SELECTED CITATIONS

Appeal:

“ . . . It is well-settled doctrine that an appeal throws the whole case wide open for review and empowers (even obligates) the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the appealed judgment even if they have not been assigned. When an accused appeals, he stands for a new trial of the whole case. . .” (P vs. Llaguno, 285 SCRA 124)

Due Process:

“There is no denial of due process, just because a decision was rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side . . .” (Bautista vs. Secretary of Labor, 196 SCRA 470)

* * *

“There is nothing in the Constitution that says a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and without such representation, he will not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers while desirable, is not indispensable.” (Nera vs. Auditor General, 164 SCRA 1)

* * *

“ . . . It is equally clear to us that an employee must be informed of the charges preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges made against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remains consistent with the constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the charges leveled against him and to present evidence in support of his defenses. The ordinary way by which a Civil Service employee is given

this opportunity is by holding an investigation in the course of which the employee may assert his defenses and present his supporting evidence.” (GSIS vs. CA, 201 SCRA 661)

* * *

“A motion for reconsideration or an appeal may cure an alleged denial of due process.” (Marcelino vs. CA, 210 SCRA 444)

“The argument misconceives the meaning of due process. The proceeding provided for is merely administrative and summary in character, in line with the principle that ‘administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses.’ . . .” (Mangubat vs. De Castro, 163 SCRA 608)

* * *

“Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. A formal trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process. What is simply required is that the party concerned is given due notice and is afforded an opportunity or right to be heard. It is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present evidence on which a fair decision can be made. ‘To be heard’ does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may also be heard through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or through pleadings, is accorded there is no denial of procedural due process.

“The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimony. Considering that complainant was afforded an opportunity to be heard

through her pleadings, her right to due process was not impaired.” (Liguid vs. Camano, Jr., 387 SCRA 1)

* * *

“It has not escaped the attention of the Court that when a party runs out of arguments, or never had any to begin with, it usually pleads a denial of due process. The plea may impress at first glance, what with all its plaintive invocation of the Bill of Rights, but it does not often succeed upon closer examination.” (Bautista vs. Secretary of Labor, 196 SCRA 470)

* * *

“We hold that the challenged orders were validly promulgated. The petitioners were not denied due process when, having the opportunity to challenge them, they chose not to do so. The requisites of notice and hearing have been satisfied. Due process is only for the vigilant, not those who, having the right to be heard, choose to be silent, only to complain later that they have not been heard. The court is not moved by crocodile tears or by those who piously invoke the name of due process in vain to excuse their own inattentiveness.” (Bautista vs. Secretary of Labor, 196 SCRA 470)

* * *

“Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners’ allegation that they were denied due process because the decision was rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.” (Var-Orient Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Achacoso, 161 SCRA 732)

* * *

“It is of course also sound and settled rule that administrative agencies performing quasi-judicial functions are unfettered by the rigid technicalities of procedure observed in the courts of law, and this is so that disputes brought before such bodies may be resolved in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner possible.” (Rizal Workers Union vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 186 SCRA 431)

* * *

* * *

“The petitioner’s invocation of due process is without merit. Her complaint that she was not sufficiently informed of the charges against her has no basis. While the rules governing judicial trials should be observed as much as possible, their strict observance is not indispensable in administrative cases. As this Court has held, ‘the standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is not ignored.’

“The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense.” (Dadubo vs. CSC, 223 SCRA 747)

* * *

“ . . . One may be heard, not only by verbal presentation but also, sometimes more eloquently, through pleadings. ‘Due process is not semper et ubique judicial process.’ Hence, a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times necessary. So long as a party is afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain his side, the requirement of due process is complied with.” (Padilla vs. Sto. Tomas, 243 SCRA 155)

* * *

“The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. This requirement is met where one is given a chance to explain his side of the controversy even if no hearing is conducted.” (Adiong vs. CA, 371 SCRA 373; Lumiqued vs. Exevea, 282 SCRA 125)

* * *

“There is no necessity for a formal hearing where an employee admits responsibility for an alleged misconduct,

it is sufficient that she be informed of the findings of management and the basis of its decision to dismiss her.” (Bernardo vs. NLRC, 255 SCRA 108)

* * *

“It is a requirement of due process that the parties to litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual findings and legal justifications that led to the conclusions of the court.” (People vs. Bellaflor, 233 SCRA 196)

* * *

“ . . . In the very nature of things, any investigation by the employer of any alleged cause for disciplinary punishment of an employee will have to be conducted by the employer himself or his duly designated representative; and the investigation cannot be thwarted or nullified by arguing that it is the employer who is accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. . .” (Foster Parents Plan International/Bicol vs. Demetriou, 142 SCRA 505; see also Cruz vs. CSC, 370 SCRA 650)

* * *

“Let us not forget that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this liberality. This power to suspend or even disregard the rules can be so pervasive and encompassing so as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are now compelled to do in this case. And this is not without additional basis. For in ‘Ronquillo v. Marasigan’ (5 SCRA 304), the Court held that:

‘The fact that the decision x x x has become final, does not preclude a modification or an alteration thereof because even with finality of judgment, when its execution becomes impossible or unjust, as in the instant case, it may be modified or altered to harmonize the same with justice and the

facts.’” (De Guzman vs. Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 171)

* * *

“In administrative proceedings, . . . the technical rules of pleading and procedure, and of evidence, are not strictly adhered to.” (Manila Electric Co. vs. NLRC, 198 SCRA 681)

* * *

“The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side.” (Var-Orient Shipping, Co. vs. Achacoso, 161 SCRA 732); “What the law abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.” (Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs. Amores, 152 SCRA 237)

* * *“Petitioners’ contention that they were denied due

process is not well-taken. Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee.” (Bautista vs. CA, 430 SCRA 353)

* * *

“This argument misconceives the nature of the action taken by the respondent Commission. That action was not the imposition of an administrative disciplinary measure upon petitioner Victoria, nor upon petitioner Mayor. There were no administrative charges in respect of which petitioner Victoria would have been entitled to notice and hearing . . . (Debulgado vs. CSC, 237 SCRA 184)

* * *

“Petitioners’ contention that they were denied due process is not well-taken. Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an

opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee.” (Bautista vs. CA, 430 SCRA 353)

* * *

Civil Service Commission:

“The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency, has the obligation to implement and safeguard the constitutional provision on security of tenure and due process.” (Gayatao vs. CSC, 210 SCRA 183)

Evidence:

“The natural instinct of man impels him to resist an unfounded claim of imputation and defend himself. It is totally against our human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false accusations. Hence, silence in such cases is almost always construed as implied admission of the truth thereof.” (Grefaldeo vs. Lacson, August 3, 1998, 293 SCRA 524)

* * *

“The respondent’s refusal to face head-on the charges against him is contrary to the principle that ‘the first impulse of an innocent man when accused of wrongdoing is to express his innocence at the first opportune time.’ Indeed, in this case, the respondent’s flight and failure to appear before the Executive Judge to clear his name is truly indicative of his guilt.” (Chua vs. Paas, 469 SCRA 471)

* * *

“As is well-settled, if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the employee. Since it is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writings should be resolved in the former’s favor.” (Prangan vs. NLRC, 289 SCRA 142)

* * *

“One can simply enter in one’s daily time record the time of arrival in the office, thereafter, leave the same and then just come back in the afternoon in time for the close of office hours.” (Orfila vs. Quiroz, 277 SCRA 4930)

* * *

“ . . . We hold that Mr. Ampaso’s claim is nothing but a lame excuse and a mere after-thought. It is very unlikely, improbable and unbecoming that a person aspiring to such a high office would request another to fill up and file such personal data forms. But granting that he did make such request, still, he himself had to sign the forms just the same prior to filing, and in the normal course of things, he should have read the documents before affixing his signature thereto. That he signed it without reading and/or understanding its contents is not excusable, nor credible . . . It is thus no excuse to say that someone else prepared the forms. . .” (Re: Samanodin L. Ampaso, 256 SCRA 679)

* * *

“It is important to note that the authenticity of a signature though often the subject of proffered expert testimony, is a matter that is not so highly technical as to preclude a judge from examining the signature himself and ruling upon the question of whether the signature on a document is forged or not. It is not as highly technical as questions pertaining to quantum physics, topology or molecular biology.

“A finding of forgery does not depend exclusively on the testimonies of expert witnesses as judges can and must use their own judgment, through an independent examination of the questioned signature, in determining the authenticity of the handwriting. . .” (Belgica vs. Belgica, 531 SCRA 331)

* * *

“ . . . The cardinal rule is that any decision or ruling promulgated by an administrative body must have something to support itself. The evidence required before

such tribunals is substantial evidence or that evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the case at bar, there is not only a lack of substantial evidence but there is in fact a total absence of any evidence that can support the assailed decision of the COA.” (Alimario vs. COA, 223 SCRA 690)

* * *

“ . . . This Court can not give credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation (Ang vs. Asis, 373 SCRA 91). It is well-settled that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondents have regularly performed their official duties, as in this case.” (Cruz vs. Aliño-Hermochuelos, 426 SCRA 573)

* * *

“ . . . Inasmuch as no evidence was presented to show that petitioner acted in bad faith and with gross negligence in the performance of his official duty, he is presumed to have acted in the regular performance of his official duty. Similarly, it is a basic tenet of due process that the decision of a government agency must state the facts and the law on which the decision is based. The COA decision merely stated conclusions of law. Facts and circumstances, as well as the why’s, the what’s and the how’s of the disallowance, were patently missing, inaccurate or incomplete. The COA cannot just perform its constitutional function of disallowing expenditures of government funds at sheer discretion. There has to be factual basis why the expenditure is alleged to be fraudulent or why was there a misrepresentation. Liability depends upon the wrong committed and not solely by reason of being the head of a government agency. . . But as to why and how the disbursement of funds in this case was considered disadvantageous must be duly supported by findings of facts.” (Albert vs. Gangan, 353 SCRA 673)

* * *

“Petitioner CSC’s evidence mainly consists of the Certification from the CHED-CAR that the Special Order No. 2-100225 appearing on respondent’s transcript of records

could not have been issued to her since its Special Order numbers for Bachelor of Education degree start with 211, not 2. To our minds, this Certification alone cannot be considered substantial evidence to prove that respondent committed dishonesty or falsification. The CSC-CAR should have presented as witnesses the personnel from the Abra Valley Colleges who prepared and signed respondent’s transcript of records to testify on its genuineness or falsity, or the officials concerned from the same school who could determine whether such transcript of records bears its imprimatur.

“As aptly held by the Court of Appeals, the findings of the CSC-CAR and the CSC have no basis since ‘the officials who signed the transcript of records were not presented to testify that their signatures on the unauthenticated copy of the transcript of records of petitioner BUMOGAS were forged.’

“Basic is the rule that in administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of establishing, by substantial evidence, the averments of his complaint. Failing to do so, as in this case, respondent cannot be held guilty of the charges.

“At this point, it must be emphasized that respondent is a holder of a Professional Civil Service Eligibility. Why did petitioner CSC grant her such eligibility if she were not a college graduate?” (CSC vs. Bumogas, 531 SCRA 780)

* * *

“Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are deemed negative and self-serving evidence unworthy of credence.” (Wa-acon vs. People, 510 SCRA 429)

* * *

“The wicked flee (even) when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion.” [Sanvicente vs. People, 392 SCRA 610; People vs. Balasa, 295 SCRA 49 (Proverbs 28:1)]

* * *

“There is no higher evidence of guilt than the accused’s own confession and unless it is vitiated by evidence of duress, a voluntary plea of guilty is admissible as evidence of guilt of high quality.” (P vs. Pineda, 311 SCRA 368).

* * *

“He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.” (Portuguez vs. GSIS Family Bank, 517 SCRA 309).

* * *

“. . . Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable mind might conceivably opine otherwise.” (Times Transportation Co. Inc. vs. NLRC, 508 SCRA 435)

* * *

“A public servant whose career is on the line would normally want the investigating body to know his or her whereabouts for purposes of notice. The timing of respondent’s application for leave, for optional retirement, and her sudden unexplained disappearance, taken together, leads us to conclude that hers is not a mere case of negligence. Respondent’s acts reveal a calculated design to evade or derail the investigation against her. Her silence at the least serves as a tacit waiver of her opportunity to refute the charges made against her.” (Aquino vs. Miranda, 429 SCRA 230)

* * *

“Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might opine otherwise—petitioner’s case is devoid of substance to convince even the unreasonable minds.” (Portuguez vs. GSIS Family Bank, 517 SCRA 309)

* * *

“ . . . If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other

consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.” (People vs. Saturno, 355 SCRA 578)

* * *

“Furthermore, appellant’s self-serving negative defense of denial cannot be given greater weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. Jurisprudence teaches us that ‘affirmative testimony has greater value than a negative one, for the reason that he who denies a certain fact may not remember exactly the circumstances on which he bases his denial.’” (People vs. Llaguno, 285 SCRA 124)

* * *

“Time-tested is the rule that between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the accused, the former undisputedly deserves more credence and entitled to greater evidentiary weight.” (Tecson vs. Sandiganbayan, 318 SCRA 80)

* * *

“It is axiomatic that negative assertions cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses. Thus, the accused-appellant’s denial, not being substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence bearing no weight in law. Moreover, the defense of denial is inherently weak and has always been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which they can be concocted.” (People vs. Monteron, 378 SCRA 340)

* * *

People vs. Alvarez, 201 SCRA 364, confession of respondent

* * *

Falsification:

“The accomplishment of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) is required under Civil Service Rules and Regulations

for employment in the government. The making of an untruthful statement therein amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document that warrant dismissal from the service even on the first offense. Of these offenses, respondent is clearly liable.” (Administrative Case for Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Document Against Noel V. Luna, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, 418 SCRA 460)

* * *

“. . . (S)ince respondent actually benefited from the falsified document, he is presumed to have a hand in the falsification of the same . . . Indeed, ‘the settled rule is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification (Maliwat vs. CA, 256 SCRA 718; Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 116). Further, ‘if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification (Maliwat vs. CA, supra); (Rural Bank of Silay, Inc. vs. Pilla, 350 SCRA 138) .”

* * *“In falsification by false narration of facts, (1) the

offender makes untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; (3) the facts narrated are absolutely false; and (4) it was made with a wrongful intent to injure a third person.” (Tessie G. Quires, RTC, Office of the Clerk of Court, Q.C., 489 SCRA 349)

* * *

“From the foregoing coupled with the fact that the town of Guindulman suffered no damage and even gained on the project . . . plus the additional fact that the alleged complaining witness mentioned in the informations suffered no damage whatsoever and were in fact awarded no indemnity, it is obvious that the falsification made by the petitioners were done in good faith; there was no criminal intent. ‘The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea—a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent.’ (U.S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil. 504, 507 [1911]). There can be

no conviction for falsification of a public document in the absence of proof that the defendants ‘maliciously perverted the truth with wrongful intent of injury the complaining witness.’ (U.S. vs. Reyes, 1 Philip. 341, 344 [1902]). Thus the learned Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino has said, ‘there is no falsification of a public document if the acts of the accused are consistent with good faith. Thus, it has been held that ‘a conviction for falsification of a public document by a private person will not be sustained when the facts found are consistent with good faith on the part of the accused.’ In other words, although the accused altered a public or made a misstatement or erroneous assertion therein, he would not be guilty of falsification as long as he acted in good faith and no one was prejudiced by the alteration or error.’ [II Revised Penal Code, pp. 986-987 (1976)].” (Amora, Jr. vs. CA, 115 SCRA 388)

* * *

“ . . . (A)dministrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are not bound by technical rules followed in courts of law. . .” (Espinoza vs. Provincial Adjudicator, 516 SCRA 635)

* * *

“Assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner’s appeal was filed out of time, it is within the power of this Court to temper rigid rules in favor of substantial justice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the orderly conduct of litigation, it is because the higher objective they seek which is the protection of substantive rights of the parties.

“ . . . Because there is no vested right in technicalities, in meritorious cases, a liberal, not literal, interpretation of the rules becomes imperative and technicalities should not be resorted to in derogation of the intent and purpose of the rules which is the proper and just determination of litigation. Litigations, should as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they

are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very aims. As has been the constant ruling of this Court, every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. . .” (Mauna vs. CSC, 232 SCRA 388, citing the case of Riconada Telephone Co., Inc. vs. Buenviaje, 184 SCRA 701)

* * *

Penalty:

“ . . . The court has also ruled that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe (Re: Habitual Absenteeism of Mr. Fernando P. Pascual, A.M. No. 2005-16-SC, September 22, 2005, 470 SCRA 569). It is not only for the law’s concern for the workingman; there is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on wage earners.” (Mendoza, Jr. vs. Navarro, 501 SCRA 354)

* * *

“ . . . (I)t is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of a duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities.” (Tecson vs. Sandiganbayan, 318 SCRA 80; see also De la Cruz vs. DepEd, 420 SCRA 113)

* * *

“ . . . (P)etitioner argues that even if she may be liable, the penalty should not be dismissal, but only reprimand considering her twenty-five (25) years in service

and the fact that the instant case is her first offense. However, it bears stressing that the penalty of dismissal is an indivisible penalty. It is not susceptible to mitigation, unlike a penalty which has a maximum, medium, or minimum, depending on attending circumstances in petitioner’s favor. . .”

Pleadings:

“ . . . That the reply is not under oath is merely a formal and not a substantive defect. This procedural lapse may be dispensed with if the circumstances call for the dispensing of the rule in the interest of justice. While we commend petitioner’s zeal in promoting faithful adherence to the rules of procedure, we cannot ignore the well-entrenched doctrine that all pleadings should be liberally construed so as to do substantial justice.” (Concrete Aggregates Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 117574, January 2, 1997)

* * *

* * *

“ . . . It must be noted that even the absence of an oath in the complaint does not necessarily render it invalid. Want of oath is a mere defect of form, which does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits.” (Sasot vs. People, 462 SCRA 138)

* * *

“The submission of a certificate against forum shopping is thus deemed obligatory, though not jurisdictional. (Jurisdiction over the subject or nature of the action is conferred by law.) Not being jurisdictional, the requirement has been relaxed under justifiable circumstances . . .” (Torres vs. Specialized Packaging Development Corp., 433 SCRA 455) (see also Mamaril vs. CSC, 487 SCRA 65)

Good Faith

Good faith is always presumed: Municipality of La Libertad, Negros Oriental vs. Peñaflor, 453 SCRA 833. It is a legal presumption, born of

wisdom and experience, that official duty has been regularly performed and that the act of public officials are regular and valid (Bordador vs. Luz, 283 SCRA 374). Suspicions and conjectures cannot overcome, in the absence of contrary proof, the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed (The New Testament Church of God vs. CA, 246 SCRA 266).

* * *

Malversation:

“The failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming such public funds or property upon demand by a duly authorized officer shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such funds or property to personal use.” (Quiñon vs. People, 389 SCRA 412)

* * *

“ . . . It is settled that in cases of malversation of public funds, the mere failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, is prima facie evidence that he has put such funds or property to personal use. An accountable officer may be convicted of malversation even in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation so long as there is evidence of shortage in his accounts which he is unable to explain. Indeed, to justify conviction for malversation of public funds, the prosecution has only to prove that the accused received public funds or property and that he could not account for them or did not have them in his possession and could not give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance of the same. . .” (People vs. Pepito, 267 SCRA 358)

* * *

“ . . . It is quite obvious that respondent detained the complainant’s money for financial gain. The undue delay in turning over said amount leads only to one inescapable conclusion and that is, respondent had misappropriated the amount entrusted to him for his own personal use.

x x x

“Undoubtedly, the same foregoing acts constitute grave misconduct and/or dishonesty. Not only is respondent guilty of conduct prejudicial to the . . . best interest of the service as we have earlier mentioned, but also of gross neglect of duty, for which dismissal from the service is warranted. . . Public officers and employees are duty bound to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people. . .” (Flores vs. Caniya, 256 SCRA 518)

* * *

“(T)he practice of disbursing public funds under the ‘vale’ system is not a meritorious defense in malversation cases. The grant of loans through the ‘vale’ system is a clear case of an accountable officer consenting to the improper or unauthorized use of public funds by other persons, which is punishable by law. To tolerate such practice is to give a license to every disbursing officer to conduct a lending operation with the use of public funds.”(Rueda, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 346 SCRA 341)

* * *

Misconduct:

“Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer, and the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules—otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.” (Santos vs. Rosalan, 515 SCRA 97)

* * *

“Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the officials functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violation the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an

official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. This is apparently present in respondent’s case as it concerns not only a stolen kiss but also a demand for a ‘date,’ an unlawful consideration for the issuance of a permit to operate a pre-school. Respondent’s act clearly constitutes grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal.” (CSC vs. Belagan, 440 SCRA 578)

* * *

“Misconduct is ‘a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.’ The misconduct is grave if involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.

“In the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the CSC Central Office that petitioner is guilty of simple misconduct for having imposed upon respondent the penalty of demotion as a form of disciplinary sanction, in the absence of any formal charge and without the benefit of due process.” (Rubio vs. Munar, Jr., 534 SCRA 597)

* * *

“In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate law or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official who unlawfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself.” (Bulalat vs. Adil, 537 SCRA 44)

* * *

“Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. To justify

the taking of drastic disciplinary action, as is what is sought by complainant in this case, th law requires that the error or mistake must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith.” (Fernandez vs. Español, 289 SCRA 1, cited in Araos vs. Luna-Pison, 378 SCRA 246)

Dishonesty:

“Disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity . . .” (PAGCOR vs. Rilloraza, 359 SCRA 525)

* * *

“(D)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.” (OCA vs. Ibay, 393 SCRA 212; Bulalat vs. Adil, 537 SCRA 44)

* * *

“True, petitioner made several payments amounting to the shortage of P568,337.98, but such restitution cannot exculpate her from administrative liability. The fact remains that when the audit was conducted, the funds supposed to be in her possession were missing and she could not account for them.

“No personal misappropriation of the missing funds on the part of petitioner is needed before she can be held administratively liable for dishonesty. That there was shortage of funds and her failure to satisfactorily explain the same would suffice.” (Belleza vs. COA, 378 SCRA 64)

“Dishonesty and falsification of official document are grave offenses punishable by dismissal from the service. As defined, dishonesty is intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing one’s examination, registration, appointment or promotion. Dishonesty is understood to imply a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity. We have consistently ruled that making a false statement in a personal data sheet amount to dishonesty

and falsification of an official document.” (CSC vs. Bumogas, 531 SCRA 780)

* * *

Neglect of Duty:

“Gross Neglect of Duty denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty.” (PRA vs. Rupa, 363 SCRA 480)

“Simple Neglect of Duty signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. (PRA vs. Rupa, 363 SCRA 480)

* * *

“ . . . failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee resulting from either carelessness or indifference. (Añonuevo vs. Rubio, 435 SCRA 430)

* * *

“Negligence was defined by the Supreme Court as involving ‘Deficiency of perception, or the failure to pay proper attention and due diligence in foreseeing the impending injury or damage’ (Guillen vs. Constantino, 282 SCRA 583). In relation to this definition, the word ‘gross’ simply means ‘flagrant; shameful’” (Morales vs. P, 385 SCRA 259).

* * *

“We are not impressed by petitioner’s posture. We have held that when an employee accepts a position, whether it be a temporary designation or not, he assumes its responsibilities. Any employee entrusted with responsibility by his employer should perform the task assigned to him with reasonable care and dedication. Failure on this the employee must suffer the consequence of his negligence in the performance of his duties.” (Tumbiga vs. NLRC, 274 SCRA 338)

* * *

“Neglect, as applied to public officers means an intentional failure to discharge the duties of their respective offices and not simply through carelessness or inadvertence.” (Villaceran vs. Beltejar, 455 SCRA 191)

“Failure of an employee to give attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.” (supra)

* * *

“Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give their own property. In cases involving public officials, there is negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.” (Golangco vs. Fung, 504 SCRA 321; cited in CSC vs. Rabang, G.R. No. 167763, March 14, 2008)

Insubordination:

“Insubordination properly refers to willful or intentional disregard of some lawful and reasonable instruction of the employer.” (Re: Request of Mr. Melito E. Cuadra, Process Server, RTC, Br. 100, Quezon City to the RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, 460 SCRA 115)

Oppression: see Ochate vs. Deling, 105 Phil. 390.

“To be considered oppressive, an act should amount to cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction, domination or excessive use of authority, for oppression is the misdemeanor committed by a public officer who, under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment of any other injury, or an act of subjecting another to cruel and unjust hardship. . .” (Buta vs. Relampagos, 279 SCRA 211)

Discourtesy:

“Yes, complainant was then a Vice-Mayor and a lady at that, which circumstances ordinarily demanded respect

from petitioner. But, it was, likewise, her moral obligation springing from such position to act in a manner that is worthy of respect. In the case at bar, complainant’s demeanor of refusing to sign the leave monetization of petitioner, an otherwise valid claim, because of a political discord smacks of a conduct unbecoming of a lady and a Vice-Mayor at that. Moreover, it appears that she had, indeed, thrown a bottle of coke at petitioner, which actuation reveals that she, too, had gone down to petitioner’s level.

“Holding an esteemed position is never a license to act capriciously with impunity. The fact that there was a squabble between petitioner and complainant, . . . that a verbal brawl ostensibly took place, speaks very poorly of their self-control and public relations. For this they both deserve to be censured and directed to conduct themselves in a more composed manner and keep their pose as befits ranking officials who officially deal with the public.

“To be worthy of respect, one must act respectably, remembering always that courtesy begets courtesy.” (Villanueva vs. People, 487 SCRA 42)

* * *

“The act of a branch clerk of court in shouting at her workplace and during working hours showed discourtesy and disrespect not only towards complainant and her subordinates but also to the court; Government service is people-oriented where high-strung and belligerent behavior cannot be allowed.” (De Luna vs. Ricon, 250 SCRA 1)

Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct:

“ . . . For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community (Narag vs. Narag, 291 SCRA 454). Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be ‘grossly immoral,’ that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree (Reyes vs. Wong, 63 SCRA 667).” (Ui vs. Bonifacio, 333 SCRA 38)

* * *

“ . . . Admittedly, it was not conclusively proven that she had illicit affairs with men other than that her husband, as no one actually saw her having sexual intercourse with any one of them. However, immorality is not based alone on illicit sexual intercourse. It is ‘not confined to sexual matters, but includes conducts inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and as an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.’” (Court Employees of the MCTC, Ramon Magsaysay, Zamboanga del Sur vs. Sy, 476 SCRA 127) (see also Licardo vs. Licardo, 534 SCRA 181)

* * *

“Having an affair with someone who is financially interested in the transactions being acted upon by his office, of which he is the head, is not only outrageous to the standards of decency and morality, but unmistakably prejudicial to the public service.” (Fabian vs. Agustin, 397 SCRA 401)

* * *

“We find the ruling in Arciga vs. Maniwang quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.” (Figueroa vs. Barranco, Jr. 276 SCRA 445)

* * *

“This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the controversial and unique situation that the marriage of herein petitioner, then a classroom teacher, to her student who was fourteen (14) years her junior, was considered by the school authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her services.

x x x

“With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged violation of the Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. If the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.” (Chua-Qua vs. Clave, 189 SCRA 117)

* * *

Resignation—effect on administrative charge:

“Petitioner argues that a government employee who has been separated from service, whether by voluntary resignation or by operation of law, can no longer be administratively charged. Such argument is devoid of merit.

“In Office of the Court Administrator vs. Juan, this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable.

“A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioner’s separation from government service. Even if the most severed of administrative sanctions—that of separation from service—may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is later

found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.” (Pagano vs. Nazarro, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 149072, Sept. 21, 2007)

* * *

“The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that cessation from office by reason of resignation, death, or retirement does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative case filed against a public officer while her or she was still in the service, or render the said case academic. The jurisdiction of the disciplining authority attaches at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint and is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. This rule applies to all employees in the civil service, mindful of the constitutional precept that public office is a public trust for which all government employees and officials are accountable to the people. . .” (Largo vs. CA, 537 SCRA 721; see also Baquerfo vs. Sanchez, 455 SCRA 13; Liguid vs. Camano, Jr., 387 SCRA 1)

* * *

Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service:

“ . . . (T)he complained acts of petitioner constitute the administrative offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which need not be related or connected to the public officer’s official functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnished the image and integrity of his/her public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or employee. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act No. 6713) enunciates, inter alia, the State’s policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. Section 4 (c) of the commands ‘that [public officials and employees] shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest.’ By his actuations, petitioner failed to live up to such standard.” (Largo vs. CA, 537 SCRA 721)

* * *

Willful failure to pay just debts or willful failure to pay taxes:

“Given this disagreement as to the actual amount of the debt and the fact that complainant’s claim is the subject of litigation in court, i8t cannot be said that respondent is guilty of willful refusal to pay a just and valid debt. As we held in Martinez vs. Muñoz (249 SCRA 14), the Court is not a collection agency.” (De Guzman vs. Burce, 378 SCRA 240)

* * *

Security of Tenure/Back Salaries:

“As a permanent appointee to the position, she enjoys security of tenure. She is likewise entitled to all benefits, rights and privileges attached to the position. She cannot be removed or dismissed from the service without just cause and without observing the requirements of due process.

“An illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of her illegal dismissal up to her reinstatement. This is only fair and just because an employee who is reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is considered as not having left her office and should be given the corresponding compensation at the time of her reinstatement.

“In the instant case, we note that there is no finding that malice or bad faith attended the illegal dismissal and refusal to reinstate Gentallan by her superior officers. Thus, they cannot be held personally accountable for her back salaries. The municipal government, therefore, should disburse funds to answer for her claims resulting from such dismissal.” (CSC vs. Gentallan, 458 SCRA 278; see also Batangas State University vs. Bonifacio, 478 SCRA 142)

* * *“In Gabriel v. Domingo (189 SCRA 674) this Court

held that an illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to back wages and other monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement. This is only fair and

sensible because an employee who is reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is considered as not having left his office and should be given a comparable compensation at the time of his reinstatement.

“Respondent cannot be faulted for her inability to work or to render any service from the time she was illegally dismissed up to the time of her reinstatement. The policy of ‘no work, no pay’ cannot be applied to her, for such distressing state of affairs was not of her own making or liking even as her family suffered tremendously as a consequence of her removal and while she was jobless. Verily, to withhold her back salaries and other benefits during here illegal dismissal would put to naught the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure for those in the civil service.” (Constantino-David vs. Pangandaman-Gania, 409 SCRA 80)

* * *

“ . . . (T)he payment of backwages during the period of suspension of a civil servant who is subsequently reinstated is proper if he is found innocent of the charge and the suspension is unjustified.” (Bruguda vs. Secretary of Education, 450 SCRA 224; cited in CSC vs. Rabang, G.R. No. 167763, March 14, 2008)

Procedural rules; Technicality:

“We recognize the importance of procedural rules in insuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. However, the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid technical sense. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence.” (Rivera vs. People, 460 SCRA 85)

* * *

“ . . . There is indeed nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of

every action or proceeding. As it has been said, where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules.

“Besides, we have already ruled in A-One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (100 SCRA 590), -

‘Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice and thereby defeat their very aims. As has been the constant ruling of this Court, every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.” (276 SCRA 610; De La Cruz vs. DepEd, 420 SCRA 113)

* * *

“To begin with, motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court, and lawyers should never presume that their motions for extension or postponement will be granted or that they will be granted the length of time they pray for. Due diligence requires that they should conduct a timely inquiry with the division clerks of court of the action on their motions and the lack of notice thereof will not make them any less accountable for their omission. . .” (Ramos vs. Dajoyag, Jr., 378 SCRA 229)

* * *

“ . . . However, oft-repeated is the dictum that courts should not place undue importance on technicalities, when by so doing, substantial justice is sacrificed. Rules of procedure are intended to promote, not defeat, substantial justice. It is within the power of this Court to temper rigid rules of procedure in favor of substantial justice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the

proper and orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the attainment of justice and the protection of substantive rights of the parties. Thus, the relaxation of procedural rules, or saving a particular case from the operation of technicalities when substantial justice requires it, as in the case at bar, should no longer be subject to cavil.” (Nazareno vs. CA, 378 SCRA 28: see also GSIS vs. CA, 266 SCRA 187)

Non-Prescription of Administrative Offenses:

“On the matter of prescription, we have in earlier cases ruled that administrative offenses do not prescribe. Administrative offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public officers and employees. In disciplining public officers and employees, the object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in our government.” (Melchor vs. Gironella, 451 SCRA 476; see also Floria vs. Sunga, 368 SCRA 551; Ruelan vs. CSC, 136 SCRA 230)

* * *

Acceptance of a Position:

“We are not impressed by petitioner’s posture. We have held that when an employee accepts a position, whether it be a temporary assignment or not, he assumes its responsibilities. Any employee entrusted with responsibility by his employer should perform the task assigned to him with reasonable care and dedication. Failing in this, the employee must suffer the consequence of his negligence in the performance of his duties.” (Tumbiga vs. NLRC, 274 SCRA 338)

Leave of Absence:

“Leaves are matter of private convenience and cannot prejudice public service. Their approval is discretionary as it depends on the higher needs of public service.” (Gonzales vs. CSC, 226 SCRA 66)

* * *

AWOL:

“Under the present Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, an employee who is absent without approved leave for at least 30 calendar days shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls even without prior notice.” (Re: Absence Without Official Leave of Darlene A. Jacoba, Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 14, Manila, 303 SCRA 148; Gonzales vs. CSC, 390 SCRA 124; Jaucian vs. Wycoco, 534 SCRA 366)

* * *

Jurisdiction:

“The CSC is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service. (PSU vs. CA , 526 SCRA 92)

* * *

“Petitioner’s filing of an Answer has thereby cured whatever jurisdictional defect it now raises. As we have said time and again, ‘the active participation of a party in a case pending against him before a court or a quasi-judicial body, is tantamount to a recognition of that court’s or body’s jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court’s or body’s jurisdiction.” (Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corp. vs. Estita, 449 SCRA 240)

* * *

“However, at this late hour the proceedings conducted by the public respondent CSC can no longer be nullified on procedural grounds. Under the principle of estoppel by laches, petitioner is now barred from impugning the CSC’s jurisdiction over his case.

x x x

“Here what is crucial, in our view, is that the Civil Service Commission had afforded the petitioner sufficient opportunity to be heard and defend himself against charges of participation in faking civil service eligibilities of certain teachers for a fee. Not only did he answer the charges before the CSC Regional Office but he participated in the hearings of the charges against him to the extent

that we are left with no doubt that his participation in its proceedings was willful and voluntary.

“As held previously, participation by parties in the administrative proceedings without raising any objection thereto bars them from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them. In the case at bar, petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time in his amended petition for review before the CA. He did not raise this matter in his Motion to Dismiss filed before the CSC Regional Office. Notably, in his Counter-Affidavit, he himself invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission by stating that he was ‘open to further investigation by the CSC to bring light to the matter’ and by further praying for ‘any remedy or judgment which under the premises are just and equitable.’ It is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings, submitting his case for decision, and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.” (Emin vs. De Leon, 378 SCRA 43; see also Alcala vs. Villar, 416 SCRA 147; Rubio vs. Munar, Jr., 534 SCRA 597)

* * *

“A litigant cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief and, after failing to obtain such relief, to repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.” (Stilianopulos vs. City of Legaspi, 316 SCRA 523)

* * *

“ . . . Jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. When complainants filed their formal complaint with the DECS-Region VI, jurisdiction was vested on the latter. It cannot now be transferred to petitioner upon the instance of the complainants, even with the acquiescence of the DECS and petitioner.” (Office of the Ombudsman vs. Estandarte, 521 SCRA 155)

* * *

“ . . . It is settled that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any

time, even on appeal before this Court. The only exception is where the party raising the issue is barred by estoppel.” (Suarez vs. CA, 186 SCRA 339)

De Facto Officer:

“The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:

“1. There must be a de jure office;

“2. There must be color of right or general acquiescene by the public; and

“3. There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.

“One can qualify as a de facto officer only if the aforesaid elements are present . . .” (Tuanda vs. Sandiganbayan, 249 SCRA 342)

* * *

In this respect, while petitioner Anino's appointment to the contested position is void, as earlier discussed, he is nonetheless considered a de facto officer during the period of his incumbency. (Corpuz vs. Court of Appeals , 285 SCRA 23 (1998)). A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office and who openly exercises its functions under color of an appointment or election, even though such appointment or election may be irregular.( Dimaandal vs. Commission on Audit , 291 SCRA 322 (1998). In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals 20 SCRA 620 (1967), this Court ruled that a rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a de facto officer the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he (the de facto officer) occupied the office in good faith and under color of title. A de facto officer, not having a good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must, therefore, account to the de jure officer for whatever salary he received during the period of his wrongful tenure. In the later case of Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary 194 SCRA 317 (1991).,27 this Court allowed a de facto officer to receive emoluments for actual services rendered but only when there is no de jure officer, thus:

"x x x in cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office."

In fine, the rule is that where there is a de jure officer, a de facto officer, during his wrongful incumbency, is not entitled to the emoluments attached to the office, even if he occupied the office in good faith. This rule, however, cannot be applied squarely on the present case in view of its peculiar circumstances. Respondent had assumed under protest the position of Administrative Officer sometime in the latter part of 1988, which position she currently holds. Since then, she has been receiving the emoluments, salary and other compensation attached to such office. While her assumption to said lower position and her acceptance of the corresponding emoluments cannot be considered as an abandonment of her claim to her rightful office (Division Manager), she cannot recover full backwages for the period when she was unlawfully deprived thereof. She is entitled only to backpay differentials for the period starting from her assumption as Administrative Officer up to the time of her actual reinstatement to her rightful position as Division Manager. Such backpay differentials pertain to the difference between the salary rates for the positions of Manager II and Administrative Officer. The same must be paid by petitioner Anino corresponding from the time he wrongfully assumed the contested position up to the time of his retirement on November 30, 1997.

Appointments:

“Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should posses the qualifications required by law. If he does, the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving consideration of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.” (Luego vs. CSC, 143 SCRA 327)

* * *

“The power of appointment involves considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. The CSC is not authorized to curtail or diminish the exercise of discretion of the appointing power on the nature or kind of appointment to be extended. The CSC, by ignoring or annulling, or supplanting with its own, Director Opinion’s appointment of petitioner on a coterminous basis, has acted beyond its authority. . .” (Jaucian vs. Wycoco, 534 SCRA 366)

* * *

“The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment.” (Luego vs. CSC, 143 SCRA 327)

Judgment:

“After the judgment has become final, no addition can be made thereto and nothing can be done therewith except its execution; otherwise, there can be no end to litigation, thus setting at naught the main role of Courts of Justice, which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order, by setting justiciable controversies with finality . . . ( Alabanzas vs. IAC, 204 SCRA 304)

* * *

“A void judgment never acquires finality.” (Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez vs. CA, 255 SCRA 572)

* * * “It bears stressing that a decision that has acquired

finality, as in this case, becomes immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. In short, once a judgment becomes final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed no matter how erroneous it may be and nothing further can be done therewith except to execute it.” (Florentino vs. Rivera, 479 SCRA 522)

* * *

“A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the petitioner in the case at bar failed to appeal timely the aforementioned decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, it cannot be deemed to have become final and executory. In contemplation of law, that void decision is deemed non-existent. Thus, there was no effective or operative judgment to appeal from. In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Sison (124 SCRA 394), this Court held that:

‘x x x [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same position they were in before the trial.’

“Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void: ‘x x x it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.’” (Arcelona v. CA, 280 SCRA 20, cited in Nazareno vs. CA, 378 SCRA 28; see also Leonor v. CA, 256 SCRA 69)

* * *

“It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. An effective and efficient administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must, therefore, guard against any scheme

calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.” (Florentino vs. Rivera, 479 SCRA 522)

* * *

“A void judgment may be likened to a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it rears its head.” (Polystyrene Manufacturing Company, Inc. vs. Privatization and Management Office, 534 SCRA 640)

* * *

“A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated and not before. Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or decision.” (Ambil, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 344 SCRA 358)

* * *

“ . . . A final judgment stands immutable, otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. A judgment that has attained finality constitutes the ultimate adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties and becomes valid and binding upon them and their successors in interest.” (Balanoba vs. Madriaga, 475 SCRA 688)

Preventive Suspension:

“The preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service Law. It cannot, therefore, be considered ‘unjustified,’ even if later the charges are dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to the employee concerned. It is one of those sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the public good. For this reason, it is limited to ninety (90) days unless the delay in the conclusion of the investigation is due to the employee concerned. After that period, even if the investigation is

not finished, the law provides that the employee shall be automatically reinstated.” (Gloria vs. CA, 306 SCRA 287)

* * *

“ . . . Indeed, the objective of a preventive suspension is to ‘prevent the accused from hampering the normal course of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses or keep him off the records and other evidence.’ (Bunye vs. Escareal, 226 SCRA 332; see CSC Resolution No. 07-1679)

* * *

“ . . . The sole objective of a (preventive) suspension, as we have held, is simply ‘to prevent the accused from hampering the normal course of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses’ or to keep him off ‘the records and other evidence.’ It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days, which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.” (Ganzon vs. CA, 200 SCRA 271)

* * *

“ . . . It is now settled that the preventive suspension of a civil service employee or officer can be ordered even without a hearing because such suspension is not a penalty but only a preliminary step in administrative investigation. The purpose is to prevent the accused from using his position or office to influence prospective witnesses or tamper with the records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. . .” (Alonzo vs. Capulong, 244 SCRA 80)

Suspension/Preventive Suspension—Distinction:

“Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different sought to be achieved.

“Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of act warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.

x x x

“Clearly, service of the preventive suspension cannot be credited as service of penalty. To rule otherwise is to disregard above quoted Section 24 and 25 of the Administrative Code of 1987 and render nugatory the substantial distinction between, and purposes of imposing preventive suspension and suspension as penalty.” (Quimbo vs. Gervacio, 466 SCRA 277)

Privileged Communication:

“In the case of Lu Chu Sing vs. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669. the Court said that ‘the fact that a communication is privileged does not mean that it is not actionable, the privileged character simply does away with the presumption of malice which the plaintiff has to prove in such a case.’ And the evidence necessary to prove malice on the part of the writer of a privileged communication is not strictly documentary for it may be either extrinsic, internal, and circumstantial, like any other fact necessary to make out plaintiff’s case.” (Suarez vs. CA, 186 SCRA 339)

Quantum meruit

Quantum meruit allows recovery of the reasonable value regardless of any agreement as to value. It entitles the party to "as much as he, reasonably deserves," as distinguished from Quantum valebant or to "as much as what is reasonably worth."

Unliquidated claims present a justiciable question ripe for judicial determination which is beyond the powers of the COA to adjudicate. Recovery based on Quantum meruit is in the nature of such claim because its settlement requires the application of judgment and discretion and cannot be adjusted by simple arithmetical processes. In the cases of Eslao and Royal Trust, the Court found it necessary to refer to the COA the task of determining the total compensation due to the claimants considering that the matter on the exact amount was not at issue and the determination thereof involves a review of the factual findings and evidence in support thereof. On the other hand, the lower court in this case, had already made a factual finding on the amount reasonably due to petitioner and scrutinized the evidence to sustain the claim. Besides, there is nothing in the cited cases which would imply that only the COA can determine the specific amount due to a contractor guided by the equitable principle of Quantum meruit . As our courts are both courts of law and equity, they are not powerless to determine a factual matter in accordance with both standards.

Position not Vacant:

In fact, the appointing officer is authorized by law to order the payment of compensation to any government officer or employee designated or appointed to fill such vacant position, as provided under Section 2077 of the Revised Administrative Code which states that:

Sec. 2077. Compensation for person appointed to temporary service.

xxx xxx xxx

In case of the temporary absence or disability of a provincial officer or in case of a vacancy in a provincial office, the President of the Philippines or officer having the power to fill such position may, in his discretion, order the payment of compensation, or additional compensation, to any Government officer or employee designated or appointed temporarily to fill the place, but the total

compensation paid shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the position filled.

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It is elementary in the law of public officers that no person, no matter how qualified and eligible he is for a certain position may be appointed to an office which is not vacant. There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed or his appointment validly terminated. (COSTIN, et al. vs.HON. QUIMBO, G.R. No. L-32271 January 27, 1983.

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Under Section 2(a) of Rule VI, the Civil Service Rules implementing Section 16(g) of Republic Act 2260, an appointment extended by an officer duly empowered to make it is not final and complete until after the Commissioner of Civil Service has certified that such an appointment may be made. (Gorospe v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications et al. 105 Phil. 129L)

It is likewise true that under Section 20 of Republic Act 2260 which, in part, provides:

SEC. 20. Delegation in the Civil Service Commission and to the Agencies. -... Appointments by ... municipal mayors shall become effective upon issuance of such appointments and upon attestation by the provincial treasurer in the case of appointments made by ... municipal mayors ... . All appointments made by the ... municipal mayors ... shall, after being attested to by the respective provincial treasurer ... be forwarded within ten days to the Commissioner of Civil Service for review pursuant to Civil Service law and rules. If within one hundred eighty days after receipt of said appointments, the Commissioner of Civil Service shall not have made any correction or revision, then such appointments shall be deemed to have been properly made.

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(Aquino vs. Civil Service Commission, 208 SCRA 240 (1992) this Court emphasized that "once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable, right (to the position) which is protected not only by statute, but also by the constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing

"an appointment to a non-vacant position in the civil service is null and void ab initio. (Morata vs. Court of Appeals , 11 SCRA 42 (1964) , cited in Aquino vs. Civil Service Commission, supra)

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The petitioner concluded that, as the appointing authority, it is the respondent who shall be personally liable for the payment of salaries as provided in Item 5(a), Part I, CSC MC No. 38, s. 1993, which states:

5. Liability of Appointing Authority and Other Officers

a. The appointing authority shall be personally liable for the salary of appointees whose appointments have been disapproved for violation of pertinent laws such as RA 7041 and RA 7430.9

POEA should pay Ms. Ong for her services since POEA was the one benefited not the herein movant in his personal capacity. The principle of quantum meruit dictates that not only is the one who rendered services who should paid (sic) but equally important, is that the one benefited from such services must be the one who should pay the services. If the herein movant would be made personally liable to pay for her services, just the same, it is tantamount to unjust enrichment on the part of the government at the movant’s expense…

Protested Appointment

In support of this contention, they cited Section 19, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), which provides inter alia:

"SEC 19. An appointment, though contested, shall take effect immediately upon its issuance if the appointee assumes the duties of the position and the appointee is entitled to receive the salary attached to the position. However, the appointment, together with the decision of the department head, shall be submitted to the Commission for appropriate action within 30 days from the date of its issuance, otherwise the appointment becomes ineffective thereafter. Likewise, such appointment shall become ineffective in case the protest is finally resolved against the protestee, in which case, he shall be reverted to his former position."