SANDOVAL vs. COMELEC Case Digest

FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS[G.R. No.133842. January 26, 2000]FACTS:Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the congressional seat for the Malabon-Navotas legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998. After canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass, the district board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner the duly elected congressman. The petitioner took his oath of office on the same day. Private respondent filed with the Comelec a petition, which sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation. He alleged that there was a verbal order from the Comelec Chairman to suspend the canvass and proclamation of the winning candidate, but the district board of canvassers proceeded with the canvass and proclamation despite the said verbal order. He also alleged that there was non-inclusion of 19 election returns in the canvass, which would result in an incomplete canvass of the election returns. The Comelec en banc issued an order setting aside the proclamation of petitioner and ruled the proclamation as void. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking the annulment and reversal of the Comelec order.

ISSUES:1. whether the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98- 206

SPC No. 98-143an "Urgent Appeal from the Decision of the Legislative District Board of Canvassers for Malabon and Navotas with Prayer for the Nullification of the Proclamation of Federico S. Sandoval as Congressman."SPC No. 98-206. The petition sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation as congressman.2. whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was valid.

RULING:On thefirst issue, we uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the petitions filed by private respondent. The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies. As an exception, however, to the general rule, Section 15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166 prohibits candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation cases. It states: "Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and Members of the House of Representatives. For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it." The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception. The second sentence of Section 15 allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns even in elections for president, vice-president and members of the House of Representatives for the simple reason that the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the election. This rule is consistent with and complements the authority of the COMELEC under the Constitution to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall" and its power to "decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections."

We now go to thesecond issue. Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter and issue of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with illegality. We hold that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered without due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely on private respondent's allegations.

Public respondent submits that procedural due process need not be observed in this case because it was merely exercising its administrative power to review, revise and reverse the actions of the board of canvassers.

We cannot accept public respondent's argument.

Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment of petitioner's proclamation, COMELEC was not merely performing an administrative function. The administrative powers of the COMELEC include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, register political parties, organizations or coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the Commission, prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal of or imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, order or decision. In addition, the Commission also has direct control and supervision over all personnel involved in the conduct of election. However, the resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent and petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in the questioned certificate of canvass requires the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the Commission to hear both parties to determine the veracity of their allegations and to decide whether the alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi-judicial power. It has been said that where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. The COMELEC therefore, acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed by private respondent.

The COMELEC order dated June 2, 1998 in SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206 is ANNULLED.

Midland Insurance Corporation vs Intermediate Appellate Court

143 SCRA 458

Adjudicatory Powers

FACTS: On October 1, 1984, a judgment was rendered by the Insurance Commission in favor of complaint-appellee, Sisenando Villareal, and against herein petitioner Midland Insurance Corporation.

Petitioner's appeal was initially-accepted by the IAC as can be gleaned from the letter-advice dated February 8, 1985, notifying petitioner's counsel to file appellant's brief. However, a Motion to Dismiss appeal dated March 1, 1985 was filed by the complainant-appellee on the ground that the petitioner herein, failed to perfect its appeal within the reglementary period. Despite the opposition thereto interposed by petitioner Midland Insurance Corporation, the Respondent IAC, on August 14, 1985 granted the stated Motion to Dismiss on the ground that by said court's computation of the elapsed period from the date of receipt by herein petitioner of the decision of the Insurance Commission to the time the notice of appeal was filed before said Commission and notice of appeal and manifestation submitted to the IAC on December 5, 1984, it would appear that petitioner's appeal was belatedly made.

Respondent-appellant's contended that under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 the reglementary period of 15 days from receipt of the decision or judgment within which to file an appeal is not applicable to quasi-judicial agencies such as the Insurance Commission. However, in its dismissal IAC ruled that the applicable rule is explicit in No. 12 (c), providing for appellate procedure under the Interim Rules which state that 'appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court from quasi-judicial bodies shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same is not inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129. The pertinent provisions in Rep. Act No. 5434 provide:

SEC. 2.Appeals to the Court of Appeals shall be filed within the fifteen (15) days from notice of the ruling, award, order, decision or judgment.

There is no conflict between the period to appeal in R.A. No. 5434 and Sec. 39, B.P. 129 which provides:

Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appeal from.

The petitioner's case, however, rests on the assumption that it had timely filed its appeal on November 7, 1984 because Section 2 of Republic Act No. 5434 which governs appeals originating from quasi-judicial bodies grants a party ten (10) days from notice of the resolution denying a Motion for Reconsideration. As notice of the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration by the Insurance Commission was received by petitioner on October 30, 1984, the latter maintains that it had ten (10) days thereafter or until November 9, 1984 within which to file its appeal and this was filed with the IAC on November 7, 1984. Petitioner's submission is that the appeal was thus filed within the reglementary period.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner had timely filed its appeal because Republic Act No. 5434 which governs appeals originating from quasi-judicial bodies grants a party ten (10) days from notice of the resolution denying a Motion for Reconsideration

RULING: Yes. It can be gleaned from the powers and duties of the Insurance Commissioner enumerated in Sections 414-416, 187, and 241 of the Insurance Code performs quasi-judicial functions a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

Section 2 of R.A. 5434 explicitly provides:

Sec. 2.Appeals to the Court of Appeals shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the ruling, award, order, decision or judgment or from the date of its last publication if required by law for its effectivity or in case a motion for reconsideration is filed within that period of fifteen (15) days, then within ten (10) days from Notice or publication when required by law, of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. No more than one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed by any part.

We find that petitioner herein is correct in maintaining that its appeal was timely filed. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Insurance Commission and advice of such denial was received by petitioner on October 30, 1984. As petitioner would then have ten (10) days from October 30, 1984 or until November 9, 1984, its appeal was well within the ten day period within which an appeal can be made to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.

What We note is that Respondent IAC fell into error because it failed to consider and apply the pivotal Section 2 of R.A. 5434, which recites that "in case a motion for reconsideration is filed within that period of fifteen (15) days, then within ten (10) days from Notice or publication, when required by law, of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration ... ." Respondent's court's failure to do so led to its erroneous conclusion.

The Insurance Commission is an administrative agency, with quasi-judicial functions. Consequently, the period of appeal from final orders, decisions, resolutions or awards of said Insurance Commission may not be necessarily modified or limited by section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

RATIO: "Quasi-judicial functions" is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. National Housing Authority vs Almeida

525 SCRA 383Adjudicatory Powers

FACTS: On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land which are part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna.The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother of private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother and left heirs.

Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera.

The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October 7, 1960, allegedly executed by Margarita Herrera.

The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna.

On December 29, 1980, a decision on the case questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication was rendered and the deed was declared null and void.

During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication, Francisca Herrera filed an application with the NHA to purchase the same lots submitting therewith a copy of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by her mother. Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, protested the application.

In a Resolution dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made by Francisca Herrera. Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the President. The NHA Resolution was affirmed by the Office of the President in a Decision dated January 23, 1987. On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they submitted to the NHA. Said transfer of rights was approved by the NHA. The NHA executed several deeds of sale in favor of the heirs of Francisca Herrera and titles were issued in their favor. Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca Herrera directed Segunda Mercado-Almeida to leave the premises that she was occupying.

Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President and the resolution of the NHA, private respondent Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a Complaint on February 8, 1988, for "Nullification of Government Lot's Award," with the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna.

In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her forty-year occupation of the disputed properties, and re-raised the fact that Francisca Herrera's declaration of self-adjudication has been adjudged as a nullity because the other heirs were disregarded.

The defendant heirs of Francisca Herrera alleged that the complaint was barred by laches and that the decision of the Office of the President was already final and executory.

The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated June 14, 1988 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated June 26, 1989 reversed and held that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case involving "title and possession to real property within its jurisdiction." The case was then remanded for further proceedings on the merits.

On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision setting aside the resolution of the NHA and the decision of the Office of the President awarding the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. It declared the deeds of sale executed by NHA in favor of Herrera's heirs null and void.

The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but a disposition of property which shall take effect upon death. It then held that the said document must first be submitted to probate before it can transfer property.

Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their respective motions for reconsideration which were both denied on July 21, 1998 for lack of merit. They both appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner NHA elevated the case to this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution of the NHA and the decision of the Office of the President have attained finality, and if so, whether or not the principle of administrative res judicata bars the court from further determining who between the parties has preferential rights for award over the subject lots

RULING: Yes. Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res judicata: "the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers . It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata.

To be sure, early jurisprudence were already mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof and that the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.

the rule prescribing that "administrative orders cannot be enforced in the courts in the absence of an express statutory provision for that purpose" was relaxed in favor of quasi-judicial agencies.

In fine, it should be remembered that quasi-judicial powers will always be subject to true judicial powerthat which is held by the courts. Quasi-judicial power is defined as that power of adjudication of an administrative agency for the "formulation of a final order."

This function applies to the actions, discretion and similar acts of public administrative officers or bodies who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

However, administrative agencies are not considered courts, in their strict sense. The doctrine of separation of powers reposes the three great powers into its three (3) branchesthe legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. Each department is co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered to "determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

Courts have an expanded role under the 1987 Constitution in the resolution of societal conflicts under the grave abuse clause of Article VIII which includes that duty to check whether the other branches of government committed an act that falls under the category of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Petitioner cites Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 where it is therein provided that the Intermediate Appellate Court (now, Court of Appeals) shall exercise the "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards, of the Regional Trial Courts and Quasi-Judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution." and contends that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to rule over awards made by the NHA.

Well-within its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of August 28, 2003, already ruled that the issue of the trial court's authority to hear and decide the instant case has already been settled in the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 26, 1989 (which has become final and executory on August 20, 1989 as per entry of judgment dated October 10, 1989). We find no reason to disturb this ruling. Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. The system of judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of a final and executory judgment. The appellate court's decision becomes the law of the case which must be adhered to by the parties by reason of policy.

RATIO: A government agency performs adjudicatory functions when it renders decisions or awards that determine the rights of adversarial parties, which decisions or awards have the same binding effect as a judgment of a court of law, such that when they attain finality, they have the effect of res judicata that even the courts of justice have to respect.Destileria Limtuaco & Co. vs Advertising Board of the Philippines

572 SCRA 455

Adjudicatory Powers

FACTS: The present dispute focuses mainly on the power of the Advertising Board of the Philippines (AdBoard) to require its clearance prior to commercial advertising and to impose sanctions on its members who broadcast advertisements without its clearance. AdBoard is an umbrella non-stock, non-profit corporation created in 1974 composed of several national organizations in the advertising industry. Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. (Destileria) was formerly a member of PANA.

In January 2004, Destileria and Convoy Marketing Corporation (Convoy), through its advertising agency, SLG Advertising (SLG), a member of the 4As, applied with the AdBoard for a clearance of the airing of a radio advertisement entitled, Ginagabi (Nakatikim ka na ba ng Kinse Anyos).

AdBoard issued a clearance for said advertisement. Not long after the ad started airing, AdBoard was swept with complaints from the public. This prompted AdBoard to ask SLG for a replacement but there was no response. With the continued complaints from the public, AdBoard, this time, asked SLG to withdraw its advertisement, to no avail. Thus, AdBoard decided to recall the clearance previously issued, effective immediately. Said decision to recall was conveyed to SLG and AdBoard's members-organizations.

Petitioners protested the AdBoard's decision, after which, they filed a Complaint which was later on amended, for Dissolution of Corporation, Damages and Application for Preliminary Injunction with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

On May 20, 2004, AdBoard issued ACRC Circular No. 2004-02, reminding its members-organizations of Article VIII of the ACRC Manual of Procedures, which prohibits the airing of materials not duly screened by it. On July 16, 2004, petitioners filed the present petition for writ of prohibition and preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners argue that their right to advertise is a constitutionally protected right, as well as a property right. Petitioners believe that requiring a clearance from AdBoard before advertisements can be aired amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law. They also argue that AdBoard's regulation is an exercise of police power which must be subject to constitutional proscriptions.

The Amended Complaint sought the revocation/cancellation of AdBoard's registration and its dissolution on the grounds, inter alia, that it was usurping the functions of the Department of Trade and Industry and the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board by misrepresenting that it has the power to screen, review and approve all radio and television advertisements.

As to the merits of petitioners' arguments, AdBoard counters that it derives its authority from the voluntary submission of its members to its jurisdiction. According to AdBoard, there is no law that prohibits it from assuming self-regulatory functions or from issuing clearances prior to advertising.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of AdBoard sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions

RULING: Yes. First of all, the petition filed in this case is one for prohibition, i.e., to command AdBoard to desist from requiring petitioners to secure a clearance and imposing sanctions on any agency that will air, broadcast or publish petitioners' ads without such clearance. Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such recourse, it must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function by which he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, which are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial function is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his/its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.

The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. What is at contest here is the power and authority of a private organization, composed of several members-organizations, which power and authority were vested to it by its own members. Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this case. The definition and purpose of a writ of prohibition excludes the use of the writ against any person or group of persons acting in a purely private capacity, and the writ will not be issued against private individuals or corporations so acting.

RATIO: Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, which are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial function is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his/its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.De Guzman, Jr. vs Mendoza

453 SCRA 565

Adjudicatory Powers

FACTS: This is a complaint filed by Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. against Antonio O. Mendoza, Sheriff IV, and Floro G. Calixihan, Jr., Branch Clerk of Court, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 58, for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the judiciary. Specifically, the respondents were charged with conniving with each other in causing the issuance of an alias writ of execution and profiting on the rentals collected from the tenants of the subject property.On October 13, 2000, a writ of execution was issued by then Judge Escolastico U. Cruz, Jr. which ordered respondent sheriff to cause the satisfaction of a civil case decision rendered on May 2, 1988. Complainant for this case was the counsel for the plaintiffs in the aforementioned civil case.On April 4, 2001, an Alias Writ of Execution/Possession/Ejectment/Demolition and Others was issued. Unlike the October 13, 2000 writ of execution which only ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens and payment of attorneys fees, the April 4, 2001 alias writ directed the transfer of possession, ejectment, payment of monthly rentals, and demolition, which were not covered by the courts decision dated May 2, 1988.Thereafter, respondent sheriff, together with Atty. Melotindos who was the counsel for the defendant, went to the subject property and served the Notice to Comply upon the five tenants of the plaintiffs. Respondent sheriff allegedly intimidated the tenants to vacate the premises, pay monthly rentals of P50,000.00, and demolish the structures therein.Complainant averred that respondent sheriff intentionally failed to attach page 3 of the alias writ of execution to the notice to comply. He insisted that the missing page was important because it contains the signatory of the writ, the date it was signed, and the dispositive portion of the May 2, 1988 decision which did not mention ejectment, monthly rentals, demolition or possession.

In his comment, Calixihan claimed that he does not know any of the parties in the civil case; thus, he could not be charged with connivance. He averred that the void alias writ of execution was prepared and issued by then Judge Cruz and implemented by the respondent sheriff. He never profited from the rentals because he immediately turned over the same to Atty. Melotindos who issued a receipt. He argued that as a clerk of court and a subordinate employee, he had no authority to prevent the judge from conducting hearings or proceedings in court.

In the Agenda Report dated March 7, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator noted that the alias writs have been declared null and void by this Court in its en banc Resolution dated September 18, 2001.

In his Report and Recommendation dated August 19, 2004, Executive Judge Sixto Marella, Jr. found respondent sheriff guilty of simple misconduct and recommended his suspension for thirty days without pay. It was established that on two occasions, he received P24,000.00 and P1,500.00 representing rentals from two tenants. In October 2001, he also received P500.00 from Atty. Melotindos which he claimed as legal fees. The investigating judge, however, noted that the amount exceeded the limit for legal fees provided under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, and the respondent sheriff also failed to comply with the requirements stated therein.

In a Memorandum dated January 31, 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator agreed with the investigating judge that by receiving money from the lawyer of the prevailing party without complying with Rule 141, the respondent sheriff is guilty of simple misconduct and act inimical to the best interest of the judiciary. It thus recommended respondent sheriffs suspension from the service for one month and one day without pay.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent sheriff committed any infraction in the enforcement of the void alias writ of execution

RULING: No. there is no proof that respondent sheriff participated in the issuance of the void alias writ of execution. Neither did he commit any infraction in the enforcement of the same. Thus, when he ordered the tenants to vacate the premises, pay monthly rentals of P50,000.00, and demolish the structures therein, he was merely implementing the writ as issued by the judge. At the time of its enforcement, respondent sheriff had no way of knowing that ultimately, the alias writs would be nullified by this Court.

The duty of a sheriff to execute a valid writ is ministerial and not discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. A discretionary act, on the other hand, is a faculty conferred upon a court or official by which he may decide the question either way and still be right.

In general, a sheriff is the proper officer to execute all writs returnable to the court, unless another is appointed, by special order, for the purpose. It is not his duty to decide on the truth or sufficiency of the processes committed to him for service. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate. He is supposed to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter.

RATIO: Ministerial function is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.

THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC., vs. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS

TOPIC: AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY IS NOT A COURT.

FACTS: Dominican Hills, formerly registered as Diplomat Hills in Baguio City, was mortgaged to the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). It was eventually foreclosed and acquired later on by the said bank as the highest bidder. On 11 April 1983, through its President Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., the subject property was donated to the Republic of the Philippines. The deed of donation stipulated that Dominican Hills would be utilized for the "priority programs, projects, activities in human settlements and economic development and governmental purposes" of the Ministry of Human Settlements.

On December 12, 1986, then President Corazon Aquino issued EO 85 abolishing the Ministry of Human Settlements. All agencies under the its supervision as well as all its assets, programs and projects, were transferred to the Presidential Management Staff (PMS).

On 18 October 1988, United (Dominican Hills) submitted its application before the PMS to acquire a portion of the Dominican Hills property. In a MOA, PMS and United agreed that the latter may purchase a portion of the said property from HOME INSURANCE GUARANTY CORPORATIO, acting as originator, on a selling price of P75.00 per square meter.

Thus, on June 12, 1991, HIGC sold 2.48 hectares of the property to UNITED. The deed of conditional sale provided that ten (10) per cent of the purchase price would be paid upon signing, with the balance to be amortized within one year from its date of execution. After UNITED made its final payment on January 31, 1992, HIGC executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 1, 1992.

Petitioner alleges that sometime in 1993, private respondents entered the Dominican Hills property allocated to UNITED and constructed houses thereon. Petitioner was able to secure a demolition order from the city mayor. Unable to stop the razing of their houses, private respondents, under the name DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION (ASSOCIATION, for brevity) filed an action for injunction before RTC Baguio City. Private respondents were able to obtain a temporary restraining order but their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was later denied.

The ASSOCIATION filed a separate civil case for damages, injunction and annulment of the said MOA. It was later on dismissed upon motion of United. The said Order of dismissal is currently on appeal with the Court of Appeals.

The demolition order was subsequently implemented by the Office of the City Mayor and the City Engineer's Office of Baguio City. However, petitioner avers that private respondents returned and reconstructed the demolished structures.

To forestall the re-implementation of the demolition order, private respondents filed a petition for annulment of contracts with prayer for a temporary restraining order before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against petitioner, HIGC, PMS, the City Engineer's Office, the City Mayor, as well as the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. On the very same day, public respondent COSLAP issued the contested order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo. Without filing a motion for reconsideration from the aforesaid status quo order, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP.

ISSUE: W/O COSLAP is empowered to hear and try a petition for annulment of contracts with prayer for a TRO and to issue a status quo order and conduct a hearing thereof?

RULING: COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the controversy. It discharges quasi-judicial functions:

"Quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."

However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency, albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are neither part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. The doctrine of separation of powers observed in our system of government reposes the three (3) great powers into its three (3) branches the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary each department being co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its own agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

Antipolo Realty Corporation vs National Housing Authority

153 SCRA 399

Extent of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Powers of Administrative AgenciesFACTS: Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation under a Contract to Sell. On 28 August 1974, Hernando transferred his rights over the said lot to private respondent Virgilio Yuson, embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell (subdivision beautification), Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter.

On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. For his part, Mr. Yuson replied that he would conform with the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of the representation in the notice. In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its request, citing the decision rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25 October 1976 in Case No. 252 (entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S. Reyes, respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have "substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the Contract to Sell. A formal demand was made for full and immediate payment of the amount of P16,994.73, representing installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during the period while the improvements were being completed i.e., between September 1972 and October 1976.

Yuson refused to pay the September 1972 - October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before NHA. Antipolo Realty filed a motion to dismiss, which NHA denied. After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell. A motion for reconsideration of Antipolo Realty was also denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NHA in ordering the reinstatement of the Contract To Sell, acted on a matter beyond its competence

RULING: No. The extent to which the NHA has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must be determined by referring to the terms of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Decree." 11 Section 3 of this statute provides as follows:

National Housing Authority. The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this decree. Presidential Decree No. 1344 (which amended Presidential Decree No, 957) clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following quite specific terms:

In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

B.Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub- division lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

C.Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

There is, in any case, no question that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally empowered to determine and protect the rights of contracting parties under the law administered by it and under the respective agreements, as well as to ensure that their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed.

Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to complete certain specified improvements in the subdivision within the specified period of two years from the date of the execution of the Contract to Sell, petitioner was not entitled to exercise its options under Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence, petitioner could neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment payments made by the private respondent as forfeited in its favor. The NHA was therefore correct in holding that private respondent's prior installment payments could not be forfeited in favor of petitioner.

There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. The very definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. Under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

RATIO: Extent of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Powers of Administrative Agencies: Function ordinarily judicial may be conferred. In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of private parties under such contracts, and award damages whenever appropriate. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts but may be conferred upon an administrative agency.Siapian vs Court of Appeals

327 SCRA 11

Extent of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Powers of Administrative Agencies

FACTS: The records disclose that the spouses Diosdado Tarlengao and Dominga de la Cruz owned a residential lot located at Tandang Sora Street corner Katipunan, Caloocan City. In July 1947, the late Dominga Siapian leased the said residential lot from the aforenamed spouses and built thereon a two-storey house where her family lived. The lessee religiously paid the agreed monthly rental of P100.00 until June 1979 when the lessor stopped collecting the same.

In a letter dated June 9, 1979, Theresa Yu informed Dominga Siapian that she purchased the lot from its previous owners. Yu said that she wanted to take immediate possession of the property since she had no other residential lot and she intended to make use of the lot for the construction of her own house. She gave Dominga Siapian three months notice to vacate and to demolish the improvements which the latter had built on the lot.

After four ejectment cases filed before the MeTC, the MeTC ruled in favor of private respondent. The MeTC ruled that petitioner indeed failed to pay rentals in arrears and even requested for extension of time to settle the same. It also held that petitioner did not deposit rentals due with the bank as the latter claimed, for no evidence was adduced to prove it. In fact, when private respondent inquired from the bank as to the alleged deposit, no statement was given.

Petitioner interprets the demand letter asking him to vacate the premises as merely asking him to pay rentals. He contends that the said letter does not constitute a demand to vacate the leased premises which is a condition precedent for instituting ejectment suit. He argues that the ejectment case must fail since the jurisdictional requirement of demand was not fulfilled.

On appeal, the RTC reversed the MeTC decision. The RTC declared that the demand letter was not precise in asking petitioner to vacate the premises because it only asked for payment of arrearages and current rentals. It also held that this latest ejectment suit against petitioner is barred by the final and executory decisions in previous cases. Hence, the ejectment suit was dismissed.

On review by the Court of Appeals, the appellate court reversed the aforequoted judgment of the RTC, and in lieu thereof, reinstated the decision of the MeTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ejectment case must fail since the jurisdictional requirement of demand was not fulfilled

RULING: No. Petitioner belabors the fact that the letter is not categorical and precise in seeking his eviction from the property. He misses the point. It must be stressed that courts and quasi-judicial bodies, in the exercise of their functions and in making decisions, must not be too dogmatic as to restrict themselves to literal interpretation of words, phrases and sentences. A complete and wholistic view must be taken in order to render a just and equitable judgment. When the lessor demanded payment of the due and unpaid rentals or a case for ejectment would be filed against them, the owner was giving strong notice that you either pay your unpaid rentals or I will file a court case to have you thrown out of my property.

The word vacate is not a talismanic word that must be employed in all notices. The alternatives are clear cut. The tenants must pay rentals which were fixed and which became payable in the past, failing which they must move out. There can be no other interpretation of the notice given to them. Hence when the owner demanded that either they pay or a case for ejectment would be filed against them, the tenants were placed on notice to move out if they do not pay. There was, in effect, a notice or demand to vacate.

In the light of the foregoing circumstances, the appellate court cannot be said to have erred in finding that the written demand is sufficient to eject petitioner from the property subject of controversy.

RATIO: Courts and quasi-judicial bodies, in the exercise of their functions and in making decisions, must not be too dogmatic as to restrict themselves to literal interpretation of words, phrases and sentences. A complete and wholistic view must be taken in order to render a just and equitable judgment.

Tejada vs Homestead Property Corporation

178 SCRA 164Extent of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Powers of Administrative Agencies

FACTS: Private respondent offered to sell to petitioner a lot owned by respondent corporation. Private respondent suggested that petitioner pay a reservation fee of P 20,000.00, which would form part of the consideration in case they reach a final agreement of sale and which amount was to be returned to the petitioner should the parties fail to reach an agreement.

Petitioner paid the reservation fee with the tentative agreement that the said lot would cost P 1,150.00 per square meter, or a total price of P 230,000.00. A 24% downpayment was to be paid by petitioner. The balance will be payable monthly within 1 or 2 years, depending upon the terms of the agreement. However, when the terms were unilaterally altered by respondent corporation by increasing the proposed amortization payments, petitioner refused to go through with the proposed purchase and he asked the private respondents to return the reservation payment. Respondents refused to return the amount.

Petitioner filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money with damages against respondents with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. Petitioner alleged that defendants refused to return the reservation payment for no justifiable reason despite verbal and written demands. Petitioner further contended that such refusal to refund the amount constitutes malicious and wanton breach of legal duty that makes them liable to pay moral damages.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss disputing the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and claiming that jurisdiction lies with the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC). The trial court denied the motion. Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court.

Private respondents brought the case to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari claiming that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled that the jurisdiction over the controverted case is with the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.

Hence, the instant petition wherein petitioner argues that inasmuch as there is no perfected contract of sale between the parties, the claim for recovery of the reservation fee properly falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts and not that of the HSRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the claim for recovery of the reservation fee falls within the jurisdiction of the courts

RULING: No. There can be no doubt that under Presidential Decree No. 1344, the NHA has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims involving refund and other claims filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, etc. There is no such qualification in said provision of law that makes a distinction between a perfected sale and one that has yet to be perfected. The word "buyer" in the law should be understood to be anyone who purchases anything for money.

Under the circumstances of this case, one who offers to buy is as much a buyer as one who buys by virtue of a perfected contract of sale.

Moreover, upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 90, if, is therein provided that the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over claims involving refund filed against project owners, developers, and dealers, among others. The former provision that the claim be made by a buyer has been eliminated. Thus, any previous doubt as to who may file the claim has been eliminated. Now, any claim for refund whether by a buyer or other in any other capacity is definitely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLRB.When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or body. Split jurisdiction is not favored. Since in this case the action for refund of reservation fee arose from a proposed purchase of a subdivision lot obviously the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

RATIO: Split jurisdiction not favored. - The rule is that when an administrative body or agency is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within its jurisdiction. Split decision is not favored.

Thus, an agency with exclusive jurisdiction over controversies involving sale of subdivision lots has also jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for refund by a subdivision buyer.

GUERZON V CA

FACTS: Petitioner executed with Basic Landoil Energy Corp (later acquired by Shell) a Service Station Lease and Dealers Sales Contract. Respondent Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) approved the latter contract and issued a Certificate of Authority in Petitioners favor. After the contract, respondent Shell wrote Guerzon informing him that they are not renewing the contract. A copy of said letter was furnished to BEU. Thereafter, BEU issued an order directing petitioner to vacate the premises and to show cause in writing why no administrative order and/or criminal proceedings shall be instituted for his violations. Shell was able to secure the possession of the gas station. Guerzon then filed with the RTC a complaint but such was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to annuk the order of a quasi-judicial body of equivalent category as the RTC.

ISSUES W/N the BEU has the authority to order petitioner to vacate the premises.

RULING NO. The power of an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted (here PD 1206) to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. Said PD states that after notice and hearing, it can impose and collect a fine and failure to pay the fine or to cease and discontinue the violation of the law (i.e. illegal trading in petroleum products) shall be sufficient reason for suspension, closure or stoppage of operations. Nowhere in the order is it stated that petitioner engaged inillegal trading or any other violation of BP 33. It merely made a vague reference to violation of BEU laws, rules and regulation. The BEU (like its predecessor, the Oil Industry Commission) has no power to decide contractual disputes between gasonline dealers and oil companies. It cannot order petitioner to vacate the premises as this is an appropriate case in the vicil courts for unlawful detainer. Assuming arguendo that it did had the authority, it still failed to comply with the requirement of notice and hearing. NOTE: Nevertheless,petitioner could not require that possession be given to him as the contract was not renewed.

Provident tree farms vs Batario mar 28 1994

DOCTRINE:

Cases before the BOC must be fully fleshed out before it prior to elevating the issues to a regular court in keeping with the exhaustion of administrative remedies.

FACTSIn the extrant case, PTFI seeks to set aside the 8 February 1990 order of respondent court and prays for the continuation of the hearing inCivil Case No. 89-48836. PTFI claims that what was brought before the trial court was a civil case for injunction, i.e., "restraining the entry of safety matches into the country . . . for the purpose of securing compliance with Sec. 36 (l) of the Forestry Code and for damages, "to seek redress of its right which has been clearly violated by the importation of safety matches . . . . (which) is a denial to the petitioner of the protection and incentive granted it by Section 36 (l) of the Forestry Code . . . ."

Naturally, PTFI asserts the inapplicability of the procedures outlined in R.A. No. 1125 relative to incidents before the Court of TaxAppeals because the instant action is not a protest case where the aggrieved party is not an importer. It then argues that since it could not avail of the remedies afforded by the Tariff and Customs Code, resort to the courts is warranted, citing Commissioner of Customs v. Alikpala. Petitioner asserts his complaint on a statutory privilege or incentive granted under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code. The only subject of this incentive is a ban against importation of wood, wood products or wood-derivated products which is to be enforced by the Bureau of Customs since it has, under the Tariff and Customs Code, the exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases and, in fact, it is the duty of the Collector of Customs to exercise jurisdiction over prohibited importations .The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis. Now it follows that to allow the regular court to direct the Commissioner to impound the imported matches, as petitioner insisted, is clearly an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases. An order of a judge to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his determination and declaration of the invalidity of the importation, hence, an usurpation of the prerogative and an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In other words, the reliefs directed against the Bureau of Customs as well as the prayer for injunction against importation of matches by private respondent AJIC may not be granted without the court arrogating upon itself the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs .ISSUEw/n the BOC holds jurisdiction in the matter of wood product importation

HELD

Petitioners position is inconceivable! The claim of petitioner that no procedure is outlined for the enforcement of the import ban under theTariff and Customs Code, if true, does not at all diminish the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over the subject matter. The enforcement of statutory rights is not foreclosed by the absence of a statutory procedure. The Commissioner of Customs has the power to"promulgate all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of this (Tariff and Customs) Code . . . subject to the approval of the Secretary of Finance." Moreover, it has been held that ". . . . (w)here the statute does not require any particular method of procedure to be followed by an administrative agency, the agency may adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions."But over and above the foregoing, PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality of match importations may already take the nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction

Cario v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook mass concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latters attention.

The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.

ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations

RULING: No.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot and not try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.

Sanado vs. Court of Appeals

356 SCRA 546

Legal effect of a decision rendered by an administrative body in a case filed in the regular courts

FACTS:

Sanado was issued by the now defunct Philippine Fisheries Commission an Ordinary Fishpond Permit covering an area of 50 hectares. On July 16, 1973, Sanado executed a contract with Nepomuceno wherein the latter agreed to develop 30 hectares of the 50 hectares covered by Sanados fishpond permit. Two days later, the parties modified this earlier agreement by excluding the area of 10 hectares already cultivated and fully developed and providing that the contract is renewable on terms acceptable to both of them.

Sept. 28, 1979

Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources recommended to the then Ministry of Natural Resources the conversion of Sanados fishpond permit into a 25-year fishpond loan agreement which covered a reduced area of 26.745 hectares. Accordingly, a Fishpond Lease Agreement was issued.

July 17, 1981

Sanado filed a complaint against Nepomuceno with the RTC for recovery of possession and damages, alleging that Nepomuceno failed to deliver Sanados share of the net harvest among other things. While this case was pending, the then Minister of Agriculture and Food canceled the Fishpond Lease Agreement, forfeiting the improvements thereon in favor of government. Later, said order was reconsidered to the extent that Nepomuceno was given priority to apply for the area and that his improvements thereon were not considered forfeited in favor of the government.

Sanado elevated the matter to the Office of the President but appeal was dimissed. Meanwhile, the trial court rendered a decision over Sanados complaint for recovery of possession in his favor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision of the Office of the President has any legal effect on the civil case for recovery of possession

Whether or not the judgment of the trial court has attained finality

HELD:

What is the nature of the July 31, 1989 Malacaang decision and what is its effect on the resolution of Civil Case No. 2085?

The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or certificate of public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial. The act is not purely administrative but quasi-judicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent upon the ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency, upon which a decision is to be made and rights and liabilities determined. As such, the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President is explicitly an official act of and an exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Executive Department headed by the highest officer of the land. It thus squarely falls under matters relative to the executive department which courts are mandatorily tasked to take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Judicial notice must be taken of the organization of the Executive Department, its principal officers, elected or appointed, such as the President, his powers and duties.

The rendition of the subject July 31, 1989 Malacaang decision is premised on the essential function of the executive department which is to enforce the law. In this instance, what is being enforced is Presidential Decree No. 704 which consolidated and revised all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries. Such enforcement must be true to the policy behind such laws which is "to accelerate and promote the integrated development of the fishery industry and to keep the fishery resources of the country in optimum productive condition through proper conservation and protection" (Section 2, P.D. No. 704).

Further, the issue of whether or not petitioner is still entitled to possession of the subject fishpond area is underpinned by an ascertainment of facts. And such task belongs to the administrative body which has jurisdiction over the matter the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. The policy of the courts as regards such factual findings is not to interfere with actions of the executive branch on administrative matters addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies. This policy is specially applicable in the grant of licenses, permits, and leases, or the approval, rejection, or revocation of applications therefor (Manuel vs. Villena, 37 SCRA 745 [1971]). Such respect is based on the time-honored doctrine of separation of powers and on the fact that these bodies are considered co-equal and coordinate rank as courts. The only exception is when there is a clear showing of capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, which we find absent in the case at bar.

The reasons given by the Office of the President in dismissing petitioner's appeal are quite clear. Transferring or subletting the fishpond granted to a licensee without the consent or approval of the administrative body concerned, as well as the failure to develop the area required by the fisheries rules, are definitely solid and logical grounds for the cancellation of one's license. Withal, if petitioner disagrees with the decision of the Office of the President, he should have elevated the matter by petition for review before the Court of Appeals for the latter's exercise of judicial review. Nowhere in the record do we find such action on petitioner's part.

Understandably, to restore petitioner to the possession of the fishpond area is to totally disregard the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President which can hardly be described as an unrelated matter, considering its patent implications in the result of both Civil Case No. 2085 and CA-G.R. CV No. 23165. For how could the appellate court award possession to the very same party whose license has been cancelled by the executive or administrative officer tasked to exercise licensing power as regards the development of fishpond areas, and which cancellation has been sustained by the Office of the President? Petitioner must remember the essence of the grant of a license. It is not a vested right given by the government but a privilege with corresponding obligations and is subject to governmental regulation. Hence, to allow petitioner to possess the subject area is to run counter to the execution and enforcement of the July 31, 1989 decision which would easily lose its "teeth" or force if petitioner were restored in possession.

The trial courts decision did not attain finality. It was appealed within the reglementary period. If the court could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory (David vs. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 710 [1999]) and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it (People vs. Gallo, 315 SCRA 461 [1999]), what more if the judgment has not yet attained finality?

It is thus plain in the case at bar that the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President is a substantial supervening event which drastically changed the circumstances of the parties to the subject fishpond lease agreement. For to award possession to petitioner is futile since he has lost the fishpond license.

In point is our ruling in Baluyot vs. Guiao (315 SCRA 396 [1997]) where we held that judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but also covers those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. For example, where the ownership of a parcel of land is decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land should be considered included in the decision, it appearing that the defeated party's claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership.

By analogy, the July 31, 1989 decision, is not confined to the validity of the cancellation by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food of petitioner's Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 3090 for violation of the terms thereof and/or the fisheries rules. The right to possess the subject fishpond area is necessarily included in the decision. The cancellation or revocation of petitioner's license necessarily eliminated his right to possess the same since the new licensee would then be the one to enjoy this right.

PHIL. CONSUMERS FOUNDATION INC V SECRETARY OF EDUCATION FACTS In 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education submitted a report, which favorably recommended to the DECS courses of action with respect to the Government's policy on increases in school fees for SY 1987-1988. On this basis, the Secretary of DECS issued an order authorizing a 15-20% increase in school fees as recommended by the Task Force. Philippine Consumers Foundation Inc (PCFI) opposed the order on the ground that the increases were too high. DECS issued Dept Order No. 37 reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10-15%. Again, PCFI opposed. ISSUE W/N DECS has the power to prescribe school fees HELD YES. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law. The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? YES. The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the country for SY 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance.

Radio Communications v NTC G.R. No. L-68729 May 29, 1987

Facts:

RCPI operated a radio communications system since 1957 under legislative franchise granted by Republic Act No. 2036 (1957). The petitioner established a radio telegraph service in Sorsogon, Sorsogon (1968). in San Jose, Mindoro (1971), and Catarman, Samar (1983).

Kayumanggi Radio, on the other hand, was given the rights by the NTC to operate radio networks in the same areas.

RCPI filed a complaint in the NTC and sought to prohibit Kayumanggi Radio to operate in the same areas. The NTC ruled against the RTCs favor and commanded RCPI to desist in the operation of radio telegraphs in the three areas.

RTC filed a MFR in 1984. This was denied.

In the SC, Petitioner alleged that the Public Service Law had sections that was still in effect even if the Public Service Commission was abolished and the NTC was established.

These were S13- the Commission shall have jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all public services and their franchises S 14- Radio companies are exempt from the commissions authority except with respect to the fixing of rates And S 15-no public service shall operate in the Philippines without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission, known as "certificate of public convenience,"

Issue: Whether or not petitioner RCPI, a grantee of a legislative franchise to operate a radio company, is required to secure a certificate of public convenience and necessity before it can validly operate its radio stations including radio telephone services in the aforementioned areas

Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

Presidential Decree No. 1- the Public Service Commission was abolished and its functions were transferred to three specialized regulatory boards, as follows: the Board of Transportation, the Board of Communications and the Board of Power and Waterworks. The functions so transferred were still subject to the limitations provided in sections 14 and 15 of the Public Service Law, as amended.

The succeeding Executive Order No. 546- the Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau were abolished and their functions were transferred to the National Telecommunications Commission

Section 15- b. Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of particular operators of public service communications; and determine and prescribe charges or rates pertinent to the operation of such public utility facilities and services except in cases where charges or rates are established by international bodies or associations of which the Philippines is a participating member or by bodies recognized by the Philippine Government as the proper arbiter of such charges or rates;

c. Grant permits for the use of radio frequencies for wireless telephone and telegraph systems and radio communication systems including amateur radio stations and radio and television broadcasting systems;

The exemption enjoyed by radio companies from the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission and the Board of Communications no longer exists because of the changes effected by the Reorganization Law and implementing executive orders.

The petitioner's claim that its franchise cannot be affected by Executive Order No. 546 on the ground that it has long been in operation since 1957 cannot be sustained.

Today, a franchise, being merely a privilege emanating from the sovereign power of the state and owing its existence to a grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue of its police power through its administrative agencies. Pangasinan transportation Co.- statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the State of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation .

Executive Order No. 546, being an implementing measure of P.D. No. I insofar as it amends the Public Service Law (CA No. 146, as amended) is applicable to the petitioner who must be bound by its provisions.

The position of the petitioner that by the mere grant of its franchise under RA No. 2036 it can operate a radio communications system anywhere within the Philippines is erroneous.

Sec. 4(a). This franchise shall not take effect nor shall any powers thereunder be exercised by the grantee until the Secretary of Public works and Communications shall have allotted to the grantee the frequencies and wave lengths to be used, and issued to the grantee a license for such case.

Thus, in the words of R.A. No. 2036 itself, approval of the then Secretary of Public Works and Communications was a precondition before the petitioner could put up radio stations in areas where it desires to operate.

The records of the case do not show any grant of authority from the then Secretary of Public Works and Communications before the petitioner installed the questioned radio telephone services in San Jose, Mindoro in 1971. The same is true as regards the radio telephone services opened in Sorsogon, Sorsogon and Catarman, Samar in 1983. No certificate of public convenience and necessity appears to have been secured by the petitioner from the public respondent when such certificate,was required by the applicable public utility regulations.

The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive in nature nor can a franchise be granted except that it must be subject to amendment, alteration, or even repeal by the legislature when the common good so requires.

PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ 180 SCRA 218; GR NO 84818 18 DEC 1989

Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission

Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other

The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing

The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didnt scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the petitioner

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative. But respondents contention that notice and hearing are not required since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, providing for the proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing, dictates that a Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject to the exceptions, limitations or saving provisions.

It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is hereby SET ASIDE.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS VERA

G.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937 En Banc [Non Delegation of Legislative Powers]

FACTS:

Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.

RULING:

Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.

The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office."

The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.

The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces and this is the actual situation now appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.

US v Ang Tang HoGR L-17122February 27, 1922Johns

Facts: The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 with one of its salient provisions, Section 1,authorizing the governor-General fro any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Thus, on August 1, 1919, the Governor-General signed EO 53, fixing the price of rice. On August 6, 1919, Ang TangHo was caught selling a ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos, a price higher thanthat fixed by EO 53. Defendant was found guilty and now assails the constitutionality of the Act 2868 for invalid delegation of legislative powers.

Issue:Won Act 2868 is unconstitutional?

Held:Yes. Said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said Act authorized the Governor-General to promulgate laws and not merely rules and regulations to effect thelaw. The said Act was not complete when it left the legislature as it failed to specify what conditions the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation as the said Act states for any cause. It also failed to define extraordinary rise that such proclamation by theGovernor-General aims to prevent. Lastly, the said Act authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures by the Governor-General

US v. Ang Tang Ho

G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922

Issue:

whether Act No. 2868 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power

Held:

Yes. This question involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the