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    Managerial EconomicsSisir Debnath

    Session 7

    Indian School of BusinessMay 18, 2015

    1Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business

    Deadliest Killer?• Suppose you want to offer a mosquito abatement

     program to your community.

    • The cost of the program is 5 lack Rs.

    • The total benefit of the program is more than 5 lack.

    • There are 100,000 households which will benefit.

    • Can you charge Rs. 5 to each household and break

    even?

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 2

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 3

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    BP Oil Spill• BP drills a well in the depths of the Gulf of

    Mexico, hoping that the marginal benefits fromlarge oil deposits exceed the marginal costs of

    drilling• The explosion of Deepwater Horizon creates an

    oil spill that threatens the livelihoods of Louisianafishermen

    • The fishermen were not party to the decision todrill

    • Drilling creates a social problem that is notaddressed through unrestricted markets

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 4

    Public Goods

    • Transactions in free markets with price systems

    always make market participants better off 

    • If all participants were not better off, the

    transaction would not take place

    • But what about non-participants? They might

    either benefit or suffer from transactions between

    market participants

    • The objective of today's class is to analyze the

     provision of goods and services that impact both

    market participants and non-participants

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 5

    Today

    Public Goods and Externalities

     –  Public Goods

     –  Externalities

     –  Optimal provision of Public goods

     –  Coasian bargaining

     –  Pigouvian taxes

     –  Cap and trade

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 6

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    Public Goods• Apart from “usual” goods and services, we consume

    many public services everyday

    • The military protects us even without a conscious

    choice to consume their services

    • Roads, railways and telecommunications enable us to

    access different goods and services

    • Health and education services increase our ability to

    appreciate different goods and services

    • Imagine life without public goods and services

    • Libertarian paradise?

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 7

    Public Goods

    • Public goods are goods and services that are non-

    rivaled and non-excludable in consumption.

    •  National defense is a pure public good.

     –  Non-rivaled : marginal cost of protection given the

    level of defence is zero.

     –  Non-excluded : One person cannot exclude another

    from protection.

    • Radio broadcasts are a pure public good.

     –  Non-rivaled : Cost for a marginal listener is negligible.

     –  Non-excluded : One listener cannot exclude another

    tuning in.

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 8

    Other Types of Public Goods• Marketable public goods are non-rivaled  but

    excludable –  Also called club goods

     –  Examples?

     –  Highways with low traffic, satellite television

    • Common property goods are rivaled andnonexcludable –  Suffer from congestion problems

     –  Examples?

     –  Fish stock, Grazing in common area

    • Private goods are both rivaled and excludable –  Most goods and services

     –  Examples?

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 9

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    Voluntary Contributions to Public

    Goods• Your group is allocated Rs. 50

    You can contribute any amount ( x, including 0 and50) towards a public good

    • Public good provision is sum of x from all groups

    • Your group's earnings

    • Actual payment to one randomly chosen group

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 10

    good publicTotal504   )- x(i

    i

    i

     xgood publicTotal

    Features of Public Goods• Even when everyone consumes equal quantities of a

     public good, not everyone has same value ofconsumption

    • Classification of public good is not absolute

     –  Depends on market conditions and state oftechnology

     –  Example: Broadcast, Cable and Satellite TV

    • Private sector does not need to supply only privategoods

    • Yet difficult for the private sector to provide non-excludable goods and make a profit

    • Example: Basic research

    •  Not necessary that public goods are produced only by

     public sector Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 11

    Aggregate Demand for Public Goods• For private goods aggregate demand is obtained by

    summing up individual demand at each price

    • How to obtain aggregate demand for public good?

    • Recall that the same amount of public good many be

    consumed by many at the same time.

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 12

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    Voluntary Contributions to Public

    Goods• What is the optimal provision of public good?

    Under voluntary provision, are public goods under orover supplied?

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 13

    Externalities• Think about the following examples:

     –  Introducing a knowledgeable worker to a team of

    employees increases the team's productivity

     –  Vaccination against communicable diseases

     protects not only vaccine receivers, but reduces the

     probability others around them get the disease

     –  Literacy not only improves a person's job

     prospects, but also allows society to use written

    contracts and forms of communication

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 14

    Externalities• An externality is the effect of a decision by one set of

     parties on others who were not participants in that

    decision.

    • Externalities are not always beneficial

    • Air pollution from a factory or a car's tailpipe has a

    negative impact on asthma sufferers who live or work

    close by

    • A business that underfunds the pension fund pushes

    the cost of providing retirement income on society

    • Corruption by bureaucrats has a negative impact on

    users of public services

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 15

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    Externalities & Managerial DecisionMaking

    • In what context do managers deal with externalities?

    • Externalities that involve the government and the

     public –  Professional education

     –  Pollution

     –  Consumer safety

    • Externalities within the firm

     –  Employees who are particularly helpful or disruptive

     –  Knowledge sharing

    • Externalities between a firm and other firms

     –  Intellectual property generated through research

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 16

    A Negative Externality Example

    S0 = MarginalPrivate Cost

    D = Marginal SocialBenefit

    Cost, P

    Q

    S1 = MarginalSocial Cost

    P0

    P1

    Q0Q1

    If there are no externalities,

    P0Q0 is the equilibrium

    If there are negative

    externalities, the marginal

    social cost differs from the

    marginal private cost, and

    P0 is too low and Q0 is too

    high to maximize social

    welfare

    If there are negative

    externalities, the marginal

    social cost differs from the

    marginal private cost, and

    P0 is too low and Q0 is too

    high to maximize social

    welfare

    Cost of externality

    17Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business

    A Positive Externality Example

    S = Marginal

    Private Cost

    D0 = MarginalPrivate Benefit

    Cost, P

    Q

    P0

    P1

    Q0 Q1

    If there are no externalities,

    P0Q0 is the equilibrium

    If there are positive

    externalities, the marginal

    social benefit differs from

    the marginal private benefit,

    and both P0 and Q0 are too

    low to maximize social

    welfare

    If there are positive

    externalities, the marginal

    social benefit differs from

    the marginal private benefit,

    and both P0 and Q0 are too

    low to maximize social

    welfare

    Government intervention

    may be necessary to

    increase consumption

    Benefit of

    externality

    D1 = Marginal SocialBenefit

    18Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business

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    Externality Solution• Goods and services with negative externalities are

    over-supplied by private markets

    • Goods and services with positive externalities are

    under-supplied by private markets

    • If externalities have a significant negative (positive)

    impact, how does one mitigate (encourage) their

    incidence?

    • Internalize the externality

    • Alter incentives so that individuals take account of

    externality in their own actions

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 19

    Externality Solutions• Private solutions

     –  Moral codes

     –  Private charities

     –  Bargaining (Coase theorem)

    • Public (government) solutions

     –  Regulation mandating maximum (negativeexternality) or minimum (positive externality)

     provision

     –  Pigouvian taxes (for negative externalities) andsubsidies (for positive externalities)

     –  Cap and trade

    • Privately developed public solutions

     – 

    Social institutionsSisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 20

    Mandated Maximum Provision

    S0

    = Marginal

    Private Cost

    D = Marginal SocialBenefit

    Cost, P

    Q

    S1 = MarginalSocial Cost

    P0

    P1

    Q0Q1

    If there are no externalities,

    P0Q0 is the equilibrium

    If there are externalities, the

    marginal social cost differsfrom the marginal private

    cost, and P0 is too low and

    Q0 is too high to maximize

    social welfare

    Government intervention

    may be necessary to reduce

    production

    Cost of externality

    21Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business

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    Coase Bargaining

    Example:

     –  A perfume factory is downstream to a paper mill.

    Gunk from the paper mill impose a negative

    externality on the operations of the perfume

    factory.

     –  The paper mill could reduce effluents by installing

    filters.

     –  The perfume factory could eliminate the impact of

    the gunk by treating water before use.

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 22

    Coase Bargaining• Definition: A property right is a legal rule that

    describes what economic agents can do with an object

    or idea.

    • Example:

     –  Deed to parcel of land

     –  Patent on an idea

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 23

    Coase Bargaining• Example: Case 1: No explicit rights allocation.

    Both the paper mill and the perfume factory cando whatever they wish.

    • The paper mill will not install a filter 

    • The perfume factory will install a treatment plant

    • Joint payoff will be 700→  Can they do better?

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 24

    Perfume Factory

     No Treatment Treatment

    Paper Mill No Filter  (500,100) (500,200)

    Filter  (300,500) (300,300)

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    Coase Bargaining• Example: Case 2: The perfume factory has the right

    to clean water and sets a fee of Rs. 500 for receivinggunk.

    • The paper mill will install a filter 

    • The perfume factory will not install a treatment plant

    • Joint payoff will be 800→ The best they can do

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 25

    Perfume Factory

     No Treatment Treatment

    Paper Mill No Filter  (0,600) (0,700)

    Filter  (300,500) (300,300)

    Coase Bargaining• Example: Case 3: The mill has a right to pollute and

    sells fresh water for Rs. 250.

    • The paper mill will install a filter 

    • The perfume factory will not install a treatment plant

    • Joint payoff will be 800→ The best they can do

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 26

    Perfume Factory

     No Treatment Treatment

    Paper Mill No Filter  (500,100) (500,200)

    Filter  (550,250) (550,50)

    Coase Bargaining• Summary of the main results

    • Ownership of property rights affects incomedistribution

     –  Party with property rights is compensated by other party

     –  Property rights are valuable• With no impediments to bargaining, assigning

     property rights results in efficient outcome

     –  Joint profits are maximized at this outcome

    • Efficiency is achieved regardless of who receives the property rights!

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 27

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    Challenges to Coase Bargaining• Why doesn't Coase bargaining solve every

    negative externality?

    • High transaction costs

     –  Ex: In Bhopal Gas case, defendants are far away

    • Large numbers of injured parties

     –  Ex: In Erin Brockovich's suit, 1 defendant but 634 plaintiffs

    • Incomplete or asymmetric information

     –  Ex: In carbon emission case, exact marginalabatement costs for each emitter are not known

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 28

     Pigouvian Taxes and Subsidies• Definition: A Pigouvian tax or subsidy is a tax

    (subsidy) levied on a market activity that generatesnegative (positive) externalities.

     –  A Pigouvian tax is not intended to raise funds, orto tax sinful activities.

    • Examples of Pigouvian Subsidies and Taxes

     –  Subsidies for higher education

     –  Free vaccines

     –  Taxes on high sugar sodas and snacks to combatobesity (fat tax)

     –  Carbon taxes to combat global warming

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 29

     Pigouvian Taxes and SubsidiesFirm has to either abate pollution or pay a tax

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 30

    Marginal

    Abatement

    Costs (MAC)

    MAC < Tax

    Firm prefers to abate emissions

    MAC > Tax

    Firm prefers to pay tax

     Pigouvian

    Tax

    Abatement

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     Pigouvian Taxes and SubsidiesShift in supply curve when firm internalizes costs

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 31

    Social Cost

    Demand

    Supply

    Quantity of AluminiumQMQO

    PC

    PS

    Pigouvian Tax

    Rs./ton

    Cap and Trade• How does cap and trade work?

    • Cap or limit on total quantity of production (across

    the industry)

    • Producers need a permit for every unit of production

    • Cap is equal to total number of permits in market

    • Permits are tradable => Market price for permits

    • Leads to known quantity, unknown price

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 32

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 33

    Firm 1

    Firm 2

    0 5 10

    10 5 0

    Rs./tonRs./ton

    MAC2

    MAC1

    Trade 1 unit

    of right to

     pollute

    Cap and TradeSame production but different abatement cost

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    Cap and Trade• Each firm must either abate pollution, or pollute with a

     permit.

    • Initially, each firm is allocated five permits (to pollute 5units).

    Total pollution is 10 units (the cap).• Both Firm 1 and Firm 2 can pollute first 5 units and must

     buy the permit to pollute beyond 5 units.

    • But Firm 1 can sell its permit to Firm 2 (the trade).

    • Firm 2 will be happy to buy, since using the permit lowersTAC2 (Total Abatement Cost).

    • Increase in TAC1 is less than reduction in TAC2 for Firm 2.

    • Price of permits is net cost savings for Firm 2.

    • Keep trading till MAC1 = MAC2.

    •  No additional gains from trading for either firm.

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 34

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 35

    Firm 1

    Firm 2

    0 5 10

    105

    0

    Rs./tonRs./ton

    MAC2

    MAC1

     Net Cost

    Savings

    Cap and TradeEach firm can do better if Firm 1 sells its permits to Firm 2

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 36

    Firm 1

    Firm 2

    0 5 10

    10 5 0

    Rs./tonRs./ton

    MAC2

    MAC1

    Keep trading till

    MACs are

    equalized

     Net Cost

    Savings

    Cap and TradeKeep trading till there are no more gains from trade

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    Carbon tax vs. Cap-and-Trade• Revenue

     –  Direct tax revenues from carbon taxes

     –  Government can redistribute carbon tax revenues as

    transfers to individuals or firms –  Revenues from cap-and-trade only if permits are

    auctioned

     –  Free permits are a hidden transfer to emitters

    • Allocation

     –  Who should receive permits initially?

     –  Distribution to current emitters?

     –  Distribution by auction?

     –  Distribution to affected parties?

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 37

    Takeaways from Today's Class• Public goods are non-rivaled and non-excludable in

    consumption

     –  Voluntary provision tends to undersupply public goodsand oversupply public bads

     –  Remedy through government action

    •   Externalities are impact of market transactions on non- participants

     –  Public policy should encourage positive externalitiesand discourage negative ones

     –  If property rights are well-designed and transactioncosts are low, bargaining will remedy externalities(Coase Theorem)

     –  But bargaining cannot fix every situation, so role forgovernment through mandates, pigouvian taxes and

    subsidies, cap and trade etc.

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 38

    Readings for Next Session• Oligopoly (Course pack page 171-199)

    Sisir Debnath, Managerial Economics, Indian School of Business 39