Session 1B: Rights-based Social Mobilisations ... · Centre for the Study of Human Rights, LSE – working conference for research students. 20 March 2007 Page 1 of 33 Session 1B:

Centre for the Study of Human Rights, LSE – working conference for research students. 20 March 2007

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Session 1B: Rights-based Social Mobilisations

Transnational mobilisation of minority groups: Reforming international minority rights to achieve domestic change

Corinne Lennox

There is a growing and diverse body of research that seeks to understand better the role of non-state actors in international relations. One important subset of this research considers those non-state actors principally interested in social justice. Forms of so-called ‘transnational social mobilisation’ have drawn the attention of International Relations (IR) and Sociology scholars alike, interested to uncover how private citizens are working together beyond their state to influence social change at the international and national levels. Sociologists (e.g. Della Porta and Tarrow 2004; Smith et al. 1997; Smith and Johnston 2002; Tarrow 2005) have attempted to transpose their knowledge of the study of domestic social movements to hypothesise on the function and emergence of transnational social movements. Researchers have been struck by the upwards and outwards shift of social movements and are working to identify the mechanisms that constrain or enable the functioning and sustainability of collective (social) action across borders. IR theorists (Finnemore 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; e.g. Risse-Kappen et al. 1999) are interested to understand the role and impact of these non-state actors at the international level. They are particularly focused on the question of how and why non-state actors working in the international sphere have influenced the elaboration of new norms for state behaviour and have pushed successfully for greater implementation of these norms. Both groups of scholars seek to understand how this action affects the relationship between the domestic and international spheres and whether international society is transforming as a result. Ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities are a special kind of non-state actor, whose interests and claims have often been viewed with apprehension by states. Frequently marginalised in the domestic sphere, the opportunities afforded in the international sphere to bring attention to their concerns are attractive to minorities. With a shared identity and experience from which to construct transnational social mobilisation, some minorities are using this form of action to good effect. Recent years have seen innovative changes in the way minority groups are embracing transnational social mobilisation as a means to influence new norms and state behaviour. The methods, goals and opportunities employed by minorities offer an additional perspective on transnational social mobilisation and an understanding of how the international protection regime for minorities operates and evolves. This paper will explore these issues drawing on the experiences of two groups during the processes of the 2001 UN World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance (WCAR). The two groups to be considered are caste-affected groups (principally Dalits or ‘Untouchables’) and Afro-descendants (in particular those from Latin America). The WCAR was a key political opportunity structure for both groups; the conference and its


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processes directly and indirectly stimulated new forms of transnational social mobilisation and new structures within the international protection regime for minorities. Their success (and failure) at the WCAR itself must be understood against the broader landscape of minorities’ engagement in the international sphere. The rights, institutions and opportunities that have been built-in to the minority ‘frame’ have had both positive and negative attractions for minorities. In an effort to construct a better fit, minorities have tried to expand, splinter or transform the meaning of ‘minority’ and the concomitant rights in international law. This has been achieved with the help of certain brokers, principally intergovernmental organisations and international NGOs. Some of the key trends in the way minorities are framing their identities, forming new structures of transnational mobilisation and using political opportunities at the international and regional level will be outlined before turning to the WCAR case studies. What is a minority? New frames for transnational mo bilisation The category of ‘minority’ has fragmented significantly over time, now encompassing a host of sub-groups that for various reasons have adopted alternative/additional markers for their identity. In a recent authoritative analysis, the UN Working Group on Minorities has said that the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (UNDM) can apply to national minorities; ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities; indigenous peoples; migrant workers; refugees; immigrants; and non-citizens.1 This gives a wide range of actors that could potentially be engaged in the international sphere as ‘minorities’. Some groups are constitutively ‘international’ or ‘transnational’; for example, refugees, migrant workers and immigrants, all of whom have left their home country and travelled across borders to take up new residence. In contrast, other minority groups are firmly rooted in a domestic sphere: these include many indigenous peoples and national, ethnic or linguistic minorities, who commonly have an historical attachment to a particular territory existing within a single state. The way that each of these groups relates to the international sphere may differ. Migrants may connect with a diaspora as a means of preserving their culture or establishing social capital when far away from their homeland. Kin groups straddling borders may form associations for similar reasons, or as a bedrock for political activism vis-à-vis the home or host state. Religious minorities may also use their international brethren for political support in the face of persecution from the state or more commonly as part of proselytising or worship. All kinds of minorities have appealed outside their borders to advocate against the action of national governments.

1 Asbjorn Eide, Commentary on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2001/2). The Commentary was officially adopted by the Working Group at its 10th session, see UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/2 (4 April 2005).


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Where domestic channels for dialogue are blocked or ineffective, the international level becomes the alternative sphere of negotiation where allies and institutions can be engaged in support of minorities’ claims. It is this last form of international engagement that is linked to transnational social mobilisation among minority groups. While cultural associations, diasporas and religious universalism all have a clear transnational element, they often lack the “contentious politics” (McAdam et al. 2001) which the present analysis intends to explore. While minorities may have long been engaged in this kind of action at the national level, the move to the international sphere is an innovation and demands further investigation. The form of minorities’ collective action is here termed transnational social mobilisation and the principal domain of this action is the international sphere. Transnational social mobilisation of minorities occurs where minorities with a shared identity normally residing in separate states jointly take action in the international sphere to achieve shared social justice objectives affecting the domestic and/or international sphere. This mobilisation is social mobilisation to distinguish it from other kinds of mobilisation that may be principally cultural, economic or combative in nature and to distinguish those minorities who are non-state actors. For example, national political parties with a minority-focused agenda or armed conflict by minority groups would not constitute forms of social mobilisation (although in some cases these forms of collective action may be complemented by social mobilisation). A vast literature on ethnic conflict, power-sharing, irredentism and secession exists already to examine the nature and scope of mobilisation by minority groups to engage in conflict or governance. This is an important body of work but it has ignored other forms of mobilisation by minority groups that are not only more peaceful but potentially more constructive than combative or narrowly political strategies. The overarching category of ‘minority’ has proved too broad for establishing a transnational social movement based on this identity alone. Nor has there been a common issue, such as access to mother tongue education, which has stimulated minorities from diverse experiences to form transnational alliances. More fruitful have been attempts to form movements on the basis of a sub-identity within the ‘minority’ category, where stronger commonalities can be used to aid mobilisation. Indigenous peoples have constituted the strongest transnational social movement among ‘minority’ groups and their mobilisation has produced a distinct normative regime for the protection of their particular rights (Brysk 2000). No other minority group has been as successful but the indigenous model is prompting other groups to make similar bids for elaborations to the minority protection framework targeted for their specific groups. Among the first steps in establishing transnational cooperation is the construction of a common frame under which to mobilise. Framing is key for influencing broader public understandings by framing old problems in new ways or helping social movements to “transform other actors’ understandings of their identities and interests” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 17). The term ‘minority’ is a powerful and highly evocative frame. When


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ethnic, religious and linguistic groups claim they are a ‘minority’, they are tapping into an existing set of rights, institutions and meanings associated with the term. When recognised as ‘minorities’ they can access a range of political opportunity structures aimed at such groups and make specific rights claims that come with that identity. Outwardly, as a frame for social mobilisation it can therefore be highly instrumental. Inwardly, it is not a value-neutral term, however, and this can affect the desire of a group to so-identify. In English, for example, the meaning of the term ‘minority’ can have negative connotations, depending on etymology and/or social and political usage.2 When groups accept they are minorities, as opposed to, for example, nations, peoples or communities, they also tacitly acknowledge that they are in a position of less power – be it social, economic or political. From an empowerment perspective, therefore, the minority frame offers both positive and negative points. From a state perspective, the self-identification of a group as a ‘minority’ can pose risks. Despite the inherently weak position of most minorities, the expression of an identity difference, namely an identity distinct from the shared national identity forged by the state can be seen as fragmentary. In an international society still rooted in the legitimacy of the ‘nation-state’ model, internal ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity is often regarded as a potential fault line for territorial integrity and the maintenance of internal sovereignty. Consequently, some states will reject or ignore the concept of ‘minority’ or minority identity claims of certain groups.3 The access to specific rights in international law for minority groups afforded by the minority frame is further reason for states to seek to artificially homogenise the population and prevent use also of the political opportunities at the international level for minorities that may cause embarrassment to the state. Self-identification as a ‘minority’ can therefore be a risky strategy for groups who may further antagonise the government they seek to engage.

2 The origins of the term ‘minority’ in English are illustrative. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) indicates that minority in its present usage can refer to “any identifiable subgroup within a society, esp. one perceived as suffering from discrimination or from relative lack of status or power.” (OED). The word minority in English was first used in the 14th century to denote “[t]he period of a person's life prior to attaining full age; the state or fact of being a minor” (OED). It was subsequently used to denote “[t]he condition or fact of being smaller, inferior, or subordinate in relation to something else” (OED). The word was then often used from the early 18th century to describe a political group not holding power, “whose views or actions distinguish it from the main body of people” (OED). From the mid-19th century the word ‘minority’ took on the meaning of “[a] small group of people differing from the rest of the community in ethnic origin, religion, language, etc.” (OED). 3 This is evident in the formulation of Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), designed to protect minorities in “those States in which persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist” (emphasis added). Although in the interpretation of the article the UN Human Rights Committee has tried to establish that the existence of a minority group must be established by fact and not merely by a decision of the state the caveat has enabled states to claim the article does not apply to their territory since their territory does not have ‘minorities’. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 23 on the Rights of Minorities (Article 27), (UN doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, 1994): para 5.2.


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There is no internationally agreed definition of ‘minority’,4 leaving open opportunities for both would-be minorities and states to expand or contract the meaning of the frame according to their interests. The fact that some groups are rejecting the term minority and opting instead for the construction of new identity frames and/or the adoption of other identity frames, such as ‘indigenous peoples’, suggests a weakness with the minority frame. As a universal concept ‘minority’ is not a universally attractive frame. Groups may seek empowerment through forging an identity around a new common frame that is unique to their experiences, regardless of whether this impedes their access to the rights and opportunities of the (universal) minority frame. They may also find that an alternative frame affords greater rights and opportunities; this is arguably the case where groups attempt to claim status as indigenous peoples, with the concomitant set of rights to land and self-determination. In an attempt to establish a set of ‘universal’ rights for minorities, states have created a common denominator of standards so low that many groups seeking protection feel compelled to build something better. This raises questions about what place the minority frame, with its meaning, rights, institutions and opportunities, will have in the future. Minorities of the same ethnic, religious or linguistic identity have a built-in foundation for framing. A shared identity, particularly one so deeply rooted in the individual and communal nature of being, inwardly serves as a powerful mobilising force. Ethnic, religious and linguistic identities, however, also contain much internal variation that can undermine attempts to establish a unified outward identity. The Roma, for example, self-identify into several groups such as the Sinti, Manush, Kale, Rudari and have associated groups such as the Ashkalija, Egyupti and Travellers (Klimova-Alexander 2005, 30-31). Indeed, the principle of self-identification embedded in the minority rights discourse recognises the right of communities to name themselves and assert their distinctiveness. Some minority groups have been successful in forging a common transnational identity in spite of inter-group variation. Indigenous peoples have perhaps been the most successful in this regard, constructing a shared universal identity around the dual concept of being ‘original’ to a territory and also constituting ‘peoples’. The rejection of the terminology of ‘minority’ in favour of that of ‘peoples’ was not fortuitous: it also strategically aligned them with the decolonisation process and the concomitant right to self-determination. Leaders in the indigenous movement felt that given the limitations of the minority rights framework, omitting as it does discussion of key issues such as land rights and use of natural resources, the ‘peoples’ frame was substantively and strategically more appropriate. This ‘framing’ has propelled indigenous advocates into serious negotiations with states over the meaning of ‘peoples’ and more critically the

4 Francesco Capotorti was asked by the UN Sub-Commission to propose a definition for the term ‘minority’ under Article 27 of the ICCPR. His definition was not formally accepted but remains as a guide. He proposed that under Article 27, a minority is “A group numerically smaller to the rest of the population of the State, in a non-dominant position, whose members, being nationals of the State, possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language”. See Francesco Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, (New York: United Nations, 1991).


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meaning of self-determination in international law. 5 There are a handful of other examples of successful transnational identity framing by minority groups. The Roma have managed to bring together a diverse range of identities into the common Roma frame. Moreover, they have managed to successfully transform the frame from the derogatory ‘gypsy’ terminology to the now widely accepted name of ‘Roma’. Groups such as the Dalits of the Hindu caste system, the Buraku of Japan, the Haratin of Mauritania and the Osu of Nigeria have also managed to unite under the frame of victims of ‘caste-based discrimination’. Finding a common link between the experiences of their communities, these groups have managed to create an identity with universal scope but based on a particular experience. Their success in gaining acceptance of this frame has been mixed, however; while the phrase ‘caste-based discrimination’ is commonly employed, some states, principally India, have objected to its use in official discourse. Consequently, since 2000 when the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights first began to investigate further this issue, they have done so under the heading of ‘discrimination based on work and descent’.6 In the Americas, the term ‘Afro-descendants’ has emerged in recent years as a frame to incorporate those people descended from slaves or escaped slaves in the region. The experiences of people of African descent across this region are diverse and complex, often with unique histories for distinct communities. There also has been some controversy as to whether the term ‘Afro-descendant’ should refer only to descendants of slaves, to distinguish them from other populations of African descent elsewhere who do not share this experience. The international acceptance of the term ‘Afro-descendants’ was won through the World Conference Against Racism in 2001, in which the final Programme of Action includes specific measures for “Africans and people of African descent”. Other categories like ‘pastoralists’ are also starting to emerge as transnational social mobilisation frames. Pastoralism denotes a particular economic and cultural way of life with nomadism and animal husbandry at the core; it is a lifestyle that is shared by many groups across the world. The first ever Global Pastoralist Gathering was held in Ethiopia in 2005.7 The meeting brought together 200 pastoralists from all across Africa, to Central Asia, Europe, the Middle East and the Americas. Each of these examples point to a desire on the part of the groups named to assert something more than an identity as ‘minorities’, creating a more specific identity. Whether they do this as a means of facilitating transnational mobilisation and/or because they see the minority frame (and its rights, institutions) as too limited needs to be explored further.

5 This issue has been a focal point of the negotiations over the draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, where draft Article 3 recognises the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples. See also the limitations made in Article 1.3 of the ILO Convention 169: “The use of the term "peoples" in this Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law”. A similar statement was made in the World Conference Against Racism Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (2001); para 24. 6 See, for example, the Progress report of Mr. Yozo Yokota and Ms. Chin-Sung Chung, Special Rapporteurs on the topic of discrimination based on work and descent, UN Doc. A/HRC/Sub.1/58/CRP.2 (28 July 2006). 7 The meeting was hosted by the Hammar people of Turmi, Ethiopia and organized in cooperation with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Pastoralist Communication Initiative and funded by the United Kingdom Department for International Development.


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Trends in transnational social mobilisation of mino rities: Transnational mobilisation for social justice is not a new phenomenon. Social movements, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and transnational coalitions of actors have since the mid-19th century been active beyond the domestic sphere in their efforts to achieve change on global and/or local issues (Chatfield 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Seary 1996). The web of transnational mobilisation of non-state actors has contributed greatly to the increasing complexity and interdependence within the international system. As states have expanded their relations with one another, creating institutions for dialogue and international law, non-state actors have played an important role in influencing these processes. The transnational mobilisation of non-state actors has been aided by innovations in transportation and communication technology that have made time and space less of a barrier to collective social action across borders. Even with these innovations, to mobilise resources, access information, create organisational structures and make international alliances is a struggle for civil society actors. The struggle is greater for minorities who are typically marginalised, poor and politically impotent. Furthermore, many minority groups are limited in their ability to constitute transnational social movements since forging a common identity across borders may be difficult. Most minority groups have a highly localised identity that does not stretch far beyond any border. This and other factors (such as funding and capacity) mean that the use of the international sphere for many minority groups is sporadic and unsustained; nevertheless, the data suggests that this use is increasing. In studying transnational social mobilisation, many scholars use international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) as their independent variable. Using the data of the Yearbook of International Organisations, Jackie Smith in particular has produced extensive analysis of how much INGOs have changed over time (e.g. Smith 1997, 2004). Smith has sometimes included INGOs focusing on “self-determination/ethnic unity” in her analysis; this is the smallest of Smith’s categories and also reportedly the only one that has remained stagnant (Smith 1997, 48). Smith (1997, 48-49; 2004, 270) hypothesises that the stagnation may be accounted for either by a shift of such INGOs to more violent forms of organisation (which would exclude them from the Yearbook of International Organizations), particularly over the 1990s as ethnic militarism increased; or to a ‘reframing’ of their issues under another theme, most probably as human rights issues. She finds that:

About half of the groups working to promote indigenous peoples’ rights were formed during the 1980s. Another organizing frame that may be displacing the ethnic unity/liberation one is the anti-racism/minority rights frame. Half of the groups listing this as a key goal were formed after 1980, and one quarter were formed during the 1990s. (Smith 2004, 270).

It is not clear how Smith’s figures on ‘self-determination/ethnic unity’ relate to the current categories of the Yearbook of International Organizations (2005), the primary


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source of her data.8 The most recent figures from the Yearbook reports that for 2004, 302 international organisations were categorised under the heading “Racial, Ethnic Groups” and 265 under “Minority, Indigenous Groups”, a slight decline from the previous year.9 These two categories have generally showed steady growth over time, with the “Minority, Indigenous Groups” population increasing at a higher rate, in particular in the period between 1986 and 1995. Since then, the growth in the two categories has increased at a more or less equal pace, with a markedly dramatic increase around 2001: from 2001 to 2002, the number of INGOs in each category nearly doubled.10 The latter growth period coincides with the World Conference Against Racism in 2001 and the former growth period (1986-95) with indigenous peoples’ participation in the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (created in 1982) and the international campaign around the 500th Anniversary of Columbus’ ‘discovery’ of the Americas (1992). One of the Yearbook’s earliest records, from 1924, shows seven organisations registered under the category of “Nationalities and races”, suggesting that the institutionalisation of transnational social mobilisation by ethnic non-state actors has a long history.11 The international organisations categorised by the Yearbook include a wide range of bodies, such as funds, research institutes, foundations, and moribund organisations, in addition to international legal standards and IGOs. The “Minority, Indigenous Groups” category, for example, begins with the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, a now defunct body of the Government of Australia, and ends with Young Women from Minorities, a small European INGO; in between are many organisations predominately working on indigenous peoples rights (e.g. International Indian Treaty Council – an advocacy INGO), some working on religious minorities (e.g. Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs – a UK-based research institute) and some for whom only a strand of their work indirectly impacts on minorities (e.g. International Alert – a conflict INGO).12 A better picture of minority INGOs is provided in Table 1.2, which gives an overview of the most active advocacy-focused INGOs, including those working primarily at the regional level. The INGOs listed are those whose exclusive focus is on the situation of

8 Smith indicates that her code on self-determination/ethnic unity was used for groups that were organized around an ethnic identity to promote solidarity within an ethnic group. Ethnic unity groups were not necessarily coded�as�Minority Rights groups. This only occurred when the organizational�description�mentioned rights explicitly, as in minority rights or rights for�marginalized�peoples. Personal communication with the author, 23 February 2007. 9 Union of International Associations, “Figure 4.1.2 Subjects. Number of International Organizations by Subject Groups: 2004”, Yearbook of International Organizations, 2005. The Yearbook also includes related categories such as “Peoples”, “Migrants”, “Refugees”, and “Class, Caste, Elites” but does not have a category “self-determination/ethnic unity” as employed by Smith. 10 Union of International Associations, “Figure 4.2.2(b) Trends in Selected Subjects, 1985-2004”, Yearbook of International Organizations, 2005. 11 Union of International Associations, “Figure 4.3.1 Classification of International Organizations: 1924”, Yearbook of International Organisations, 2005 12 It is not clear how the Yearbook decides where to categorise the organisations; one can assume perhaps that the categorisations are self-selecting. Several bodies also appear under both the “Minority, Indigenous Groups” heading and the “Racial, Ethnic Groups” heading.


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ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities and/or indigenous peoples.13 These INGOs also share a social justice mandate, advocating usually within a human rights framework, and do not use (or condone the use of) violence to achieve their goals. Most combine roles in information sharing, advocacy vis-à-vis international institutions, research, training/capacity building, and funding or running small to medium-sized projects, usually at the local level. The majority of INGOs considered here are concentrated in Northern countries, regardless of their main region of work (for example, many INGOs on indigenous rights in Latin America are located in the USA). Of the 18 globally focused INGOs, 15 have their headquarters or secretariat in a Northern state. Several INGOs are concentrated in the UK, Thailand, Southern Africa and the USA. Contrary to the general trend among INGOs, very few of the minority/indigenous focused INGOs are based in the world ‘decision-making’ cities (i.e. London, Brussels, Geneva and New York). Three of the global INGOs are based in London (Minority Rights Group International, Rainforest Foundation UK and Survival International); only one of the global INGOs listed here is based in Geneva (DoCip) and one in New York (the Rainforest Foundation USA), although others may send representatives to meetings in these cities and at least one (the International Movement against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism) has a permanent representative in Geneva. Although most of the INGOs here are based in the North, many do straddle the North-South divide, working in close cooperation with organisations in the South and/or North. For example, Minority Rights Group International reports that it has over 130 partner NGOs/INGOs in nearly 60 countries worldwide.

13 This list does not include INGOs that may give attention to minorities/indigenous peoples as one of several issues in their repertoire: for example, Human Rights Watch has been very active on Dalit rights issues, but is not principally a minority rights INGO.


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Table 1.2 INGOs focusing on minorities or indigenou s peoples. The country in which the headquarters or secretariat of these organisations is located appears in parentheses. Global Cultural Survival (USA)

Centre de Documentation, de Recherche et d'Information des Peuples Autochtones (DoCip) (Switzerland) Forest Peoples Programme (UK) First Peoples Worldwide (USA) International Alliance of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests (Thailand) International Dalit Solidarity Network (Denmark) International Indian Treaty Council (USA) International Movement against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (Japan) International Romani Union (Czech Republic) International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (Denmark) Minority Rights Group International (UK) Netherlands Centre for Indigenous Peoples (Netherlands) Rainforest Foundation (UK/USA/Norway) Society for Threatened Peoples (Germany) Survival International (UK) Tebtebba Foundation - Indigenous Peoples' International Centre for Policy Research and Education (the Philippines) Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (Netherlands) World Alliance of Mobile Indigenous Peoples (Iran)

Europe/North America

Arctic Council Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat (Denmark) Association for Democratic Initiatives (Macedonia) European Roma and Travellers Forum (France) European Roma Rights Centre (Hungary) Federal Union of European Nationalities (Germany) Indian Law Resource Centre (USA) Inuit Circumpolar Conference (Canada/USA/Russia/Greenland) Roma National Congress (Germany/Czech Republic) Saami Council (Finland)

Africa African Indigenous Women’s Organisation (Burkino Faso) Commission Amazigh Internationale pur le Developpement et les Droits de L'Homme (Algeria) Indigenous Peoples of Africa Coordination Committee (South Africa) Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa (Namibia)

Asia/Pacific Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact Foundation (Thailand) Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network (India)

Middle East Latin America

Abya Yala Fund for Indigenous Self-Development in South and Afroamerica 21 (USA)


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Meso America (USA) Amazon Alliance (USA) Coordinator of the Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin (Ecuador) Indigenous Information Network (Mexico) Mundo Afro (Uruguay) Red de Mujeres Afrolatinoamericanas y Afrocaribeñas (Costa Rica) South and Meso American Indian Rights Center (USA)

While Smith (2004) finds that INGOs are increasingly working with regional organisations, the spread of INGOs in Table 1.2 suggests that many continue to use the UN as a key focus of their activity. All of the INGOs in Table 1.2 have engaged at some point with the UN and its agencies at the international level and about half of these have formal consultative status with the UN under ECOSOC, including seven of the mostly regionally focused INGOs. The distribution of INGO activity coincides somewhat with the availability of regional mechanisms, or political opportunity structures, on minority or indigenous rights. For example, Europe and Latin America have the most INGOs by region on minorities. The Council of Europe and the OSCE each have specific standards and liaison bodies to engage on minority issues. In Latin America, the OAS has been active in elaborating a draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and new mechanisms on non-discrimination, while regional institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank have programmes targeted at indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants. Asia does not have a regional mechanism, which perhaps explains why the only global focused minority/indigenous INGOs from the South come from Asian countries (Thailand, the Philippines and Iran). In Africa, there is a Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities under the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, established only in 2001. The Middle East has no regional mechanism, including on human rights and no presence of regionally-focused minority INGOs. That so many of the organisations have ECOSOC status, whether working regionally or globally, and have engaged with the UN suggests that the political opportunities within the UN remain an overarching focus for many minority activists even when engaging also with regional mechanisms. Significantly, most of the INGOs have a primary or exclusive focus on indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples’ organisations have long been active on the international stage, making use of the myriad of political opportunity structures that have evolved over the decades in response to their advocacy. This action has translated into more formalised organisational structures, resulting in several INGOs.14 This expansion has been enabled by good access to funding for these kinds of INGOs, both from public 14 The International Indian Treaty Council (IITC), for example, was established in 1974 by representatives of 98 Native American nations. While its founding statute recognises a union with indigenous nations of South America the main focus of attention was the United States. Over time, through active engagement with the UN (in 1977 the IITC became the first indigenous peoples’ organization to be granted ECOSOC consultative status) and coalition building, the IITC has expanded from a domestic alliance to become a key INGO focused on advocacy, standard-setting and monitoring activities for indigenous peoples’ rights globally.


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and private sources.15 These funding opportunities have been linked in large part to public interest in indigenous peoples via environmental movements and sympathy with the plight of marginalised, isolated and ‘exotic’ communities (Brysk 2000). Only one of the 18 global INGOs focuses on a particular minority/indigenous group, namely the International Romani Union directed towards the interests of the Roma (Klimova-Alexander, 2005). The International Dalit Solidarity Network does work principally with Dalit issues but seeks to represent the interests of a wide range of caste-affected groups. At the regional level as well the only non-indigenous groups to have a dedicated INGOs are the Roma and Afro-descendants. This does not mean that transnational coalitions of domestic NGOs have not formed around single-identity minority issues, only that this form of coalition has not evolved into an INGO structure, either by design or because the coalition is not sufficiently advanced to warrant such a structure. The evolution of transnational social mobilisation by minorities into international NGOs clearly has a long history, stretching back at least to the early 20th century. There is now a small but important cadre of INGOs working on these issues at the global (principally vis-à-vis the UN) and regional levels. The establishment of new international organisations working on minority issues shows no signs of great decline according to the figures afforded by the Yearbook of International Organizations. How the face of these organisations will change over time remains to be seen; more interesting is how these organisations might change the landscape of international protection for minorities using the political opportunity structures available to them. Political Opportunity Structures: Adaptation and ex pansion by minorities Sociologists contend that social and political conditions do not necessarily or directly led to social protest (McAdam et al. 1996) but require political opportunity structures to enable social mobilisation. For transnational mobilisation, Tarrow (2005) sees international institutions as the primary political opportunity structures and an essential space for enabling transnational social mobilisation. International institutions may encompass intergovernmental organization (IGOs) at the global or regional level, multilateral negotiations, world conferences or similar fora. These international institutions may be created by and for states but can quickly become “focal points for contention” of non-state actors (26, citing Martin and Simmons 1999, 106). International institutions give non-state actors opportunities to engage in dialogue on normative issues, both formally – e.g. through NGO representation in UN meetings – and informally, via the ‘corridor advocacy’ of international spaces. They provide 15 Many indigenous groups in Northern countries have pooled resources to support national and international activities. The International Indian Treaty Council (IITC), for example, reports that it receives no funding from governments but does rely heavily on private donations. Funding lines specifically targeted for indigenous peoples organisations have come from various donors such as the European Commission, the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), or the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD).


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physical space for organization of coalitions, networks and common platforms. They give opportunities to learn about policy issues and to share relevant domestic information. They give legitimacy or “certification” (Tarrow 2005, 194) to transnational social movement actors by raising their profile outside of the domestic sphere. International institutions can also offer a range of monitoring mechanisms to which NGOs can appeal for thematic or country-specific concerns. International institutions “serve as a fulcrum for the formation of alliances of different state and nonstate actors” (della Porta and Tarrow 2004, 236), thus increasing the leverage and visibility of social movements. Minorities have several political opportunities open to them within international organisations. At the global level, the UN has been the most important inter-governmental organization (IGO) for minorities and has established numerous minority-specific mechanisms that have expanded over time.16 UN member states recognized that the minority issue needed to be considered more systematically by the UN and created the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to this effect (Jackson Preece 1998; Thornberry 1991). A minority protection clause was included in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights at Article 2717 but proposals emerging from the UN Sub-Commission for a minority convention (Capotorti 1991) were ignored until the early 1990s when the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992) was adopted. The Declaration structures minority rights on four pillars: the right to exist; the right to non-discrimination; the right to protection and expression of cultural identity; and the right to participate in decision-making that affects minorities. The UN Sub-Commission agreed to create a Working Group on Minorities (WGM) (opened in 1995) to review the implementation of the Declaration and to offer a space for minorities to present statements on country or thematic issues. The WGM runs for 5-days each year and is also attended voluntarily by UN member states. The WGM was modeled on the successful formula of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), created in 1982. From the 1970s, indigenous peoples and their partners worked to establish a parallel system of protection distinct from the minority protection regime. The WGIP has proved to be a critical focal point of this regime. Attendance of NGOs in this forum has been strong from its inception; in 2006 some 583 participants were accredited to the meeting. This high attendance is facilitated in part by a UN Voluntary Fund to enable indigenous representatives to travel to international meetings.18 The regular inter-governmental meetings to 16 International attention to minorities predates the establishment of the UN. Special protection clauses for ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities have historically been tied to treaties for the restructuring of territory between states. The League of Nations also acted to oversee agreements between states to protect minorities. 17 Article 27 holds that “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.” 18 Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its twenty-fourth session (Geneva, 31 July-4 August 2006), UN Doc. A/HRC/Sub.1/58/22, (14 August 2006).


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negotiate the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples have also provided a collective focus. The interface with the UN for indigenous peoples has continued to grow with the addition of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2000 and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2001. Finally, the approval of two consecutive International Decades of the World’s Indigenous People (1995-2004 and 2005-2014) by the UN has kept the spotlight focused on their issues. In contrast, other minority groups have had to be content with the opportunities for non-indigenous groups under the ‘minority’ rubric, where fewer political opportunity structures exist and groups with varied interests are lumped together. The WGM has struggled to match the success of the WGIP. Although admittedly much newer than the WGIP, the WGM only had 90 NGOs present at its peak in 1999, with the number falling steadily since then (Schweizer 2004); in 2006, only 41 NGOs attended. The Secretariat of the WGM has tried to respond to this decline by undertaking since 2001 to finance the attendance of NGOs to the meeting; funds are limited, however, and only between 5 and 10 NGOs can be supported in this way each year. Efforts to push states to create a UN Voluntary Fund for Minorities have so far failed. An international coalition of NGOs worked to secure the creation of a new mechanism for minorities in 2005, the UN Independent Expert on minority issues.19 The Independent Expert includes in her repertoire country visits and the issuing of communications and statements on issues of country or thematic concern.20 Perversely, the creation of this new mechanism has put the WGM at risk (despite being mandated to support the WGM), and NGOs are lobbying hard to prevent the WGM from being shut down in the reforms to the UN Sub-Commission. They are lobbying for a new structure to be created, not dissimilar to the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, which would give minorities a permanent space at the global level where they “can raise issues and possible solutions be canvassed to problems”.21 For minority communities with serious grievances against the state, the two-level game made possible by international institutions accessible to them offers important leverage. In interviews conducted for this paper, minority NGO representatives repeatedly cited the UN or similar IGOs (such as the European Union) as important allies to their cause. Recognition by the IGO of the NGO’s right to participate in the proceedings of the IGO’s institutions can be an important “certification” (Tarrow 2005, 194) of not only the organisation but also of the people they seek to represent. Through strategic alliances, savvy use of media and effective use of mechanisms, such as taking cases to international bodies, even the most marginalized minorities can generate domestic attention by making their voice heard at the international level. Direct access to the domestic political institutions therefore become less necessary to

19 The Independent Expert on minority issues was established in 2005 pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2005/79 of 21 April 2005. 20 See http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/minorities/expert/index.htm 21 Minority Rights Group International, Eight NGOs call for new UN body to ensure minority rights, Press Release, 11 August 2006.


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achieving their objectives; the need for minority-focused political parties, elected representatives or mass local mobilisation is reduced. Participation in any IGO comes with certain restrictions, however, and minority NGOs that seek to engage in these fora must adopt a particular modus operandi to be admitted and succeed. Minority communities must produce moderate, organised, and professional NGOs if they are to be taken seriously in IGO fora and must not advocate or use violence. Minorities will also be most successful where they do not directly challenge the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state in which they reside. This is evident in the discourse of indigenous peoples’ rights where advocacy on self-determination in the main focuses on internal self-determination. The IGO is first and foremost an institution formed for the interests of states and minorities must operate within these limitations. This may be more challenging for minorities than for other civil society groups since many of the issues for which minorities seek remedy touch upon the authority and structure of the state. Access to IGOs, however, enables (and creates?) “voices of moderation”22 within aggrieved minority communities; the rules of engagement for civil society participation within IGOs are law-abiding, orderly, adhering to certain repertoires and organised procedures, following patterns of longer-term step-by-step progress towards normative change. ‘Quick-fix’ or violent methods have no place in IGOs. The more space for minority NGOs/INGOs within these international fora, therefore, the more moderate the mobilisation of minority groups, provided (and this is a key caveat) that minorities see that change is possible in using these fora. One forum where change proved possible was the World Conference Against Racism. This gathering proved to be a crucial political opportunity for many minority groups and two in particular will be studied below. Durban or Bust: The World Conference Against Racism The UN World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR) was held in Durban, South Africa, 31 August - 8 September 2001.23 It was the third such world conference on this topic, predated by the first held in Geneva in 1978 and the second, also in Geneva, in 1983. The decision to hold a third world conference on racism was not inevitable. By many accounts the first two world conferences had been largely ineffective. Despite the universalist language of the outcome documents of these conferences, the tenor of UN dialogue on racism during the period was linked strongly to the issue of apartheid in South Africa and also to debates surrounding Zionism. The 1990s, however, was a period of UN world conferences (Friedman et al. 2005) and the success of the 1993 World

22 This point on NGOs attending the UN being “voices of moderation” was made by Mr. Karim Abdian of the Ahwaz Human Rights Organization at the 2005 session of the UN Working Group on Minorities. 23 The meeting was scheduled to end on the 7 September but due to crisis over agreement of the text, the meeting was extended to allow delegates time to formulate a final document.


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Conference on Human Rights and the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women were enough to stir optimism. The WCAR was significant politically because for many governments in the global South it represented a topic through which they could readily point out the faults of the West. As former UN Sub-Commission expert J.A. Lindgren Alves (2003) accurately states:

…contrary to what had happened with the other global [conference] themes (destruction of the environment, violations of human rights, population growth and discrimination against women), the West would not be able to place elsewhere the preferential locus of the problems. Nor to throw on somebody else’s shoulders the burden of its deepest causes. (366)

It was significant substantively because it sought to bring examination of discrimination and group protection under one dialogue, uniting the mechanisms for non-discrimination and group protection that often work in parallel but very much apart. The landscape of these mechanisms had changed significantly since 1983 and the WCAR gave a chance for stock taking on gaps between mechanisms and who was being left out. A wide array of UN official preparatory processes led up to the final conference in September 2001. Several expert seminars at the regional level preceded regional inter-governmental preparatory conferences to hash out draft text recommendations for the final WCAR outcome documents, the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action. Several inter-governmental preparatory conferences were also held in Geneva. Parallel to these UN sanctioned processes were also NGO-led initiatives, culminating in the NGO Forum also held in Durban, 28 August – 1 September 2001. The WCAR aimed to address a wide range of issues, but two points of contention emerged early on and ultimately marred the outcome of the conference, namely the issues of reparations for the slave trade and colonialism and Israel’s actions towards the Palestinians. Famously, both the US and Israel withdrew from the conference in protest against the latter point, while the NGO Forum was widely criticized for parts of the NGO Forum Declaration and Programme of Action that were viewed as disproportionately critical of Israel and even anti-Semitic (Camponovo 2003; Lantos 2002; McDougall 2002). On the issue of colonialism, calls for reparations were eventually subsumed by generic promises for more international development aid. On slavery, the outcome documents recognize that slavery is a crime against humanity and “should always have been so”, a clever wording designed to assuaged some Western states’ fear that compensation claims would be made against them based on ex post facto interpretations of legal responsibility. In the middle of this, many civil society groups representing victims of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance were vying to secure group-specific commitments in the outcome documents, regarding the WCAR as a critical


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opportunity to make their voice heard on the international stage. These were the so-called ‘victim groups’. The original General Assembly resolution 52/111 authorizing the WCAR named only two groups specifically: migrants and indigenous peoples. It is significant, therefore, that the final Durban Declaration and Programme of Action makes mention of not less than 21 different groups as victims of racial, racial discrimination, xenophobia or related intolerance, namely: • Africans and people of African descent • Asians and people of Asian descent • indigenous peoples • ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious minorities • migrants • refugees and asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons • Mestizo populations of mixed ethnic and racial origins • certain religious communities • Jewish communities • Muslim communities • Arab communities • Palestinian people • Roma/Gypsies/Sinti/Travellers • women and girls • people infected or affected by HIV/AIDS • victims of trafficking How did these groups make their way into the WCAR outcome documents? For some, it was a question of political expediency: this is clearly the case in the mention of “Jewish, Muslim and Arab communities” in the same sentence of paragraph 61 of the WCAR Declaration condemning both anti-Semitism and Islamaphobia, included in large part to balance tensions surrounding the issue of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. For others, it was a long struggle from obscurity to recognition, facilitated by the political opportunities offered by the WCAR and its preparatory processes. The successes of two groups will be outlined here: people of African descent and victims of caste based discrimination. Dalits and caste-affected groups: “cast out caste!” Dalits and those affected by caste-based discrimination were the least successful ‘victim’ group at Durban in terms of the outcome documents but arguably one of the most successful in making their voice heard within the international community. Some 200 Dalit delegates were present in Durban, after maintaining a steady presence throughout the preparatory processes. There are approximately 240 million people in Asia and close to 260 million people worldwide that are affected by caste-based discrimination. This form of discrimination exists not only in the Hindu caste system; forms of discrimination based on work and


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descent exist also in Japan (Burakumin), Nigeria (Osu of the Igbo ethnic group) and Senegal, to name a few. Domestic advocacy on caste-based discrimination has existed for several decades, particularly in India (Jaffrelot 2005) and Japan. The internationalization of this advocacy was linked directly to preparatory processes of the WCAR. Dalit organizations and their international NGO partners (principally Human Rights Watch, International Movement Against Discrimination and Racism, Minority Rights Group International, the Lutheran World Federation, Anti-Slavery International and the Asian Human Rights Commission) identified the WCAR as a crucial political opportunity for bringing international attention to caste-based discrimination. They established an International Dalit Solidarity Network in March 2000 as one vehicle for coordinating action across borders during the WCAR processes. Caste-based discrimination was not on the WCAR agenda in the initial draft Declaration and Programme of Action prepared by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. At issue was the position of the Indian Government, which argued that “the term ‘caste’…is not based on race”. Their position had previously been debated with the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), upon India’s submission of its first periodic State report in 1996; CERD disagreed that caste-based discrimination was not racism.24 India refused to capitulate (and maintains this position to date).25 From the government’s perspective, to include caste as a topic of discussion at the conference would be “diluting focus on racism and racial discrimination per se”. Moreover, the government argued, caste-based discrimination was an internal matter to which the government was already giving its full attention. Caste-based discrimination was constitutionally outlawed in India in 1950 and several measures, principally in the form of ‘reservations’ in access to education and public sector employment for so-called “scheduled castes”, were in place. The government concluded that “tools for bringing about social change, where so desired by the people, are available within the Indian democratic polity and do not have to be sought elsewhere”.26 In spite of the government’s best intentions, however, discrimination against Dalits was (and is) still rife in India, as demonstrated by a landmark report by Human Rights Watch, Broken People: Caste Violence Against India's "Untouchables", published in 1999 (Narula et al. 1999). Activists rallied for grassroots support and collected some 2.5 million signatures demanding greater action to eradicate the effects of caste-based discrimination, presented to the Indian Prime Minister in December 1999 (Fox 2005). The same petition simultaneously called upon the UN to take action in support of Dalits. These efforts marked the start of an international campaign, an upwards scale-shift enabled by support of the key international NGO Human Rights Watch and the

24 Consideration of Report by India to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN doc. CERD/C/304/Add.13, (September 17, 1996). 25 At the most recent CERD session in February 2007, India submitted a periodic State report (UN Doc. CERD/C/IND/19 (29 March 2006)). The issue of caste and scheduled tribes was not discussed by the government. 26 UN Doc WCR/IC.2001/Misc.3, Suggestions made by States, United Nations bodies and specialized agencies, national institutions and non-governmental organisations regarding the content of the draft Declaration and Programme of Action, p. 37.


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political opportunity structures of various human-rights institutions of the UN, principally the Sub-Commission on Human Rights and the WCAR preparatory processes. The WCAR was important because, unlike the UN Sub-Commission, there was direct and active engagement of UN Member States, funding for civil society to participate and a clear outcome document to target for new standard-setting. The caste-based coalition took a two-pronged approach, focusing both on the inter-governmental dialogue and making a strong presence within the parallel NGO fora. For example, Mr. Paul Divakar, head of the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) was appointed to sit on the International Steering Committee of NGOs that organized the NGO Forum in Durban. The regional preparatory meetings in Asia were key to moving the issue from regional to global attention. The Asia-Pacific NGO Forum was held 17-18 February 2001 just prior to the Asian regional inter-governmental preparatory meeting, convened in Tehran 19-21 February. While the NGO Forum Declaration makes strong statements on the issue of caste, it is noticeably absent from the inter-governmental document, no doubt because of pressure from India (if not from other states). In order to build some momentum and forge a common position, the NCDHR also held a satellite NGO preparatory meeting focused exclusively on caste-based discrimination.27 The meeting drew participants from Asia, Europe and the US, demonstrating the global reach of the campaign. The Final Declaration28 of the meeting called upon the WCAR and UN to take further action on caste-based practices “affecting at least 240 million persons in south Asia and millions of others in East Asia and West Africa” (preamble para 4). The Government of India is singled out for condemnation for opposing the inclusion of caste-based discrimination in the agenda of the WCAR, whilst other governments are urged to take up the issue. (preamble para 16). The most visible support on caste came from the WCAR preparatory expert seminars and the NGO parallel fora to the regional inter-governmental preparatory conferences. For example, the Expert seminars in Geneva, Addis Ababa and Bangkok all noted the issue of caste-based discrimination, as did the NGO Fora Declarations from the Asia-Pacific and Europe. Outside of the WCAR processes there was also support. At the international level, the European Parliament urged "the EU and its member States to voice its concern regarding caste discrimination and to formulate strategies to counter this widespread practice".29 Domestically, some groups were able to use the WCAR to solicit media interest and bring greater attention to their cause; in India, for example,

27 Global Conference Against Racism and Caste-based Discrimination: Occupation and Descent-based Discrimination Against Dalits, 1-4 March 2001, New Delhi, India. 28 Hurights Osaka, “Conference on Dalit Discrimination”, Focus, Newsletter of the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Centre, March 2001, Vol 23, p 4-6. 29 ISDN http://www.idsn.org/


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there was open debate on caste for the first time in the run-up to Durban. As one author describes it:

By mid-August, Indian papers were ablaze with articles on caste versus race, and conferences throughout the country debated the merits of the Indian government’s position – a position taken in the absence of consultation with Parliament, or the country’s national commissions on human rights, women, and scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. (Narula 2001)

At the WCAR NGO Forum, Dalits and other caste-affected groups made a strong presence; Dalits alone constituted over 200 representatives. They used a number of symbolic tools to raise their profile, drawing on established repertoires of contention from rallies to hunger strikes. Those in solidarity with Dalits wore head and arm bands reading “Dalit Rights are Human Rights” and sported black vests with the words “Cast out caste-based discrimination”. Marches to traditional drumming drew additional attention and the world’s media was quick to pick up on the visible and highly emotive calls of the Dalit representatives. The NGO Forum proved an important institution for highlighting the absence of attention to caste-based discrimination in the official WCAR documents. At the NGO Forum, Dalits formed a distinct caucus, giving them voting leverage on the final contents of the NGO Declaration and Programme of Action. There was also visible solidarity between groups like Afro-Descendants, Roma and Dalits; one NGO Forum event featured representatives of each group on the same panel, focusing on “Institutionalized Racism/Casteism”. This solidarity enabled the Dalit caucus to secure a prominent place in the NGO Forum outcome documents: a section on “Caste and Discrimination Based on Work and Descent” with seven paragraphs (paras 84-90) is included in the Declaration and ten paragraphs under a similar heading in the Programme of Action (paras. 267-277). Caste is included in the list of grounds for protection against discrimination in several places in the document. The term “casteism” is also introduced, an innovative framing to portray caste-based discrimination as an equivalent to racism. The Dalit caucus also had support from actors within the Government of India. The Indian National Human Rights Commission (an independent statutory body) made a public statement in favour of using the WCAR as an opportunity to discuss caste.30 Several Indian MPs in attendance also spoke out against the government’s policy on excluding caste in the WCAR agenda and for failing to discuss the issue in parliament prior to Durban.31 Although two members of the Indian delegation were Dalit, NGO campaigners did not feel that they could rely on them to support their calls. Furthermore, a small number of Dalit NGOs at the WCAR were reportedly governmental NGOs (GONGOs), towing the government line that caste-based discrimination was not an appropriate topic for inclusion at the WCAR.

30 See http://www.dalits.org/nhrcstatementwcar.htm#statment 31 Rahul Singh, “Indian MP shocks in support of Dalits”, Conference News Daily, 31 August 2001, p 2.


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Until a late stage in the negotiations of the WCAR Declaration, one draft paragraph (73) with language on “discrimination based on work and descent” (the compromise language on caste-based discrimination) remained. Switzerland had proposed the paragraph at the second prep-com, which called upon states to “To ensure that all necessary constitutional, legislative and administrative measures including appropriate forms of affirmative action, are in place to prohibit and redress discrimination based on work and descent” (Constable 2001). Several states supported retaining the paragraph, including Argentina, Canada, Guatemala, Namibia, Norway and Syria; the EU had internal disagreement on whether to openly support the language and made no public declarations either for or against. In the end, under diplomatic pressure from India, no state was willing to push hard for the retention of the paragraph (Banton 2002, 359). The Government of India thus prevailed in its objective of excluding mention of caste in the final WCAR Declaration and Programme of Action. Although this was a blow for the Dalit and caste-based discrimination lobbyists, their success (or failure) can be measured in other ways. The issue of caste was by no means invisible in the Durban process. Indeed, the government’s attempts to push out consideration of caste arguably made it more visible. As one commentator noted, “intense Indian political lobbying ensured that the situation of Dalits stood alone as the only issue to have been systematically cut out of the governmental conference’s documents” (Narula 2001). What the Dalit experience shows is that where the interests of one powerful state are concerned, pushing new norms contrary to the will of that state remains a serious challenge. The Government of India had to work hard to see caste removed from the WCAR agenda; in that forum, it had the leverage to trade other interests with states in favour of seeing caste recognized. The peculiar aspect of this story is that India did not deny the fact of caste-based discrimination, only that it legally and normatively constituted racism. It also was staunch in its refusal to accept that caste was a matter of international concern; regardless of the fact that such practices exist in many countries other than India, wherein domestic efforts to tackle “casteism” (let alone to even acknowledge it) are far less advanced than in India. Exactly what the Government of India felt was at risk in making caste-based discrimination an international concern remains unclear. What is in evidence, however, is that victims of this type of discrimination were and remain committed to internationalizing the issue. Caste-based discrimination has been an on-going focus within UN and other international fora since Durban. The institutions created for WCAR purposes, such as the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) and the International Dalit Solidarity Network, continue to be active. Among the key successes have been CERD’s issuing of General Recommendation XXIX on ‘caste and analogous systems of inherited status’, adopted in August 2002. That meeting identified twenty different countries in which caste-based discrimination is still practiced.32 The engagement with CERD has continued also through shadow reports to periodic state reports; in 32 These are Algeria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Guinea Conakry, India, Japan, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Yemen.


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February 2007, for example, India’s state report (which does not mention caste-based discrimination) was challenged by a coalition of NGOs, including through shadow reports such as Hidden Apartheid: Caste Discrimination against India’s ‘Untouchables’ (Human Rights Watch 2007). Other UN treaty bodies, specifically CEDAW and the CRC have also been taking up the issue of caste in state reports from relevant countries. Among the UN Charter bodies, the Sub-Commission continues to be a key focus. Activists secured a major three-year study on caste-based discrimination under the authorisation of the UN Commission on Human Rights in April 2005. The two Special Rapporteurs are to “prepare a comprehensive three year study and draft ‘principles and guidelines’ to assist in the elimination of caste-discrimination”.33 Previously, only the independent experts of the Sub-Commission had been engaged on the issue (since 2000)34; the endorsement by member states of the Commission was a significant step forward. Paul Divakar, veteran of the WCAR and leader of the NCDHR, proclaimed the approval of the study as evidence that "Dalits have pierced through the wall of silence in the UN" (Datta-Ray 2005). It is not just the UN that is being engaged. Major international development agencies, such as the World Bank, UNDP, and UK Department for International Development (DFID) were among the participants at an International Consultation on Caste-Based Discrimination organized by the IDSN in Kathmandu in 2004. The key outcome document was the Kathmandu Declaration, a lengthy prescription of recommendations in the political, economic and social spheres to governments and international actors to address caste-based discrimination globally. The international mobilisation of Dalits and their cooperation with other caste-affected groups shows no signs of abating. Without the impetus of Durban, it is unlikely the mobilisation would have reached so far and so high in such a short space of time. Caste-affected groups may have lost the fight at Durban but their leaders know that the WCAR was only the start of a much longer battle. Afro-Descendants: Asserting a regional identity For civil society actors representing people of African descent, the WCAR and its preparatory processes were a major platform for the international recognition of their identity. Not only did the term ‘Afro-descendant’ enter the international lexicon, Afro-descendants secured sweeping commitments within the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action. Arguably no other group achieved so much through Durban as Afro-descendants and in the post-Durban processes, they continue to make important gains at the international, regional and national levels.

33 The two Special Rapporteurs are Mr. Yokota and Ms. Chin-Sung Chung. 34 In 2000, the Sub-Commission passed a resolution requesting one member to prepare a study on the question of discrimination based on work and descent. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2000/4 (2000). Mr. Goonesekere produced the first report in 2001, followed by follow-up reports in 2003 and 2004 produced by Mr. Asbjørn Eide and Mr. Yozo Yokota (See UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/31).


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The locus of much of this work has been Latin America. Although the diaspora of people of African descent (as distinct from Africans living in Africa) is global in its reach, transnational social mobilisation of Afro-descendants has been strongest in the Americas and especially in Latin America where groups are united by language and regional identity. There are approximately 150 million people of African descent in Latin America, mostly descended from slaves or escaped slaves. The experiences of people of African descent across Latin America are diverse and complex. The population ranges from a large numerical majority in several Caribbean states to a small numerical minority in others. They have different experiences of slavery and colonialism that influence their position in modern society. Some communities are urban others are rural, many living in particular coastal regions or other territories they have settled in since escaping slavery. There are variations in language and tradition and they descend from different tribal groups across Africa. Some states have responded to their interests, in others, their interests remain largely ignored. They are rarely represented in government, have lower levels of human development, and have remained a kind of ‘invisible’ visible minority. This invisibility, however, has started to decrease in the past decade or so thanks to the mobilisation of Afro-descendant leaders to push for greater inclusion of their communities and recognition of their rights. This mobilisation is not entirely novel; it is rooted in the Pan-African consciousness that emerged in the US around the start of the 20th century. People of African descent in Latin America were among the last to join this consciousness, however, and the present transnational social mobilisation should be understood largely as endogenous (Rodriguez 2000). Contemporary Afro-descendant leaders have sought to forge a common identity under the rubric of all being people of African descent, bearing the same negative legacy of slavery and colonialism that many of their ancestors began fighting centuries ago.35 They have worked to establish a more coherent social movement with clearly articulated shared goals. These goals include: an end to discrimination and racism, including through affirmative action, policy and institutional change; specially targeted social and economic development programmes; recognition of land rights; improved access to education; curriculum reform to reflect Afro-descendant history and culture; census reform; and improved collection of disaggregated data. In individual countries, there has been some progress. For example, one report indicates that five countries in Latin America (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras and Nicaragua) have formally recognised land entitlements for people of African descent; several more have adopted strong anti-discrimination legislation.36 While some of these concessions were made in the 1990s (for example, Colombia passed important legislation on Afro-descendants in Federal Law 70 in 1993), much of the progress has come during and after the WCAR processes.

35 For a discussion of national experiences of Afro-descendants’ advocacy, see Minority Rights Group (ed.), No Longer Invisible: Afro-Latin Americans Today, (London: Minority Rights Group, 1995). 36 Inter-American Dialogue, Race Report: Constitutional Provisions and Legal Actions Related to Discrimination and Afro-Descendant Populations in Latin America, (Washington, D.C., August 2004).


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Like the issue of caste, Afro-descendants did not feature in the preliminary state discourse surrounding the WCAR. Latin American states, like those of Asia and Africa, were outward looking in their early statements against racism, blaming other countries for the practice but refusing to acknowledge their own (internal) failings. In Latin America, the prevailing socio-political precept has long been ‘racial democracy’, whereby multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-racial populations are intermixed through marriage and united by the democratic system; all are thus included in society on the basis of equal citizenship. Where there are no distinct ‘races’ there is no racial discrimination. While it is true that skin colour in the region is socially constructed along a wide spectrum, discrimination on this basis nevertheless exists. As one author explains it “There area few social, cultural, political or economic incentives to identify as black in Latin America” (Thorne 2001, 4). The creation of a pan-Latin American Afro-descendant consciousness is hindered greatly by the nature of racial identity and self-identification in the region. The high profile of the WCAR helped to begin to change the negative perceptions attached to the Afro-descendant frame for social mobilisation. The lobbying of Afro-descendant leaders, alongside other marginalized groups, around the WCAR exposed the racial democracy ideal as a fallacy in Latin America. In recent years, many Latin American states have taken a more multicultural approach to citizenship, in particular with respect to indigenous peoples, recognising distinct rights and institutions for these groups. Afro-descendant leaders have borrowed from the repertoire of indigenous peoples and many of their demands parallel existing rights and institutions aimed at indigenous peoples. The WCAR exposed the gap in policy vis-à-vis indigenous peoples and that aimed at similarly marginalised groups, principally Afro-descendants. States were forced to respond under the spotlight of Durban. Much of the Durban text on Afro-descendants comes directly from the preparatory Regional Conference of the Americas, held in Santiago de Chile in 2000. 37 This was preceded by the regional Expert Seminar where a series of recommendations targeted at “Afro Latin-American peoples” were elaborated.38 The use of the terminology of ‘peoples’ here is a prime example of ‘borrowing’ from the indigenous movement (Lennox 2006) but was not translated to the inter-governmental text. Nevertheless, it is striking that in the outcome document of the regional inter-governmental conference the rights acknowledged for indigenous peoples and people of African descent are almost parallel.39

37 Draft Declaration and Programme of Action, Regional Conference of the Americas, para. 20 and 116. 38 See UN Doc. A/CONF.189/PC.2/5 27 (April 2001) 39 Apart from the referent paragraph on indigenous peoples’ treaty rights, the rights and measures for indigenous peoples (such as recognition of identity, right to full participation, respect for culture and heritage, and need for specially targeted development programmes) are repeated for Afro-descendants. Even land rights are recognised for both groups: indigenous peoples are recognised as having a “special relationship …with the land as the basis for their physical and cultural existence”, while states are urged “to find a solution to problems of ownership in respect of land inhabited since ancestral times by people of African descent”.


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Notably, the Africa regional inter-governmental prep-com did not have much focus on the African diaspora. Only one reference to this group appears in the outcome document of the prep-com, acknowledging that the effects of slavery “are still present in the form of damage caused to the descendants of the victims by the perpetuation of prejudice against Africans in the continent and people of African descent in the Diaspora (emphasis added).40 Similarly, the Africa regional experts seminar does not discuss the diaspora of Afro-descendants, which suggests that African states and civil society did not have this issue high on their list in the initial stages of the Durban processes. By way of contrast, the outcome document of the Africa regional Experts seminar does recommend that “an in-depth study of the question of castes, in particular in Africa, in cooperation with the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)” be undertaken. 41 In the first draft of the Declaration and Programme of Action, prepared by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “people of African descent” are mentioned only once and not in connection with any distinct or substantive paragraphs. In contrast, both Roma and Indigenous Peoples have separate ‘chapters’ in the draft, with specific targeted recommended actions.42 At least one author has argued that this oversight was a factor of the High Commissioner’s failure to reflect adequately the key points of the regional inter-governmental prep-coms from Africa, the Americas and Asia favouring instead in the draft the European prep-com outcomes (Campanovo 2003, 690). States from these regions fought to have the outcomes of their regional prep-coms better reflected in the draft documents, to reflect both the controversial and less controversial issues. By the time of the third preparatory committee in July 2001, the working draft documents included a distinct chapter on “Africans and People of African Descent”.43 Unlike Dalits and caste-affected groups, Afro-descendants could be confident by the time of the Durban conference that their issues would be retained in the final draft and in fact were not openly contested. The final Declaration and Programme of Action include special ‘chapters’ focusing on the rights recognised for ‘people of African descent’ and practical recommendations in support of this group.44 The NGO Forum Declaration and Programme of Action also elaborates distinct ‘chapters’ for Afro-descendants, unsurprising given that Afro-descendants constituted a central caucus in the NGO processes. Notably, the official Rapporteur of the WCAR was Afro-Brazilian Edna Santos Roland, a long-standing member of the regional movement of Afro-

40 UN Doc. A/CONF.189/PC.2/8 (27 March 2001): para 11. 41 UN Doc. A/CONF.189/PC.2/4 (14 March 2001): para 41 (d). 42 See Section XIV on Romas [sic] and Section XV on Indigenous Issues. UN Doc. A/CONF.189/WG.1/3 (22 February 2001). 43 See UN Doc. A/CONF.189/PC.3/8 (12 July 2001). 44 These rights are very closely parallel to those recognised for indigenous peoples; even rights to land and natural resources, typically only elaborated in relation to indigenous peoples in international discourse, are acknowledged at Durban: for people of African descent, “recognition…should be given to their rights to culture and their own identity…, to use, enjoyment and conservation of the natural renewable resources of their habitat….and where applicable to their ancestrally inhabited land” Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, para. 34.


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descendants and subsequently appointed to the Working Group of (5) Independent Eminent Experts created as an outcome of Durban to support WCAR follow-up. Afro-descendant leaders clearly see much to be gained from carving out a ‘distinct’ identity for their communities in Latin America. ‘People of African descent’ exist. The international community has started to respond to this fact, creating new institutions to address this particular constituency, much as was previously done for indigenous peoples. The UN Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent was established in 2002, one product of the WCAR itself.45 The Working Group is mandated, inter alia, to “study the problems of racial discrimination faced by people of African descent living in the Diaspora”. This work is conducted during annual 5-day meetings in Geneva and through country visits upon invitation of governments (only Belgium to date has requested such a mission). The Working Group represents an important innovation in the way the UN has dealt with non-indigenous minorities: this is the only other (minority) group-specific mechanism with an institutional structure, not dissimilar to the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (PFII). The PFII, however, is better staffed and better funded, providing an interface between indigenous peoples and UN agencies and bodies; the Working Group has struggled to match its success. In the 2006 session, for example, only 14 NGOs/INGOs attended the Working Group and none of the key UN agencies were present; in contrast the PFII had every major UN agency present and hundreds of NGOs. The differences demonstrate that engagement of Afro-descendants with the UN is still nascent in comparison with that of indigenous peoples and may be hindered, inter alia, by issues of language46; lack of funds to travel to Geneva; poor outreach of the Working Group to UN and civil society stakeholders; and attention to alternative fora at the regional level(s). Most international engagement of Latin American Afro-descendants has focused on the regional level. This is consistent with global trends on NGO engagement (Smith 2004). The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights continues to hold regional seminars for Afro-descendants, most recently in Chincha, Peru in November 2005 to focus on poverty. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights appointed in February 2005 a Special Rapporteur on the Rights of People of African Descent and Racial Discrimination, with responsibilities, inter alia, to “[p]repare reports and special studies on the rights of Afro-descendants and, more broadly, studies on issues pertaining to the elimination of racial discrimination”.47 The OAS has also approved since 2000 exploratory discussions on a future Inter-American Convention against Racism and All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance.48 Drafting of the Convention began in early 2006 and consultations are on-going. Engagement with

45 Also created following the World Conference Against Racism are the Working Group on the Effective Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action and the Group of Independent Eminent Experts. 46 The WG meetings are conducted principally in English with simultaneous translation; most Afro-descendant activists from Latin America use Spanish as the language of transnational communication. 47 OAS, IACHR CREATES SPECIAL RAPPORTEURSHIP ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS OF AFRICAN DESCENT, AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, Press Release, February 25, 2005. 48 The study was initiated with resolution AG/RES. 1712 (XXX-O/00), 5 June 2000. The most recent progress is detailed in resolution AG/RES. 2126 (XXXV-O/05), June 7, 2005.


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international development agencies in the region has also been key. In 2000, for example, the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), among others, established the Inter-Agency Consultation on Race Relations in Latin America (IAC), aimed at addressing the poverty and human development gap faced by Afro-descendants.49 The establishment of this initiative was linked directly to the regional momentum around the WCAR and remains active in 2007. The rapidity of change stimulated by the WCAR preparatory processes must not be underestimated. As one author notes, “in September 2000, one year prior to the World Conference, South American governments, in a regional heads of state meeting, did not acknowledge the plight of the over 100 million African Descendants living in Latin America” (McDougall 2002, 143). Many states have since responded with stronger measures to combat racial discrimination. Brazil has emerged as a leader in this regard. With at least 40% of the population of Brazil being of African descent, the government has had a strong internal motivation to reach out to this highly marginalised community but for decades failed to do so under the racial democracy pretence. Htun (2004) documents the change in domestic policy vis-à-vis Afro-Brazilians, attributing it to “three variables—issue networks, presidential initiative, and international events - [which] arose independently but were mutually reinforcing” (83). The international events refer to the WCAR and its processes. As the Brazilian Ambassador to the UN, Gelson Fonseca Jr., put it:

Durban was a positive experience for Brazil because it legitimized the debate on racism at the international level and recognized the need for remedial actions to benefit the victims of discrimination. But the most significant and immediate effect of Durban occurred at the domestic level, for it mobilized civil society and public opinion against racism, and strengthened the political will for policies to combat discrimination and led to the first experiences in affirmative action for Afro-descendents. (Htun 2004, 82-83)

After Durban, the Brazilian government created in 2003 the Secretariat for the Promotion of Racial Equality, which has the status of a government ministry and introduced new policies of affirmative action in access to higher education and public sector employment, principally targeting Afro-Brazilians. Brazil has also taken a leadership role in Durban follow-up. Latin America is the only region to have prepared a formal inter-governmental Durban + 5 process to review progress in implementation of the WCAR Declaration and Programme of Action. The meeting was held in Brasilia in July 2006. For Afro-descendants, Durban itself was just one phase of a much wider process of before and after activity that has significantly increased their profile and stimulated new forms of transnational social mobilisation. Afro-descendants in Latin America are finally beginning to get the attention they deserve, using transnational mobilisation to secure gains made by indigenous peoples in the region before them. 49 For more information, see http://www.thedialogue.org/iac/eng/index.html (accessed 12 February 2007).


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Assessing the impact of WCAR mobilisation: The controversies of the WCAR have obscured the positive impact that the processes have had on the lives of minority groups around the world. In the long view of Durban, these benefits are becoming ever clearer. Dalits and Afro-descendants realized three key outcomes that will be noted here, namely new recognition, new transnational mobilisation and new ‘rights’ language and mechanisms in the international protection regime for minorities. Recognition: Before the WCAR processes, neither caste-affected groups nor Afro-descendants were explicitly recognized within the international human rights law lexicon. It was assumed that the interests of these groups could be subsumed within existing regimes on non-discrimination and/or minority rights. Like indigenous peoples, both Dalits/caste-groups and Afro-descendants sought distinct recognition of their communities rather than the generic categorization as ‘minorities’. This distinct recognition was both a moral validation of their collective identities, both of which have been stigmatized at the national level, and a ‘certification’ of the identity as a basis for mobilisation within international fora. This latter point made ‘Afro-descendant’ and ‘caste-based discrimination’ accepted frames under which individuals and sub-communities could unite. Although only Afro-descendants were successful in securing formal recognition at Durban within the Declaration and Programme of Action, caste-affected groups secured recognition in all but the outcome documents themselves, their identity incorporated into the NGO Forum documents, as one of the largest caucus groups and within the media reports on the conference. The on-going work of the UN Special Rapporteurs on discrimination based on work and descent approved by the UN Human Rights Council demonstrates that despite the stalwart efforts of states like India, caste-affected groups continue to push the boundaries for international recognition. The impact of these developments means that the rubric of ‘minority’ continues to fragment. With distinct recognition comes distinct protection mechanisms and a more prominent seat at the table. The trailblazing path set by indigenous peoples shows how much groups can achieve if they push for a separate regime. Indeed, both Afro-descendants and Dalits have on occasion asserted identities as ‘peoples’, no doubt in part with the intention to access certain opportunities and rights afforded by this frame, principally land rights (Lennox 2006). At the same time, Afro-descendant and caste-affected leaders have struggled to make their respective identity frames more empowering for group members, for whom the stigma of self-identifying as either ‘Dalit’ (for example) or Afro-descendant remains a social disadvantage. The social construction of these identities is linked with the practical opportunities afforded legally, politically and socially by belonging to the group. Without state intervention to integrate fully these identities into a pluralist, multi-cultural construction of the nation, civil society leaders will find an uphill struggle to bring people together regardless of the machinations in the international sphere.


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Transnational mobilisation: The processes surrounding Durban provided ready political opportunities for establishing transnational mobilisation for both caste-affected groups and Afro-descendants. In the case of the former, the WCAR effectively stimulated the internationalisation of what had previously been primarily domestic advocacy. It also pushed Dalits of south Asia to unite with other caste-affected groups and the Dalit diaspora located primarily in the West. A new global identity frame was created through this transnational mobilisation. By making caste a global issue, Dalits (in the lead) have pushed international fora to pay more attention to their pleas and have diluted the influential objections of the Indian government. Although Afro-descendants have mobilized transnationally for at least a century or so under the Pan-African consciousness, Latin American Afro-descendants had mostly been marginal to this process. The WCAR offered them the opportunity to emerge as a uniquely dynamic component of transnational Afro-descendant mobilisation, based upon a strong regional identity. For this transnational mobilisation, international organisations have been important brokers, providing not only certification of the claims made by these groups but also giving space for them to mobilize, advocate and shape the emerging standards that affect them. In Latin America, the engagement of regional organizations, like the OAS and the IDB and the organization of regional events, like the seminars of the OHCHR, has further coalesced the regional transnational mobilisation. For caste-affected groups, the UN has proved a useful focal point for the construction of a global cooperation. Although the thrust of the movement continues to come from south Asia, without a regional mechanism to target, Dalit leaders and their international partner NGOs recognize that continued engagement of caste-affected groups in East Asia and Africa is strategically important to their success at the UN. Expanding norms and mechanisms: Both Afro-descendants and caste-affected groups used the momentum around Durban to expand rights norms and secure new mechanisms. Afro-descendants were the most successful at Durban itself where the key innovation was to recognise certain rights for Afro-descendants that had previously only been associated with indigenous peoples in international law. These included rights to “protection of their traditional knowledge”; to “the use, enjoyment and conservation of the natural renewable resources of their habitat”; and “where applicable to their ancestrally inhabited land” (para 34 Declaration). The creation of a Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent was also innovative. At the regional level, the proposed OAS convention on racial discrimination and new Special Rapporteur may not be exclusively for Afro-descendants but they will surely benefit greatly from these mechanisms and the jurisprudence that will evolve from their interaction with these mechanisms. Some interesting cases are also being put forth by Afro-descendants through the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; for example, the decision on the Moiwana Village v.


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Suriname case in 2005 offered new interpretations of collective land rights for Afro-descendants.50 For caste-affected groups, the normative change was not won at Durban but was certainly won through Durban. For them, the CERD General Recommendation XXIX offered an authoritative interpretation of work and descent under the meaning of Article 1.1 of International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), thus providing an expanded definition of racial discrimination. The work of the Special Rapporteurs will also be important in identifying trends across countries in addressing caste-based discrimination, which may contribute to the elaboration of further international standards. A useful insight from the Durban processes is the importance of regional hegemons in influencing the emergence of new norms and mechanisms. Dalits and caste-affected groups failed in their quest at Durban largely because India blocked them. Afro-descendants were successful at Durban thanks in part to the positive support of Brazil, whose delegation played a pivotal role in both the regional and international WCAR meetings. If regional hegemons have a strong commitment to seeing issues emerge or retreat, the success of transnational social mobilisation can hinge on the interests of individual states. At the same time, the WCAR shows that even where state interests are firmly entrenched, they are no longer able to silence their opponents thanks to the political opportunities and allies available to marginalised groups within the international sphere. Within the narrow confines of negotiating a text at Durban, India could make trade-offs to meets its objectives; within the wider playing field of the international human rights regime, with all of its institutions and mechanisms, they have not been able to silence their critics. Conclusion The transnational social mobilisation of minorities is changing the landscape of the international protection regime for minorities. How this landscape will look in future is open to speculation. The UN Working Group on Minorities is under threat and there is no certainty that the mandate of the Independent Expert on minority issues will be renewed in 2007. The Human Rights Council is currently reviewing plans for a global Durban follow-up conference for 2009 and studying proposals for new standards to cover gaps in ICERD. New group-specific mechanisms continue to emerge at the international and regional levels. In such a dynamic environment, minority representatives can help influence the direction of change. States should be open to their input: the minorities that engage with international fora typically do so in conformity with the rules of organized cooperation and with peaceful, rights-based objectives. Political opportunity structures like the WCAR can stimulate constructive cooperation and dialogue without violent conflict or threats to stability. Inter-governmental organisations have demonstrated a willingness and capacity to facilitate 50 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Case of Moiwana Village v. Suriname, Judgement of 15 June 2005;. Series C, No. 124.


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Documents

Session 1B: Rights-based Social Mobilisations ... · Centre for the Study of Human Rights, LSE – working conference for research students. 20 March 2007 Page 1 of 33 Session 1B: