Taxpayers would save$1 billion a year.

Once the NWS achieves trading fundstatus, it should move toward fullprivatization. The service could beprivatized as a single enterprise or brokenup and sold to existing companies,startups, or shareholders through an IPO.All these arrangements have provedsuccessful in multiple privatizationsaround the world. The exact form ofprivatization would be decided as aresult of the move to trading fund status,which would help identify the operation’sprofit and cost centers.

Privatizations generally lead to significantincreases in investment and infrastructurespending, so the product we all rely onwould be improved.

There will be few, if any national securityimplications. The armed services all havetheir own weather functions. Any securityissues that arise can be addressed duringthe move to trading fund status. Forexample, there are some antiquated rulesthat prevent private operation of weatherradar that can be revised with appropriateconsideration for defense and air trafficcontrol concerns.

Turn specialized centers like theNational Hurricane Center and theNational Environmental SatelliteService into charitable trusts. Fororganizations like the National Hurricane

Center that perform highly specializedand valuable research, we suggest analternative form of privatization that wasuse in the privatization of scientificorganizations in the UK. One such agency,the Building Research Establishment(BRE), was privatized as a charitabletrust, rather than as a for-profit body, andhas become one of the world’s leadingresearch led consultancies providingexpert advice on better buildings andrelated products and services.19 Certainindustries, such as insurers, would havean interest in the success of such a bodyand would likely become major funders.

NOAA’s other main weather-relatedfunction is the National EnvironmentalSatellite Service, which operates severalsatellites and collects data from militaryand civilian services, both domestic andinternational. These civilian-operatedsatellites could easily be managed byprivate entities (many TV servicesaround the world operate from satellitesmanaged by private entities) and couldbe privatized as a company either ownedby all the new weather companiescombined or as a charitable trust.

The various data centers provide anacademic function and are used byacademics internationally. They wouldbe more appropriately funded and runby academic bodies, and thereforeshould be transferred to universities. Theprestige of housing such bodies shouldbe attractive enough to universities to beable to secure funding to run them.


Transfer the National Ocean Service tothe United States Coast Guard and theU.S. Geological Survey. The NationalOcean Service is largely a surveyorganization. Its various survey functionscould be transferred to the U.S. CoastGuard and U.S. Geological Survey.

Privatize National Marine Sanctuariesor transfer them to their respectivestates. The National Marine Sanctuariesand other oceanic resources should betransferred to the states or privatizedby sale, as they could earn significantincome through recreation activities.

The National Marine Fisheries Serviceshould organize the privatization of thenation’s fisheries and bow out gracefully.As experience around the world shows,fisheries are managed best not bybureaucrats but by the fishermen whohave a direct ownership stake in theirlong-term health. Where fisheries havebeen genuinely privatized, such as inNew Zealand, with the fishermen’sproperty rights guaranteed, fish stockshave rebounded along with fishermen’sprofits.20

Privatize the Office of Oceanic andAtmospheric Research. The Office ofOceanic and Atmospheric Researchprovides the theoretical science, asopposed to the applied science of theNational Hurricane Center. It consistsmainly of seven research laboratories, sixundersea research centers, and severaljoint research institutes within universities.Where appropriate, these should be

merged with their applied sciencecounterparts and privatized as charitabletrusts.

An example of a successful laboratoryprivatization is the Laboratory of theGovernment Chemist (LGC) in the UK.Before privatization, LGC had a toplinerevenue of £15 million ($19.4 million)and a staff of 270.21 Today, it has revenueof £222 million ($287 million) and a staffof 2,000.22 It has successfully acquiredseveral European laboratories and is aworld leader in analytical chemistry. Theenvironmental business is here to stay,thanks to consumer demand. There is noreason why environmental laboratoriescannot be privatized.

Break up the Office of Marine andAviation Operations and reassign itsassets to other NOAA agencies duringthis process. The Office of Marine andAviation Operations, which provides theships and planes used by NOAAagencies,should be broken up and its assetsreassigned to the various agencies.

Residual NOAA functions left over afterthis process can be transferred to the EPAor NASA if they are still felt appropriateand Congress is unwilling to terminatethem.

Merge the Census Bureau with otherstatistics agencies such as the Bureauof Justice Statistics and the Bureau ofLabor Statistics to create a NationalStatistical Agency and privatize as manyof these agencies’ functions as possible.The Census Bureau has a genuine

As experiencearound theworld shows,fisheries aremanagedbest not bybureaucratsbut by thefishermenwho havea directownershipstake in theirlong-termhealth.


The CensusBureau shouldconcentrateon its missionof keepingtrack of theheadcount forcongressionalapportionmentand abandonasking moreand moreintrusivequestions.

constitutional role, but its current functionsfar exceed its constitutional requirements.The Bureau should concentrate on itsmission of keeping track of the headcountfor congressional apportionment andabandon asking more and more intrusivequestions, which are normally used toredistribute wealth along demographiclines or provide market research tobusinesses free of charge.

The Census Bureau should be merged withthe various federal statistical agencies,such as the Bureau of EconomicAnalysis,the Bureau of Justice Statistics, and theBureau of Labor Statistics. Many ofthese provide important indicators suchas the murder rate, unemployment levels,or inflation indices. Given that much ofthis data could be compiled and providedprivately, privatization of these functionsshould be seriously considered.

Make the Patent and Trademark Officea performance-based organizationunder the Office of Management andBudget. The Patent and Trademark Officealso has a valid constitutional function.In 2000, it became a performance-basedorganization. This categorization wasintroduced to improve the delivery ofgovernment services while providinggood value to the taxpayer. The Officeof Personnel Management recommendsseparating service operations from theirpolicy components by placing them inseparate performance-based organizations.These report to the agency or departmenthead with whom they negotiate to setout the “goals, measures, relationships,

flexibilities, and limitations for theorganization.” In the absence of aDepartment of Commerce, it would needto be housed somewhere. All PBOs mightbe transferred to the Executive Office ofthe President, preferably as part of theOffice of Management and Budget,which would negotiate and monitor theperformance of these organizations.

Privatize the laboratories of theNational Institute of Standards andTechnology. The National Institute ofStandards and Technology (NIST), whichhas a $1 billion budget, consists mostlyof research laboratories, which can beprivatized along the lines describedabove.23 Where necessary, the privatizedlaboratories can retain statutory roles,which is common in privatizedlaboratories around the world. Notably,most countries’ representatives to theInternational System of Units, the metricsystem’s global governing body, areacademics or even private individuals.These days, the American delegates areamong the few bureaucrats.24

Abolish the International TradeAdministration and transfer itsremaining duties to the U.S. TradeRepresentative. Abolishing theInternational Trade Administration (ITA)would save taxpayers $483 million ayear. For the most part, the ITA organizestrade mission junkets, which benefitspecific businesses and industries, andenforces antidumping regulations, whichare a form of protectionism. Congressshould abolish both of these functions.


The ITA’s remaining functions, such asthose related to enforcing internationaltrade treaties, should be transferred to theoffice of the U.S. Trade Representative.

Abolish the Economic DevelopmentAdministration and Minority BusinessDevelopment Administration.Abolishing the Economic DevelopmentAdministration (EDA) and the MinorityBusiness Development Administration(MBDA) would save $300 million. TheEDA regularly wastes taxpayer moneyon hopeless projects. For example, theCedar Rapids, Iowa, convention center,which the EDA is backing to the tune of$35 million, is projected to lose $1.3million annually, according to the city’sown estimate. In another case, the EDAgave a $2 million grant to a companythat opened a new warehouse in Visalia,California, with the goal of creating 250jobs. The firm took the grant and closedits existing warehouse in Brisbane,California, shedding 313 jobs in theprocess.25 The MBDA pursues similarprojects.

Transfer the Bureau of Industryand Security to the U.S. TradeRepresentative’s office. The Bureau ofIndustry and Security is charged withseveral national security functions, suchas enforcing export controls to prevent thespread of weapons of mass destruction.Such functions would be better off housedat the office of the U.S. Trade Represen-tative, the Department of HomelandSecurity, or the Department of Defense.

Break up the National Telecommunica-tions and InformationAdministrationand transfer its management of assetsto the General Services Administrationand its auctioning of spectrum to theFederal Communications Commission.The National Telecommunications andInformation Administration manages thefederal use of the electromagneticspectrum. Those functions should betransferred to the General ServicesAdministration, while the auctioning ofspectrum should go to the FederalCommunications Commission. Others,like the grants for promoting children’seducational television, should beabolished.


Federal depositinsuranceintroduceda systemicproblem ofmoral hazard—the incentive toengage in morerisky behaviorthat resultswhen adverseconsequencesare lessened bya third-partyguarantee.

The Franklin D. Roosevelt administrationand Congress created the Federal DepositInsurance Corporation (FDIC) duringthe Great Depression as a response toruns on banks that left many depositorswithout access to their money (as partof the 1933 Banking Act, better knownas the Glass-Steagall Act). However, inreturn for confidence in the bankingsystem, federal deposit insuranceintroduced a systemic problem of moralhazard—the incentive to engage in morerisky behavior that results when adverseconsequences are lessened by a third-party guarantee.

Banks are more likely to make riskyinvestments knowing their customers’deposits are guaranteed. Customers,meanwhile, are less likely to pay attentionto banks’ business practices. If all banksare perceived as being equally safe,customers will choose based on otherconsiderations beside sound investmentpractice, resulting in a loss of competitivemarket discipline in the banking system.

Ideally, the moral hazard of depositinsurance should be eliminated from thebanking system by abolishing the FDIC,which would require legislation byCongress. If that were to prove not

politically possible, the impact of moralhazard could be significantly lessenedby reducing the FDIC’s coverage limit.The coverage limit was raised to itscurrent level of $250,000 from thepre-financial crisis level of $100,000,first as an emergency measure during thecrisis,26 then made permanent in theDodd-Frank Act.27 Congress shouldreduce the level back to $100,000 andenable the administration to then reduceit gradually to $50,000.

The median savings balance for anAmerican household is $5,200, and theaverage is $33,766 (a number skewedupwards by a small number of very highaccount balances).28 Therefore, reducingthe coverage level to $100,000 and then$50,000 would still guarantee savingsfor most Americans, and would end animplicit subsidy or bailout for richerAmericans, who have other options forstoring their wealth.

Lowering coverage levels would alsoreduce the FDIC’s incentive to over-supervise banks. With fewer public fundsat risk, the FDIC’s need for prudentialsupervision would be lessened. It alsowould lessen the incentive to engage inabusive practices like Operation Choke

Federal Deposit Insurance CorporationFree Market Reforms to Improve Financial Safeguards

and Reduce Taxpayer Risk

By Iain Murray


Point, an FDIC-led campaign to denyaccess to the financial system to legalbut controversial businesses, likefirearms dealers.29

The FDIC’s role in bank resolutionshould also be reduced, at least to the

levels present before the financial crisis.

Finally, the Consumer FinancialProtection Bureau (CFPB) should nolonger have a seat on the FDIC’s boardor any role in bank supervision.


The currentCFPB imposessignificant costson the financialsystem andon Americanconsumersthroughoverregulation.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau(CFPB) should be abolished. In its currentform, it undermines the constitutionalprinciple of checks and balances. IfCongress wishes to establish an agency tooversee consumer financial issues, it shouldstart again from scratch, acting in amanner that respects fundamentalconstitutional principles.

In addition, the current CFPB imposessignificant costs on the financial systemand onAmerican consumers throughoverregulation. This leads to higher costsfor financial services, loss of access to thoseservices for lower income consumers, and alack of innovation.

As the District of Columbia Circuit CourtofAppeals found in PHH Corp. v CFPB,Congress gave the agency’s director toomuch power when it created the CFPB aspart of the 2010 Dodd-FrankAct, withlittle attendant accountability (the case iscurrently being reheard).30 The CFPBdirector is not answerable to the president,and Congress holds no power over theBureau, which is isolated from theappropriations process and instead getsits funding from the Federal Reserve.

If abolishing the CFPB were not to provepolitically possible, at the very least the

agency should undergo significantstructural reform. Its director should bemade accountable to the president, as theD.C. Circuit Court urged in its originaljudgment.

Just as importantly, in order to make theCFPB director accountable to Congressfor the agency’s use of taxpayer money,the Bureau should be subject to Congress’power of the purse by having its fundingcome through the normal appropriationsprocess.

To counter the problem of overregulation,Congress should pursue the followingreforms:

• Force the CFPB to appreciatethe effects of its regulations onfinancial institutions, by placing itunder the supervision of a boardconsisting of officials from otherfederal financial regulatoryagencies, including the Office ofthe Comptroller of the Currency,the Federal Deposit InsuranceCorporation, and the FederalReserve.

• Abolish the Bureau’s supervisoryrole and make it purely a regulatoryagency. The CFPB currently hassupervisory authority over banks,

Consumer Financial Protection BureauFree Market Reforms to Improve Financial Choices

and Opportunities for all Americans

By Iain Murray


thrifts, and credit unions withassets over $10 billion, as well asover non-bank financial institutionssuch as mortgage lenders andservicers, payday lenders, andprivate student lenders. Supervisoryauthority should be returned to theprudential regulators.

• Revise the Bureau’s overly broadpower over “unfair, deceptive orabusive acts or practices,” whichto date has only been definedthrough enforcement. This has ledto a significant chilling of financialinnovation.31 Ideally, that powershould be returned to the FederalTrade Commission (FTC) andplaced under the FTC’s Unfairand Deceptive Acts and Practicesresponsibility. At the very least,the Bureau should be requiredto define its power through arulemaking.

Congress or a new, accountable CFPBdirector should drastically reform theBureau’s handling of data. The CFPB’spublic consumer complaints databasecollates thousands of complaints leveledagainst financial institutions but isriddled with errors. According to a

former CFPB official, more than a quarterof the complaints registered “didn’t panout” or were simply incorrect. Forinstance, a single complaint was countedas 35 different ones and anothercomplaint was registered against a bankwhen it was actually against a paydaylender.32 The CFPB should make itscomplaints database more reflective ofreality or shut it down.

In addition, the Bureau has undertakenan intrusive data collection exerciseinvolving over 500 million credit cardaccounts, from which account holderscannot opt out. The Bureau should endor reform this program and be moretransparent about how it collects andhandles Americans’ sensitive financialdata. If it is unwilling to do this,Congress should shut down the program.

Finally, the CFPB should shut down itsindependent research program andrestrain its research to analysis ofindependent academic examination ofthe issues it addresses. The Bureau’sresearch—such as, for example onpayday loans—is often out of step withacademic research on the same topicsbut is nevertheless used as justificationfor rulemakings.33


The nation’ssecurities lawsand the veryexistence of theSecurities andExchangeCommissionare premisedon the situationAmericaninvestorsfaced in the1930s. Thoseconditions donot hold today.

The nation’s securities laws and the veryexistence of the Securities and ExchangeCommission (SEC) are premised on thesituationAmerican investors faced in the1930s. Those conditions do not hold today.

When President Franklin D. Rooseveltsigned the Securities Act of 1933 andthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934,many Americans did not have electricityor a telephone.34 Investors were limitedto mail or physical travel to study theparticulars of a given firm. Now, manyAmericans pay their electricity bills ontheir phones—from which they also canaccess information from all over theworld on industries and firms.

Originally, under the 1933 Securities Act,securities transactions were regulated bythe Federal Trade Commission (FTC)and applicable state agencies, the sameas other business transactions. However,the 1934 Securities and Exchange Actcreated the SEC, which meant investorsand entrepreneurs had to comply with ahost of prescriptive mandates beforeoffering shares of their businesses—which federal regulators considers“securities”—to investors.35 Over thedecades, laws such as Sarbanes-Oxleyand Dodd-Frank have further piled on to

these mandates. It is long past time topeel away the regulatory onion.

Therefore, Congress and the Trumpadministration should abolish theSecurities and Exchange Commission.In the process, they should transfer itsduties to police and punish fraud to theFederal Trade Commission. At the sametime, they should make participation inthe stock exchanges and their rulemakingbody, the Financial Industry RegulatoryAuthority, voluntary for entrepreneursand investors.

Abolishing the SEC and transferringfederal jurisdiction over securities to theFTC would mean that stock exchanges—including the New York Stock Exchange(NYSE) and NASDAQ—would nolonger have quasi-governmental powersas “self-regulatory organizations”through their jointly controlled FinancialIndustry Regulatory Authority, whichanswers to the SEC.

Instead, they would go back to beingpurely optional for listing securities, asthey were for nearly 150 years beforethe creation of the SEC. Entrepreneursselling parts of their businesses couldchoose any venue they considered bestto do this—whether NYSE or eBay. In

Securities and Exchange CommissionFree Market Reforms to Increase Financial Opportunities

for Investors and Entrepreneurs

By John Berlau


this free securities market, entrepreneursand investors would gravitate to venueswith rules that best suited them for theexecution of securities transactions, justas they do today for every other kind oftransaction.

Since the advent of Sarbanes-Oxley andDodd-Frank, policy makers of both partieshave come to recognize the burden thesehastily passed laws have imposed oninvestment and capital formation andlooked for ways to reduce it.

When President Obama signed theJumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS)Act in 2012, which offered modestderegulation of investment-basedcrowdfunding, he remarked that “lawsthat are nearly eight decades old make itimpossible for [ordinary Americans] toinvest” in small startups, and “a lot haschanged in 80 years.”36 He was right. Alot has changed since the first federal lawswere enacted to regulate the securitiesmarkets, and the government needs tofollow suit.

Every day on the Internet, not justproducts, but businesses, are bought andsold. Yet, amazingly, investors andentrepreneurs can face volumes morepaperwork for a $500 transaction thatfalls within the SEC’s jurisdiction thanfor a $500,000 transaction that falls onother agencies’ turf.

For example, in 2012, a gas station andconvenience store in North Carolinaexchanged hands on eBay for about$1.2 million.37 Yet as large as it was, thistransaction was governed by a fractionof the rules for a $120 investment in apublicly traded company regulated bythe SEC.

This illustrates how our securities lawsare impeding capital formation. Buyingan entire business requires much moredue diligence than investing in a portionof a business, yet investors in the latterface far more paperwork and regulations.

Had the gas station owner soughtinvestors and offered to sell 50 percentof the business for half a million dollarsin shares, she would not have been ableto make the transaction on eBay. Instead,she would be required to go through alicensed broker-dealer, because selling apiece of a business is considered a“securities transaction” and is thereforesubject to the plethora of securities lawsenforced by the SEC.

In the 21st century, offering a part of abusiness should face no more or no lessrules than selling an entire business. Ifthe gas station owner who lists on eBayengaged in deceptive or fraudulentbehavior, the FTC and state agenciescould address the situation as needed.

Buying anentire businessrequires muchmore duediligence thaninvesting in aportion of abusiness, yetinvestors inthe latter facefar morepaperworkand regulations.


The NLRBno longeroperates as itwas intendedby Congress—as a neutralarbiter inlabor disputes.

The National Labor Relations Board(NLRB), the federal agency that overseesprivate sector labor relations in the UnitedStates, has long outlived its usefulness.Created under the 1935 National LaborRelations Act, it was intended toimplement workplace regulations andresolve labor disputes. It has both arulemaking and an adjudicatory role.

However, the NLRB no longer operatesas it was intended by Congress—as aneutral arbiter in labor disputes. Duringthe past eight years, the NLRB overturneda cumulative 4,559 years of its ownprecedent.38 This radical reversal ofBoard policy stems from politicizationof the agency.

Throughout the NLRB’s history, itspartisan composition has depended oncontrol of the presidency. The Board iscomposed of two Republican and twoDemocratic members, with a chairmanfrom the president’s party. This hascaused case precedent to flip-flopdepending on which party holds theWhite House. This politicization of theNLRB and oscillation of Board policy haseroded union and employer confidence inthe institution, as uncertainty reignsamong those regulated by the NLRBdue to ever-changing precedent.

In addition, the NLRB has provenineffective in its labor dispute resolutionrole, doing less work at greater cost tothe taxpayer. From 1980 to 2016, theBoard’s annual caseload fell by 58 percent,from more than 57,000 cases to 24,200,and its output of published decisions fellby 78 percent from 1,343 to 298. Yetduring that same period, the NLRB’sannual budget appropriation increasedfrom $112 million to $274 million.39

Eliminating the National Labor RelationsBoard would improve the resolution ofprivate sector labor disputes. Currently,unions and employers have incentive tofile cases in hopes of reversing NLRBpolicy. Increased consistency in decisionmaking by federal courts would likelyundermine the incentive to attempt toreverse policy.

Abolishing the NLRB also would lessenuncertainty regarding labor policy andmake it easier for businesses to plan forthe future.

The agency’s rulemaking authority andelection duties should be transferred tothe Department of Labor, which alreadyhas expertise in these areas.

The Board’s adjudicatory authorityshould be transferred to federal district

National Labor Relations BoardFree Market Reforms to Better Serve the Needs

of American Workers

By Trey Kovacs


courts. This involves reforming Section10 of the National Labor Relations Act torevise the NLRB’s adjudicatory authority.

Under this proposal, NLRB regionaldirectors would continue to investigateunfair labor practice claims and determinewhether they are meritorious. For casesthat are found to have merit, thecomplainant could then file a charge inthe appropriate federal district court.This would bring about more consistentand fair decisions and less flip-flopping

of precedent. Federal judges servelifetime appointments and are less likelyto come from the ranks of a union ormanagement, with the bias that comesfrom that experience.

In addition, sending labor disputesdirectly to federal court would expeditevindication of unfair labor practiceclaims. Currently, a case must weave itsway through several levels at the NLRBbefore it can be appealed to a federalcourt. It is time to cut out the middleman.

With a handfulof exceptions,the FCCcontinues toregulate as ifit were 1996—or, in somecases, 1934.


Created by the Communications Act of1934, the Federal CommunicationsCommission (FCC) wields broadauthority to regulate broadcasters,telecommunications services, andwireless providers. Recently, the FCC evenclaimed to have the power to regulateInternet access.40 Yet the economic andtechnological realities that purportedlyjustified the creation of this agency83 years ago no longer hold true.Information scarcity has given way toinformation abundance. Americanstoday do not depend on a tiny handfulof companies to communicate with oneanother and learn about the worldaround them.

Therefore, the FCC should undertake acomprehensive review of its manyregulations and eliminate those that nolonger serve consumers to the extent theagency has the discretion to do so. Congressshould amend the FCC’s enabling statuteto curtail the agency’s authority to regulatethe Internet and the media. Lawmakersshould also consider abolishing the agencyas it currently exists and moving someof its functions elsewhere in the federalgovernment.

With a handful of exceptions, the FCCcontinues to regulate as if it were 1996—

or, in some cases, 1934. For example,even as the once-profitable newspaperindustry has declined in recent years,FCC rules continue to restrict the abilityof local broadcasters and newspapers tooperate under a single owner. This is justone of many media ownership rules thatartificially inflate the cost of producinglocal news in the name of promoting adiversity of voices. In fact, these rules arefar more likely to reduce the number ofviable media outlets in communitiesacross the nation.

Similarly, the FCC’s current regulatoryregime for television can be traced in largepart to the Cable Television ConsumerProtection and CompetitionAct of 1992.41

Remarkably, the FCC’s most recent TVbroadcasting rules address the emergenceof satellite carriers, which were alreadywell established by 2000.42 Yet instead ofseeking to relax legacy rules in light ofcord-cutting, as consumers drop cable TVsubscriptions in favor of Internet videoplatforms like Netflix and Hulu, the FCChas sought to expand its role as a televisionregulator, with proposals such as newset-top box rules and subjecting someInternet video services to rules designedfor cable companies.

Federal Communications CommissionFree Market Reforms to Protect Free and Open Internet

By Ryan Radia


The FCC has also attempted to positionitself as Internet regulator, issuing anumber of rules over the past decade.These rules were rebuffed by the courtson two occasions but eventually approvedin 2016 by the U.S. Court of Appeals forthe District of Columbia Circuit.43 Yetwhen Congress last overhauled theCommunications Act in 1996, it madebarely any mention of the Internet.44 Theone provision of law that addresses theInternet in particular (47 U.S.C. § 230)makes clear that the Internet shouldremain unfettered by federal or stateregulation.

Unfortunately, this has not stopped theFCC from placing Internet providersunder the same regime as the telephonecompanies descended from the old MaBell monopoly.

The FCC also possesses considerable

control over the airwaves, which are usedby every American who owns a cellphone, Wi-Fi hotspot, or a plain old radio.Because of FCC rules, many of the mostvaluable airwaves cannot be licensed bywireless providers. The resulting scarcityof spectrum means consumers pay higherprices for inferior mobile broadbandservice than they would in a morecompetitive market environment.

As an independent regulatory agency, theFCC can reform some of these outdatedand costly rules on its own. But totruly liberalize America’s media andcommunications markets, Congress muststep in and rewrite the CommunicationsAct to eliminate most of the FCC’scurrent duties. Congress should alsoexplore folding a much smaller FCC intoanother arm of the federal government,such as the Department of Commerce.

To trulyliberalizeAmerica’smedia andcommunicationsmarkets,Congress muststep in andrewrite theCommunicationsAct to eliminatemost ofthe FCC’scurrent duties.


NOTES1 Peter F. Drucker, Managing in Turbulent Times (New York: HarperBusiness, 1980).2 Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., Ten Thousand Commandments 2017: An Annual Snapshot of the Federal Regulatory State,

Competitive Enterprise Institute, May 2017, https://cei.org/10kc2017.3 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Presidential Executive Order on a Comprehensive Plan for Reorganizing

the Executive Branch,” March 13, 2017,https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/13/presidential-executive-order-comprehensive-plan-reorganizing-executive.

4 Robert Donachie, “Mulvaney Releases Plans For Government Reorganization,” Daily Caller, June 15, 2017,http://dailycaller.com/2017/06/15/mulvaney-too-often-we-split-the-baby/.

5 The President’s Committee on Administrative Management, Administrative Management in the Government of the United States(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1937), p. 29,https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015030482726;view=1up;seq=37.

6 Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through,’” Public Administration Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Spring, 1959),pp. 79-88, https://www.jstor.org/stable/973677?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

7 White House Budget FY 2018, Environmental Protection Agency,https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/epa.pdf.

8 White House Budget FY 2017, Environmental Protection Agency,https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2017/assets/epa.pdf.

9 For section on eliminate IRIs and folding it into TSCA, see page three, third paragraph, of TSCA as enacted,https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-06/documents/bills-114hr2576eah.pdf.

10 Environmental Protection Agency, “Conduct a Chemical Survey,” accessed July 13, 2017,https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/chemicalsafety.pdf. In the “Wrap Up” section: “Students can talk to theirparents about purchasing products for the home that are both effective and safe for the environment.”

11 Department of Commerce, “About Commerce,” accessed July 17 2017, https://www.commerce.gov/page/about-commerce.12 Department of Commerce, “Statement from Secretary Ross on the President’s Budget: ANew Foundation for

American Greatness,” May 23 2017,https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2017/05/statement-secretary-ross-presidents-budget-new-foundation-american.

13 Department of Commerce, “About Commerce.”14 Department of Commerce, “FY 2018 Budget in Brief,” p. 53, accessed July 17 2017,

http://www.osec.doc.gov/bmi/budget/FY18BIB/All508.pdf.15 Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. xx (1970), reprinted in 84 Stat. 2090-93 (1970), and in 35 Fed. Reg. 15627-30 (1970), and

reprinted with amendments in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1557-61 (1994).16 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “About Our Agency,” accessed July 17, 2017,

http://www.noaa.gov/about-our-agency.17 Don Hopey, “Panel says Weather Service still plays a key role,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, January 21, 2003,

http://old.post-gazette.com/nation/20030131forecastnat3p3.asp.18 Department of Commerce, “FY 2018 Budget in Brief.”19 BRE, “Our History,” accessed July 17 2017, https://www.bre.co.uk/history.20 Iain Murray and Roger Abbott, “Give a Man a Fish,” OnPoint No.178, Competitive Enterprise Institute, May 17 2012,

https://cei.org/onpoint/give-man-fish.21 Michael Walker, Department for Business Innovation and Skills, “Scientific Appeal to the Government Chemist,”

March 16 2016, http://www.cieh.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=58987.22 LGC Science Group Ltd., “Annual Report and Accounts,” March 31 2015,

http://www.lgcgroup.com/LGCGroup/media/PDFs/AboutUs/OurResults/15-LGC-LGC-Science-Group-signed-accounts-31-03-2015.pdf.

23 Department of Commerce, “FY 2018 Budget in Brief.”24 Members of the International Committee for Weights and Measures, accessed July 17 2017,

http://www.bipm.org/en/committees/cipm/members-cipm.html.25 David Bier, “The Case for Abolishing the Economic Development Administration,” Issue Analysis 2012 No. 6, Competitive

Enterprise Institute, September 18 2012,https://cei.org/issue-analysis/case-abolishing-economic-development-administration.

26 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 Temporarily Increases Basic FDICInsurance Coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 Per Depositor,” news release, October 7 2008,https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08093.html.

27 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Basic FDIC Insurance Coverage Permanently Increased to $250,000 Per Depositor,”news release, July 21 2010, https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/pr10161.html.


28 ValuePenguin, “Average Savings Account Balance in the U.S.: A Statistical Breakdown,” using data from the Federal Reserve’s2013 Survey of Consumer Finances, accessed July 17 2017,https://www.valuepenguin.com/banking/average-savings-account-balance.

29 Iain Murray, “Operation Choke Point: What It Is and Why It Matters,” Issue Analysis 2014 No. 1, Competitive EnterpriseInstitute, July 2014, https://cei.org/content/operation-choke-point.

30 PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rehearing en banc granted, order vacated,No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017.

31 “UDAAP,” Investopedia, accessed July 17, 2017, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/udaap.asp.32 Rachel Witkowski, “Errors Abound in CFPB's Complaint Portal,” American Banker, November 17 2015,

https://www.americanbanker.com/news/errors-abound-in-cfpbs-complaint-portal.33 Hilary B. Miller, “Ending Payday Lending Would Harm Consumers,” OnPoint No. 220, October 5 2016, Competitive Enterprise

Institute https://cei.org/content/ending-payday-lending-would-harm-consumers.34 Michael E. Parish, Anxious Decades: America in Prosperity and Depression, 1920-1941 (London: W.W. Norton, 1992).

Jodie T. Allen, “How a Different America Responded to the Great Depression,” Pew Research Center, December 14, 2010,http://www.pewresearch.org/2010/12/14/how-a-different-america-responded-to-the-great-depression/.

35 Deepa Sharkar, “Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Wex Legal Dictionary, accessed July 18, 2017,https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_exchange_act_of_1934.

36 Samuel C. Thompson, The Obama vs. Romney Debate on Economic Growth: A Citizen’s Guide to the Issues (Bloomington,Indiana: iUniverse, 2012), p. 33.

37 Timothy P. Carney, “Entrepreneurs win half a loaf with the JOBSAct,”Washington Examiner, April 1, 2012,http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/entrepreneurs-win-half-a-loaf-with-the-jobs-act/article/1208256.

38 Michael J. Lotito, Maurice Baskin, and Missy Parry, “Was the Obama NLRB the Most Partisan Board in History?” Coalition fora Democratic Workplace and Littler’s Workplace Policy Institute, December 6, 2016,http://myprivateballot.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/CDW-NLRB-Precedents-.pdf.

39 John Raudabaugh, “The Raudabaugh Report: NLRB Productivity Cost Analysis FY1980–FY2016,” National Right to WorkLegal Defense Foundation, Accessed July 10, 2017, http://www.nrtw.org/the-raudabaugh-report-nlrb-productivity-cost-analysis.

40 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at scattered sections 47 U.S.C.).41 Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460.42 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.120–.123.43 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010), Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014),

US Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016).44 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.


About the Authors

Kent Lassman is president and CEO of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, where he oversees strategy for thefree market organization, including management of a team of policy, communications, and fundraising staff.

Myron Ebell is director of CEI’s Center for Energy and Environment and chairs the Cooler Heads Coalition, acoalition of more than two dozen public policy organizations that challenge global warming alarmism andoppose energy rationing policies.

Iain Murray is CEI’s vice president of strategy. For the past decade, he has concentrated on financial regulation,employment and immigration regulation, and free market environmentalism.

John Berlau is a senior fellow at CEI. His work focuses on how public policy affects access to capital, entrepre-neurship, and investments made by the public and business community alike. In recent years, he has studied theconsequences of the government’s response to the 2008 financial crisis.

Trey Kovacs is a policy analyst at CEI, where he focuses on the economic impacts of labor policy. He has spentthe last five years researching the adverse effects of public-sector unions on workplace choice and the economy,worker freedom, private-sector labor relations, and other labor policy reforms.

Ryan Radia is a research fellow and regulatory counsel at CEI, where he focuses on adapting law and publicpolicy to the unique challenges of the information age. His research include intellectual property, informationprivacy, telecommunications, cybersecurity, competition policy, media regulation, and Internet freedom.

The Competitive Enterprise Institute

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SHRINKING GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY Government...SHRINKING GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY ... Economic Growth and Freedom. ShrinkingGovernmentBureaucracy ... Protection Agency and Federal