Self-concept: Autopoiesis as the Basis for a Conceptual Framework

■ Research Paper

Self-concept: Autopoiesis as the Basis for aConceptual Framework

John Devlin Smith*Anstice Cottage, East Knowstone, South Molton, Devon, UK

This paper examines the proposition that self-concept exists as a networked modularstructure in which the modules, consisting of actual or current self-concept and a numberof possible selves, are held together as a dynamical system through an autopoietic processof self-regulation. In this context, the whole lifeworld of an individual can be thought of asa field that is maintained and/or changed through engagement in various kinds of devel-opmental tasks controlled through self-regulation. A ‘morphology’ of self-concept definedin this way involves a dimension ranging from the internal (the person) to the external (theenvironment) passing through some form of interface. As a system, like any other system,self-concept is characterized by structure, pattern, and process elements. Self-concept,therefore, can change and develop yet ‘stay the same’, thus providing the individual, ina reflective and reflexive way, with a personal sense of history, growth, continuity, andchange. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Keywords self-concept; self-regulation; possible selves; autopoiesis; lifeworld

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is to examine how asystemic process known as autopoiesis can beused as the basis for creating a unifying concep-tual framework spanning four major domainsof interest within psychological theory: self-concept, self-regulation (SR), possible selves,and the notion of ‘lifeworld’ found within lifespan developmental psychology (LSDP). Eachdomain has its own specialist literature andestablished research traditions that address

specific issues in the field; however, themetatheoretic perspectives provided by systemsthinking and logic offer an opportunity to bringkey elements from these four domains togetherto address a simple yet paradoxical question—how is individual self-concept capable of stasisand change across the life span? The motivationto write this paper came from a need to reviewthe extensive self-concept literature to apply thetheory of possible selves to empirical researchon the development of ‘self-concept as a teacher’amongst beginning teachers. In that project,possible selves and LSDP offered structural inter-pretations and frameworks for understandingthe process of change within the lifeworld andacross the life span of beginning teachers; on the

*Correspondence to: John Devlin Smith, Anstice Cottage, East Know-stone, South Molton, Devon, EX36 4DZ, UK.E-mail: [email protected]

Received 18 April 2012Accepted 18 December 2012Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Systems Research and Behavioral ScienceSyst. Res. 31, 32–46 (2014)Published online 31 January 2013 in Wiley Online Library(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/sres.2168

other hand, integrating dynamic features fromSR into the emerging framework provedproblematic precisely because there was no over-arching mechanism, readily available, capable ofexplaining (rather than describing) the connec-tions between the phenomena. A way forward,however, was afforded by thinking about SRand self-concept together, from a ‘systems’perspective, which in turn allowed the researcherto ask a specific question—what follows from as-suming that self-concept is a self-regulatingautopoietic system? This paper presents aconceptual framework to address that proposition.

Background and Rationale

Systems and systemic behaviors are importantfeatures across many different disciplines andfields of study ‘from biology and neurosciencethrough to practical interventions in the organ-isational world’ (Mingers, 2006, p. 2; Paucar-Caceres et al., 2011). An important contributionto the development of systems thinking in thepostwar period was made by Humberto Maturanaand Francis J. Varela who proposed the conceptof autopoiesis (meaning ‘self-production’) as adefinition of life during the 1970s and 1980s(Varela, 1979; Maturana and Varela, 1980,1987). In the 50 or so years since the conceptwas first formulated, autopoiesis has been ap-plied mainly in fields dealing with ‘human so-cial living’, that is, in applications dealing withlarge aggregates of agents and actors, and lessso within psychological contexts (Paucar-Caceres et al., 2011). Before 2000, researchers inthe field approached a range of psychological phe-nomena using systems thinking and paradigmswithout necessarily mentioning autopoiesis dir-ectly (e.g. Bateson, 1972, 1979; Ford, 1994; Mayer,1998; Carver and Scheier, 1998, 2000; Puddifoot,2000). Now, the concept of autopoiesis is usedmore explicitly to explore the interactive relation-ship between people and their environment. Inthis paper, autopoietic theory will be applied atthe level of the individual rather than the commu-nity or the group; the idea is to explore contextsand circumstances in which the theory can beused as a paradigm for explaining the way

individual self-concept operates. The paper beginswith a brief review of the principal reasons andreasoning for adopting autopoiesis as a startingpoint for investigating self-concept.

Autopoiesis, when applied to people, can bedescribed as ‘a biological theory, in which livingbeings are seen as systems that produce them-selves in a perpetual way . . . and are thus theproducer and the product at the same time’ (Sori,2009, p. 23). Sori has used autopoiesis in a busi-ness management context, but the analogy ofthe producer being the same thing as the productis an apt illustration of the way self-concept willbe considered generally. Although Maturana(2002) has developed a lengthy and complex ar-gument for autopoietic theory, there are six par-ticular features of autopoiesis that are of interestto this paper and its project. First, a system is saidto be autopoietic if the components interact witheach other in such a way as to continually (re)produce the components and the relationships be-tween them (Maturana, 2002, p. 10; Bourgine andStewart, 2004, p. 337); these autonomous actionsare generally referred to as self-organization (SO).An important issue to be addressed in this paperis to what extent does the personal experience andunderstanding of self-concept as reported in the lit-erature fit this picture? Does self-concept develop,persist, and reproduce itself across the life span inaway that suggests SO is involved? Second, Matur-ana suggested that many features of the naturaland social worlds exhibit SO, for example, a tor-nado or a social club; however, he argued that aliving system requires something more specific inthe form of a ‘molecular’ foundation. Conse-quently, he defined life as a

dynamic molecular entity, realized as a unity asa closed network of molecular productions inwhich the molecules produced through theirinteractions: (a) recursively constituted thesame network of molecular productions thatproduced them; and (b) specified the extensionof the network and constituted operationalboundaries that separate it as a discrete unityin a molecular space (Maturana, 2002, p. 7).

If the human body is a molecular autopoietic sys-tem and the cognitive or intellectual domain ofmind is an integral part of the physical domain

Syst. Res. RESEARCH PAPER

Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Syst. Res. 31, 32–46 (2014)DOI: 10.1002/sres

Self-concept as a System 33

of body, that is, an integral part of the entire mo-lecular system, is it reasonable to assume, a priori,that self-concept as a mental system, like anyother of the major body systems, will share andexhibit features of autopoiesis as defined in thefirst point above? This paper suggests that it is areasonable working assumption that requires fur-ther consideration. Third, living and nonlivingautopoietic systems are ‘more’ than the sum oftheir parts: ‘The elements that compose a systemare not its components by themselves, they are itscomponents only as they participate in its com-position, and only while they do so’ (Maturana,2002, p. 10). There is no single ‘core’ or ‘centraldriver ’ for the human system, everything is con-nected as a network; therefore, as in the secondpoint above, it is reasonable to suppose, a priori, thatthe physical and intellectual domains of mind andbody are connected systems and that both aredriven by autopoietic principles. Fourth, thesystem (network) is specified through Maturana’sconcept of structure and organization; structuredetermines how the parts are (inter)connected,whereas organization identifies the system andcorresponds to its general configuration. Lossof organization results in loss of identity (i.e.death). Structuralist views of self-concept sug-gest that it is a hierarchical, multidimensionalarrangement that becomes more multifacetedwith age; in other words, self-concept is an ex-periential phenomenon, shaped by the experi-ence and process of daily living, expressed as‘identity’ (Shavelson et al., 1976; Marsh, 1993).Changes in structure and/or organization ofself-concept will change identity too. Fifth,Maturana stated that the twin features of closureand boundaries define the relational spaces inwhich the system exists; moreover, this ‘exist-ence’ takes place in a perpetual ‘present mo-ment’ because ‘past’ and ‘future’ are merelyconstructs of the observer; they are not inherentfeatures of the systems ontology (Maturana,2002, p. 9). This ‘existential’ notion chimes per-fectly with the idea of ‘possible selves’ as con-struction and reconstruction rather thanstraight recall. Finally, Maturana’s model is do-main based with at least two nonintersectingphenomenal domains: (i) the system and (ii)the environment in which it exists. These two

are said to be operationally congruent and are ableto modulate each other’s behavior (Maturana,2002, p. 15). Two key questions arise here: first, inthe autopoietic human system, does self-conceptconstitute the observer, or is self-concept some-thing that is itself ‘observed’? Second, where isthe system boundary in relation to self-conceptas a system? Maturana was clear that the notionof autopoiesis is itself an ‘abstraction’, a ‘meta-phor’ constructed by an observer to give meaningto the workings of a system that may appear to be‘participating’ in its own ‘genesis’ but is actually‘blind to the consequences to which they giverise’. In a molecular autopoietic system, that is, aliving system, there is no ‘organising or guidingprinciple’ (Maturana, 2002, p. 9). In other words,the system merely exists; it is the observer of thesystem who believes that it lives a ‘life’ with someform of teleological purpose or explanation. This‘observer’ issue merits further consideration.Maturana in his 2002 article adopted a reflectivestance in recounting the story of howhe developedthe idea of autopoiesis and why he eventuallychose that term in 1970. The term autopoiesis aroseout of a need for Maturana to provide a functionalanalysis of the following questions: what is life andhow are living systems defined? Functional ana-lysis, by itself, however, ‘cannot explain a feature’spresence without an aetiological account whichexplains how the feature came to be where we findit’ (Honderich, 1995, p. 868–869). AlthoughMaturana(2000) was very clear about the functionality ofautopoiesis as a concept, what is problematic isthe following: (i) the status of Maturana’s first-person account as an observer of ‘observers ofsystems’ and system functioning and (ii) whereexactly Maturana (as the observer) sits within theconceptual framework in question to carry outthe observer role and then to report his findingsto other observers? This difficulty of observerplacement and recursion is analogous to the prob-lem of the ‘homunculus fallacy’ as applied to ‘the-ories of mental states and processes that explainthe phenomenon in question implicitly in termsof that very phenomenon’ (Honderich, 1995, p.373). Essentially, the concept of ‘observer’ is a rhet-orical device to place the writer (e.g. Maturana)outside the circular subject matter of life and cogni-tion. Viewed in thisway,Maturana is ‘everywhere’

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34 John Devlin Smith

and ‘nowhere’ simultaneously, which is somethingof a domain paradox. The domain paradox is animportant issue and is considered later in the dis-cussion section. Overall, these six issues lead backto the questions of how the three phenomenaldomains—the biological, the cognitive, and the so-cial—are connected from a systems perspectiveand what role self-concept plays within those con-nections. Before addressing those issues, we haveone further consideration; although autopoiesis is apowerful explanatory tool within systems contexts,it is not the only one; other ideas, for example,modu-larity and feedback, have relevance too.Modularity: This is a biologically based

‘organization feature’ that explains how peoplechange and yet ‘stay the same’. Throughout the1970s and 1980s, biologists and geneticistsworked to understand the specific and long-standing problem of ‘development’, that is, howan undifferentiated egg can transform into acomplex adult. They solved the conundrum byusing two key conceptual tools together, that is,SO and modularity. In a modular system, individ-ual parts can change, but the overall structuremaintains its integrity and identity. Using theseideas, biologists created a model and a metaphorof living (developing) systems based on thefundamental concept of a network of regulatorymodules (Smith, 1998, p. 18–40). Biologically,humans are self-organizingmodular networks of sys-tems that physically change and develop across thelife span from birth to deathwhilst maintaining theirstructural and organizational integrity and identity.If modularity is an important feature of the materialbody, could it also have a role to playwithin the cog-nitive and intellectual domain of self-concept, and ifso, how? In this paper, a modular network of pos-sible selves is proposed as the basis for a systemicmodel of self-concept.Feedback: Korzeniewski (2001) presented a

cybernetic formulation for the definition of lifewith a special emphasis on the role of feedback.He proposed that life (or a living individual)can be defined as ‘a network of negative feed-backs sustaining a superior positive feedback(potential of expansion)’ (Korzeniewski, 2001,p. 275). A network of negative feedback processeswill support stability (stasis); a superior positivefeedback loop will give the whole organism a

potential for change (growth and development).This could explain how self-regulated self-conceptmediates between the need for stability andchange across the life span. This idea fits well withKorzeniewski’s definition in that he suggestedthat the phenomenon of life consists in a ‘direc-ted-at-itself-identity of living organisms’ (p. 286).

Overall, these three concepts—SO (autopoiesis),modularity, and hierarchies of negative and posi-tive feedback—together provide the building blocksfor a conceptual framework for self-concept, anecology of self-concept that has explanatory as wellas descriptive capabilities. The ecological metaphorfor self-concept is underpinned by a number of con-tributions from seemingly separate fields of studythat are, nonetheless, connected by their associa-tionswith systems thinking and theory. By drawingcollectively on these sources, this paper examineshow the individual lifeworld can be viewed andanalysed as a self-organizing system in which self-concept, the cognitive manifestation of the materialliving system, is shaped, through feedbackprocesses,by the self-regulated interaction of a modular net-work of possible selves. Although empirical studiesare referred to where appropriate, this is primarilya concept paper to be used as the basis for furthertheoretical development and empirical research.

Self-concept and the Lifeworld

Over the past three decades, a consensus hasemerged that the self is not a behavioral by-product or bystander in the world of humanbehavior, rather it exists as a ‘particular kind of re-flective, interpretive understanding—an under-standing that is always embodied and unfoldingwithin an historical, sociocultural tradition ofliving (a life world)’ (Martin and Sugarman,2001, p. 104). This proposition combines, orbridges, ‘social constructionism’ with ‘irreducibleagency’ (Martin and Sugarman, 2001, p. 113),thereby creating a conceptual framework involv-ing a continuum between the inner and outerregions of the self—the ‘lifeworld’. At the sametime, life course research within LSDP developeda strong biographical research focus, and in a re-view of the LSDP literature, Butt and Raymond(1989) identified six broad clusters of inquiry




topic/method in the field; one of theseclusters, ‘reconceptualist studies investigatingthe “architecture” of self’ (Butt and Raymond,1989, p. 404), has particular interest for thisstudy. Life course methodology offers two inter-esting and practical ideas about how changes inthe ‘architecture of self’ take place. These are asfollows: (i) the notion of the life course as anevolving structure, where life structure is definedas the underlying pattern or design of a person’slife at a given time and is said to evolve throughan alternating series of structure-building andstructure-changing (transitional) periods (Levinsonet al., 1978, in Sugarman, 1996, p. 297) and (ii) theconcept of the developmental task where develop-mental tasks are described as the issues addressedduring each phase of structure building andstructure changing; the tasks are associated withparticular points in the life course, and their reso-lution contributes towards growth (Chickeringand Havighurst, 1981, in Sugarman, 1996, p. 298).Levinson suggested that the life structure existson the boundary between the person and the en-vironment. This suggests that the lifeworldincorporates the inner (physical) life or world ofthe individual and also the (social) outer worldof the environment, forming a continuum, acomplete world system or worldview. LSDP, there-fore, offers a structured and interpretive frame-work for examining the lifeworld in terms ofdirections, targets, and goals (life tasks inter-preted as possible selves), as well as the actualityof the current position (life structure interpreted ascurrent or actual self). Themany kinds of ‘develop-mental life tasks’ undertaken by individuals overthe course of the life span can be viewed as anessential part of the self-regulating mechanismlinking the actual self with various possible selves.Becoming involved in developmental tasks, tomove the lifeworld along its trajectory of evolu-tion, is equivalent to intentional engagement in aprocess of SR. This understanding represents animportant synthesis of ideas between hitherto sep-arate bodies of literature.

Self-concept as a System

This shift in perspective has important conse-quences for theway the self can be conceptualized;

first, the idea (or metaphor) of a continuumsuggests that the self is not just in the lifeworld;the self is an integral part of the lifeworld wherethe continuum is theorized as a dimension runningfrom the internal to the external world of theindividual, traversing ‘the mind, the person, thegroup, society, and culture’ (Kruglanski et al.,1997, in Puddifoot, 2000, p. 89). Second, the ideaof a ‘lifeworld’ as a system suggests how it canbe both stable and dynamic and have structureand process properties. Building on the idea ofthe self as ‘embodied understanding’ (Martin andSugarman, 2001, p. 104), we define the lifeworldhere as all the material and nonmaterial aspects of aperson’s existence, including all their perceptions,memories, and imaginings; it is a virtual ‘network’connecting all of their physical and social relationshipswith people, places, and ideas in the past, present, andfuture. This holistic approach to the lifeworld isconsonant with Maturana’s understanding of theway a living system constructs its environmentthrough the interactions made possible by itsautopoietic organization (Maturana and Varela,1980, p. 82); it accords with Mayer’s (1998) ‘5thgeneration’ of ‘field wide’ frameworks in which‘systems’ perspectives andwriters have an import-ant place in personality psychology (p. 176–177); italso draws on a diverse literature including cyber-netic definitions of life stressing the role of feed-back and SR (Korzeniewski, 2001), systemicdefinitions of life emphasizing the ‘structuralcoupling’ between the organism (the person) andthe environment—the autopoietic self (Maturanaand Varela, 1980; Ford, 1987; Capra, 1996), SR asa key concept within learning theory (Schunkand Zimmerman, 1994), the dynamic self-concept(Markus and Wurf, 1987), and possible selves(Markus and Nurius, 1986). Taken together, thesedifferent perspectives suggest that the lifeworldhas systemic qualities and characteristics.

Self-concept: the Metaphor Matrix

In the process of researching the development of‘self-concept as a teacher’ amongst a group of be-ginning teachers, Smith (2004, 2009) classifiedand organized a broad range of self-concept lit-erature and sources into broad metaphor groups




according to their relationship to ‘internal’,‘external’ and ‘boundary’ features of the humanlifeworld. Metaphors are important ‘instrumentsof thought’ (Andriessen, 2011), and this method-ology, used by Smith (2004, 2009), replicated anapproach used by Sternberg (1997) who, in amajor review of the literature on intelligence,used metaphor labels to describe and organizethe many and various theoretical approachesto the topic (p. 5). However, to accommodateideas about self-concept’s systemic features intothe ecological framework, Smith (2004, 2009)adapted Sternberg’s triarchic framework to in-clude the three generic components of anysystem—structure, pattern and process—to createthe conceptual framework shown in Figure 1.Figure 1 shows how different metaphors con-

cerning various aspects of self-concept relate toone another along the continuum running frominside to outside the person and within the threegeneric components of any system, that is, struc-ture, pattern, and process. The matrix is designedto focus attention on the ‘architecture’ of self, inparticular the idea that the self is a socioculturalconstruction that proceeds from the outsidein, as well from the inside out (Bruner, 1990,p. 110). Although the categorical analysis carriedout by Smith (2004, 2009) identified a number ofsignificant ‘metaphor groups’ for self-concept(Figure 1), it is evident that there are other im-portant topics and themes within psychology

that have relevance for the project undertakenin this paper that are not mentioned explicitly inthe matrix, for example, language, learning,thinking, intelligence, reflection, and metacogni-tion. Where are they, and how do they fitinto the ecological conceptual framework forself-concept? Are they separate topics, or do theyfit within other topics? Before addressing thesequestions directly in the discussion section, wenow turn the analysis to the issue of dynamicprocess and the regulation of self-concept. Thefocus now is on the following question: whatmakes self-concept work as a process?

Possible Selves and Self-regulation

‘Possible selves’ (Markus and Nurius, 1986) and‘The dynamic self-concept’ (Markus and Wurf,1987) presented an individuated view of selfwhere the focus is on features of self-definitionexplored through self-schemas (Markus andWurf, 1987), life tasks (Cantor, 1981), andpersonal projects (Little, 1983). ‘The DynamicSelf-concept’ presented the self as something‘dynamic—as active, forceful, and capable ofchange’ (Markus and Wurf, 1987, p. 299). Thefundamental importance of the possible selvesconcept presented by Markus and Nurius(1986), however, was that it addressed directlythe question of what kind of dynamical agent

Figure 1 A conceptual framework encompassing metaphors concerning self-concept




could be involved in the regulation of behavior?Two novel suggestions were made; first, possibleselves posited several ‘generic’ modes (or mod-ules) of self-concept, ‘possible selves representindividuals ideas of what they might become,what they would like to become and whatthey fear becoming’ (Markus and Nurius, 1986,p. 954). Positive and negative images of self,therefore, could act as incentives for action.Second, the concept of possible selves linkedmotivation theory with learning theory as a wayof explaining current behaviors and, as aconsequence, could be thought of as comprising a‘behavioral blueprint’ for action (Robinson andDavis, 2001, in Kerka, 2003). Putting these twoideas together leads directly to the conjecture thatthe visualization of the future self influences theoperation of the current ‘working self-concept’ ina reciprocal relationship (Markus and Nurius,1986, p. 957), that is, possible selves should play arole in the operation (SR) of self-concept on aday-to-day basis. Markus and Nurius (1986) didnot present a model showing explicit linksbetween self-concept and SR: ‘for the most part,the problems of self-concept and self-regulationhave been pursued in two largely non-overlappingliteratures’ (p. 965). The view adopted here in thispaper, however, is that SR and self-concept can bebrought together, within a single framework,using possible selves as the catalyst. Possible selveshave been described as a cognitive bridge betweenthe plans of the now self and the future self

(Markus and Nurius, 1986, p. 961; Hoskins andLeseho, 1996, p. 247); this bridging or regulatoryconnection between the two domains plays an im-portant part in the creation of a new conceptualframework in which possible selves play a central,systemic role in the operation (SR) of self-concepton a daily basis (Figure 2).

Figure 2 suggests how the self operates withinits own ‘boundary’, the lifeworld. As a part of theprocess of everyday living, actual self and a con-stellation of possible selves are held together insome form of dynamic equilibrium by a processof SO and SR. Dynamic equilibrium is a way inwhich actual self and ideal selves can be shiftingand changing together and/or independentlyand where SR attempts to create a desired rela-tionship between the two, according to someevaluative process or criteria. In a study of theprocess of motivation theory, Vroom (1964) devel-oped what became known as the ‘expectancytheory’, which describes how a person perceivesthe relationship between three things—effort,performance, and rewards. The strength of theattraction of a particular outcome (e.g. some pos-sible self) is termed valence, whereas the degree ofbelief that a particular act (e.g. a developmentallife task) will produce a particular outcome istermed expectancy. Valences and expectancies willdepend on the individual’s perception of asituation, particularly the estimation of effortrequired (Vroom, 1964). This perceptual, reflexiveunderstanding about the chances of a life task

Figure 2 The autopoietic self domains of possible selves held together by a process of self-regulation




leading or contributing to a desired possible selfis considered to be an important part of the SRprocess. Valence and expectancy, therefore, pro-vide the evaluative component of possible selves.Although there is, generally, an inadequateunderstanding of the dynamics of decisionmaking by individuals (Maani and Li, 2010), overtime, a ‘theory of self’ would emerge from theself-regulatory process that is trying to hold alarge number of actual and ideal possible selvestogether. The extensive literature on SR suggeststhat SR is not a homogenous factor; it involvesall of the ‘missing’ psychological elementsmentioned earlier, that is, language, memory,cognition, reflection, and metacognitive skills.These are applied within the three systemic com-ponents of self-concept, that is, structure (skill,personality, and identity), pattern (consciousawareness, values, and culture), and process (lifenarrative, dialogue, and social role) as presentedin Figure 1. In this context, SR is so much morethan the SR of learning within academic contexts;SR affects every aspect of daily life but is not theonly form of regulation that impacts on the self.Within the lifeworld, ‘exterior’ factors will beexerting major influence (regulation) throughthe expectations and behaviors of others in termsof perceived identity, cultural pressure, and the

operation of social role. Many kinds of ‘regula-tion’ are at work, and situational factors impactjust as surely as personal factors on behavior(Heider, 1958, p. 79; Goffman, 1959, p. 13; Laveand Wenger, 1991, p. 32). Positioning theory,for example, illustrates the way individuals‘negotiate’ their way through countless experi-ences, on a daily basis, drawing on life narra-tive, dialogue, and role (script, voice, andposition) when attempting to self-regulate adesired position in the face of external regulation(Usher et al., 1997, p. 107; Harre and VanLangenhove, 1999, p. 5). Positioning is syno-nymous with the ‘process’ elements of the meta-phor matrix; however, Figure 3 suggests howpositioning operates as a complete interactivesystem composed of all the subsystems drawnfrom the entire lifeworld.

Figure 3 suggests how the elements of themetaphor matrix, that is, structure, pattern,and process, form a complete (autopoietic)system, each part linked to all other parts.There is no ‘hierarchy’ within the process; onthe contrary, there will be multiple informationroutes through the system allowing heuristicapproaches to problem solving and positioningto take place in relation to the situationencountered.

Figure 3 The metaphor matrix expressed as an autopoietic lifeworld




The aim of this paper is to create a unifyingconceptual framework for self-concept usingautopoiesis as a starting point for the investiga-tion. What has emerged so far is that the variousaspects of self-concept relate to one another alonga continuum, running from inside to outside theperson and within the three generic componentsof any system, that is, structure, pattern, andprocess; self-concept is synonymous with theentire lifeworld of the individual; the lifeworlditself has systemic qualities and characteristics;developmental tasks designed to affect thelifeworld constitute a form of SR; SR and self-concept are linked together by and within a fieldof possible selves; a continuous process of posi-tioning within the field emerges from the activ-ities that constitute the process of everydayliving. The continuous interactive and intra-ac-tive processes amongst all the components ofthe self-concept metaphor matrix are expressedin Figures 1–3. Issues that remain problematic in-clude the domain paradox, that is, determining theobserver role and status within the system; theplace and role of cognitive phenomena, such aslanguage and thought, within the self-conceptmetaphor matrix; and also the way in which atheory of self might emerge from positioning ac-tivities associated with the process of everydayliving. What needs to be considered next are theimplications and possible applications of the con-ceptual framework developed thus far.

DISCUSSION

That self-concept can change is not, nowadays, acontested idea; the question addressed in thispaper is how this can happen. The proposition isthat self-concept operates as an autopoietic sys-tem in which stasis and change are natural fea-tures of a self-regulating modular network ofpossible selves referred to as the lifeworld. Tosupport this contention, we map a wide rangeof psychology and psychology-related literatureonto a ‘metaphor matrix’ representing the genericfeatures of any system—structure, pattern, andprocess. In addition, the matrix incorporates theidea of the lifeworld as a ‘continuum’ based onthings relatively internal and/or external to the

person. The conceptual framework for this prop-osition rests within a paradigm that must answerquestions about the following: (i) its claim to real-ity, the ontological question; (ii) the personal epis-temology associated with this reality; and (iii) themethodology concerning data gathering appropri-ate for a project of this kind? The order of the discus-sion reflects the idea that ‘in the postmodern,ontology precedes epistemology’ (McHale, 1992, inUsher et al., 1997, p. 204). The discussion begins withan examination of systems.

The ontology of self-concept presented here restson three foundation arguments about systemsas embodied in the matrix model. The first foun-dation argument is that the self-concept literatureis consistent with a systemic view of the self as anautopoietic concept. The second foundation restson the metaphor matrix itself; this provides a rea-sonable description and explanation of the way inwhich self-concept operates as an integratedwhole, for example, as a self-regulating lifeworld.Figures 1 and 3 suggest that the lifeworld is‘powered’ by three sets of interactive and intra-active ‘triplets’. The first triplet consists of anintegrated modular structure composed of skills,personality, and identity; these three structuralelements define what can be done as a person.The second triplet provides an ethical frameworkfor guiding or informing action on the basis ofself-awareness, values and principles, and cul-ture; these three design elements define whythings could or should be done as a person andcan be interpreted in terms of life having apurpose and/or a meaning. The third tripletshows a continuous positioning process basedon the personal narrative in play at any particu-lar moment, the dialogical strategies in use, andthe range of social roles and positions that are,or may be, available (as possible selves); this dy-namic explains how action is carried out by a per-son. The third foundation argument is that thematrix is consonant with particular aspects ofpsychology that are traditionally related to thegrowth, development, and maintenance of theself and self-concept, for example, possibleselves, positioning theory, SR, a range of stagedevelopment theories, and reflective practice.

If the lifeworld operates as an autopoieticsystem, how does the self, as ‘knower’, stand in




relation to that world, and where is the observerin the system? These questions relate to the do-main paradox discussed earlier and is addressednow. Epistemic beliefs are of two kinds, under-standing about the process of knowing and aboutknowledge as a product or knowledge object.Personal epistemology examines ‘what indivi-duals believe about how knowing occurs, whatcounts as knowledge and where it resides, andhow knowledge is constructed and evaluated’(Hofer and Pintrich, 2002, p. 1). A worldview,therefore, is composed of ‘our values, attitudesand beliefs. It is through these that we createknowledge and obtain meaning about the realityaround us’ (Yolles, 2006, p. 148). Every lifeworldis ‘powered’ by the process of everyday living, inwhich the person must act to satisfy certainneeds, to stay alive (Roper, 1985). The process-level triplet in the matrix (narrative, dialogic,and social role) suggests that the dynamic forthe whole system, the lifeworld, is providedthrough a continuous process of positioning inwhich a series of context-related actual andideal (possible) selves are regulated externally(through forces and agencies relatively externalto the person) and internally (through processesgenerally referred to as SR). Positioning takesplace even when no other person is present andis largely driven by the situation. The situation,defined as the immediate moment-by-momentcontext of the lifeworld, calls into play a set ofdomain-related possible selves and sets the para-meters affecting the range and impact of externaland self-regulatory strategies available. For eachperson within each situation (a domain), there willbe a range of ‘possibilities’ for positioning the self,for example, relative to other people within a sociallandscape. Moving from position to position can bedescribed as a ‘move’ (as in chess for example)where each move has a value; therefore, it is pos-sible to conceive of the lifeworld as a ‘field’ consist-ing of positions relating to self and to others; eachposition in the field has a particular value withina payoff matrix, where

others are taking decisions partly to achievethe same ends as himself (sic) and partly dif-ferent, even incompatible, ends. He is able tosee this situation in terms of the strategic

choices open to himself and others, the conse-quences of those choices, and the values ofthose consequences. He is also able to putinto perspective the significance of co-ordin-ation and communication even where a basisfor conflict exists as well’ (Peston andCoddington, 1967, p. 16).

In other words, positioning is a game, and ingame theoretic terms, the likely or preferred out-come is probably a ‘Nash equilibrium’ where ‘allthe players are simultaneously making a bestreply to the strategy choices of others’ (Binmore,2007, p. 14). By drawing on a ‘theory of self’and some form of evaluative process, forexample, Vroom’s expectancy theory, the individ-ual negotiates the process of daily living by self-regulating a network of possible selves. In LSDPterminology, this amounts to continuous engage-ment with a series of structure-building andstructure-changing projects across the life span.Structure building is associated with the consoli-dation of actual selves, whereas structure changingis oriented more towards the realization of idealselves. Both aspects of the lifeworld are part of acontinuous process of positioning and change inwhich change is understood as ‘a transition orseries of transitions between one social conditionand another’ (Gould and Kolb, 1964, p. 538).Positioning, therefore, can also be defined asaction designed to manage a series of social transitionsacross the life span. Differentiating between actionand behavior as concepts is important for tworeasons. First, ‘adopting human action as the unitof analysis for sociocultural research means thatit serves as the fundamental object to bedescribed and interpreted’ (Wertsch, in Wertschet al., 1995, p. 61); this keeps the research aboutself-concept grounded in the context and the flowof everyday living, that is, positioning. Second,proponents of autopoiesis assert that behavior(note ‘behavior’ rather than ‘action’) is not ‘in’the system; it is something ascribed to the actionsand operation of the system by observers. Froman epistemological perspective, possible selvescan be thought of as pseudonoumena created in‘a mental space in which those with a capacityfor consciousness develop structured patternsthat create a coherent representation of their




phenomenal world’ (Fox, 2006, pp. 1–3; Yolles,2006, p. 168). Yolles suggested that the inter-action between the phenomenal world and theworld of noumena is autopoietic (p. 168); thisaccords with the idea that the relationship be-tween actual and ideal selves is achieved througha process of (autopoietic) SO and SR.

Overall, the model of self-concept developedso far suggests that positioning is a feedbackprocess, a game, consisting of external regulationand internal SR involving transitions from onesocial condition to another to establish some kindof (Nash) equilibrium. The personal history ofthose transitions and equilibria exists in the formof memory, language, and text embodied in thelifeworld, for example, as pseudonoumenal mod-els within a phenomenal world. Over the indi-vidual life span, the ‘knower’ creates a portfolioof ‘life histories’ comprising past, present, and fu-ture possible selves (ideal and actual); however, itmay not be possible to determine which one, ifany, is the ‘truth’ (Kvale, 1992, p. 20–21). Becauseunderstandings about the ‘nature of nature’ arederived from observations and data, issues aboutmethodology are discussed next.

In this paper, autopoiesis is presented as aparadigm for understanding how self-conceptoperates. The self-concept metaphor matrix isderived from a broad range of psychology-basedand psychology-related literature stretching backmany years (Figure 1); therefore, many of theideas drawn into the matrix will reflect paradigmsbased on linear or nondynamical ways of formu-lating research questions and gathering data. Morerecently, however, researchers have been using orsuggesting systems-based approaches (para-digms) on a range of mainstream psychologyissues; two examples will illustrate.

Multidimensional modelling: Many areas ofpsychology feature various kinds of stage devel-opment theories to account for degrees of abilityor modes of functioning (Stanton, 2002, p. 176).Stanton examined the dimensions of many stagetheories and noted that ‘The majority of stagetheories are unidimensional whereas a multidi-mensional structure may be warranted’; Stanton(2002) described multidimensionality as ‘an inter-active hierarchy of processes or stages in whichinformation passes through the system in more

than one direction or along more than one axis’(p. 176–177). Thismultidimensional quality is exactlywhat the self-concept metaphor matrix, expressedas an interconnecting set of triplets, suggests.

Systems-based modelling: Systems thinking andmultidimensional models have been suggestedas a framework for crossing domain boundariesand organizing the academic field of personalitypsychology (Mayer, 1998). Mayer argued thatnew frameworks arise within his field every 20to 30 years and that the fifth generation (involv-ing systems thinking) was underway. In hischronology, a fifth generation of ‘field wide’frameworks emerged in the 1990s in which ‘sys-tems’ perspectives and writers have an importantplace (e.g. Ford, 1994; Lester, 1995; Pervin, 1996;Cloninger, 1996; Mayer, 1998, p. 176–177). Adopt-ing systems-based multidimensional modellingacross a broad range of psychological researchprojects requires more than just a change of in-strumentation used by researchers. Mayer’sobservations about ‘5th generation systems fra-meworks’ and Stanton’s comment about infor-mation flows that pass through the system in‘more than one direction and along more thanone axis’ suggest that methodology itself is anissue that requires closer attention. What changesin approach are appropriate in this case?

Using Fisher Information to Explore Self-conceptas a System

Roy Frieden (Frieden, 2007, in Frieden andGatenby, 2007) developed a theory of measurementenabling the exploratory analysis of ‘unknownsystems’ on the basis of the ‘information flow’ thatis conveyed by the data rather than phenomenallyas is more usual (p. 1–2). Frieden’s idea is thatmeasurement is based not on the classical infor-mation theory of Shannon but on that of Fisher.The act of measurement, rather than the specificdata, is fundamental to the approach becausethe measuring process itself ‘is embedded inthe noumenal domain because the measuringprocess is a creator of noumenally defined phys-ical laws that arise because of our participationin the measuring process’ (Yolles and Frieden,2007, in Frieden and Gatenby, 2007, p. 300). With




this approach, measurement becomes a processof discovery of the general ‘laws’ governing thedata rather than a more piecemeal approachusing traditional phenomenology, the researcherbecomes a ‘creative observer ’ ‘whose worldviewinfluences the way that information is acquired’(Yolles and Frieden, 2007, in Frieden andGatenby, 2007, p. 300). Using Fisher informationto explore self-concept, as a system, would in-volve Frieden’s idea of extreme physical infor-mation (EPI), a unified approach to science. EPIhas two forms of information, I and J; I repre-sents Fisher information about an observed ef-fect (the noumenon), whereas J is the totalamount of information needed to describe thenoumenon with perfect accuracy. Yolles andFrieden argued that the information availablefor observers arises out of a flow of informationfrom the effect to the data collectors via aninformation channel:

J ! I (1)

Because information is lost in transit, I is gener-ally some fraction of J:

I ¼ kJ; or I � kJ ¼ 0; 0≤k≤1 (2)

Equation (2) shows the role of the constant k;this is a measure of the efficiency with whichthe information is transferred from the effect tothe observer and lies in the range 0 (0%

efficiency) to 1 (100% efficiency). Its valuedepends on the measurement instrumentationused and the particular sociocultural systemunder investigation (Yolles and Frieden, 2007, inFrieden and Gatenby, 2007, pp. 302–305). Futureresearch projects into self-concept, possibleselves, and positioning could be formulatedusing game theoretic approaches and multidi-mensional and systems-based modelling andinclude research questions that explored thenature of J, I, and k. This could be the sixth-generation methodology to complement Mayer’sfifth-generation systems theories.

CONCLUSIONS

There has been little or no modelling or develop-ment of the possible selves concept since theoriginal formulation by Markus and Nurius(1986); however, this paper suggests that pos-sible selves play a central role in the processof everyday living and that positioning, carriedout through the SR of a pseudonoumenal fieldconsisting of ideal and actual possible selves,is the way in which transition across the lifespan takes place. SR of appropriate life tasksis ‘managed’ through the mental processes oflanguage, thinking, decision making, memory,and imagination. These mental faculties areoften the focus of attention at critical periods

Figure 4 Self-concept metaphor matrix—a meta perspective on data




in a person’s life; for example, (i) in childhood,where they are rapidly forming and developingand where attempts at SR of actual and idealself will influence the child’s emerging relation-ships (positioning) with family, peers, and thewider society; (ii) in old age, where these facultiesoften begin to fail, with or without the consciousawareness of the person involved and whereSR of the lifeworld (positioning) becomesproblematic; (iii) at particular moments of crisis,for example, trauma, stress, or even periods ofcreative activity, where the pseudonoumenalfield of possible selves suddenly expandsthrough enlightenment or contracts through ex-ternal regulatory forces and where different‘ways of thinking’ are needed to cope or respondaccordingly.

So that greater understanding of the processcan be promoted, further research is needed onthe development/decay/change in the mentalfaculties involved with the SR of the pseudonou-menal field of possible selves amongst children,adults, and the elderly, using measures basedon Fisher information.

Recommendations

Further research: There are several possibilities fordeveloping the ideas presented earlier.

First, the metaphor matrix in Figure 1 can be re-drawn so as to incorporate ideas about thephenomenal and noumenal worlds of observers(Figure 4).

Figure 4 indicates the data and types of ana-lysis associated with the three domains of theself-concept system and the perspective theyoffer. This should provide a way of classifying,arranging, and analysing existing research aboutself-concept on the basis of the data characteris-tics rather than the topic field alone.

Second, undertake new research using Frieden’s‘flow’ theory of EPI to analyse appropriate datastreams based on experimental paradigms inwhichself-concept is framed as a type of ‘unknown sys-tem’. In this context, the researcher participates asa ‘creative observer’ and is an integral part of thedata creation process. Suitable research objectiveswould be as follows: (i) to provide insights into

the way positioning operates in different people atdifferent points in the life span, that is, in childhoodand in old age; (ii) to explore opportunities for cre-ating and illustrating new ‘units of measurefor information’ associated with the behavior ofliving systems, for example, positioning and SR(Schaffernicht, 2010; Simms, 2011).

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Self-concept: Autopoiesis as the Basis for a Conceptual Framework