Sen Description as Choice

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354 DESCRIPTION AS CHOICEFrederichEngel's The Condition f the Working-ClassnEngland in 1844,or John nd Barbara Hammonds' The Village Labourer1760-1832, a gooddeal more is involvedthan just checking he truth f the individualfactsrecorded. n fact,description an be characterized s choosingfrom hesetof possibly true statements subset on groundsof theirrelevance.Truthis-at best-a necessary ut not sufficientondition orgood description. tis perhapsnot an exaggeration o say thatanyconscious act of descriptioncontains some theory-usually implicit-about the relative mportanceofthe variousstatements ealingwiththe subjectmatter.1 shall call thisthe"choice basis of description". might dd in passingthat recentdevelop-ments in formal choice theorycan be fruitfullysed for studying heregularities f description, ut I shall not pursue this suggestion n thislecture23

A description an be accurate without eing a good description. t couldbe unhelpful, ven useless.We question the experton the level of factorywages in India. He answers: "Oh, it varies from place to place." Trueenough,of course.We ask formore description, emandingprecision.Theexpertnow goes into details. "The integer pproximation f the nationalaverage wage inrupees,"he says,"is a primenumber". won'tbelabourthepointfurther. learly, ruth sn'ta sufficientondition or description o begood.Is it a necessary ondition? t might ppear that the answer mustbe yes.How can a false description e good? The issue is, however,more complexthanthat, nd there are at least two distinct ourcesofdifficulty.First,departures romiteral ruthmaynot be immediately ismissable suntrue. ndeed, approximations,metaphors, implifications,tc., have im-portantroles in conveying he truth.Your child asks you: "How large isChina?", and you reply:"Very large-it has 900 millionpeople". You mayhave enlightened im,butyouhave also almostcertainlymade a statementthat s untrue n terms f the exact number. 00 millionmay convey he sizemore efficiently-shornf unimportant etail-than 876,493,179, even ifthathappensto be the exact number t the momentyou spoke. Even thatold summarytatement: Everyfifthersonbornon earth s Chinese" hascommunicatedomethingbout thesize of China in thepast, despite pitfallsinthe iteral nterpretationfthat tatementnd feeble okes aboutthe fifth

1See Koopmans (1947) and Hicks (1979), p. ix.2The literature n generalchoice theory s quitevast. Discussionofsome of the main ssuescan be foumd n Herzberger 1973) and Sen (1977b, section 4). Herzberger'srecentconcernwith hoice-theoreticpproachesto semantics elatesclosely to thechoice basis of description,as definedhere.


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A. SEN 355child n an Englishfamily eing called Chang. Insofar s truth s a necessarycondition f good description, he concept of truthmust be a broad one.The second problem s, I think, good deal more complex.Descriptionmay have objectivesthe pursuit f whichcan be helped by departures romtruth-even in thebroad sense. MiltonFriedman 1953), in particular, asarguedpowerfullyn favourofdeparting rom ruthn describing eality nthe context f economicmodels, udgingthe merits f the assumptions otin termsof accuracy but in the lightof theirpredictive sefulness. shallhave somethingo say presently n Friedman'smethodological bservations,and on Paul Samuelson's critiqueof Friedman and the "F-twist",3but atthis tage wouldsimplynote thatFriedmanhas drawnour attention o theimportant ossibility hat an unrealistic ssumption giving an inaccuratedescriptionmay nevertheless e a usefulone for the purpose forwhichthedescriptions intended.Friedmanrestricts isattention o predictive seful-ness only, but the point can be generalized, and objectives other thanpredictive uccess might lso lead to a case for departing romthe truth.Examples can be constructed uch thattruth f descriptions onflictswithusefulness orprescriptive xercises, r even for communication.4 A distinctionmust,however, e made betweena descriptionfsomethingbeing good in the sense of being a good one to give and it being a gooddescriptionof that thing.The aspiringmurdererdemands fromyou adescription fwhere his would-be victimhas gone, and as you pointat thewrongroad he proceeds in that directionwith a roar. That description fwhere the would-be victimhas gone is, I would agree,a good one to give,but it can hardlybe acceptedas a good description f where the would-bevictimhas gone. The goodnessof a description an be judged in termsofmanyalternative riteria, ut in callinga description good description fsomething,ruth-in thebroad sense-would seem to be a necessary ondi-tion.4There isn'tanything erypuzzlinghere,even thoughthe distinction asbeen frequentlyverlooked.A good descriptionfsomething eflects ealityaboutthat hings somestraightforwardense,rather handistortingt.Thisis so evenwhendistortions a commendable ctivityn terms f some otherobjective, and furthermorelso commendabletaking everythingnto ac-count.A cook whohelpsthe arrest f a mass murderer y mixing sleepingdrugwithhis food mightwell be doinggood, but that does not make hiscooking good, nordoes itmake him an outstandingook.

3Samuelson 1963), pp. 231-6; reprintedn Stiglitz 1966), pp. 1772-8.4In terms f M. A. Slote's (1966) "theory f important riteria", ruth an be seen to be animportant riterion f a description einga good description f something.


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356 DESCRIPTION AS CHOICE5

I turnnow to themethodological isputebetweenFriedman nd Samuel-son.5 Friedman argued that the appropriateness f an assumptionmust bejudged not by its realism but by its predictiveusefulness.Furthermore,Friedman saw an inverserelationship etweenrealism of assumptions nditspredictive ontribution.Insofar s a theory an be said to have 'assumptions' t all, and insofar s their'realism' can be judged independentlyf the validity fpredictions,he relationbetween thesignificancef a theory nd the realism'ofitsassumptionss almostthe oppositeof thatsuggestedby the view under criticism. ruly mportantndsignificant ypotheseswill be foundto have 'assumptions' hatare widely naccu-ratedescriptive epresentationsfreality, nd, ngeneral, he moresignificanthetheory, he moreunrealistic he assumptions in thissense).6Characterizinghe approach as "F-twist",Samuelson has attackedFried-man's position harply. If theabstractmodels contain mpirical alsities,wemust ettison hemodels,not gloss over their nadequacies." "The empiricalharmdone bytheF-twist s this. n practice t eads toHumpty-Dumptiness.Lewis Carrollhad Humpty-Dumptyse words anyway he wanted to. I had

in mind somethingdifferent: umpty-Dumpty ses the F-twist to say,'What I choose to call the admissable amount of unrealism nd empiricalinvaliditys the tolerable amount of unrealism"'.'I am notpresentlyoncernedwithwhether riedman s correct nthinkingthat n inverse elationshipendsto existbetweenaccurateassumptionsndpredictive uccess. The important ointto note is thatif such an inverserelationshipwere to obtain,Friedman would be quite willingto sacrificeaccuracy.Stanley Wong (1973) has pointed out that Samuelson's critiquetakesinsufficientoteofthe "instrumental" atureof Friedman'smethodologicalposition, nd the atter's verridingoncernwithprediction.8his, believe,is indeed the case, but the two viewsof description iffer n an issue thatgoes well beyondthequestionof thepredictive ocus. No matterwhat theaim happensto be, as long as it is not-or does not include-makingonlyaccurate statements bout observedfacts, conflict an conceivably risebetweendescriptive ccuracy nd the aim of thedescription. he issue is a

good deal more general than the so-called "F-twist", and concernstheconflict etween aimsofdescriptionnd thetruth f statements hatcan beused to further hese aims.5See also Nagel (1963).6Friedman 1953), p. 14.7Samuelson 1963), p. 236.8See also Boland (1979).


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A. SEN 3576

Another different otivations involved n Nicholas Kaldor's9 advocacyof departurefrom ruthful escription,n favourofwhat he calls "stylizedfacts". These aren't facts n the sense ofbeing true,but theycommunicaterapidlycertainthings that are close enough to being true, but avoid aplethoraof details. An example: that n the Western conomies the capital-outputratioremained tationaryvermanydecades and so did the shareofwages in national ncome.Not exactly rueforall the alluded economies. nfact,notexactly rueforanyofthealluded economies.Still, fthevariationsare relativelymall n comparisonwithother, elated variables, he simplifi-cation will have certainobvious advantages.I have to report that in this case the advantages were probably ratherunequally shared,withthebiggest hare goingto Kaldor himself,who usedthese stylized facts to illustratehis well-known models of growth anddistribution. ut thatwasn't all therewas to it,and someofthestylized actsundoubtedly ucceeded in enhancing omprehension, rawing ttention oimportant bserved regularities,ven though heywerenot quite accurate.However,theimportantssue here isn'twhether heseparticular implifica-tions were all informative ithout eing misleading ut that the methodofusing "stylizedfacts" can indeed have thisproperty.There is nothingexceptional to economics in making stylized facts apossibleand potentially fficient ethodof understanding eality. iction sa generalmethodofcoming o gripwithfacts.There is nothing llegitimatein being helped by War and Peace to an understanding f the Napoleonicwars in Russia, or by Grapes ofWrath o digesting spectsof theDepres-sion. There is no reasonwhy descriptive tatementsn economics have toaspireaftermechanical ccuracy venwhenit conflicts ithcomprehensionand absorption.There is, of course, an obvious objection to presentingnon-facts ressedup as facts, utthere s no need to do thisonce non-factsare accepted as ligitimate escriptive nstruments hemselves. uch a de-scription f somethingwill be good in the sense of being useful,but-asalready explained-must not be confused with its being a good-orrealistic-description f thatthing.7

Samuelson's argument hat"we must ettisonthe models" that "containempirical alsities" eems to be based on a verynarrowviewofobjectivesofdescription. owever,Samuelson wasn'tonlyobjecting o theuse ofempiri-cal falsities n models, but also disputingFriedman'suse of words. Thereference o Humpty-Dumptinesseals with his.This relatescloselyto our9See Kaldor (1960a, 1960b).


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358 DESCRIPTION AS CHOICEdistinction etween a description hat is good and a good description fsomething. riedmannot only defendstheuse of inaccurate ssumptionnpredictive heory, ut also employs newconcept of realism. t is "the testby prediction" n classifyinglternativessumptions as more or less realis-tic" that Friedmanembracesand whichhe sees others being "necessarilydriven" to accept (p. 33).The predictive sefulness f an inaccurate escriptionmaywell ustifyhechoice of thatdescription, ut whydoes itmake it a more realistic escrip-tion? The "instrumental" atureofFriedman'spositionmay be adequate indefending he choice of such an assumption, ut to call it "realistic" is aseparateassertion, iolating he important riterion hata descriptionmustbe true, n the broad sense, to be realistic.Samuelson's objection to thisviolationcannot be dismissedby a pointerto the "instrumental"haracterof Friedman'seconomicmethodology.The defencethatFriedmanprovidesof this characterisationf "realism"mainly akes theform f denying heviabilityfanyalternativeonception.

A theoryor its "assumptions"cannotpossiblybe thoroughlyrealistic" in theimmediate escriptiveense so often ssignedto thisterm.A completely realis-tic" theory f thewheat marketwould have to includenot onlythe conditionsdirectly nderlyinghe supply nd demandforwheat but also thekindofcoins orcredit nstrumentssed tomake exchanges;thepersonalcharacteristicsfwheat-traders uch as the colour of each trader's hair and eyes, his antecedents ndeducation,the numberof membersof his family, heircharacteristics,ntece-dents, and education, etc.; the kindof soil on whichthewheatwas grown, tsphysical nd chemicalcharacteristics,he weatherprevailing uring he growingseason; thepersonalcharacteristicsf thefarmers rowing he wheatand of theconsumerswhowillultimately se it; and so on indefinitely.ny attempt omoveveryfar n achieving his kind of "realism" is certainto rendera theoryutterlyuseless.0In assessing this objection it is necessaryto consider the distinctionbetweenrealism nthe sense of"nothing ut the truth" nd that n the senseof"thewhole truth".An assumption an be realisticn that t s truewithoutthe claim beingmade that it is exhaustive n capturing ll aspects of thereality.Advocates of realism n the sense of "nothingbut the truth"neednotdemand"the whole truth".The dissatisfaction ithFriedman'spositionon the part of critics uch as Samuelson does not arise fromFriedman'srejectionof "the whole truth", ut fromhis rejectionof "nothingbut the

truth".The distinctions importantorFriedman'sdiscussion fdepartures romrealismand the criteria f acceptability f suchdepartures.What is the criterion y whichto judge whethera particulardeparturefromrealism s or is notacceptable?Why s itmore"unrealistic" n analysing usinessbehaviour oneglect hemagnitude f businessmen's oststhanthe colour oftheir

l'Friedman (1953), p. 32.


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A. SEN 361The non-predictive, on-prescriptive otivations re particularlympor-tantto bear in mind in understanding he role of "theories of value" ineconomics, articularlyhe abour theory fvalue. The labour theory an, in

fact, be given various intrepretationselated to the motivationsnvolved.One is that of a predictive heory-in particular hatof relativeprices anddistribution,nd it encompasses the so-called "law of value". Another snormative, roviding theory f entitlements. third,which s frequentlymissed, s a wayof discriminatingetweendifferenteatures fproductionand exchange byfocussing n elementsof human nvolvement.13Value, inMarx's (1887) words, s "a relationbetweenpersonsexpressed s a relationbetweenthings" p. 45).The last interpretations frequently akento be "metaphysical", s JoanRobinson (1964) puts it,describingt also as "a mere rigmarole fwords"(p. 39). Whyso? Because itpicksup from hedescriptionfproduction ndexchange onlysome features s beingspecially ignificant,eaving the restuntouched?The discriminationmakes the description rbitrary,s manycriticshave seen it. But, as I have alreadytried to argue, any descriptioninvolvesdiscriminationnd selection, nd thereal question s the relevanceof the selectionprocessto theobjectivesof description.I have claimed elsewhere14 hat the methodological ssue can be moreeasilyunderstoodby lookingat otherdescriptive tatements n which thediscriminationnvolved annotbe reducedentirelyo predictive rprescrip-tive interests. onsiderthe statement Michaelangeloproducedthe statueof David". There is an obvious sense in whichthiswould be acceptedas arealisticdescription,despite its being informationallyelective and theselectionprocessnot beingprimarilymotivatedby prediction r prescrip-tion. The productionprocess in makingthe statue actually nvolvednot

merelyMichaelangelo, but his helpers, a huge block of stone, chisels,scaffoldings,tc.,butthedescription uoted focusses n Michaelangeloonlyas themost relevantbitofinformation. ote thatthediscriminationannotbe based on any marginal productivityonsideration n the usual neo-classical sense. WithoutMichaelangelo,no statue,but without tone, nostatue either!But this does not give the same status to the twostatements"Michaelangeloproducedthe statueof David" and "this stoneproducedthestatueof David" (or "thisstonequarryproducedthe statueofDavid"). Theselectionprocessreflects thermotivations,n particular, hatof capturingthe source of the imagination isplayed n the statue.The labour theoryof value, in its descrptive nterpretation,hows asimilar-but not thesame-type ofdiscrimination,ocussing-inthiscase-on the human effort irectly nd indirectlynvolved in the process of

"This has been best discussedbyMaurice Dobb (1937).14Sen (1978a) pp. 176-8.


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362 DESCRIPTION AS CHOICEproduction nd exchange of commodities. n assessing he labour theory fvalue as a description f production nd exchange, t is the cogencyof thisfocus that has to be assessed, including ts ability, f any, to capture ourinterest omparedwithothermethods fdiscrimination.xamining nlythetheory's redictive uccess,or its normative elevance,will not even begin toprovide a complete assessment f the labour theory fvalue. And to call itmetaphysical ecause it is informationallyiscriminatingnvolves a totalfailure o perceivethenatureofdescription s an activity.10

I turnnow to theotherof the two greattheories f value, viz., the utilitytheory.Again, utility escriptions ave predictive nd normative nterest,butonce again theydo notexhaust hedescriptivemotivations. he joysandsufferingsf human beings and theirdeprivations nd fulfilments aveinterest f theirown. Even classical politicaleconomistswere muchcon-cerned withrelated-thoughnot identical-features n their ntersetn usevalue.15 t is thispartof thedescriptivemotivation hat has been least wellservedbyrecentdevelopments futility heory,mostnotablybythetheoryofrevealed preference. ocussingonlyon predicting ehaviour, he richnessof humanpsychology as been substantiallygnored,refusing o see any-thing n utility r happinessother than choice. As the "father"of revealedpreference heory, aul Samuelson,puts t: behaviour s to be "explained nterms f preference,which are in turndefined nly by behaviour."'16This has led to an approach that is-despite some predictivemerits-remarkablymute about human oys and sufferingsnwhicheconomicsusedto take a lot of interest.The result s a descriptive mpoverishmentrommany perspectives, ncluding-among others -normativerelevance,sincemanyof the common norms do relateprecisely o the ignored descriptivefeatures.17Attempts t overcoming his lacuna by defining tilitynot interms f choice but ndependently,ay,as a person'sownconceptof his ownwell-being, ut assuming hatpeople do in fact choose accordingto theirrespectiveutilities, aise otherdifficulties.n particular,hisyields view ofman totallyuncommittedo anything ther thanmaximizing is own well-being irrespective f political values, class interests, ommunity pirits ndsocial conventions, xcept insofar s these things ffecthis perceptionof

15This is especially rueof Karl Marx,and as he himself uts t: "use-value plays a farmoreimportant art n my economics than n economicshitherto" Marx (1879-80, p. 39)). In thesubject ndex of volume ofCapital (Marx 1887)), edited by Engels, the first eference o "usevalue" is to pages 1-114. This aspect ofMarx's concern eems to be frequently verlooked ncharacterisationsf Marx's "treatment f value".16Samuelson (1947), pp. 90-1.17See Hicks (1958, 1974). Also Sen (1979).


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A. SEN 363his own well-being. his extraordinaryodel of man-the "rationalfool"'8has been widelyused in economicswithvery ittle mpirical esting.Insularity as permitted histheory o remain n vogue, despiteconspicu-ous failure o account formanytypesof humanbehaviour, .g.,whypeoplevote in large elections,whypeople are ready to fight orand even die for acause, or why so many seem convincedthat theydo manythings ut of asense of commitment atherthan pure pursuitof self interest.Predictingfuture hoice on the basis of past choice is not in itself bad predictivestrategydespitesome well-known roblems).But ifthat s used as theonlyfocus of the theory f utility, hen there s either ilence on many mportantissues (when "utility" s treated as just another name for a numericalreflectorf choice), or there s a good deal of senseless noise.While therehave been some attempts ecently o break away from hishighly imited model, e.g., in the works of Hirsch (1976), Hirschman(1977), Leibenstein 1976), Scitovsky 1976), and a few otherauthors, hedominant traditionof behavioural studies in economics remains largelyshackledto that model. We have, thus,the strange pectacleof two greattheories of "value"-each rich in descriptivefeatures in their originalformulation-reduced o descriptive enuryor to factual rrelevance.Thelabour theoryof value is dismissed as "metaphysical",or at best animperfectntermediate roduct n a theoryof price and distribution. hedelimitation futility heory o one of silentchoice-no questionsasked asto what ies behindchoice-stiflesdescriptive nquiry nto human oys andsufferings.he dominantmethodologyn economicswith tsextraordinarilynarrow nterpretationf objectives of descriptionhas producedmolehillsout ofmountains.11Descriptiveeconomics has sufferedor a long time from he imperialismofpredictiveconomics.Recently t has suffered certain mountalso fromthe new and expanding empire of prescriptiveconomics. Prescriptiveeconomicshad itself ratherhard time earlier n thepositivist eyday.Thedebunking fwarfare conomics that can be seen in suchworks as LionelRobbin's TheNatureand Significance fEconomic Science'9 kept prescrip-tive studiessomewhat mmersed n a pool of apologyfrom hemid-thirtiesuntilrelatively ecently.Welfareeconomics was fora long timethe "un-touchable" in the community f economics and when economistsspoke"qua economist"-to use that ovely expressionbroughtnto circulation y

18Fora critique f the propensityf economictheory o relyon the "rationalfool",see Sen(1977a). For a "balanced" account of the issues involved,see Hahn and Hollis (1979),"Introduction".19Robbins 1932).


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364 DESCRIPTION AS CHOICEpositivism-they riedto speak in a value-free scientific" anguage,with"expletives"deleted. Welfare economicswas seen as the subject, f not ofexpletives, t least of emotiveutterances,whichthecool positivistcientistsfound"meaningless" n terms f theirnarrow heory fmeaning.The balloon did ultimately urst, nd prescriptiveconomicshas certainlyemerged n recentyearsas a vigorousfield-both in thetraditional orms fwelfare conomicsand politicaleconomy s well as in theshape of the newdisciplineof social choice theory.Debates on prescriptivematters re nolonger treated as just a case of "thy blood or mine", to quote LionelRobbin's influential haracterization.But while freeing tselffrom thepositivist rison, prescriptive conomicshas, I would now like to argue,quiteoften mposed ts own shackleson the discipline fdescription.There has been the proposition that every factual statement nvolvesimplicitvalues. In its originalformulation nd use, this claim, which Ibelieve is false, mayhave played a challenging art in the dialecticswithpositivism. So you want factsonly,no values, because they are illegiti-mate," the argument ran, "but you can't have facts without values.Touche'!"But whymusteveryfactual statement nvolvevalues? The basis of theclaim seems to rest uneasily on the belief,which is correct,that anydescriptionnvolves ome selection.What is not correct s the further eliefthat the selection mustbe based on some explicitor implicitprescriptivecriterion. he criteriaused forselection,as I have been arguing,may beaimed at objectives otherthan prescription, .g., cateringto curiosity.Cosmologists r historians ake thisforgranted.There is,ofcourse,a sensein whichthistoo involves judgment, o wit, t is right o caterto people'scuriosityn thechoice basis ofdescription.20ut thisdoes not mply hat heselectionhas to be done in terms fnormative nterests. rescriptions oneof several possible objectives of descriptive election, and to assert itsomnipresences to replacethe imperialismfpredictive conomicsbythatofprescriptiveconomics.12

The enormous success of Gunnar Myrdal's Political Elements in theDevelopment fEconomicTheory wes not a little o thisspirit f huntingforvalues in factual statements.While Myrdal entered the exercise as apositivist,ooking for contrabandvalues, he ended up asserting omethingclose to the impossibilityf prescription-freeescriptive tatements seeMyrdal (1958)). There was, however, some haste and a good deal of

20Even the choice of words reflectsudgments,when"a cluster erm" s used,as to "what sor is not important" Slote (1966), p. 223).


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A. SEN 365unestablished ssertion n detectingunderneatheach bed a surreptitiousprescriptive ead.The chief source of confusionhere rests in confounding he need forselectionin the choice basis of descriptionwith the need to cater toprescriptivends in particular.One consequenceof this llegitimatedentifi-cation s the growth f the recent endency o convert escriptive uestionsinto as ifprescriptivenes. To take an example,considerthe questionofmeasurement f inequalitiesof income. While there is little doubt thatprescriptiventerestprovides one reason for inquiring nto economic in-equality, he question"How much nequality f incomes s there?" cannotbe fully apturedbya prescriptiventerpretation.ut in a paper publishedin 1920,HughDalton,21 in effect,einterpretedhe question n ethicaltermsto mean: "How much oss of social welfare s therefrom nequality?"This prescriptivee-interpretationemained ubdued underthe positivisthegemony stablished hortly fterDalton's paper was published,butwiththe prescriptive acklash,thishas now re-emergedn the front ine. TonyAtkinson's 1970) ethical ndexof economic nequalitymeasures nequalityin terms f thesame approachas thatofDalton, butdoes it more elegantlyand more economically hroughmeasuringhesocial welfare oss in terms fequivalent ncome.This has theconsequencethatthedescriptive eatures fincome inequality re all drowned n a normativeflood, producing omerather xtraordinaryonsequences.An incomedistributionf (99,1) has tobe declared as perfectlyqual if social welfare s taken to be the sum ofindividualutilitiesgivenby a linear function f individual ncomes,sincethere is no social welfareloss from nequality n this case. Other oddconsequences-some more seriousthan others-have been pointedout.22A hard-headedprescriptivistould perhapsremainunaffected y theseconsequences if he really does believe that income inequalityhas noindependent escriptivemeaning t all, and would probably ay somethinglike: "Whynot describe 99,1) as equal ifthere s no socialwelfare oss fromthis inequality, mean, discrepancy?"But inequalitydoes seem to havedescriptivemeaning oowhichpeople acknowledge,23nd to jettison ll thatimpoverishes he subject. One of the ironiesof the situation s thatTonyAtkinson'sownworkson descriptive eatures f nequalitynBritain workswhich in depth and relevance remain,in my opinion, quite unexcelled

21Dalton (1920). For an uncompromisingnd forcefulrejection of this approach, seeWiles (1974).22See Hansson (1977) and Sen (1978b).23This s, however,not the same as asserting hatthere re no ambiguitiesn thedescriptivemeaning,nor that t mustyield a complete rdering. hese issues have been discussed n Sen(1978b), whichshows,amongother things, hat the partial ordering f unambiguous thicalranking giventhe commonly sed value frameworks)s not moreextensivethanthepartialordering f unambiguousdescriptive anking in termsof the commonly ccepteddescriptivecriteria).


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366 DESCRIPTION AS CHOICEanywhere),cannot be captured at all within the arena of the Dalton-Atkinson measures.Nor can ethical measurement rovidethe appropiatebackgroundfor checking such relations as that between inequality andcrime.We are back again at the question of realism. Friedman dismissed tsclaim on the ground that the only way of tellingrealism is predictiverelevance; the Dalton-Atkinson pproach to themeasurement f inequalityamounts o dismissingt on the ground hatthe onlycriterion s prescriptiverelevance. Neither eems correct, ut both have a good deal of following.There are twodistinct bjectionsto the ethical ndexesof nequality. irst,ethicalconcern s notthe only motivation ehindmeasuring nequality, ndmightnot even be the most importantmotivation n many cases. Second,even ifethical concernwerethedominantmotivation, distinction tillhasto be made betweena description f inequality hat s useful and a gooddescriptionf nequality as discussed nsection4). Even ifwe are interestedin inequalityprimarily ecause of the loss of social welfare from t, thequestions "How muchinequality s there?" and "How much loss of socialwelfare s there from nequality?"are not identicalqueries. There may beno loss of socialwelfare rom distribution99,1), but it is absurd to call itan equal distribution.13

A related, houghnot exactlyparallel, problemhas arisen n theconcep-tualizationof proverty. he distinguished mericansociologistMollie Or-shansky 1969) has not been alone in arguingthat "poverty s a valuejudgment", nd the approachis well-reflectedyher often-quoted phor-ism: "Poverty, ikebeauty, ies in theeye of the beholder" (p. 37). Does itreally? Orshansky'sview is an amalgam of takinga prescriptive iew ofdescription ofpoverty, n thiscase), and-additionally-a subjectivist iewof prescription. oth assertionshave superficialplausibility, ut neitherclaimis, I believe,easy to sustain.Here we are really oncernedwith he former laim,viz.,thatpovertys avalue judgment. his assertion uffersrom ifficultiesather imilar o thosethatapplyto ethical measurement f inequality.Povertydescription-likeany description-involves election,but value interestsmaynotprovidetheonlymotivation nderlyingelection.Furthermoreven ifprescription eretheonlyreasonforwhichpeople take an interestn poverty-this believeis notthe case butassuming hat hiswere thecase-poverty descriptionwillthenreflect ociallyheld value judgments ather hanbe value judgementsthemselves.As Marx (1887) had argued, discussingthe concept of "subsistence",whilethenotion of "the so-callednecessarywants" have "a historical nd


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A. SEN 367moral element", "nevertheless n a given country, t a givenperiod, theaveragequantity f the means ofsubsistence s practically nown" p. 150).For thesocial scientist tudying overty, heexercise s not one of unleash-ing one's morals on thestatistics fdeprivation.Rather t is theexercise ofassessing hese statisticsn line with ociallyheldviews as to whatcounts spoverty.These viewsmayor may not themselves e moralones, but evenwhenthey re moral,forthe personstudying heseviews,they re mattersoffact,viz., thatsuch views are held.24To describewhatprescriptionsremade is a description, ot a prescription.14

The view thatpoverty s a value judgmenthas often had the peculiarconsequenceof leadingto attempts o avoid the use of the word"poverty"in social communication.n Indian official ocuments-includingplanningpapers-the words "poor" and "unemployed"have been replaced fairlyuniformlyytheexpression: theweaker sectionof the ndianpopulation".This may have been morallywell-motivated, ut it has not been descrip-tivelyvery lluminating. s it happens, people drawn from this "weakersectionof the Indianpopulation"do theheavywork n India,varying rombreaking tones and bending ron to carrying eavy loads on theirheads.However, it has been possible to avoid being constantly emindedof thefactsof overwhelming overty n India by the peculiar terminology. fcourse, this practice has to be distinguished rom the spiritof MollieOrshansky's laim,but the view thatpoverty s nothingbut a value judg-mentdoes open up many possibilities. t also eases the way to achievingwhat the late Daniel Thorner (1956) had characterised-in a paper onIndiancensuses-as "AgrarianRevolutionbyCensusRedefinition".ndeed,we have very ittlehardfacts bout,say,theplight f the"untouchables" nIndia because not contentwithcallingthemby themorally uperiorname"Harijan"-"children of God"-as Mahatma Gandhi had renamedthem,the census authoritiesproceeded to discontinuedata collection on themorally ffensiveubjectof thepracticeof untouchability.To return o my general theme,the prescriptiveradition n the socialsciences-freed at last from he shacklesofpositivist ismissal-has startedexercising n imperialismf its own.15Finally, fewconcluding emarks.First,descriptionnevitablynvolves election. t can be usefully een as achoice of a subset from set ofpossiblestatements.

24While ypicallyhe exercisemaybe concernedwithviews held in thecommunitynwhichpoverty s being measured,this need not always be the case. For example, "internationalstandards" are sometimesused forthe measurement f "national" poverty.


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368 DESCRIPTION AS CHOICESecond, truths clearlynot a sufficientonditionfora description o begood.Third, nor is it a necessary ondition.Friedman's defence of departures

from truth n choosing factual assumptions s a special case of a generalargument n favour of judging descriptionby its usefulness. Friedmanconsidersonly predictiveusefulness, ut there are otherobjectives whichlead to the same conclusion. amuelson's assertion f the need to "jettison"models thatcontain"empiricalfalsities" eems to take a verynarrowviewof description s an activity.Fourth,Friedman's ttackon traditional otionsofrealism s based on amisunderstanding.is ownsuggestionbout judgingrealismby"the testbyprediction" eems to confound sefulness fa description ith tsrealism.Adescription f something an be a good one to givewithoutbeing a gooddescription f that thing.Fifth, escription an be motivated y predictiventerest r by prescrip-tive nterest, ut tmayalso have othermotivations,nd to confine ttentiononly to predictiveor prescriptiventerest mpoverishes he traditions fdescriptive conomics.Finally, uch mpoverishmentan be seen in recentdevelopments n manydifferentieldsof economics, varyingfrom nterpretationsf theories of"value" to the measurement f inequalityand poverty.The richnessofdescriptivemotivations eems to have been sacrificed orconsistency ithinan arbitrarily arrowconceptionof these motivations, r-to be moreexact-for consistency espectivelywithin two arbitrarily arrowconcep-tions of motivations. his, I have argued,has been an unequal exchange:confounding he nature of description s an activity nd unnecessarilyweakening the theoreticalunderpinning f many legitimateand usefulactivitiesn the social sciences.All Souls CollegeOxford.

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