Sensous Experiencies

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Wittgenstein on Sensuous ExperiencesAuthor(s): Malcolm BuddSource: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 143, Special Issue: Mind, Causation and Action(Apr., 1986), pp. 174-195Published by: Wiley for The Philosophical Quarterly

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ThePhilosophicaluarterlyol. 6 No. 143ISSN 0031-8094 $2.00

WITTGENSTEIN ON SENSUOUS EXPERIENCES*BY MALCOLM BUDD

IIt is ingeneral rue hatwhatevermyudgementsrassertionsre about

there re twopossibilities:itherheyre ustifiedfullyrpartially)rtheylack nyustification.boutmostkinds f ubject-mattermay r maynotlack ufficienteason, r even nygoodreason tall,for elieving hat do.Inthese asesmyudgementanbe either ell-foundedrunfounded:canpossessor lacka justificationor t.Furthermore,t can be either rueorfalse.Accordingly,fmy udgements of hiskind, can havegoodreason ormybelief ndin fact e informedfthetruthfthematter;r I can havegoodreasonformybelief lthought sactuallyalse; r canhavenogoodreason, r nsufficienteason, or false elief; r,finally,hat believe an,fortuitously,e true venthoughmyreasons re nsufficient.Butthere ppears obe onesubject-matterboutwhich always ave, ndcannotbut have,theperfect ustificationormy udgements r sincereassertionsndaboutwhich cannot e mistaken:the imple ropertiesf)the intrinsic haracter f mypresent ensuousexperience mypresentsensations,ense-impressions,magesand relatedphenomena.' or mostkindsof assertionhat mightmake,what saycan be insecurelyased.Such remarksan reston illusion r various ther orms ferror, r canmerelyack the evidential asis theyrequire. t maybe that havenoevidence orwhat sincerelyayor itmaybe thatwhat saygoesbeyondwhat have vidence or:my vidence ntitlesme tosayonly omuch, utam edby hegeneral tructurefmy eliefs ndbymy emperamento forma belief hat s notmerely representationfmyevidence, ut nstead

*In thetext use thefollowingbbreviations:BB TheBlue ndBrown ooksOxford, nded., 1960)PI PhilosophicalnvestigationsOxford, nded., 1958)NFL 'NotesforLectureson "Private xperience" nd "Sense Data"' ThePhilosophicalReview,7 (1968)RFM Remarksnthe oundationsfMathematicsOxford, nded., 1978)RPP Remarksn the hilosophyf sychologyOxford, 980)Z ZettelOxford, 981)Althoughhequalificationnparenthesisppears obe needed, t s nottomypurpose oexamine owthedistinctionetween imple ndcomplex ropertiesfsensuous xperiencesmightmost lausiblye drawn.nwhat ollows ignore hequalification.

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WITTGENSTEINON SENSUOUS EXPERIENCES 175constructionhat s based uponbut goes beyond hisevidence.And,ofnecessity,his s hazardous.Bygoingbeyondmyevidence mayfall ntoerror:myconstruction aybe a misconstruction.ut ifmyremarksrerestrictedo the ntrinsicharacterfmypresent state fconsciousness"they ave, t eems, nabsolutelyurefoundation. y udgementsbout heintrinsicharacterfmypresent ensations,ense-impressionsndimagesdonotgo beyond heevidence ponwhich heyre mmediatelyased, nd,accordingly,am always ullyntitledo makethem.Mybeliefs re aboutwhat s present omy onsciousnessnd the contents fmy onsciousnessarerevealed o meif directmy ttentiono them.Andsince amdirectlyawareofmypresenttate fconsciousness,fmybeliefs re confined o tscurrentonditionheyannot e inerror. hisprivilegedositionnwhichstand omy resentensuous xperiencess ofcoursemine lone.Forotherpeoplecan neverhave as good reasonfortheir eliefs boutmypresentsensuous xperiencess I haveformy wnbeliefs bout hem. heirbeliefsaboutmypresent ensations,ense-impressionsrimagesmustgobeyondthe evidenceon whichtheirbeliefs re based, and so can neverbe assecurelyased as my wnbeliefs.This conceptionhat ur beliefs boutourpresent ensuous xperiencesrestuponan absolutelyecurefoundations one of theprincipal bjects fWittgenstein'sttack n his considerationf the conceptsof sensation,sense-impressionnd image.Andit s byreferenceo hisrejectionf thisconceptionhathisthoughtan bestbe understood.

IIAssociatedwith his onceptionf the elf-ascriptionfpresentensuousexperiencess,Wittgensteinelieved, certain layofthe magination acertain icturewe areliableto form: picture fthe tems boutwhichwehave suchperfect nowledgend of our relation o them.This picturesconstructednthemodelofthematerial orld nd our access to thisworldinperception.hus: wemightmagine hat or ach of us theres a "worldofconsciousness"RPP, 720),a "realm fconsciousness"NFL,p. 320), nwhich hese tems,when heyreours, ccur nd ntowhichnobody utweourself an gaze. Accordingly,here s an "externalworld"and a set of"internal orlds". ach ofus is intheexternal orld at east, achofus is

intimatelyonnectedwith nobject ntheexternal orld, heobjectwecallourbody buteachofus isthepossessor f world fourown, ur nternalworld.And whereasthe externalworld s builtof one kind of material(matter),n internal orld s builtofanother ind f materialmind). BB,p. 47) The contentsf world fconsciousnessre not omposed fmatter,and a worldof consciousness oes notrequire he existence fmattero



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176 MALCOLMBUDDsustain t.The itemsnour nternal orld xist inside"us,not nthe enseinwhich hysicalvents ccur nside urbodies for ther eoplecan (butusually o not) ook nto he nteriorsfourbodies, ndthe vents hat akeplacethere re eventsn the external orld nd arecomposed fmatterbutratherna differentensethat ecessarilyrecludes thers rom bserv-ingthese tems. he "inner" bject snecessarilyidden romveryoneuttheperson nwhosemind, nwhose nnerworld,texists.Whereas canobservedirectlyhecontents fmyownmind, therpeoplecan at mostspeculate boutthesecontentsn the basis ofwhat hey an observe mybodyand its environment. y experiences, he objects n myworldofconsciousnessRPP, 720, 733,896) - theobjectsnmy ubjectivepace-are visible nly ome. The "content" f an experiencef mine s a "privateobject" hat observewithinmy onsciousnessndwhich notheran neverobserve.NFLpassim,ndespecially . 279,p. 316; RPP I 109, 440, 694)This familiaricture,s so far utlined,s incomplete;ut t sdifficultoimagine ow tcouldbefinishedn suchaway s to rendertattractiveandit spreciselyts ackoffinish hat nables ttoexert malignnfluenceponus. The pictures designed orepresentur sensuous xperiencesndourrelationship iththem.But, in the first lace, it fails to delineate heconnectionetween he external orld and, nparticular,urbody andour nternal orld fconsciousness. nd fweshould nderstandhenatureofthe ink etween materialbject nd an innerworld fconsciousnessobe merely ausal,thisappearsto open up twopossibilities:hat humanbeing might ack an inner worldof consciousness nd yetbehavenodifferentlyrom humanbeingwhopossessesan innerworld, nd that ninanimatebjectmightpossess"an innerworld.But t snoteasy omakesense of these deas. (PI 420 and surroundingections, 81 andfollowingsections)A secondrespectnwhich hepictures incompletes this:whilstt isdesigned o render ntelligiblene feature ftheconception f theself-ascriptionf ensuous xperienceshat have rticulated,tcontains othingthatwould llow ttoexplain heother istinctiveeatureftheconception.Itpurportsoexplainwhyt sthat person's udgementsbouthispresentsensuousexperiences re, and mustbe, bettergrounded hananotherperson's udgementsbout them for each person s supposedto haveperceptualccessonly o hisown nnerworld but t doesnotmakeclearwhy hese udgementsannot e mistaken.he picture epresentshem sbeingbased on thedeliverancesfan "inner ense",whereby e look ntoourownmind nddescrytscontents.he ideathat ur udgementsrenotliable oerrorwillbemirrorednthe dea that ur nner ense snot iable odefects, he mediumof consciousness s fully ransparent,he lightofconsciousnesshineswhenever urmind s active,no private bjectcan



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WITTGENSTEINON SENSUOUS EXPERIENCES 177block heview f nother rivate bject, ndso on. The items n ourworld fconsciousnessmust eliver heir atures ous as soon as we attend o theminfact, hey xist nlyn so far s we areconscious f them because ourinnerye s ever igilant,evermalfunctionsnd sblessedwith hepower fperfectiscrimination:s a result urconsciousnesssalways epresentedousas it s.Butthis deaoftheflawlessnner ensewillbe sufficientoexplaintheproblematiceature f theconceptionf theself-ascriptionfpresentstates fconsciousnessnly f t s taken o meannotmerelyhat ur nnersensenever oesmislead s,butthatt cannotmislead s.Andthe dea ofsensethat s incapable fmisrepresentingheworld tprovidesnformationabout sincoherent. ence,thepicture f world fconsciousness oes notcontainnymaterialhatwould nable ttoexplainhe lleged ncorrigibilityofavowals.The introductionf an inner ense toprovide ccesstothecontents f aworldof consciousness otonlyfails o guaranteeheincorrigibilityf aperson's udgementsbouthispresent tateofconsciousness,utcreatesproblemsf tsown.One suchproblems this: f n inner enseprovides swith ur informationboutoursensuousexperiences,t will tselfnvolvesensuous xperiences, hichmust e inhabitantsf n innerworld, erhapsanotherworldwithin world,watched verbyits own inner ense,andso on.However,twouldbe mistakeno believe hat his econd nadequacy fthepicture f an innerworld fconsciousness, ithin hich ur sensuousexperiencesxist, temsfrom he nclusion f an inner ensebymeansofwhichwe obtain our knowledge f the contents f our innerworldofconsciousness,ndthat he nadequacywouldbe removed and theprob-lemsconsequent pon ts ntroductionouldnot rise ifwe were o erasethe nner ense.The imageof an inner ense s an essential lement f thepicture venthoughtcannotfulfil hefunctiont s intended operform.For ifwe wereto delete he nner ense and to addnothingn tsplace,thepicturewouldnotbe improved:hedisappearancef an inner ensewouldcreate gap in thepicture nd wouldstrip t ofthepowerto offernyaccount even n insufficientccount ofhowweacquireknowledgef heitems n ourworld fconsciousness. utnothingouldbe substitutedor heinner ense whichwouldguarantee hat he contents f a worldof con-sciousness realways aithfullyepresentedo thepossessor fthatworld fconsciousness. nd nfact he deaofan inner ense s anirreplaceableartof thepicture: t exploits ur familiarityiththe senses as a meansofacquiring nowledgeftheworld ndthus ncourages s to believe hatweunderstandhepicture f a world f consciousness.A third espectnwhich hepictures incompletes this:we aresupposedtohaveperceptualccess to thecontents fourownworld fconsciousness,



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178 MALCOLM BUDDbutnotto thecontents fanyotherworld f consciousness. utnothingsofferedn explanation f this restriction.f I am withinmyworldofconsciousness, hycannot nother ersonalso be within t? f I am notwithinmyworld fconsciousness, hy annot nother erson harewhat-everkind fsupposedlyrivilegedccess to t possess?Withoutnswers osuchquestions,hepicture f a world f consciousness astoo fewdetailsfor tplausiblyomasquerade s anadequaterepresentationf ts ubject:tismerelyn image, metaphor,hat ttemptsopresenttself s thoughtweretobe understooditerally,ut thatdisintegratess soonas we try ograspt n the ntendedmanner. ut etus setasidethesedifficultiesor heidea ofthe nnerworld f consciousness.

IIIThe ideaoftheprivate bjectof nternal bservationeads,first fall,tothe dea thatwordsfor ensations,ense-impressionsnd imagesmustbetaughtndirectly.NFL,p. 285) Aperson an earn hemeaningfwords hatnameordescribe he ntrinsicharacterfsensuous xperiencesnlyfheobserves n his own case instances fwhat hesewordsrefer o: hisinnersensemust howhimwhat pain s,what nimage fthecolour ed s,andso on. Butwe cannotdirectlybserve, n anyoccasion, hat hekindofprivatebjectwe want omeone ousetheword s thenameof spresentohismind. n consequence, urmodeofteachinghemeanings fwords orsensationsndother ensuous xperiencess indirect,orwewant urpupilto correlateucha wordwith omething e do not observe n anyof theoccasions nquestion utwhichwe hopehewillobservewithin imselfnthoseoccasions.Butof coursethe situationuicklyworsens. or ifthe contentsfone

person'smind re hidden romheminds fothersntheradicalway hat simplied y he deaoftheprivatebject f nternalbservation,urconcep-tion of whatwe have reason to believeabout otherpeople's sensuousexperiencesnd their nderstandingfthewords hey se tosaywhat hesearerequires evisionf an equallyradicalkind.This can be shown n thefollowingmanner. fwe acceptthe idea of theprivate bjectof internalobservation,heundeniable act hat hewordpain' s thenameofa certainkindof sensations transformedntotheidea that he word pain' is thenameofa certain ind fprivatebject. A similar ransformationilltakeplace nthe ase ofotherwords hatwe usetonameor describe he ntrinsiccharacter f oursensations,ense-impressionsnd magery.) owconsiderthe wopropositions:

(1) For each personwho uses the word pain' to ascribepaintohimself here s a certainkindofprivate bject, nstances f



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WITTGENSTEINON SENSUOUS EXPERIENCES 179which hepersonuses the word pain' to refer o inhis self-ascriptionsfpain.(2) There s a kind fprivate bject uchthat or achpersonwhouses thewordpain'toascribe aintohimself,e uses thewordto refer o nstances f thiskind.

It is clearthat 1) does not entail 2): (x)(3y)(xR y)-4(3y)(x)(xR y).Thenaturalhoughthat here s a common nderstandingfthewordpain'andthat ach ofus says he ame of another ersonwhenweascribe aintohimaswe sayof ourselveswhenwe self-ascribeain requires hatwe shouldbeassured fthetruthf 2). But t follows rom heconceptionftheprivateobjectof nternal bservationhatwe could haveno goodreason o believe(2). Yet s itequally learthatnothingssuresus ofthe ruth f 1).2 Hence,ifwearetosayonlywhatwemighte in a positionoknow,urclaim houldbe personal nd notplural:(3) When ascribepaintomyselfuse theword pain'to refer oinstances f a certain ind fprivatebject.Forthe deaoftheprivate bject f nternal bservations suchthat llI cando is to speculatefruitlesslybout theexistence ndnature fanyprivate

objectsother han hosethat re or have beenpresentwithinmyworld fconsciousness. ndyet t s theseprivate bjects hat eemall-importantnour understandingf the natureof consciousness.Words forsensuousexperiencesppear o stand or arious inds fprivate bjects at east,t stemptingormetobelieve hat use themnthisway nmy wn case. Butthere s noway nwhich nyone ould know hat nother ersonuses suchwords n self-ascriptiono name the same kindsofprivate bjectsas hehimself oes, and,consequently,he dea that here s a common nder-standingfwordsfor ensuous xperiencess groundless.

IVThe set of deas outlinednthefirstection fthepaper thatwe cannotbe mistaken bout our present ensuousexperiences, hatwe have theperfectustification,hevery estofreasons, or elieving hatwe do abouttheir ntrinsicharacter,hat ur sincere emarksbout heirnternal aturehavean absolutelyecurefoundation andtheassociated icture f sensa-

tions, ense-impressionsnd images s private bjects f nternal bserva-tion,weretheprincipalargetsfthe sectionsnthePhilosophicalnvestiga-tionsndWittgenstein'stherwritingshat re concernedwith heconceptsofsensation,ense-impressionndimage.2Compare: how can I generalize heone ase so irresponsibly?",hilosophicalnvestigations293.



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180 MALCOLMBUDDWittgensteinxpressed isoppositiono thiswayofthinkingf states fconsciousnessn a number fconnected emarks:

(i) I do not identifymysensation ycriteria.PI 290) (Whathappens s that use the ameexpression.)(ii) I cannot e said to earn fmypresentensations.PI 246)(iii) Whereas a true sentence n the thirdperson present hatascribes sensationo someone ransmitsnformation,truesentence n the first ersonpresents akinto an expression(Ausserung)f sensation.RPP II 63; Z 472)(iv) When I say I am in pain' I use the word pain'withoutjustification.PI 289)(v) The verbal xpressionf sensations not thereport f (theresult f)-anybservation.NFL p. 319; RPP II 63; Z 472)(vi) A sensations notan object. PI 304,293: RPP I 1081-9;BBp. 47)(vii) I donot derive hewords nmyverbal xpressionf a sensa-tionfromhe sensation.NFL p. 319)3The basic thoughthatunderlies hesevariousformulationss easyto

grasp. or someone o dentifyomethingy criterions for im o dentifyitby method,he pplicationfwhich ecan cite nanswer o thequestion'How doyouknowt s ... ?' or Whatreasondoyouhavefor ayinghatt s... ?'. (e.g., PI 239: RFM VII 40) The methodprovideshimwithajustificationorhis identification:e judgesthat omethingallsunder acertain oncept, nd there s some other ropositionhat s his reasonforbelieving hathe udges o be true nd which eaccepts s a result fusingsome method ordetermininghetruthfthematter.Now twasWittgenstein'siew hatI don'tknowwhether am npainornot' 'I knowwhat pain"means;what don'tknow s whetherhis,hathavenow, s pain' - is not a significantroposition.PI 288, 246, 408)4Accordingly,omeonewho understandspain'hasno means r methodhathe can use to findoutwhether e can truly aythathe is in pain,theapplicationrfindingsfwhichhe can cite s his reasonfor elieving hatheasserts. or f herewere method hat omeonewhounderstandspain'could use tofind utwhethertwouldbe true osay I am npain', twouldbe possible hathe shouldfail oapply hismethodhencethepossibilityfat leastignorance), r that omethinghouldgo wrong n itsapplication(hencethe, ossibilityferror).PI 288) Ifhe knows hathe has notmade

3 haveomittedonsiderationfWittgenstein'semarkIt can'tbe said of me atall exceptperhaps s a joke) that know am inpain",for he sakeofbrevity.believe hatnothinggermaneo themattern hand s lostby gnoringheremark.4Likewise hefollowings not a significantroposition:I knowwhat red"means;whatdon'tknow s whetherhismage orsense-impression)s an image sense-impression)f thecolour ed'.



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WITTGENSTEINON SENSUOUS EXPERIENCES 181use ofthemethod,r fhesuspects hat omething ight avegone miss nhisuse of t,hecouldbe indoubt s to whether eis inpainand twouldbesignificantorhimtosay I don'tknowwhether aminpainornot'. Sincethis s not ignificant,omeonewhounderstandspain'cannotmakeuse ofmethod or etermininghenhe cantrulytter he entenceI am npain'.He cannot e in thedark s towhethere cantrulyay hat e isinpainandresolve isuncertainty,ome to earnwhat he ruths,bythe pplicationfsome method of discovery.He does not learn or fail to learn of hissensations:he does not have some means thathe can use to acquireinformationbout heirntrinsicharacters(ii) above).The questionHowdoes a personknowwhenhe cantrulyay hat e sinpain?',where his uestionsasking or hebasis f heperson's ssertions,smisplacedf thepersonknowswhat heword pain'means.His assertionslack nybasis.The answer o thequestionHowdoes he knowwhenhecancorrectlyssert hat e is inpain?' where hismeansByreferenceowhat,bytheuse ofwhichmethod, oes he find utthathe is inpain?' is 'Bynothingt all'. He does notidentifyis sensation ycriteria,ut on thevarious ccasionswhenhe is inpainhe uses,or iswillingouse,the sameexpression 'pain' ((i) above).

Thereis no intermediatetep vailable o someonewho understandshewordpain'- a step uchthatfhe takes t he is then na positionoassertthathe is in pain - thatwouldprovidehimwith reason forhis self-ascriptionfpainandwithout hichhe wouldnot knowwhat o say:hisapprehensionfwhen he can truly aythathe is in pain is unmediated.Without heemploymentfanymethod fdiscovery,e finds imselfblesincerelyosay I aminpain',as he canfind imselfroaning ith ain. nthiswayhis self-ascriptionfpain is akin to an expression fpain ((iii)above).It follows hatt sincorrectomaintainhat hereason have rightobeabsolutelyertainhat cantrulyay hat am npain s thatmy emarkasanabsolutelyecurebasis, r that haveunshakeablevidence,rthat havean overwhelminglyood justificationorwhat say. My remark estsonnothingt all, in thesense that haveno reasonthat ssuresme of theprobable r certain ruth fmyremark.Myremarks ungrounded:n theself-ascriptionf pain I use theword pain' without justification(iv)above)5To assert hat hereason cannot e in error r ndoubt boutmy eingnpain sthat amimmediatelyware f thefact s toprovide o explanationt all. To saythat amimmediatelyaware fsomestate faffairssmerelyo ndicate he end fthechain f reasons.Hence,thepicturef world fconsciousness ouldnotbe mademore dequateby he ubstitutionf heidea of immediatewareness orthe idea of an inner ense: a private bjectof immediateawarenesssno more cceptable s a modelfor sensuous xperiencehan sa privatebject finternal bservation.



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182 MALCOLMBUDDInparticular,tfollows hat here snokind fobservationf nything,heresult fwhich report hen sincerelyssert hat am npain.The verbalexpression f a sensation s notbased upon observationf oneself (v)above).And fweconcludefrom his hat sensationsnotthe ort fthinghatcanbe observed,nd fwesay hat omethings not n"object"unless tcanbe observed,6e can derive he conclusion hat ensations renotobjects((vi)above).This leaves ust he astformulation(vii) bove)ofWittgenstein'snder-lying hought nexplained,nd I nowturn o this.The point s bynow afamiliarne.

VWhen form nimage ndexpressnwordswhat haveformed nimageof,orwhen havetheexperiences ofseeing certain olour ndexpressthecharacterftheexperiencenwords, r when havea sensation ndexpress n words the nature of the sensation experience, the greatdifficultyere",Wittgensteinrites, is not to representhe matter s iftherewere omethingne couldntdo.As if here eally ere nobject, romwhich derive tsdescription,ut wereunableto shew t toanyone".PI374) The thoughthat nderlies is remarksthe houghthatt s mistakentoconstruemy xpressionnwords fmypresenttate fconsciousnessnthe model ofmydescriptionf a material bject, yregarding ypresentstate of consciousness s somethinghat , but only , can observe a"private bject".This misconstructionnvolvesreditingmewith reasonforwhat saywhen expressmy mage, ense-impressionr sensation,

reason hatustifies hat say, s I can have reason hatustifies y se oftheword red' n a descriptionfa materialbject. nthis atterase, f amasked o ustify y escription,nethinghat can do istoappeal o a colourchart hat ontains sampleof thecolour orrelated ith heword red'. Icanpoint othe ample ndsay"This colour s called red and thismaterialobject s,as youcan see, the colourof thesample". see a materialbjectand I saythat ts colour s red. could see somethinglse that s agreed oexemplifyhewordred',andI could derive heword hat use to describethematerialbjectfrom his econdthing this hing hat orrelates ordandsample. venwhen don't nfact erive heword romhe olour hart,I could ustify yuse oftheword red' inthiswaybyreferenceo a rule n

6"The descriptionf theexperience oesn'tdescribe n object .. The impression onewould ike osay is not n object .. One can't ook t the mpression,hat swhyt s not nobject. Grammatically.)".RPP I 1081-9)



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WITTGENSTEINON SENSUOUS EXPERIENCES 183accordancewithwhich use theword; ust s someonewhohasbeentaughttheword red' byreference o someparticular hing hat xemplifieshecolour could explainwhyhe used theword red' in some later case byreferringo the ample nd the laim hat heobjectmatches he ample.BBpp. 14-15,72-3)Now - to take the case of the imagefirst my mageof red is notsomethingobserve nd ofwhich have somehow een nformedyothersthat omethingfthiskind s called an imageofred'. don't earn hat nimage fthecolour ed ooksike his r s this ort f hing.PI 388) The factof hemattersthat do notuseany riteriono determine hether have nimageof the colour red. (PI 377) My verbalexpression fmy mage scriterionless. hen rendermymagenwords cannotustifyhat saybyreferenceo an exemplarymage:an imagethat an be seentomatch hepresentmage ndthat sagreed obe animage fred.The idea that derivemydescriptionfmymagefrom nobject hat nly canbe directlywareofcollapses: couldnotapply nyrules o derive rom privatebject heright ordsformy mage. PI 380)We have lreadyeen that heverbal xpressionfpain s not hereportfanobservationof omethingnly candirectlybserve).When assert hatI am in pain I am notdescribing omething observe within"myself.Hence, I cannot e said to derivemywordsfromwhat observe. cannotderivemywordsfrommypain,for his s not omethingobserve.Whenam npainand say incerelyI am npain',my tterances notmediatedyanobservationfsomethingr other romwhich couldderive hewordsutter.NFL,p. 319)Finally, cannot erive hewordred'frommy isual ense-impressionsofseeingthe colourred,butonlyfromomethinghat s red, .e.,fromsample fred. cannot ead off hedescriptionromomethingobserve.cannot dduce thesense-impressions my ustificationormyutterance.(NFL,p. 319)Hence, the self-ascriptionf sensuousexperiences an be said to beunderived(vii) bove).

VIItmight e thoughthat herolethat sampleof thecolourredplays n

thedescriptionfpublic objectscould be playedbya memory-samplef aprivatebject fa certain ind n thedescriptionfprivate bjects: o that fmymage s thoughtf as a private bject couldstill erivemydescriptionof t fromhe mage tself:fmy ain sthoughtf s a privatebject couldderivemydescriptionf t fromhepainitself yreferenceo a memory-image fpain,which unctionss a sampledoes; and so on.



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184 MALCOLM BUDDButthis hought ouldbemistaken. or f haveforgottenr am unsurewhat olour red' is the nameof, can lookup a chart hat orrelates heword with a sample of the colour and thereby rovidemyselfwithajustificationor sing rwithholdinghewordred' nmydescriptionfthispublic bject hat onfronts e.But f haveforgottenr amunsurewhatkind fprivate bjectS' is thenameof- if cannot emember hich indtis thename of- I could not ookup a chart hat orrelateshewordwithsampleoftheprivate bjectkind norder oregain ssurance. he mostcould do wouldbe to form n imageof such a chart.For such a chartcorrelatingamples ndwords ould exist nlynmymind inmymemoryor imagination because thesamples t contains re samplesof kindsof

private bject.Butmyformingn imageof a chart fthis ort ould notprovidemewith justificationor sing, r for ecliningouse,thewordS'inmydescriptionf theprivate bject hat s nowpresent omymind. PI265) A memory-images not a sample hat cansee butthat thers annotsee,andbyreferenceowhich canestablishhatS' is,or s not, herightword ouse for hisprivate bject.Myappealtoa memory-images notamatter fmy ooking p to see which ample s correlated ithS'; it is,rather, y emembering,rmy ttemptingoremember,hich ample oesgowith S'. If I am unsure hat'S' is therightword ouse for hisprivateobject, .e., am unsurewhat S' means, n appealto a memory-imageillnot nableme to reachfirmerround; or must emember hich ample scorrelated ithS', i.e.,what S' means, ndthis s justwhat amin doubtabout.7It is therefore istakenobelieve hat herolethat sampleplays n thedescriptionfpublic objectscould be playedbya memory-samplen thedescriptionfprivatebjects.Accordingly,heconclusion olds: couldnotapply nyrules o derive rom privatebject heright ordfort.

VIIWe havenow worked hrough number f formulationsfWittgenstein'soppositiono the deaof sensuous xperiences a privatebject f nternalobservation:n item hat annotbe misidentifiedythesubject nwhoseconsciousnesst exists, nd whichprovides he subjectwitha perfectjustificationor isbeliefsbout t.Andwe have eenthat his ppositionanbe expressedn thethoughthat sensations notanobject:my ensationsarenot hecontentsfa subjective pace, ntowhich nly can see.Whenexpressmy ensationn words donotobserve privatebject, ee it ust sit s,and then endert n words. fmy ensations ere tems hat observedwith ninternalye, henwhen expressmy ensationnwords wouldhave7CompareA.J.P. Kenny,WittgensteinLondon, 1973),pp. 192-3.



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WITTGENSTEIN ON SENSUOUS EXPERIENCES 185a reason, justification,orwhat say:theevidence fmynner ense.Butthewords usetoexpressmy ensation usewithout justification:donotidentifyy ensationycriteria. nameof sensationsnot henameof nobject.But ifthis s so,what s theright ccountofthemeaning fnamesofsensations:owarethey sed? mmediatelyrior o hisconsiderationfthisquestionWittgensteinnnounces he followingonclusion one he hasreached s a result fhis examinationftheconcept ffollowingrule:

If language s to be a means of communicationheremustbeagreementotonlyn definitionsut lso queer s thismay ound)in udgments.PI 242: cf.RFM VI 39)Now na language hat an be usedas a meansofcommunicationords orsensationsre,Wittgensteinnsists, tiedupwith"behaviour, hich s the"naturalxpressionf ensation".PI 244, 256,288) It s nvirtuef his actthat urcommonwords or ensationsansatisfyherequirementhat hereshouldbe agreementnpeople's udgements: e apply hesewords oeachother n thebasisof each other's ehaviournd weapply hem o ourselvesinconformityith, lthough otonthebasisof, hebehaviour-criteriasedtodetermineheir pplicationoanother.8n a "private"anguagewords orsensations re not tiedupwith ehaviour,or hesensationsheytandfordonothavenaturalxpressions.PI 256) In fact,hesewords reusedquiteindependentlyf thebehaviour ndbodily tate ftheuser ofthe anguage.(PI 270) Accordingly,hey annotmeet therequirementfagreementnjudgements:heonlybasis available o another ersonformakingudge-ments bout heprivateanguage ser's sensationss just rrelevant.Now there re many onnections etween, n the one hand,the views

WittgensteinasdevelopednthePhilosophicalnvestigationsp tothepointatwhich ebeginshis examinationfhowwords eferosensationsnd,ontheother and, heresults fthis xamination.ut do notbelieve hatt spossible oderive heconclusion fWittgenstein'sprivateanguage" rgu-ment that "privateanguage"for ne's sensationss impossible fromtheconclusion f his considerationfthe notion ffollowingrule that"obeying rule" s a practicend,hence, hatt s notpossible oobey rule"privately"PI 202) - in thesimplemanner dvancedbythe"communityinterpretation"fWittgenstein'siscussion frule-following.or thecom-munitynterpretationf the dea ofobeying rule"privately"swideof the

8The notion fbehaviour,s Wittgensteinses it,often ncludes he dea of the externalcircumstancesn which hebehaviourinthenarrowense)occurs.See RPP I 314, II 148ff.The vagueness fthe dea thatwords or ensations re "tiedupwith" ehaviour ouldnotbecompletelyemoved, believe,without ttentionothe roleofthe notion f causationn ourunderstandingf suchwords. consider his nthefinal ection f thepaper.



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186 MALCOLM BUDDmark nd its understandingf the idea of a "practice" s unwarranted.Accordingly,tmisrepresentshe natureofWittgenstein'srgumentndcreditstwith conclusion hat t hasnotestablished."n fact, heuserof aprivateanguage an embrace he thesis hat obeying rule" s a practice.He can agreethat t s notwhat omes beforehismindwhenhe writesS'down hat etermines hether heres a rulethat e is therebybeyingndwhat his ule s,butrather is use over ime f'S'. He cansay hatf therscould be aware ofwhathe is doing theywouldsee, he hopes,thathe isfollowingrule n his use of S' - theywouldreact n eachoccasion s hedoes iftheyweretohave whathe has; and he can saythat ftheyweretocontradictimtheywould,perhaps, e right: e hasmade a mistakenhisapplicationfthe term n someoccasionor,moreseriously,here s noregularityt all in his use of the term.The point s that thers annot eaware fwhathe does,andso they annotknowwhetherhere s regularityorrandomnessnhisbehaviour for thers annot e aware fthenature fthe tem ifany)towhichhe applies S' on anyoccasion.Since others anknow nly t which imese uses S' and neverwhat s true tthese imes,heyarenever na positionopass judgementn his use oftheterm.The connectionetweenWittgenstein'sssertion hat t s notpossible oobey rule"privately"nd theconclusion fhisprivateanguage rgumentemergeswhenwe focus ntherealdifficultyhat aces heuserof a privatelanguage. his arisesfrom is ntentiono ntroduce signS' as a name fsensationin order to be able to record n words the recurrence f thesensation).PI 258) Andthedifficultys obvious. or f'S' is intendedobethename ofa sensation tmusthavethe same"grammar"s a wordforsensation.Now thisgrammar as two essential omponents:hatwhich scharacteristicfthe hird-personseofnamesof ensations,nd thatwhichis characteristicf thefirst-personse. But in thecase ofthe userofaprivateanguage here s nothird-personse:nothing rovidesnother itha goodbasis forusingthe termS' to describe heprivateanguage ser'scondition,ndnothingrovidesheprivateanguage serwith goodbasisfor sing he ermS' todescribe nybodylse's condition. ence, f'S' hasany laim t alltothe itle f nameof sensation,tmust e used n thewaya nameof a sensation s used in thefirsterson inparticular,n thefirst-person resent. ndhence,when heprivateanguage serthinksI haveS'he has no reason forbelieving hat this is so: his self-ascriptionsrecriterionless:e uses 'S' without justification:n orderforhim to knowwhen owrite own I haveS' theresnothing eneeds tofind ut about ounderwriteisdispositionodo so: histhoughtI haveS' isgroundless.utnotonly s this nsufficientor S' to be granted hestatus fnameof a9See thediscussionnmy WittgensteinnMeaning,nterpretationndRules", ynlhese8(1984).



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WITTGENSTEINON SENSUOUS EXPERIENCES 187sensation,t sinsufficientor t to be accorded he tatus fmeaningfulignorword.The privateanguage ser s someonewhospeaks,writes own rsays ohimselfhesign S' at the same time s he concentratesisattentionn asensation hegiveshimselfprivatestensive efinitionf'S' (PI 258,268)- andthen ncertainater ccasionswrites he igndown gain.Now hisactofprivate stensive efinitionoes notgive nycontent othe dea that twouldbe correctorhimtowriteS' downon certainubsequent ccasionsand incorrectorhimtowriteS' downon certain ther ccasions.For thecombinationf nactof ttentiono a sensationnd theutterancef'Thisiscalled S" does not determinehemeaning f S': anyostensive efinitioncan bevariouslynderstood.PI 28) It sthewaynwhich sign sused,or sintended o be used,that eterminestsmeaning,nd the oncentrationfperson's ttentionpona sensation s he speaksor writes own thesignimplies othingbouthowthe ign s tobe used.And the ombinationf nact ofattentiono a sensationnd the utterancef This sensations called"S"' likewise oesnotdeterminehemeaningf'S': the ntentiono use S'as the name of a kindof sensation fwhichthis s an instance eavesindeterminatehenature fthekind n question.Comparepointingo acolouredobject and saying hat C' is to be the name of thiscolour.)Furthermore,he ntentionouse 'S' as thenameof a kind f sensationscoherent nly f the ntentions to use 'S' in theway nwhichwordsforsensations re used.10 he onlydifferenceetween he firstnd secondstyles f ostensive efinitions that he secondmakesexplicit se of theconcept f ensationnd thus howswhat lace ngrammarstobe assignedto theword: t shows hepostat which hesign s to be stationed.PI 29,257) Hence, the secondstyle f definition erelymakesexplicitwhat spresupposedythefirsttyle, amelyhat heprivateanguage ser ntends'S' to be thename of a sensation. ut this ntentionequires heprivatelanguageuser to use the sign according o the grammar f names ofsensations,ndthis s somethinghat e cannot o.As we have een,his useof thewordcannotbe thesameas the use of a word hat s thenameofasensation. he most hat heprivateanguage sercan do is touse hissign'S' in accordancewithpartof the grammarf theself-ascriptivese ofnames f ensations. ndthismplieshatwhenhewritesS' downheuses twithout justification:n eachoccasionwhenhewritesS' downhe hasnoreason odo so thatustifies im ndoing o.Itwouldbemistakeno think hat nappealtomemory ouldprovideheprivateanguageuserwith justificationorwhathe proceeds o do. Wehavealready een that memory-imageoes not enableus to derive ur

10 "'To give sensation name' meansnothingnless know lreadynwhat ort fgamethisname s to be used". NFL p. 201)



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188 MALCOLMBUDDwordfor sensation rom he ensationtselfnaccordancewith rule.Andtheprivateanguage ser'sthoughtThis is an S' receives osupportfanykindfrom isthoughtThis is thesameas theone I called "S" previously';forhe must aythat It is an S' is equivalento It is thesame as the one Icalled "S" previously' theonethoughtsnotona differentevelfromheother.Hence,all thathismasteryf a privateanguage omesto s thefactthathe sometimes, ithoutnyparticulareason,writes hesign S' inhisdiary.NFL,p. 291) And sincehisuse of'S' is entirelynconstrained,S' isnot signwhoseuse is rule-governed.This unfortunateonsequencefor heprivateanguage ser's use of S',inwhich he brogationfthenormalanguage-game ith he xpressionnbehaviours assumed PI 288), does not hold fora sensation erm n acommonanguage.Althoughuch a word n a commonanguages usedinself-ascriptionithoutustification,his se isnotunconstrained;or tmustbe used in general onformityithwhat s taken o be indicativef theoccurrence f a sensation fthekind n question thebehaviourhat s"expressive"f the ensationtoputthemattereryoosely) iftheuseroftheword s tobe deemed ounderstand hat he ermmeans.Andso therearerestrictionsn the use of theword, venthoughn self-ascriptionheword s used without justification:hegroundlessnessf self-ascriptiondoes not mplyhat here s no rulethat sbeingfollowed hen heword sused. t ispreciselyecause the elf-ascriptivese ofa wordfor sensuousexperiences notviable n solation hat an inner rocess' tands n need ofoutward riteria".P1580) Forthe elf-ascriptionfan "inner rocess"willbe criterionless;ndwithoututwardriteria sign hat upposedlytandsfor he"inner rocess"willnotbe rule-governed.his iswhyWittgensteininsists hat if assume he brogationfthenormalanguage-gameith heexpressionf sensation,need a criterionf dentityor he ensation".PI288)The privateanguage ser s thereforempaled n thehorns f dilemma:eitherhe intendsS' to be a signforsomethinghatothers an have aconceptionf, r hedoes not.But fhe doesnot,he is consignedo silence:there snothingecansay hatwillmake lear oothers hatkind f ignS'issupposed o be. If, n theother and,heintendsS' to be a signwhich anbe explainedoothers, ither e intendst to be thenameofa sensationrhe intendst to be some otherkind fword.But fhe intendsS' to be thenameofa sensation,hemosthe can do is to use it nself-ascriptionn theway hat nameof sensationsused,and thenhisuse is notrule-governedandhe is notusing S' as the nameofa sensation.Andhe cannot scapefrom ispredicamentyretreatingrom is ntentiono use S' as thenameofa sensationndrestingontent ith weakerntentiono use it as someother ind fword, nameofsomethingr other. orthewordsheusesto



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WITTGENSTEINON SENSUOUS EXPERIENCES 189explain he natureof S' willbe words n a common anguage nd hisentitlemento use thesewordsrequireshim toprovide justificationorusing hem hats acceptable o thosewho have masteryfthe anguageand this s something e cannotdo, or can achieveonlyat the cost ofrendering is signone that s not a word n a privateanguage. PI 261)Hence,theprivateanguage ser's houghthat e isusingS' as a sign acksanyfoundation.The conclusion hat he upposeduse of'S' as thenameof sensationna privateanguage mounts nly owritingS' downfromime otime, neachoccasionforno ustifyingeason, nablesus tomake lear heconnec-tionbetween hetwopropositions:

(i) It is notpossible o use a word s thenameof a sensationnaprivateanguage,and

(ii) It is notpossible oobey rule"privately".For f he spirant rivateanguage sermerely ritesS' down na numberofoccasions, n each occasiononlyfor henon-justifyingreason" hatheconsiderstcorrecthen o use S', there sonlywhat sbefore is mindthesign S') on the various ccasionsto givesubstance o the dea thathe isobeying rulein his use of S'. But,as Wittgensteinas shown, his sinsufficientogive ontento thenotion fobeying rule.For,otherwise,omatter hat he setof occasions s on which omeoneuses thesign S', hewillbe followingrule n hisuse of S' throughoutheseriesof occasions.And so iftheperson hinks e is followingrule n his use of S' - becauseoneach occasionwhenhe uses it'S' ispresent o hismind n a certain ay,i.e., S' seems ohim o be the ppropriateordfor heoccasion he willbefollowingrule.But:

to thinkne is obeying rule s nottoobey rule.Hence it s notpossibleto obeya rule "privately":therwisehinkingne wasobeying rulewouldbe the amethings obeyingt. PI 202)Accordingly,t s notpossible o use a word s thenameof a sensationn aprivateanguage ecauset s notpossible oobey rule"privately".or theuse of'S' bythe spirantrivateanguage sercomestonothingmore hanthe sign's comingbeforehis mind n a certainmanneron thevariousoccasions of use. And this nvolveshis proceeding privately",ut not,thereby,beying rule.



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190 MALCOLM BUDDVIII

It canbe seen, therefore,hat t leastthesefour onsiderationsie attheheart fWittgenstein'srivateanguage rgument:(i) If anguage s to be a meansof communicationheremust eagreementn udgements.(ii) It is theway n which word s used thatdetermines hatmeaningthas,notwhat omesbefore person'smindwhenhe usestheword.(iii) Wordsfor ensationsre"tiedupwith" ehaviour.(iv) A persondoesnot dentifyis sensationsycriteria.Andthe astoftheseconsiderationss of crucial mportance. oreover,tprovidesnelink etweenWittgenstein'soncernwith he elf-ascriptionfsensations nd hismoregeneral oncernwith heconcept ffollowingrule, nd, nparticular,ith henotion fdeveloping series fnumbers ytheapplicationf a formula. or he insists hat formulaor erformingmathematicalperationoesnotcompels to makeuse of t ntheparticularcaseas wedo, n the ensethat urreasons or oing o are not ndless.Buthebelieves hatwe are nclined o ookfor justificationf certain ind alogicallyonclusiveeason for urapplyingheformulaswedo,andthatwemaybe dismayed henwe fail o find uch an absolutelyirmustifica-tion.And he believes hatwhenwe reflectn theself-ascriptionfpresentsensations e are iable oexperience similaremptation:e are nclinedolook for a justificationor our usingthe word that occurs n our self-ascription hen heres no ustification.BBp. 73) And ust s the ackofaperfectustificationas itwere)for sing formulan a certain ay sactuallyofno consequence, or n factpeoplereactto instructionnd trainingnsimilarways nd agree n theirudgementss to how the formulas to beapplied, espite hefact hat hechain freasons asanend;so the ackofjustificationor our specificationf our present ensations also of noconsequence, or n factpeoplereact o "training"n the use ofnamesofsensationsnsimilar ays nd self-ascribeensations hen thersudge hatit is trueto sayof themwhatthey ayof themselves.n bothcases therequirementor hepossession fwordsn a commonanguages satisfiedand t s satisfied ecauseof our common umannature:we reactnsimilarwaysnresponse osimilarxposureo, ndtrainingntheuseof, anguage.

IXThere is,however, ne aspectofWittgenstein'sonsiderationf wordsthat tandfor ensuous xperienceshatsproblematic:hevirtual missionofanyreferenceo,andno assessmentf thesignificancef,theapparent



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WITTGENSTEINON SENSUOUS EXPERIENCES 191fact hat ensuous xperiencesreevents hat ause hebehaviourn whichtheyre"expressed". he sensuous xperiencehat ccupiespride fplaceinWittgenstein'sarious iscussionssbodily ain, nd it s integralothe"language-game"hat s playedwiththeword pain' that pain can becausedby somethinghathappens o a person's ody nd, moreover,hatpaincauses themovementsfthebodyn whicht smanifested. hatdoesthisfeature fthe anguage-gameequire f a pain:whatmust e true fapain f t s toplay heroleassigned o tbythe anguage-game theroleofthatwhich ringsbout tsnatural xpressions?"Furthermore,painnotonly ringsbout tsnaturalxpressions,ut lso,it seems,theutterance hat s the verbalexpression f thepain (or theinternal ounterpartfthe utterance:he awareness hatone is in pain).Someone is said to understandpain' only fin generalhis readiness oascribepainto himselfs in accordancewith hebehaviour-criterian thebasis of whichpain s ascribed oanother: heremustbe a general oinci-dence ofhisspontaneousnclinationo behave nways hat re ndicativefhisbeing npainwithhisbeing blesincerelyoutter he entenceI aminpain'.Now it is natural o believethat hiscoincidence annotbe a merecoincidence: heremustbe somekindofcausalconnection etween hesephenomena hatgo togethero regularly. nd thenature f this causalconnection,ssuminghat heres one,seemstobe apparent:nthecase ofsomeonewhounderstandshewordpain', ninstancef pontaneous ain-behaviour ndtheself-ascriptionf thepainresponsibleor hat ehaviourhavea common ause- thepainthat heperson hen eels.For I appear obe aware nmyown case that his s indeedthefact f thematter:t s thepainthatmakesmelimp ndit s in virtue fmy onsciousnessfthepainthat amina position o say sincerelyhat aminpain.When sincerelydeclare hat am npain am na positionodo soonly ecause, o it eems,I amaware fan event; nd am awareofthis vent s the mmediateauseofmy houghtI am npain'andas theobject fmy houghtThis isa pain';and t s this vent hat auses both heverbal ndthenon-verbal ehaviourinwhich hepain s expressed. ut therequirementhatmy houghthatam npainandthebehaviourhat eveals hat am npainshould e causedbymy ainplacesa constraintn thecorrect ccount fthe oncept fpain.Whatmust e true f pain f t stoplay heroleofthatwhich ringsboutitsnaturalxpressions,tsverbal xpressionsnd itsunvoiced ecognitions?

Now f neaccepts his rain f hought,tmightppear hat presupposi-tionof the anguage-gamelayedwith heword pain' is that achpain s" It s clear hatwhenWittgensteinrote hilosophicalrammare embraced heview hatpaincauses tsnatural xpressions:Thereisn't furtherrocesshidden ehind,which s therealunderstanding,ccompanyingndcausing hesemanifestationsntheway hat oothachecausesonetogroan, oldone's cheek, ullfaces, tc."PhilosophicalrammarOxford, 974),Part138.



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192 MALCOLMBUDDidenticalwith physicalvent hat ccurs n thebodyof thesubject f thepain.Andsince he ausalconsiderationshat pply opain pplyna similarwaytoother orms fsensuous xperience,heconclusion an be genera-lised:eachsensuous xperiencemust e identical ith physicalventn thesubject's ody. fthiswere o,my ensations ouldnotbe "objects" ome,in as muchas I do not observe hem;buttheywouldbe observablenprinciple,venbyme. A sensationwould thenbe somethingPI 293, 304),butnota somethingbservationfwhichgrounds elf-ascriptionf thesensation.Myself-ascriptionsf sensuous xperiences ouldbe a formfsensitivityo thepresencewithinme ofsomething somethinghat asthepropertyfbeinga sensuousexperience f some kindor other;but thesensitivity,s far smy ninformedwarenessf trevealsttome,wouldbebrute: wouldnotbe conscious fhow knowwhen osay hat am npain,that can see thecolourred,and so on,in the sense that wouldnot beconsciousof thecausal mechanismhatmediatesbetween he sensuousexperience nd myconsciousness f its presencewithinme. And thecriterionlesself-ascriptionf sensuous xperiences ould conformo thispattern:my elf-ascriptionf S is a judgementr theverbal xpressionfajudgementhat amexperiencing; at a certainime make rexpressucha judgement; do notuse anymethod ofind utwhat shappeningo methatwouldprovideme with reason oaccept he udgementr thatwouldsupporthe udgement; physicalvent hat s identical ith he nstancefS in question auses the udgementnd/or tsexpressionas wellas thenatural xpressionsf theexperience). s soonas we abandon heconcep-tionof sensuous xperiencess theprivate bjectsof nternalbservation,we becomefree o conceiveof them s physical vents hat ccur n ourbodiesand that, lthough ot observed yus, cause us to havebeliefsbeliefs hat re caused n a manner nmediatedyperceptual xperiencebeliefs hat reexpressiblen sentences ftheformI am npain', I canseethecolourred',andso on.Now it is hardto understand owthe inherentuitabilityf sensuousexperiencesoplaya causal role in theproductionf behaviour ould beaccommodatedyWittgensteinnanyotherway hanbyregardinghem sbeing physical vents n people's bodies - forhe would have rejectedrecourse o Cartesian on-physicalvents s possible ources fthenaturalexpressionsfsensuous xperiencesndof ourself-ascriptionsfsensuousexperiences. ut whatever hemerits f thissuggestion,t is clear thatWittgensteinouldnothave cceptedt.The suggestionhat achpainmustbe a physicalventna creature's odyderives, asically,rom hethoughtthat paincausesthebodilymovementsnwhich t smanifested;ut thetrain fthoughthavedeveloped asbuiltntota thesis hat sspecificallythesis bout theself-ascriptionfpain.Now thenature f thecapacityo



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WITTGENSTEIN ON SENSUOUS EXPERIENCES 193self-ascribeain what correctnderstandingf his equires,nd howweare nclinedomisrepresenthis o ourselvesn false ictureshatweconjureupwhenweare bewitchedyour anguage is oneofthe eadingmotivesfWittgenstein'snvestigationfthephilosophicalroblem fsensation.f hehad believed hat hecapacity o self-ascribeainmustbe thoughtfasbeingfoundedna causalmechanism, herebyphysicalventnthebody,theoccurrencefwhich srequired omake self-ascriptionrue, roducesthe nclinationoself-ascribeain, herewould urely e sometrace fthisview nhisvariousnvestigationsfthe oncept fpain.But theresno suchtrace; nd there sgoodreasonwhywe should xpect here obe noevidenceofthiskind fview nWittgenstein'sork. oralthoughhepostulationfacausal connection etween painand thesubject's elf-ascriptionf thatpain scompatible ith he riterionlessature fthe elf-ascriptionfpain,theviewthat ainsareevents apableofcausing elf-ascriptionsfpain sincompatibleith heview, mbraced yWittgenstein,hatt s senseless osuppose hat omeonemight onderwhetherewas npainorbe inerrorstothefact fthematter.PI 246,288,408) This canbe demonstratedn thefollowingmanner. f a causal mechanism ubserves heself-ascriptionfpain, o thatwhenever omeone rulyelf-ascribesaina physicalventnhisbody, denticalwithhispain,setsin motion causal mechanismhatproduceshis self-ascription,t must be possibleforthismechanismomalfunction.neway nwhichtmightmalfunctionouldbe this: neventthatwouldhaveproduced true elf-ascriptionfpain f hemechanismadoperated ormallyails oproduce ny elf-ascriptiont all. Sincethis ventdiffersrom n event hat s a pain onlyn a respect hats inessentialo anevent's eing pain, t snotdisqualifiedrom eing painby ts ackinghepropertyfcausing self-ascriptionfpain.12 ccordingly,omeonewhounderstandspain' mightproperlywonderwhetherhe is in pain, eventhough e hasno inclinationoself-ascribeain.Another ay n which hemechanismmightmalfunction ould be this:the mechanism eneratesself-ascriptionfpainalthoughthas notbeenset n motion yan appro-priate vent.Andthismakes ossible situationnwhich omeone s n errorinbelieving imselfobe inpain.Hence,Wittgensteinas not na positiontoaccept his iewof the elf-ascriptionfpain.The train fthought sketchednsists hat he natural xpressionsf apain, nd alsothe elf-ascriptionf that ain, re causedbythepain;anditthen rgues hat heres no viable lternativeothinkingf his ain sbeinga physicalvent hat ccurs n the ubject's ody.Now we have lreadyeen

12 It s not f he ssenceofpainthat t hould ausea judgementnwhich t s self-ascribedwitness nimals hatexperience ain and yetdo not self-ascribeain.And since thecaseinvolvesnly malfunctionf hemechanismhat roduces self-ascriptionfpain, heres noground or enyingheperson perfect rasp f theconcept fpain.



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194 MALCOLM BUDDthatWittgensteinouldhaverejected heview hat heconcept fthe elf-ascriptionfpainrequires s tothink f a painthat s self-ascribeds beingan eventnthe ubject's ody hat ausestheself-ascription.utwouldhehave ccepted heview hatt s a requirementfthe anguage-gamelayedwith hewordpain'that achpain s identicalwith physicalvent n thebodyof thepersonwho experiences hepain?Did he believe that t isimplicitn theconceptofpain thaton each occasionon which omeoneexperiences aina physicalventmust ake lace n hisbodywithwhich hatpain can be identifiedor is in somewayassociated)? believe that heanswer othese uestionss "No", and thatWittgenstein'seasonfor ivingthis nswer avehim furthereason oreject he ccount f elf-ascriptionwehaveconsidered.It would have been entirelyut of character orWittgensteino havebelieved hat language-gamelaces a requirementf thiskindon whathappensnside eople'sbodies: twouldhavebeenforeignohisconceptionoftheautonomyf language-gameso havethoughthatwhen someoneexperiences painand this smanifestednthenaturalxpressionsfpainthese- atural xpressionsmust e causedby physicalventn theperson'sbodythatpossessesthepropertieshepain has. And I believe thatthisconception f language-gamesxplainswhyhe did not insistthatthelanguage-gamen whichpain' sused- and nparticularhe elf-ascriptionofpain presupposeshat achpain s identical ith physicalventn thesufferer'sody;and why n his considerationf theconceptofpainheemphasiseshemanifestausesofpain, heprimitiveaturalxpressionsfpain, ndvarious thermanifestationsfpain npeople'sbehaviour.WhenWittgenstein,nhis discussion f"reading",maintains

But in the case of the living eading-machinereading"meantreactingo writtenigns nsuch-and-such ays.This conceptwasthereforeuite ndependentf thatof a mental r othermecha-nism. PI 157: cf.,BB pp. 120-1)

he appears o be expressing certainonceptualhesis.'3 his thesis laimsthat fthecriteriaor heapplicationf W' to somethingan be known oobtainwithoutindingutthat certain ropositions true fthat hing,hefact hat W' appliesto something oes notrequire hat hatpropositionshouldbe true f that hing: heconcept ignified y W' is quite ndepen-dentofthepropositionnquestion. incethecriteriaor heapplicationf'pain' to someone, nd thecriteria or omeone opossessthecapacityoascribepaintohimself,an be known o obtainwithout indingut that13Forfurtheriscussion fWittgenstein'sttitude o theconcept f"reading" nd to otherrelated oncepts, ee my"Wittgensteinn Meaning, nterpretationnd Rules",Synlhese8(1984).



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WITTGENSTEIN ON SENSUOUS EXPERIENCES 195physical vent occurs in theperson'sbodythatcauses the behaviouralmanifestationsfthepainandtheperson's eadiness oself-ascribeain, fweweretoacceptthis hesiswe wouldbelieve hatneither heconcept fpainnortheconcept f theself-ascriptionfpain mposes herequirementthatwhen omeone xperiences aina physicalventmust ccur nhisbodyand cause whateverssues fromhis pain. Consequently,Wittgenstein'sadoptionof the conception f language-gamesrticulatedy thisthesiswouldbe a sufficientxplanationf the fact hathe does not nsist hat heoccurrence feachpain requires correspondingr denticalhysicalventinthesufferer'sody.Anditwouldaccountforhis notrequiringhat heexplanationfa person'sbeing ble toacquirethecapacityo self-ascribepain- a capacityhat omeonehas onlyfthere s a general oincidence fhis nclinationo behave nways hat re ndicativefhisbeingnpainwithhisreadiness o udgethathe is inpain- must eside nthefact hatwhentheperson s inpaina physical vent hat ausesthenon-verbal ehaviourthat ssuesfromhepainalso causes theperson's udgementhathe is inpain. And itwould also account for theflavour f behaviourismhat sdetectiblenhis examinationftheconcept fpainandother oncepts fsensuousexperiences. or hisrejection f theCartesian mmaterialventandhis refusaloacknowledgehenecessityor n internalhysicalvent obring boutthe effectsf a sensuous xperience ouldprecludehimfromdoingustice othecausalityhat s anintegrallementnourunderstandingofsensuous xperience.14Universityollege,ondon

14A previous ersion fthispaperwas read to a graduate eminar nWittgensteiniven yColinMcGinnandmyselftUniversityollege,London n the ummerf 1982. amgratefultoLeslie Stevenson orhishelpfulomments n an earlier raft.

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