Shifting the Frame from Nation-State to Global Market: Class and Social Consciousness in the Advanced Capitalist Countries

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Shifting the Frame from Nation-State to Global Market: Class and Social Consciousness in theAdvanced Capitalist CountriesAuthor(s): Terence TurnerSource: Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice, Vol. 46, No.2 (Summer 2002), pp. 56-80Published by: Berghahn BooksStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23170151 .

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Shifting the Frame from

Nation-State to Global Market Class and Social Consciousness in the Advanced

Capitalist Countries

This paper examines the relationship between the globalization of capital,

changes in class structure, and the development of new forms of social con

sciousness. 'Globalization' is not a new historical phenomenon, as many scholars have pointed out. There have been repeated episodes of global expansion in the history of capitalism, followed by periods of contraction or

near collapse, and as Friedman and numerous others have properly insisted, episodes of expansion and contraction have been characteristic of

the relations among societies and cultures long before the appearance of

capitalism (Friedman 2001; 1994). The last major episode of global expan sion in the history of capitalism took place at the end of the nineteenth cen

tury, from 1880 to 1914. It is often pointed out that roughly the same levels

of capital export and trade were reached in that period as in the present

resurgence of transnational expansion. It is important, however, not to over

look an important difference between the two episodes, which is that in the

previous period of globalization, the nation-state was still the fundamental

economic unit, whereas in the present phase, capital, in the form of trans

national corporations and financial markets, has escaped the limits of state

fiscal and political controls, and now increasingly operates in an effectively

stateless environment. The difference is reflected in the contrasting forms

assumed by imperialism as the political framework of nineteenth century

globalization and the present system of putatively independent nation-states.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the global expansion of

national capital was made possible by the political conquest and control of

Terence Himer

Social Analysis, Volume 46, Issue 2, Summer 2002



Shifting the Frame from Nation-State to Global Market 57

other countries or regions as subject colonies, whereas in the present stage,

direct political control is dispensed with, and has been superseded by an

array of financial, commercial and corporate arrangements operating largely in a global space not under the control of any state.

The Historical Roots of the Current Surge of Globalization:

From War to the Fiscal Crisis of the State

Despite the shocks of the First World War and the Great Depression of the

1930s, the nation-state-based global system, with the colonial systems of

the major powers essentially intact, lasted until the aftermath of World

War II. The Allied victory over Germany and Japan and the ensuing peace

arrangements, including the Bretton Woods accords, the North Atlantic

alliance, the Marshall Plan and the economic rehabilitation and reintegra tion of the Axis powers, created a historically unprecedented situation

among the major capitalist countries. For the first time in their history as

modern states, it became unthinkable that any of them could advance their

national interests by going to war with any of the others. A peaceful capi talist oikumene was thus established. The removal of military rivalries

among the major capitalist powers thus eroded one of the main historical

supports of state-level nationalism: military rivalry between states. The

Cold War tension between the Western and Eastern blocs substituted in

some ways for this effect, but did not reach the level of relations among individual capitalist nations, and at any rate collapsed in the late 1980s.

The Bretton Woods international economic accords among the principal

capitalist allies, worked out before the end of the war, established the eco-,

nomic framework for the reintegration of the defeated powers into the inter

national political and economic system, maintaining the nation-state as the

primary unit of economic organization and currency regulation while mak

ing possible a rapid expansion of international trade. A major purpose of

these accords was to control international trade, and especially financial

and exchange transactions, so as to protect the ability of member nations

to implement potentially inflationary domestic policies designed to pro mote social peace.

Following the War, the U.S. government, with broad support from pri vate capital, continued to follow four broad social and economic policies initiated in the previous interwar period: firstly, to continue to foster the

shift of production from heavy capital goods to consumer commodities (a

policy first introduced in the 1920s); secondly, to guarantee the rights of



58 Terence Turner

labor to organize and engage in collective bargaining, and to provide pub lic assistance to unemployed working class and lower income groups of the

population (i.e., the 'class compromise,' institutionalized in the welfare

state'); thirdly, to promote high wage contracts for labor designed to

increase the purchasing power of workers, so they could raise their stan

dards of living without resort to the strike weapon (the "treaty of Detroit"); and fourthly, to stimulate the development of a greatly expanded profes

sional-managerial class, to be trained and recruited largely through a vastly

enlarged system of publicly supported higher education. European coun

tries instituted policies designed to achieve many of the same purposes, but

relying more on centralized state welfare programs. Finally, the Cold War,

as it developed after 1948, provided the pretext for a fifth major policy that

was to shape the political-economic reality of the U.S.A. and the other

major capitalist countries in a variety of ways. This was the reinitiation of

massive armaments production and the development of 'military Keyne sianism' in the national security state.

From the end of the War to 1970, these policies largely achieved their

primary objectives of promoting upward social mobility, increasing eco

nomic equality, and the expansion of middle classes, in the U.S., and to

varying degrees in the other major capitalist nation. The U.S. approach, based on promoting individualized consumerism sustained by high wages, oriented to the self-production of personal identity and life-style, had con

siderable success in increasing social mobility in America. The general increase in economic well-being produced a politically complacent social

consciousness in the U.S., and to varying degrees in other First World

nations. As (Schoppa (2002): 319) summed up the resulting social climate:

The growth of the middle classes in these nations [came] to be so taken for

granted, in fact, that for twenty years scholars [wrote] about the emergence of

a new post materialist age in which class differences are coming to matter less

and less. Income gaps between rich and poor [were said to] have closed, gov ernment policies [had] cushioned the effects of the business cycle on the over

all economy and on individuals, and the extended period of prosperity [had]

created increased opportunities for upward mobility. The amelioration of class

conflict that followed from these developments ... led voters to focus on qual

ity-of-life issues like the environment instead of on economic policy—when

they [cared] about politics at all.

The optimistic class-compromise policies of the post-World War II

period were sustained by the long economic boom of the 1950s and early 1960s. The boom was partly created by heavy state social payments intended to make possible high levels of commodity consumption. Another




major cause of the post-war boom in the U.S. economy was the continued

massive infusions of public funds required by military Keynesianism. This

huge public investment directed into essentially unproductive activities had

unfortunate economic and social consequences, perhaps the most impor tant being the creation of large amounts of speculative financial capital. An

increasingly wealthy and powerful group of rentiers drew their income

largely from financial dealings employing the capital generated by military

production. This mass of mobile financial capital was also fed by the large U.S. trade deficits that began during the Vietnam War and have continued

thereafter. This ever-increasing mass of speculative capital, much of it in

the form of 'Eurodollars,' was to become a major element in the creation of

the globalized financial market of the 1970s.

By the end of the 1960s, an economic contraction set in, culminating in

the OPEC-precipitated energy crisis of 1973. The failure of the economy to

continue to expand precipitated a tightening of competition for resources

among the main political-economic sectors of society (workers and salaried

middle class, capitalists, and government), which O'Connor (1973: 5-10) has called "the fiscal crisis of the state." The fiscal crisis occurs because the

state must bear a large share of the research and development and infra

structural costs required by private industry to remain competitive. Compe tition drives private industry to raise productivity and thereby cut labor costs. As the private economy lays off workers, the state must devote more

resources to sustain the unemployed as well as other groups of the popula tion that lack the resources to support themselves (O'Connor calls these

social subsidies "legitimation payments"). To meet the rising levels of legit imation payments, as well as its growing obligations for infrastructure, and

subsidies to private business, the state must increase its own bureaucratic

apparatus. To do all of these things, it must raise taxes; but after a point, the tax burden begins to erode the profitability, and thus the competitiveness of

industry, as well as the ability of the mass of the population to consume the

goods and services it produces. Taxes cannot be raised further without

becoming counterproductive, but the demands on the state continue to

increase. The result is a fiscal crisis. As long as the national economy can continue to expand at a satisfactory rate, the fiscal crisis can be held at bay, even if (as was the case in the 1950s and 1960s) state costs for infrastruc

ture, research and development, state administration, and social welfare

proportionally increase. When a relatively sharp downturn arrives, however, these costs are likely to rise even higher as the sources of revenue available

to the state from taxation decline. This happened in the early 1970s. The fis cal chickens came home to roost in the OPEC oil crisis of 1973.



60 Terence Turner

Globalization after 1973: From Fiscal Crisis of the State to

Financial Crisis of the World

The U.S. had begun running a trade deficit, largely because of its bloated

military budget. This exacerbated economic tensions with its main trading

partners. The value of the dollar could no longer be sustained without

European and Japanese support. One result was to force the U.S. to go off

the gold standard in 1971, a major blow to the Bretton Woods system. TYans-national financial transactions, freed from the restraints of the Bret

ton Woods accords, increased exponentially in volume:

... the years since capital liberalization began in the 1970s have seen an explo sion in the volume of short-term capital movements, with the sum of money

flowing through currency markets reaching the level of US$1.2 trillion a day by the early 1990s and the volume of bank loans across borders reaching the level

of US$3.6 trillion. Both these levels were double those of just a few years ear

lier (Schoppa 2002: 328; citing Greider 1997: 23).

These daily amounts are the equivalent of the total volume of world trade

over several months.

New communications technology made possible virtually instanta

neous transactions of enormous scope, with the potential (soon realized] for destabilizing national currencies and economies. The OPEC-produced

energy crisis of 1973 was another heavy economic blow, which greatly exacerbated the increasing financial and monetary pressures. The U.S. Fed

eral Reserve and the central banks of the other major capitalist countries

became unable to prevent destabilizing trading in their national currencies

on international financial markets. The Bretton Woods system of regulation

of international financial capital by the governments and central banks of

nation-states, which had been designed to prevent unrestricted movements

of global financial capital that could put pressure on national expenditures for social policies, thus effectively collapsed (Block 1977). Meanwhile, pri vate corporate capital, taking advantage of the peaceful international order

created by state political and economic policies during and since the War,

moved rapidly into trans-national operations and forms of corporate orga

nization, thus escaping the pressures and responsibilities of the fiscal crisis

of the state, such as taxation and the restraints of state protection of the

rights of labor and the environment. 'Globalization,' in the contemporary sense of a trans-national system of trade and financial transactions in

which the nation-state is no longer the primary organizational framework

of the economy, had arrived—or perhaps rather returned.




Globalization constitutes an essentially unregulated intensification of

the capitalist dynamic of competition, accumulation, exploitation, and class

conflict. It is the result of deliberate actions and policies of political and cor

porate leaders, rather than a spontaneous or natural result of new informa

tional or other technologies, or the sheer accumulation of surplus capital. It

does, however, have one unavoidable economic result. Trans-national finan

cial transactions require that the exchange rates of the national currencies

involved be kept stable. Inflation, in other words, must be avoided. This

means that states are under pressure to curtail the social policies constitut

ing the post-war social contract, such as full employment and social trans

fer payments. As Hiwatari (2002: 281-2) has observed:

Since the mid-1970s, the flow of global capital has forced governments with

inflation rates higher than those of their trading partners to carry out disinfla

tionary policies ... even at the cost of significant unemployment... The inabil

ity of governments to guarantee employment and social protection, as they had

prior to the oil crisis, has put the postwar social contract under stress and

weakened the sense of security and entitlement among the middle classes ...

The disinflationary constraint is the link between the new global economy and

the challenges to the postwar social contract.

The Persistence of the State in the Globalized Economic Order

The development of the global capitalist system over the past three to four

decades has thus deprived states of a significant degree of freedom to deter

mine their own social policies, and has forced a partial abandonment of the

post-war social contract, but it has not led to any withering away of the

state itself. On the contrary, while the state has lost much of its power to

regulate its own internal economy, it has acquired a new importance as a

provider of indispensable administrative and policy support of transna tional financial, commodity, labor and capital markets (Weiss 1997). Nor

has the heightened importance of transnational commerce, financial trans

actions, labor migration, and media communications led to any general weakening of the state as a territorial entity. On the contrary, it has if any thing heightened rather than undermined the importance of state bound aries. The frontiers dividing state territories, especially those separating the

economically successful state economies from the relatively unsuccessful

ones, have more than ever become dialectically identified with the internal

class divisions of the social systems that are at once separated and con

nected by interstate frontiers. The ways states attempt to regulate, encour

age or obstruct flows of workers, capital and commodities across their



62 Terence Turner

borders are directly related to their explicit or implicit social policies with

respect to mitigating or widening internal class divisions.

The New Elites, Class Repolarization, and the Crisis

of Sovereignty

As corporate and financial élites, armed with neoliberal ideology, have

gained political control and ideological hegemony within First World states, the result has been to narrow the ideological basis of popular identification

with and loyalty to the state and its institutions of political participation

(representative democracy). The political, ideological, and corporate hege

mony of the new trans-nationally oriented élites, in other words, has

tended to undermine the political basis of nationalist ideology at the state

level. At the same time, new multilateral institutions like the World Bank,

IMF, WTO and credit-rating agencies acting directly at the trans-national

level now exercise considerable sovereignty beyond the borders of any state. Sovereignty, in other words, is no longer the monopoly of states. It

has become distributed among states and an array of transnational institu

tions (Sassen 1996, 1989). The specialized rentier, industrial and financial élites that have devel

oped within First-World and other states in the period of globalization have

become increasingly oriented towards strengthening the viability, prof

itability, and competitiveness of the trans-nationally oriented sectors of

their national economies. The unproductive state expenditures from which

the financial and rentier élites draw much of their wealth are themselves in

considerable part the results of state policies designed to maintain trans

national economic and political hegemony at regional or global levels.

These élites tend to be politically, socially, and economically indifferent to

those sectors of the state population with little to contribute to the com

petitive performance of the national economy in relation to the global sys tem (Gill 1994).

The sustained attack on the welfare state class compromise with labor

mounted over the past two decades by the advocates of neoliberal disinfla

tionary policies, who speak for the interests of globalizing capital, has had

the cumulative result of leaving both the working class and the salaried

middle class increasingly insecure, frustrated, and both resentful and mis

trustful of the political systems and governments of their nation states.

'Middle class angst' has replaced the confident complacency of a few years

ago—appropriately enough since:



bhifting trie Frame from Nalion-State to Global Market 63

... the middle classes in most advanced economies are shrinking. Some indi

viduals are moving up into the upper-middle class, but many are slipping down

into the ranks of the poor. Moreover, the institutions and policies that previ

ously worked to grow middle classes and dampen the frustrations of the poor ...are not functioning as well as they used to (Schoppa 2002:340).

In the U.S., middle class households (income $30,000-80,000 in 1997

dollars) decreased from 63% in 1973 to 51% in 1996. The U.K. data show

a similar decline. Continental European welfare state economies show

much less impact (and in Italy even an actual increase). îhe erlects oí globalization, in sum, have led to accentuated social

inequality in most first World countries, above all the U.S. and U.K.

International trade and capital flows have tended to redistribute

income in ways that aggravate inequality in advanced industrialized

nations. Those individuals who have capital and skills that are in high demand can command much higher salaries in this increasingly global market, even as those with fewer skills face more competition from low

paid foreign workers (Schoppa 2002: 340). The middle class, in other

words, is not only shrinking, but becoming polarized between a minority who are successfully leaving to join the new upper middle class élites, a reduced contingent of the old professional-managerial class, which remains

engaged in the national economy and civil society, and a downwardly mobile detachment who are in the process of dropping into the lower class.

Erosion ot the economic security and relative income levels of the

salaried middle class and the working class have accompanied these phe nomena. Wage levels and employment of the industrial work force in the

more developed capitalist economies have also been adversely affected by the reallocation of production to less developed countries with lower wage levels and weaker labor legislation, and by the practice of job substitution,

whereby wage labor in developed countries is replaced by unwaged forms Df labor, including forced labor and slavery, in poorer regions. There has thus developed a global crisis of wage labor (McMichael 2000: 190-92). The Fundamental cause of this crisis is the inherent capitalist drive to find the most effective opportunities for extracting surplus value from labor. This remains a driving force of the current global expansion of capitalism as it was of seventeenth century English agricultural "improvement."



64 Terence Tamer

The Crisis of Sovereignty, the Decline of Nationalism and the

De-Hyphenation of the Nation-State

A corollary effect of the hegemony of neo-liberal policy and capitalist élites

and their "cadres" (Gill 1994, 1996) has been the implicit weakening of the

principle of popular sovereignty on which the Modern state has been based

since the eighteenth century. The result has been a crisis of sovereignty in

the contemporary state. This crisis is directly related to the weakening of

nationalism at the state level in the more economically successful capitalist

states, and the rise of sub-state (ethnic) nationalisms among the more eco

nomically disadvantaged and politically disempowered groups of their pop ulations. Success at the game of competitive free-market capitalism, with its

winner-take-all and devil-take-the-hindmost mentality, is a mean and nar

row basis for a national community that excludes many, and threatens to

exclude any who fail to contribute to national economic competitiveness. The narrowing of the ideological basis of citizenship, accompanied by the

thinning of the social community represented by the state, while the state

as such recovers a modicum of political-economic power as an agent of

globalized capital, may be thought of as a political and ideological counter

part of the crisis of overproduction. This is the crisis in which the expansion of potential wealth through production for the market coincides with a nar

rowing of the proportion of the population that can be integrated into the

work force, and is thus able to earn the wherewithal to consume the com

modities that are produced. The corollary of the crisis of sovereignty is widespread and increasing

alienation from the political system, as reflected in the low levels of politi cal participation in many Western states. One casualty of this appears to be

a decline in nationalism as an expression of solidarity or 'community'

among all the citizens of the state, at least in those states, like the U.S. and

U.K. that have adopted neoliberal market-oriented policies. As state gov ernments are forced or induced to adopt disinflationary policies as a pre

requisite of fiscal survival, at the cost of discontinuing social programs for

full employment and social welfare, the unemployed and relatively disad

vantaged elements of the population have less and less reason to identify with the state as a national 'community' of which they can feel themselves

full and equal parts. Nationalism, under these circumstances, may be

expected to lose its power to induce political loyalty to the state among the

relatively disfranchised masses.

The globally-oriented elites who direct or strongly influence the poli of many contemporary states, and who act as mediators between the




global economic system and the internal economy of the state, meanwhile,

have little stake in an identity as citizens of their states of origin. In their

new class role, they are not wholly or unambiguously based in the internal

economic and political processes of their nations, unlike their former fel

low-members of national bourgeoisies. They thus have little basis of iden

tification or sense of national community with economically unproductive or uncompetitive elements of the national population, such as the unem

ployed or unemployable underclass and other marginal groups it com

prises. They no longer depend for the legitimation of their power within the

state on the ideological claim to represent all the citizens of the nation, even the nationally oriented members of the bourgeoisie, in the way Sièyes claimed for the Third Estate at the time of the French Revolution. They thus

have little need for nationalist ideology, to throw a veil of imaginary com

munity, political equality and collective solidarity over the stark social

inequalities being exacerbated by the global processes they serve. Nation

alism at the state level, at least in the more neoliberal influenced states, has

thus increasingly tended to become moot, both in the economically suc

cessful countries of the First World, and for complimentary reasons also in

those of other regions. Under these changed historic circumstances, nation

alism has increasingly become, in the major capitalist countries, an idiom

of last resort for social losers and marginal groups to make claims upon the

state for amelioration of their marginal or otherwise disadvantaged situa

tions (Turner 1999). The efforts of alienated citizens to create new vehicles for their civic

and social values outside the formal political structure, meanwhile, have

led to a great multiplication of New Social Movements (NSMs). These

include not only ethnic nationalist movements and those oriented to 'iden

tity' issues but also those committed to universalistic values and 'quality of

life' issues, like human rights and environmentalism. These movements, I

suggest, stem directly from the quest by alienated citizens for forms of

civic and political action commensurate with their social values, which

they feel can no longer be realized through the institutional political struc

tures of nation-states. NSMs provide bases for critically opposing and resist

ing political and economic policies of states and global capital alike. They have increasingly learned to cooperate on a global scale, typically through the formation of temporary alliances that Keck has called "issue-oriented

networks" (Keck and Sikkink 1998). To this extent, they represent a kind of

trans-national nemesis that the global capitalist system and its participating state regimes and corporations have raised up against themselves.



66 Terence Turner

Emergent Contradictory Tendencies

Three contradictory tendencies arise from the conjuncture of economic,

class, and political relations I have described. First is the contradiction

between the disinflationary policy the state is obliged to adopt by the

requirements of global financial markets and transnational commerce and

the domestic social policies (full employment, social welfare) that comprise its commitments under the class compromise or post-World War II social

contract. Default by the state in fulfilling its part of the contract threatens to undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, and thus diminish its

political ability to implement the policies on behalf of global capital that are

responsible for the problem to begin with. A second contradiction (more acute in the U.S. and the U.K. than on the Continent) arises from the

emphasis on expanding the consumer economy through increasing the pur

chasing power of the working and middle classes, while withdrawing the

state as much as possible from the regulation of capital, in both its pro ductive and financial forms. This comes down to increasing the empower ment of consumers to produce their own identities and life-styles while

diminishing their collective political power over capital, including its con

duct of production, decisions over what to produce, damage to the natural

environment, etc.

The suggestion that consumerism may be a contradictory feature of

contemporary capitalist society calls for fuller explanation. Ohmae (1990) calculated in 1990 that there were the 600 million relatively affluent con

sumers in the middle classes of Europe, Japan and North America, who col

lectively constitute the most important bloc of purchasing power in the

present world economy. For the members of this bloc, the huge accession

of purchasing power they have received through the huge expansion of

salaried and professional employment since the War. and the equally huge

growth of the consumer commodities market has been an important source

of social mobility and up-grading of personal identity and life styles: in a

word, empowerment. Consumerism on an unprecedented scale has meant,

in other words, a great expansion of the power of self-production: the abil

ity to produce personal identity, creates individual and group lifestyle, and

achieves personal and social values. This increase in the power of self-pro duction, however, has come, especially in the U.S. and the U.K., at the price of a diminution of political and social power to influence the relations and

conditions of production, including not only working conditions, job sta

bility, and benefits, but also environmental and social effects of corporate

policies. Private capital, for instance, retains virtually unlimited control



shifting the trame from Nation-State to GlobaL Market 67

over decisions to reallocate production, engage in job substitution at the

expense of wage workers and salaried employees, close or reorganize pro ductive and marketing processes, and to centralize and amalgamate corpo rate operations. These effects are amplified by the decline of the regulative powers of states resulting from the first contradictory tendency, with the

result that the middle and working classes have been less and less able to

look to the state as an ally in restraining the behavior of private capital in

ways that affect their well-being. One resuit oí this contradictory combination of empowerment and dis

empowerment has been the huge increase in the number, size and variety of new social movements (NSMs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), staffed overwhelmingly by members of the national middle class, with increasing support from organized labor. These movements typically appeal beyond the state to universal principles of ecology, philanthropy or human rights to sanction their efforts to challenge and resist abuses by cor

porations, governments, and multilateral development agencies working in

collaboration with private capital. The new movements draw upon the

power of the professional-managerial class as a repository of purchasing power, professional skills, and access to communication networks to chal

lenge the disempowering and lifestyle-disrupting effects of capital and state

policies created to satisfy its needs.

A third contradictory tendency, the chronic crisis of overproduction is,

af course, not new, but as an intrinsic feature of unregulated competitive mass production, acts to reinforce the other two in new ways. As the trans national economic system has grown and complexified to the point where it has become an effective basis for corporate leverage on state economic and regulatory policies, it has also taken on some of the besetting contra dictions of state-level capitalist economies. The chronic crisis of overpro duction has emerged as a structural limit of the global system as a whole. <\s labor becomes ever more productive under the pressure of global com

petition, relatively fewer workers are required to produce ever greater quan ities of commodities, with the result that an ever-increasing proportion of he world's population is effectively excluded from the opportunity to con ume the constantly increasing amounts of goods and services. The market or commodities thus tends to shrink as the supply continues to expand, jreider (1997: 45, 220-221, 233, 421) has stressed that tendencies to over production are inherent in the dynamic of globalization.

This limiting contradiction acts as a feedback loop, reinforcing its own effects at different levels of the system: that of the transnational system as i whole, and that of the internal political-economic systems of its compo



68 Terence Turner

nent state-level economies. The need for national economies to remain

competitive under global conditions becomes an effective lever for the dis

mantling of welfare-state class compromises at the state level, while rela

tively more highly paid workers from the original state populations of

successful states are increasingly replaced by cheaper migrant labor from

poorer states, and exportable productive operations are moved out of the

territories of successful states to areas of cheaper labor. The result is a

polarization of class incomes and social conditions, increasingly unmedi

ated by social welfare policies at the state level. The result is intensifying

pressure for class conflict. At the level of trans-national relations the same

pattern is replicated by the widening gulf between the more successful

capitalist economies, net exporters of capital, and those relatively unsuc

cessful state economies that cannot meet the economic needs of their pop ulations, and thus become net exporters of labor, feeding the competitive demands of the more capital-rich economies for ever cheaper laborers.

The state, then, is not withering away under the impact of globaliza tion, but rather losing some of its historic functions and powers and

assuming others. If one begins, as one should, from a recognition that the

market and the state are historically interdependent institutions and not

mutually distinct and unrelated entities, it becomes possible to see the

globalization project for what it is: not an attempt to do away with the state

or render it irrelevant, but rather an attempt to shift the terms of the polit ical interdependence of the two so that states are increasingly forced to

shift their policies from regulating the national economy to managing the

global economy in cooperation with other states, while giving up the

power to protect the national society from the effects of its requirements

(McMichael 2000). The question thus is not whether the state either should

or should not be brought into some form of interaction with the market, as

the issue is frequently framed by proponents of state regulation of the

economy and neoliberal proponents of the global 'free market,' respec

tively. State and market are already interpenetrating and interdependent: the only question, as Humpty Dumpty expressed it, is which is to be mas

ter (Carroll 1896: Ch.6). This question is rendered both more complex and more urgent by cer

tain inherent features of the development of global capital markets, espe

cially financial markets, now under way. As Coronil has observed, global

capital markets are becoming increasingly abstracted and homogenized in

three mutually reinforcing senses. In the first place, they are increasingly concerned with financial transactions detached from the trade in actual

commodities. In the words of a 1999 article in the New York Times, "the




global economy is no longer dominated by trade in cars and steel and

wheat, but by trade in stocks, bonds and currencies" (New York Times Feb

ruary 1999; cited in Coronil 2000: 366). The abstraction of financial values from exchanges of real commodities

has been accompanied by a second kind of abstraction: the homogeniza tion and decomposition of the commodity itself into abstract aspects of its

own value. Coronil points out the tendency of neoliberal market rationality to treat all forms of wealth, including the human potential for production, as capital; that is, as having value insofar as it contributes to the expansion of wealth (Coronil 2000: 365]. Coronil calls this "the transmaterialization of

wealth," meaning the transfiguration of material wealth through the ever more abstract commodification of its elements across time and space. As he

says, wealth is increasingly treated by investors and bankers not as tangi ble commodities but as risks assumed on them, such as derivatives (J. Ramo in Time April 27, 1998: 55, cited by Coronil 2000: 367). Derivatives

have grown exponentially: in 1997 they were traded at a value of $360 tril

lion, a figure equivalent to a dozen times the size of the entire global econ

omy" (Coronil 2000: 366). This wealth is also abstracted in a third sense:

as national capital markets merge into a global capital market, the wealth transacted becomes detached from the natural economies of actual states

and regions: in a word, stateless (Coronil 2000: 366). In political terms, the effect of these interdependent forms of abstraction and homogenization is

to bring about yet another kind of abstraction: the removal of financial

trading and global capital markets from any control by states or national

political agencies.

Social Consciousness: New Chronotopes for Old

Hiese contradictory tendencies form the basis of the contrasting formations

sf social consciousness that have emerged in the period of unregulated glob alization from the early 1970s to the present. In the ideological perspective Df classic bourgeois nationalism, the state was the organization that led the assimilation of citizens into the homogeneous national community. Differ ences of class, region and/or culture were regarded as stigmata of incom

plete assimilation into the national community. The bourgeois project of national state formation thus assumed the spatio-temporal form ('chrono

:ope') of a linear process of progressive assimilation of difference within the

spatial limits of the state territory. With the substitution of market hegemony "or the hegemony of nationalism, however, the assimilation of difference as



70 Terence Turner

a linear diachronic process has given way to a vision of synchronic plural ism, in which culturally marked differences of identity are equally valued.

The global market does not have the structural perspective of a state. From

its vantage point—the globe—all individuals and groups are alike: all are

both consumers and producers. Their specific cultural, linguistic or national

identities are irrelevant. All differences, and all identities, are equal, and all

coexist in the same moment of present time. The assimilation of a culturally distinct person or group into the culturally distinct community of another

group or nation is of no interest. The same universal laws of the market

apply equally and simultaneously to one and all.

In the perspective of synchronic pluralism, difference, rather than

homogeneity as vested in unified national identity, has become the ideo

logical touchstone of the new social consciousness ('identity politics,' 'mul

ticulturalism,' etc.). Under the aegis of the new hegemony of the market,

'identity' pluralism has accordingly become positively valued as an end in

itself in consumerist societies committed to the realization of personal iden

tity and collective difference. With the eclipse of 'assimilation' (or at least, the repression of difference) as the essential character and mission of the

nation, 'progress' and the conception of historical time as a linear process of social consolidation within the spatial framework of state boundaries lost

their dominant status as formative categories of social consciousness in the

more fully developed capitalist societies.

The vision of society as a pluralism of equal differences is a static

vision, with no room for the directed assimilation or transformation of any

identity, collective or individual, into any other. 'Synchronic pluralism' thus

replaces the diachronic assimilationism (i.e., 'progress') of the modern

nation-state as the new form of social consciousness—the chronotope, to

use Bakhtin's (1981) apt expression of consumerism and the classes that

primarily construct their social identities through it.

Space as well as time takes on new forms and meanings. In the syn chronic pluralist society of equal differences, there can be no 'center,' nor

any consequential boundary or periphery, in the sense of a point where dif

ference begins to be devalued as alien or 'underdeveloped.' Where all iden

tities and cultural styles are equally valid and synchronically self-existing,

there can be no 'deeper' systemic dynamics or infrastructure, no underly

ing causes or constraints, but only a surface pattern of contrasting signs of

difference. Synchrony as 'pluralism' does not imply a motionless world of

fixed spatial enclaves, but rather a world of aleatory movements and freely

circulating discourses, where 'flows' are reversible. Lacking a constant tem

poral direction, they do not become structurally consequential changes.




Carried to an extreme, the perspective of 'flows,' understood as ran

domized spatial movement, converges, in the thinking of some analysts, with the notion of "time-space compression" put forward by the geogra

pher, Harvey (1989: 240-42, 274-78). According to this notion, a kind of

synchronicity has been created by the development of new media of com

munication, information transfer and means of rapid transportation, which

have neutralized the significance of space and time as material obstacles to

instantaneous social interaction and communication. In place of 'material'

space and time, the new technologies have made possible the emergence of

virtual or 'real' time and space as the privileged dimension of economic

and ideological interchange, superseding such archaic features of social

space-time as boundaries, specific places, and the distinct cultural and

social identities associated with them.

Without discounting the importance of the new technologies of instan

taneous information transfer and monetary transactions in constructing the

financial circuits of transnational capitalism, however, I would insist that

the technological achievement of near simultaneity of individual transac

tions does not commute, logically or pragmatically, to the foreshortening of historical time or the overthrow of the linear temporal conception of

progress embodied in the nationalist notion of the assimilative mission of the nation-state. At this level of social consciousness, explanations for

changes in concepts of space-time must be sought in macro-social phe nomena: specifically, in shifts in the hegemonic status and political rela

tions of social classes, such as those involved in the contemporary

transformation of the nation state. In this connection, I have suggested that

the fundamental changes in social consciousness I have described may be

understood as integral parts of the development of new schémas of hege mony, unity and opposition among polarized segments of the middle class and elements of the working class and marginal social groups.

The loss of its historic hegemonic project in the French, Sieyèsian sense of a privileged identification with the nation, has left the national middle

class with no project other than individual commodity consumption as the

instrument of production of personal social identity. This, together with the individual character of professional and managerial work, the defining activity of the professional-managerial segment of the middle class, accounts for the individualistic character of the social consciousness of

contemporary members of this class. This, in turn, together with the sev

erance of professional and managerial work from direct involvement in

economic production, accounts for the focus of the professional-manager ial class perspective on processes of circulation and consumption in the



72 Terence Tarner

market, in abstraction from production and the exploitative relations of

production (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1979; Pfeil 1990). The combination

of these features of class perspective leaves the middle class in general and

the professional-managerial class in particular with no coherent political or

ideological relation to society as a whole. The social vision of synchronic

pluralism offers no depth, no center, no boundaries, and no basis for a rela

tion to any form of social reality beyond the shifting identities constructed

by consumption, and thus no structure. It offers, in short, Post-Modernism.

The new globally oriented élites and the neoliberal ideologues that

swell their ranks have also produced a form of social consciousness specific to their own project and perspective as agents of global capital. Neoliberai

ism is founded upon the substitution of the market for the nation-state as

the hegemonic ideological and political-economic framework for political

society at both state and transnational levels. The global market, in neolib

eral ideology, is conceived not so much as a product of history as a mani

festation of the trans-historical essence of social existence, whose material

epiphany as the governing structure of political and economic relations

thus marks the end of history. It is, in this sense, also a 'synchronic' ideo

logical vision. It is also 'pluralist', both in the positive sense of its empha sis on the individualistic activities of competition, consumption, and

accumulation in abstraction from governmental interference, and in the

negative sense that it is indifferent to assimilative notions of homogeneous national community.

The neoliberal view is thus compatible with the 'synchronic pluralism' of the emergent chronotope of national middle-class social consciousness.

It too presupposes the de-hyphenation of the nation-state, the elimination

of the nation and national sovereignty, and with it the project of middle

class hegemony of which state-level nationalism was the vehicle. It too

wishes to reduce the state to the role of referee, manager, and enforcer of

relations among mutually discrete and autonomous entities, in its case,

private capitals, rather than the different identities and cultural groups of

the pluralist vision of the national middle class. It too is unconcerned with

any totalizing vision of 'society.' Unlike the synchronic pluralism of the

national middle class, with its notion of random and reversible flows, how

ever, the neoliberal vision allows for a unidirectional flow of capital and

wealth to the private corporate owners of capital, creating an ever-increas

ing vertical polarization of society between rich and poor, empowered and

disempowered. This vision of quantitative change within the limits of qual itative structural stasis is framed from the perspective of the global market

rather than that of the nation-state. As such, it defines the conceptual para




meters of the class project (and current ideological hegemony) of the élite

class segments identified with global capital.

The Dialectics of Space and Place: The Persistence of the Local

and the Importance of Territoriality for Indigenous Peoples versus the Post-Modern Assault on the 'Metaphysics Of Place'

The time perspective of the older Modernist chronotope of evolutionary

progress was projected in spatial terms as the relation between progressive

capitalist metropolitan centers and the relatively backward colonial periph eries. As Fabian and others have analyzed this chronotope, spatial distance

from the metropolitan centers was equated with temporal regression into

the cultural evolutionary past. With the collapse and transformation of the

temporal dimension of this chronotope, its spatial dimension has also given

way to a new vision of social space. In the new chronotope of synchronic

pluralism, the old distinction between center and periphery tends to be

replaced by a new articulation of places and spaces in which elements of

the old periphery become intermingled with the old centers, and the old

metropolitan centers become fragmented into relatively central and periph eral elements. 'Centers' of the global economy, the "world cities" described

by Sassen and others, cease to be associated primarily with states and their

territories, and become more identified with their functions in the global

economy. Movements of labor and capital between relatively developed

and undeveloped areas become more important, giving rise to a conscious

ness of the world as a whole—or most of the world, at least—as an integral (and thus synchronic) economic system rather than a transformative rela

tion of relatively undeveloped peripheral areas to relatively developed

metropoles that continues to enact the evolutionistic scenario of the historic

transformation of the primitive past into the civilized capitalist present. In recent years, an influential group of writers, mostly drawn from Cul

tural Studies and Anthropology, has attempted to interpret this new spatial order in terms that deny the continued relevance of specific places and territorial boundaries. Thinkers of this group, whom we may call 'trans

nationalists,' have argued that increases in economic transactions, commu

nications and movements of all kinds across state frontiers have so

undermined control of states, and even smaller units like local communities

over their boundaries, and internal processes as to render irrelevant not

only the political framework of the state, but the very forms of hitherto

existing social space, as articulated by fixed boundaries and locations, rela



74 Terence Turner

tions of center and periphery, etc. In their place, it is claimed, a new virtual

space of flows, constantly shifting points, electronic hyperspace, and virtual

communities with no fixed territorial attachments, i.e., a sort of Heraclitean

flux with no structure and no fixed addresses, has become the geographi cal form of the global system. This 'transnationalist' view of the nature of

social space under globalization addresses the same phenomena that I have

attempted to subsume under the new chronotope of 'synchronic pluralism' comes to different conclusions, both about the nature of the phenomena and their political and ideological implications.

Productive Processes as the Articulation of Place and Space

Sassen's work on "global cities" and the spatial requirements of propagat

ing and processing global flows of various kinds makes the fundamental

point that the 'transnationalist' account, with its abstraction from social

and political economic context, and its fetishization of 'space' and 'flows,' as if they were self-existing phenomena from a new and alien technologi cal and epistemological realm, reflects the gratuitous abstraction of the

work of thinkers of this school from the social and material conditions of

the production of the phenomena they misleadingly describe. In Sassen's

(n.d.) words:

... the emphasis on hypermobility, global communications, and the neutral

ization of place and distance in the ['transnationalist'] account about eco

nomic globalization needs to be balanced with a focus on the work behind

command functions, on the actual production process in the leading informa

tion industries, finance and specialized services, and on global market places. This has the effect of incorporating the material facilities underlying global ization and the whole infrastructure of jobs typically not marked as belonging to the global economy. It overcomes the tendency in the ['transnationalist'] account to take the existence of a global economic system as a given, a func

tion of the power of transnational corporations and global communications.

(Sassen's emphasis; I have substituted here 'transnationalist' for Sassen's

term, "mainstream account")

Disturbingly, the transnationalists' master trope, the binary classifica

tion of local societies and cultures as 'inertial' and lacking in dynamic

capacities for resistance or change, while all agency, dynamism and effec

tively invincible force is ascribed to transnational processes of the global

system, repeats the form of the most ethnocentric and ideologically impe rialist chronotope of all, the evolutionistic vision of the dynamic, histori

cally innovative and spatially expansive West as the bearer of global




progressive change to the historically inert, spatially closed and culturally 'traditional' Others. The global system is Us; 'local communities' are Them; the myth of the historic 'break' constituted by transnationalism puts Them

in the past and makes Us the bearers of history.

Equally notably, the transnationalists' make no attempt to account for

the internal social or political-economic dynamics of local systems before or

during the impact of global processes, nor the specific forms of the

processes by which local and global systems interact. Nor does any central

representative of the group present a serious political-economic account of

the genesis and expansion of the global system, or of contemporary global economic processes. The global system is rather treated in abstraction from

its sociological, political and economic aspects, as a cultural phenomenon whose distinctive forms and effects are to be sought in the sphere of the

'imaginary,' as if composed of floating signifiers existing and operating independently of social agents and processes; in effect, then, as a natural

condition, a fetish. It might be suggested that the whole 'transnationalist'

project of transmogrifying the analysis of a total social, political-economic, cultural and ideological phenomenon—the contemporary global system— into an abstract descriptive account of its spatial forms and their imaginary effects represents an ideological move to place under theoretical erasure

these excluded aspects of contemporary historical reality. The ideological effect of the transnationalists' failure to analyze the ways that the global system, both historically and in the present, is produced by social actors and forces, acting within the received forms of the political-economic sys tem of world capitalism, is to naturalize and legitimate the system as a nat

ural emergent of market forces. This is the view of neoliberal élites now

dominating state governments and economies around the world.

From Contradictions to Consciousness to Political Action: The Ultimate Contradiction and the Struggle for Production

James O'Connor and his fellow contributors to the journal, Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, have attempted to develop an "ecological Marxism," which extends Marx's analysis of the contradictory basis of the capitalist relations of commodity production to "the second contradiction of capital ism," which they define as the progressive destruction by capitalism of its own conditions of existence. These conditions are essentially three: exter nal nature, labor power (the production of the social person as productive worker), and social space (the infrastructure and spatial organization of



76 Terence Turner

social intercourse) (O'Connor 1998: 158-186). This then may claim to be

not only the second but the ultimate contradiction of capitalism. In its con

cern with extra-economic aspects of production (the human production of

human beings, the built environment and other infrastructural features like

transportation and communication facilities), and human impacts on the

regeneration of nature, O'Connor's formulation brings together aspects of

an anthropological critique of capitalism with a Marxist approach to glob alization and the politics of the New Social Movements, to which I shall

now turn in conclusion.

Not only has globalization not eliminated the practical, political and

ideological relevance of 'places' and 'locality,' it has created certain limited

openings for local political action and cultural self-assertion. Many con

temporary indigenous movements have taken advantage of the ideological and political window of opportunity created by the new chronotope of syn chronic pluralism, which globalization brought into currency by shifting the ideological frame of reference from the nation-state to the global mar

ket. This has had the effect of replacing the modernist chronotope of

progress, bound up as it was with the idea of the nation-state as the agent of a linear process of ethnic Gleichschaltung, or the creation of culturally and ethnically homogeneous national communities. From the perspective of the global market, there are no privileged social or cultural differences, no temporally loaded evaluations of some cultures or groups as 'progres sive' and others as 'primitive' or unevolved: no justification, then, for the

idea of the mission of the nation-state as the agent of assimilation of cul

tural or ethnic differences into a homogeneous national community. In

terms of the market, all entities of whatever scope—nations, groups, and

persons—are just potential consumers or producers. The culturally specific

criteria by which they identify their individuality are not relevant, just the

fact that their differences identify them as distinct individuals, and as such

potential players in the universal market game. This leveling perspective can be potentially liberating for persons or groups whose differences from

dominant groups in the societies of nation-states stigmatized them as

unequal. As Coronil (2000: 9) remarks:

Unlike other Occidentalist strategies of representation that highlight the differ

ences between the West and its Others, discourses of neoliberal globalization evoke the potential equality and uniformity of all peoples and cultures ... inso

far as it decenters the West, effaces differences between centers and margins, and postulates, at least in principle, the fundamental equality of all cultures,

globalization promotes diversity and represents a form of universality that may

prefigure its fuller realization.




The formation of global markets for commodities and capital may thus

be seen as the political-economic underpinning of what has been called

'identity politics' and 'multiculturalism' (Turner 1993, 1999). Coronil, fol

lowing Sassen, Escobar, and others, has expressed the sense of political

opening that has been an important aspect of these tendencies:

In social spaces organized under neoliberal conditions, collective identities are

being constructed in unprecedented ways through a complex articulation of

such sources of identification as religion, territoriality, race, class, ethnicity,

gender, and nationality, but now informed by universal discourses of human

rights, international law, ecology, feminism, cultural rights, and other means of

respecting difference within equality (Coronil 2000: 370, citing Sassen 1998; Alvarez et al. 1998).

The florescence of New Social Movements in the last three decades has

drawn upon some of the same sources. The NSMs, with their predomi

nantly middle-class membership, can be understood in considerable part as

a response to a widespread sense that contemporary global capitalism is

pushing towards O'Connor's "second (and final) contradiction of capital ism" (O'Connor 1998). The great majority of the issues addressed by the

NSMs are concerned with the defense or reproduction of essential condi

tions of human existence, that are both excluded and undermined by capi talist production and its extensions in the global financial and other capital markets: external nature, labor power (the social person as productive

agent) and the social infrastructure (these are the three categories of O'Con

nor's second contradiction). Adjusting for differences in context, these are

also the main concerns of indigenous struggles for control and protection of

natural resources, adequate health care, and rights to traditional territory

(Turner 1999, n.d.). In both cases, the implicit criterion is a broader view

of production as including the regeneration of the natural environment, the

individual person and his/her social relations, and the infrastructure of

spaces, places, and communities essential to social existence. These devel

opments of social consciousness and political struggle by some citizens of

modern capitalist countries and members of non-capitalist indigenous soci eties appear not merely parallel but convergent. To some degree, the mul

tifarious projects of the NSMs substitute for the collective class project of

the historic modern middle class, as its political and ideological hegemony passes to the new neoliberal élites oriented to global capital.

Ironically, until and unless some trans-national movement can succeed

in forging a viable global political framework capable of regulating transna

tional capital, the pivotal element in this conflict of class perspectives and



78 Terence Turner

projects remains the state. Just as the state, acting in concert with other

states, created the institutional basis of the global market and financial sys

tem, and remains the most practicable source of the powers of interna

tional regulatory agencies and crisis intervention by central banks to avert

periodic threats of monetary and financial collapse, so concerted action by states remains the most likely basis for the imposition of a new global order,

capable of regulating financial and corporate capital for social and political ends. This would take a concerted political movement that could re-take

control of state policy-making from the current neoliberal hegemony. This, in turn, would require a more coherent social and political vision than the

current array of NSMs and fragmented oppositional movements (including

working class organizations) have thus far been able to produce. Can anthropology contribute to such a unifying vision? I have argued

that the implicit common denominator of the new social movements for

human rights, environmental protection, consumer protection, support of

indigenous peoples, and numerous other causes is the defense of the power of production in the widest human sense of the term, including the pro duction of personal identity and empowerment for the realization of cultural

values, as well as the production of material commodities and means of

subsistence. The issue of the production of human personhood and social

being in this sense lies at the heart of the contradictory empowerment of the

middle class for self-production through consumption, and its disempower ment through the consolidation of control by capital over conditions of

work, commodity production, and marketing that has been intensified by

globalization and its evisceration of the social policy-making powers of

states. Collaboration between working class organizations and middle class

social movements might be catalyzed if both could recognize the other as

engaged in a struggle for a measure of social control over production, in its

complementary aspects as the production of commodities, and the produc tion of persons, social life, and nature (in the sense of ecological conditions

for the self-reproduction of the natural word). The anthropological concep tion of production as a human and social totality could contribute to build

ing a unifying ideological basis for such a collaborative struggle.




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Documents

Shifting the Frame from Nation-State to Global Market: Class and Social Consciousness in the Advanced Capitalist Countries