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Marine Policy 36 (2012) 859–866
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Marine Policy
0308-59
doi:10.1
n Tel.:
E-m
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol
Shifting accountabilities? Understanding the connections between nationaland provincial fisheries in Papua New Guinea
Catherine S. Benson n
School of Natural Resources and the Environment, University of Michigan, 440 Church Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48104, USA
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 9 June 2011
Received in revised form
12 July 2011
Accepted 17 November 2011Available online 17 January 2012
Keywords:
Fisheries
Decentralization
Accountability
Natural resources management
Melanesia
Papua New Guinea
7X/$ - see front matter & 2011 Elsevier Ltd. A
016/j.marpol.2011.11.007
þ1 770 663 7847.
ail address: [email protected]
a b s t r a c t
This paper examines the effects of fisheries decentralization strategies in Papua New Guinea. The paper
assess the financial, human resources, information, and institutional mechanisms that the National
Fisheries Authority uses to connect with provincial fisheries offices to show the consequences of
institutional reforms. The findings suggest both intended and unintended effects, particularly in terms
of shifting accountabilities and loyalty. These findings are broadly applicable to decentralization and
institutional change scholars and practitioners interested in understanding how governments imple-
ment institutional change reforms and the effects of this implementation.
& 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Decentralization represents one of the most important trendsin environmental governance. More than sixty governmentsaround the world have engaged in reforms that transfer centralpowers to more local levels of authority. Over the past twodecades, Papua New Guinea’s (PNG’s) National Fisheries Authority(NFA) decentralized fisheries responsibilities, restructured itselfas a more central organization, and delegated responsibilities tothe provincial level. This paper examines these efforts by the NFAto more closely integrate national and provincial fisheries man-agement through Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs). The goalof this analysis is to describe the effects of transferring powersand resources to provincial fisheries, with particular attention toissues of accountability.
Decentralization advocates highlight several benefits of trans-ferring power from central to local levels. Reforms may result innew local level responsibilities for protection, monitoring, orproviding information. Other reforms utilize incentive strategiesto encourage effective resource management at the local level,such as the case of the Philippines where a coastal resourcemanagement certification system incentivized local level govern-ments [1]. Reforms may also encourage the revitalization oftraditional community based management systems as shown in
ll rights reserved.
an example of Indonesian fisheries [2]. In some cases, decentra-lization results in democratic empowerment of local actors andinstitutions, such as when reforms empower new actors, such asminorities and women, to participate in local politics and deci-sion-making [3]. Scholars cite such reforms as evidence thatdecentralization can result in increased efficiency, equity, andsustainability while simultaneously increasing the power of localofficials to manage natural resources.
At the same time, analysis of decentralization strategies showsthat many institutional reforms result in incomplete transfers ofpower or authority. Decentralization rhetoric is often employed bystates who appear ‘‘to condone decentralization but transfer verylittle real power away from the central government’’ in effect‘‘diffusing centralization’’ by transferring decision-making power tolocal bodies [4]. In such situations, states may extend their reach intomore local levels and maintain consistent power relations rather thantransferring power to localities [4]. Similarly, Cambodian governmentinvolvement in fisheries management is viewed as a part of a stateeffort to consolidate political power and gain revenue [5]. Actors mayalso employ further tactics to limit meaningful devolution of powerand authority through decentralization reforms [6].
An additional concern is the potential of decentralization todecrease efficiency. In Thailand’s fisheries reforms, for example,decentralization granted provincial, district, and local officials thepower to collect taxes, but duplicated responsibilities among lowerlevel officials and introduced time consuming reporting [7]. Nationalgovernments may use arguments about decreased efficiency toreclaim power and authority over natural resources, resulting in a
C.S. Benson / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 859–866860
reversal of decentralization policies in favor of recentralization, aprocess in which authorities retain important powers or re-appro-priate powers and resources after decentralizing them [8].
Scholars have clearly documented many benefits and challengesof decentralized natural resource governance strategies. What isnow necessary is to assess the effects of such reforms and strategies.This paper proposes an understanding of decentralization thatmoves the debate past a discussion on the benefits and challengesof decentralization to consider decentralization reforms as a set ofefforts to better integrate central and local levels of governance [9].This classification of decentralization allows an examination of theconsequences of reforms and illustrates their intended and unin-tended effects in PNG’s fisheries reforms, particularly with respect toquestions of shifting accountabilities. Analyzing the mechanismsthat connect levels of governance is an important step in under-standing both the nature of decentralization reforms and the extentto which such reforms affect the powers and autonomy of localactors. These findings are broadly applicable to decentralization andinstitutional change scholars and practitioners interested in under-standing how governments implement institutional change reformsand the effects of this implementation.
This article is organized in five sections, beginning with a briefdiscussion of the data and methods. Second, the paper provides abrief background on the history of NFA to show that naturalresources governance reforms represent an ongoing tensionbetween decentralization and centralization. This section brieflyoutlines the relevant legislation governing national and provincialfisheries responsibilities and describe the process of organiza-tional restructuring from the Department of Fisheries and MarineResources to the NFA. Next, the findings section: (1) describes thedelegated functions contained within the Memorandum of Agree-ments (MOAs); (2) identifies four mechanisms that connect NFAto provincial fisheries officers; (3) examines whether thesemechanisms increase the power and autonomy of provincialfisheries officers; and (4) analyzes the intended and unintendedeffects of this arrangement. The conclusion describes the creationof a new national fisheries agency with the potential to furtherreconfigure connections and relationships among fisheries man-agers and highlighting recommendations for decentralized gov-ernance and fisheries management in PNG and globally.
2 Today, however, the staff of NFA has increased.3 The Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) include the Federated States of
2. Methods
The information in this article is based on data gathered inPNG between January 2010 and December 2010. Semi-structuredinterviews were conducted with national fisheries officers basedat the National Fisheries Authority in Port Moresby (n¼22) andwith provincial fisheries officers in Madang, Manus, and NewIreland provinces (n¼12). In addition, the author attended the2010 NFA-provincial fisheries meeting in Alotau, Papua NewGuinea and conducted a survey with all1 of the provincial fish-eries advisers in attendance (n¼13). The survey was conducted inEnglish and focused on the relationship between national andprovincial fisheries officers and whether and how this relation-ship changed as a result of the MOA. The sample includes allnational fisheries officers with provincial responsibilities and 93%of PNG’s provincial fisheries advisers. The findings section isprimarily based on the results of the survey while the interviewsprovide qualitative detail and explanations used to inform thebackground section and triangulate survey findings.
1 Each provincial fisheries adviser at the meeting completed a survey (n¼13).
However, the Bougainville fisheries officer was unable to attend the meeting and
did not respond to subsequent requests to participate in the survey. All provincial
fisheries advisers are male and their average age was 48 years.
3. Calculation and background
This section briefly outlines the changes in the organizationalstructure of PNG’s fisheries over time, illustrating fluctuations andtensions between a centralized and a decentralized role. The goalof this section is to provide the context to understand PNG’scurrent efforts to connect central and provincial fisheries officers.In the 1990s, the Department of Fisheries and Marine Resourcesemployed fisheries officers at the provincial level who carried outextension activities and conducted research at the provincial,district, and local government levels in addition to maintaining afocus on commercial fisheries. By the late 1990s, there was ageneral sense that NFA was overextended by trying to focus onboth commercial fisheries and small-scale fishing activities. Fish-eries officers employed in the organization at the time explainthat the perception was that the organization needed to refocuson core functions and develop a more business-like approach(NFA Corporate Plan A). Donor pressure further facilitated aninternal reorganization. The Asian Development Bank provided aloan for an institutional strengthening project from July 1999 toMarch 2003, during which the Department of Fisheries andMarine Resources became the National Fisheries Authority [10].
As part of this restructure, NFA became an authority withcorporate status and a leaner staff structure [10]. Fisheries officersbased in the province were released from their duties and thenumber of national staff decreased from over 155 to 65 [11].2 Inaccordance with PNG’s Organic Law, responsibilities for provincialand coastal fisheries were transferred to the provincial adminis-trations. Section 42(1)(1)(t) of the Organic Law on Provincial
Governments and Local Level Governments empowers provincialgovernments ‘‘to make laws on fishing and fisheries and renew-able natural resources matters but such laws may be limited inthat the National Fisheries Act 1998 declares that fisheries are amatter of National Interest for the purposes of Sections 42 and 44of the Organic Law and prevails over any law made underSections 42 and 44 to the extent of any inconsistency’’ [12:3].The Fisheries Management Act 1998, also notes the authority ofNFA ‘‘to delegate powers, functions, duties, and responsibilities tothe provinces and the assignment of functions, responsibilities,and powers is provided for under Section 74(d)(e), Section 78,Section 79, and Section 80 of the Organic law on Provincial
Governments and Local Level Governments’’ [12:3].Since its restructure, NFA has focused on large commercial
fisheries, generating significant amounts of revenue and emergingas a leader among the PNA nations.3 Along with its mineral andtimber wealth, Papua New Guinea’s fishing industry is a majorsource of national revenue. PNG’s tuna fishery contributes thehighest percentage of fisheries revenue. Additional sources ofincome include operator license fees, donor funding, and penal-ties collected from fines levied under the Fisheries ManagementAct [10]. The Food and Agriculture Organization identifiesincreasing tuna catch and increased on shore processing of tunaas major trends in PNG’s fishing industry [13]. NFA is uniquewithin the Pacific context because it is one of the only threefisheries authorities in the Pacific and it is the only authority thatretains its own revenue.4 NFA staff are considered private per-sonnel rather than civil service, which means they can be fired for
Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, PNG, and the Solomon Islands
and represent the countries engaged in tuna purse seining in the Pacific.4 In the other two authorities in the Pacific (the Marshall Islands and the
Federated States of Micronesia), the income generated from fisheries goes first to
the central government and then a percentage is returned the authority as the
fisheries budget.
C.S. Benson / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 859–866 861
failing to perform, a distinction that many, within and outside ofNFA, credit to the high dedication and performance of NFA staff.
While NFA performs well in commercial fisheries, small-scale,coastal fisheries have received less attention since the organiza-tion’s restructure. In response to concerns about provincial fish-eries management, NFA took two actions: the creation of theProvincial Support and Industry Development (PSID) divisionwithin NFA and the development of Memorandum of Agreementsbetween NFA and provincial fisheries offices. PSID serves as thehuman link between NFA and the provinces while the MOAsprovide the administrative language to devolve functions fromthe national to the provincial level. The factors that influencedNFA to become involved in provincial level fisheries and theresulting MOAs are discussed in the next section.
4. Results and discussion: the effects of the MOAs
4.1. The motivation for NFA re-entry into the provinces
Three main factors at the provincial level motivated NFA’sinvolvement in provincial fisheries: (1) limited provincial atten-tion to fisheries, (2) limited provincial support for the fisheriessector, and (3) limited provincial capacity to manage fisheries.The Managing Director of NFA explained ‘‘fisheries was notrecognized as an important sector in many provinces in the earlyyears. The MOA was to raise the profile of fisheries as aneconomic sector that was sustainable and can sustain the liveli-hoods of our rural people.’’
Second, provincial administrations did not allocate sufficientfunding for fisheries offices. Provincial fisheries officers identifiedthis limited financial support as a significant constraint. Officersdescribed both a lack of funds and slow disbursements of budgetedfunds. The Central Province fisheries adviser said ‘‘instead of theplans driving our budgets, in most cases the budgets are drivingthose plans’’, explaining that limited financial support from theprovinces hindered effective work at the provincial level. Whenprovincial administrations did provide funds to fisheries offices,many officers felt that this funding was not adequate to carry outactivities. The Oro provincial fisheries adviser gave an example of anannual transport allowance that was not sufficient to pay for aweek’s worth of transport. He concluded, ‘‘you can say that Oro isnot working, but we do not have the means to work.’’
In some cases, the provincial administration promised fundingand then did not deliver. The New Ireland provincial fisheriesadviser explained ‘‘Provincial funding towards fisheries and relatedactivities have beenyvery encouraging on paper. However, thereality is completely opposite because funds have not been releasedon time due to cash flow. NFA has really benefitted the province, ithas fully complied with what they were supposed to give theprovince and in fact given more. While the province has not beenfaithful in all agreements, NFA has been completely faithful.’’ A NewIreland provincial official supported this statement, saying that ‘‘Iknow there was no funds for all the officers to carry out their work.For the first quarter and now in the second quarter, the story is thesame. I do not know why the government does not give any moneyto do what it is supposed to do.’’ The West New Britain provincialfisheries adviser described a similar scenario, explaining that theprovincial finance department delayed the release of funds by oversix months: ‘‘by the time we started using the funds, the year wasover.’’ This constraint was also echoed by the Gulf provincialfisheries adviser who said ‘‘to date the [provincial] funding hasnever come. Half the year gone and we are just sitting down andwaiting for the money to come.’’
The third factor cited by both national and provincial fisheriesofficers in the increased role of NFA in the provinces is the lack of
human capacity at the provincial and district levels to effectivelymanage fisheries. The New Ireland fisheries adviser described thelack of qualified staff to work at the district and local levels. Hesaid that none of his staff has an advanced degree and they lackthe training needed to really understand some fisheries manage-ment issues. The East New Britain fisheries adviser explained thisissue in terms of motivation: ‘‘Our staff is under capacity in termsof, maybe not under capacity, but they tend to be in the systemfor too long, they may become complacent, the productivity islow and I am still looking for a way to enable the division, I thinkreplacement is what we need.’’ NFA officers described persistentstaff turnover as limiting effectiveness. For example, Gulf pro-vince has had five different fisheries advisers in the past six years.
As a result of these three limitations, NFA created the provin-cial support and industry division. The priority objective of PSID’sprovincial support component is ‘‘to develop and provide highlyresponsive, transparent, and effective operational processes andprocedures with provincial and local level governments to facil-itate effective partnership and working relationship in developingand managing coastal marine and fisheries resources’’ [11:21]. Asthe Executive Manager of PSID described, ‘‘We realized that in2002ythat the provinces were without budget, they were notreceiving enough money from the provincial governments’’ so wecreated the MOA for provincial fisheries officers to assist us withservices and we pay them so that they generate revenue to runtheir administrationyThe provincial liaison was basically createdto liaise with provincial administrations on issues that at thenational level affects fisheriesyconcerning monitoring, enforce-ment, anything that happens in the provinces, illegal things, wework closely with the provincial fisheries officers and they reporton what happens there.’’ Officers within PSID see their primarygoal as maintaining ‘‘a good relationship between ourselves andthe provincial authorities, whether it is the provincial governmentand the communities and provincial sector, so that we can carryout our programs and projects.’’
The MOAs are ‘‘the principle tool for defining the workingrelationship between the parties and outlining roles and respon-sibilities of the parties’’ [11:18]. NFA’s Managing Director explainsthat the MOA ‘‘sets out how we collaborate to carry out respon-sibilities in terms of effective fisheries management.’’ The 2002–2004 Corporate Plan identifies perceived benefits of the MOAarrangement for both the national and provincial levels: ‘‘NFAgets effective national coverage to deliver its services and collectdata through these arrangements. The province gets access toinformation, technical support and business advice for developingtheir fisheries’’ [10:7]. The delegated functions that NFA requeststhe provinces to carry out on their behalf are explained in sixschedules, Schedule A through Schedule F:
�
Schedule A: Management of coastal, estuarine, river, and lakefisheries � Schedule B: Implementation of ADB, EU, and other projects � Schedule C: Procedures for provincial recommendations onnational licenses
� Schedule D: Management of computers, printers, and phone/fax equipment supplied to provincial officers by NFA
� Schedule E: Procedures and administrative and financialarrangements for delegated functions, duties, and servicessupplied by the province to NFA
� Schedule F: Use of assets in the provinceThe Memorandum of Agreements between NFA and theprovincial government show that both levels of government sharean interest in conserving and managing Papua New Guinea’sfisheries. As noted in the background section, the 1998 FisheriesManagement Act and the 1995 Organic Law on Provincial
C.S. Benson / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 859–866862
Governments and Local Level Governments both spell out rolesand responsibilities in conserving and managing Papua NewGuinean fisheries. The Fisheries Management Act centralizesfisheries responsibilities while the Organic Law decentralizesfisheries responsibilities. The MOAs represent an effort to addressthis tension through integrating national and provincial levels ofgovernment.
4.2. Four mechanisms
This section provides empirical evidence on the effects of theNFA-provincial MOA based on the perceptions of the 13 provincialfisheries advisers who attended the 2010 NFA-provincial meeting.The mechanisms through which NFA connects to provincial fish-eries offices and officers can be grouped into four categories: (1)information, (2) human resources and capacity building, (3)institutions and decision-making, and (4) financial. As part ofthe survey, provincial fisheries advisers were asked to identifymechanisms which described their relationship with NFA. Thenumbers displayed in Table 1 represent the number of fisheriesadvisers who responded that the mechanism existed in theirprovince.
Information mechanisms can improve coordination and trans-parency among multiple levels of government. The most commoninformation mechanism identified by provincial fisheries officersis reporting on delegated monitoring and surveillance functionsto NFA, a form of communication that ensures greater account-ability of provincial officers. In addition, the majority of theadvisers said that NFA approves management plans and providestechnical oversight. Management plan approval, or a similar formof oversight, is frequently viewed as positive within the decen-tralization literature because it allows central levels to ensurethat lower levels focus on sustainable management. For example,
Table 1Mechanisms of decentralization.
Yes
InformationNFA conducts audits of activities 3
NFA conducts audits of finances 1
NFA provides a mechanism for reporting corruption 0
NFA approves provincial fisheries management plans 5
NFA provides technical oversight 7
Provinces provides activity reports to NFA 5
Province provides reports on MCS to NFA 8
Human resources and capacity buildingNFA appoints provincial fisheries officers 4
NFA approves provincial rules and laws 7
NFA staff provide advice 9
NFA staff provides technical assistance to me and other fish officers 9
NFA provides educational activities for me 7
NFA provides training activities for me in PNG 7
NFA provides training activities for me internationally 7
Institutions and decision-makingNFA has the authority to oversee provincial 1
Provincial fish staff have authority to sanction provincial activities 5
NFA has authority to recognize local management groups 8
Provincial fish authorities have authority to recognize local management
groups
9
Provincial fish staff have authority to create laws, policies 8
NFA monitors the performance of provincial fish activities 7
FinancialNFA transfers funds to provinces 4
NFA provides funding for operating costs 8
Provincial fish staff provide accounting reports 6
Provincial officers have authority to collect revenue from licenses or fees 1
advocates of the implementation of minimum environmentalstandards suggest that such standards ensure that local levelgovernments do not allow unsustainable timber harvesting [14].From this perspective, NFA approval of provincial managementplans may ensure that plans incorporate sustainable fisheriesmanagement. At the same time, when provincial authorities mustseek approval from NFA, their authority to act independently isconstrained. Consequently, NFA involvement in provincial activ-ities may ensure sustainable fisheries management while limitingthe autonomy of provincial fisheries offices to design and imple-ment management plans.
Information mechanisms related to audits and corruptionwere less common. Three officers reported that NFA audits theiractivities while only one responded that NFA conducts financialaudits in his province. Further, a mechanism for fisheries advisersto report corruption was completely absent. This finding suggeststhat information mechanisms focus more on reporting andmanagement plan support and less on activities which ensuretransparency and minimize the temptation for corruption.
A second way NFA connects with the provincial level isthrough mechanisms designed to increase local capacity. Eighty-two percent of provincial fisheries advisers stated that NFAprovides both formal and informal advice and technical assistancewhile a majority also benefitted from education and trainingactivities. Such training is designed to strengthen the capacity oflocal fisheries officers to perform delegated functions. Only fouradvisers responded that NFA appoints provincial fisheries officers;these responses are from officers in provinces with high levels ofenforcement activities, suggesting that NFA’s involvement instaffing concerns primarily relates to industrial fishing activities.These mechanisms address national concerns about the capacityof provincial officers to carry out their responsibilities and havethe potential to improve fisheries management because ofincreased local capacity.
Third, examining institutional and decision-making mechan-isms illustrates the devolution of responsibilities from thenational to provincial level. Provincial fisheries advisers havethe authority to create laws and policies. For example, the NewIreland provincial fisheries adviser explained that if he wants todevelop a local regulation or law, he has the authority to do soand NFA’s lawyers will assist him to ensure that the new localregulations do not contradict existing national legislation. Addi-tionally, 50% of advisers felt they had the authority to recognizelocal management groups and to sanction provincial activities,which suggests increased power at the local level. Further, onlyone adviser responded that NFA had the authority to overseeprovincial activities. At the same time, other institutional anddecision-making mechanisms suggest restrictions to local auton-omy. Advisers said that NFA monitors their performance and hasthe authority to work with local groups, both of which limit theautonomy of these advisers.
Finally, the mechanisms illustrate the financial support pro-vincial fisheries offices receive from NFA, as discussed earlier. Thisfinancial support provides critical resources for provincial offices,but also creates a dependency relationship between the NFA andprovincial fisheries offices. Provincial fisheries advisers do nothave the authority to collect license fees or taxes in theirprovinces. Therefore, they cannot generate their own sources ofrevenue and remain dependent on the provincial government orNFA to provide operational and salary support. The provincialfisheries advisers recognize that NFA has improved provincialcapacity in the absence of similar support from the provincialadministration. The New Ireland provincial fisheries adviser, forexample, described the ways NFA had supported provincialcapacity building and then noted ‘‘NFA has assisted usy, butreally it is the province that should be doing it.’’
C.S. Benson / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 859–866 863
The MOAs are based on template language that ensures similardelegation of roles and responsibilities from the national to theprovincial level. Consequently, one might expect similar responsesamong the fisheries advisers, with all respondents answering yesor no to the same questions. However, responses varied. Some ofthis variation is the result of the diverse nature of Papua NewGuinean provinces, such as with Monitoring, Surveillance, andCompliance (MCS) activities, which is not applicable to all pro-vinces, as suggested with NFA appointment of provincial fisheriesofficers in provinces with significant enforcement responsibilities.
One of the PSID officers explained the differences in provincialresponsibilities, saying ‘‘the more activities we have in theprovinces, the more enforcement requirements that we have toundertake. So you find in different provinces, some provinces haveno, there are some fishing activity, but it does not require thatmuch enforcement task from us. But in other provinces we have alot of like foreign vessels coming in and unloading or transferringfees, so we need to be there doing the monitoring. So in someprovinces there are a lot of enforcement activities.’’ As his state-ment suggests, some provinces carry out significant monitoringand enforcement roles on behalf of NFA while other provinceshave more limited engagement with monitoring and enforcement.
In other cases, the divergence of responses may illustrateprovincial fisheries advisers experiencing challenges in the imple-mentation of the MOA. For example, the MOAs clearly include thetransfer of funds to provinces and the provision of funding foroperating costs, the first two financial mechanisms. However,only eight out of the twelve advisers responded that theirprovince received this support. In one province, for example, thefisheries officer continuously exceeded the allowed limits for thephone bill and the telephone company shut off his service. His‘‘no’’ response can then be explained in terms of a dispute overhigh phone bills. In addition, some advisers commented that NFAhas been slow to provide funding while other provinces experi-enced delays in signing MOAs which then delays funds. Thesedelays may have contributed to the ‘‘no’’ responses from someactors.
Overall, these four mechanisms illustrate the ways the institu-tional reform process initiated by the MOAs result in closerrelationships between national and provincial fisheries officers.The outcome of this reform is the greater delegation of respon-sibilities to local level fisheries officers that is simultaneous withincreased upward accountability and central oversight.
4.3. Meeting NFA priorities
This paper proposed three factors that influenced NFA’s inter-vention in provincial and local level fisheries through the MOAs:(1) limited provincial attention, (2) limited provincial financialsupport, and (3) limited provincial capacity. Here, the paperevaluates the implementation of the MOAs to examine if theircreation resulted in NFA’s desired effects.
The MOAs deliver significant financial support to the pro-vinces. The amount of funding NFA provided to the provincesincreased over time: from 5000 Kina to 10,000 K to 15,000 K andmost recently to 35,000 K.5 In 2010, PSID requested the NFA boardto increase the MOA amount to 100,000 Kina for the next fundingcycle; consequently, the level of funding is likely to continue toincrease.
In addition to the amount NFA pays the provincial offices toperform MOA services, provinces may receive financial supportthrough performing additional functions or applying for project
5 At 2011 exchange rates, this amount in Kina is equivalent to $1940, $3875,
$5812, and $13,562.
funding. For example, provinces can bill NFA for performingMonitoring, Control, and Surveillance functions, which sevenprovincial fisheries officers reported doing in the past year.Provinces also received support from NFA’s project developmentfund for amounts ranging from 50,000 to 685,000 K and provincesreceived between 150,000 and 500,000 K to support the develop-ment of fisheries cooperatives. Provincial advisers who take theinitiative to apply for additional funding receive higher levels offinancial support from NFA.
NFA also provides equipment, such as cars, internet, phones,and fax machines. The funds and equipment provided to provin-cial fisheries offices elevate the status of these offices within theprovinces. This increased financial support and status of provin-cial fisheries addresses NFA’s original concern about limitedattention to provincial fisheries.
In some cases, the provincial government has begun to payattention to provincial fisheries. For example, in 2009, the Manusprovincial government provided only 20,000 K to Manus provin-cial fisheries while NFA provided 68,000 for the recurrent budgetin addition to over 10 million for projects. By 2010, in contrast,the Manus provincial government provided funding for both therecurrent budget (25,000 K) and the development of fisheriescooperative societies (200,000 K). The Manus fisheries adviserexplained that the Governor of Manus is starting to recognize theimportance of fisheries ‘‘because he is putting a lot of effort nowinto it. And I am not sure where he would rank fisheries, but Iwould say within the top 3. Whereas previously, it was only thetop 5 priorities, now I think top 3, could be 1st or 2nd, not sure.’’
Finally, limited provincial capacity and skills motivated thecreation of the MOAs. The original, MOAs, however, did notspecifically address this concern. At the 2008 NFA-provincialfisheries meeting, provincial officers requested the inclusion ofan extra schedule focused on capacity building and training. NFAaccepted this recommendation and added a seventh schedule. Atthe 20106 meeting, officers expressed their appreciation for theinclusion of this training support in the revised MOAs. The Oroprovincial fisheries adviser thanked NFA, saying ‘‘Plenty of ushave gone out and done training. I have been [in fisheries] for 24years and before I did not know how to press a button on acomputer and now I can type thanks to NFA.’’ Similarly, theMorobe provincial fisheries adviser thanked NFA, saying ‘‘youhave continued to support us, not in a small way, but in a big wayand your continued support is what has helped us and allowed usto develop.’’
The MOAs can be considered successful in addressing nationalconcerns in the provinces. The MOAs have facilitated manypositive outcomes, particularly in providing necessary financialsupport for provincial fisheries offices, presenting new educationand training opportunities, and strengthening communicationbetween national and provincial fisheries officers. Provincialofficers now carry out activities on behalf of NFA and receivecore funding support that ensures that offices have basic infra-structure and communication. When considering these positiveoutcomes, the MOA reforms can be seen as a successful experi-ment in integrating central and local levels of governance.
Provincial fisheries advisers also agree that the MOAs havefacilitated positive outcomes. When asked ‘‘Do you agree that theMOAs have strengthened relationships between NFA and theprovinces?’’, 100% agreed or strongly agreed. Fisheries advisersalso agreed that individual relationships with the provinces hadstrengthened over time. This perspective is shown in a represen-tative comment made when provincial fisheries advisers weresurveyed about their relationship with NFA. The New Ireland
6 No conference was held in 2009.
C.S. Benson / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 859–866864
fisheries adviser compared his relationship with NFA to therelationship of provincial officers with corresponding agenciesin other sectors, saying ‘‘I think we have a very good relationship.If I must boast, I will say that with the provincial fisheries, I do notknow about others, but in New Ireland, the relationship with usand the NFA, compared to other national agencies like [agricul-ture and commerce], I think we are the only one that is a very,very good relationship with NFA.’’
To ensure that the MOA continues to meet the needs andpriorities of both NFA and provincial fisheries, NFA organizes anannual national–provincial fisheries conference to review theMOAs. The goal of this conference is to ‘‘foster and maintainproductive networks as well as robust working relationships’’between national and provincial fisheries officers (MD speech,Alotau). This conference illustrates the increasing power ofprovincial officers in discussions and negotiations with NFA. The2007 conference focused primarily on NFA activities while the2008 conference allowed participants time to review and revisethe MOAs. In 2010, NFA gave the provinces the opportunity topresent their perspectives. The Executive Manager of PSIDexplained that NFA decided to have provincial fisheries advisersgive their presentations first because we did not want ‘‘NFA totalk first’’ but wanted to know ‘‘the issues of the provinces.’’ Thisrecognition of the importance of asking about provincial prioritiesrepresents a shift in which both national and provincial officershave the power to influence the agenda and participate indiscussions. This shift in interaction between NFA and provincialfisheries underscores some of the additional and potential effectsof the MOAs, which are discussed below.
4.4. Producing unintended effects
One potential intended, or unintended, effect of the MOAsrelates to questions of accountability and loyalty. Provincialfisheries advisers indicate that NFA’s support provided substantialbenefits to the province while provincial administrations have nothonored their budget commitments. Fisheries advisers are tech-nically upwardly accountable to the provincial administration.Still, such differences in financial and other forms of supportcould alter provincial fisheries officers loyalties over time, makingthem more responsive to requests from the national level than topriorities of the provincial or lower levels.
Concerns raised by some advisers who felt NFA was only activelyinvolved in the province when provincial activities met nationalpriorities illustrate this potential for divergent priorities. One adviserexplained that NFA ‘‘[concentrates] on tuna, beche-de-mer,7 alsolobster.’’ The previous year, fisheries officers discovered a largenumber of dead turtles, so the adviser ‘‘rang the people in NFA tocome and do research and they never came, they arrived about twoweeks late and [the turtles] were all dead. And that is one problemin NFA, is with responding to the issues in provinces with researchon marine issues. They have money to fund projects on resourcesmanagement and coastal zones buty[they ignore] resource man-agement and they do not want to do it.’’ Similarly, anotherprovincial fisheries adviser said NFA has ‘‘neglected the coastalfisheriesyA lot of their work is focused on the offshore fishery, thatis probably where the money is, but by the same tokenythe coastalareas [and marine protected areas] should not be forgotten as wellbecause that is the lifeline of the people here.’’
Fisheries advisers believe the MOAs resulted in stronger work-ing relationships and increased NFA oversight of provincial
7 BDM, or beche-de-mer, are also known as sea cucumbers. The beche-de-mer
fishery was an important source of income for Papua New Guineans; however,
NFA imposed a three year ban on beche-de-mer collection in 2009 as a result of
growing concern about the depletion of the fishery.
fisheries. At the same time, five advisers stated that local powerand local autonomy8 increased following the implementation ofthe MOAs, which suggests that some advisers still believe theyhave sufficient independence to make decisions and managefisheries in their province. These responses suggest a mixedpicture of increased responsibilities, restricted autonomy, andstatic power relations.
As noted earlier, legislation provides for both centralized anddecentralized fisheries responsibilities. Papua New Guinea’sOrganic Law theoretically empowers provincial fisheries officers,but their autonomy is limited by both the National Fisheries Actand their financial dependence on NFA. Provincial fisheriesofficers report satisfaction with the closer relationships betweenNFA and the provinces as a result of the MOAs. Still, theirstatements and actions suggest a sense of upward accountabilitytowards the NFA. Further, the degree to which these MOAs haveresulted in significant changes in the power or autonomy ofprovincial fisheries officers appears limited. One area in whichthis tension may become more pronounced in the future is incommunity fisheries.
4.5. More unintended effects? Community fisheries
The analysis suggests the MOAs have successfully integratednational and provincial fisheries and achieved NFA’s intendedeffects while simultaneously producing other, potentially unin-tended effects. Coastal fisheries illustrate one such example.Scholars propose a need to more closely examine governancereforms in the fisheries sector to determine whether such reformsbenefit fishers [15]. They emphasize that the participation offishers is central in rhetoric surrounding fisheries reforms acrossAfrica [15]. In contrast to such cases, however, PNG’s policies donot explicitly identify community fishers as targets of fisheriesgovernance reforms. Instead, PNG’s MOAs are remarkable for theabsence of attention to coastal fisheries and small-scale fisheries.
Over the years, there have been efforts to commercializecommunity fisheries in PNG. Community fisheries in PNG aretypically characterized as small scale, artisanal fisheries. In someprovinces, fishers may sell their catch to fish buyers or processingplants for export. In other provinces, fish catch may be primarilyfor household consumption or village markets. The Food andAgriculture Organization’s country profile of PNG notes: ‘‘there isconsiderable difficulty in developing coastal commercial fisheriesand the past is littered with expensive attempts’’ [13:2]. The AsianDevelopment Bank and the European Union initiated projects todevelop coastal fisheries at the same time as the Asian Develop-ment Bank’s institutional strengthening project for NFA, but bothof these projects suffered from mismanagement, failed to meettheir objectives, and were terminated early. More recently, NFAhas provided grants for the development of fisheries cooperatives.NFA envisions these cooperatives as a mechanism to bring smallscale fisheries into the market economy. Still, despite thesevarious initiatives, attention to community fisheries is limitedcompared to PNG’s commercial fishery, which focuses on export.
Community fisheries are discussed each year at the annualnational–provincial fisheries conference. The 2007 conferencereport noted that participants endorsed the concept of commu-nity based fisheries management and asked for increased support.It cautioned, however, ‘‘Community-Based Management [CBM] isnot the sole responsibility of NFA and provinces and civil societyneed to take initiatives in designing and funding the implementa-tion of CBM programs in the provinces.’’ [11:3]. The 2008 meeting
8 Local autonomy was defined in the survey in terms of flexibility, freedom,
and independence to manage fisheries.
C.S. Benson / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 859–866 865
again described CBM as a priority activity, but cautioned that NFAdid not have an operational policy in place to address this activity.The 2007 and 2008 conference facilitator also highlighted theimportance provincial fisheries officers placed on CBM: ‘‘Theprovinces themselves were very outspoken, we want CBM, wewant to see that level of community managementywe want NFAto facilitate it and there has been this confusion, if you like,between provincial liaison and provincial fisheries managementas to where it sitsyeveryone says it is a big hot potato and thereis no one really assigned.’’
Provincial fisheries officers are responsible for coordinatingwith district and local level officers; in practice, this linkage isweak at best. Provincial fisheries officers said they do noteffectively communicate and work with the district and locallevel governments. For example, the Central Province fisheriesadviser explained ‘‘we have a poor relationship with the districts.’’
Extension services to fisheries communities are limited to non-existent in PNG. When asked about extension activities carriedout in their province over the past year, two advisers admittedthat their province had not carried out any activities or patrols.Other provincial advisers referenced trainings or awarenessprograms on the beche-de-mer closure. Still, even when provin-cial officers do visit villages, their interaction tends to be limited:one officer who reported visiting nearly all of the villages withinhis province said he spent only 1–2 days in each village. The samefisheries adviser later admitted ‘‘right now, the extension pro-gram is very, very poor, [we do not have it].’’
At the same time, local interest in fisheries and demand forservices is high. All thirteen advisers said that villagers regularlyvisit their offices to request assistance. These visits suggest thatlocal communities in PNG desire a higher level of involvementand support from provincial fisheries offices.
When asked whether ‘‘NFA successfully addresses coastalfisheries management’’, 11 respondents replied that NFA did notsuccessfully address coastal fisheries. Fisheries advisers explainedthat there had been ‘‘very little effort’’. When asked to makesuggestions on how NFA could better address coastal fisheriesmanagement, three advisers recommended the development oflegislation addressing community fisheries.
NFA also recognizes the continued failure to manage commu-nity fisheries. The director of PSID said ‘‘you see the communityfisheries is not moving, you can see clearly that these people arenot involvedyand that is the worry, so we see that as a concern.’’She also cautioned the provincial fisheries officers at the meetingthat their funding requests often focus on office equipment andsupplies and that she would prefer provinces use funding ‘‘forextension visits, or help the districts to have access to it.’’ AnotherPSID staff explained ‘‘I think one of the challenges, problems inthe provinceythey are not given out enough resources to carryout their work so as a result maybe they stay in the office and dowhatever and they get paid. They do not go out to district orLLG (Local Level Government) levels to do fisheries extensionsbecause they do not have the funds.’’ This comment underscoresthe ways in which financial mechanisms play a significant role inshaping provincial activities and focus.
The comments of both NFA and provincial fisheries officersillustrate the limited focus on coastal fisheries in PNG. While thecreation of the MOA has strengthened the relationships betweennational and provincial fisheries officers, an unintended effect hasbeen increased focus on national priorities at the provincial level,which has limited provincial focus on coastal fisheries. Further,this situation highlights one of the more vexing questions facingdecentralization: that such reforms increase upward accountabil-ity and do not necessarily transfer authority to downwardlyaccountable local officials who consider the interests and prio-rities of local communities.
5. Conclusions
The MOAs between NFA and provincial fisheries represent anovel solution to a legislative situation that provides for bothdecentralized and centralized environmental governance. TheseMOAs represent an effort by the national government to addressconcerns about the limitations of provincial fisheries through betterintegration of levels of governance. The MOAs successfully trans-ferred financial support and increased local capacity, which alsoraised the profile of provincial fisheries. At the same time, analysisof information and institutions/decision-making mechanismsshows a closer relationship between NFA and the provinces. Whilethe connections between the national and provincial levels haveimproved as a result of the MOA, the links between the provincial,district, and local level government remain poor, with limitedattention to coastal fisheries in PNG and limited to non-existentservice delivery occurring. Further, while the provincial fisheriesoffices benefit from financial support, these resources have notbeen shared with or transferred to community level fisheries.
A recent ruling by Papua New Guinea’s National ExecutiveCouncil recognized this gap and authorized the creation of theCoastal Fisheries Development Agency (CFDA) to address coastalfisheries management. The draft strategic plan describes CFDA as‘‘an office established by NEC Decision 151/2009 with the objec-tive of bridging the link between the national, provincial, andlocal level governments to the rural masses as far as coastalfishery and marine resources are concerned’’ [16:7]. The ActingManaging Director of CFDA believes his agency has the potentialto address the shortcomings of NFA with respect to communityfisheries. He explained that NFA focuses on commercial fisheriesand CFDA will focus on community fisheries: ‘‘our service isfocusing on extension service, we do not want to do what NFA isdoing, we want to be different in the sense that we want to bethere for the 4 million people of PNG, we want to get to them.’’
As CFDA becomes operational and begins to provide funding toprovincial fisheries officers, it will be interesting to examinewhether this emerging national agency represents an extensionof the Papua New Guinean state within localities or an effort tobetter address the needs and priorities of local fisher commu-nities. Attention to the concerns and priorities of communityfisheries is an important next step in improving coastal fisheriesmanagement in PNG.
The core of this analysis suggests better integration betweenthe national and provincial levels of government. This exampleillustrates how an examination of the mechanisms of governanceamong levels can show both intended and unintended effects,particularly in terms of shifting accountabilities and loyalty. Whena national government agency provides services to provincial staffthat the provincial administration does not deliver, such as howNFA provides financial support and capacity building opportu-nities, provincial staff recognize these differing levels of support.This situation illustrates the potential for such funding arrange-ments to increase upward accountability to the national level, evenin situations where provincial fisheries officers are legally accoun-table to the provincial level. Understanding the potential for suchshifts in accountability and loyalty is important for scholarsseeking to understand decentralization and institutional change.These findings show the importance of financial mechanisms inshaping loyalty and performance-related outcomes and suggest animportant avenue of research for scholars of decentralization.
Acknowledgements
This work could not have been conducted without the help ofstaff of Papua New Guinea’s National Fisheries Authority and the
C.S. Benson / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 859–866866
provincial fisheries advisers across PNG. I am particularly grateful toLekha Pitoi, Welette Waru, and Norman Barnabus for allowing me toparticipate in the annual national–provincial fisheries meeting and toHugh Walton for first showing me the unique nature of the NationalFisheries Authority. I am grateful for comments on this manuscriptby Claudia Rodroguez–Solarnzo and to the University of MichiganSoutheast Asian Reading group and DESULICO group who commen-ted on earlier version of the paper. The National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration (NOAA) Nancy Foster Scholarship anda Fulbright Hays Scholarship provided support for the field researchupon which this article is based. I was solely responsible for theresearch design, data collection, and data analysis and interpretation.
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