Late Tang China and Buddhism: A Case Study in Religious Favoritism, Religious

Pluralism, and Tax Exemptions for the Twenty-First Century United States of America

Aaron Garrett

History 490: Senior Thesis

July 20, 2016

Introduction

The relationship between the Buddhist faith and the Late Tang Dynasty Chinese state

centered around the three issues of religious favoritism, religious pluralism, and tax exemptions

for religious institutions. How these two groups interacted provides a case study applicable to

current state/faith debates in The United States of America. Existing literature offers no modern

applications for the events during this time in Tang Chinese history. Although limited in its

scope, this paper offers a necessary contribution to this effort.

From the inception of the Tang Dynasty, the central government created laws that

especially benefitted the Buddhist faith due to its higher number of adherents and the religious

favoritism it enjoyed due to the preceding dynasty’s rulers. These laws took the form of

exemptions and enforcement of exemptions from certain taxes. The first of these, the equal-field

(chün-tien) system, provided land tax exemptions to many classes, including monks and nuns of

the Buddhist and Daoist faiths. The second, the Tang Code, enforced the chün-tien system as

well as all tax exemptions for the Buddhist and Daoist faiths. Together these provided the legal

groundwork for the both the Buddhist and Daoist faiths to operate in Tang China. However, it

also opened up the system to abuses by those who never espoused sincere belief in either faith.

Since Buddhism constituted the majority faith during this time period most of those who abused

the tax exemptions became Buddhists. The individual monks and nuns in Buddhism formed an

illegal class unto themselves, called in this paper Monks In Name Only (MINO). This class

became a particular problem for the Tang government starting in the mid-eighth century.

In the mid-eighth century, the Tang forever changed because of the An Lushan rebellion.

It fundamentally restructured Tang society and government. The central government no longer

possessed the power it once enjoyed, allowing the provincial governments to act beyond or

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above the central government. Once the rebellion ended, the provincial governments acted

quickly to not only remedy themselves economically, but to assert their power as autonomous

entities. Whereas before the rebellion, the central government controlled and legitimized all

ordinations of Buddhist and Daoist clergy, the provinces after the rebellion began to ordain

Buddhist and Daoist monks and nuns themselves for a monetary price. The majority of these

ordinations went to the Buddhist faith, greatly expanding the MINO. The illegal status of the

MINO class began to undermine the entire legitimacy of the Buddhist faith. After the An Lushan

rebellion this shifting status of the faith caused many within the upper echelons of the Tang to

question the usefulness and necessity of even having the faith in China altogether. However, no

efforts began to curtail the MINO class and restore order to Tang society until the mid-ninth

century. The reasons for this come from the powerful Eunuch class which ruled the Tang after

the rebellion, and their dealings with the Buddhist faith.

By the mid-ninth century the eunuchs lost power over the Tang, and the Huichang

persecution became the first effort to end the MINO. The Huichang persecution forever altered

Buddhism in China. The emperor during that persecution, Emperor Wuzong, displayed clear

religious favoritism towards Daoism, the main minority faith in China. His favoritism went to the

point of undermining religious pluralism, or the ability for different faiths to coexist. Through

imperial edicts, Wuzong targeted the MINO with the goal of ending their illegal tax evasion

practices. However, he quickly expanded his curtailment of the faith to the point that he nearly

eliminated Buddhism from China. Through his efforts he effectively reasserted central

government control over the provinces while persecuting a faith that long enjoyed religious

favoritism codified in Chinese law.

Equal-Field (chün-tien) System and the Tang Code

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Two laws created the foundation of religious favoritism for Buddhism in Tang China, the

first comes in the form of land tax privileges. In 624 CE the Tang first codified a land tax system

under the name of the equal-field (chün-tien) system. It divided the population into five

categories: baby, infant, adolescent, male adult, and old person. The adult classes paid taxes on

the land they received from the state.1 This system provided Tang China with an excellent means

of ensuring every adult male paid their fair share of taxes. However, the Tang government

quickly provided exemptions to this land tax. The following five groups became exempted from

taxes associated with the chün-tien system:

1. Direct relatives of imperial, military, and civil officials.2. Close relatives of rulers in provinces.3. Victims of certain natural disasters.4. The elderly, sick, widowed, and slaves.5. Monks and nuns.2

The fifth exemption, that of monks and nuns, included Daoist monks and nuns. However, the

Buddhist monks and nuns took most advantage of it. It became dangerous to give tax exempt

status over lands to a faith with significant monastic holdings. In their collaborative examination

of Tang China, Arthur Wright and Denis Twitchett quantify the number of Daoist and Buddhist

monasteries. They mention that, “At the height of the T’ang’s glory3…Taoists had 1,687

monasteries and nunneries as against 5,358 for the Buddhists.”4 The trend of higher numbers of

Buddhist monasteries only continues throughout the Tang. Along with a vastly higher number of

monasteries, Jacques Gernet mentions that the Buddhist clergy “comprised only 1 percent at

most of the total population of China” yet held two percent of arable lands.5 This significant

1 Kenneth Ch’en, “The Economic Background of the Hui-ch’ang Suppression of Buddhism,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 19, no. 1/2 (June 1956): 69-70, accessed April 30, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2718490.2 Ch’en, “The Economic Background,” 71-72.3 Reign of Emperor Taizong (627-649 CE).4 Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett, eds., Perspectives on the T’ang (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973), 23.5 Jacques Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society: An Economic History from the fifth to the tenth centuries (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1995), 140.

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amount of land holdings allowed for extensive benefits for all who wished to join the faith during

that time period.

In addition to tax benefits for land ownership, once people chose to become ordained a

Buddhist or Daoist monk or nun they fell under the protection of the Tang Code. This code

remains one of the earliest legal codes that survives to this day and formed the foundation for all

Chinese legal codes to follow. Wallace Johnson gives the reader of English the only full

translation of this extensive code. Three particular articles of note within the code that enforce

tax exemptions for the Buddhist and Daoist faiths. The first one, Article 172.1, stated that “All

cases of not allowing rightful exemption from taxes and labor services, or allowing such

exemption improperly, are punished by two years of penal servitude.”6 This article provides two

conditions that, if violated, necessitate a punishment. First, the denial of tax exemptions and

labor. If anyone denied a Buddhist or Daoist monk or nun their right to tax free lands they

violated the law and became subject to punishment. Second, improperly granting tax exempt

status also carried punishment. This became a problem for the Tang starting in the mid-eighth

century and continuing throughout the ninth century with the rise of the MINO. The second one,

article 217.1, mentioned that “In all cases of required payment of taxes or other articles that

should be turned over to the government…what is lacking is calculated and punished as

comparable to robbery.”7 This article excludes officially ordained monks and nuns of either the

Buddhist or Daoist faiths since they paid no taxes. It includes the MINO whose tax exempt status

came from illegal means. Wisely the Tang created another article that dealt with illegal

ordinations. This article, 154.1a, codified punishment for a MINO type of problem long before it

occurred. It stated that “All cases of unauthorized ordainment as a Buddhist or Taoist Priest 6 Wallace Johnson, trans., The T’ang Code Volume II: Specific Articles (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 148.7 Johnson, trans., The T’ang Code Volume II, 205. Punishment for robbery was up to life sentence but did not include the death penalty.

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punish both the person who is ordained as well as the person who performs the ordainment by

one hundred blows with the heavy stick.”8 While evidence for this specific punishment used

against the MINO never occurs in the literature, the idea of punishing those who became illegally

ordained nevertheless existed. According to the best evidence available, a MINO problem never

reached extensive numbers in the Tang until after the destabilizing events of the mid-eight

century.

The An Lushan Rebellion (755-763 CE)

The issue of the MINO began after the An Lushan rebellion and continued into the ninth

century. In order to better understand the context for the MINO’s rise one needs to first examine

the effects of the rebellion of An Lushan. The rebellion radically changed the governmental

structure of Tang China. In Stanley Weinstein’s examination of Tang Buddhism, he states that

the An Lushan rebellion dramatically effected Tang China, particularly the Buddhist teachings

and religious institution in China.9 He also mentions that the rebellion “weakened the authority

of the imperial government.”10 The governmental structure changed in ways unseen since Sui

reunification in 581 CE. For almost two centuries China operated under a strong centralized

government. When the Tang dynasty succeeded the Sui this stable structure continued.

Throughout China’s ancient history it periodically experienced instability, such as after the Qin

and Han dynasties. After the Qin and Han, numerous independent countries formed within

China. Unlike during those periods, the An Lushan rebellion never broke apart the Tang dynasty.

Instead it destabilized the centralized governmental structure. Denis Twitchett best summed up

the impact of the An Lushan rebellion on the Tang government when he said that, “The rebellion

left the provincial governors more powerful and independent than ever, for during the rebellion

8 Ibid., 128.9 Stanley Weinstein, Buddhism under the T’ang (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 59.10 Weinstein, Buddhism under the T’ang, 61.

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the system of provinces with some degree of financial autonomy was extended to the whole

empire so that after 763 the empire was no longer the strongly centralized state which it had

been.”11 Twitchett brought up two points worth noting. First, he stated that decentralization gave

more power to provincial governments who beforehand operated completely under the thumb of

the centralized imperial government. Second, he argued that after 763 CE the Tang dynasty

never returned to its former state/subject relationship. This changing relationship between state

and subjects equally impacted state/faith relations, especially between the state and the Buddhist

faith.

In response to immediate economic needs after the An Lushan rebellion the local

provinces turned to the Buddhist faith for help. For centuries the Sui and Tang governments

required state approval for all ordinations of clergy in the Buddhist and Daoist faiths. However,

the unstable circumstances after the An Lushan rebellion created a situation where ordinations

occurred on both the state and provincial levels. Since the central government remained

weakened after the rebellion, the local governments created through illegally authorized

ordinations to all with the money to pay for them.12 The vast majority of those ordained at this

time became Buddhist, not Daoist clergy. This influx of numerous illegal ordinations to the

Buddhist faith created the MINO problem that the early Tang leaders prepared for when they

created the Tang Code. The real issue of the MINO came not only from their illegal status, but

what that status meant to Tang society. It created a class of people ordained who often enjoyed

the privileges that came with the position of Buddhist monk or nun, but rarely espoused the

tenants of the faith. Beginning in the period after the An Lushan rebellion, discussions and

11 Denis Twitchett, “Lands under State Cultivation under the T’ang,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 2, no. 2 (May 1959): 182, accessed July 11, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3596019.12 Weinstein, Buddhism under the T’ang, 59.

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serious debates began over the usefulness and dangers of a growing Buddhist clergy, with their

extensive monasteries, land holdings, and special privileges.13

Post An Lushan Rebellion and the Rise of the MINO

The period after the An Lushan rebellion saw the rise of the MINO, further undermining

the authority of the central Tang state. To provide some context for this growth, the following

statistics show the number of the Buddhist clergy during different periods in the Tang:

By 624 CE: ~ 50,000 officially ordained clergy650-683 CE: ~ 60,000 officially ordained clergy700-750 CE: ~ 126,000 officially ordained clergyBy 830 CE: ~ 300,000 illegally ordained MINO14

By 843 CE: ~ 260,000 officially ordained clergy15

Two significant notes from this statistic. First, the growth of legally ordained clergy continued

after the An Lushan rebellion. The central government indeed lost power after the rebellion but

not to the point that they ceased ordinations. Second, by the time of the Huichang persecution of

Buddhism under Wuzong in 845, the MINO outnumbered the officially ordained. However, no

efforts appear before Wuzong to curtail or eliminate this abuse of privilege. As mentioned

before, the Tang Code enforced tax exemptions only to those legally ordained and punished a

MINO class. Two examples show how knowledge of the extent of MINO abuses came to the

attention of the central Tang government long before Wuzong’s reign. In 780 CE, less than

twenty years after the An Lushan rebellion, the eighth century Tang official Yang Yen warned

the central government about the growing MINO problem. He stated that those with enough

money to afford unofficial ordinations became monks or nuns to “evade the various corvée

duties.”16 Corvée duties refer to duties of unpaid labor. He goes on to say generally that the tax 13 Arthur Wright, “Buddhism and Chinese Culture: Phases of Interaction,” Journal of Asian Studies 17, no. 1 (1957): 37, accessed June 11, 2015, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290508082?accountid=9817.14 Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 37. Instead of MINO, the exact language Gernet uses in his book is “false ordination certificates.”15 Ibid., 36.16 Ibid., 57.

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exempt status for monks and nuns brought “the empire to ruin and causes it to be swamped by

vagabonds.”17 Yang Yen correlates the ordinations with the degradation of Tang China. This

became a significant departure from the pro-Buddhist attitude held by most in Tang and earlier

Sui when the early emperors of that dynasty greatly expanded the Buddhist faith.18 Now whether

or not the emperor during Yang Yen’s life, Emperor Dezong, attributed this problem in Tang

society to the tax exempt status of the MINO remains unclear. However, since no enforcement of

the MINO occurred during this time one assumes no correlation existed in his mind. Less than

fifty years later in the year 824 CE, a report from An-hui province (modern day east-central

China) indicates that they ordained clergy for 2,000 cash at the rate of one hundred per day.19

Since this originated from a province all of the ordinations became MINO. How long the

province ordained at this rate remains unknown, however, it provides some perspective on how

quickly the MINO expanded and how much the central government lost in revenue on a daily

basis from just one province. Despite the pattern of no enforcement of the Tang Code continued,

the debates against the Buddhist institution only intensified into the ninth century.

Early Ninth Century Tang/Buddhist Relations and Daoism

The ninth century brought mixed emotions towards Buddhism. In general, religious

favoritism of Buddhism still continued into the ninth century. Every group from the imperial

elites to the lowest classes supported the faith for the most part. By this time Buddhism already

established itself as one of the major three faiths of China with Daoism and Confucianism.20

17 Ibid.18 For more on Buddhism’s expansion under the Sui please consult Arthur Wright’s “The Sui Dynasty (581-617)” in The Cambridge History of China and his larger work entitled The Sui Dynasty. Also consult Victor Cunrui Xiong’s profile of the second Sui emperor in Emperor Yang of the Sui Dynasty: His Life, Times, and Legacy and his focused work entitled “Sui Yangdi and the Building of the Sui-Tang Luoyang.”19 Ch’en, “The Economic Background,” 80. The term “cash” is per the source. In this case it refers to actual coins, not paper currency. For more information on Tang Dynasty coins, look up “Kai Yuan Tong Bao,” the name for Tang China’s coinage system.20 Kenneth Ch’en, Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 213.

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However, the mixed feelings towards Buddhism came from the growing MINO and equally from

age old arguments against its existence. Unlike Daoism and Confucianism, Buddhism originated

from outside China. Buddhism permeated China during the first couple centuries CE from its

origins in India. By the time of the Han Dynasty (206-220 CE) and especially by Sui

reunification, Buddhism became a completely Sinicized faith broadly referred to as Mahayana

Buddhism.21 As soon as Buddhism first entered China questions arose about its usefulness to

society. One of the most common arguments against the faith arose from its celibate monks and

nuns, who took people away from contributing to society. In the ninth century, Tang courts

brought this same argument against Buddhism back. In their viewpoint, Buddhism damaged

China because it took people away from contributing to society and granted them certain

privileges for this status.22 This reveals two points about Tang society at this time. First, a climate

developed after the An Lushan rebellion and into the ninth century of distrust and general

malaise towards Buddhism. Second, the faith began to lose its legitimacy23 in the eyes of the

ruling elites due to the privileged status of its adherents, a status many enjoyed without any

sincere belief in the faith. The ninth-century Tang central court began to lose its religious

favoritism towards Buddhism, eroding its legitimacy and compromising its position in society.

Also during this time Daoism became the main competing faith to Buddhism.

Although not as numerous in terms of membership, the imperial elites thought highly of

Buddhism’s rival. The royal elite saw themselves as descendants of Laozi, the founder of the

philosophical branch of Daoism and deity figure in religious Daoism to this day.24 By contrast,

21 For more on early Buddhist penetration into China the dated but still authoritative source on the subject is Erik Zürcher’s Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China.22 Edwin O. Reischauer, trans., Ennin’s Travels in T’ang China (New York, NY: The Ronald Press Company, 1955), 29.2323 Legitimacy in this context refers to the power, inherent in the emperor and other imperial elites, of sanctioning, supporting, and growing a particular faith.24 Wright and Twitchett, eds., Perspectives, 23.

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nothing indicates that any emperors claimed descent from the Indian Buddha, Siddhartha

Gautama. Since Daoism started in China, the emperors and royal elites justified their positions of

authority by creating a narrative around decent from ancient deities.25 Important to note that

although the imperial elites preferred Daoism for granting them authority, the very fact that

Buddhist monasteries far outnumbered their Daoist counterparts showed religious favoritism

towards Buddhism.26 What set the Buddhist faith apart from the Daoism also came from its

widespread imperial support, allowing it to flourish. Yet that very support created a climate

where abuses of power occurred by the MINO. While no emperor ever sanctioned the creation of

a MINO class, none before Wuzong ever acted to stop those abuses of privilege. One of the main

reasons why such abuses of power went unchallenged centers around the Eunuch class.

The Eunuch Class

The Eunuch class, an often overlooked group in the English translated literature, ruled

Tang China after the An Lushan rebellion. Edwin Pulleybank describes the Eunuch class as a

group that “exerted a precarious suzerainty” over Tang China at that time.27 The reason for their

rule came from the destabilized nature of the dynasty after the rebellion, which also extended to

the emperorship. From the end of the An Lushan rebellion to the reign of Emperor Wuzong, a

period of seventy-seven years, seven emperors ruled China. To put that into perspective, the

previous one-hundred forty-four years, dating back to the beginning of the Tang Dynasty, seven

emperors ruled China. This rather rapid succession of emperors came not from old age, since

most of these emperors died relatively young, especially after about 820 CE. It came from the

reality that although the emperor maintained power, the de facto rulers of Tang China became

25 Around this time in East Asia the Japanese emperors also claimed descent and authority from a multitude of gods and goddesses. For more see the creation epic the Kojiki.26 Wright and Twitchett, eds., Perspectives, 267.27 Edwin G. Pulleybank, The Background of the Rebellion of An Lu-Shan (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1.

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the Eunuch class. Their control extended to “every field of government”, with power to control

and influence those in the royal elite, and even power granted unto them over succession.28 The

Eunuch class created the rapid succession of emperors before Wuzong. Even worse, they ruled

from a “totally different power-base,” with an ideology “based on the account-book” instead of

ethics.29 Even worse, right before Wuzong’s reign, during the reign of his older brother

Wenzong, the Eunuch class created an alliance with the Buddhist faith. Wenzong tried to

regulate the Buddhist church in order to lessen the power of eunuchs.30 His efforts proved

unsuccessful. However, the association between the Buddhist church and the Eunuch class

undermined traditional rule in China, creating a condition ripe for persecution.

Emperor Wuzong and the Eunuch Class

Emperor Wuzong successfully wrested power from the Eunuch class during his brief

reign as emperor, reestablishing the sovereign rule of the emperor. As mentioned, the first effort

to reassert institutional superiority occurred during the reign of Wuzong’s older brother,

Wenzong. Once Wuzong took over, he understood the need for a strong emperor in China. He

also knew that in order for this to occur he needed to suppress those elements in society that kept

his vision from reality. Wuzong succeeded in what his brother Wenzong tried to accomplish. He

effectively suppressed the Eunuch class that possessed de facto rule in China since the end of the

An Lushan rebellion some eighty years before.31 Since the Buddhists became tied to the Eunuch

class, the faith became increasingly unpopular under Wuzong to the point that he suppressed it.

28 Denis Twitchett, “The T’ang Imperial Family,” Asia Major Third Series 7, no. 2 (1994): 30, accessed July 11, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41655507.29 Denis Twitchett, “Merchant, Trade and Government in Late T’ang,” Asia Major New Series 14, no. 1 (1968): 63-64, accessed July 11, 2015, http://www2.ihp.sinica.edu.tw/file/1728QArfwvz.pdf.30 Jesse Dalton Palmer, “Searching for the Law: Ennin’s Journal as a Key to the Heian Appropriation of Tang Culture,” PhD diss., University of California – Irvine, 2009: 231, accessed April 30, 2016, http://search.proquest.com.byui.idm.oclc.org/docview/304856608/458D760E48E24F90PQ/1?accountid=9817.31 Michael R. Drompp, Tang China and the Collapse of the Uighur Empire: A Documentary History (Boston, MA: Brill, 2005), 201.

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Emperor Wuzong and Religious Pluralism

Emperor Wuzong also persecuted the Buddhist faith for other reasons. Throughout his

life he showed a consistent level of distrust toward the faith. When he came to power after the

death of Wenzong in 840 CE, he never hid his religious favoritism for Daoism, often referred to

as a “fanatic devotee” of the faith.32 From early on he made a conscious effort to delegitimize

Buddhism. He hosted frequent lectures where Daoists received preferential treatment.33 As

mentioned before, every emperor during the Tang considered themselves descendants of Laozi.

However, no Tang emperor married their religious favoritism to political ends like Wuzong.

Since Wuzong tried to reestablish the authority of the emperorship, he fed his own religious

favoritism for Daoism to destructive ends. It appears from all the translated literature that

Wuzong acted alone in his suppression of the Eunuch class and Buddhist faith. Clearly “apart

from a few of his favorite Taoist monks, he does not seem to have fostered a true Taoist pressure

group…that was hostile to Buddhism as a matter of dogma.”34 Without a large group of

supporters to aid him in his persecution, what occurred becomes judged on his actions alone.

The Huichang Persecution (843-845 CE)

Translated imperial records of Wuzong’s Huichang persecution remain scarce, apart from

the edicts of 844 and 845 CE issued by Wuzong. However, outside observations of the Huichang

persecution offers us a detailed, though secondhand account of the events. The record of Ennin

constitutes the foundation for our understanding of this seminal event in the late Tang Dynasty.

Ennin, a Buddhist monk from Japan, grew up under a system where the government regulated

religious institutions. So when he traveled to China he accepted the emperor’s institutional

32 Reischauer, trans., Ennin’s Travels, 29.33 Palmer, “Searching for the Law,” 241.34 Michael T. Dalby, “Court Politics of late T’ang times,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. III, eds. Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 667-68.

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superiority over Buddhism and Wuzong’s actions in the beginning of the Huichang persecution.35

Japan at the time of Ennin36 established a governmental structure based, at least in part, on Tang

Chinese law. Ennin knew about this, and therefore he knew the role of the emperor of China. He

understood the immense power over legitimization the emperor possessed. The Tang emperor

regulated the various religions and, through religious favoritism, decided which to promote

above others. Ennin’ s account of the persecution argues that Emperor Wuzong became irrational

in his later persecution of Buddhism. Ennin makes sure never to condemn Wuzong’s earlier

actions and the role of the emperor himself.37 The early stages of the Huichang persecution

focused on ending the abuses of the MINO and any who used the ordination to avoid taxes.38

Early on Ennin saw Wuzong as justified in his actions of ending abuses that plagued the Tang

dynasty for over eight decades. From what we understand from Ennin’s diary, his shift in

opinion towards the reforms began in 844 CE and intensified through 845 once outright

destruction of Buddhist property and defrocking vast swaths of clergy began.39

The year 844 CE marked a significant change in the measures used against the Buddhist

faith. From this point onward Ennin considered the persecution an abuse of power by a fanatical

emperor. In 844 an imperial edict stated the intentions of Wuzong towards the Buddhist clergy. It

states that “Those monks and nuns of the destroyed monasteries who were unrefined…regardless

of their age, were sent back to their places of origin…those who were young…were all forced to

return to lay life.”40 The destroyed monasteries refer to the smaller monasteries. A couple points

to consider from this edict. First, the initial steps Wuzong took centered around consolidating the

clergy and monasteries of Buddhism, a worthwhile endeavor given the vast amount of MINO. 35 Palmer, “Searching for the Law,” 226-27.36 Heian Period (794-1185 CE).37 Palmer, “Searching for the Law,” 225.38 Ibid., 227-28.39 Dalby, “Court Politics,” 666.40 Palmer, “Searching for the Law,” 228.

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Second, the order for all young clergy to go back to civilian life reveals the economic necessities

of the time period. The young constituted those best equipped to contribute to the greater society.

On the surface this edict comes across as justified on the part of Wuzong. Yet the enforcement of

the edict showed the true nature of his persecution. Ennin observed how Buddhist persecution

intensified in 844 after this edict went into effect. He mentioned that “…scriptures and images

were taken…and their bells were sent to the Taoist monasteries. Those monks and nuns of the

destroyed monasteries…were all forced to return to lay life.”41 To make it clear again, Ennin

never condemned the Tang system for carrying out the persecution. His observations indicate the

work of an unstable emperor, prone to justifying his own religious favoritism for Daoism at the

expense of other faiths. The enforcement of this edict clearly showed that religious favoritism.

While Wuzong’s initial actions seemed justified since they targeted the abuses of the MINO,

Ennin made sure his readers understood that once 844 came, the direction of the measures

drastically changed. Wuzong began to go after the wealth of the Buddhist clergy in an effort to

legitimize his own rule and reestablish the supremacy of Daoism. Once 845 came, the measures

turned into an outright campaign to undermine religious pluralism through wiping out the

Buddhist faith completely from China.

In 845 he issued a famous edict to start curtailing all of the Buddhist clergy. He began

this edict by developing a narrative, using history as the judge of the legitimacy of the Buddhist

faith. It reads, in part, “We have learned that up through the three dynasties [of Hsia (Xia),

Shang, and Chou (Zhou)] there had never been any talk of Buddhism, and only since the Han

and Wei has this idolatrous religion come to flourish.”42 Two things to understand from this part

of the edict. First, Wuzong hearkens back to the ancient past of China to support the expansion

41 Reischauer, trans., Ennin’s Travels, 254.42 Ibid., 225-26.

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of his persecution. He raises a valid point that Buddhism never existed during any of those

dynasties. In fact, he correctly states that the actual growth and prominence of Buddhism never

surfaced until the Han dynasty. Second, Wuzong specifically calls Buddhism an “idolatrous”

religion. While showing disdain for the idols of Buddhism, between the lines this signifies

something more important. The idols of Buddhism most commonly took the form of statues, art

work, and various ornamental fixtures. By expanding confiscation of idols to all monasteries, not

just those harboring MINO, the amount of potential wealth for the dynasty became far greater.

Wuzong pointed out another old, though still valid, argument against Buddhism. Later on

in the edict it reads that “Now, when one man does not farm, others suffer hunger, and, when one

woman does not weave, others suffer from the cold.”43 This statement connects with an argument

as old as Buddhism itself, that of the dependent non-contributory clergy. Once a man or woman

became a monk and nun they abandoned their working lives to become celibate and dependent

on others for sustainment. While entirely valid to point out this situation in the context of the

MINO who took advantage of the status of monk and nun to abuse tax privileges, Wuzong never

made this association. Instead he left his persecution open to include all Buddhist monks and

nuns, regardless of status.

With this justification, in 845 Emperor Wuzong began a systematic suppression of the

entire Buddhist faith. This Huichang persecution became the single greatest persecution of the

faith up to that time. After the 845 edicts Ennin knew the intention of Wuzong. He mentioned in

his diary that in 845 the Chinese government began to persecute the larger Buddhist monasteries

and higher class clergy, sparing none, not even the “accredited monks,” forcing all to return and

become contributors to society.44 Ennin realized the purpose of Wuzong’s curtailment of the

43 Ibid., 226.44 Palmer, “Searching for the Law,” 229.

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Buddhist faith shifted from ending abuses of the MINO to elimination of Buddhism from China.

As shown before, the total number of legal Buddhist monks and nuns and MINO in 843

constituted over half a million. By the end of 844 some 410,500 remained.45 This means that

Wuzong’s initial efforts to curtail the MINO in 844 ended with him defrocking around 100,000

or one third of the total MINO class. So while two-thirds of the MINO still remained, he directed

his efforts in 845 on all monks and nuns. In Wuzong’s 844 edict he mentioned the need to return

the young to civilian life, presumably to acquire jobs and/or land so tax revenue came to the

central imperial government. Once he took it upon himself to eliminate all Buddhist clergy the

following year, the same reasoning remained in place. Adding more than 400,000 monks and

nuns allowed for an enormous source of revenue for the Tang. To put this into perspective, if

successful, this amount of defrocked clergy constituted close to ten percent of the total number of

taxpayers at that time. By defrocking the monks and nuns it added roughly ten percent more

revenue to the dynasty.46 However, the full extent of the Huichang persecution never

materialized. Emperor Wuzong died in 846, but not before defrocking “more than 260,500

monks and nuns,” nearly one half of the total, as a part of his two yearlong suppression of

Buddhism.47

Reasons for the Huichang Persecution

A few areas of general consensus exist about the motivations behind this systematic

suppression of Buddhism exist. The scholar Michael Dalby argues that the persecution occurred

mostly out of economic necessity.48 Jacques Gernet agrees, going further to say that the “great

45 Ch’en, “The Economic Background,” 105.46 Ibid.46

47 Ibid., 81.48 Dalby, “Court Politics,” 666.49 Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society, 21.4750 Ch’en, “The Economic Background,” 68.48

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repressions of Buddhism…presented themselves primarily as measures of economic recovery.”49

On the surface the persecution became an attempt by Emperor Wuzong to defrock multitudes of

MINO and then later all clergy to gain tax revenue from their lay status. However, both Dalby

and Gernet oversimplify the complexities of late eighth and ninth century Tang China. While the

An Lushan rebellion weakened the economy, Wuzong’s clear affection towards Daoism also

factors into the equation. His favoritism towards Daoism seriously undermined religious

pluralism in China. So while he sought to eliminate the Buddhist faith to bolster the economy, he

also tried eliminate what he deemed a foreign faith unfit to remain in China. The scholar

Kenneth Chen agrees with Dalby and Gernet about the economic necessity of the Huichang

persecution. He also argues that the motives behind it centered around acquiring the wealth of

Buddhism, not necessarily to completely end it.50 However, if one adds Ennin’s record to the

debate, Wuzong intended to end the Buddhist faith in China completely. When Ennin mentioned

that Wuzong began to defrock legally ordained monks and nuns, the scope of the persecution

became absolutely clear. The wealth tied up in people, land, and objects became far too attractive

to not forcibly acquire it all in the persecution.

More recent research on the subject presents new arguments over the necessity of the

persecution. In a 2009 article on Ennin, Jesse Palmer argued that Wuzong’s persecution

originated from tensions and conflicts of interest, and the economic power of the Buddhist

monasteries constituted a symptom, not a disease.51 However, through destroying the

monasteries and confiscating their wealth he showed the institutional superiority of the imperial

central government. For over eight decades the Tang Dynasty ran as a broken system, with local

governments garnering more influence and power. The totality of Wuzong’s persecution became

49

50

5151 Palmer, “Searching for the Law,” 234.

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to accomplish what no other Tang emperor dared to attempt since the An Lushan rebellion. He

addressed the erosion of centralized government authority, reasserted the power of the

emperorship, curtailed the MINO in the Buddhist faith, and then sought to eliminate the tax

exempt status of all Buddhist adherents.

Conclusion – Modern State/Faith Debates

The Huichang persecution offers a case study applicable in today’s debates over

state/faith relations. Religious favoritism before and during the Huichang persecution showed the

dangers of such a practice. From the time of Sui reunification to the ninth-century, Buddhism

reigned as China’s predominant religion. Religious favoritism for this faith contributed to its

unchecked growth. While Daoism and the Confucian ethic also enjoyed loyal followings, they

never compared to Buddhism. In their recent work on religious persecution, the scholars Brian

Grim and Roger Finke discuss the dangers of religious favoritism. Specifically, they point out the

dangers of minority faith persecution. When a minority faith receives a “dominant religion”

status they often negatively impact majority religions. If that status becomes coupled with state

limitations on religious freedom, then the persecution only intensifies.52 When Wuzong came to

power he proceeded to undo the centuries long religious favoritism for Buddhism. However,

while doing this he propped up a minority faith in Daoism, granting it status as the dominant

religion. This led to intense persecution of Buddhism even though it remained the majority faith.

In The United States of America today, Christianity remains the majority religion. While

Christianity no longer constitutes a monopoly on faith, it still holds onto a dominant status. Other

faiths such as Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism claim minority status. However, while

none of these faiths claim dominant status in the United States, denials of religious freedom like

52 Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke, The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 6.

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that of Buddhism during Wuzong still occur today. Grim and Finke argue that “to the degree that

governments and societies ensure religious freedoms for all, there will be less conflict between

religions and less violent religious persecutions.”53 So while Christianity claims a dominant

status, the situation never need occur where religious freedom for other faiths becomes

undermined.

Religious pluralism needs to remain in a traditionally religiously-inclined society like the

United States in order to avoid a monopoly of faith. Both Tang China and the history of the

United States reveal many instances where religious pluralism became ignored. During

Wuzong’s reign, the very act of trying to end the Buddhist faith undermined religious pluralism.

In the beginning of the persecution, Wuzong curtailed the faith to get rid of the MINO. Once

Wuzong focused on defrocking all monks and nuns his favoritism for Daoism became apparent.

While the Tang Code justified Wuzong curtailing the MINO, he possessed no right under Tang

law to go the extent of ending an entire faith. In the United States, persecutions of certain faiths

show similar patterns of illegal measures taken to suppress them. One example comes from the

minority faith officially known as The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, commonly

called Mormons. This sect of Christanity came under intense persecution in the 1830s when

many of its adherents lived in the state of Missouri. The governor of Missouri at that time,

Lilburn Boggs, issued an extermination order to kill all Mormons. No right under the law of the

United States allowed for this level of persecution. Unless religious freedom remains upheld in a

religiously plural society, nothing but persecutions follow. Another equally relevant issue also

dominates the state/faith debate today, that of taxation and tax exemptions.

Just as the Tang Dynasty codified tax exempt status in the chün-tien system and through

the Tang Code, religious institutions in the United States also receive tax exempt status. This

53 Grim and Finke, The Price of Freedom Denied, 8.

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status, called 501(c)(3), exempts religious and other organizations from taxation if they engage

in charitable works. Every year many Americans enjoy the benefits of this tax exempt status

when they file their taxes. In her discussion on religious exemptions, Leilani Fischer comments

on the issues of allowing such a practice. She states that “some have argued that institutional

exemptions amount to undue preferential treatment of religious organizations” and adds that such

treatment “undermines the efficacy of law.”54 This system of tax exemptions invites abuses of

power similar to that of the MINO in Tang China. While some enjoy the tax benefits out of

sincere devotion and allegiance to their church or organization, others reap the benefits while

never holding true convictions for the principles of their faith or organization. This ultimately

undermines the law by allowing a group to satisfy personal desires, in this case avoiding taxes. In

connection with this, Fischer also mentions that “whereas individual exemptions depend on

proof of a person’s sincerely held religious belief…institutional exemptions are granted more

broadly in order to protect a religious group’s right to self-governance.”55 Just like the MINO

during the late Tang, the United States ought to examine those who hide behind institutional

exemptions from taxation because of the ability of religious institutions to govern themselves.

How to grasp with and ultimately resolve these three issues of religious favoritism, religious

pluralism, and tax exempt status for religious institutions in the United States remains beyond the

scope of this paper. However, the events from the mid-eight to mid-ninth century in China offers

useful insights in how to better navigate these issues in the future.

54 Leilani N. Fischer, “Institutional Religious Exemptions: A Balancing Approach,” Brigham Young University Law Review 2014, no. 2 (March 2014): 416, accessed June 18, 2016, http://web.b.ebscohost.com.byui.idm.oclc.org/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=21c64a3d-a666-4113-a64e-72623d93195e%40sessionmgr106&vid=5&hid=125. 55 Fischer, “Institutional Religious Exemptions,” 417.

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