Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
SEPTEMBER 1990
N- 9020
TIE CAPITAL LABOR RELATIONS IN DECO CDUNTRIES :
FROH TIE FORDIST •GOLDEN AGE•
TD CDNTRASTED NATIONAL TRA1ECTDRIES
Robert BOYER
CEPREMAP, CNRS, E.H.E.S.S.
142 Rue du Chevaleret 75013 Paris (France)
Contribution to the WIDER project on "Capital Labor Relations", J. SCHOR Ed •• , This paper has beneffted from the comments gathered durfng the seminar held in Harvard University on March 11-12, 1989.
•
TIE CAPITAL LABOR RELATIONS IN OECD. COI.MTRIES : ·FROH TIE FORDIST .GOLDEN AGE• TO CONTRASTED NATIONAL TRAJECTORIES
·Robert BOYER
ABSTRACT This paper reviews the transformations of capital labor relations from the
f1ft1es to the early Nfnetfes for e1ght OECD countr1es : Austrfa, France, Italy, Japan,
Sweden, United Kfngdom, United States and \lest Germany. In most countries a genuine
fordist compromise took place : workers accepted mechanfsatfon and labor division
against a new wage formula and the implementation of a welfare system. This specific
capital labor played a major role in the golden age, and has promoted a hfgh and rather
stable growth. Nevertheless, various national configurations, with significant
differences in work organization and industrfal relations were observed. This
international and natonal growth regime seems to have broken down after the Seventies,
and this demise of the fordist capital labor relations has trigged drastic changes on
labor organizations, work process, wage formation, welfare. It is argued that these
transformations are very likely to be structural and far reaching for social
integration and economic dynamics. The contours of alternative capital labor relations
are then presented: toyotist, kalmarist, Saturnian •••• Basically two strategic choice
are opened. First will the information technologies be used in order to control workers
or on the contrary will their committment and skills enhance these technological
opportunities? Second, at what level will wage bargaining take place: within the
firms, the sectors, the whole economy? Each country seems to followadifferent path.
Instead of one best way, very contrasted nat iona 1 strategies, a long long run
trajectories, seems to be competing fn spi te of the deepening of international links via
trade, production and finance. Converging economic pressures do not mean necessary the
convergence towards a unique capital labor relation.
LE RAPPORT SALARIAL DANS LES PAYS DEL 'OCDE : llJ FORDISHE A LA COEXISTENCE DE TRAJECTOIRES NATIONALES CONTRASTEES.
Robert BOYER
RESUHE L'article ·passe en revue les transformations du rapport salarial depuis les
années cinquante jusqu'au début des années quatre-vingt pour huit pays de l'OCDE :
l'Autriche, la France, l'Italie, le Japon, la Suède, le Royaume-Uni, les Etats-Unis et
l'Allemagne. Fondamentalement, intervint un compromis original : les salariés
acceptaient division du travail et mécanisation en contrepartie d'une
contractualisation des salaires et de la constitution de la Sécurité Sociale. Ce
rapport salarial semble avoir joué un rôle déterminant dans la rapidité et la relative
stabilité de la croissance de l'après guerre. Néanmoins on observait dès les années
soixante de notables différences nationales en matière d'organisation du travail et de
relations professionnelles. Cette symbiose entre le rapport salarial fordiste et le
modèle de croissance a été remise en cause, à partir des années soixante-dix, du fait
d'une série de changements structurels affectant l'économie internationale, la
finance, la technologie. En conséquence, l'organisation du travail, la formation des
salaires, la couverture sociale se sont progressivement transformées, au point de
désigner un changement structurel et durable du rapport salarial. Il est alors passé en
revue une série d'alternatives au rapport salarial fordiste : toyotiste, kalmariste,
Saturnien, •••• Entreprises, gouvernements et syndicats font face à deux choix majeurs.
D'une part, faut-il utiliser les nouvelles technologies, en particulier de
l'information, pour continuer la logique antérieure de division du travail ou au
contraire le relèvement des qualifications et l'implication des salariés constftuent
ils le préliminaire à l'efficacité des nouvelles technologies ? D'autre part, à quel
niveau devraient se négocier les nouveaux compromis : la firme, la branche ou l"économie
toute enitère ? Il ressort que les divers pays ont donné des réponses différentes à ces
deux questions de sorte qu'ils explorent une série de trajectoires nationales
contrastées. Aussi, en dépit de la globalisation financière et de
l'internationalisation des marchés et de la production, il n'est pas évident que les
pays de l'OCDE convergent vers une seule et même configuration du rapport salarial •
KEYtlORDS : -Capital Labor Relation, Fordism, \lage formation, Labor market deregulation,
Collective Bargaining, Unions. HOTS CLES : Rapport Salarial, Fordisme, Formation des Salaires, Négociations
collectives, Syndicats, Crise. J.E.L. CLASSIFICATION SYSTEH: 110 - 120 - 820 - 830
iHE CAPITAL LABDR RELATIONS IN DECO COUNTRIES : ·FIDf TIE FORDlST .GOI.ŒN ASE. ·10 .CONTRASTED NATIONAL TRAJECTŒIES
Robert BOYER
SUHHARY
1 - A CRUCIAL ISSUE FOR THE NINETIES •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
II - THE CAPITAL LABOR AND THE GOLDEN AGE IN RETROSPECT ••••••••••••••• 4 1. The Fordist compromise in historical perspective •••••••••••••• 4 2. The four pilars of the capital labor nexus •••••••••••••••••••• 7 3. One model, many national brands ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 13
III - THE BREAKING OOWN OF THE SEVENTIES : EVIDENCES AND INTERPRE-TATIONS. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 18 1. A brief priodisation: four acts drama ••••••••••••••••••••••• 18 2. Quite all the components of the Fordist Capital Labor are
a 1 tered. • • . . • • . • • • • • . • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • 23 3. The consequence of adverse and converging pressures~········· 31 4. Micro and macro-corporatisms fare better than other
industrial relations ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 35 S. Slow but far reaching structural changes ••••••••••••••••••••• 38
IV - NEW CONFIGURATIONS FOR THE NINETIES •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 43 1. A typology for alternative Capital Labor Relations •••••••••••• 43 2. Two strategic choices ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 47 3. Four national trajectories •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 51 4. European hybrid system: France, ltaly, United Kingdom
V - CONVERGENCE THEORY REVISITED •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 36
REFERENCES ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• , • • • • • • • • 47
1
I - A CIUIAL ISSUE FOR TIE NINETIES
During the Eight ies, many observers have been convinced that an
exceptional era was over and that firms, unions andgovernments were groping
in the search of new organizational forms. The previous research by WIDER CS.
MARGLIN and J. SCHOR Eds (1990)) has convincingly argued that the arrangement
built after second world war are now challenged, due to a converging series of
pressures originating from the international system, the impact of product
and process innovations, the sharpening competition and shift in economic
po 1 fc ies.
More precisely ft turned out that the post World War Il capital labor
relation had generated rising difficulties in gettfng productivity
increases, whereas a close full employment had strengthened the bargaining
power of unions, bath at the level of the firrns and of government econornic
polfcies. A macroeconomic .oriented analysis has shown the likelihood of a
structural crisis of the very accumulation regime built on this specific
capital labor relations, labelled as Fordist. The present paper follows up
these resu 1 ts and invest igates more close ly the ma in f eatures of these
original institutionnal arrangements, try to characterize the basic
transformations occuring during the last fifteen years, and finally delineate
not one but several alternatives to post World War Il capital labor
relations.
This fs first a very necessary, even if dffficult, task. Prev1ous long
run historical studies have evidenced that the capital labor relation ts a
very basic instftutionnal forms withfn capftalist economies. Basfcally, ft
integrates workers wtthin society, whereas it brings constraints, incentives
and therefore regulatftfes into ffrms strategies. Consequently, the capital
labor relation links decisions at the micro- leve 1 with key features of the.·
accumulation regime at the aggregate level. Each area of capftalfst hfstory
has relied upon a specific configuration of the productive process and the
life style of workers. 'If such a statement stfll hold for modern economies,
then investigating post Fordist labor institutions constitutes an essential
2
part of any prospective view. A previous international comparison has already
tried such an exercise for EEC countries and got some propective scenarii CR.
BOYER Ed. (1988b>>.
Can such an anlysis be carried meaningfully at the level of OECD
countries ? Opposed answers can be put forward. On one side, this
geographical area 1s indeed congen1al to the surge and demise of Fordism : 1t
was 1nvented and progessively implemented -not without contradictions and
major unbalances- 1n the United States, since \l\11 ; after 1945, quite
consciously in most cases, the Fordist model was exported to Europe and
Japan, and spread all over OECD countries. Consequently, a rather large
homogeneity was created due to the adoption of the same production and
consumpt1on norms and the adhes1on to the international order created under
Pax Americana. Seen ,rwm out6Lde, for instance Latin America, South Asia or
Africa, striking similarities emerge among large or medium size OECD
countries. This legitimates the wr1ting of a paper covering at least e1ght
advanced economies : Austria, France, Italy, Japan, Sweden, United Kfngdom,
United States, \lest Germany. Another chapter of the present book is devoted
to the Japanese capital labor relations, with some comparisons with the
Ameritan and the British cases (8. LAZONICK ( 1990)).
On the other si de, 6een ,riom wLthLn a.d.va.n.ced ca.pLtalL6t cou.n.th.i.e6,
many important differences and possibly diverging patterns emerge. Given the
rising number of comparative case stud1es, the unicity of Fordist capital
labor relation can no more be maintained. Clearly, the work organizationand
collective barga1ning are not at all the same in the United States and Japan :
the discoverer of Fordism has been imitated by a brillant followerwho seems
to have superseded American standards and invented a new configuration for
scientffic management. This might explain why Japan is analysed with more
details by a special chapter (8. LAZONICK (1990)). Similarly, German and
French trajectories which used to look so similar during the golden age, now
appear as rather contrasted, as far as capital labor organizat1on ·1s
concerned. A comparison of Italy w1th UK suggests that beneath rather close
macroeconomic achievements, quite different industrial and labor
organization are operating. Finally, even within the so-called social
democratic countries, Sweden and Austr1a exhibit rather distinctive features
J
in industrial restructuring and labor market functionning and. policies.
According to this kind of evidence, dealing OECD countries as a whole, would
be basically erroneous.
This paper attempts a very uncertain compromise between these two
conflicting views. Instead of aggregating OECO within the group of advanced
capitalist countries, 1t provides an analysis upon eight significant national
examples, according to a common set of questions, hypothesis, and methods :
the variety of national strategies reveals the diversity of new capital labor
configurations which could replace the Fordist compromise. Simultaneously,
the analysis will run from understanding the past towards englighting some
possible future recompositions.
In a first step, the typical Fordist compromise and its four major
components are presented, but the existence of various nat iona 1 arrangements
will be stressed upon CIi). Then 1t is argued that these institutionnal
arrangements have been challenged, circumvened, destroyed or significantly
altered during the last two decades. These changes are more structural and
far reaching than short run and transitory : an impressive serfes of
pressures are shapen1ng aga in a 11 the components of Fordist capita 1 labor
nexus CI II>. Contrary to that suggests many bestsellers in the management
literature, these transformations do not take place a long a broad and clearly
designed avenue: the very succession of managerial fads, the alternance of
opposite strategies from firms to governments suggest that this process is
multiform, difficult to grasp with, contradictory arid uncertain.
Consequently, any relevant analysis has to carefully sort out between basic
and far reaching innovations, backward looking and somehow archaîc strategies
and finally continuities and hysterisis phenomena. In fact, comb1n1ng these
contradictory factors deliver a series of major configurations for present
and probably future capital labor relations CIV). To investigate the factors
shaping contrasted national trajectories 1s a challenging task for further
investigations CV).
II - TIE CAPITAL LABDR NIJ TIE GOLDEN >DE IN RETROSPECT.
Such a productive roundabout fs necessary, even 1f ft makes the paper
somehow longer and apparently dfstract us from the main concern about the
future of the capital labor relation nexus. Gofng back to the foundation of
the golden age helps in understanding the orfgina lity of the Eight fes
Nfnet ies, while this fntroduces a very important notion, that of national
trajectories a long the same basic Fordist model. In order to fnvestigate thfs
issue, it was out of the scope of the present paper to study a 11 OECD
countries. Instead, for all empfrical purpose, eight have been selected for
their diversity: four EEC countrfes CITALY, France, Germany, UK) Japan, US
and two social democratic countries CAustrfa, Sweden).
1. THE FOROIST COMPROMISE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.
Of course long run trends seem to rule the capital labor relation
CCLRL Ffrst, the wage-earners tend to have a larger and larger share among
the workfng population. Nevertheless, during structural crises, for example
the interwar period, self-employment appears agafn as an alternative to
dep~ndant labor. Second, the struggle for the control over labor process and
the stimulus of compet it ion urge capf ta l ists to mechanf ze and replace
individual know-how by machinery or control procedures within the firm. But
there are exceptions, for example fn Japan and West Germany and they wfll play
a role in the discussion of post fordist trajectories. Third, recurrently,
workers and their collective organizatfons are fighting for gettfng better
wages and working conditions. Therefore, for each epoch, prevails a form or
another of tacft or explfcit compromises upon the rules governing the CLR.
For some authors CR. BRENNER ( 1988), M. BERNSTEIN ( 1988)) such a steady
evolutfon fn technologies and institutions would induce an economfc dynamic:
ftself continuous.
The "régulation" approach has challenged this conception, since long
run economi c laws are far from evident and st 111 more because even apparent 1y
slow alterations m1ght finally induce major changes in the accumulation
regime or regulation mode. For example, catastroph theory and non linear
dynamical systems conv1ncingly argue that small changes in initial conditions
might unfold diverging dynamical patterns. The argument is still reinforced
for social and economic systems in which innovations and conscious or
unintended institution building induce new collective and individual
behaviours as well as macroeconomic regularities. This seems to have been the
case after WII : major transformations 1n the world system, monetary and
state management, and changes in the forms of competition and CLR have
launched a brand new avenue for advanced capitalist countries CM. AGLIETTA
(1982), R. BOYER, J. MISTRAL (1978), A. LIPIETZ (1983)).
The catastrophic evolutions of the Thirties, the large distrust
towards pure laisser-faire strategies, the major transformations of
technology, social organizations and State interventions occuring during the
war put on top of the agenda the design and implementation of a genuine CLR.
An unprecedented conjunction of political and social forces led to this new
order. In spite of unescapable and sometimes violent conflicts, all political
parties and social groups did accept building again or modernizing the
national economies. New managers replaced old malthus1an entrepreneurs, more
open to social and technological innovations. In some key sectors,
nationalized firms have been playing an important role in this paradigm
shift. From the side of labor, the aggiornamento is impressive too: de facto
if not de jure, the unions and the1r · constituents accept Scientific
Management methods, which they previously used to fight in ordèr to black. ln
ex change, they demanded and got the pr 1 ne i p 1 e tha t wage-earners wou ld benef 1 t
from such a New Productive Deal, via direct wage increases. ln this process
the State took a major place 1n foster1ng these Fordist agreements, whereas
it helped in capital accumulation via adequate public infrastructures
spend i ng, a perm i ss 1 ve cred i t and mone tary po 11 cy and of course a new
counter-cyclical economic polie.Y, legitim1zed by keynesian theory CR. BOYER
C1990b)). Finally, the collective side of labor force reproduction in fully
deve l oped cap i ta 11 st envi ronment was recogn i zed by a k 1 nd of Beveridge
Welfare State CCh. ANDRE, R. DELORME (1983)).
TABLE 1 THE FOUR PILARS OF THE FORDIST CAPITAL LABDR RELATION CFCLRJ
COUNTRIES UNITED UNITED WEST-
COMPONENTS AUSTRIA FRANCE ITALY JAPAN SWEDEN KINGDOM STATES GERMANY
OF CAPITAL _LABOR RELATION ..
1. MECHANIZATION OF MANUFACTU-RING: 1969-1973
(1) Labo~ pr?duc\1ï1ty > - 6, 1 4,0 6,8 - 4,0 3,3 4,0 per our var a 1on 1n i
(11) ?utput capital )at1o - 0,3 - 2,0 - 3,8 - - 0,6 1 ,0 - 2,0 · var1at1on 1n i
2. THE DIVIDEND OF PROGRESS FOR LABOR A WAGE ELASTICITY w.r. to : ( 1) Pr1ce 0,97 0,94 0,96 0,93 n.a. 0,99 1, 01 0,99 (11) Product1v1ty n.a. 0,4 0,33 0,25 n.a 0, 1 0,30 1,20
< 1 ,2} (3,5} ( 1 ,2) < 1 ,5) (3,8) (6,2) 0-,
3. CONNECTIVE BARGAINING \l~ge rate d1spprs1on ( oeff1cfent o yar1at1on
fn percent 21 12 8 29 8 17 22 12
4. THE WELFARE AND KEYNESIAN STATE Share of collective red1s- 41,3 38,3 37,8 22,4. 44,7 40,6 30,6 41,5 tr1but1on fn GNP (j}
fn 1973
Sources : Une 1 : A. GLYN (1989} "Prodyct1v1ty and the cr1sfs of Ford1sm" M1meograph Barcelone, June 1988. ·. Tables A2 to A7.
Une 2 : < 1> OECD < 19~6) "Fl9><1b111Jl f"d La~our M11rket" p. 17. . (11) J. LE Dt~ ~~l~P!'J~·M ~T~ÂE t1988~0RET (19é6J, p. 24, P. ARTUS (1983}, M. JUILLARD (1988),
L1ne 3: B. RO\lTHORN (1990}, Table 1.
7
The CLR was an essent 1a 1 part, but a part on ly, of th.lb foll.d.lbt
Beue~ld.ge-Keyn.ebla.n. comp'1.0ffll6e. Basically the bargain could be presented as
f o 11 ows : on one s ide , managers and fi rms ho 1 ders were recogn i zed the 1 ead 1 ng
role and initiative in organizing the productive process and making the
strategtc choices about markets and 1nvestments. On the other side, the
unions were struggling for getting the major share of the productivity
increases, associated with the diffusion and maturation of Fordist production
methods and consumption and life styles (Figure 1). It can be shown that a
rather coherent accumulation regime has been built upon this genu1ne social
compromise <M. AGLIETTA (1982), H. BERTRAND (1983), R. BOYER C1988a)).
The general acceptance of scientific management, associated with the
backlog due to WI generally enhanced a tremendous increase labor
productivity. Collective agreements usually set wage increases according to
expected productivity achievements, whereas labor conflicts focus upon wage
demands • Consequen t ly, rea 1 wage speeds up and a 11 ows typ ica 1 wage earners to
buy and benefit from mass produced goods (cars, home appliances, homes ••• ).
In turn this .spurs consumpt ion goods production, which cal ls for new and
modern equipments. Therefore a virtuous spiral of cumulative growth, once
init 1ated tends to perpetuate from per1od to period, provided that the
1ndexing of wage with respect to productivity is neither too low nor too high
<R. BOYER Ed. C1988b)). The 1mplicit compromise upon income shar1ng allows
stable and high profits, a basic condition, along with buoyant demand for
accumulation to be sustained.
2. THE FOUR PILARS OF THE CAPITAL LABOR NEXUS.
In retrospect, the main features of Fordist capital labor relation
CFCLR) are c lear enough. Just by contrast with the Eight 1es, the roaring
Sixties have been built upon four major founding princ1ples <Table 1).
• A d.eepenln.g ln la.bo~ dlulblon has been a distinctive feature of post WII
era. On one side, a clear distinction between conception and execution,
production and sa 1 es, marketing and finance and so on ••• a 11 ows an un
precedented technical and social division of tasks, within the original
FIGURE 1 : THE FORDIST HYPOTHESIS IN A NUTSHELL
THE FORDISH CAPlTALILABOR RB.ATlON CFCLRJ
Large division or labor
- Specialized Equipment - Mass Production of Slandardized
goods ..
Rather strong Unions
,
H
..
~ Strong
~
accumulation
-
- Large -
The disputes fucus on wages
product1vily gains
Hlgh profil level
~ Real wage increases
per111l
~ Cànsu11pltoh
sector dynàmbm
Need for Eqtit1>11ent
Cl,
Cap 1ta 1 good Seclor dyna11is•
land of Fordtsm, i.e. the manufacturtng sector, but in all the related
tertiary sectors. Within the plant, specialized equipment are designed in
order to embody the larger technical knowledge possible, the assembly tasks
requiring a very low grade of education ànd skilling. Basically, the
Fordist pr1nc1ple of mass production of very standardized good sets the
pace in industrial organization.
This is the modern method for reaping increasing returns to scale in
Adam SMITH tradition, given the technical opportunities and the social
·compromise of the post WII era. Therefore, labor productiv1ty experiences
an unprecedented rate of growth, in most OECD countries, with the exception
of US, for which a large continuity prevails over a century (A. MADDISON
( 1982)). During the 1969-1973 last Fordist boom, even United Kingdom
exhibited very high productivity and growth rates {Table ·1, item 1). But
this achievement has a cost : in most countries, capital deepening is such
as to propel a decline in the output capital ratio <A. GLYN (1988)).
• A comprtamLH a.bout prtOdu.ctLuLty 6hah.Ln.g is guiding wage formation, at odds
with previous compet1tive mechanisms accordingwhich labor scarcitywas the
major factor for real wage dynamic. First, the pressure by unions and
workers in order to get an indexation with respect to consumer prices is
actually taken into account, either by explicit clauses within collective
agreements, or by the formation of expectations about an inflation which is
now a permenent feature of Fordist growth (J.P. BENASSY, R. BOYER, R.M.
GELP I . ( 1979)) • Conceptua 1 ly, af ter W. W. II wage i s no more a pure market
variable sfnce it takes int.o account a minimum standard of living. Second
and s t 111 more th 1 s wage i s then var i ed accord i ng to the genera 1 advances in
productivity. During the golden years, most government officials-even the
most conservat ive- have promoted that they ca lled a 6hah.Ln.g the dLuLden.d. o&
ph.Ogtte.66.
The surprise is precisely that this broad vision of the world did
inspired actual wage policies by firms <Table 1, item 2). With uneven lags,
quite all countries exhibit a perfect indexation with respect to consumer
prices, and this was far from a fact of nature : in the Nineteen century the
corresponding elasticity was about 0.1 - 0.2 (R. BOYER (1979)).
GRAPH 1 : A LARGER STAB1LITY OF THE tlAGE SHARE AFTER tlORLD tlAR 11
Share of wage 1n value added, after correction for the 1ncreasing share of wage earners in total working population
"''''•''''• 1eo- . , , ' ' 1 ' ' ' , 1 ' ' , , 1 ' , ' , 1 , ,,,,,, .. , i,, .• ,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 110
I , ••• ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
140
130
120
110
100
90
IO
70
eo
IO
40
30
,_ .. ,__ __ , ____ .,
• ,~ ' 1 1 ' • 1 , 1 • 1 1 • 1 1 1 •• 1 • 1900 1101 1910 1911
• '
• '·-·, ----~ ,-- ,,, .... ., -- - '
•
• • • • • • -- - - -·-·-· .. ++++++
France R.F.A. Un 1 ted K tngdom United States Japan
'" ~-..... ·-' " . ·- ,.. ·-·- ·-· ·-· . ~. . ., .-~ . . " ~-· '' __ .,. ' •
" .. " .. ... ... . "' ..,.-+• .... .,
""----, - ·- ..--..
' • ' 1 1 ,l,111111 .,, ... 1l1111l111,l1 ,,,1,, 1 ' 1 • • ' , i' 1 1 ' i 1 1 '
1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1980 1985 1970 1975
Source : BASLE M., MAZIER J., VIDAL J.F. (1984), p. 105.
~ 0
11
Productivity shartng is a ltttle more complex to prove. The best evidence
relies upon the noticable constancy of distributive share Ccorrected from
the shift towards salaried activities) in the medium run. The changes
occuring after World War II clearly point towards this rough stabilityfor
France, US and United Kingdom, and possibly Germany CGraph 1).
Nevertheless, signif1cant fluctuations of 1ncome shares still exist 1n
Japan, which mtght tmply a genuine form for wage formation. Long run
econometric studies for wage formation in United States seem to confirm
these transformations towards more sluggfsh adjustments and a decl1ning
impact of unemployment fluctuations CJ. SACHS (1978)). This is a typical
pattern for most OECO countrf es CJ. SCHOR C 1985)). For the contemporary
perfod, other econometric studies seem to confirm productivfty shar1ng,
either fnstantaneous CGermany, Japan) or over amultiperiod labor contract
CUS, probably France) «MIMOSA C 1990), R. BOYER C 1990a)).
• Ccm.n.ectLve baJt.G4LnLng is creatfng strong complementarities 1n wage
increases which start from the leading h1ghly unionized sectors and
.progressively spread to. the secondary sectors and finally to the public
civil servants CM. PIORE (1986), B. CORIAT (1985),(1990)). The innovation
with respect to the previous century or even the interwar period is far
reaching: labor struggles used to create wage dffferentfals between skills,
sectors or regions; within FCLR, successful wage demands are setting the
pace for average nomina 1 wage i ncreases • Three me chan i sms a t 1 eas t
contribute to this spreading the rather large centralization of
co 11 ec t ive barga f n 1 ng usua lly negoc fa ted a t the sec tor or even the national
economy levels, the mobility of workers moving towards best paid job and
finally minimum wage policy by government when it exists.
Most indexes for wage dispersion confirm the lait.Ge 6UbLlLtw a, r.oa.ge
dL,,e11.en.tL4l6 under Fordism (Table 1, item 3), a feature which partially
resists to contemporary crisis (OECO C 1985), Chapter 5). Neverthe less
withfn this new historical configuration, some national specificities âre .·
observed: the conventfonal opposition between primary and secondary jobs
CP.B. DOERINGER, M. PIORE (1971)), and a remaining competitive wage
formation legacy exp la in why in United States wage differentials stfll play
arole after WII. Similarly, wage dispersion seems to be the highest in
12
Japan, whfch suggests agatn a genuine and decentralized process in
1ndustr1al relations. On the contrary, most European countries experience a
low dispersion in sectoral wage. The more equalitartan configuration is
observed 1 n Sweden, probab 1 y due to so 11 dari st 1 c wage po 11 ci es , and 1 n
Ita 1y, where the comp lete indexing with respect to price seem to have
significantly reduced wage d1fferent1als CB. ROWTHORN (1990)).
• Fourth pilar of FCLR, the basic social compromise and new conception about
the role of the State induce and leg1t1mate an 1mpressive redistribution of
i ncome v 1 a the k'.eyn.e.6.La.n. and coe.e,a11.e Sta.te. I nterpersona 1 and
intergenerational solidarities which used to operate through family ties,
have now to be fulfilled by more collective and horizontal institutions.
The welfare system is therefore a key component of thfs new deal between
citizens and the State. The recognition of social wage, general access to
health, basic education, the provision of pension funds for the poorer, of
unemployment benefits explain the surge of redistribution mechanisms by the
State or by collective agreements.
Again, this 1ntroduces a · far reaching innovation in the CLR and
consequently upon wage and productivity dynamfcs. On one side, the
disciplinary role of firings and unemployment becomes less evident (with
possible adverse impact upon productivity), whereas real wage increases are
now more stable, smoothing the cycle. On the other side, the variety of
public entitlements induce built-in stab111zers, given the taxandwelfare
financing systems. Nevertheless, this Keynesian-Beveridge State 1s
unequaly developing among advanced capita11st countries (Table 1, 1tem4>.
Just before the 1973 oil shock, the share of collective redistribution was
the higher in social democratfc countr1es such as Sweden, Austria. EEC
countries were exper1enc1ng a s1m1lar redistribution, even 1f generally
lower for example in Italy. The lowest size for welfare is observed for
United States and st111 more Japan, where fam1ly solidarity and private
pension funds constitute alternative to public welfare. Clearly, for most
components of the CLR, Japan is quite original indeed <B. LAZONICK (1990)).
To summarize, Fordism manifests itself through common features all
accross advanced capitalism countries. Nevertheless, the previous
13
description suggest that the precise configuration of this model may vary
from country to country.
3. OOE rmEL, MANY NATIONAL BRANOS.
Let us now adopt a more qualitative and institutionnal view about
these cross country differences. Each of the components of CLR exhibits clear
national specificities (Table 2).
• Th.e cooh.k pn.oce66 is typically Fordist in US, which is not at all surpris1ng,
but in France too : a high division between blue and white collars,
engineers and rank and file workers is common whereas managers rely upon
me chan i za t ion for sol v i ng techn i ca 1 and even soc i a 1 prob lems CO. NOBLE
C 1984), BRIE < 1987)). But in other countries, a craftmansh.ip tradition and
an explicit organtzation of professional markets CD.·MARSDEN (1988)) do
moderate the Fordism principle of maximum division of labor and blue collar
deskill1ng. With contrasted results, Germany, Japan and Sweden belong of
this mitigated or hybrid Fordism. Contrary to genuine sc1entific management
which constantly seeks to take the skills off the shop floor, in these
countr1es "the employers have put the skills on the shop floor and invested
in the capabilities of shop floor workers" CB. LAZONICK (1990)). The
Br 1t i sh CLR i s another en 11 ght i ng case : the ver y constitution of the
bargaining power of workers used to rely upon very precise craft boundaries
and work rules, which might operate as barriers to t"he continuous
rationalization process intrinsic to the Taylorsit principle. Somehow
loose ly, these contrasted configurations are not wi thout exp la in ing
productivity differentials (Table 1).
• L4bo~ mobLtLtw is necessary for coping with the permanent changes brought
by capital accumulation, competition and the search for innovation and the
une.scapab 1 e dec 1 i ne of some obso 1 ete industries. Aga in, each economy seems
to have built original mobility itineraries. In United States, workers move
from firms to firms, reg1ons to reg1ons. ln France, regional mob111ty 1s
usually lower, whereas most the adjustments used to take place in small or
medium size firms. ln ltaly, the disequilibrium between the South and the
14
TABLE 2 TIE NATIONAL VARINITS FOR FORDIST COHPROHISE : A TENTATIVE TYPOLDGY FOR TIE GOLDEN ASE.
COUNTRIES UNITED UNITED VEST-COMPONENTS AUSTRIA FRANCE ITALY JAPAN S\ilEDEN
KINGDa1 STATES GERMANY OF CAPITAL LABOR RELATION
1. ORGANIZATiON OF THE \ilORK Not very Taylor1st H1ghly Tpam work Early Balkan1- fyp1ca 11r Profer
PROCESS taylorist karge gap taylor1st o poly- attempts ze~ v11 a.Y.loris s1ona &
etween 1n large valent to mu }1P e fna craft Îoncep-d 1rms workers feplace cra ts & ord1st markets
ion an morÎ than ay orism work TorÎ thar execution tay orist rules ay oris1
-·-2. STRATIFICATION OF SKILLS Average Larr & Large Moderate Moderate Precise H1gh Moderate
ins 1tr bounda-t1onna 1- ries zed
3. LABOUR MOBILITY H1gh Low Rpg1onal Average Average/ Average H1gh Average
io~Î~ to H1gh
orth) Average
4. \ilAGl FORMATION (1) n~ex1ng w1th respect to
RathÎr Cpmplete FullÎ Complete • r1ce \ilorld · Slow bt Partial Slow and comp ete 1 not 1nst tr more than comple e and/or P.frtial
perm1tted t1onna 1- consumer slow ( orbid-zed pr1ces den)
• Product 1v1ty Not clear lmpl1c1t Not Expl1c1t ln the Not clear ImÎ11c1t Rather expl1c1t via export bu strong
bonuses sector ex1st1ng
( 11> Influence of unemploy- S1gn1f1- Moderate Rather High Sign1f1- Low Average ~prent-ment . cant h1gh cant ly ow
(111) In~1rect wage and H1gh H1gh H1gh Very low H1gh ~ow (\,lel- Low Average w? are (as prÎportion are Îax-o direct wage based
5. LIFE STYLE AND CONSUMPTION ln1t1ally Closing ln1t1ally F'st Mo~ern Mo\ern 1,.argel.Y. ~aP.id
NORMS agging gap agg1ng c os1ng 11 h w1 h commocli- oè:terni-
gap arr we fare t1zed" zat1on wel are
GLOBAL FEATURES OF FORDISM CORPORA- STATE LAGGING HYBRID DEMOCRA- FLA\ilED GENUINE FLEX-TIST PUSHED AND IN- FORDISM TIC FORDISM FORDISM FORDISM
FORDISM PERFECTLY FORDISM INSTITU-
· TIONNALI-ZED
Sources for f1111& the rows of F1gµ_rt 2: L1nes 1 ID 2.~ Maioly M. CArl" NOS-DUBERNET and GRANDO J.M. <!988>. M. AOKI (1988>. B. STRAH (1988).
Of ~tructural AdJus ments and.Economie Performance.
L1ne 3: OECD (1986) ·r1ex1b111ty and labor markets", p. 63, Table II.3 for 1971, or p. 66, Table II.4.
Line 4 : ldi p. 17 J Jable I .2. 1, and (11 For the 1ndex1ng w1th respect to product1v1ty P. PORET (1986), Table 7, p. 24.
15
North explains most of the features of workers behavior and expectations.
ln Germany, active local or regional markets allow the shift of sk1lled
workers from- f irms to f irms. In Japan on the contrary, a quasi tenured
employment in large firms is not necessary counterbalanced by a higher
mobility within the subcontractors (K. KOIKE (1988)). These contemporary
strategies of the Japanese large firms are not so different from the
american mass producers in the 1900's and 1920's (8. LAZONICK (1990)), but
might have been implemented more systematically (R. BOYER, A. ORLEAN
(1990)). Finally, in social democratic countries (Sweden, Austria), the
adaptation to changing economic outlook seem largely centralized and
operating via public organizat1on, regional or national (8. STRAH (1988),
J.O. ANDERSSON, L. MJOSET (1987), G. STANDING (1988)).
• The IAKl.ge cornph.Oml6e is more or less formalized into collective agreements
and labor contracts. For the indexing with respect to priées, the spectrum
ranges from a complete, quasi instantaneous and contractual clause (lta11an
scala mobile) to a legal interdiction (Germany, France ••• ). These
configurations seem to affect mainly short run adjustments, since in the
long run the indexing is complete (Table 1>~ The same observation is to be
made for- indexing with respect to productivity. Quasi explicit in Japan,
via the high variability of bonusses, implicit but strong in Germany,
operating in the medium run in US and France, integrated in official wage
policy in Scandinavian countries. Nevertheless, most of the researches on
wage formation do not focus upon the core of Fordist mechanisms (roughly
speaking, wage = consumer prices + productivity) but on thesmall residual
part of compet 1t ive me chan i sms, as convent i ona 1 Phi 111 ps curves do. For the
whole sample of OECD countries (H. THOULUC (1988)), the moderating impact
. of unemployment on wage cornes out as modest since the corresponding
elasticity is estimated around 0,4. But the mechanism is somehow unstable
1n the short run and 1t 1s hard and risky to relate the various elast1cities
to national specificities. For example, given the statistical methods for
measuring unemployment in Japan, the labor market seems extremèly:
competitive (J. LE OEM (1987), J.H. CHAN LEE l Alii (1987)).
• Wa.ge ea.M.eh.6 1.i,e .6tyte.6 exhibit a large variety of lags with respect to the
American way of life, another image for Fordist consumption norms. The gap
16
has been vanfshfng quite quickly in France and Italy, along with the
decline of the agricultural sector. ln United Kingdom, Sweden, Austria,
collective consumptfon has played a significant role in shaping consumption
patterns and habits. At one extreme (US), Fordism has been synonimous for
commoditization of prfvate consumption and life style ; at another
CSweden), 1t has been associated with quite a-Fordist uses, generall.Y
collectively organized Chealth, education, training and retraining ••• ). In
closing the macro model representative of post WIJ growth, this is a
feature to be 1ncluded : the coherence between the spreading of fordist
production and the transformations in consumption helped in stabilizing the
growth pattern. A contrario, any divergence between them may trigger a
structural cri sis. For
example, the 1981 French reflatfon was rapidly blocked by the large import
increases of modern equipment and consumer goods not produced in country
CR. BOYER Cl 987)) • In United States too, the demi se of 'the FCLR i s not
without relation with the preference of American consumers for forefgn
durable goods.
Even if the characterization is somehow impressionnistic, a
national flaveur for each of OECD countries can be diagnosed. United States
and France seem to explore typLca..t forid.Ll,m, since the.Y experience a clear
distinction between engineers and technicians on one side, blue-collars and
low skilled workers on the other side. Nevertheless, genuine US Fordism is
market drfven, whereas in France State has played a proeminent role in
promoting and implementing it via labor laws, nationalized industries,
numerous incentfves by economic policy. At the opposite, the British case
shows that Fordism is not always a fatality which imposes itself due to fts
superior economfc efficiency. A strong labor movement, defending precise
skills tasks and job rules, can block most of the productive potentials
as soc i a ted w i th modern management me thods • This can be ca 11 ed ,.eawed Forid.L 6m.
Sfmilarly, Italy gives a suggestive example of possible discrepancies between
fordism as production techniques and its outside work aspects. \.lhen the . ·
struggles of the hot Autumn 1969 led to new labor laws, they simultaneously
recognized the principle of productivity sharing and the control of workers
upon plant organizatfon at the shop floor level. The system was potentially
explosive and did break-down at the end of the Seventies CE. \.IOLLEB ( 1988), M.
17
MARUANI & Alii Eds C1989)). In this ml6'1ntch.ed forul.l6m, political and social
struggles contradict the maturation of mass production.
A quite different configuration prevails in Germany : there
manufacturing industries as well as the educational and vocatfonal systems
never tried to implement completely the Fordist logic. High skilling and
workers' invo lvement were searched for by the manager, whereas fina 1 products
were more differentiated than standardized CW. STREECK C1989a,b}).
Similarly, collective agreements and bargaining within the firms partially
integrate new technologies and work organization. Finally wage formation is
much more linked to actual performances than in most other countries. One
might label this configuration as ,tex-Forul.L6m. Japan is still another case,
since high skills and a significant polyvalence allow to shift more quickly
from one production to another : products can both be mass produced and
somehow differentiated CR. BOYER C 1989)). This is an h.11bta.Ld. ,orul.i.6m, which
may announce an alternative to genuine fordism both in work organisation CH.
JACOT C1990d)), and management CM. AOKI (1990)).
Clearly the degree of centralization/decentralization is an open
variable in the Fordist model CB. RO\ITHORN C1990), L. CALMFORS, J. DRIFFILL
C1988), S. BO\ILES, R. BOYER C1990)). The Scandinavian countries and Austria
give a striking example of an industrial modernization which largely takes
place in a small open economy and nevertheless allows a very centralized
capital labor compromise, emerging from the interactions between firms, a
strong union and State civil servants CB. BOSWORTH, A. RIVLIN Eds C1987)).
Interestingly enough even within a cota.pol\4tl6t ota.6oclaldemoc'14tlc Forul.L6m,
the macroeconomic performances might be rather different indeed: Austriaand
Sweden do not exact ly f o llow the same trajectory, as far as macroeconomic
outcomes are concerned Csee later Table 7).
18
III - TIE BREAKING omtN OF THE SEVENTIES · EVIDENCES AND INTERPRETATIONS.
This genufne and symbiotic interactions between industrial relations
and macro dynamics seemed to deliver an infinite prosperity (8. LUTZ
(1990)) ••• at least according to most contemporary views. Since then, various
social crises, two oil shocks, a globalisation of competition at the world
level, a wave of technological innovations and of course a drastic revision
fn economic policies have induced a significant alteration in the fordist
capital labor relation. After a short chronology, the major instftutional
changes will be investigated. It will be argued that the capital labor
relation is experfencfng a great transition from the old FCLR towards various
alternatives.
1. A BRIEF PERIOOISATION: A FOUR ACTS DRAMA.
To understand how such an happy fordist regime has ended into a sharp
criticism of the rigidities and inner limits of fordist industrial relations,
a short retrospectfve mfght be englfghtening. Basically, thfs begfn as a
comedy, pass by a dramatic episod and might end like a tragic comedy 1
• Act 7 starts from the end of the Sixties and stops before the second oil
shock of 1979. The social unrest associated with the hot May 1968 or the
Italian Autumn 1969 was challenging indeed fordist division of labor and
excessive deskilling and mechanization. But unions, business associations
and governments usually interpreted this episod as an inducement to
complete the fordist agenda. Minimum wage was generally significantly
increased and the welfare state extended to new areas, training for
example. A second major challenge was associated with the first oil shock :
it was interpreted as a benchmark, but then only for energymanagement and,
finance. ConseQuentl,Y, Quite all the governments, including the most
conservative, have been extending unemployment benefits, and training and
g i v i ng subs id i es to the fi rms in order to curb down the job redue t ions wh i ch
took p 1 ace w i th in the manuf actur 1 ng sector. In France for examp 1 e, the
'19
CHIRAC's government extended the severance payments and inst1tuted a
control over firing by Ministry of Labour. S1milarly, keynesian
countercyclical measures helped in lim1t1ng the rtse of unemployment. By
symmetry with respect to the statement by President NIXON : "Now we are all
keynesians I", eueriycm.e cm.6 &oh.d.L6t but somewere ignoring it. The FCLRwas
so pervastve that tt used to be considered as "natural", i.e. part of the
social compromise between citizens and the state, wage earners and
business. OPEP's monopoly had created energy scarcfty and major
international financial unbalances and was the culprit, not the fordist
capital labor relation.
• Act 11 begins after 1979 and lasts approximately until the mid-Eighties. In
fact the previous strategy had led to a persisttng inflation even durtng
recessions, ·a worsening of public deficits, without necessarily fighting
effictently agafnst an upward unemployment trend. Similarly keynes1an
therapies, when applied at the national or even international level, had
not provided the expected results. Then came the mcm.et4'1.(la.n.d.ccm.6e~ua.tLue
ba.c'2.ta.6h. On one side, monetary stability had to be kept at any cost in term
of unemployment : most of the central banks following Federal Reserve
Board, tben adopted rather restrictive monetary poltcies. The related
increases tn real 1nterest rates have levelled off the firms profits, and
pushing them into either bankrupcies, or massive firings and concession
bargatntngs. On the other side, came out the idea that labor market
institutions were restricting mobility, employment and wage adjustments.
I f such large unemp l oymen t ra tes pers i s ted over a de cade·, c 1 ear l y the
monopoltstic or oltgopoltst1.c character of labor markets was to be blamed.
In France for example, after 1976 the Prime Minfster Raymond BARRE set up a
new economic policy, based upon both prices and wages freezes, the search
for a better matching of vacancies and unemployment, and a restrictive
money supply. During this period, most governements try to promote a
disindexing of nominal wage w1th respect to past consumer prices. More a~d
more, the FCLR is, first implicitly and then explicitly, questioned. Of
course, the conservative counter-revolution fs clearer in United Kingdom
and United States than in West Germany or France, but similar conceptions
and strategies are spreading all accross OECD countries. Nevertheless,
social democratic countries remain largely specific.
20
• Act 111 actually puts forwards an ideal for capital labor relationat odds
w f th the f ord f s t one • F f rs t , European . .governmen ts rea 11 ze tha t the
smoothing of unemployment has been paid by a strong decl1ne in profit
margfns and therefore a sluggish investment. Here cornes the famous Elmut
SCHMIDT's theorem : "Today wage austerity provides tomorrow profit, i.e.
the day after tomorrow investment and consequently future job creations".
This macroeconomic vision is quite the opposite to the fordist virtuous
circ le Csee previous Figure 1). Second, the pre-keynesfan conceptions
concerning the self adjusting of pure and perfect labor markets tend to
challenge the f ordist fnst f tut ions and compromises. Consequent ly, by
reducing the legal power of unions (specially in UIO by decreasing
unemployment beneffts, by legalfzfng atypical labor constracts and of
course promoting the transparency of employment offers and demands, most
governments have been dreaming to implement a competLtLve c4pLtal l4boh
hel4tlon.. Third, the keynesian principles are strongly under attack because
they overemphasfze demand factors and frequently forget the supply side of
the economy. Both the so-called and mysterious LAFFER's curve and the
impressfve come-back of neo-schumpeterian fdeas about the role of
enterpreneurs and innovations in the process of capitalist development do
challenge the fordfst-beveridgian and keynesfan model. Ouring the mid
Eighties, few governements dare to stick to the old capital labor
compromise ••• w 1 th the poss 1 b le exception of the soc i al democra tic
countries. During the same period, many official reports call for a drastic
flexibilisation of labor contracts, wages, and a scaling down of the
welfare state COECD C 1986)). As far as the ideas are concerned, fordism was
ac tua l ly dead l
• Act IV begins at the end of the Eight 1es, after the surprisingly long
recovery starting after 1983 in United States and whfch diffuses itself to
Japan and Europe. A partial restoration of profit shares, a slackening of
mon~tary policy in order to prevent the recurring ffnancfal crises ·to
unwind a cumulative depression, the opportunities opened by innovations
concernfng finan.ce as well as information technologies, all these factors
promote more optimist1c long run views, which generate a boom in productive
fnvestments and even public infrastructures, specia l ly in Europe <ECONOMIE
21
EUROPEENNE ( 1989)). The rigidit 1es of the labor markets become less evident
in this context of renewed job creation. Labour mobility and specially quit
rates vary procyc lica 11.Y and therefore ~ncrease endegenous 1y wi th the
lasting boom <R. BOYER (1990c)). Similarl.v, the consequences of previous
conservative strategies can be assessed and comparedwithmore cooperative
social democrat alternatives CD. LEBORGNE, A. LIPIETZ (1989)). Therefore
the objective of adapting to international competition and new
techno 1 og 1 cal opportun 1t 1 es has been searched for by contrasted and somehow
conflicting strateg1es. For simplicity sake, two diverging transformations
can be opposed (Table 3) :
- oe,en6Lue 6buttegle6 combine a kind of fordist nostalgiawith the belief
that market mechanisms should take in charge the whole process of CLR
restructuring. Work organization should be only marginal.Y transformed;
for example information technologies should be used in order to reinforce
controls over blue collar workers. Wage formation should be kept aside
from any co 1 lect ive agreement and left to market adjustment or micro
bargaining at the more decentralized level. Consequenl.Y, connective
bargaining would break-down and relative wage would become an important
variable in labor market adjustments. Finally, the beveridge and
keynesian welfare state should be reduced and replaced by private
insurances, whereas conventional public expenditures should be kept
minimum. United States and United Kingdom provide good examples for this
vision.
- O"endue 6th.4tegle6 are bui 1t upon a long term view : some short run
unbalances are to be accepted in order to invest into training and
retraining workers, to elaborate sophisticated wage systems in order to
manufacture workers'consent and committment, and finally preserve some
solidaristic mechanisms which enhance the acceptation of restructuring,
and therefore help in getting long run efficiency. According to this
second vision, fordist hierarchical controls have to be replaced by more
subtle incentives in order to obtain workers committment. A compromise
about the sharing of the dividends of progress is still necessary, even
if possibly quite different from of the fordist one. In turn, this
compromise .enhances p~oduct and process innovations and proyides long run __ ~ .. . .
competitlveness of the firm or the nation. Public policies should
TABLE 3
1. WORK ORGANIZATION
' i
2. WAGE FORMATION
3. CONNECTIVE BARGAINING
4. WELFARE AND KEYNESIAN STATE
TtiO STRATEGIES FOR ADAPTING THE CAPITAL LABOR RELATtON
DEFENSIVE STARTEGY
• Exporting old fordist methods
• Reinforcing controls via new technologies
• Marginally inproving ForcHsm
• Two tiers contracts • Desindexing of wage
• Weakening of unions
• Decentralization of bargaining
• Make iage more sensitive to in ividual financiat situa ion .
• Relative wages are adjusting variables
• Reduçtion in employment benetit
• Budget cuts
OFFENSIVE STRATEGY
• Modernizing even mature industries
• Enhanç~ workers' committment
• Use infprmijtion techno logies to find an alterna-to Fordism .
• Homogenous Labor contract • Genuine w~g~ fprmula
(t.e. profit sharing) • Joint bargain1ng Îf wage,
emplorment and we fare by firms or nationa unions
• Possible centralization
. Solidaristic wage po icies
• Rather ,table wage hierarchy
• Intensive training programs
• Investm~nt in infrastructure Ceducation, transportation, communication)
• Ideal of private insurancel • 6:\l~~=l~f:t~on of
j...J 1\)
23
precfsely provide the collective fngredfents of such a strategy : good
infrastructures, efficient educational system, incentives to
innovations ••• and so on. Sweden, Germany and Japan provide good examples of
these strategies, quite different indeed in many other respects Cdegree of
centralization, importance of unions, size of the welfare state).
During the mid-Eighties, the defensive strategies were generally
consfdered as highly required and efficient. Now, after a decade, the
offensive strategies seem to be as good as, or even better than the former.
Sfgnificantly enough, influentfal OECD reports have changed thefr emphasis
from defensive to offensive flexibility COECD (1986), C1988c)). This is not
necessarily an happy end for the fordfst legacy. Qufte on the contrary, all
these episodes have significant ly a ltered most of the features fnherited from
WII.
2. QUITE ALL THE COMPONENTS OF FCLR ARE ALTERED.
Has thfs paradfgmftic shift fn the realm of fdeas fmplfed equivalent
transformations into the fordist labor regime ? Many international
comparative researches allow a provfsfonal description of the major changes
ac tua l ly observed w f th in the management of fi rms C OCDE C 1985) , C 1988a) ,
C 1988c > , . R. BOYER C 1988b > , C 1990a > , B • RO\JTHORN C 1990 > , R • BRUNE TT A, C.
Dell'ARINGA Eds (1990)). The four basic features of·· fordism have
sfgnfffcantly changed.
• A4 a. pn.oductlve devi.ce, ,on.di.4m toouti tiome, L' not a.tt, a, Lt4 e"Lci.encM.
After 1973, labor productivfty signfffcantly slowed down for qui te all OECO
countries CTable 4, Item 1). Capital productiv1ty too continues to decl1ne,
whfch explafns why total factor productivfty has so much decelerated wfth
respect to the Sixties. Such a decline still represents a puzzle, even for.·
the most sophfsticated stat1st1cal and econometric studies COECD (1989)).
Cl ear ly the o 1 d methods for reap f ng i ncreas i ng returns to sca 1 e by
standardizfng products and mechanf zing are no more efficient. A lot of
managerial and economfc studies overwhelmingly confirm that quality and
TABLE 4 CHANGING PATTERN IN FCLR
COUNTRIES UNITED UNITED \IEST-
COMPONENTS AUSTRIA FRANCE ITALY JAPAN S\IEDEN GERMANY KINGDOM STATES
OF CAPITAL LABOR RELATION
I.FORDISM BECOMES LESS PRODUCTIV Product1v1ty rate (l) per year (1) Before 1973 5,4 4,4 5,0 8,2 2,8 3,3 0,9 4,4 ( 1 f) After 1973 2, 1 2,3 1, 7 2,9 1,0 1,5 0,4 2, 1
2.BREAKING 00\IN OF THE FORDIST \IAGE FORMULA ' . (1) Inst1tut1onnal pressures Extst1ng State rron~ at Some bÏt Some but rrong at ~ess~C~A Nr very dr1ven he Î rms m1tfga ed gen~1nr he rl1- ew o - f rong eve vfa prÎ uc 1- 1ca lect ve lex-
btmuses v1 y eve agrr..; y~d1sm shar1ng mens (11) styn1{1cance of a fh1ft Yes Yes Uncerta1n Yes No L1kely Yes Possibly
tn o he wage equa ton
3.MORE ATOMISTIC BARGAINING ~ (1) Instttutfonnal ev1dence Pressures Yes Yes · Not clear Some pres Alf~ady Yes Not clear
{or decen "Economto sures for ra er ra11za- sommersa iece~tra- iece~ ra-ion fza fon 1ze (11) 5volutfon 1n wage rates ~l 1ght Dec11ne Oecl1ne Rfse Dec11ne Dec11ne R1se ~t~~,~ 1spers1on fse an~ then and
tse fncrease
4.RATIONALIZATION OF THE KEYNE-SIAN \IELFARE STATE
(f) t~t~~~ 1,~aJ,of fts share 51,9 51,8 50,5 Jj, 1 63,5 46,2 36,9 46,6
(11) Break1ny 1n prev1ous Not clear Slow1ng Slow1ng Decrea,5 Oecreaf' Decrea'J Yes ~uar Decrea,, upward rend down down sl~i~o 5l~5~1 sl~i~0 cons an sl~~~8 s1nce 8
Sources Lfnes 1 (1) and (2) : Computed from OCDE, December 1988, p. 195.
L1ne 2 : (11> J.H. CHr-hi~tR2i:_ ~?ijé8~: :~vvf~-ftf~7>, Table 8, p. 157, Y. TSURU (1988), E. KREMP &
L1ne 2 (1) and 3 <1> lT8iC?i~i3y~>ll~ttV§~~Ç~l AdJustment and Economie Performance" Chapter 3,
1 4n .. 'l I 4 4 \ • C' 11'1 Ali an~ A MTTTC'I C:TAnT I tODt:. \ - At:. t&.-- C A-.t r "'-,,' &ftWUI'& 1 ...... ,.,..,.,.. -
25
di f f eren t i a t ion of consumer and equ i pmen t goods are crue i a 1 in the new
international compet1tion (M. PORTER (1990)), P. KRUGMAN (1989)). If under
fordism "big was beautiful", 1t has been argued that smaller plants and
runs for each product would prevail 1n the future (M. PIORE, Ch. SABEL
(1984)). But this view can be mitigated : scope and scale economies are not
excluding one another (A. CHANDLER ( 1990)) and mass production in modern
information technologies is not over I Nevertheless, the correlation
between productivity increases and demand growth has steadilydeclinedall
a long the Sevent tes <R. BOYER, P. PETIT ( 1990)). In other words, both
quantitat ively and qua litat ively, one of the basic pilar of the fordist
regime is challenged. Consequently, this relative productive failure put a
stress upon the viability of the capital labor compromise.
• The ,atid.L.t,t co.e.eectL ve a.grieemen.t6 C1l1.e n.o morte rwlLn.g mge ,attma.tLon.. An
impressive amount of evidence suggest that in many OECD countries, two of
the basic fordist indexing mechanisms have been challenged, and consequenly
transformed (Table 4, Item 2).
- First, many governments have promoted the b~e4kLn.g d.own. a, a.rLfl exptLcLt
Ln.d.exLn.g mech.a.n.L6m of nominal wage with respect to past consumer prices.
For example in France and Italy, Ministry of Finance or/and the central
bank have played a determinant role in implementing such a strategy. In
other countries, the very weakening of unions and the rise in
unemployment have indirectly al lowed such a disindexing. Some
econometric studies actually confirm that such a shift has affected the
dynamics of average nominal wage in quite all OECO countries (Table 5).
More precisely, during the Eighties, the elasticity of wage with respect
to consumer prices has been reduced in Austria, France, Italy, United
Kingdom, United States and Germany (Graph 2). More sophiticated
investigations confirm this desindexing process, specially for France :
the process is more sluggish and the medium run elasticity is no more one
<P. RALLE & Alii (1989)).
26 GRAPH 2 : -A GENERAL DISINDEXING OF NOHINAL #AGE 111TH RESPECT TD CONSUHE~ PRICE
EVOLUTION OF ELASTICITIES DERIVED FROM RECURSIVE ESTIMATES FROM 1978 TO 1988 ... ..
PARAMETER a OF THE EQUATION \IN = a. p + b. Log U + c • p + d
1
:~:~ • , 1
0.65 ~ 1 1 1 1
a.sa L : AUSTRIA
Î 1
1 • 1
1 1 0.85 r 1
1 1 1
0.8 : -1 1 1
0.75 : r-1 1 1 1 • FRANCE •
0.70 "-• 1 1 1 • 1 1
-,·=t . 1 -
0.95 •~i;
0.90 t 0.85 1 .. :
1 0.80 r ITALY
1
1
1 .. 1
~
1 .. -, i -- ·:r
1 ---· .... , _,..__......,_,__.~_.____.___,....__. 1
0.15 L
0.55
0.35'
0.15' --..
JAPNI.
1972 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88
C r ; 1
0.6 L 1 StiEDEN 1
0.4 r . 1
0.2 1 1 ---·-.. 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 -1
1 1 1 • .-· . :- 0.2 • ___ ....... ~ _ __,__...__ ____ _
1.17 Î 1.16 r
1 1.15 ~
1.14 ~ 1
1 1 • 13 1- UNITED KINGDOH
1 .
1 1.12 ~
1 1
1.11t-1.10 ~
: • 1.09 • =-::::±:=:=::=:;;:::!:=;::'!:!:=====~· ' - . .;....i ' j 1
1.25 r 1·
1 •. 15 t . 1.05 ï 1
0.95 + 0.85 t O. 75 r LIIITED STATES : 0.65 ...
i 0.55
·3_5
2.8
2.1
1.4
0.7 --- - --- -IIEST GERHANY :
0 ---.. -- - - .. 1972.74 76 78 80
• -· 1 •
82 84 86 88
27
- Second, managers and governements have searched for marie competLtLve
mecha.n.L6ffl6 for wage formation. E i ther they have been promot i ng more
deèentralized wage bargafnfng, or they have fmplemented wage norms or
guide lines which implied a quasi-constancy of average real wage (I.L.O.
( 1984)). The impact of these strateg ies shou ld be captured by an 1ncrease
in the parameter which measures the influence of unemployment upon wage
evolution. The related estfmates do confirm such a mechanism for Italy
and Germany, but the evidence is opposite or mixed for most other OECD
countrf es (Graph 3). In fact, est fmates over a longer µerfod seem to
conffrm a stronger unemployment impact for United States (E. KREMP, J. MISTRAL ( 1988)) and for Japan (T. TSURU ( 1988)). Nevertheless the shifts
in estimated parameters are smaller than would be expected simply by
takfng for granted all the statements from firms, experts and ministers
about the need for flexibilisation. In fact, a very large inertia
charac ter i zes even the trans f t ion per i ods from one growth reg i me to
another. This is a major finding for any prospective assessement.
• Vecen.truilLza.tLan a, ba.h.ga.LnLn.g a.nd. rt.eHgmen.ta.tLon a, la.bon. ma.ttket have
a 1 tered the s tab i li ty of wage h f erarchy. Under f ord i sm, na t f onw ide or
seêtora 1 key collective agreements used to set up the pace and the norm for
wage formation in other sectors. Still more strong unions using the parity
and equity arguments and quasi full employment were two efficient ways for
a noticeable wage hierarchy stability. Most of these conditions have
van i shed dur 1 ng the Se vent i es. \Ji th the exception of Sweden and Austr i a
(See later Table 7, Item 1), union density and initiatives· have steadfly
declined, whereas intense job destructions in the manufacturing sectors,
the rise of smaller firms wfth fewer union opportunitfes and of course a
persisting long run unemployment, have made wage formation more dependent
from competition (Table 3, Item 3). Since job destructions and creations
are highly sensitive to the sector and the product, the management style
a~d regional localisation, the intensity of foreign competiti~~,
conn.ectL ve ba.h.ga.Ln.Ln.g ha..6 b11.0'2en. dOUJ11.. Accord i ng to a trick 1 e down ·.
strategy, the wf.denfng of income dffferentials has frequently be assumed as
a condition for job creations, specially in United States CS. BOWLES, O.
GORDON, Th • \IE I SSKOPF ( 1983}) and Un i ted Ki ngdom. \Jage di spers ion has
indeed increased, between sectors, regions, nations, and widened the
28
GRAPH 3 : AN AHBIGUOUS EVOLUTION OF THE IMPACT OF LJNEHPLDYHENT UPDN HAGE .
EVOLUTION OF THE SEMI-ELASTICITY DERIVED FROM RECURSIVE ESTIMATES FROM 1978 TO 1988 .. • PARAMETER b OF THE EQUATION WN = a. p + b. Log U + c • p + d
C r
-3.0r i -4.5' 1
··6. 0 r AUSTRIA '
-7.5~ 1
-9.0..-1 -&..-~-+-,-.1--:&...-L.---L__;_L-...:!
3.51 • 1
1 ' ' i 4.5 I"" ' ' ' ' ' i 1 FRANCE 1
l :,, s.;--· ______ :....-__ __.__.__ ....
1
: : t i
-9 .~l ITALY Il 1
-12
j 1 • t . :-. ---lL--...i----1..__,.1-..a----'----
-20 r·
· JAPAN
-30 ,, .--1 ---iL....-.J---'----'-~:....s--11..---
1972 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88
1
1
1 - 1 Sr-
1 ' : ---1 ' ! SHEDEN ' i ' i
- 2s! ---------'---'--'----'-----= i
-1.2~ I · i
-1.9~ !UNITED KINGDDH
::::f - ~ • .u----...___.__J._..L.._,-L-L-....!
1
! , r 1
- 0.5!-
- 2.
- 3. UNITED STATES
- S. d~--L---'----'--'----L-.J•1.-...:
1.
0
- 1
- 2 1
IIESTGERHANY
- 3 __ _..,_-..&,_...___._--1._.J_~-f
1972 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88
29
distance between the well paid and the poorer at least in decentra lized
industrial systems ce. RO\ITHORN C 1990)). No country more than United States
exhibit such -a breaking down of the ideal of joint increases in standard of
livings CM. JUILLARD C 1990)). In the long ruri, this is the evidence for the
dismante ling of the fordist growth regime : a cumulative different iat ion of
life-styles between the yuppies and the poorest minorities would induce a
dualistic society ••• and still has done so CB. STEINBERG (1985)) a puts new
demands upon governments CM. PIORE (1989)). France does not define any
ex cep t ion . : even under a mil d soc i a lis t governmen t , i ncome i nequa 11 t i es
have slightled since the mid Eighties CCERC (1989)). Again, a third pilar
of FCLR is slowly decaying.
• The coe.e,Cl/1.e and '2eyn.e6La.n. Sta.te Lli LtH.e, u.n.deri. pti.euu.h.e from business
associations and conservative governments. During the first phase of the
fordist crisis CActs I and Il), State interventions and welfare
entitlements have cushioned the adverse effects both for households
Cunemployment benefits, health, retraining, ••• ) and firms (subsidies and
tax credit). Consequently, a persisting public deficit has been observed
during almost a decade, whereas the share of public spending and welfare
transfers have continuously risen until the end of the Seventies. But after
1979, a constant worry of governments has been to reduce tata 1 pub 1 i c
interventions. Cutting public expenditures and reducing taxes have not been
so easy as was contemplated by free marketers. Nevertheless the previous
surge has been stopped in quite every country ••• including social
democratic one such as Sweden CTable 4, Item 4>. As far as the capital labor
relations are concerned, minimum wage has been moved much more carefuly and
of ten imp 1 ici t ly reduced 1 n order to promo te young workers' emp loyment.
Unemp 1 oymen t bene f 1 ts , when they were generous , have oc cas i ona 11 y been
reduced, but g 1 oba 1 budget for unemp 1 oyment relief has genera lly i ncreased.
Similarly, many specific measures have been designed in order to curb down
long term unemployment: special subsidies, tax cuts, public retraining and
so on. Therefore, the management by the State of the FCLR has been amended_.
at the margin and somehow rationalized, more than revolutionarized. For
example, private insurance schemes have not truly developed outside the
promizing but limited market of yuppies and upper middle classes.
Nevertheless, the breaking down of the fordist engine has made welfare
TABLE 5 : CHANGING NOMINAL NAGE FORHATION : SOHE STABILITY TESTS FOR THE PERIOD 1972-1988
• • • • Est1mated equation: WN = a.p + a . p + blog U + c • p + d c ·· -1 c-1 r
COUNTRIES UNITED UNITED WEST-AUSTRIA FRANCE ITALY JAPAN SWEDEN
KINGDOM STATES GERMANY VARIABLES •
• Price : p cY:~~ cR:9~ <~ :.~Y c~:~1 011 d:l~ c3:~~> c8:Y~, C • (1: )
• Price (-1) : p c-1 cY:~~ c~:aj - c8 :R~> c8:31 c8:~R> -c8:~J <~:~~ cY:l~,
• Log Unemployment : U - ctYj -c~:t~ -c~:ij -B:g> - ~ 5 -cA:~~> - 4 J4 -ci:Bj • ( : 9) c2: > • Product1v1ty : p -c8:~1 - 0 14 - 0 39 c8:8~, c8:~1, c8:~Y <~:~j cYjJ r co:J0> CO: 9) • Constant 7 3~ <4:o <~:~> î~:~> l1:~, l~:~, c~:8, c~:8, cR:Y,
SER 1 , 3 1 , 0 1 , 6 1 ,8 2,8 2,8 0,8 0,9
DW 0,99 1, 00 2,96 0,90 1,67 2,67 1, 98 2,03
rl 0,85 0,96 0,92 0,93 0,42 0,80 0,87 0,90
STABILITY TESTS ..
CUSUM2
CUSUM X X Chow's test XC77,78j 79,8
XC77 j78, 79
XC77j78, 79
XC79)
NOTE : The figures w1th1n brackets give the estimates for the t-student stat1st1cs. Computed from: OECD statistics data bank, normalized unemployment rates - least squares estimates.
t.l 0
31
state financial problem more accute, and consequently exacerbated the
previous problems.
Clearly, FCLR has been under numerous and severe pressures during the
last two decades. The issue is now the following: are these changes purely
transi tory or do they de 11 nea te a 1 ong run structural a 1 terat 1 on in the
capital labor relation? Even if such a prognosis is difficult, let us risk
some prospective views.
3. THE CONSEQUENCE OF ADVERSE AND CONVERGING PRESSURES.
The first hypothesis be contemplated is simple enough: the FCLR must
have been the more severe ly cha llenged in countries where the adverse trends
have been the more acute. Our i ng the Sevent i es, three major reversa l s have
been observed.
• Expansionary keynesian policies have been replaced by ttebth.LctLve and
conbetwa.tLve 6.th.a.tegLeb, in most OECD countries. The main objective has
been to stop any danger of acce lerat ing inflation, via binding monetary
norms i mposed by the central banks. Ac tua lly, the fi rst part of the
E 1 gh t i es has exh i b i ted an i mpress ive and somehow unexpec ted dec li ne in
inflation rate <Table 6, Item 1). Even the surge in inflation during the
last few years of the Eighties has been rather moderate with respect to the
Seve nt i es. In f act even af ter the stock market crashes, most monetary
policies have been careful enough under that respect. An u.n.pttecedented
l.evel. &oh. ri.e<Ll. Ln.tettetit 114.teb has ac tua l ly checked cred i t and monetary
supply <Table 6, Item 2). Still more, therise in interestratepaymentsby
the non-financial sectors has exerted strong distributive pressures. It has
been convincingly argued that the central banks have themselves reacted not
on.ly to inflation and external deficit but to social unrest CEPSTEIN G.,
SCHOR J.B. C 1988)). Conversely, the surge in real interest rate has been
used by firm in order to curb down wage demand and more generally to
question the viability of the past fordist compromise. Note that in Italy
the shift in monetary policy has been the premise for revising downwards
J2
COUNTRIES COMPONENTS AUSTRIA FRANCE ITALY
OF CAP 1T AL LABOR RELATION
1. THE SHin TQIARDS PRICE STABILITY
. fy3~01~tlf~~y9 rate (1) 6.8 13.6 21. 1
. Peak minus 1987 rate (1) - S.4 - 10.5 - 16.S
2. RISE OF REAL INTEREST RATES
, TfB~~~> n.a, - 1 8 (76.: 0) - <7~.:9s>
• Pfak n.a. 4.3 <8Î.:~4) · Date> (81-84)
3. ADVERSE EVOLUTION OF PROFIT RATE
• p?Bk ate> n.a. !9j~ -
• TrBuîh n.a. (,~ï -< a e)
4. INTERNATIONAL.IZATION OF.
TRADE Import Îenetration for manufac uring • 1970 27,5 16.2 16.3
• 1979 34.1 22, 1 28.7
• 198S 36.4 27.4 31.3
4. QUALITY OF INTERNATIONAL. SPECIALIZATION • Employment in low f~owth
sectors Cshare in n.a. 43.9 48.4
• Sens1Î1veness to fore1gn Average H1,h Average co111pe 1tion 118 nly
Îr1ce aker
Source: L1ne 1 : OECD (198) ·Econ01111c Outlook·, p. 190.
Line 2: P. ATKINSON, J.C. CHOURAQUI C198S), p. 6.
Line 3: J.H. CHAN-LEE & Al11 (1987>, p. 11.
line 4: C. BERTHET-BONOET, D. BLADES (1988), p. 11.
Line S: tlEYER-ZU-SCHLOCHTERN <1988), p. 12-14.
UNITED UNITED VEST-JAPAN SVEDEN
KINGO<l1 STATES GEIUW
8.0 13.7 18.0 13.S 6.3
- 8,2 - 9.S - 13.8 - 9,8 - 6.1
---
- 2 ' - 2 ; - 4 9 - 0.7
(61.:l <71.: S> (71.: S) (71.: S) (76-80)
4,i (81- 4) 3.9
(81-84) c01.:L> 6.a (81- 4) c01.:,
1,ô~ 8.2 7.6 ms~ 14.2 (74) (64) (66)
l9s~ - ~ 9 (7 j cl.\~ (,41 (;5~
4.7 28.3 14.2 s.s 19.S
S.6 36.6 24.8 9.0 29.4 S.3 41.4 33.2 12.9 3S.8
3S.6 46.3 38.2 30.4 38.2
Low Averag1 Average Average \OW partia ly argely pr1ce pr1ce 11aker maker
the 1ndexing mechanisms CE. WOLLEB (1988)). Similarly, in United Kingdom,
the monetarist management has not been without influence upon the weakening
of unions and workers (A. GLYN (1989)).
• The cred 1 t crunch has been the more cha 11 eng 1 ng , the l ower the 1 eve l reached
by the profit rate. In the Sixties, non financial firms used to benefit from
a leverage effect : a slightly negative real interest rate added to the rate
of return to invested capital. All along the Eighties, the same leverage
effect vanished or even was reversed, because the monetary policy and the
p11.0,Lt 11qu.eeze generated by the 1968-1973 boom then played into the
opposite direction. Accordtng to a X-efficiency theory, the firms should
have been induced to revise their labor contracts in order to scale down
their unit costs. Consequently the ford1st compromise breaking down should
be the more severe, the larger the profit rate decline (Table 6, Item 3).
But this does not seem to have been a purely cyclical phenomena, since the
two recessions generated by the oil shocks have not triggered an
endogeneous recovery of .profit share. The case has been well documented for
US : the non reproductive cycles of the Seventies likely delineate a
downwards kondra t i e f depress ion <S. BOWLES, D • GORDON, Th • \IE I SSKOPF
<1983)), i.e. a structural crisis since the given institutions do not
deliver any endogeneous recovery.
• The 11tCMLn.g dCMn. and u.ttce'1.ta.Ln.tLe11 o, the c.oott.ed econ.omy destab 111 ze the
prevtous configuration for competition, whereas they largely open the
fordist national virtuous circle. This has a direct tmpact upon the
previous links between productivity-real wage-consumption and investment.
Firstly, the national manufacturing sectors likely become more price taker
than pr1ce maker. Consequent ly, the conflict upon income distribution
becomes more acute : wage 1ncreases, if they can no more be passed into
nominal prices, directly reduce the profit rate, i.e. capital accumulation
and finally either job creat1on or standards of living. Therefore, wage
becomes a cost which is detrimental to external competitiveness, and not.·
that much a component in aggregate demand, as it was in the fordist
regulation mode. Such pressures upon the FCLR should be the more acute, the
more open the national economy 1s or has become. Actually, contrary to the
interwar period, a creeping protect 1onnism has not prevented externa l trade
34
FIGURE 2 · · THO CONFIGURATIONS FOR CAPITAL LABOR RESTRUCTURING
Weak unions
A - THE DILEHHA OF THE DECENTRALIZED STRATEGIES
• Concession
Bargaining · ,
Lower wage
lndividualistic
Startegies
Job deruct ion
Pressures upon previous
Collective agreements
B - THE PERSISTING VIRTUOUS CIRCLE OF SOCIAL DEHDCRATIC SYSTEHS
/Solidaristic wage
Centralized ' Strong unions __ ...., __ _
Bargaining
Rough
viability of
industrial relations
'Active employment po l icy
t High
Employment
to represent an increasing share of national production (Table 6, Item 4).
A priori the challenge would be more important for the larger economies,
which were not so used to maintain a long run structural competitiveness:
may be the French and the Amer1can 1ndustr1al relations are the more
challenged by this continuing internationalisation. lncidentalb, labor
intensive industries, often price taker, must suffer a lot from such a
world competition (Table 6, Item 5). Of course, organisational and
technological innovations can compensate such a feature, by shifting
employment from low value added sectors and firms to more efficient. Sweden
is a good example of such an offensive strategy. Clearly, in the long run,
any advanced capital labor relation can only be sustainedviaa continuous
inducement to innovation.
4. MICRO AND MACRO-CORPORATISMS FARE BETTER THAN OTHER INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS.
The Swedish evo lut ion puts at the forefront the issue of workers
bargaining power and their .relations with political strategies and reforms.
In the Sixties, the unions and the grass root workers generally had the
initiative in labor conflicts. Most managers were ready to significant
concessions in order to buy social peace. In other words, labor used to have a
large or significant bargaining power over wages, labor organisation and
welfare ••• even under rather conservative governments. But the last two
decades have sharpened some major differences between two broad
configurations (figure 2).
• ln. hi.ahtw decen.ttuili.zed a.n.d. a.dueti6aJ\.i.al 6Y6tem6, the initiative and
bargaining power has drastically shifted to business. The surge of
unemployment has disciplined workers (Table 7, Item 3). On one side, the
segmented and dualistic labor markets have implied a wage moderation, at
least in the secondary sectors. On the other side, job preservation has
been considered as important, along with wage increases ; consequentJy ..
unions have frequently be constrained to concession bargaining. United
States 1s a clear example of such a reversal (Ch. REHMUS <1986), S.
ROSENBERG (1988)). Once initiated, this process has been cumulative (figure
2.A) : the threat of job delocalisation or bankrupcy has weakened unions
TABLE 7 THE FACTORS AFFECTING THE HORKERS'BARGAINING PONER
COUNTRIES UNITED UNITED WEST-COMPONENTS AUSTRIA FRANCE ITALY JAPAN SWEDEN
KINGDOM STATES GERMANY OF CAP IT Al LABOR RELATION
1. UNION DENSITY <I> 1970 64 22 39 , 35 79 51 31 37 1979 59 28 St 32 89 58 25 42 1984/5 61 28 45 29 95 52 te 42
-------------------------------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- ~--------Pattern of evolut1on 811~ht R1se, His, and ste,dy ~lear HisÎ and ~teady & R1se and
' ' ec 1ne ~tagna- ec 1ne ec 1ne 1se ec 1ne tr1ng n~ftna-; 1on and ec 1ne dec l 1ne
2. DAYS OF STRIKE (evolut1on 1)
From 1970 to 1979 - 66 + 182 151 237 - 82 268 - 70 - 79 From 1979 to 1985 + 250 - 77 - 86 - 72 1762 - 78 - 65 - 93
-----~-------------------------- ~-------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- ~-------- 1----------P~ttern of evolut1on Dec11ne Surge Su~ge Surge Decl 1ne Surge ste,dy Ste,dy and 3nd and and 3nd dec 1ne dec 1ne surge ecl 1ne 3~cl 1ne decl1ne surge ecl1ne
3. U~EMPLOYMENT RATES Cl> 1970 1 , 1 2,5 5,0 1 ,2 1,2 2,4 5,0 0,6 1979 1,7 6,0 7,2 2, 1 1 ,7 4,5 5,8 3,3 1989 3,4 9,5 12, 1 2,3 1 ,4 6,2 5,3 5,5
~----~-------------------------- --------- --------- ~--------.._ ________
--------- ---------· ~-------- 1----------P~ttern of evolut1on ilow Cont1- Cont1- row Slow rise ~T~~ rise rr1ng Continu-1se Ruous Ruous 1s, and and yc 1cal ou~ r1se 1se and 1se ec ine ecl1ne ecl1ne omponent an
~ ow recÎnt ecline dec 1ne
Sources : L1ne 1 National so~rces for France i~PlY. ft strgoa dec11ne of union den~1ty djro g the Eight1e~. For çomparative purposes, Richara • FREEMN figures have been kept, R1c~ard B. FREEMAN (1988), p. 6~. Une 2 Annual St~tfstfcs BIT vprfous years 1972l 1982, 1986. If th~ cprrespond1ng year was except1ona1 the variation rate has been computed wi{n the average around the correspondlng year.
t.l 0"'
J7
position, and ultimately the attractiveness of membership. Union density
has continuously decl1ned, therefore reducing their impact upon wage
differentials <Table 7, Item 1 >. \lorkers mil itancy has itself been severely
disc1pl1ned by unemployment and uncertain prospects. ln these countries,
the strike activity has been drastically reduced all along the Eighties
(Table 7, Item 2). Under some respect, most European countries share these
general trends. The only difference is that the unemployment crisis has
first stimulated unions memberships and strike activity ••• but the
persistance of long run unemployment and the failure of dfvided unions to
find out a new viable strategy has led to the same vicious circle.
• Ca~paMtibt ln.du.bt~ia.f rie.ea.tlonb suggest that this is not the unique path
for restructuring the FCLR and facfng international competition. In social
democratic countries, such as Sweden and Austria, this perverse spiral is
stopped at the very begfnnfng. A clear committment of governments to
maintain quasi-full employment is part of the founding compromise CG.
THERBORN C 1986)) : in this model, job opportunit1es are more important
than wage increases, since strong unions can accept a short run decline in
workers income, provided that new Jobs are created and intensive retraining
policies are pursued CB. ROWTHORN (1990), L. CAL.MFORS, J. DRIFFILL (1988),
M. BRUNO, J. SACHS (1985)). Avery deep and long lasting insertion into the
political elites and even mànagerial decisions give a proeminent role to a
unified union, who can bargain at the macro economic level and take into
account possible feedback effects upon external competitfveness and job
creation CS. 80\ILES, R. BOYER (1990)). Given this favourable context,
strikes did explode during the Eighties, some of them challenging the
official union's strategies. Nevertheless, the constrast with
decentralized and adversarial industrial relations is striking (Items 1, 2
and 3, Table 7 for Austria and Sweden). Consequently, given the same
international uncertainties, high interest rates and sluggish markets,
these societies have found in their institutional forms tools for
sustaining the previous social democratic compromise (figure 2.8).
J8
The international crisis makes apparent major differences which were
partially hidden when growth was stable and. fast. In retrospect, the capital
labor compromise is far different between the two industrial systems : more
than a simple prefix to be added to the FCLR, such diverging path might
delineate different models, even in the very long run. This is an evidence for
the structural character in the transformations of the capital labor
relations inherited from WII.
5. SLOW BUT FAR REACHING STRUCTURAL CHANGES.
The future of industrial relations is nowadays characterized by the
opposition of two conflicting hypotheses.
• For many North American scolars, concession bargaining, resegmentation of
labor markets, flexibilisation of wage and welfare rationalisation were
only the consequence of the most severe recession of the post WII era
CCh.REHMUS (1986)). If economic trends were reversed, then most of the
capita 1 relation would turn ba.c#l to the ph.evLou.1, con.,i.gUILCl.t.Lon., may be
altered at the margin. In other words, the changes in the capital labor
relations would be totally reversible. Most macroeconometric models do
share the same hypothesis.
• For others, the innovations linked to information technologies, as well as
new trends in life styles and international competition, would definitely
rule out any capital labor compromise for implying too much rigidities in a
world of fierce competition where flexibilfty is decisive in survival.
Still more, archaic unions would slowly decay in their unability to cope
with the individualistic expectation of new generations. The two decades
would be the starting point of an i.Meve,u,.Lbte p11.oceu. One finds for
example such a vision in the "New Industrial Divide" : both unions and'the_.
keynesian state would undergo an irreversible decay CM. PIORE, Ch. SABEL
C 1984)).
39
A third vision is adopted here: after the destruction or reform of
most of the component of the FCLR, every nation would grope in the search for
a new capital labor which would make national political and cultural
inheritage, coherent with the new trends in life style, technology,
finance •••• Two symmetrical evidences can be given against the two too
simplistic views. The revers1bility hypothesis is first contradicted by the
very observation of American industrial relations : concession bargaining and
innovations in order to fi nd new labor contracts are st il l frequent even
after the seventh year of the longest boom in American history (ETUI ( 1990)).
Clearly, the economic recovery has not be suff1cient to curb down the
previous transformations in FCLR. Similarly in Europe at the end of the
Eighties, atypical labor contracts still continues to be the major component
of job creation, the conventional fordist agreements are exceptional COECD
(1990)). But, the complete breaking down of labor legislation and collective
agreements do not necessarily define an irreversible and unescapable
scenario. The social-democratic nations do prove the resilience of a capital
labor compromise, 1f adequate i.e. coherent with innovation and long run
competitiveness. But paradoxically, the social- democratic model is
challenged in the early Nineties : may be the Swedish wild strikes and wage
explosions are expressing the very success of this model in maintening full
employment. Still more, the decentralized industrial systems, such as United
States and United Kingdom, experience too a large wage drift and consequently
inflationary pressures, fueled by an easy monetary polie.Y COECD (1990)).
All the prev1ous arguments in favour of the transition towards a new
CLR can be complemented by more structural factors (Table 8).
• 1n.tettn.a.tLon.alL6a.tLon now concerns trade, finance, but also production and
even innovation. Consequently, any CLR mode has to build into its inner
organisational forms the competitiveness objective. Very small open
economies are used to such a challenge since half a century at least. For ,,
other l arger countr i es, be 1 ong i ng to European Commun i ty or even United ..
States, not to speak of Eastern Europe, a significant redesign of their
capital labor compromise has to take place.
TABLE B CHANGES IN LABOR CONTRACTS AND CATEGORIES OF tiORKERS INVOLVED
COUNTRIES UNITED UNITED COMPONENTS AUSTRIA FRANCE ITALY JAPAN SIIEDEN
OF CAPITAL LABOR RELATION KINGDOH STATES
1. FEMINIZATION OF LABOR FORCE
Yt1J!tJa9 îf9,~!l~Jir rate • Male c: Y:j, - 7 i (- 2: )
- 3 6 <- 2:s> - 1 8
<- 0:0, c: ~:~, - 2 ~ (- 2: ) c: 8:~> • Female
c! ~:R> c! l:f> c! ~:~, c! ~:h c!18:~> + 4,g (+ 4, ) c! ~:i,
1
2. TERTIARIZATION OF EMPLOYMiNT Oec11ne 1~ manufaj~uriny n.a. - 3, 1 - 3,6 + 0,8 n.a. - 5,6 - 3,2 emp oymen share -8 i>
,~s3JuîeaJT~flogr73!~iJcff, 54 60 55 56 65 65 69 (+11) (+11) (+13) (+ 9) (+12) (+12) (+16)
3. PART TIME JOBS Increase 1n shares - 0, 1 + 3,7 0,5 1 ,2 0,2 4,0 0,3 (1979 - 1988)
"
4. DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT ACCORDING TO PLANTS SIZE < 1980 - 1 986 >
,•
• Less than 10 employed n.a. + 2,9 n.a. + 0,3 n.a. + 2,0 + 0,4 • More than 500 employed n.a. - 3,2 n.a. - 0,4 n.a. - 2,2 - 0,3
(dec11ne 1n share, total= 100)
Sources: Une 1 : OECD (1988), September, p. 218, Table H. L1ne 2: H. BERTRAND (1989), p. 10) ; BROCLAIISKI & A111 (198) p. 15). Line 3: OECD (1990) "OECO Figures", OECD Observer n• 164, Supplement, p. 12-13. 1 fnA A , 1-1 a~DTDAtJn - ,,,, C-- 1"----- 11 ...... ,.................... - • -··-····· • ·---·
IIEST-GERMANY
-2 7 (- :6>
(+ ~:~>
- 2,5
54 (+10)
1,2
0,8 - 0,5
.... 0
41
• New and marie dema.n.d.Lng generui.tLon.6 call for a larger autonom,y in the work
place, more freedom in choosing Job and ltfe cycle activity. Under this
respect the feminisation of the labor forc.e definitely introduces a lot of
novelty in conventional tndustrial relations (Table 8, Item 1). Basically,
at least two sources of income are now needed to susta in a standard of
living which used to be provided by only one male worker. The genuine ideal
by Henry FORD (1930), according to which women should be kept home, is now
dead, and the women seem to have definitely gained a new status in the work
place and within society.
• New pri.od.u.ctLve pri.LncLpfe6 and teri.tL<111.L6a.tLon. do challenge the o ld vision of
labor, centered upon manufacturing processes requiring human energy much
more than cleverness and committment. The information technologies will
probably have some role in completely redesigning the role of human labor,
not only in the manufacturing sectors but in the services too. The
deepening of labor division, the rise of the tasks of management,
conception, marketing, insurance, finance, the concern for health,
education and training will ultimately completely redefine the boundaries
between the various jobs. Remember that all along the crisis, the global
trend about tertiarisation has not be alted, quite on the contrary (Table
8, Item 2).
• The triend.6 toc.oaJtd.6 dL,,erientLa.tLon. a, .eL,e 6tyfe6 st il 1 re i nf orces a 11 the
previous factors. On one side, customizing mass produced goods is a
permanent feature in the very history of the so-ca lled Ariierican system,
CD.A. HOUNSHELL C 1984), P. CHANDLER C 1990)). From FORD T to FORD A, from the
American annual model change launched by general motors to toyotism (J.H.
JACOT ( 1990)), the same strategies are implemented in order to capture
market shares and oligopolistic power. This might challenge the precise and
paralyzing job rules inherited from fordism. S1milarly, wage earners might
want to play with a whole spectrum of labor contracts. Under fordism full
time jobs and labor contracts with indifinite duration used to be the rule • .
Nowadays, part tjme is for example capturing most of job creations (Table
8, Item 3), and this is only a small evidence of the numerous innovations
which have taken place during the last two decades. Finally, even if
financial concentration again increases CB. HARRISON (1989)), at the plant
LABOR PROCESS
LABOR CONTRACT
WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT FLEXIBILITY
( 1)
CONTRACTUAL WAGE FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT
(2)
THREE COMPONENTS WAGE FORMULA \IITH JOB TENURE (3) = (1) + (2)
THREE COMPONENTS WAGE FORMULA + MESO/MACRO TUNING
(Job duration, wage funds employment banks, training 1
and retra1n1ng)·· 1
TABLE 9 : A TAXONOHY FOR ALTERNATIVE CAPITAL LABOR RELATIONS
LARGE AND RI G ID LARGE AND RIGID DIVISION FLEXIBLE AUTOMATION DIVISION OF LABOR OF LABOR + FLEXIBLE ORGANIZATION
+ AUTOMATION a b C
TAYLORIST FOROIST .. T .. CALIFORNIAN
NEO-TAYLORIST FORDIST "A" GENERAL MOTORS
REJUVENATED CORPORATIST-SATURNIAN NEO-TAYLORIST FOROIST
SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC KALMARIST TAYLORIST FORDIST
FLEXIBLE AUîOMATION + LEARNING BY OOING
+ TRAINING d
FLEXIBLE SPECIALIZATJON
COOPERATIST
. TOTYOTIST SON~IST
UDDEVALLIST
,t,, 1\)
4J
level, average size has decltned both. in manufacturing and in service
sectors C\.I. SENGENBERGER, G. LOVEMAN C 1987)). May be the shift of
emp 1 oyment towards sma 11 s 1 ze fi rms w 111 de li nea te more than a mere
transition from one industrial regime to another (Table 8, Item 4).
To conclude, all these factors confort the basic hypothests of this
paper: the Eighties have experienced a significant or complete redesign of
the capital labor relations. These changes are likely to be structural and
far reaching, and not at all transitory and reversible. Given the previous
analyses, can any scenario be proposed?
IV - NEH CONFIGURATIONS FOR THE NINETIES
Just to introduce the conclusive chapter by A. LIPIETZ (1990), it 1s
necessary to der ive some prospect ive views about future configurations of the
CLR for the next century, however d1fficult such an exercice might be.
1. A TYPOLOGY FOR ALTERNATIVE CAPITAL LABOR RELATIONS.
Any configuration for CLR can be captured by the description of work
organization on one side, the 1nst1tutional setting forwage formation on the
other. Consequent ly, most of past and contemporary capi ta 1 labor relation can
be located into a two entries table, combining alternative work organizations
and wage formation principles (Table 9).
• Along an horizontal axis, the unfolding of ,cLentL,Lc ma.n.a.gement can be
followed. lnitially, the rationalization of work aims at dividing complex
tasks into simpler ones, via a measure of operating time : this 1s the.·
taylorism stage. Once decomposed, these tasks can be mechanized and
combined along the assembly line, at least for mass produced goods: the
fordism deepens the taylorism breakthrough. If typical fordismused to mass
produce standardized goods, this system has exhibited strong rigidities and
44
an intr1ns1c unabil 1ty to cope with fast changes into the demand and
consumers' expectations. Therefore, the annual model change 1ntoduced by
General Motors during the 1920's already aimed at flexibil izing mass
production. This general trend is st111 reinforced during the 1970's and
1980's, due to the numerous innovations by Japanese firms such as Toyota.
At the extreme, mass production would vanish and would be reproduced by
flexible production of customized goods, by polyvalent workers using
electronized equipment goods.
• The vertical axis displays the form of the c4plt4f .ta.ho~ compt1.0mL6e about
rent or productivity sharing. The upper part emphasises the role of market
adjustments : in compet1t1ve "régulation", labor mobility 1s supposed to
provide both wage and employment flexibility. But, the history of
industrial relations shows that the very technical centralization has
enhanced the formation of unions and workers demands for hfgher wages an~
more genera l ly co 1 lective agreements codifying some institut iona 1
mechanisms for wage formation, for example cost of living adjustments. A
flexible employment contract, 1mplying layoffs, is used in order to cope
w i th uncer tain ty and econom i c f 1 uc tua t i ans • Ano ther avenue for cap i ta 1
labor compromise runs a long job tenure. In the begining of this century, it
was the initial strategy of large american corporations, such as the Ford
company, but this tenure was mainly implemented by contemporary large
Japanese firm. In that case, wage flexibility was the necessary complement
for this implicit employment stability. Finally, the contractualizationof
the CLR mfght concern the very reproduction of skills, ·"the investment
decisfons i.e. the conditions of long run competitiveness. The social
democratfc compromise gfves a good example of such an highly
institutionalized CLR.
According to this broad historica 1 retrospect, the capital labor
relations has evolved from elementary forms of scientific managemen~ and_.
competitive wage formation to a large mechanization, associated with
collective agreements codifying an explicit capital labor compromise. For
convenience, these stages have been labelled respectively taylorist and
fordist. The distinction between ,ond.L6t T and ,and.L6t A refers to the shift
45
from totally standardized products to annual model changes, following D.A.
HOUNSHELL (1984>, A. CHANDLER (1990>. The tQ.fllo11.6Lt CLR refers to purely
atomistic industrial relations, whereas neo-t4y.to~Lbt CLR, implies rather
strong unions and wage contractualization.
Let us present briefly the labell ing of the other cells. A WL,01U1.La.n.
CLR combines flexible automation and organization with atomistic competition
on labor markets. The Genen.a..e Moto~ CLR is a variant of fordist A, pushing the
organizational flexibility. A Sa.twmLa.n. CLR borrows its name from the SATURN
experiment by General Motor : basically it combines sophiticated flexible
automatisation, with an agreement upon job tenure. The toyotlbt o~ 60nYL6t
CLR is following the same logic but mechanization is not used as a form of
contra 1, since the manufacturing of workers commi ttment a 1 lows large learning
by doing effects and internal flexibility to product and process changes. A
further deepening of this model concerns the global institutions associated
with training, solidaristic wage policies and wage funds. A social democratic
compromise can be associated with various work organization : fordist,
flexible automatisation, based on continuous learning by doing and
retraining. These give respectively a 60CL4.t democn.a.tlc ,oh.d.Lbt CLR, a
Kalma.h.Lbt con,LgUM.tLon Cby the name of a pionneering experiment ing work
organization in a Volvo plant during the Seventies), and finally the
Ud.d.eu4llL6t CLR, which corresponds to the most advabced experiment away from
the fordist principles. Finally at the other extreme, a totally decentralized
industrial system can be asociated with the same organizational principle and
delineate a ,.eexLb.te 6pecL4lLza.tLon C46e. A priori, technology is far from
implying any definite organization CS.G. PEITCHINIS (1985>, Ph. d'IRIBARNE
( 1989a)).
In the new pro du et ive mode 1 , the commit tment and the sk 111 s of workers
are crue i a 1 for innovations , compe t i t i veness and adapta t ion to chang i ng
markets and tastes. This introduces a discontinuity with respect to one
century of scient ific management : the sk il ls are no more removed from the .·
blue collar workers, but on the contrary managers try to enhance them. In a
sen se , however paradoxa 1 1 t mi gh t sound, work democracy i s on 'top of the
agenda for the next century (8. CORIAT (1990)). In this new era, the method
for upgrading skills has a large impact upon the viability of any CLR. But
PURE
MARKET
MECHANISMS
MESO-
CORPORATISM
NATION
\.IIDE
COMPROMISE
46
FIGURE 3 : FROH FORDISH TD ALTERNATIVE CAPITAL LABOR RELATIONS
liDRK ORGANIZATION
MORE CONTROL BY MACHINES OF
\.IORKERS
MARKET PUSHED
NEO-FORDISM
CORPORATE PUSHED
FORDISM ~·
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC
FORDISM
FORDISM
MORE CONTROL BY \.IORIŒRS OF
MACHINES
FLEXIBLE
SPEALISATION
-----t .... TOYOTISM
UDDEVALLISM
47
again, contrasted compromises and organizations can cope with such a challenge <Table 10). Under toyotism, skills formation and retraining are 1nternalized wtthfn large firms, whereas the capital labor compromise, often
implicit, is specific to each firm ; it reminds corporatist or paternalist strategfes. At the opposite Kalmarism combines nation wide capital labor compromise with a public external organization for skills formation. In the Uddevallist model, given the same national setting, more training will be made internaly to each firm. Finally, the saturnien model is the more decentralized for wage formation, employment and skills enhancement. These
configurations might have Quite different impact upon performance (\l. STREECK (1988a), M. CAMPINOS-DUBERNET & Alii (1988)).
Given this typology, what could be the future of the capital labor relations in advanced capitalist countries. The present analyses suggest that taylorist and fordist one definitely be long to the past, and are now ruled out by more efficient and possibly more promising organizations. Furtheremore, all the. eight countries under review do not belong to the same CLR, and therefore could experfence different trajectorfes.
2. T\10 STRATEGIC CHOICES.
Thus, the demise of the fordist capital labor relations is largely recognfzed, but various alternative restructuring are competing one wfth each
other. How to go from here to there? Basically, firms, governments and unions are facing two major issues, to whfch contradfctory responses can finally emerge according to the basic specificit ies of each nat iona 1 economy and polftical process (Figure 3).
• Hoco to eue the a.d.uance11 Ln L_n,ohma.tLon techn.otogLe11 Ln 11.e11ttu.Lctu'1..Lng c.ooltl2 . oh.Qan.Lza.tlon ? This is no more a Question simply restricted to the
manufacturing sectors, since these technologies permeate the whole economic system, specially the banks, the insurances, engineering, marketing, pub lie and priva te management.... An overwhe lmi ng evidence suggests that the same technological device can be given contrasted role in
48
TABLE 10 : HOH IS TRAINING DRGANIZED ?
TRAINING AND WAYS FOR SKILLS INTERNALIZED EXTERNALIZED
GETTING COMPROMISE
DECENTRALIZED TOYOTISM SATURNIAN
CENTRALIZED UDDEVALLIST KALMARIST
..
~y~3gj_Tables 9 and 10 are adapted from a joint research with Benjamin CORIAT
49
capital labor management :
- If conventional scientific management pr.inciples are still ruling, then
electronized equipment goods (robots as well as computers) will be used
b.v managers in order to ti.e6to11.e contn.o.e ouett btu.e 4nd. wh.Lte co.e.eaJt.6. For
example, new flexible automated equipment could be designed in order to
maintain a clear separation between conception and execution tasks CD.
NOBLE (1984)). Consequentl.v, a neo-,o'1.di6t work organization would
deepen previous trends in scientific management. Man.v examples of such a
strateg.v can be provided by the American CP. ADLER ( 1990)) and French
manufacturers (Ph. D' IRIBARNE ( 1989b)). In most cases 4:>ut of course
there are some exceptions-, the name of the game i s s imp 1 e : "remove the
skills off the grass roots workers I"
- But the same equipments or sma 11 adaptations of them ·can support an
alternative strategy, the motte of which would be quite on the contrary:
"give as many ski 1 ls as possible to workers". Then due to their
workers'committment, the firms can consequently get simultaneously
quality of the product, high productivity and market versatility. Indeed,
information technologies would help, but not necessary imply, to give
more control of machines by workers CH. SHAIKEN C 1984)). This toyot.L6t 011.
,.eexLb.ee 6peciali6a.tion 6tMtegy is at odds with the neo-fordist one
which aims to control workers by machines. This restructuring seems
common to very different national economies : Japanese, as well as
Swedish and German firms seem to share this same concern.
Recent detailled investigations and international comparative studies
suggest that the first strategy gives better results than the second one.
For example, in the car industry, the new conceptions provide
simultaneously more productivity and better quality, lower unit costs and a
larger flexibility to demand variations CD. ROOS (1989)). For the mo~t.
advanced flexible manufacturing system, i.e. computer integrated
manufacturing, comparative analyses show convincingly that the performance
of any given plant is highly corelated with the skills involved. Gfven the
numerous breakings down and the progressive learning how ta repair and
prevent them, only wel 1 trained workers can maintain a decent capacity
50
utilfsatfon <R. AYRES (1990), R. J. BAOHAM (1990)). Sfm.ilarly, in the service sectors, the efficiency of computer networks is closely associated wfth the qualtty of data, i.e. the concern of white collars for thefr Job. If not, "garbagge in, garbagge out" 1 Consequently, in figure 3, the most promf sing strategies are re lated to the enhancement of sk il ls and organizational flexibility. But now a second major issue has to be addressed at.
• Haw 1>hou.td the dlvlden.d.1, o& thl1, n.eco con.&LaUJta.tlon. be dl1>t11.Lbu.ted ? Aga in, the previous international comparison suggests that there is not necessarily one best way: alternative strategies might cape with the same restructuring of work organfzation. How and at what level should be negociated the sharing of the related rents? Three major strategies are available :
- Ma.h.ket mecha.n.L1,m1, can be considered at the more efficient tool in order to guide such a restructuring process. Labor mobility from obsolete firms to promising ones, as well as efficient labor markets would provide incentives for such a diffusion of the new productive organization. According to a "laissez faire" strategy, the past fordist collective agreements should vanish and be replaced by purely individual strategies.
- Me1,o co11.p0Mtl1,m is an alternative arrangement. On one side, workers, managers and firms holders would negociate a long run compromise about rent sharing, at least for large conglomerates (M. AOKI (1988), (1990)). On the other side, labor .mobi 1 ity would provide a diffusion of this capital labor relations to the rest of the economy. State interventions would be as moderate as within the purely decentralized cas.
- Soclal democMtlc compttoml1>e extend this configuration to the who le economy via a centralizatfon of wage bargainfng, subsidies to fndustria.1 restructuring and retraining, via macroeconomic policy used in order to sustain this basic capital labor relations. Consequently, State interventions are numerous and imply many genuine institutions as well as large social transfers.
51
Ouring the Sixties and Seventies, economists used to think that market
mechanisms generally provide an optimum outcome, superior to meso or social
democra tic corpora t i sm. Modern micro theor i es emphas i ses the externa 11 t i es
associated with network information technologies (B. ARTHUR (1988)) and the
spillovers from one innovation to another (P. ROMER (1986)). Consequently,
pure market competit1on might lock economies into 1nferior state and
conversely some coordination ru les could provide better outcomes. This is a
first reason for the possible super1ority of meso or macro institutions.
Another one is st il 1 more important for CLR : the apparent unabil ity of pure
and perfect competition to provide the adequate skills. Firms would under
invest into training, since it raises a public good dilemma: why to train
if skilled workers can be poached from other firms? The more decentralized
industrfal systems US and UK do exhibft poor vocational training. The
prob lem is specia 11.Y acute for the United States <DERTOUZOS M. &. Ali i
(1989), BUSINESS WEEK (1988)). On the contrary, some international
comparative studies suggest the superiority of meso or micro corporatist
training institutions CW. STREECK (1989a,b)).
Therefore, each economy manifest some institutional and technological
inertia, more or less related to the form of labor division and ways for
getting social and political compromises about the CLR. Consequently, each
economy does not have the same opportunity to follow a given strategy: some
are more likely than others.
3. FOUR NATIONAL TRAJECTORIES.
The choice 11mong alternative strategies is always, at least partially,
the consequences of the regulatory schemes of the various countries. A
substantial amont of comparative research ( including R.J. FLANAGAN &. al.
(1983), R. BOYER Ed. (1986), R.Z. LAWRENCE&. Ch. L. SCHULTZE Eds (1987>~·H •..
SARFATI &. C. KOBRIN Eds < 1987), ILO < 1987), OECD < 1988a), < 1989>, Ph.
SCHMITTER &. W. STREECK C 1988), B. BRUNHES < 1989), points to four major
trajectories regards the wage-labor relationship <Table 11). The following
analysis confines itself to advanced capitalist countries, leaving as ide the
TABLE 11 . OUTLINE OF A TYPOLOGY : FOUR TRAJECTORIES .
TRAJECTORIES DECENTRALIZED
AND ADVERSARIAL MICRO-CORPORATISM SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC HYBRID
·- - -·· ·- - ..
lnstitutional - Decentralisation - Compromise within - High degree of - Relative cèntrallsation characteristics - External mobility the firm centralisation - Weak internai inobil-
- Market forces - Internai mobility - Region- and state- ity/enforced external - Little trade union - Weak trade union sponsored mobility , mobility
involvement involvement - Much involvement of - Trade union tradition strong trade unions
Adjustment - Lay-offs - Internai transfers - lndustrial - Staff eut-backs variables - Variation of average f rom job to job redeployment - Rigidity of real wages
/ wage - Pressure for product - Possibility of wage - Weak variation of --L. Variability of wage innovation flexibility wage dispersion
dispersion - Multiple skills - Flat wage structure - Unemployment - Regional mobility - Reliance on bonuses , - Training among the yoûng
Advantages - Quick response to - Short-term response: - Maintenance of wage - Maintenance of thé 1 ~·.
recessions bonuses uniformity welfare state - Adjustment to - Long-term response: , - Affirmation of the - Stimulation ot
structural changes productivity and principle of full productivlty product innovation employment
Drawbacks - lnadequate training - Build-up of labour - Strain on the capital/ - Arbitratlon ln - Little l9ng-term - De facto segmentation labour compromise favour of
investment of the labour force - Strain on public jobholders - Possible inhibition of (large enterprises/ finances - Erosion of the
technical chang.e subcontractors) - Adverse eff ects wage-labour - Limitations in labour- of fiat wage relationship
intensive industries structure on incentives - Youth unemployment
- Forced reductlon of activity rates
Examples United States, ' Japan Sweden, Austria, W G France, Italy , U K
5J
newly fndustrfalised countries, despfte thefr growfng importance in the
international division of labor.
• A decen.t'1.allzed and a.d.ueru,a11.Lal th.a.J ectol'Lfl tests , in genera 1 , on a broad
decentralisatfon of wage bargainfng ; it favours recourse to external
mobility and relies on the market, rather than on trade union efforts, to
adjust employment to technical innovations, to the pressures of competition
and to the frequent disruptions which have characterised the international
economy in the past two decades. In theory, the mobility of employment and
the corresponding flexibility of wages constitute the keyvariables in the
adjustment ta changing circumstance. This model offers a deffnite advantage
during recessionary periods or wi th respect ta the dec 1 ine of ageing
sectors. Yet ft has a number of defects. The extreme flexibilftyof wages,
the heterogeneity of legislation concerning trade union rights and the
modest levels of the minimum wage may inhibft labor-sàving technical
changes. Why chance expensive and risky innovations ta obtain results that
can be ach i eved through a de f ens ive f1 ex i b il i ty ? However, as severa 1
econometric studies have shown CG. DUMENIL & O. LEVY (1989)), in the long
run the s 1 ugg i shness of rea 1 wages slows the ove ra 11 produc t f v i ty of
production factors. The reader will have recognised this as a description
of the American and Canadian economies. This would propel these economies
towards d ma.ttl2et pu6hed neo-,oltd.L6m (Figure 3).
• A mLc11.o-co11.po'1.a.tL6t mode.e, on the contrary, seems to characterise Japan. A
compromise concerning the sharing of surpluses resultfng from quick
reactions to market opportunities and from productivity gains made possible
by the effects of experience is evident in its large enterprises. Obviously
the subcontracting network helps to soften the impact of economic
fluctuations, but it also plays a role in the ongoing modernisation
strategy. The versatility of labor and product innovation are the key
factors in long-term adjustment, while flexibil ity and large bonuses
facilitate short-term adjustment. This model is therefore effective in bath
respects, fnasmuch as the compromise wfthin large enterprises does not
hinder short-term adjustments, and yet stimulates technical change.
Nevertheless, there fs no denying the disadvantages of this system. Long
term prospects hinge on favourable global economic conditions and the
ffnancial system's willingness to gamble on a bright future. ln addition,
this model cannot be applied 1n traditional or labor-intens1ve industries,
unless the corresponding enterprises are part of large conglomerates that
can guarantee a high level of internal mobility. In Japan's case, this
decentralised offensive flexfbilfty fs therefore accompanfed by some
segmentation and inequality among wage earners. This second trajectory is
the very example of a towotL6t c4pLtal l4bo~ n.el4tlon {Figure 3).
• The model a, o"en6Lve ,iexLbLlLtw Ln the 60CL4l democMtLc mold constitues
a third configuration which is of interest because it stands in sharp
contrast to the previous two models. The strength and solidarity of the
workers'movement, and its close ties to the social democratic party, have
led to a unique institutional configuration, characterised by a
multfplfcit.Y of collective mechanisms whfch ensure the mobilfty of wage
earners and the adaptation to techn i ca 1 change. The advantages of th i s
system are to be found -in the assistance made available for industrial
reconversion, the possibility of timely wage flexibility and the priority
accorded to full employment. Contrary to the European model, preference is
given to training and active employment creation measures over traditional
unèmployment benefits <OECO { 1989)). Nevertheless, if we are to judge by
its socio-pol1tical track record of the 1980's, this system also exhibits
certain tensions : the temptatfon of enterprises to question the compromise
of the 1980' s, persistent public def i c 1 ts, and the counterproduct ive
effects of an overly flat wage structure. An yet, the return to nearly full
employment is proof that this model has coped successfully with the
structural changes of the 1970's and 1980's. The 1990's, however, are aga in
cha 1 lenging the compromise, espec1a 1 ly as regards ear 1 ier wage
restraint.But this model, far from representing a transftory exception to
defensive flexibil ity strategies, seems to be b lessed with a g1ft for
regulation which, barring major transformations, may keep it viable for
qui te some time. This third trajectory corresponds to the Uddevall4 mode.l,
pointed out by figure 3.
• Lastly, 4 hw~Ld model seems to character1se the general situation 1n the
Europe Community, allowing for occasionally significant differences
between individual countries. The system is characterised by the interplay
55
of market forces and institutionalised compromises in which the trade
unions have trad i t i ona 1 ly p 1 ayed an important ro 1 e. Branch 1 eve 1 co 11 ect ive
agreements typify this approach to wage set·ting. In the 1970's, given the
initial rigidity of real wages, enterprises relied on adjustments in staff
levels. As a result, unemployment in Europe is distributed very unequally
among the various occupational groups, with the young bearing a
disproportfonate share of the burden. This is not to fmply that the
European model is without mer1t : indeed, the maintenance of social
transfers and pub lie interventions has enab led fndividua 1 countries to
to 1 erate 1 eve 1 s of unemp 1 oyment hi gher than any exper i enced si nce the
1930's. Moreover, despfte the stability of real wages, the fncentive for
productivity has never totally vanished, and there is, therefore, cause for
optimum as regards long-term competitiveness and continued improvement in
the standard of living. This trajectory is hard to locate on figure 3 since
it combines toyotL6m, Ud.d.ev~ffL6m and co~poM.te o~ ma.hket pu6hed &ottd.L6m,
in various proportions in the different countries or ·regions within the
same countries.
The pos 1 t ion of the European Commun i ty ca 11 s two comments, one
retrospective and the other prospective (M. EMERSON (1988)). ln the ELghtLe6
Europe showed the poorest results as regards unemployment and, to an extent,
inflation. Arguments in support of this contention exceed the scope of this
article, but this area is the subject of much active research which ts
expanding the frontiers of macroeconomics and labor economics· CR. BOYER Ed.
C 1988b), R. FREEMAN < 1988), R. BRUNETTA & C. De 11 'AR INGA < 1990), OECD C 1988),
L. CALMFORS & J. DRIFFILL (1988». Briefly, 1t can be argued that the
Community has yet to make a chofce. It benefits from neither the defensive
flexibility of the American continent, nor from the advantages of a social
democratfc global compromise. This intermediate position between purely
centr~lized and decentralized models, between Fordist inertia and promisi~g
work experiment and between systems of industrial relations with either
strong or very weak .trade unions, is qualified as "hybrid", since it combines
features of both the market oriented and social-democratic strategies.
56
V - CONVERGENCE THEORY REVISITED
Fina 11.Y, this work proposes an unconvent iona 1 view of the
transformations which will shape the XXIst century. The falling of the Berlin
wall and the total collapse of Eastern Europe, as well as the fad about the
Japanese mode 1, that every firm or nation should adopt and import, have given
a new appeal to the old convergence theory: in the Sixties, it was fairly
common to think that all economic systems would evolve towards a unique
configuration. In the Nineties, this vision is reviving. Still more the
breaking down of the so-called communist regimes has sometimes be interpreted
as the end of history : is not the democratic capitalism the only viable form
of organisation? So, SCHUMPETER and HAYEK would finally have defeated MARX
and KEYNES.
Of course, cap i ta 1 i sm has overcome the cha 11 enge of the commun 1st
regimes but it has itself envolved far aways from its early configuration and
taken contrasted national . .forms. Consequently, the same constraints and
opportunities ma.Y generate quite contrasted institutional forms. This
sketch.Y but we hope suggestive, analysis of the capital labor relation hints
that man.Y paths are open to capitalist dynamics, and that history is neither
totally reversible nor absolutely irreversible. Still more, in the long run,
strategic political choices during structural crises might exert a
determinant role in shaping new social relations and correlatively economic
regulation modes. The contrast between the Swedish social-democratic
compromise and Japanese micro-corporatism or the distance between the
American highly decentralized system and the European hybrid configuration is
sharp enough to show that it is nota purely cosmetic choice, but a true and
cha 11 eng i ng one •
REFERENCES
ADLER P. (1990) Capltallzlng on new product and process. technologies : current problems and emergent trends ln US lndustry, mlmeograph prepared for the International OECD Conference •rechnologlcal Change as· a Soc/a/ Process : Society, Enterprlses and the lndMduar, Helsinki, 11-13 December 1989,To appear OECD, Paris.
AGUElTA M. (1982) Regulation and Cr/sis of Capltallsm, Monthly Revlew Press, New York. ANDERSSON J.A., MJOSET L (1987) The transfonnatlon of the nordlc models, forthcomlng ln
Cooperation and Conf/let ANDRE Ch., DELORME R. (1983) L'Etat et l'économie, Seuil, Paris. AOKI M. (1988) Information, lncentlves, and Bargainlng ln the Japanese Economy, Cambridge
University Press, New York. AOKI M. (1990) Toward an Economie Model of the Japanese Flrm, Jaumal of Economie Llterature, Vol.
XXVIII, March, p. 1-27. ARTHUR B. (1988) Competlng Technologies : an overvlew, in G. DOSI & Alii Eds Technical change and
Economie Theo,y, Pinter Publishers Ltd, London. ARTUS P. (1983) Formation conjointe des prix et des salaires dans cinq grands pays Industriels: Peut
on comprendre les écarts entre les taux d'inflation ? , Annales de /'INSEE, n° 49, Janvier-Mars, p. 5-52.
ATKINSON P. , CHOURAQUI J.C. (1985) Taux d'intérêt réels et perspectives de croissance durable, Document de Travail OCDE, n° 21, Département des Affaires Economiques et Statistiques, Mal.
AYRES R.U., DOBRINSKY E., HAYWOOD W., UNO K., ZUSCOVITCH E. Eds (1990) CIM: Economie and Social Impacts, 1.1.A.S.A., L.axenburg.
BADHAM R.J. (1990) Socio-technlcal CIM trajectories ln national systems of Innovation: The need for an lnterdisclpllnary approach, mlmeograph prepared ·for the ·c1M : Revolutlon ln Progress·
, ~erence, IIASA.Laxenburg, 1-4 July. BASLE M., MAZIER J., VIDAL J.F. (1984) Quand les crises durent ... , Economlca, Paris. BENASSY J.P., BOYER R., GELPI R.M. (1979) Régulation des économies capitalistes et Inflation, Revue
Economique, Vol. 30, n° 3; Mal. BERNSTEIN M. (1988) The great depression and regulation theory : A North Ameclan perspective,
Mlmeograph, International Colloqulun on the Regulatlon Theory, Barcelone, June 16-18. BERTHER-BONDET C., BLADES D., PIN A. (1988) The OECD compatible trade and production data
base 1970-1985, Worklng Paper OECD n° 60, Department of Economies and Stratistlcs, November.
BERTRAND H. (1983) Accumulation, régulation, crise : un modèle sectionnel théorique et appliqué, Revue Economique, Vol. 34, n° 6, March.
BERTRAND H. (1989) Modèle d'emploi européens : convergence ou divergence ? Mlmeograph INNOVENCE, Novembre, Recherche réalisée pour le compte de la Commission des Communautés Européennes.
BOSWORTH B., RIVUN A. Eds (1987) The Swedish Economy, The Brooklngs Institution, Washington D.C ..
BOWLES S., BOYER R. (1990) Labour market flexlbUlty and decentrallsatlon as barrlers to hlgh employment ? Notes on employer collusion, centrallsed Wage bargalnblng and aggregate employrnent, ln R. BRUNElTA, C. DELL'ARINGA Eds, Labour Relations and Economie, Perofrmance, MacMDlan, Baslngstoke, p. 325-352.
BOWLES S., GORDON D., and WEISSKOPF Th. (1983) Beyond lhe Waste Land, Basic Books, New York.
BOYER R. (1979) Wage formation ln hlstorlcal perspective : the French Experlence, Cambridge Jaumal of Economies, n° 3, March, p. 99-118.
BOYER R. Ed. (1986) La Fle:dbüité du travail en Europe, La Découverte, Paris.
58
BOYER R. (1987) : The current economlc Crisls, ln S. HOFFMANN et G. ROSS Eds The MITTERRAND . Experlment, Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, p. 33-53.
BOYER R. (19888) Formallzlng Growth Reglme, in G. DOSI & Alii Eds Technical change and Economie
Theory, Pinter Publishers Ud, London, p. ti08-630. BOYER R. Ed. (1988b) The Search for Labour Market Flexlblllty, Clarendon Press, Oxford. BOYER R. (1990a) The transformations of the capital labor relation and wage formation ln elght OECD
countries durtng the Elghtles, ln MIZOGUSHI Ed., ·Maklng Economies more Efficient and Equitable, Factors determlnlng lncome Distribution•, Tokyo, November 27-29, 1989, to appear Oxford University Press.
BOYER R. (1990b) The forms of organisation ompllclt ln the General Theory: an lnterpretatlon of the · success and crtsls of keyneslan economlc pollcles, ln BARRERE A. Ed., Keynes/an Economie
Polle/es, MacMDlan, Londres, p. 117-139. BOYER R. (1990c) The Economies of Job Protection and Emerglng Capital Labour Relations : From the
Perspective of ·Regulatlon Theory", Mimeograph CEPREMAP, May, Prepared for the International Conference on 'Workers'protectlon and Labour Market Dynamtcs•, Berlin 16-18 May.
BOYER R. (1990d) New Directions ln Management Practlces and Work Organisation, Mlmeograph CEPREMAP, November, prepared for the OECD Conference on "Technlcal Change as a Social Process : Society, Enterprlses and lndlvk:lual·, Helsinki, Decembre 11-13, 1989, to Appear OECD Parts. .
BOYER R., CORIAT B. (1989) La démocratie salariale, Mimeograph CEPREMAP. BOYER R., MISTRAL J. (1978) Accumulation, Inflation, Crises, Presses Universitaires de France, Parts,
2nd Edition (1982). BOYER R., ORLEAN A. (1990) Convention salariale: du local au global, l'exemple fordien, Mlmeograph
CEPREMAP, Avril. BOYER R, PETIT P. (1989) Technlcal change, cumulative causatlon and growth: an exploration of some
post keyneslan theorles, mlmeograph CEPREMAP, May , prepared for the International OECD Semlnar on ·science, Technology and Growth•, 5-8 Juin.
BRENNER R. (1988) The Regulatlon Approach to the Hlstory of Capitallsm. Mlmeograph , International Colloqulun on the Regulatlon Theory, Barcelone, June 16-18.
BRIE (1987) Round Table on Production Reorgan/zation ln a Changlng World Economy, Berkeley, Actes du Colloque, September 10-12.
BROCLAWSKI J.P., DESSAINT J., ECALLE F. and MAZAS C. (1988) L'emploi dans les services. Comparaisons Internationales, Document de travail Direction de la Prévision, n° 88-8.
BRUNETTA R., DELL'ARINGA C. Eds (1990), Labour Relations and Economie Perofrmance, MacMRlan, Baslngstoke.
BRUNHES B. (1989) La flexibDlté du travaU : réflexions sur.les modèles européens, Droit Soc/al, Mars, repris dans Problèmes Economiques, n° 2.125, 17 mal, p. 23-27.
BRUNO M., SACHS J. (1985) Economies of Worldwlde Stagflation, BasU Blackwell, Oxford. BUSINESS WEEK (1988) Hurnan Capital, The Decline of Amertca's Work Force, September 19, p. 44-72. CALMFORS L, DRIFFILL J. (1988) Centrallzatlon of Wage Bargalning, Economie Pollcy, n° 6, Avril, p.
13-61. CAMPINOS-DUBERNET M., GRANDO J.M., MARGIRIER G. (1988) Comparaison Internationale des
modes de gestion de la main d'oewre dans le secteur du BTP. L'effet du rapport monopoliste. mlmeograph, Colloque International sur la Théorie de la Régulation, Barcelone, June 16-18.
C.E.R.C. (1989) Le Revenu des Français, La Documentation Française, Parts. CHANDLER A. (1990) Sca/e and Scope. The Dynamlcs of lndustrial Capitalism, The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, Cambridge Ma.. · . CHAN-LEE J.H., COE D.T., M. PRYWES (1987) Mutations micro-économiques et deslnflatlon salariale
macroéconomiques dans les années 80, Revue Economique de l'OCDE, n° 8, Printemps. CORIAT B. (1985) L'emploi dans les stratégies d'automatisation : le modèle automobDe américain,
Mlmeograph, January, Parts. CORIAT B. (1989) Mutations technologies et Démocratie salariale, ln La Nouvelle Revue soclallste, N°
5, mal 1989, repris dans Problèmes économiques, N° 2.138, 30 aoOt 1989, p. 14-21.
59
CORIAT B. (1990) L'atelier et le robot, Christian Bourgols, Paris. Dell'ARINGA C., LODOVICI S. (1989) lndustrlal relations and economlc performance, Unlverslta
Cattollca del Sacro Cuore, D.P. n° 16, September. Dell'ARINGA C. (1990) ln lndustrlal Relations and the Raie of the State ln EEC Countrles, Mlmeograph,
présented for the EEC wporklng group on "Wages ln Europe•, June 18-19. d'IRIBARNE Ph. (1989a) La logique de l'honneur, Editons du Seul, Paris. d'IRIBARNE Ph. (1989b) Nouvelles technologies et noweaux modes d'organisation: le cas français,
Ronéotypé CEREBE, préparé pour la Conférence OECD ·Technologlca/ Change as a Social Process : Society, Enterprlses and the lndlvlduar, Helsinki, 11-13 December.
DERTOUZOS M.L, LESTER R.K, SOLOW R.M. (1989) Made ln America, The MIT Press, Cambridge
Ma. DOERINGER P., PIORE, M. (1971) Internai Labor Markets and Manpower Analysls, D.C. Health,
Lexington, 214 p. DUMENIL G., LEVY D. (1989) Micro adjustment behablor and macro stability, Mlmeograph CEPREMAP,
n° 8915, June. ECONOMIE EUROPEENNE (1989) Relever les défis du début des années 90, n° 42, Novembre. EMERSON M. (1988) Why Mode/ for Europe ?, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge Ma. EPSTEIN G., SCHOR J. (1988) Macropolicy ln the Rlse and Fall of the Golden Age, Worklng
PaperWIDER, n° 38, February. E.T.U.I. (1988) Les négociations collectives en Europe Occidentale en 1987 et les perspectives pour
1988, Bruxelles, Juin. E.T.U.I. (1990) Les négociations collectives en Europe occidentale en 1989 et les perspectives pour
1990., Bruxelles. FLANAGAN R.J., SOSKICE D.W., ULMAN L (1983) Unionism, Economie Stabllizatlon, and lncomes
Polle/es,. The Brooklngs Institution, Washington D.C .. FORD H. (1930) Ma vie et mon oewre, Payot, Paris FREEMAN R.B. (1988) Contraction and Expansion : The Divergence of Prlvate Sector and Public Sector
Unionism ln the United States, The Jaumal of Economie Perspectives, Vol. 2, n° 2, Srplng, pp. 63-88.
GLYN A. (1988) Productlvity and the Crlsls of Fordism, Mlmeograph, International Colloqulun on the
Regulation Theory, Barcelone, June 16-18. HARRISON B. (1989) Concentration wlthout centrallzation : The changlng morphology of the small flrm
industrlal districts of the thrld ltaly,. Mimeograph, International Symposium on Local
Employment, Natinal lnstltute of Employment and Vocational Research, Tokyo, 12-14
September. HOUNSHELL D.A. (1984) From the Amerlcan system to mass production, 1800-1932, John Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore. I.LO. (1984) Collective Bargalnlng and recesslon ln lndustrlal Market Economies, Geneva.
I.LO. (1987) Labor ln the World, Geneva. JACOT J. H. (1990) Du fordisme au toyotlsme ? Les voles de la modernisation du système automobDe
en France et au Japon, Etudes et Recherches, Commissariat Général du Plan, n° 7-8, Février
1990, La Documentatln Française. JUILLARD M. (1990) La fin du modèle amlricain?, Editions Economica, Paris, à paraître. KLAU F., MITTELSTADT A. (1986) Flexibilité du Marché du Travail, Revue Economique de l'OCDE, n° 6,
Printemps, p. 8-51. KOIKE K (1987) Human Resource Development and Labour-Management Relations, ln The polltlca/
Economy of Japan, Vol. 1, The Domestlc Transfonnatlon, Stanford University Press, Stanford
Ca.. p. 289-330. KREMP E., MISTRAL J. (1988) AexibDlté des salaires : l'impact des années Reagan, Economie
Prospective lntematlonale, n° Special 36, 4ème trimestre, La Documentation Française, Paris.
KRUGMAN P. (1990) Rethlnklng lntematlonal Trade, The MIT Press, Cambridge Ma. LAWRENCE R.Z., SCHULTZE Ch., Eds. (1988) Ba"iers to European Growth: A transatlantlc Vlew,
Brookings lnstltute.
60
LAZONICK B. (1990) The Japanese Capital Labor Relations, contribution to the WIDER pro]ect on •Capital Labor Relations•.
LEBORGNE D., UPIETZ A. (1989) Pour éviter l'Europe à deux vitesses, EAL.E. Conference, Turin, September.
LE DEM J. (1987) Les salaires dans le modèle MIMOSA, Mimeograph, CEPII-OFCE, n° 87-04, Juin. LEVI-GARBOUA (1982) Les modes de consommation dans quelques pays occidentaux. Comparaison
et lois d'évoltion (1960-1980), Rapport CREDOC, Juin. UPIETZ A. (1983) Le monde enchanté. De la valeur i l'envol Inflationniste, La Décowerte, Paris. UPIETZ A. (1990) Capital Labor relations at the sawn of twenty-first century, contribution to the WIDER
pro]ect on ·Capital Labor Relations·. LUTZ B. (1990) Le mirage de la crolsisance marchande, Editions de la Maison des Sciences de
l'Homme, Paris. MADDISON A. (1982) Les phases du développement capitaliste, Economlca, Paris. MARSDEN D. (1988) The End of Economie Man?, Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton. MARGUN S., SCHOR J. Eds. (1990) The Golden Age of Cap/talism, Clarendon Press, Oxford. MARUANI M., REYNAUD E., ROMANI a. Eds (1989) La flexibilité en Italie, Syros Alternatives, Paris. MEYER-ZU-SCHLOCHTERN F.J.M. (1988) An international sectoral data base for thlrteen OECD
Countrles, Worklng Paper OECD, n° 57, Department of Economies and Statlstlcs, November. MIMOSA (Equipe) (1990) Mimosa, une modélisation de l'économie mondiale, ObseNatlons et
Diagnostics Economiques, Revue de l'OFCE, n° 30, Janvier. NOBLE D. (1984) Forces of production, Knopf, New York. OECD (1983) Comité de la Main-d'oewre et des affaires sociales, Mimeograph MAS/WP3(83)3,
Groupe de travail sur les relations professionnelles, négociations collectives et politiques économiques , Novembre.
O.E.C.D. (1985) Perspectives de l'Emploi, Septembre. O.E.C.D. (1986) Flexlblllty and labour markets. O.E.C.D. (1988a) Performandes économiques et ajustement structurel, le marché du travaU et les
relations profesionnelles. Mimeograph, MAS/WP3(88)2, Groupe de travail sur les relations professionnelles changements en cours dans les relations professionnelles, Fevrler.
O.E.C.D. (1988b) Working party on lndustrlal Relations, lndustrlal Relations : Agenda for Change, Mlmeograph, MAS/WP3(88)1, February.
O.E.C.D. (1988c) New Technologies ln the 19890s. A soclo-economic Strategy. Report of a Group of Experts on the Social Aspects of New Technologies.
O.E.C.D. (1988d) Structural Adjustments and Economie Performance, Paris. O.E.C.D. (1989) Science, Technology and Growth, lntematlonal Semlnar, Paris, 4-7 June. O.E.C.D. (1990) EmploymentOutlook. : PEITCHINIS S. G. (1985) Issues ln Management-Labour Relations ln the 199s, MacMIiian, London. PIORE M. (1986) Perspectives on Labor Market Flexlbillty, Mlmeograph MIT, January 9, forthcomlng ln
special issue •1ndustrlal Relations•, C. BROWN & B. HARRISON Eds. PIORE M. (1989) Post-Reagonomlcs: The Resurgence of the Social Sphere ln Economie and Polltical
Ufe? Mlmeograph MIT, November, Revlsed January 1989. PIORE M., SABEL Ch. (1984) The Second lndustrlal DMde: Posslbllltles of Prosperlty, Basic Books,
NewYork. PORET P. (1986) La formation sectorielle des salaires dans cinq économies européennes: premiers
résultats d'une étude statistique, Document de travail, n° 86-7, Direction de la Prévision. PORTER M. (1990) The Competltive Advantage of Nations.The MacMUlan Press, London. : RALLE P., TOUJAS-BERNATE J. (1989) Les salaires deslndexés depuis 1983, Mlmeograph INSEE,:
Departement des Etudes Economiques d'Ensemble, DMslon des Etudes Economiques, n° 39/G231, Novembre.
REHMUS Ch. (1986) L'avenir des relations de travail aux Etats-Unis, Travail et Société, Vol. 11, n° 2, Mal, p.151-162.
ROMER P. (1986) lncreasing Returns and Long-run Growth, Journal of Polltlcal Economy, Vol. 94, October, p. 1002-1038.
61
ROOS O. (1989) The Importance of Organlsatlonal Structure and Production System Design ln Deployment of New Technology, OECD, DSTI, International semlnar on Science, Technology and Economie Growth, Paris, June 6th.
ROSENBERG S. (1988) The Restructurlng of the Labor Market, the Labor Force and the Nature of Employment Relations ln the United States ln the 1980s, Mlmeograph, prepared for the International Conference on ·Economie Developrnent and Labor Market Segmentation•, University Notre Dame, Aprll 17-20.
ROSENBERG S. (1989) De la segmentation à la flexlbDlté, Travail et Soc/lltll, Vol. 14, n° 4, Octobre, p. 387-438.
ROWTHORN B. {1990) Wage Dispersion and Employment ln OECD Countrles, prepared to the International Symposium on ·Ma/clng Economies more Efficient and Equitable, Factors deterrn/nlng Incarne Distribution•, Tokyo, November 27-29, 1989. To appear Oxford University Press.
SACHS J. (1978) The ehanglng eycllcal behavior of wages and prlces : 1890-1976, W.P. n° 304, National Bureau of Economie Researeh.
SARFATI H., KOBRIN C. Eds {1987) La flexibllltll du marché de l'emploi: un enjeu llconomlque et social, International Labor Organlzatlon, Geneva.
SENGENBERGER W., LOVEMAN G. {1987) Smaller Unlts of Employment : A synthesls Report on lndustrlal Reorganlsatlon ln lndustrlallsed Countrles, Mimeograph, 1.1.LS., New lndustrlal Organisation Programme OP /3/1987.
SCHMITTER Ph. and Al. Eds {1989) Comparative Govemance of Economie Sectors . To appear. SCHOR J. {1985) Changes ln the Cycllcal Pattern of Real Wages: Evidence from Nina Countrles, 1955-
80, The Economie Journal, Vol. 95, n° 378, June, p. 452-468. SHAIKEN H. {1984) Work transforrned: Automation and Labor ln the Computer Age, Lexington Books,
Lexlgton Ma STANDING G. (1988) Unemployment and Labour Market Flexib/1/ty: Sweden, ILO, Geneve. STEINBERG B. {1985) Le Reaganlsme et l'économie américaine dans les années 1980, Critiques de
l'Economie Politique, n° 31, AvrU-Juln, p. 5-24. STRAH B. (1987) The polltics of De-Industrialisation, Croom Helm, London. STREECK W. - {1989a) On the Soclal and Politlcal Conditions of Dlverslfled -Quallty Production,
mlmeograph LME's International OECD Conference Wo way to full employment r, Berlin, -7 July.
STREECK W. (1989b) The soclal dimension of the European Flrm, mlmeograph prepared for the 1989 meeting oftheAndrewSHONFIELDAssoclatlon, Florence, September 14-15.
THERBORN G. (1986) Why some people are more unemployed than others, Verso, London. THOULUC H. (1988) La détermination de l'emploi et la formation des salaires dans sept grands pays de
l'OCDE. Une étude sur données empilées, Mlmeograph, Ministère de /'Economie, des Finances et de la Privatisation, D.P., G.P.E.M., Janvier.
TSURU T. (1988) Change ln the Wage-Unemployment Relation : The Reserve Army Effect ln the Postwar Japanese Economy, Mlmeograph, The lnstltute of Economie Research, Hltotsubashl University, AprU 7.
WOLLEB E. (1988) Mutamentl nel rapport! dl produczione nella erlsl: Ascesa e tracollo del fordlsmo ln - ltalla, ln BOYER R. and WOLLEB E. Eds La flesslblllta del Lavomo ln Europa, Franco Angell,
MDano.
