weights, rates and quality o[ producesold. Since the communist revolu-tionaries ~ntered the area about threeyears ago nearly 25,000 to 30,000a~res of Government and priyatelan~ have been occupied by :the tri-bals. All forms of exploitation cameto a standstill aong with the civiladministraltion.

In 1917 an Act ""as passed i,n thethen old 1\hdras State to whichlUO'lIr and Bhadrachalam taluks be-

longed, safeguarding certain rights ofthe tribals. Under· the Act, aliena-tion of tribal lands to non-tribalseiltJioer by sale, foreclosure of mort-gages or against debts was prohibit-eel. The Act specifically laid downthat even taking on l'ease tribal landswas void. Debt relief, wages to bepaid for daily and monthly labourand certain other provisions to safe-guard the tribals from exploitationwere included. In 1963 the sameAct became applicable to the tribalsin Telengana also. Yet the sameGovernment is not prepat'ed to en-force the Acts, as this would workag-ainst class interests.

Since the turn of the century,Nugur and Bhadrachalam taluks havebeen declared scheduled areas anduntil recently were administered bythe Central Government through aspecial Agent of the rank of a Collec-tor. For political reasons the pre-sent State Government is not prepar-ed to declare the entire area a sche-duled area. Not that this will makemuch difference to the exploita,tion ofthe tribals, but the Centre would beforced to take greater interest in thearea; not that the Centre is any bet-ter than the SLate Government now.

lIn mid.1969 the State Governmentdedared the entire area a "disturbedarea". The way things are happen-i,ng, it would not surprise any-body if before long the Governmentdeclares the area a "prohibited area".

Whatever the Government does, itdoes not make any difference,now that the Revolutionary Commu-nists have made the area their home.

(This was written a few monthsago) .

JULY 29, 1972

Serious Mistakes

! (This i.1 a summary of PMI of adowment 1'eZeased by the Revo,l'll-liollary Communist Committee oj

Andl/HI Pradesh)

MORE than three years have pass-ed since the armed struggle

started in Andhra Pradesh under the~eadership of :the Andhra PradeshRevolutionary Communist Commit-tee. During this period the revolu-tionary movement in the whole ofthe State was subjected to severe re-pression. The majority of the mem-bers of the Pradesh Committee and·important leaders and workers in thedistricts were arrested and im plicat-ed in conspiracy cases.

The government deployed a largepolice force to wipe out the armedsq uads. The police let loose a reignof terror in the Agency area and arestill subjecting the toiling masses toinhuman torture.

We faced many difficulties andhardships in the course of the pasttwo years of armed struggle. Seri-ous mistakes were committed tooand we sustained severe losses.

We had decided to mobilise andorganise ItJI:lemasses for armed agra-rian revolution. But [OI'est and Pra-desh leaderships did not discuss andcome to an opinion on the issue ofwhat forms of resistance should beadopted against the repression of theruling class·es even before the massmovement reached the stage of armedstruggle [or agrarian revolutionaryprogramme. There was no clear un-derstanding on this. Because ofIthis weakness, the Agency movementwas SLl bjected to many difficulties andhardships.

In the initial stage itself, the lea-dership of the Agency area gaveoverstil1lations about the situationthel'e. It overestimated the cons-ciousness at the masses, the prepared-ness of the masses for armed struggle,and ,the organisational capacity ofthe Party.

The leadership of the agency areaestimated that about 1,000 volun-

teers would be available at villagelevel from Ithe then areas ot thei.i.·movement i,n Khammam and ,.varan-gal districts (Forest area). In Janu-ary 1969, a circular was issued afterdiscussing with the pradesh leader-ship about the training ItObe impart-ed to the volunl!eers and laying downthe du ties and tasks o[ volunteers inl))'otecting the villages from thepolice. But in pratice, volunteersdid not turn up as was hoped. Itwas thought that the youths mobilis-ed in the legal struggles were readyfor immediate armed struggle. "Wecompletely failed in correctly asses-sing (the poli tical consciousness, pre-paredness of the people [or armedstruggle, and the determination ofthe youth rallying around us at thatItime".

The same overestimations recurredin "The Review of Political andOrganisa,tional IS~LUation" presentedto and adopted by the pradesh Pal~tyconvention in April 1969. It wasstated in the review that "the com-ing forward of hundreds of youth tofight consciously for the rights ofItheir people has begun" and "hatredagainst police atrocities is mount~ing". The dissatisfaction of thepeople towards the govern men twastaken for class hatl'ed, their mobili-sation on economic issues was takenfor political preparedness for directparticipation.

On these overestimations, the con-clusion was drawn Ithat by imple-menting the programme of massmouilisation for a few months in theAg-ency areas of Warangal, Kham-mam and East Godavari districts,the people would come forward forarmed struggle for an agrarian revo-lutionary programme and the revolu-tionaries would be in a position toconduct regular armed guerillastruggle.

Note the following sentences inthe "Immediate Programme" adoptedby the Pradesh Convention in April]969.

The First Rains"Preparations have to be made lor

this (rom now onwards. PloughiJng

13

- ..~

'-

people on class issues to wage militantstrugg'les and when we integrate thesemass struggles with the politics ofpeople's war. The government willnot remain silent as the movementreaches the stage of occupying thelandlords' land. No sooner' themasses move on mass issues tban thelandlords alnd the government resortto severe repression to crush themovement. During the course of thearmed struggle which depends - onthe people's direct participation, weprepare them for land distribution.Tn this way we strive to put into prac-tice the programme of agrarian re-volution. In conditions when thepeople are not yet ready for armedresistance against the landlord andpolice repression, we will have tobuild up squads with the militantsand workers in the villages in orderto protect the movement and thecadre. This struggle has to be con-ducted in various forms keeping inview the support of the masses andIthe geographical' condition of theareas and organisational strength ofthe party. We mobilise the peopleon mass issues and take necessaryactions against enemies of the peo-ple and police agents who stand inthe way of their' movementand actively oppose it. And asagainst police, we adopt the tacticsof self-defence. Mao 'I)e-ltung, haspointed out:

"The object of war is specifically'to preserve oneself and destroy theenemy' (to destroy the enemy meansto disarm him or 'deprive him ofthe power Ito resist' and does notmean destroying every member ofhis force physically)... In defence,the immediate object is to preserveyourself, but at the same time de-fence is a means of supplementingattack or preparing to go over to '"'-the atta{:k." (((Oil Protracted War'. ";--Selected Works Vol. II. P. 155).

At Ithis stage we acquire necessaryweapons not by conducting raids O'nthe police but by other means. Thisentire programme has to be carriedout along with the propagaltion ofrevolu tionary politics of armed strug-gle to enhance the; revoludionary

scale in extensive areas, dependsmainly on the people's willingnessand determination Ito directly parti-cipate in the armed struggle. Thel:i'eople will occupy landlords' landsin extensive areas when they becomeconscious and have confidence in thestrength of our armed squads inresisting ,the government's armedforces, and when they are confidentand determined that they can andwill defend and retain those lands.

'iVe must also remember that evenduring the days of the Telanganaarmed struggle (1948-51), the peo-ple came forward to occupy lands ona big scale only after they had dir-ectly participalted in the armed strug-gle against free labour, 'Nagu', levyon grain, atrocities of landlords etc.and ony after many victories hadbeen won against Razakars and theNizam's military forces. This doesnot mean that we. are not going topropagate among the people for theoccupation of landlords' land as animmediate issue. 'iJ\Te will do it andwe ought to do it. 'iJ\Thenever thepeople organise themselves and comeforward ,to occupy land of the land.lords we should inspire them andlead them.

But we should not forget thatmobilisation of the people in exten-sive areas for this purpose dependson their l'eadiness and our work forthe armed struggle, on the confidencethat can be created by the militarystrength of the armed squads.

BUlt without! deeply going :jntothis issue, we prepared for armedstruggle thinking that by June 1969the people in the entire area couldbe mobilised to occupy landlords'lands.

Not only this, the party thoughtthat armed struggle could be startedonly when landlords' lands were dis-tributed and thus we had linked dis-tribution of landlords' lands witharmed struggle.

Tt is good to start armed struggleonly when people come forward tooccupy the lands of the landlordand proteot them. We must strivefor that. But the government willnot k'eep quiet when we mobilise the

FRONTIER

operations (01 lands of landlords)should be started wi,th the first driz-zles of the rainy season".

"Fertile land and fruit gardens thathad been grabbed from Girijan pea-sants are 8till in the hands of land-lords. People have been anxious totake them back. We must preparethem to occupy these lands. Thisprocess mllst staDt with the fir~"trains':.

"1,t is our opN11On that we mustcomplete the above activities in poli-tical propaganda, in lUobiJising themasses and other organisational fieldsand be prepared for armed strugglein the coming rainy season. Withthe flfSt rains we can distribu te land,start propaganda, the main item ofthe agricultural l'evolution. 'iJ\Temust co-ordinate guerilla strugglewith this programme, and it wouldgive a wide, strong mass base for thestruggle".

So, in the "Immediate Program-me", we came to a definite conclu-sion that we could prepare the peo-ple in the Agency areas of the fourdistricts to come forward for the dis-tribution of lands of landlords byJune, 1969, and that we could startdistribution of land with the onsetof the rainy season and along withthis we could start armed guerillastruggle.

But the people of that area cameforward mainly to occupy lands.Occupation of reserved lands tookplace in some areas. But here andthere the lands of landlords whichwere kept for cattle grazing anduncultivated lands were also occupi-ed. It is true that even before start-ing ,the armed struggle people cameforward to occupy the cultivatedlands of landlords in a few places inMulugu and Palwancha taluks aJl1din East Godavari District. The factthat people in Karimnagar, "Varan-gal and Khammam districts did notcome forward to occupy the landsof landlords showed our overestima-tions on this issue as stated in theImmediate Programme.

Here, we must keep one aspectin mind. Occupation of the land-lords' lands by the people, on a big

14 I .rw' JULY 29, 1972

~oNtIER

~fifi••t'fJ ~I ~~-n1~~••t1ft,~t~

The CPI-led AITUC's MaharashtraS'!ate Trade Union Committee held itsSixth Conference in Bombay recentlyafter a gap of eleven years (the lastconference was held in 1961).

... The conference appears to ~avebeen notable for tthe report of theGeneral Secretary of the MSTUC onthe state of the trade union movement, Iand the AITUC in particu~ar, in the , ~i lf~~T1 ~~C-t i!(i\t~c~ficlIc.state. The report is the first official·'. 'J~'\'f'1c~nfirmation by .the. CPI of .the de- (~t\T~- ••ofif\~.~1l't~~ ~~~chne of commUQ1stmfluence In trade ~'union politics- in Bombay city and in 9t .• )Malh\arashtra. The General Secre- cJl~ Jf~~1ti~tc~-

~tary of MSTUC is completely frank • 1PI~ .in his admission of the total loss of • '8f~~ 9f6~1f~ommunist influence .over the work- •• Jtr;,~tf,'{ij •• t.t.~~t~.- ~mg class. Workers 1D Bombay and ~r.;in the rest of Mal1&rashtra accord- ••• t'8ft .• ~ 1ft• ., 1I~ing to him, have lost' all "re~pect and fJf-f1-li!t~ (Jl1l)'l O\~~<fi.~c~J!/~tf1li'f·,liking" for the left trade unions, "lt~':l ~'ll<ll Jf~~ti{( T ) tll ~P:t 't.C~particularly CPI-led unions. The CPI ~lHC,/51tl-"Jf-f1C.tor 9fCtfand its trade unions ltwe failed to • _~i{ ~~'"••f.~tti{'orgjanise workers on organisational' ~lI!iflP..r1and ideological tases; \:ts a result ~workers have lost all interest in poli- ••• t.*tf.!-.t'cal struggles and no longer believe fllif~1t~",/~t1t"l/1Jt(i\~t~il/~~ithat in their fight ag\,inst empl,?yers 9itf••~ti{ /~t~i'f1t1fllffor higher wages, shorter hours of • ~ ~work and other benefits, they are «essentially waging a class struggle forthe "Jltirrt~te goal of ending exploita-tion. As they become less and lessconscious of class interests ,and more

considering that otiher groups-like and more 'income conscious', they in-Fuel, Chemicals, Machinery and variably leave AITUC trade unionsTransport, and Manufactured Goods- for other unions which make higherremain either stationary or have eve!} "'age demands. Most important,gone down marginally. Only Indus- workers have stopped acknowledgingtrial Raw Materials kept pace with' nhe historical fact that whatever theyfood by registering a 1.7% rise. are receiving now-by way of higher

It is possible that the hot weatlher wages ,and other many benefits-haveand drought conditions late in May come from the sacrifices made and theand early June in some parts of the struggles fought by earlier generationscountry are responsible for the shoot- of the working class.ing up of the price index. But it is In sum, what tlhe General Secre-,also possible that /high taxation and 1,~+ryhas sharply brought home to hisincreased governmental spending dur- partymen is the grim reality that theing the crisis months of last year are communist party and its trade unionnow making an impact. There is, how· organisations have been neutr\tlisedever, no official explanation for the in Bombay city, where their leadershipsudden price rise. (The Statesman). of the textile workers provided for

nearly four decades the inspiration forthe working class 'all over the country.

Workers Of BombayE i~ The report has attributed this loss ofinfluence to, among other things, theanti-communist activities, of the ShivSena and other independent tradeunion orffmisations. Here the reportloses some of its objectivity and fails tomention \\\hat the CPI and its trade'union organisations in Bombay havedone in the 1pst five years to fight

For Frontier contact

People"s Book House

Cowasji Patel Street,

~ Meher House,

Fort, Bombay .r

JULY 29, 1972

CtilJvin"

Price· Index

;..~,consciousness of the masses. 1n this_ process, the revolutionary conscious.

ness of the people twill Igrow andthey will get prepared and determin-ed -for land distribution and alsofor armed struggle for emancipation.Then only the necessary base forprotracted ,war will be created.

-.. It is now clear that the country(India) is in the grip of a viciousinflationary spiral, prices having risenby as much as 3.1 % in a singlemonth (this was the average rise forthe whole of last year).

Figures for the official price indexare available only until the week endedJune 17 . .,But the 'figure above con-stitutes the rise registered during themonth preceding it. What is furtlheralarming is that prices then were asmuch as 7.1 % higher than in the

~_corresponding period last year.l1he average rise has been of the

order of just under 1% every week.This is substantial and, ominously andinexplicably, much of it is a.ccountedfor by the common man's requirements.

In the week ended June 17, for ins-tance, the price index of the groupFood Articles went up by a massive1.6% (as it had during the previousfew weeks also). This is because in asingle week, tihe price index of eggsincreased by 13%, milk and ground-nut oil by 8%. Other articles wentup by 2% (including meat, rice, jowarand onions) while wheat, gr,am, teaand coffee rose by I%.

The new peak that the price indexhas' registered is all the more alarming