Any informed assessment of thefuture direction of events in the WestBank must take as its point of departurea review of the main elements of currentIsraeli and Palestinian policies.

The Big Picture

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon hasadopted a wide-ranging and dynamicpolicy that makes no reference toPalestinians or the Oslo framework.This spirit of unilateralism has longbeen a central feature of Israel’s policiesin the occupied territories.

Palestinian president MahmoudAbbas, an advocate of nonviolence,hopes to assert the leadership of the PAover Palestinian factions and their vio-lent resistance to continuing occupationin an effort to convince Israel to resumenegotiations on final status issues andrestore territorial and security attributeslost during the intifada.

In December 2001, Israel’s cabinetdefined the Palestinian Authority (PA)as an “entity that supports terror,” set-ting the stage for the body’s subsequent

emasculation. This declaration has notbeen amended nor repudiated.

In May 2002, shortly after the begin-ning of Israel’s restoration of directsecurity control over the entire WestBank, the Settlement Report observed, “Anew, post-Oslo era has begun in theoccupied territories. The understandingsbetween Israel and the Palestinians thatmade possible the establishment of aPalestinian Authority led by YasserArafat and the creation of Palestiniansecurity services with a mandate inPalestinian populated areas [Areas A] ofthe West Bank have been irrevocablyundermined. Likewise, the territorialdivision of the West Bank that resultedfrom the Oslo process—the creationAreas A, B, and C—is no longer rele-vant to the reality in the West Bank andGaza Strip.”

Subsequent events, including Israel’sdeparture from the Gaza Strip, haveconfirmed that the Sharon governmenthas no interest or faith in the “land forsecurity” bargain at the heart of Oslo.Nor do many Palestinians who seeIsrael’s retreat from Gaza as a victoryfor the armed resistance. Abbas is rely-ing upon the international community,particularly the Bush administration, torestore the Oslo equation, now updatedby the moribund road map, to thediplomatic center stage.

Palestinian strategic objectives arefreedom, independence, and sovereigntyover all territories conquered by Israel inJune 1967. In an April 2005 positionpaper presented to U.S. envoys, Pale-stinians demanded “full . . . sovereignty

over the land borders, regional waters,and air space of these areas, includingsecuring an international presence.”Minister for Civil Affairs MuhammadDahlan explained, “There will be noseparation between the West Bank andGaza, and we will not allow the GazaStrip to be turned into a prison.”

Measured against these Palestiniangoals, Israel’s disengagement from theGaza Strip remains incomplete, pendinga resolution of the residual powers Israelwill retain over the movement of peopleand goods between the Gaza Strip andEgypt and beyond, and the degree offreedom established for movementbetween Gaza and the West Bank.

Crippling the PA

The government of Ariel Sharon haslittle interest in the creation of an effec-tive Palestinian security force in theWest Bank, and it is at best ambivalentabout the rehabilitation of such a capa-bility in the Gaza Strip.

In the West Bank, the Israeli armyregularly exercises freedom of actioneverywhere, preempting the crippledsecurity capabilities of the PA. Unilater-al Israeli actions, notably the erection ofthe separation barrier, assassinations,and the complex and draconian systemof controls on Palestinian movement,now define Israel’s preferred securityinstruments. Despite Palestinian andinternational entreaties, Israel has shownno interest in reassessing these policies.

Beginning in March 2002, the gov-

REPORT ON

ISRAELI SETTLEMENTIN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

A B i m o n t h l y P u b l i c a t i o n o f t h e Fo u n d a t i o n f o r M i d d l e E a s t Pe a c e

Volume 15 Number 6 November-December 2005

SHARON’S WEST BANK POLICY LEAVES LITTLE ROLE FOR THE PA

Please visit our website to see itsnew look and improved navigation.Sign up to receive the Report by e-mail, to be notified of events inWashington, DC, and more. Visitus at www.fmep.org.

Also in this issue:

Separation Barrier Update 5Ma’ale Adumim Map 6

WEST BANK, continued on page 7

2 ❖ Report on Israeli Settlement November-December 2005

TO OUR READERSFOUNDATION FOR

MIDDLE EAST PEACE

Merle Thorpe, Jr.Founder

(1917–1994)

Philip C. Wilcox, Jr.President

Geoffrey AronsonDirector, Research and Publications, Editor, Report onIsraeli Settlement in the OccupiedTerritories

Nitzan GoldbergerEditorial Assistant

Maher BitarIntern

TRUSTEES

Lucius D. BattleLandrum R. BollingCalvin H. Cobb, Jr.James J. CromwellPeter GubserStephen HartwellRichard S.T. MarshRichard W. MurphyJean C. NewsomGail PressbergWilliam B. QuandtNicholas A. Veliotes

The Foundation, a non-profit I.R.C. 501(c)(3)organization, supports peaceand security for Israelis andPalestinians through mutualrecognition and a negotiateddivision of historic Pales-tine. It publishes the bi-monthly Report on IsraeliSettlement in the OccupiedTerritories.

Copyright © 2005

Hopes for peace based on MahmoudAbbas’ commitment to non-violence, aninformal truce, and Ariel Sharon’s with-drawal from Gaza are fading fast, threaten-ing a return to the old cycle of violence andrevenge. There has been little progress onthe critical issue of assuring Palestinianfreedom of movement in and out of Gaza,and American envoy James Wolfensohnhas complained about Israeli foot-dragging.Abbas has not stamped out terrorism, norhas the IDF stopped settler violenceagainst Palestinian citizens and property.Sharon is moving relentlessly to consolidateWest Bank settlements and confine thePalestinians to isolated enclaves, ignoringU.S. concerns. In the first quarter of 2005,settlement building in the West Bank wasup 83%, and 14,000 more Israelis have set-tled there, far more than the 6,500 evacuat-ed from Gaza. The 23 square miles alonethat Sharon plans to encircle with his sepa-ration barrier in order to sever EastJerusalem from the West Bank are more

than the 19 square miles abandoned inGaza.

The only way to break the currentimpasse and avoid a new descent into vio-lence is to end unilateralism and return tonegotiations, with vigorous Americanmediation. Abbas wants peace talks. ButSharon prefers unilateralism and treatsAbbas like Yasser Arafat, claiming he is nota “partner” until he gains control of securi-ty. Meanwhile, as this Report points out,Sharon and the IDF have rejected coopera-tion with Palestinian security forces and arepursuing unilateral settlement and securitypolicies that undermine Abbas, strengthenhis militant rivals, and provoke new vio-lence. Adding to this dismal picture,President Bush discouraged hopes forrenewed U.S. leadership when he said dur-ing Abbas’ visit in October that he wouldurge no timetable for renewed talks.

TO OUR READERS

—————— ◆ ——————

NETZARIM VERSUS THE CHRISTIANS

Ariel mayor Ron Nachman wants “to strength the Jewish character of the city,”according to a September 9, 2005 article in the Ma’ariv supplement. The settle-ment was established in 1978 and enjoys a growing population of 18,000. Close tohalf the settlement’s population arrived from the former Soviet Union during thelast 15 years, including a large percentage (up to 50 percent) who are Christian.Ariel is home to Russian evangelicals and a group of “Jews for Jesus”—the “Hopeof Samaria”—who count Christians from Waco, Texas as members. TheseAmericans were first introduced to the settlement by Nachman, who has longsolicited Christian fundamentalist groups throughout the United States for finan-cial and political support.

Ariel’s popularity among Christians has prompted a backlash of sorts. As partof his campaign “to strengthen the ideological religious ( Jewish) public that livesin the Land of Israel” and to double its population in the settlement to 20 per-cent, Nachman invited evacuees from the Gaza settlement of Netzarim, nowresiding temporarily in the settlement, to establish a new, permanent neighbor-hood.

“If they intend to build a new little Gaza with beautiful houses and money-earning hothouses,” said one Christian resident, “I’ll be very happy.”

November-December 2005 Report on Israeli Settlement ❖ 3

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Bet Amana—the leading company forfreestanding homes invites you totake advantage of a once in a lifetimechance in the New Anatot—the newcottage neighborhood in Anatot.

This advertisement for the settlement of Anatot/Almonappeared soon after the Sharon government decided thatthe route of the separation barrier would include theAdumin bloc settlements.

Yediot Aharonot, February 20, 2005

4 ❖ Report on Israeli Settlement November-December 2005

August 26 Yerushalaim reports that twoJewish American investors are in the processof purchasing 13 dunams belonging to Arablandowners in the Palestinian village abut-ting Har Adar in an effort to expand HarAdar by about 2,000 residents.

Kol Ha’Ir reports the Jerusalem municipali-ty’s intent to encourage one-third of Gaza’sNeve Dekalim settlers, about 2,500 persons,to relocate to a newly built neighborhood inHar Homa in East Jerusalem.

August 28 Yerushalaim reports on a plan tobuild 500 housing units in Har Homa. Theneighborhood currently includes more than2,500 homes.

Yerushalaim reports that Jerusalem mayor UriLupolianski has proposed a plan to transfersome neighborhoods in East Jerusalem tothe Palestinian Authority (PA) in exchangefor complete Israeli control of the Old City,including the al-Aqsa mosque.

August 31 Avri Ran, the “father” of hilltopoutposts and leader of the settler youthmovement, is captured near the Jordan Riverby police. He had escaped house arrest sevenmonths prior. (Ma’ariv)

Settlers vandalize security cameras placed bythe Israeli Defense Forces in the Jewishenclave of Tel Rumeida in Hebron. Twoteenagers are arrested. (Ha’aretz)

September 1 Ha’aretz reports the Israelicomptroller’s findings of serious violations inthe enforcement and operation of the sepa-ration barrier following an investigation con-ducted August through October 2004. Thecomptroller asserted that technology andpersonnel were not being used effectively toensure the security or standard of living ofthe Palestinian people.

September 2 Yerushalaim reports a plan tobuild more than 1,000 Palestinian housingunits on approximately 1,500 dunams in theneighbhorhood of al-Tur. An agreement isbeing negotiated whereby in exchange for aPalestinian commitment to freeze unautho-rized construction in the area, the munici-pality would cease issuing demolition orders.

September 6 Israeli agriculture ministerYisrael Katz orders the fencing of 15,000dunams south of Har Hebron. The govern-ment had decided to leave this area nearunauthorized outposts outside of the separa-tion barrier, but Katz, according to Ma’ariv

“voiced his determination to alter the demo-graphic reality in the area to an extent wherethe government will be forced to include thearea within the boundaries of the separationbarrier.”

Ma’ariv reports Defense Minister Mofaz’sapproval of the construction of 117 housingunits in the West Bank settlements of Arieland Ma’ale Adumim. High-ranking mem-bers of the Ariel municipality claim thatmore than 3,000 housing units have actuallybeen approved.

Yediot Aharonot reports that 10 housing unitshave been built in the West Bank settlementof Ariel since the beginning of the year.

September 7 Ha’aretz reports that duringthe first half of 2005, Jerusalem mayorLupolianski declined to sign 4 percent ofdemolition orders issued for Palestiniandwellings in East Jerusalem, while hedeclined to sign 37 percent of those issuedfor West Jerusalem.

Ma’ariv reports the recent building ofapproximately 130 new housing units inWest Bank settlements. The most significantsettlement expansion of 40 new unitsoccurred in the outpost of Bruchin, west ofAriel.

September 8 The Jerusalem municipalitygives final approval for the construction of20 housing units and a synagogue in theheart of the Old City’s Muslim quarter.(Yerushalaim)

September 9 Neto reports on a project tobuild 74 housing units in Har Adar. Thereare some 2,000 residents in the settlement.The 5 to7 room houses will be sold for$320,000-370,000.

September 11 Ha’aretz reports that hun-dreds of Palestinian children in East Jerusa-lem have again been refused admission tolocal schools. The Israeli High Courtinstructed the municipality to resolve thecapacity problem a few years ago, when apetition was submitted on behalf of 950 EastJerusalem children for whom no publiclyfinanced educational facilities existed.

September 12 The last IDF soldiers leavethe Gaza Strip after 38 years of direct mili-tary occupation. (Ha’artez)

September 13 During a visit to the WestBank settlements of Beit Arieh and KarneShomron, Defense Minister Mofaz expresses

his commitment to increasing the security ofsettlements and to clearing any obstacles toexpansion plans for key settlement blocs.(Ha’aretz)

September 15 Israel’s High Court ofJustice orders the government to move theseparation barrier in the Alfei Menashe area(see page 5). (MidEast Mirror)

Yediot Aharonot reports that the outpost ofRamat Gilad, near the West Bank settlementof Karne Shomron, is now connected to thearea’s electrical grid. Prime Minister Sharonand Defense Minister Mofaz had recentlysigned off on Ramat Gilad’s immediate dis-mantlement.

September 16 Ha’aretz reports that in TelRumeida five Jewish families have movedinto a building purchased by Jewish residentsof Hebron, bringing the total number ofJewish families living in the quarter to 20.

Kol Ha’zman reports the issuance in Britainof a warrant for the arrest of Jerusalem hous-ing supervisor Micha Ben-Nun. Since 2002,the Jerusalem municipality and Office ofInternal Affairs have demolished 294 housesin East Jerusalem. Ben-Nun was allegedresponsible for 36 home demolitions in2002, 66 in 2003, 124 in 2004, and nearly 60thus far in 2005.

September 20 A Palestinian resident of theWest Bank village of al-Sheikh is arrestedfor attempting to bribe an Israeli officer toredirect the route of the separation barrier toinclude his home on the side of the Jerusa-lem municipality. (Ha’aretz)

IDF soldiers complete their withdrawal fromthe settlements of Ganim and Kadim in thenorthern West Bank. (Ha’aretz)

September 21 Israel declares its borderwith Gaza an international boundary. Theresidents of Gaza must present passports toenter Israel. Internal Affairs Minister OfirPines-Paz signs orders making the Office ofInternal Affairs responsible for the move-ment of people between Gaza and Israel.The responsibility had previously been thatof security forces. (Ma’ariv)

A group of 30 settlers from Yitzhar throwrocks at the jeep of central commander Maj.Gen. Yair Naveh as he tours the West Bank.(Ha’aretz)

SETTLEMENT TIME LINE

November-December 2005 Report on Israeli Settlement ❖ 5

HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel

Alfei Menashe is an Israeli [settlement] town in theSamaria area. It was established approximately four kilometersbeyond the Green Line. Pursuant the military commander’sorders, a separation fence was built, surrounding the townfrom all sides, and leaving a passage containing a road con-necting the town to Israel. A number of Palestinian villages[5] are included within the fence’s perimeter. The separationfence cuts them off from the remaining parts of the Judea andSamaria area. An enclave of Palestinian villages on the“Israeli” side of the fence has been created. Petitioners are res-idents of the villages. They contend that the separation fenceis not legal.

The military commander is authorized to order the con-struction of the separation fence if the reason behind its con-struction is a security and military one.

It is sometimes necessary, in order to erect a separationfence, to take possession of land belonging to Palestinian resi-dents. Is the military commander authorized to do so? Theanswer is that if it is necessary for military needs, the militarycommander is authorized to do so.

Does the military commander’s authority to construct aseparation fence also include his authority to construct a fencein order to protect the lives and safety of Israelis living inIsraeli communities in the Judea and Samaria area? . . . In ouropinion, the answer is positive.

Even if the military commander acted in a manner thatconflicted the law of belligerent occupation at the time heagreed to the establishment of this or that settlement—andthat issue is not before us, and we shall express no opinion onit—that does not release him from his duty according to thelaw of belligerent occupation itself, to preserve the lives, safe-

ty, and dignity of every one of the Israeli settlers.Israelis present in the area have the rights to life, dignity

and honor, property [emphasis added], privacy, and the rest ofthe rights which anyone present in Israel enjoys. Converse tothis right of theirs stands the state’s duty to refrain fromimpinging upon these rights, and to protect them.

The fence cuts the residents of the villages off from thePalestinian communities which provide them necessary servic-es. The fence traps the residents of the villages inside of anenclave cut off from the Palestinian population in the WestBank. The residents of the villages are unable to enter aPalestinian community outside the enclave without passingthrough the gates in the fence or a checkpoint (crossing 109).Residents who wish to travel from the villages of the enclaveto the adjacent towns of Habla and Ras Atiyeh are forced topass long and wearying roads, which require travel by car, justto get to a place which in the past was reachable by foot.

We have reached the conclusion that the considerationsbehind the determined route are security considerations. It isnot a political consideration which lies behind the fence routeat the Alfei Menashe enclave, rather the need to protect thewell-being and security of the Israelis (those in Israel andthose living in Alfei Menashe, as well as those wishing totravel from Alfei Menashe to Israel and those wishing to trav-el from Israel to Alfei Menashe). Our conclusion, therefore, isthat the decision to erect the separation fence at the AlfeiiMenashe enclave was made within the authority granted tothe military commander. . . .

Indeed, any route of the fence must take into account theneed to provide security for the Israeli residents of AlfeiMenashe.

SEPARATION BARRIER UPDATE

Opponents of the separation barrier have filed almost 90 peti-tions before Israel’s High Court of Justice since the governmentapproved construction in June 2002. More than 40 petitionsremain active, contesting 80 km of the route, parts of which havealready been completed. Most of the petitions have been filed byPalestinians opposed to the barrier route in their local environs,including one that resulted in a court order in mid-2005 to revisethe route near Beit Surik. Others have been filed by Israeli humanrights organizations.

The current route of the barrier is 763 km, of which 242 km iscompleted, with an additional 157 km under construction. Con-struction has yet to begin along almost half of the route locatedsouth of Jerusalem and along the West Bank’s southern perimeter.

Construction of the 25 km section of the separation barrier inthe area of Alfei Menashe, south of Qalqilya, was completed in the summer of 2003. Alfei Menashe, a settlement of 5650 people,along with noncontiguous areas slated for its future expansion and a section of Route 55 linking the settlement to Israel, wasincluded in the “seam area”—the land created between the

barrier and the Green Line.In a September 15 ruling, Israel’s High Court of Justice ordered

the Sharon government to reconsider 13km of the existing route inthis area because of the disproportionate harm caused to Palestin-ians affected by its route. It expressed doubt that security considera-tions were always the paramount consideration in determining thebarrier’s route. It found that Israel must take into account the secu-rity requirements of settlers and settlements, as well as those ofIsrael itself, in determining the route of the separation barrier, butonly insofar as the chosen route does not have a disproportionateimpact upon affected Palestinians. The court found justification forits recognition of the security rights of settlers in the Oslo Accords inwhich, the court argued, the Palestine Liberation Organizationrecognized Israel’s right to protect the security of settlers. Inte-restingly, the justices also argued that settlers enjoy property rightsthat the state is obliged to protect, according to standards enjoyed bycitizens resident in Israel. The full decision can be found at:http://www.btselem.org/English/Special/20050916_Ruling_on_Alfeii_Menashe_Enclave.asp. Excerpts appear below.

SEPARATION BARRIER UPDATE, continued on page 7

6 ❖ Report on Israeli Settlement November-December 2005

COMPROMISING PALESTINIAN JERUSALEM—THE ADUMIM BLOC

November-December 2005 Report on Israeli Settlement ❖ 7

ernment of Ariel Sharon effectively destroyed the principalfeature of the Oslo framework when the IDF assumed directcontrol of security in Area A—covering the main Palestiniantowns in the West Bank.

In November 2002, the Settlement Report noted, “Israel isnow settling in for an extended period of the direct exercise ofsecurity responsibilities everywhere in the occupied territories,a dramatic transformation from the last decade, and onewhich the Bush administration, the road map notwithstand-ing, hesitates to confront.”

In the years that followed, Israel destroyed Palestinianoperational security capabilities, adding to the already formi-dable internal obstacles to a unified and decisive monopoly offorce faced by the PA. Israel has continued to obstruct thereconstruction of Palestinian security institutions by refusingto cede operational control exercised by the IDF throughoutwhat was formerly considered Area A and by opposing theenhancement of Palestinian security capabilities.

Maj. General Ya’ir Naveh, who heads Israel’s West Bankoccupation forces, explains the difference between Israel’s viewof the Gaza Strip and West Bank as follows,

“In Gaza, we are leaving and closing the gates behind us.We have no intention of leaving Judea and Samaria. We willremain here in one way or another for hundreds and thou-sands of years.”

Israeli policies reflect an intention to permit the PA toexercise only the most limited of security functions. As Navehexplains, “I am pleased with the operation of the [Palestiniansecurity] apparatus. There is a positive trend: returning Israeliswho stray into Palestinian cities, returning [Israeli] stolen cars,and collecting weapons. I don’t expect much more fromthem.”

Occupation Forever

Every aspect of Israeli policy, including the separation bar-rier, the system of checkpoints, closures, and bypass routes,and arguably the retreat from Gaza, is inspired by the inten-tion to remain in strategic control of all of the West Bank andin permanent, exclusive physical control of between 20 and 50percent of it. The evacuation of four settlements and armybases in the northern part of the West Bank did not result inthe change in status of these areas from Area C, another indi-cation of Israel’s current lack of interest in reviving the territo-rial hierarchy that characterized the Oslo period.

Israel is prepared to evacuate additional settlements in theWest Bank, although the timing and extent of the retreatremain to be decided. Notwithstanding this readiness, settle-ment expansion and the consolidation of new settlements,even in areas that are deemed to be potential candidates forevacuation, continues apace, without reference to concernsraised by third parties, including the United States. ◆

WEST BANK, continued from page 1

The map opposite portrays the emerging territorial realityof critical parts of East Jerusalem and its immediate WestBank hinterland. The following points should be noted:

■ Prospects for maintaining Palestinian territorial hege-mony in East Jerusalem have been undermined, not only byextensive Israel settlement there, but also by construction ofthe separation barrier south of Kufr Aqab and Semiramis andaround the Shufat refugee camp.

■ In contrast, territorial contiguity of East Jerusalem set-tlements with each other and nearby settlements is beingenhanced by the expansion of East Jerusalem settlementperipheries beyond the municipal boundary of the city estab-lished by Israel in June 1967. Note in this regard the route ofthe separation barrier northeast of Neve Ya’acov and east ofPisgat Ze’ev.

■ Territorial contiguity between the Ma’ale Adumim blocof settlements and Israel is created by the territorial linkage in

the E-1 plan area and westward via Mt. Scopus. This territo-rial linkage is enhanced by dedicated transportation networks,notably Route 1 and Route 45.

■ Palestinian communities pay the price of these territorialand transportation linkages. The prospect of Palestinian terri-torial continuity within the West Bank is compromised by theMa’ale Adumim bloc. Contiguity within Jerusalem andbetween it and the West Bank is compromised by the destruc-tion of Route 60 as the principal north-south Palestinianthoroughfare, and the separation barrier, which controls andlimits access by Palestinians through 10 planned permanentgates. Construction of the barrier along the approved routeeast of Qedar to the Shufat Gate is essentially a politicalexpression of the limits of settlement development.

■ A transportation link between the Palestinian areasnorth and south of the Ma’ale Adumim bloc is maintained byan Israeli-controlled road yet to be constructed. ◆

Respondents must reconsider the existing route. They mustexamine the possibility of removing the [Palestinian] villagesof the enclave—some or all of them—from the “Israeli” sideof the fence.

Respondents must, within a reasonable period, reconsiderthe various alternatives for the separation fence route at AlfeiMenashe, while examining security alternatives which injurethe fabric of life of the residents of the villages of the enclaveto a lesser extent. In this context, the alternative by which theenclave will contain only Alfei Menashe and a connectingroad to Israel, while moving the existing road connectingAlfei Menashe to Israel to another location in the south ofthe enclave, should be examined. ◆

SEPARATION BARRIER UPDATE, continued from page 5

COMPROMISING PALESTINIAN JERUSALEM

—————— ◆ ——————

President Bush: [A]chieving peace demands actionfrom all parties. Israel must continue to work withPalestinian leaders to help improve the daily lives ofPalestinians. At the same time, Israel should not under-take any activity that contravenes its road map obliga-tions, or prejudices the final status negotiations withregard to Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem. Thismeans tht Israel must remove unauthorized posts andstop settlement expansion. It also means that the barriernow being built to protect Israelis from terrorist attacksmust be a security barrier, rather than a political barrier.Israeli leaders must take into account the impact thissecurity barrier has on Palestinians not engaged in ter-rorist activities. . . .

President Abbas: Peace requires a departure from thepolicies of occupation and the adoption of the principleof freedom. Peace requires departure from the policies ofsettlements construction, the collective punishment,unilateral acts that undermine your vision toward twostates and replace that with progress towards negotia-tions. Peace and security cannot be guaranteed by theconstruction of walls, by the erection of checkpoints, andthe confiscation of land, but rather by the recognition ofrights.

President Bush: And so you said I would like to seetwo states before I get out of office. Not true. I’d like tosee two states. And if it happens before I get out ofoffice, I'll be there to witness the ceremony. And if itdoesn’t, we will work hard to lay that foundation so thatthe process becomes irreversible.

President George W. Bush Welcomes Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to the

White House, October 20, 2005

Foundation for Middle East Peace1761 N Street, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20036Telephone: 202-835-3650Fax: 202-835-3651E-mail: info@fmep.orgInternet: http://www.fmep.org

FIRST CLASSUS POSTAGE

PAIDMERRIFIELD, VAPERMIT #2333

Arab Neighborhoods Jewish Neighborhoods

(East Jerusalem) (East/West Jerusalem)

Population (2002) 185,000a 460,000

Social workers 32 178

Cases per social worker 240 160

Public parks 45 1,087(470 dunams) (5,165 dunams)

Playground structures 15 220

Playground structures installed, 2003–2005 1 14

Recreational structures installed, 2003–2005 90 1,000

Ping Pong tables 0 14

Park benches 38 400

Budget for public centersand services $530,000 $3.5 million

(15% of total) (85% of total)

Average household (persons) 5.3b 3.4b

Number of births (2004) 8,200 11,800(41%)b (59%)b

Sources:Kol Ha’Ir, September 23, 2005.a. Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, 2003, Table III/13; Table X/12.b. Kol Ha’zman, “18,000 People Don’t Live Here Anymore.”September 30, 2005.

JERUSALEM SHORTS