Sharples_Anamnesis

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Discussion Note

More on ÉAnãmnhsiw in the Meno

BOB SHARPLES

ABSTRACT

John Glucker, “A Platonic Cento in Cicero”, Phronesis 44 (1999) 30-44, argues

that the account of the mind’s experiences at Cicero, De divinatione 1.115 derives

from an unknown Platonist’s combination of Plato, Meno 81c5-d1 and Republic

10 614d3-615a5. G.’s connection of what is said by Cicero with these two pas-

sages of Plato is persuasive; but in concentrating on the surface references to

souls’ memory of their experiences in previous lives the Ciceronian account failsto do justice to the underlying signiÞcance of both passages. It is also question-

able whether an unknown Platonist needs to be invoked as a source; the inter-

pretation of the two Platonic passages could be Cicero’s own.

In his paper “A Platonic Cento in Cicero”1 John Glucker (henceforth “G.”)

argues that the account of the mind’s experiences at Cicero, De divinatione

1.115 derives from ‘some contemporary or slightly earlier Pythagoreanizing

Platonist’ combining the references to souls’ previous experiences in Plato,

Meno 81c5-d1 and Republic 10 614d3-615a5. That the passage in Cicero reßects

these passages in Plato seems entirely convincing, and G.’s reference to a

“midrash” (39) is very much to the point, though there may be room for doubt

concerning the “Pythagoreanizing Platonist”, an issue to which I will return

at the end of this discussion note.How the passages may have been read in antiquity, and how they should

be read, are however two diff erent issues.2 In his 37 n. 15 G. argues that

What our two sections of diff erent myths do have in common is that they main-

tain, in their literal sense, that the soul, in the many periods when it is outside

its successive earthly bodies . . . has learned all things, pãnta xrÆmata, on earth

and in the other world. Neither of them refers to Ideas, or even to the aÈtÚ kayÉaÍtÚ formula. Cicero’s source Ð whatever his view of the Theory of Forms may

have been Ð seems to have taken this detail in Plato’s myth more literally than

most modern Platonists.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 1999 Phronesis XLIV/4

Accepted June 19991 Phronesis 44 (1999) 30-44.2 G. indeed (35 n. 13) explicitly disavows any attempt to interpret the account of

énãmnhsiw in the Meno in its own right: “my concern here,” he says, “is not with

Plato’s dialogue, but with the way it was read by a later source”. But his remarks at

37 n. 15, quoted below, do seem to be directly concerned with the interpretation of

Plato’s text. Ð G. might indeed claim that, although a non-literal reading of the Meno

PHRO/62/Sharples/1-5 11/25/99 3:50 PM Page 353



Immediately before this he observes that modern commentators have not

connected the two passages because they have connected the Meno passagerather with recollection of the Forms in the Phaedo; and in criticism of such

an approach he instructs us

For some of the controversies and confusions resulting from taking ‘Plato’s

Theory of Recollection’ seriously as a philosophical doctrine which must be con-

sidered with similar ‘doctrines’ in the various other dialogues, see R.W. Sharples

(ed., trans., comm.), Plato: Meno, Warminster 1991, 147-149 . . . and 7-9 . . .,

where ‘the doctrine of reincarnation’ and ‘the theory of recollection’ are taken

in full seriousness.

Taken together these two passages could be taken to imply that (i) my dis-

cussion supposed that this passage of the Meno refers to apprehension of the

Forms, and that by unintentionally and unconsciously exposing the difÞcul-

ties of such an interpretation I provided evidence against such a readingmalgré moi. They also indicate more deÞnitely that, in G.’s view, (ii) it is, as

a matter of fact, a mistake to read a reference to the Forms into this passage.

As far as (i) is concerned, I would simply point out that my discussion

cited by G. is followed by the argument that the Theory of Forms as found

in the Phaedo and Republic is not developed in the Meno and should not be

read back into that dialogue.3 I did indeed also insist that we should not go

to the other extreme and suppose that Plato in the Meno is entirely innocent

of all distinctions between diff erent types of truths or realities4 and what is

involved in knowing them; thus we should not assume that the example of

the Road to Larisa implies that all knowledge is in all respects similar to

direct acquaintance with particulars perceptible by the senses, any more than

we should infer the same from the example of the jurymen at Theaetetus

201ac. And to that extent I am certainly committed to holding that Meno 81cdhas implications for types of knowledge other than that resulting from expe-

rience of sensible particulars in previous lives.

That brings us to the much more important question whether 81cd is to be

read entirely at face value, or whether on the contrary it is to be interpreted

on two levels, as G.’s description of it as a myth, and his reference to a “lit-

eral sense” in the passage already quoted, indeed imply. And here a compar-

ison with the Republic myth may be instructive. There can be no doubt at all

that this is to be read on two diff erent levels.5 On the speciÞc issue that con-

passage is irrelevant for the purposes of his discussion, he has no quarrel with a non-

literal reading as such, only with one that introduces the Theory of Forms. But in that

case it is difÞcult to see why he thinks he and I are in disagreement.3 Sharples (1991) 12-13, 147-148. See also below, n. 8.4 Ibid. 13.5 And that in order to interpret the myth it is vital that these two levels be kept dis-

tinct. I have discussed this point elsewhere: in a review of S. Halliwell (ed.), Plato:

354 DISCUSSION NOTE




cerns us here, it is enough to point out that a reader of the Republic will come

to the myth in book 10 after reading book 5,

6

and that in terms of the dis-tinction drawn at the end of book 5 anyone who thought that moral under-

standing could be achieved simply by experience of the events of previous

lives, one’s own and others,7 without referring that experience to knowledge

of general truths Ð which, in the Republic, means knowledge of Forms Ð

would be operating on the level of the filoyeãmonew, or rather the filÆkooi,

rather than on that of the filÒsofoi. Socrates’ exposition of the myth how-

ever makes it explicit that filosof¤a is needed if we are consistently to escape

punishment in the afterlife: 619d8-e1 (cf. also 619d1). So the “Pythagorean-

izing Platonist”’s reading of the Republic only gets part of the point.

Similarly, I would contend, in the Meno. Admittedly, in my commentary I

took 81c5-d5 too much as Socrates’ interpretation of what the “priests and

priestesses who have made it their concern to be able to give an account of

their practices, and . . . Pindar and many others of the poets” say, rather thanas part of it. In fact, as G.’s discussion makes clear, the account of the views

of the priests, priestesses and poets extends all the way from 81a10 to 81d5;

and on one level a reference to experiences in previous lives certainly is to

be understood.8 This may indeed have been the emphasis of the doctrine of

reincarnation in the form in which Plato Þrst encountered it; Pythagoras

himself was notable for having been able to remember his soul’s previous

Republic X , Warminster 1988, at Journal of Hellenic Studies 110 (1990) 226-7, and

in ‘Plato, Plotinus and Evil’, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 39 (1994)

171-181, at 175-176.6 Assuming that the Republic, whether or not it originated as a single composition

(which I think it probably did) is at any rate to be treated as one in the form whichit now has.

7 G. (37) draws attention to the souls’ hearing of each others’ experiences (614e4-

615a4) as a solution to the problem that ‘if, for example, a certain soul has been, in

all its incarnations, a just soul, there would be parts of “Hades” which it would never

have seen’. Since in the Republic myth the cycle of incarnations seems to be ever-

lasting, with no reference to a beginning and none to an eventual escape (by contrast

with Phaedo114c and Phaedrus 249a), the question arises whether or not Plato thought

that in an inÞnity of rebirths a soul would undergo all possible experiences. That ques-

tion is unanswerable; but Republic 10 619d3-e5 at least, by introducing as a condi-

tion not only moral choice but also the luck of the lot (in contradiction to 619b3-6)

indicates the difÞculty of supposing that a given soul will escape Hades altogether and

take the “heavenly route” on every occasion.8 At Sharples (1991) 147-148 I raised the question whether “recollection of previ-

ous experiences on earth” is “of central importance for Plato’s own argument”. But because I then regarded 81c5-d5 as interpretation of the myth rather than as a con-

tinuation of it, my discussion was concerned with interpretation of the underlying

meaning of the “myth”, rather than with the surface level on which Cicero and G.

concentrate.

DISCUSSION NOTE 355




identities,9 and it is a not implausible supposition that the practice described

by Iamblichus of recalling the previous day’s events in sequence before get-ting out of bed in the morning, or “if one had more leisure” those of the day

before as well, was intended to improve one’s ability to recall actions and

events earlier in one’s present life and ultimately, by extension, in previous

lives as well.10 Nevertheless, Plato is using the reference to the beliefs of the

priests, priestesses and poets to make a point which the following geometri-

cal experiment with the slave is meant to demonstrate, and this suggests that

81c5-d5 is to be read on two levels, as part of the mythical account begin-

ning at 81a10, indeed, but also as pointing forward to the geometrical exper-

iment and the possibility of achieving understanding in mathematics. Socrates

does after all say that “since all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all

things, nothing prevents it, if it has recollected one thing Ð what people call

learning Ð from discovering all other things”.11 Even if we were to suppose

that the slave’s ability to distinguish (when sufÞciently prompted) betweencorrect and incorrect answers12 reßects nothing other than the fact that in an

inÞnity of past lives he is bound to have been taught geometry at some point

(or to have met and conversed with someone who has been Ð if that is dif-

f erent from being taught), the words quoted seem to indicate a recognition on

Plato’s part of the fact that geometrical understanding is systematic and that

from awareness of some things one can work out others.13 And that is a rather

diff erent matter from simply amassing experience of events that occur to one-

self or to others in the ordinary course of life.

As for the “Pythagoreanizing Platonist”, it is worth emphasising that Cicero

was himself familiar at Þrst hand with a range of Plato’s writings. After all,

he translated a considerable part of the Timaeus, was proud enough of his

translation of the argument for immortality in the Phaedrus to use it twice,14

9 Heraclides of Pontus fr. 89 Wehrli = Diogenes Laertius 8.4-5.10 Iamblichus, Vit. Pyth. 165 = DK 58D1. Iamblichus, it must be admitted, refers

rather to the importance of memory for knowledge and experience and wisdom.11 81c9-d2. G. (35 n. 13) notes that this aspect is absent from Cicero’s version.12 Cf. 85b8-c8. I leave aside here questions of whether the “slave-boy experiment”

is to be taken at face value, and of whether it actually establishes what Socrates claims

it does.13 G. (35 n. 13) notes that énãmnhsiw is presented as an intellectual process at Meno

98a3-4, but that “what people call learning” at 81d1-2 is “recollecting the one thing”

that starts the process. But the preceding reference to having previously learned all

things as what makes the process, of discovering other things from the one thing ini-

tially recollected, possible shows that this process must also itself be thought of as

part of the process of recollection; and that is made explicit at 81d4-5. Recollectionhere is not, in other words, simply a matter of remembering a large number of indi-

vidual past experiences, even if it was so for the Pythagoreans (above, n. 10). See also

above, n. 2.14 Plato, Phaedrus 245ce; Cicero, Republic 6.27 and Tusc. Disp. 1.53-54.

356 DISCUSSION NOTE




and includes versions of other Platonic passages in his own works as well.15

It is indeed highly probable that his reading of Plato was inßuenced by inter-pretations current among Platonists in his time. But can we rule out the pos-

sibility that the interpretation in De divinatione 1.115, and its extraction from

Meno 81cd and Republic 10 614d-615a, might simply be Cicero’s own con-

tribution?

University College London

15 E.g. Republic 9 571c3-572b1, translated by Cicero at De divinatione 1.60-61

(noted by G., 39); Republic 1.328d ff . at De senectute 7 ff . Cf. J.G.F. Powell, ‘Cicero’s

Translations from Greek’, in id. (ed.), Cicero the Philosopher , Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1995, 273-300, especially at 279-280.

DISCUSSION NOTE 357


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