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SELLING SCIENCE?

Source struggles, public relations, and UK

press coverage of animal�human hybrid

embryos

Andy Williams and Slavko Gajevic

Over the last 20 years science news has been written by dwindling numbers of reporters, with

higher workloads, and less time than previously to conduct tasks such as finding, researching, and

checking news stories. Simultaneously, a growing science communication sector is developing

more power to influence what, and how, such news is reported. This paper examines media

coverage of animal�human hybrid embryos in the context of a highly efficient public relations

campaign by a coalition of scientists and scientific organisations in the United Kingdom. It draws

on the findings of a comprehensive content analysis of UK national press coverage of the issue,

and 16 semi-structured interviews with specialist science journalists, key news sources, and press

officers on both sides of a polarised media debate. We argue that while science communicators

won a convincing media victory, the broad (and unintended) effects of such campaigns highlight

concerns about media independence, and the openness and quality of public and scientific debate

about controversial science.

KEYWORDS animal�human hybrid embryos; public relations; science communication;

science news

Introduction: Hybrid Embryos in the News

This article explores an often bitter struggle between a powerful coalition of

scientists, funding bodies, charities, and politicians, on the one hand, and a less cohesive

group of religious figures, ethicists, campaigners, and politicians, on the other, concerning

the media representation of animal�human hybrid embryos between January 2006 and

November 2008. Some scientists wanted to create the controversial embryos in order to

harvest stem cells and study the development of incurable diseases and conditions such as

motor-neurone disease, Alzheimer’s, and Parkinson’s (Bobrow 2009). It was hoped that

such lab-based studies would yield insights that would eventually lead to cures and

therapies. Their opponents feared that fusing animal and human genetic material was a

step too far, and that stem cell scientists already enjoyed very liberal regulatory and legal

environments. The event which triggered the PR backlash from scientists and science

communicators was a proposal to ban the practice in a draft version of the UK Human

Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Bill. The analysis presented here reveals that those who

supported hybrids won a clear media relations victory, e.g. substantially more sources

were quoted in favour of the science than against, and the scientists’ key messages

dominated media discourse. This success was aided by a co-ordinated, well-resourced, and

tactically rich PR campaign which drew on a range of communication techniques such as:

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relationship management; the provision of information subsidies like press releases,

briefing papers, and press conferences; and rapid reaction crisis management. But this

success, arguably, came at a price.

Literature Review: Science, News Sources, and Public Relations

Numerous studies have found that, when writing about science, journalists often get

too close to their news sources. Dorothy Nelkin’s influential study, Selling Science, found

that ‘‘many journalists are in effect retailing science and technology more than

investigating it, identifying with their sources more than challenging them’’ (1995, 164).

Likewise, Hansen highlights science journalists’ over-reliance on official and elite sources

(1994, 111) and Boyce suggests relationships between science journalists and sources are

‘‘too familiar to remain ‘objective’’’ (2007, 33). Research into human genomics news has

also suggested such relationships have led to uncritical displays of optimism when

reporting claims about the benefits of the technology (Haran et al. 2008; Petersen 2001;

Kitzinger and Reilly 1997). Some have suggested that the relationship between science

journalists and scientists has grown so uncritical that specialists, in effect, act like a

priesthood to science (Murcott 2009, 104). The reasons for the power imbalance between

journalists and their sources are numerous, but it is commonly argued that the political

economic constraints under which journalists work play a significant role. The kind of

scrutiny and scepticism demanded by the likes of Murcott is becoming more difficult in UK

newsrooms, at least in part, because so many have been starved of resources over the last

two decades.

Journalism’s contraction in this period has been more than matched by an

unprecedented expansion in the field of PR and media management, and science

journalism has been affected by these trends as much as any other news beat. Williams

and Clifford’s work found the numbers of specialist science news journalists at many UK

news outlets are in decline, with most such reporters fearing further job cuts (2010, 25�6).

It also shows how science specialists are under significant pressure to do more work across

more media platforms than previously and that this is leading to news about science

which is more homogenous, less independent, less critical, and increasingly reliant on PR

(36�56). This echoes the findings of numerous studies which have charted the growing

importance of science public relations in setting agendas, influencing media frames,

mediating news events, and in some cases actually providing journalists with the very

words and images that make up the science news we consume (Gopfert 2008; Machill,

Beiler, and Schmutz 2006; Weigold 2001, 171).

Those who explore the ‘‘medialisation’’ of science have shown how scientists, in

order to legitimatise their work and secure continued funding, have increasingly sought to

‘‘seek public and media attention rather than the truth’’ (Rodder 2009, 453). This media

orientation has encouraged the rapid professionalisation and expansion of media relations

work by many scientific organisations (Schaffer 2011, 402). This is perhaps most obviously

visible in ‘‘big science’’ enterprises, such as the Human Genome Project, which have

openly engaged in lobbying and large-scale media relations drives (Rodder and Schaffer

2010). But universities, scientific journals, and other bodies have also expanded their

media teams, and now routinely make extensive use of promotional tactics (Anderson

2002, 331; Clegg Smith, Friedman Singer, and Edsall Kromm 2010; Henderson and

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Kitzinger 2007; Williams and Clifford 2010; Williams, Kitzinger, and Henderson 2003). Bauer

and Gregory usefully begin to theorise such developments when they describe them as

part of a shift away from a democratic, dialogic, and public-centred model of science

communication to an ‘‘incorporated’’, one-way, business-influenced, persuasion-oriented

model which they call ‘‘public understanding of science incorporated’’, or ‘‘PUS Inc.’’ (2007,

47�8).

Such broad concerns are echoed in some of the few academic studies which

explicitly seek to understand news coverage of human genomics in the context of science

PR. Haran and Kitzinger (2009) explored these issues in relation to the scandal surrounding

the academic malpractice of Korean stem cell scientist Hwang. They claim the media were,

at least in part, taken in by Hwang’s hoax because of specialist science journalism’s routine

reliance on (and proximity to) official sources, its continued ‘‘investment in narratives of

scientific progress’’, and persistent susceptibility to science communicators’ repeated and

continued emphasis on the promise of stem cell research (647�8). Henderson and

Kitzinger (2007) build on previous research into scientists’ use of promotional metaphors

in the news (Nerlich and Clarke 2003; Nelkin 1994), and consider such framing devices as

an integral part of the Wellcome Trust’s news management of the publication of a

‘‘working draft’’ of the Human Genome. They critique the notion of ‘‘science by soundbite’’

(69), suggest that journalists and news sources colluded in hyping the story, and argue

that the role of source�media strategies in ‘‘packaging’’ the story was central to this

process (80�1). More recently Rodder and Schaffer (2010) have described how publicly

funded US scientists from the Human Genome Project came under huge pressure to

sequence the human genome quickly, partly because of a media relations battle instigated

by their private competitor Celera. They show how media and commercial pressure led

Human Genome Project scientists to frame their efforts in a much more ‘‘promotional’’

manner, to employ ‘‘misinformation’’ and ‘‘spin’’, and ultimately to downgrade their

research goal from completely sequencing the human genome to completing a ‘‘working

draft’’, or a ‘‘PR version’’, of the genome (258�9). Less research has been done specifically

on news coverage of animal�human hybrid embryos. Haran notes a failure among

journalists to interrogate the claims of scientists rigorously, a lack of ‘‘critical engagement’’

with the wider social contexts of the science, and examines how the media management

and framing of hybrids raises concerns about the space for open public dialogue about

controversial science (2009, 2011). Stressing that she does not imply ‘‘wilful or malicious’’

intent on the part of the UK Science Media Centre (SMC), she criticises the organisation’s

structural role in this debate. She argues the SMC’s ‘‘unashamedly pro-science’’ advocacy

function leaves little room for two-way ‘‘citizen focused’’ approaches to science

communication (Haran 2011, 241).

These studies all raise concerns about the potentially damaging social and cultural

effects of the role of PR in seeking to promote, publicise, and manage discourse about

science in the news media. The problem is approached in two principal, but related, ways.

Broadly speaking, critiques from journalism studies tend to focus on damage to the quality

and independence of science news caused by a weakened news media’s susceptibility to

messages supplied by a strong science PR sector. The media’s ability to play a sceptical,

critical role in holding science to account is diminished, it is suggested, when over-worked

journalists become more reliant on material provided to them by media managers. A

related strand of this critique emphasises the unequal distribution of power and resources

between news sources, and fears that those with the most resources or authority can, in

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some instances, be assured of more favourable news coverage. On the other hand,

accounts from those who study science communication from the sociology of science

perspective tend to stress a diminished role for active publics in debate about, and with,

science in society. Both approaches highlight potential problems which could lead to a

weakened role for citizens who wish to actively engage in debate about science: because

they may be ill-informed by news discourse unduly influenced by powerful news sources

with vested interests; or sidelined from the democratic governance of science by a

growing emphasis on persuasion over engagement, participation, and meaningful debate.

Methods

In the research reported here we sought to answer the following questions:

. What were the aims and tactics of science communicators in the hybrid embryos debate?

. How successful were science media managers at influencing newspaper coverage of

hybrid embryos?

. Are there any problems associated with such media relations campaigns around

controversial science?

A multi-method approach was adopted. In order to determine which source groups

were most successful at generating coverage, and to examine the nature of their

interventions, we completed a comprehensive analysis of coverage (427 items) in the UK

national press (broadsheets, tabloids, and mid-market) between January 2006 and

December 2008.1 All coding categories were developed inductively from scrutinising

the media coverage, and from a thorough knowledge of previous similar content and

discourse analyses of genomics coverage. Notes were made to ensure consistent

categorisation of basic details such as format, news hook, and journalist specialism, as

well as more complex coding categories relating to sources quoted and the kinds of

arguments and rhetoric most commonly used on both sides of the debate.

Analysis of the manifest content of media messages can generate findings which

indicate the success (or not) of a media management campaign. It can also outline and

suggest broad areas of media management work that were successful or not. But in order

to get under the skin of the media, to gain insights into exactly how news sources sought

to influence media discourse, it is necessary to carry out research with the full range of

social actors involved in the processes of news production. We therefore also conducted

16 semi-structured interviews with key participants in the media debates including:

specialist science journalists, primary news sources such as scientists, campaigners, and

religious leaders, as well as press officers and senior media managers (Table 1). Some

participants wished to remain anonymous, and identifying information has been removed

from quotations for this reason.

The findings of the content analysis were used to inform a semi-structured interview

design which focused on exploring the following broad areas: the media management

aims of participants on both sides of the debate; the resources that media managers

devoted to the communication of the science; the public relations tactics employed;

whether and how news sources collaborated and co-operated with other groups of news

sources; and finally, potential or actual problems that arose around the media manage-

ment of the hybrid embryos story. This article will mainly draw on the interview data from

journalists, and those who argued in favour of allowing the creation of hybrid embryos,

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because the principal aim is to understand and interrogate how the science was sold to

the news media, the public, and policy makers with a particular emphasis on the media

relations strategies used.

Findings and Discussion

Aims and PR Tactics

A highly organised PR coalition. One of the most striking characteristics of the PR

campaign in favour of hybrid embryos was the organised show of media-management

unity by participants (it is rare, if not unprecedented), that such a large range of

organisations with an interest in communicating science should work together so closely,

and for so long).2 Early on in the development of the story a coalition of scientists and

press officers formed to allow the groups involved to pool PR resources, putting aside

sectional or organisational interests. The coalition, which grew substantially over the

course of the debate, was co-ordinated by the SMC, which instituted a fortnightly PR ‘‘war

party’’ (Minger) in December 2006 to plan media strategy in response to government

plans to ban the creation of hybrid embryos in the upcoming HFE Act. The coalition

consisted of a large number of organisations and individuals, but key members were:

scientists whose work would be affected by the proposed ban (Stephen Minger and Chris

Shaw, Kings College; Lyle Armstrong, Newcastle University; as well as Robin Lovell-Badge

from the Medical Research Council (MRC)); learned societies (Academy of Medical Sciences,

Royal Society); research councils and funding bodies (MRC, Biotechnology and Biological

Sciences Research Council, Wellcome Trust) and press officers (e.g. from the SMC and

numerous disease charities).

The overriding motivation for the formation of this coalition cited by interviewees

was the perceived need to convince the public and policy makers that hybrid embryo

TABLE 1

Semi-structured interview participants

Press officersFiona Fox, Director, Science Media CentreWill Greenacre, Press Officer, Science Media CentrePress Officer, UK learned societyPress Officer, medical research charityNick Hillier, Press Officer, Academy of Medical Sciences

ScientistsProf. Robin Lovell-Badge, Head of Developmental Genetics at the Medical Research CouncilProf. Sir Leszek Borysiewicz, (then) Chief Executive, Medical Research CouncilDr Stephen Minger, (then) Senior Lecturer in Stem Cell Biology at Kings College, London

JournalistsSteve Connor, Science Editor, IndependentMark Henderson, Science Editor, The TimesRoger Highfield, (then) Science Editor, Daily TelegraphNational newspaper specialist science/health journalist (anonymous)

OpponentsArchbishop Peter Smith, (then) Archbishop of CardiffPeter Kearney, Director, Scottish Catholic Media OfficeDr Calum MacKellar, Director, Scottish Council on Human BioethicsJosephine Quintavalle, Director, Comment on Reproductive Ethics

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research should not be banned, and that decisions on regulating the science should be left

to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA). This was deemed important

for a number of overlapping reasons. Primary amongst those cited in the interviews was

the hope that this laboratory-based research could lead to therapies and cures for a range

of diseases and debilitating conditions. Secondary reasons include: the defence of

‘‘scientific freedom’’ (Minger); the principle of defending science from ‘‘anti-science’’

opponents (Lovell-Badge); the importance of defending science in the media against the

backdrop of recent perceived science PR failures (one press officer told us, ‘‘We can’t keep

having people saying ‘you got it wrong on MMR [measles, mumps and rubella vaccine],

you got it wrong on BSE [bovine spongiform encephalopathy], you got it wrong on GM

[genetically modified] foods.’ There’s an element of professional pride about it’’ (Hillier);

another stated, ‘‘this was our GM’’ (Fox)).

Managing relationships between scientists and science journalists. PR is as much

concerned with managing relationships with key publics as it is about managing

communication (Broom, Casey, and Ritchey 2000; Ledingham 2003), and one of the key

publics targeted by the coalition were specialist science and health journalists. The

cultivation and dissemination of key messages was accompanied by a well-planned, and

highly effective, drive to cement already strong relationships between scientists and

specialist reporters. This was made somewhat easier by the fact that many of the key

reporters, scientists, and press officers in this debate belong to very close-knit social, as

well as professional, networks. Key ‘‘relationship management’’ tools were regular media

briefings at the SMC (there were five dealing with hybrids between 2006 and 2008). Such

briefings, a regular feature at the SMC, usually begin with a number of scientists giving

presentations in front of an audience of invited specialist journalists followed by an open

question and answer session.

From an early stage, and certainly before this became a contentious political story,

relationships were mobilised and cultivated between these beat reporters and relevant

scientists which would endure throughout. A lot of the language used to describe these

events stresses the briefings were a chance for the scientists to communicate their plans in

a neutral, value-free, way. But while all effort was undoubtedly made to ensure against any

mis-communication of the science, these events can also be seen as largely pre-emptive

exercises in ‘‘issues management’’, a field of PR which arose out of US corporations’

urge to protect against public criticism and adverse legislation (Heath 1997). As one

communicator told us, ‘‘you always have to tailor your communications to your audience

and so the minute you start that process, then you are, I guess, . . . trying to persuade

someone’’ (press officer, UK learned society). In a PR battle aimed at constructing

persuasive narratives for understanding the science, they were tightly managed media

events set up in order to secure ‘‘maximum impact’’ for the scientists (Fox).

Another, more common, relationship management tool used by the SMC was their

popular time-saving service of connecting journalists with ‘‘media-friendly’’ scientists on

their 800-strong database of contacts (Greenacre). Other members of the PR coalition also

report doing this kind of work very often during busy periods, such as the bill’s progress

through parliament in 2008 (Hillier; medical research charity press officer). The health

charities, for their part, worked hard to put reporters in touch with affected patients to

satisfy the reporters’ demands for ‘‘human-interest stories’’ (medical research charity press

officer). A number of press officers also told us about (very rare) instances in which they

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‘‘seeded’’ exclusive information or stories to individual journalists, which is another key

tool in building relationships of mutual dependence.

There are some strong indications that relationship management with specialists

was effective for the coalition. Unusually, more science specialist journalists covered this

story than any other group of reporters (Table 2).

In a general content analysis of science coverage in the UK media, Boyce, Kitzinger,

and Lewis (2007, 19�20) found that only 10 per cent of all science news is normally written

by specialist reporters, rising to 16 per cent of articles specifically about human genetics.

Yet here, even after the hybrid embryos story became ‘‘political’’ when the bill was passing

through Parliament, many of the stories were at least co-authored by science journalists.

Interviews suggest these reporters retained ‘‘ownership’’ of the story after having covered

it for a number of years already, and that this allowed them to convince editors to let them

continue reporting about it. This was the case for those specialists who worked on

newspapers traditionally antipathetic to embryonic stem cell science, as well as those on

more supportive titles.

The benefits to the coalition of cultivating the science beat are clear. Of course, such

specialists are often more able to understand and communicate complex science, but

there are other practical advantages. In this case science and health specialists were far

more likely to cite pro-hybrid sources (principally scientists), and far less likely to quote

opponents (mainly reproductive ethics campaigners), than other groups of journalists

(Figure 1).

Pro-hybrid sources outnumbered their opponents overall in the news coverage: 53

per of all quoted sources were in favour of hybrids compared with 34 per cent against.

The coalition’s media relations success cannot be wholly explained by the influence

of strong PR, of course. Other factors include a lack of co-ordinated PR opposition from

those who opposed the science, little vocal dissent from other scientists (whether founded

or not), and the fact there was no real widespread public opposition to the science (all of

which have been present in other science controversies such as the MMR autism scare, or

the coverage of GM foods in the early 2000s). That said, the testimony of many

stakeholders suggests the coalition’s press strategy played a significant part in securing

favourable coverage (Fox, UK learned society press officer, Connor, MacKellar, Quintavalle).

Addressing the influence of the early SMC briefings, one science journalist explained it was

most marked in the coverage of tabloids and mid-markets traditionally least sympathetic

TABLE 2

The specialism of reporters in press coverage of hybrid embryos

N %

Science/health 131 29.2Political 88 19.6No named journalist 80 17.9Letter to the editor 51 11.4Unspecified/general reporter 42 9.4Columnist 20 4.5Other specialism 13 2.9Guest writer: science/medical 9 2.0Guest writer: other 9 2.0Guest writer: religion/ethics 5 1.1Total 448 100.0

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to embryonic stem cell science (Henderson). Early PR management of the issue meant that

throughout 2007 the coalition could cultivate contacts and hone their messages without

significant opposition. Those who spoke against the science in this period were either

isolated individuals or small campaigning groups, and they did not co-ordinate their PR

(MacKellar; Quinatavalle). By the time the better-resourced press offices of the Catholic

Church in England and Wales, and in Scotland intervened, they did so in a media

environment that was already largely sympathetic to the scientists’ case.

Managing messages: text-based information subsidies. As well as relationship manage-

ment, the coalition also produced high volumes of conventional text-based ‘‘information

subsidies’’ for journalists (Gandy 1982). The SMC’s ‘‘roundup’’ press releases were

particularly successful. These documents aim to ‘‘put research into context’’, and differ

from conventional press releases in that they are composed entirely of quotations from

scientists and other sources (Greenacre). They are usually pre-emptive attempts to manage

news coverage, and are often written in anticipation of breaking news about controversial

science. They are invariably embargoed in order to control when this information is

allowed to be published. One SMC press officer claimed, ‘‘It’s purely about putting the

comments of the scientists out, so that when journalists do cut and paste bits of press

releases, which they obviously do . . . they’re cutting and pasting quotes from the best

scientists who kind of represent the scientific consensus’’ (Greenacre). The SMC is insistent

that these documents do not overtly attempt to impose a narrative on the issue at hand:

‘‘When churnalism does happen they’re just churning the scientists’ words and not a pre-

agreed ‘line’ from the SMC’’ (Greenacre).

This emphasis on information transfer over rhetoric and persuasion is telling. As

Haran argues, the organisation’s claim that it ‘‘eschews PR’’ is somewhat problematic, as

the line between information and persuasion can be hard, perhaps impossible, to draw

(2011, 247). Reticence to see what the coalition did as ‘‘conventional PR’’ and discursive

anxieties about accusations of spin are important. The SMC has undoubtedly taken

measures to minimise their own organisation’s rhetorical influence on framing, or selling,

science. However, there is still inevitably a large amount of selection, editing, and framing

FIGURE 1

Proportion of pro- or anti-hybrid sources quoted by reporters from different specialist news

beats (N�646)

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involved in composing texts like this. Furthermore, the scientists quoted in these

roundups do not exist in a promotional vacuum: many are experienced media operators,

and all had the support of institutional press officers. A key element of PR practice is the

formulation and careful design of key messages. This has led to a professional focus on

‘‘message design and dissemination to achieve awareness, to inform, to persuade*even

to manipulate’’ (Heath 2001, 2). Fox told us that although the SMC ‘‘imitated’’ conventional

PR campaigners, she did not see their work as a campaign, and they never met to

formulate key ‘‘campaign messages’’, something which surprised her fellow non-science

PRs. But whether they consciously planned them or not it is clear from the content analysis

that a shared set of messages existed.

Arguments which mention the promise of potential cures and therapies occur in

three-quarters of all articles which mention hybrid embryos (Table 3). Other arguments

include: the guarantee that embryos would be destroyed before they were two weeks old;

the justification that hybrids were needed to overcome a shortage of donated human

eggs; the suggestion that the hybrids were mainly human in terms of their genetic make-

up, in order to counter arguments about creating monsters, and desecrating nature; as

well as the assurance that the embryos would never be allowed to develop in animal or

human wombs. Variations on such claims permeate the press releases, briefings, and other

information subsidies supplied by all partners in the coalition throughout the campaign.

These messages do serve to pass on information from science communicators, of course.

But they also frame the debate in ways that are advantageous to those who supported the

science; they are (highly convincing) persuasive tools which are easily digestible and

reproducible by overworked journalists working to tight deadlines.

The messages used by anti-hybrid sources were not reproduced as often as pro-

hybrid ones, and when they were cited they rarely set the agenda of news stories and

were more likely to be ‘‘reaction quotes’’. Even when opponents did manage to set the

media agenda, the coalition’s ‘‘crisis management’’ (Regester and Larkin 2005) was highly

effective at turning the tide of coverage back in their favour. For instance, on 20 March

2008 the highly influential Cardinal Keith O’Brien used his Easter sermon to condemn the

science as ‘‘grotesque’’, of ‘‘Frankenstein proportions’’, and a ‘‘monstrous attack on human

rights, human dignity, and human life’’ (SCMC 2008). The intervention gained widespread

coverage in the Sunday newspapers. However, the SMC co-ordinated a very successful

fight back, with one of its ‘‘rapid reaction roundups’’ consisting of quotations from

numerous scientists repeating the (by now finely honed) arguments they had made in

favour of hybrids for over a year already, and complaining about scaremongering, unfair,

and inaccurate attacks from the church hierarchy (Fox; Minger; SMC 2008). This was

followed up by an exhausting schedule of media appearances and interviews by key

TABLE 3

Most common arguments in favour of hybrid embryos (N�427)

Stories

N %

Promise of potential or actual therapies/cures 315 73.8Embryos destroyed after 14 days (or sooner) 124 29.0Shortage of eggs justification 109 25.5Embryos still mainly human (e.g. containing 99.9% human DNA) 99 23.2Embryos will not be placed in humans/animals 82 19.2

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scientists (Minger), and a rhetorically strong intervention in The Times from Catholic

scientist, and (then) chief executive of the MRC, Prof. Sir Leszek Borysiewicz (The Times,

March 29, 2008).

Potential problems with such PR campaigns. In instrumental terms these science

communicators won a clear media victory, which was later compounded by the proposed

ban on creating hybrids not being implemented. But science media relations campaigns

should not be judged on their effectiveness alone. We turn now to a series of potential

problems which relate to the ability of a weakened science news media to act as an

interrogative watchdog, and anxieties around the social effects of promoting messages

about science to the media in this way. These problems are not general to the

communication work carried out by the press offices under discussion, but rather specific

to these kinds of persuasive, single-issue, pan-organisational campaigns. Indeed groups

like the SMC routinely work effectively in a difficult environment to improve (often

sensationalist or ill-informed) media coverage of controversial science as well as broad

areas such as scientific uncertainty, risk, methods, and processes such as peer review.

Likewise, these criticisms are not raised with a view to apportioning blame to individuals

or organisations. The problems raised here are too complicated for blame games, but they

do have potential impacts on the news coverage of, and the nature and quality of public

debate about, scientific controversy.

Churnalism, Science PR, and Accountability

Three of the four science press officers we interviewed confirmed they regularly

experience ‘‘cut and paste journalism’’, and that their material was routinely ‘‘churned’’ in

the reporting of hybrids. One stated: ‘‘You send a press release out and it gets picked up

by a newswire and [then] you can see it on 80 different websites. And for me it’s

brilliant . . . You could say that churnalism is a sign that science press officers have got their

jobs down pat’’ (Hillier). In common with other science press officers, however, he was also

aware that such dependence might be problematic, explaining that, in another sense

‘‘I shouldn’t really celebrate that, I should really say ‘that’s a bit bad’ . . . I very rarely get

questioned on the press releases that we send out’’ (Hillier). Another told us that

churnalism was quite a widespread problem ‘‘despite what journalists might say’’ (Fox).

She was highly critical of the trend, but admitted that her organisation’s success was

linked with the slow demise of the news media: ‘‘It’s perhaps ironic, because we reject

churnalism, and we critique it. But we acknowledge the SMC is a reaction to churnalism,

we work so well because of it’’ (Fox).

By necessity, most media relations work influences the news media from offstage,

beyond the view of all but the most careful and tenacious readers. This can be

problematic. The effects of the coalition’s relationship management, although clearly

significant, are difficult to quantify for media researchers; they are almost completely

invisible to the media audiences. Fiona Fox is very open about the fact that despite their

very close relationships, ultimately, journalists and science PRs have ‘‘different interests’’.

She explained:

mostly [journalists] don’t notice that because . . .we’re so open. They think we’re with

them, and that we only exist to serve them. [But] we work on behalf of the scientific

community and we’re going to use our savvy and our media skills to get them the best

media coverage and the best impact.

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Although the SMC is a highly effective press office, and its employees are ethical

public relations operatives, this statement is telling. However imperfectly applied in

practice, in principle, journalists have a commitment to upholding the public interest. PR

usually has a primary commitment to organisational self-interest. These two do not always

overlap. Information subsidies are not always free; they can have a hidden price which can

manifest itself in effects on news independence and, by implication, the possibilities for

full public debates about controversial science.

The ‘‘C-word’’: When is a Campaign Not a Campaign?

One problem identified by this study is a lack of willingness on the part of science

communicators to accept they took part in a persuasive PR campaign with political aims.

There is a clear tension in their discourse about whether they actually campaigned or not.

We use the word throughout because we see this unequivocally as a PR campaign: an

organised, professional, and systematic attempt to persuade politicians and the public to

support well-defined goals. All four press officers we interviewed disagree with us on this.

Minger was somewhat atypical in acknowledging this was a campaign: ‘‘I didn’t like the

idea that it was a campaign’’, he told us, ‘‘but once we publicly said, ‘we’re not going to

allow the Government to dictate what is acceptable research’, then you’re a little bit on a

crusade’’. His discomfort stems in part from the fact that some participating organisations

(e.g. the MRC) are restricted in their ability to campaign politically, but it also relates to

general anxieties about the appropriateness of scientists engaging in persuasive PR

campaigns about the benefits of their professional practices. It is linked to the above-

mentioned sensitivity of many communicators about the persuasive aspects of their PR

drive, and their insistence on the neutral, value-free, transfer of information to the media.

Robin Lovell-Badge’s explanation of such reticence is telling:

‘‘Campaign’’ sounds a little bit like, either it’s personal interest or you sort of distort the

truth a little bit to try and get your way . . .A campaign is like the pro-life groups did,

writing to all their MPs [Members of Parliament] and saying vote against, without giving

the full information . . . I refer to [what we did] as a campaign, but always in inverted

commas, because I don’t think it really was. If you like, it was a campaign for the truth,

and it was to provide, as much as we could, the scientific truth to Members of both

Houses of Parliament in such a way that they could make their own decision in an

informed way.

The implication seems clear: campaigning is done by self-interested (and possibly

manipulative) publics; but when scientists use similar tactics the persuasive act should be

understood differently. It is marked as exceptional by the use of quotation marks, and

inoculated against the taint of vested interest by the certainty of scientific truth. This

displays quite an un-reflexive approach to the nature of ideology, discourse, and the

plurality of meaning in communicative acts. It also suggests a rather scientistic privileging

of the authority of scientists over that of lay publics.

Leszek Borysiewicz also told us he did not see the coalition’s work on hybrids as a

campaign, but it seems that his experience of the PR drive around hybrids left him with

some concerns:

It’s not my responsibility to promote a particular line or direction. It is our responsibility

to put, in an open-ended way, what our views have been. It is right and proper to say,

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well, this is how far the evidence goes, this is what we believe we can actually learn from

it, and that is a statement of belief, rather than of fact, and leave it to the wider body to

enter into that discussion.

This statement implies more nuanced views on the contingent, contestable, and

perhaps fragile, nature of scientific ‘‘truth’’. He also emphasises how scientists should

participate in open-ended debate rather than simply seek to persuade publics of a fixed

set of immutable truths, and displays anxieties that scientists, and public trust in science,

might be damaged by playing the media game:

In public debate, if there is something that the public do hold with scientists, that’s open-

mindedness . . . That value of being seen to be even-handed, and being prepared to be

convinced by an alternative view, is something that is at its core. Once you cross that line

you get into the very dangerous territory of promoting propaganda for a particular

course or direction . . . It is not for science to dominate society’s views.

This was a general point, and he did not accuse anyone involved with this campaign

of communicating propaganda. The science communicators most active in the media

management of hybrids understand the common pitfalls of working with the media very

well. Recurring themes in interviews were the dangers of simplification, sensationalism,

and the news’ inability to communicate uncertainty effectively, and action was consistently

taken to mitigate these dangers and to remain even-handed when communicating the

science. Nonetheless, this widespread failure to acknowledge the persuasive and political

nature of the communicative tactics and rhetoric employed by the coalition does not bode

well for the prospects of critical self-reflection when problems do occur.

Simplification, Hype, and Scientific Self-censorship

One area of the campaign that attracted sharp criticism from some quarters was the

repetition of the claim that the proposed hybrid embryos were composed of 99.9 per cent

human genetic materials. Variations on this claim were present in almost a quarter of all

articles. The figure was also reproduced in many of the press statements of coalition

members. This was a matter of concern to some in the coalition, as well as to other

sections of the scientific community. Stephen Minger, for example, found the figure

‘‘unhelpful’’ and encouraged journalists not to use it. In April 2008, the (then) Science

Editor of the Daily Telegraph, Roger Highfield, published a critical article claiming this

figure ‘‘misleads the vast majority of people’’, and citing a statement from mitochondrial

DNA expert, and Nobel Prize winner, Sir Martin Evans that the science of hybrid embryos

had been ‘‘hyped’’ and claims about cures ‘‘overheated’’ (Daily Telegraph, April 8, 2008). In

a blog post about the production, packaging, and circulation of scientific ‘‘facts’’ for the

media, Highfield later claimed ‘‘this ‘fact’ was propaganda’’. He told us that while he was

not in favour of banning hybrid embryo research, at the same time he was uneasy about

elements of the way it was communicated: ‘‘I just felt it was being over-sold, at the end of

day, and I felt that there were a lot of complexities there that were not being mentioned at

all . . . I could just see inevitably, that it was going to be hyped up’’ (Highfield).

Others have suggested this kind of science PR can limit the range of dissenting voices

from the scientific community covered by the press, and even that it stifles open debate

about controversial science between scientists. Opponents complained bitterly that the

coalition failed to provide a platform for Catholic scientists opposed to the creation of

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hybrid embryos (Quintavalle). A specialist science journalist questioned the lack of a voice

in the campaign for scientists who questioned the value of the science. Referring to the fact

that those seeking to carry out the science did not subsequently receive any research

funding, he stated: ‘‘obviously there were scientists . . . sitting on the MRC committees or

Wellcome Trust committees . . . saying, ‘this science isn’t up to it. We shouldn’t fund it, there

are better things to fund.’ So it’s a pity we didn’t have them’’ (Connor). Fiona Fox responds

by claiming the SMC represented the views of ‘‘mainstream science’’, and the ‘‘scientific

consensus’’, adding that when asked to put journalists in touch with dissenting scientists

they did. The fact remains, however, that the pro-active and agenda-setting nature of the

campaign in favour of hybrids, coupled with the general lack of critical reporting of the

issue, fed a situation in which coverage of such voices was limited.

There is also some doubt about the indirect effect of this PR campaign on the

formation of a public scientific consensus around hybrid embryos. A related, but less visible,

problem than the range of voices actively promoted by the coalition is the notion that

scientists who questioned the promise of hybrid embryos, or who queried the need for such

a large media relations effort, simply kept quiet in order to give the impression of a united

front. This was confirmed in some of our interviews. Lovell-Badge stated, ‘‘there were

indeed some scientists who couldn’t understand what all the fuss was about in respect of

hybrids, because they were concerned . . . this was not something that was necessarily

going to work’’. Talking of these, Fiona Fox commented, ‘‘I think some scientists self-

censored’’. A journalist put this in the context of other scientific controversies:

Something that always worries me about science is when it hits the political arena*we’ve seen it with animal research, we’ve seen it with global warming*if you have

legitimate reason to challenge the value of research, people say to you, ‘‘look, I think

you’ve got a good point but I’d rather you didn’t mention that in public, because you’re

damaging all this hard work we’ve done to get the public to accept this’’. (Highfield)

This is troubling because of the unspoken limits it places on open and honest public

debate about science among scientists. Such self-imposed foreclosure on dissent may also

have disturbing consequences for wider public debate about science. Disconcertingly, as

this journalist implies, the dangers of such a falsely homogenous public scientific debate

may correlate with the amount of effort, resources, and ‘‘hard work’’ expended on

persuasive public and media relations.

Some in the coalition accept the dangers of self-censorship but charges of

simplification and hype are denied. In answer to claims about the controversial 99.9 per

cent figure, Fiona Fox told us, ‘‘[that was] the truth as the scientists knew it. I do not accept

that they sat in a room and said, ‘we’re going to say it’s 99.99 per cent human because that

will win us the vote in Parliament’’’. Some might blame scientists or PRs for wilfully

miscommunicating their science; but the problem is clearly more complicated than that.

Communicating scientific uncertainty to journalists is notoriously difficult, even more so

when one is pitted in a Manichean media debate against ideologically opposed

campaigners. As Fox explains, all too often science communicators’ ‘‘nuanced messages’’

do not make it to the printed page. Lovell-Badge echoes this:

it’s very hard when you’re challenged by a pro-life group saying ‘‘you want to make

monsters’’, and blah-blah-blah. Your response obviously is going to be ‘‘look, if we don’t do

this research, then we are less likely to come up with good cures for diseases’’, and it’s very

easy for that to get translated into ‘‘this research is going to lead to cures immediately’’.

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But despite science communicators understanding such pitfalls, they do find

themselves implicated in the process of generating media hype and simplifying science.

He continued, ‘‘it’s very easy for [such arguments] to be translated in the wrong way, not

just by journalists but also by spokespeople for organisations and research charities’’

(Lovell-Badge). Simply blaming the news media, then, is as inadequate a response to these

problems as only blaming science PR. The problems of simplification, hype, and scientific

self-censorship are systemic, complex, and over-determined, and arise because of: the

often intense struggles between polarised groups of news sources and media managers;

the demands placed on these groups by media forms and journalistic norms; as well as

their own (understandable) urge to generate sympathetic coverage. If blame can usefully

be placed anywhere it is on the rules of the game more than the tactics that groups or

individuals employ when playing it.

Bauer and Gregory write that both ‘‘science and journalism are traditionally sceptical

professions’’ which should ‘‘interrogate and assess results critically. Their work seeks

controversy and the debunking of myths’’. PR, on the other hand serves to promote ‘‘a

positive image of its paymaster so as to minimise controversy and critical response’’ (2007,

47). We agree with the broad normative assumptions underpinning these statements, and

worry that engagement in large-scale persuasive PR campaigns such as this, no matter

how ethical, reflexive, and sensitive they may be, might have the unintended consequence

of weakening the sceptical edge and interrogative ability of both scientists and journalists.

In so doing, it could also diminish the public’s ability to participate in full and meaningful

debates about controversial science.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank the Academy of Medical Sciences, the Science Media

Centre, the Medical Research Council, and the Wellcome Trust who co-funded and

commissioned the content analysis element of this research. We are also grateful to the

Academy of Medical Sciences for allowing us to reproduce content analysis findings from

this research.

NOTES

1. Our sample was generated using the Nexis media database and the search string: hybrid

embryo OR admixed embryo OR animal human hybrid OR human animal hybrid OR

human animal embryo OR animal human embryo OR chimera OR parahuman OR cybrid

OR centaur OR Mootant OR Franken* OR Humanzee OR chimpmanzee OR minotaur. The

validity of our coding categories was tested using a pilot sample of 40 stories selected to

represent the diversity of coverage. After further discussion, a finalised coding frame was

formulated and a detailed 16-page coding manual was written to ensure the consistency

of coders. Regular coding review meetings were held, the research team worked in the

same room, and maintained regular informal conversations to maintain consistency.

Overall inter-coder reliability tests showed our reliability rates were very high:

most variables were over 90 per cent reliable, and all were more than 80 per cent reliable.

2. There is a very real sense in which this article addresses only half of the PR campaign

around hybrid embryos. We focus on media relations work, but there was also a parallel

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and equally well-organised effort to lobby MPs on the issue. At the same time as press

officers from coalition organisations were carrying out the work described here, policy

experts were managing relationships with politicians, and writing and disseminating

briefings for MPs, fact sheets and other such political ‘‘information subsidies’’.

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