SECURITY, DEFENSE, AND FORCE DESIGN Establishing Capability-based Defense Planning

8/10/2019 SECURITY, DEFENSE, AND FORCE DESIGN Establishing Capability-based Defense Planning

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SECURITY, DEFENSE, AND FORCE DESIGN

Establishing Capability-based Defense Planning

Salvador Ghelfi Raza

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies National Defense UniversityWashington, D.C.2002

(2) Narrow Security Broad Defense

3)road Security

Narrow Defense B

(4) Narrow Security Narrow Defense

( B B

1)road Security road Defense

1970

HaitiHonduras Ni caragua

Pananma UruguayDom. Rep.

GuatemalaUSA Canada Peru Ecuador

Uruguay BoliviaMexico Paraguay

Colombia Costa RicaBrazil VenezuelaChile Argentina

(1) Broad Security Broad Defense

(2) Narrow Security Broad Defense

3) Broad Security Narrow Defense

(4) Narrow Security Narrow Defense

Colo mbiaCosta Rica PanamaDom.Rep. Nicaragya

Honduras Peru EcuadorUruguay Guatemala

HaitiArgentina Bolivia

Venezuela ParaguayCanada

MexicoUSA Chile

Brazil

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CENTER FOR HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE STUDIES

At the first Defense Ministerial of the Americas (DMA) held in Williamsburg, Virginia, inJuly 1995, defense leaders from the region observed to U.S. participants that a major obstacle toachieving civilian control of the defense establishment in their countries was a profound lack ofcivilians with familiarity or expertise in defense and military matters. In response, U.S. Secretaryof Defense Willian J. Perry announced the creation of the Center for Hemispheric DefenseStudies at the October 1996 DMA meeting in Bariloche, Argentina. In September 1997, theCenter was established as a subordinate element of the National Defense University located at Ft.Leslie J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

CHDS is one of five U.S. Department of Defense Regional Centers, each with regionallytailored programs focused on the needs of their constituencies. The Centers mission is to..develop and present academic programs tailored to the requirements of Latin America andCaribbean states that stimulate both civilian and military thinking about defense policy and civil-military relations, and provide an understanding of defense decision making and resourcemanagement in a democratic society.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solelythose of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the National DefenseUniversity, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies or other any agency, organization or

government.


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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Structure of Relationship 9

Figure 2. Capabilities Construct . 15

Figure 3. Cross-Impact Matrix of Objectives, Tasks, Missions and Roles . 23

Figure 4. Divergent and Convergent Patterns 30

Figure 5. Force Design Framework Logic Blocks .. 35

Figure 6. Security and Defense Matrix ... 45

Figure 7. Notional Chart for Selected Countries ... 47

Figure 8. Plotting US movement in the Security and Defense Matrix ..... 57


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FOREWORD

This volume addresses many topics, some esoteric, some simply common sense.Throughout the pages ahead two issues guide this writing: spending and saving. Saving lives,saving monies, and ultimately the fundamental role of defense: saving a way of life by providingadequate security at the least possible cost, near term, medium term and long term. Yet noapproach to defense analysis can avoid measures of spending. Todays wives and children can

become tomorrows widows and orphans when defense is inadequate to provide deterrenceand/or compelence; no savings results from an inadequate defense.

Spending monies does not provide defense or security, nor do budget cuts equate toinadequate defense and security. Monies spent for defense and security represent theembodiment and empowerment of choices. It is the choices themselves that determine a nationslevel of defense and security.

Guiding this entire process of choice identification, analysis and decision making withinthe sphere of defense and security for every free state on the face of this globe are more subtlefactors which stem from the collective will of the people within the borders of the country,

people who have chosen a way of life and by their voting patterns give an imprint to theirgovernment.

Defense reform results when sufficient domestic or external change gives cause for anations government leadership to revise its assessment. Defense reform addresses these sameissues of spending and saving.

In its most simplistic form, it can take the form of a budget cut by a specified percentage.Or, it can be left to the Armed Services, which all too often spend as much time and energyassessing how the other branches are faring as they do buttressing their established positions.Or, the modern management thought and science can be applied to defense reform.

It is the hypothesis of this volume that the series of analyses and processes outlined hereinand collectively called force design offers useful thinking regarding that last alternative.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The subject addressed by this book is a difficult one and it would not be possible withoutthe incentive and tutoring of Dr. Margaret Daly Hayes, CHDSs Director. My many arguments

with her seldom had either witnesses or winners, but much was learned at least on my side. She provided input during the conception process and reviewed ideas with clear understanding thatconcurrence was never required. I also received important education on subjects covered herefrom my students at the CHDS.

I also would like to thank our many colleagues at the Center for Hemispheric DefenseStudies. This book attempts to capture, for a wider audience, some discussions that haveoccurred in our peer-review sessions, reflecting a creative energy and determination to provideour students the highest educational standards. However, among these there are a few that Iwould like to acknowledge specifically. Talks on capability by Craig Deare stimulated mythoughts in this area; good revisers are essential and I am indebted to Suzanne Heist for her help;generous support for my research and words of encouragement came from Dennis Caffrey. Theywere all fundamental in supporting my effort to produce this book as requirement of a post-doctoral fellowship.

This book is dedicated to my wife and children for their support, patience andencouragement throughout the many hours of research and writing.


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INTRODUCTION

Emerging from a millennium capped by a half century of defense thinking dominated byCold War-era necessities, now tainted by the aftershocks of September 11 th and aware of theinadequacy of traditional rigid defense structures (whatever their military might), every nationstate is finding a need for a new concept and framework for defense planning. Force design acomplex-yet-taxonomic decision-making process which amalgamates policy formulation,modernization of military hardware, and organizational restructuring with changes in thedecision-making processes fulfills that need.

In conjunction with effective decision-making processes that recognize long-term goals (aswell as procedures that can guide its execution), force design affords the two-way flow of critical

information and assessments needed both at the political level and within defense ministries andtheir subparts. Through force design a professional defense sector can be created, appropriatelysized, based on an efficient use of resources, working within precise guidelines and thereforesubject to democratic control.

Absent force design, decisions are taken based on a set of foundations seen as axiomaticand absolute only because they remain unexamined; as a result, ministries and the politicalleadership often appear to respond to events as they unfold. When problems arise, the problem

becomes the focus of attention. In such situations, the urgency of decision-making in and ofitself pushes aside the seemingly abstract notion of force design.

Unless force design is addressed head on, unless a system competent to address force

design is already in place, choices offered by ministries to the political leadership are often no broader than between building more of the same (easier and quicker than doing acomprehensive review) and developing an entirely new approach (generally hinged imprudentlyto some form of technology).

The final goal of force design is to accomplish a system of concepts manifest within aframework which is an open-ended measurement tool capable of:


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Security, Defense and Force Design Pre-publication DRAFT 08/22/2011

1) Assessing the changing relationship between capabilities requirements anddefense demands properly addressing the challenge of defense planning in anera of uncertainty of threats and information technology.

2) Specifying capabilities to be added that might lead to different choices underthree concurring perspectives - adaptation, modernization and transformation.

Lacking an existing force design capability, inappropriate defense decisions taken on atight timetable generally fail to take into account the various tradeoffs and cannot systematicallyexamine their interaction(s). That is, decisions made tend to result in capabilities later to befound incapable of meeting defense objectives, i.e., operational failure.

What is force design? This book attempts to depict the dynamic process that it is. Itsfoundation is capability-based defense planning. Upon this foundation is a set of coherentconcepts and a framework that makes them practical in both term and significance. The resultantanalytical construct abstracts military capabilities into their component elements, explicatingconcept and relationship. Framework and concept integrate to form a hierarchy whicharticulates processes that allow ways and means to develop and choose defense alternatives

even when limitations of knowledge and information exclude the possibility of assessing allexpected outcomes. Its underlying assumption is that defense reform demands emerge as thedifferential between current defense capabilities and the fluctuating synthesis of defense

planning in light of perceived future conditions

The book is organized in four chapters. Chapter One sets the stage by introducing the problem force design uniquely solves with the key question: Whether Change by Design orHappenstance? It also introduces the necessity of rethinking obsolete - Cold-War heritages -system of concepts and framework in order to face the new challenges posed by todays defenseand security environment. Chapter Two defines force design as the conceptual warp and weftgiving pattern to the fabric of military capability, offering a fully developed theoretical construct(an abstraction of the situation in appropriate detail to address the problem) that sees andassesses capabilities components in order to identify their internal relationships, as well astensions implicit within these components and their relationships. Chapter Three presents threelogical blocks articulated in a framework that examines roles and the instrumental functionalityof policy formulation, scenario developing and practices for reengineering defense capabilities,examining defense Adaptation , Modernization and Transformation requirements. A matrix ofsecurity and defense is also offered in this Chapter as an instance of reference for reform

purposes, describing environment conditions that might harbinger the necessity andappropriateness of force design being called upon to make practical defense reforms demands.The book concludes by presenting force design as a new area of study with its own articulatedset of concepts and hypotheses.

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command and control structure. Brazils National Multi-annual Plan (PPA), explicitlydeclares that:

The modernization of the National Defense System will be the main objective of the project for reequipping and adjusting the Brazilian Army, the Brazilian Navy and the Brazilian Air Force, together with the project for managing the armed forces policy. Both projects will contribute to reequip and adjust for ce structure to a newtechnological pattern, assuring the country higher protection 4 .

In the US case, particularly, September 11 th catalyzed, albeit drastically, post-Cold Wardemands for reform. Even earlier, in February 2001, the Project on DefenseAlternatives of the Commonwealth Institute at Cambridge pointed out four causes ofinefficiencies of the US Armed Forces, demanding reforms in the context of theQuadrennial Defense Review:

One type of inefficiency is manifest in excess infrastructure a Cold War residue.Today, the US Armed Forces still maintain 20 percent of excess infrastructure. Crude,costly and seemingly intractable, this problem has had little political salience. The

support of excess infrastructure drains money away from training, maintenance, andquality-of-life accounts. A second type of inefficiency derives from inter-service rivalryand redundancy. A third type of inefficiency involves having military tools and

procedures that do not correspond closely to todays operational challenges. Persistentshortages despite the expenditure of more than $250 billion on procurement during the

past five years indicates a failure to configure our armed forces to meet current needs. A final type of inefficiency results from the failure to fully exploit information-agetechnology and organizational principles, which could reduce structural redundanciesin our military and increase its flexibility. By c ontemporary business standards, ourmilitary remains an industrial age organization 5.

Many changes, broad-based changes, yet what is extraordinary are not these changes in andof themselves, for defense has always been an evolutionary process and future oriented. What istruly extraordinary is the scale and scope of current defense reforms, with countries endeavoringsimultaneously to:

Define organizational requirements in association with new decision-making, controland oversight mechanisms aimed at accomplishing a higher degree of political controlover defense issues and priorities.

Increase the efficiency, efficacy and economy 6 of defense resource allocation, with afocus on the processes and criteria used for the formulation, spending and evaluation ofthe defense budget.

Define affordable military forces, balanced against multiple axes, to hedge againstuncertainty in the current and future threat environment.

These overarching themes are linked into mutually determinant chains of cause andcausality, making few of the decisions in security requirements and defense planning eithersimple or noncontroversial.

Previously unnoticed is the necessity of an articulated set of concepts and its associatedanalytical framework for planning defense alternatives based on military capabilities. That is

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why the following questions are always present: What criteria oriented the identification ofmilitary capabilities? What strategies do those capabilities support and how do those strategiessupport the range of defense mission policy objectives? How are budgets related to thosecapabilities?

All these questions pertaining to the defense reform debate in its different shapes and perceived priorities have a common goal and a common assumption. The common goal is todetermine credible military capabilities that connect current fiscal possibilities to futurealternatives of possible military action, with an acceptable degree of political risk. It has long

been recognized that when the strength and credibility of the States military capabilities areadequate to deter threatening intentions by others, Peace is the yield.

While these central arguments of defense planning are rather common-sensical, it isimportant to keep in perspective that defining requirements for affordable and credible militarycapabilities is a complex issue demanding a set of valid conceptual propositions articulated by acoherent internal logic.

History teaches that conceptual propositions bred by applying reason and critical

examination to past events in order to set forth requirements for the future will eventually beconfronted by empirical evidence which will make them invalid. No conceptual proposition that

pretends to be based on a purely scientific foundation, i.e., hypothesis-observations-refutation,can postulate ongoing validity. The internal logic of the conceptual system provides thearticulating rules of its component propositions, establishing a causal relationship betweenconcepts, which provides the starting point and the interdependency of the parts for the desiredor intended final product 7. This logic is only valid insofar as it is useful for instructing thecollection, organization and interpretation of quantitative and qualitative information; orientingthe research for alternative solutions to the assorted problems; flanking its analysis withconsistent and explicit criteria; and allowing the precise communication of results.

The validity of a conceptual system and its internal logic simply assures that the devised problem is the real problem, not that it can be solved within the domain of existing competenciesor that solutions proposed consider the relevant aspects of the problem. Yet without the supportof a valid conceptual system, defense reform propositions are mere options and opinions, withoutany way to ascertain which option or opinion is better.

The required mind set for approaching defense reforms must take into account the fact thatmost conceptual propositions and their articulating logic used for defense planning have theirorigin in t he last 50 years (the wake of the Cold War) and are therefore now either obsolete orinadequate 8 .

It is difficult to overemphasize the uniqueness of each countrys defense planning approachand associated problems. There is relatively little systematic research on the nature andconsequences of these problems, forcing analysis to rely largely upon impressionistic data. Thissituation is potentially harmful for four intertwined reasons:

1. Failing to effectively reshape the military to meet future demands. Reluctance to re-evaluate defense reform practices supports the existence of a culture that acceptsredundancy as synonym of security rather than symptom of inefficiency.

2. Harboring inefficiency. Major decisions on force structure not adequately identifiedwith force design goals, focusing on a wide range of relative near term, unconnected

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issues, ruled by inadequate criteria and organized procedures for integrating andassessing capability requirements.

3. Causing the breakdown of policy, strategy and resource allocation into isolated processes, breeding into stove-piping capabilities.

4. Creating misleading performance evaluation criteria. Masking capability inefficienciesthrough methodologies deprived of analytical rigor.

The outcome of this condition entails risks that are not always recognized, with defense planners often trying to purchase a breakthrough model through experiences taken from othercases. Unfortunately, these models rarely work as anticipated because they can import neitherthe conceptual system nor the people who understand it.

Moreover, given post-Cold War changes in security and defense requirements and theaftermath of September 11 th, past conceptual systems must be taken with a grain of salt. It seemstherefore both appropriate and opportune to propose a new conceptual framework for designingdefense alternatives. Such a mechanism would focus on reevaluating the concepts of security anddefense, taking into consideration their evolving nature and diffused contours, the mechanismsfor forecasting contingencies (within a framework that integrates the ebbing and flowing natureof distinct patterns), and requirements for efficiency, economy and efficacy in defense resourcemanagement. Such an endeavor should more properly be called Force Design .

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Chapter Two

FORCE DESIGN

Force Design accesses all components of the fabric of military capabilities and as a result provides the foundations for an integrated project of defense. Its purpose is theconceptualization, development and evaluation of alternative military capabilities to attend todefense requirements in response to security demands, assuring that the proper set of effectiveand efficient military is economically identified, developed, organized, fielded and supported.

Force Design results an integrated project of defense - are the source of guiding principles that contribute to communicate goals and plans that are reinforced through rules andnorms at all levels of the defense organization. Such a project ties objectives together and givesmeaning and purpose to operational procedures, enabling all parts of the organization tocontribute to the overall effort with consistency even though they act independently in arapidly changing environment. Equally important, it includes an indication of capabilities whichneed not be developed, retaining an appropriate focus in building essential capabilities. The basic

purpose of an integrated project of defense is to provide guidance to those whose actions canaffect the focus and development of the required military capabilities.

Although subordinating all defense operational processes to a common purpose, forcedesign allows the necessary latitude for leadership and initiatives and serves as an umbrella overthe various functional activities developed within the defense establishment, shaping the contextwithin which day-to-day decisions are made and setting the bounds on strategic options. Further,an integrated project of defense guides in making trade-offs among competing requirements for

short-term and long-term goals. Finally, it provides consistency among programs offering theinstance of reference for resource allocation.

These guiding principles are defined as the pattern of decisions that determine the ultimateset of military capabilities and as being the blueprint for force planning, programming and

budgeting 9 which underpins all defense related functions including: procurement andacquisition; intelligence gathering; operational training and evaluation; personnel (civil andmilitary); educational requirements; and technology research. Essentially it is because of theability of these guiding principles to coordinate operational activities with policy requirementsassuring consistency over time that military capabilities development evolves in a directedmanner renewing, augmenting and contracting its components to reinforce and expand defense

possibilities.

Although force design mills operational requirements into defense alternatives, it is notmerely the application of military planning at the ministerial level, which at b est warns thosewho enter its domains about the inadequacy of military operational planning 10 concepts andmethodologies for the processes and products that fall under its purposes. Instead, force designrequires attention to the organizational structure of a ministry of defense, involving determiningthe number and qualification of the individuals on the force design team.

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Force Design provides a set of concepts and the articulating logic required to swivel political options into military capability requirements and for cranking these requirements intoforce alternatives, assuring jointness and interoperability. It provides a functional logic formanagement of the defense system, disciplining the relationships of its component parts, while

providing a common taxonomy for discussion, progressively examining and integrating new

concepts.Once an integrated project of defense has been defined, it informs the development of

subparts related to individual services and defense agencies that will converge to produce therequired set of military capabilities. The same logic that provide focus on the required decisionsat the ministerial level can help to divide responsibilities among multiple agents, dedicating

portions of effort to each subunit of the defense establishment.

Insuring that subunits adhere (over time) to alternatives set forth by ministries requires anintegrated project of defense; force design provide exactly the systemic perspective needed tosupport such decisions as time and circumstance dictate additions or contractions in the militaryinventory. Force Design constantly tests the forecast demand for military capabilities for thedesired level of efficacy, the exploitation of better integration and synergy among component

parts of the military system in order to maximize its efficiency, and exploit economies of scaleand scope that compete on the basis of price in order to assure economy within acceptable levelsof risk.

MILITARY CAPABILITYCommon s ense: capabilities are understood as the quality of being able to use or be used in

a specified way. 11 However, for specific force design purposes, a military capability is the potential ability of force components to perform a defense task under specific pre-determinedconditions with an expected degree of success.

Military capabilities are designed to fulfill the demands (or potential demand) for the use offorce in support of policies deemed essential to the survival of a nation-states way of life.Having no intrinsic value their value derives from the assessment of success in its intended use their value obtains only in the context of a political climate which senses threat to the survival of anation-states way of life. The above statement is crucial for force design, because it casts lighton the fundamental question: how much is enough? It articulates a recognition that (withindemocracies, the arena chosen for this study) the only acceptable answer to this question resultsfrom the self-determination. The citizen speaks, and from that process come political prioritiesfor defense, which then afford the development of criteria pairing widely recognized anticipatedtasks with requirements of quantitative and qualitative dimensioning of force components underresource constraints and acceptable level of risk. It is therefore paramount within force design torecognize that tertiary defense, Mobilizational Readiness, must be of such a systemic nature as towithstand the ebbs and flows of popular awareness. (This is more fully discussed under theheading: The Conjunct of Regulating Factors, some pages ahead.)

The nature of these capabilities instrumental in the practice of violence under stateauthority define the individual competencies which defense components must acquire whilecircumscribing their use within the bounds of a defense mission embodying the nation statesright to exist as an entity of self-determination. Therefore, military capabilities are not absolute

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Force components are the functional aggregation of force structure elements in combat andassociated support structures according to practiced doctrine.

The concept of Employment is a set of articulated decisions that express the prioritizationof missions and operations, relating them through an integrated interpretation of strategic defensemission and mission tactical objectives.

Objectives are elements, either material or insubstantial, that must be accomplishedthrough operations in order to provide an intended benefit that contributes to a specific mission.Tasks ar e r equired actions to achieve objectives, towards which there is some sort of oppositionor threat. 14

Countries have their defense assets (number and size) stationed or deployed in military bases. However, these assets are not in themselves military capabilities. It is meaningless to say,for example, that Brazils aircraft carrier So Paulo is a military capability. It is only an asset.Brazils military capability reflects the scale and scope of tasks that force components, withwhich this asset might be integrated, could perform with an expected degree of success.

One alternative of military capability for Brazil could include the So Paulo in a forcecomponent to contribute to defend Brazils sovereignty in the Amazon area (defense objective),aiming to deter internation al designs on the Amazon forest. The resulting capability isconditioned by the readiness 15 degree of its component air wing, the degree of training of itscrew, and the ability to sustain continuous operations for an extended period of time.

The Aircraft Carrier So Paulo is based in Rio de Janeiro, taking approximately 5 days todeploy (non-stop) to the Amazon area, requiring the support of other assets with the technicalability for replenishment at sea tanker ships, in this case, to refuel the escorts of the So Paulo .Similarly, these tanker ships, in and of themselves, are also not a military capability.Replenishment at sea is only a technical requirement; the derived military capability is the abilityof the Brazilian Navy to support continuous operation of its maritime assets.

Brazils required military capability to defend its sovereignty in the Amazon Area,exploring the combat possibilities of So Paulo aircraft carriers air wing in a force capable toescort a convoy transporting Army troops and material to the region, would only be constrained

by the availability of tanker ships, if its defense posture (relating the concepts of employmentwith force structure), would demand a short reaction time, whereas keeping the So Paulostationed in the Naval Base of Rio de Janeiro (imposing non-stop deploy and therefore requiringreplenishment at sea).

If Brazil were to decide to station/deploy the So Paulo to a northern naval base (changingthe force structure), it would produce a higher operational response tempo for the Amazon Area

with fewer demands of replenishment at sea, with the compromise of reducing theresponsiveness of that force component (integrating the So Paulo ) to anti-submarine operationswithin a context of maritime warfare to protect the national flow of petroleum in the SouthAtlantic. This would change Brazils defense posture, signaling a higher commitment to defendthe Amazon Area and, at the same time, would impose the necessity of developing expensiveshipyard facilities in the northern region of the country, in order to provide repair facilities to thisextremely complex ship.

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The required technical and fiscal costs as well as concomitant political impact would haveto be weighed against the effectiveness of a reduced operational tempo associated with the lowerdemands of replenishment at sea. In addition, since the Army troops and materiel that the SoPaulo would convoy to the Amazon area would also be held in Rio de Janeiro, the decision of re-deploying this asset to the northern region should take into consideration the technical

characteristics and operational requirements of the Brazilian Armys assets, increasingcoordination and control demands.

Referring to cost-effectiveness analysis, Brazil could have decided, instead of convoyingArmy troops and material using a force component integrated by the So Paulo , to use near-the-shore maritime routes under the umbrella of the Brazilian Air Force aircraft (changing theconcept of employment). In this case, the same task to protect the military flow of troops andmaterial would be accomplished with other force components and associated operations,without significant changes in the defense posture.

The extensive list of possible alternatives derived from analyzing Brazils case reflects thecomplexity of force design. The mission potential of military capabilities results from theassessment of task-force functional aggregations to achieve assigned objectives with forcestructure components. Similarly, Mexico faces force design problems with its two oceans;Argentina with Chile and Falklands/Malvinas; Venezuela with Suriname border; Colombia withits internal conflict -- to mention just a few other cases.

Having outlined the purpose and several trends in force design, it remains to present itsoperational definition. Force design is a decision making system designed to insure that the

proper set of effective and efficient military capability is economically identified, developed,organized, fielded, and supported. Within this operational definition, design is related to a

proposed solution to a perceived problem, presented with necessary and sufficient details toguide a course of action and evaluate its outcomes, and force is the composite of militarycapabilities which have been formulated to attend to defense requirements in response to security

demands required to enforce the nation states right to self-determination.

FORCE PLANNINGThe specific and limited purpose of force planning within force design is to determine the

quantitative dimension, organization, and spatial distribution of military assets in associationwith a specific concept of employment for a determined theatre of operations based on a givendefense mission and a desired state of security (generally expressed in terms of budgetallocation).

Force planning has different approaches that might include more or fewer components and

processes, depending on the aggregation criteria ruled by specific doctrin al understanding. ForceDesign does not dispute these aggregation criteria or understanding 16 ; on the contrary, itrecognizes these efforts as a valid procedure to rationalize the planning process, having as areference the guidelines it provides.

An example might help to clarify the distinction between force design and force planning.Force Design might determine US capability requirements for protecting Americas interests inCentral and South America, assuring combat efficacy against any specific country or regionalcoalition, and providing sea control and airspace interdiction against drug trafficking and illegal

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immigration. The purpose of force planning for the Caribbean Basin Area of Operationsspecifically, would determine how many X-type surveillance aircraft and Y-type patrollingsurface vessels based in Norfolk (VA) are required to interdict and prevent illegal air andmaritime traffic under strict rules of engagement limiting the use of force to yield Z-level ofefficacy. Force planning would also determine the command and control requirements associated

with an operational structure for these air and maritime assets to assure the required operationaltempo. In addition, force planning would consider the redeployment of old surface patrol vesselsfrom Norfolk to Guantanamo (Cuba) to reduce transit time, allowing fewer ships to perform thesame tasks. It would also consider that the redeployment of these old patrol ships near the area ofoperations would contribute to reducing its aging rate until faster and more fuel-efficient combatships could be developed and stationed back in Norfolk. Force planning also considers howmany new ships would be necessary and how enhanced air surveillance detection aids (radar, forexample) could reduce the number of required surveillance aircraft.

During these processes, force design would shape new rules of engagement and instructForce Planning about the changing defense roles and missions in the Caribbean Basin, whichwould determine new tasks and evolving readiness and doctrine requirements, conditioning the

specification, development and deployment of these new assets. Finally, it would also considerwhat changes in the concept of employment might be demanded to attend the limits imposed byforce planning possibilities. Force design is, therefore, the instance of reference for force

planning. It provides planning guidance while incorporating operational alternatives as acondition of possibility for its designing purposes. Although with complementary purpose, theydo not fuse into one all-encompassing process. Force design is the master of force planning;recognizing that, one can see that the servant enables the designing requirements of force design.When these roles are inverted, or force design simply does not exist, force planning startsimposing limits to political-level alternatives. The tail wags the dog; politicians can do no morethan the military says it can do (or thinks should be done), making military planners the masterof policy.

FORCE DESIGN ENVIRONMENTThe complex interrelationship between the problems force design faces must be viewed

and understood against the background of the political structure of the society in which theyoccur, however limited the view that may be offered. Current mechanisms to enforce defensereform range from reorganization acts (which assumes as a structuring principle that legal

boundaries can create conditions for effective defense reform) to the use of the defense missionstatement to provide guidelines for specific threats as they arise, resulting in defense policywhite papers. The question, therefore, is what kind and what amount of information is needed,

heading into the devilish question of functional relevance. Applying these considerations, themost import feature in analyzing the force design environment is to ascertain the place in thehierarchy of a defense decision-making tree from which its actions are guided.

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had accepted downsizing and reorganization, but not changes that invaded toodramatically the traditional function of each of the individual armed services, or thatchanged too radically the social composition of the forces, or cut too deeply into combatreadiness, or otherwise undermined the quality and ability of the military to fullfill its

functions. 20

One of the undisputed givens is that the armed forces are still a major player in national politics both in the US and in the region, with influence through expenditures, investments, andsavings upon the economy and social environment to which they belong. Thus, designingdefense capabilities must be acknowledged as an influencing factor in the national andinternational arena.

Zackrisons 21 study of the roles and missions of the armed forces of Argentina, Brazil,Chile, Colombia, and Peru, brings a unique perspective to force design environment:

Argentina has the most distance between the arguments, with civilians generallydebating the need for armed forces and the military successfully lobbying thegovernment for money to maintain international multilateral operations.

Brazil has the largest armed forces, adequately funded, but has no real sense ofmissions and not enough public support to push a specific agenda.

Chile has perhaps the best funded military in the region, and the best defined set ofroles and missions, but faces just enough public hostility that the future after General

Augusto Pinochets departure is a big question.

Colombia has the most urgency in defining an adequate role for its armed forcesbecause of the threat to national survival at the hand of the Marxist insurgents anddrug traffickers.

Peru faces the popular perception of having lost a recent border skirmish against a

much smaller military, an increasing threat of insurgency, and pressure from thearmed forces for more funding and better military equipment.

These tendencies can only be understood in the constantly changing configuration of theexperience in which each unfolds. Notwithstanding that fact, they give an example of the ever-flowing stream of trends that shape the force design environment.

Measurement of the relevance of these trends requires an analytical model that can assurethat the result to be achieved through force design does not become detached from theenvironment in which it belongs. It is necessary to model the components and relationships ofmilitary capabilities, understanding that the constituting characteristics of the whole will emergethrough the relationships of the individual characteristics of its component parts.

The goal of such an analytical model is to understand not just the specific function ofindividual military assets, doctrine, tasks, or objectives, but also to learn how all of thesecomponents interact within capabilities possibilities, yielding information useful to generatemore accurate defense planning methodologies that will help to unravel the complexities ofdefense reforms and the underlying mechanisms that provoke inefficiency.

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MODELING MILITARY CAPABILITIESIn order to design capabilities, first it is required to understand that capabilities are a

measure of the resulting ability of force component arrangements to perform a range of tasks.The performances of these arrangements depend on the performance of its component parts and

the stability of its relationships. Secondly, it its required to comprehend that abstraction is thefirst step toward modeling because it allows pointing out and organizing aspects of the reality asthe object of analysis. As Bunge 22 presents, abstraction is indispensable not only to applycausal ideas, but also to permit either empirical or theoretical investigation.

Both provisions were included in the formulation of the construct of capabilities depictedin Figure 2. This construct identifies military capability components, states their precise meaningwith the description of their basic qualities, and delineates the outer edge of each componentagainst the context in which th ey pertain. That means givi ng significance to the abstracted objectof analysis, defining its variety 23 as pertaining to a system 24 .

Readiness

Rules ofEngagement

Enabling Elements

Military Hardware

Personnel

Operational Protocols

Military Assets

Combat

Support

Operational Structures

C4

Tasks

Objectives

Interoperability

Force Components Regulating Factors Concepts ofEmployment

DoctrineDerivativeElements

Operations

ISR

Figure 2: Capabilities construct

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The capability construct is an ideal 25 model with two purposes. The first purpose is toabstract the complexity of the empirical reality in necessary and sufficiently analytical variables,explaining how these variables interact, contract and maintain relationships that enable arequired capability to be obtained. The second purpose is to explain the sensibility of militarycapability to changes in the security and defense environment, providing assessment criteria ofits efficiency, efficacy and economy in adapting, modernizing and transforming the defensesector in response to changes in the security environment. Analysis of the sensitivity of militarycapability to changes in the security and defense environment requires making explicit possibleforms of its relationships and logical consequences. That means supporting hypothesisformulation and explaining its elements of refutation.

The capability construct, as an ideal model in the sense of logical -, is not a hypothesisand, therefore, can b e neither true nor false but valid or not valid depending on its utility forunderstanding reality 26 . That means that it has its own conditions of possibility; it contains itsown principle of constitution, encapsulating a conjunct of defined predicative, arbitrarily createdaccordingly to the necessity of the investigation, that can be used or not as an instance ofreference to compare empirical data drawn from the reality.

The construct models capabilities as an open system. It assumes a flow of materials,information, etc. from and to the surrounding environment, implying that its variety assumesdifferent values over time, as well as varying relationships between its components that aredynamically reconfigured, while keeping the system in a uniform state 27 . This explains thecharacteristic of military capabilities to retain its efficacy while its components are reconfigured.It will also explain the limits and possibilities of adaptation, modernization and transformationtrends.

Pragmatically, the construct will help in problem definition in force design: what will (andwill not) be considered as inputs and outputs. This entails defining the scope of the expectedalternatives, what procedures will be followed in generating and evaluating alternatives, and inselecting the alternatives to recommend for policy decision.

Military capabilities alt er natives are a particular manifestation of an (intended) stablerelationship of three conjuncts 28 of elements: the conjunct of force components, the conjunct ofregulating factors, and the conjunct of concepts of employment, all interacting with each other inunique ways.

The concept of employment, force components and regulating factors are mutuallydetermined elements of capabilities. The first assures the proper relationship of tactical

possibilities, strategic alternatives and the goals of national policy. The second determines the proper quantitative and qualitative dimensioning of military assets and organizations, beingenabled by interoperability, jointness, command, control, communications and computing (C4)

possibilities. The regulating factors link both force components and concepts of employment,assuring the external coherence of military capabilities with the political will and the internalcoherence between its component parts. By examining these complex interactions, it is possibleto shed more light on how they alter defense reform possibilities.

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THE CONJUNCT OF FORCEThe conjunct of force emerges in the articulation of A) military assets possibilities, B)

operational structures, and C) its enabling elements, which will make tactics and strategy possible.

A) Military AssetsMilitary assets are the means effectively used to accomplish assigned tasks and the meansnecessary to provide efficiency and sustain the tactical effort for a certain period. Foranalytical purposes, each military asset ha s three component elements: 1) military hardware;2) personnel; and 3) protocol of operations 29 .

1) Military hardware

Military hardware is the machinery and equipment of war, such as tanks, aircraft, ships,rifles, etc. The identifying criterion for including an element in the conjunct of militaryasset is its sufficiency for a specific purpose. Such is the case with a war ship, with itssensors, weapon systems, engines, damage control systems, communication and commandcenters integrated into a single platform with the purpose of providing task efficiency.

A Boeing 747 initially conceived for civilian airlines might become a military asset as atroop transport; a merchant freighter may become a tank carrier or an ordinary SUV may

be converted into an armed scooter. On the other hand, if it is considered aircraft,warships or tanks originally conceived as war-machines, the question would be what arethe distinguished features that typify a corvette, a frigate and a cruiser other than their sizeand weaponry? A corvette with sophisticated and powerful weaponry might overcome afrigate in an artillery duel, but the weight of this weaponry could restrain its speed and

performance, allowing the frigate to maneuver fast enough to overcome its weakness.

Similar propositions could be posed to the entire war arsenal with its composing typologyof fighters, bombers, aircraft carriers, tanks, guns, etc. Clearly, not only their aptitude tofly, navigate or maneuver off-road empowers these material components as militaryassets. What defines these materiel means as military assets is their ability to providetactical efficacy. However, because resources are always constrained, efficacy should beassociated with efficiency. An efficient combat asset, for example, will perform tasks withless fuel, which is transformed into a wider deployment range or longer periods on stationwithout replenishment.

In other words, the criteria used to define a military mean is whether it is able to providean identifiable contribution to the required task, being a lever of influence in the outcome.Military assets are defined using four combining criteria:

Mobility and staying power: the ability of military means to deploy and maintaincontinuous operations. Mobility and staying power can be enhanced by newtransportation and communications technologies.

Offensive and defensive firepower: offensive firepower refers to the ability to damage(neutralize or destroy) adversaries fighting ability by attacking targets such as missilelaunch sites, airfields, naval vessels, command and control nodes, munitionsstockpiles, and supporting infrastructure. Offensive firepower includes but is not

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limited to physical attack and/or destruction, military deception, psychologicaloperations, electronic warfare, and special operations, and could also include computernetwork attack. Defensive firepower seeks to affect the adversarys ability to achieveor to promote specific damage against our assets. It includes all aspects of protecting

personnel, weapons, and supplies while simultaneously employing frequent

movement, using deception and concealment or camouflage. Sustainability: the ability to perform tactical actions until successful accomplishment

or revision of the tasks.

Tactical Flexibility and Versatility: the ability to adjust assets configuration toconfront changes in the environment, laying out a wide range of interrelated response

paths.

2) Military personnel

Military personnel are considered in force design in its qualitative and quantitativedimensions. The qualitative dimension of military personnel translates both its totalcombat efficiency and the individual ability to assess complex situations making andimplementing decisions within the domain of their professional expertise, with reasonableexpectation of success. The quantitative dimension of military personnel deals with therequired mix of active, reserve, professional and conscripts to effectively operate, deploy,and maintain material means required to attend a set of concepts of employments.

The common trend in personnel reforms, supported by most scholars as a by-product ofthe end of the Cold War, has been downsizing the military 30 and a complement ofcivilians. This is a monumental decision that has to be carefully thought out in its impacts.David McCormick 31 summarizes its complexity:

Judging the appropriateness of an armys downsizing objectives is more complicatedthan it might appear. The logic behind each of the four primary objectives protectingquality, shaping the force, sustaining personnel readiness, and demonstrating care andcompassion is persuasive. An officer corps of exceptional quality is obviously crucial toa dynamic and effective military organization, even more so given the uncertainchallenges of the post-Cold War era. Similarly, there is an obvious and compelling need

for shaping the officer corps by precisely identifying the individuals with the specific skilland expertise needed in a downsized organization and for distributing officer cuts acrossthe entire officer corps Sustaining personnel readiness is also a reasonable objective.Personnel readiness in the aggregate is a telling indicator of the alignment between cutsin force structure and cuts in personnel, two activities that should ideally go hand inhand. Thus, personnel readiness allows the army to gauge how effectively it is managingthis aspect of downsizing. In addition, at the unit level, reasonably high levels of

personnel readiness are necessary for effective unit training and operations. And, personnel readiness obviously has significant implications for the armys wartimecapabilities.

In the US case, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld believes that the military's personnelmanagement system might be a Cold War relic that encourages too many servicemembers to stay for 20 years, too few to stay thereafter, and most m embers to scurry

between assignments at a pace harmful to unit cohesion and to families. 32

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3) Operational protocols

Operational protocols are the instructions of how to operate efficiently those materialmeans, exploring their technical characteristics to maximize task effectiveness. Anoperational protocol for five similar surface ships to deploy in calm sea aiming sonardetection of low speed submarines would recommend a pattern of simultaneous turning tohave a detection probability of 80%. Another protocol of operation for the same class ofships operating in rough sea would recommend another pattern for a 60% detection

probability 33 .

More efficient protocols of operations can be developed by applying computationalroutines to a generic model, modifying its parameters to make military assets satisfy

performance requirements appropriate for a wide variety of conditions, or to make them perform existing tasks better, or to implement tasks never before performed.

However, one of the most difficult and expensive activities of modern armed forces ismaking exactly efficient protocols of operat ions. It demands sophisticated centers ofoperational analysis and complex processing 34 . For this reason, not all countries can

afford such centers. The problem, therefore, is that they might employ newly acquiredmilitary assets with obsolete operational protocols, virtually neutralizing their efficiency.However, since they do not have such centers, they do not realize their necessity, orsimply deny this problem. The error, therefore, is circular, with increasing costs ofacquiring and maintaining technologically sophisticated assets with diminishing returns interms of effectiveness.

When defining the military assets conjunct, the relevant variable is the tooth-to-tail ratio offighting assets to their supporting components. Fighting assets are designed to maximize combatability relative to foreseen opponents. Supporting components are designed to assure themaintenance of the cutting edge of fighting assets. The fighting tooth needs refueling andammunition supplies to maintain combat ability. Without supplying vessels, tank aircraft, depotsand bases, the fighting ability would be severed to the point of impairing task possibilities. InUS, for example, the fighting tooth has required deployment of only 4% of active-duty

personnel 35 .

The conjunct of military assets, therefore, includes both its cutting edge and its supportingdevice categories. Training and motivation of military personnel, the internal militaryorganization, communications systems, logistical and other systems all may enhance or prejudicemilitary capability because they impact on the possible tooth-to-tail ratio.

B) Operational StructuresThe conjunct of operational structures creates the ability of military assets to performoperations in support of required tasks. They are designed, therefore, to attend command andcontrol requirements, articulating military assets in order to get task efficacy through theefficient performance of the parts. Their role is to make the conjunct of military assets

present in a military capability become more than the sum of the parts. For analytical purposes, operational structures have two distintive components: 1) Combat structures, and2) Support Strutures.

1) Combat structures

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Combat structures allow parts of the conjunct of military assets to be detached anddeployed to perform specific tasks, allowing expansion of the number of possible tasksthat the conjunct might perform. Therefore, the synchronization of detachment andreincorporation of those parts maximizes the po tential ability of military assets toaccomplish the envisaged concept of employment. 36

2) Support structuresSupport Structures are designed to fulfill two simultaneous demands. The first refers tothe maintenance of military effort over time. In this case, the purpose of supportstructures is to provide the adequate logistical flow to maintain both military means intheir optimum technical performance, and personnel adequately supplied in order toassure the continuous validity of operational protocols, providing for the expected

performance of military assets. The second demand imposed on support structures is to prepare the conjunct of military assets to attend operational requirements. In the firstdemand, support structures are articulated with combat structures, timely linking, forexample, depot resources with theatre demands. In the second demand, support structures

group military assets by types and classes, seeking a gain in scale in maintenance, repairand training.

Decisions regarding military assets and the organizational design are highly dependent onthe degree of required jointness, as well as on decisions regarding how force components aredeployed, interconnected and specialized.

C) Enabling ElementsThe range of possibilities provided by military assets in response to tasks depends on the 1)interoperability of their component parts, and 2) the possibilities created by command,control, communication, and computing. Together, they contribute to achieve jointness

synergy.1) Interoperability

Interoperability defines the degree of compatibility between force components that permits them to work together to produce expected tactical results. It explores technicalfeatures incorporated in military assets to perform operations.

Interoperability is primarily a technology function in response to a common doctrine. Itdepends on a systemically integrated conjunct of knowledge and instructions that fulfillor create specific demands of force designing and guide the production possibilities ofdefense products and processes though proper techniques 37 .

Technology differs from techniques in continuously reconstructing and transformingitself, having as reference all previous knowledge, whereas techniques are specificknowledge circumscribed in time and space oriented to use or produce required productsand processes. Technology supports the presumption of certainty that force componentswill produce expected results to tasked demands , and determines the transforming rulesof knowledge into force components possibilities 38 .

2) Command, Control, Communications and Computing (C4)

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Command and Control, Communications and Computing assure the processestransaction of combat and support organizational structures in a logical fashion, being anintegral part of force structure manifested in military capabilities. They can lead to fewerchangeovers in force components and tasks to produce required military capabilities,reducing cycle time without changing military effectiveness or increasing military

effectiveness using lesser-sophisticated conjunct of military assets. As the size of forcecomponents increases, it can exploit more and more tasks, but it also becomesincreasingly complex to select the C4 system that makes it possible to pro videeffectiveness at a low total cost/risk ratio and at the same time assure interoperability 39 .

Properly identified, C4 requirements lead demand growth of military capabilities with preemptive actions to exploit current deployment of military assets considering itsdifferent degrees of readiness tailored to expanding or contracting task requirementswithin a specific concept of employment.

THE CONJUNCT OF CONCEPTS OF EMPLOYMENT

The conjunct of concepts of employment define a set of articulated decisions that expressthe prioritization of objectives and their translation into task requirements having operations asits linking factor, all the while relating all of them within a transcending logic which is consistentwith the nation states political will.

In the US case, for example, the Navy has put emphasis on network-centric operations, theAir Force moves towards becoming an expeditionary force, the Marines continuing experimentswith concepts such as Desert Warrior and Urban Warrior, and the A rmys recently announcedeffort to develop medium-sized brigades with increased responsiveness 40 .

A) Objectives

Objectives are functionally sufficient descriptors of foreseeable demands for the use of forcein support of the states right to exist. Each one encapsulates a comprehensive content that justifies its individuality and permanence, supporting the assumption that during the processes force design guides, those demands of force will not change.

There are five implicit premises in this formulation. First, that the objectives, once selected,are necessary and sufficient to achieve the predetermined purpose. Second, that the

processes are logically articulated. Third, that if those objectives were achieved, theenvisaged initial purpose would be accomplished. Fourth, that its formulation and executionare bounded by some degree of sufficient rationality. Fifth, that during the processes, theobjectives and the rules of transformation will not change.

These premises support the proper linkages between national interests and defensecapabilities towards higher states of effectiveness, efficiency, provided four conditions:

Intelligibility: the denotative content of objectives are clearly defined and understood. Feasibility: objectives are achievable within the realm of practical possibilities and

logical reasoning.

Assessment possibility: the results are measurable either quantitatively or qualitatively.

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Compatibility: the effects are part of a chain of causality addressing defenserequirements.

Intelligibility is the requirement for the proper developing of plausible hypotheses relatedto a set of accepted values and principles, with clearly communicated results.

Assessment Possibility is the requirement for determining the consistency of the proposedobjectives and its sensibility to changes in the threat environment.

Attending intelligibility and assessment possibility requirements are relevant to preventthree common risks in defining defense objectives. The first risk is making static adynamic process. The second, is that objectives, as Lodi 41 put it, convey solutions in termsof re-scaling existing capabilities, increasing or downsizing, thus restricting the emergenceof new capabilities based on different internal logic for rearranging force components.Finally, objectives tend to focus on the short term.

Compatibility is the enabling of strategic possibilities. It assures that the resulting effect ofoperations as manifest through the tactical use of military assets in engagements(articulated toward insuring the nation states goal of survival in both form and culture)through a cascade of linked results.

B) TasksTasks are a set of intended actions or desired effects from the application of force towardsspecific defense objectives. They are the building blocks of the concept of employment,defining the intention for using force components in a chain of linked tactical actions,expecting that the aggregated outcome of this chain will contribute to achieve a cascade ofintermediate objectives having at its top the defense objective.

The logic that links objectives and tasks can be understood with the comprehension of itsrelation with 1) Defense Missions and 2) Defense Roles.

1) Defense missions

Defense missions are the assemblage of tasks within the scope of an intended purpose.Each mission is related to a specific outcome, in the form a hypothetical combination ofassumptions and chains of future developments that serve as a reference for thediagnosis of current and required tasks. Defense missions are, therefore, a proposition ofreality aiming to anticipate possible, probable and plausible contingencies where theuses of military capabilities are considered.

Determining and prioritizing missions are a prime policy level decision found in a set ofcompromises seeking to reconcile, and where possible, to balance conflicting questions

of value. Once defined, they orient the bulk of national effort towards the appropriate,necessary and sufficient use of military capabilities in defense related tasks.

At least three important characteristics are common to the use of the term mission:

a) Time horizon: it defines a time horizon for the anticipated impact of the tasksrequired to carry out its mandate.

b) Focus: it requires concentration of effort on a narrow range of pursuits reducing theresources available for other activities.

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c) Chain of causality: in requires a series of decisions supportive to one anotherfollowing a consistent pattern.

2) Defense roles

Defense roles are generic descriptors of the nature of the effect, cause or consequence ofapplied military capabilities in defense tasks. Defense roles are usually categorized asnation building, diplomatic, combat, constabulary, and police reflecting the voice ofthe defense mission statements, white papers, and such which define the rules andlegal framework that bind and bound defense tasks.

Nation building roles shape defense tasks toward the social and economic developmentof the state under democratic governance, civil law and economic rules of marketregulation. International law and treaties bind diplomatic and combat roles in peace,crisis and war, clearly asseverating Clausewitzs conclusion that war is the continuationof policy with the introduction of means of force. The importance of diplomatic roleslies in the fact that nations judge potential adversaries in terms of their militaryresponsiveness, reliability, co nsistency, and, most of all, unity: unity of purpose, unity of

effort, and unity of action42

. Constabulary and policy roles are oriented to themaintenance of order and enforcement of regulations, under national or multi-statecoalition legal mandate.

The priorities of defense roles reflect the mandate of politics in defense issues. Theimportance of clearly defined defense roles is the assignment of functions for defense,making it accountable for its results. Military capabilities acquire fighting, diplomatic,

police, or constabulary roles depending on doctrine, the way they are organized,deployed, trained, sustained, commanded and controlled. The required status of each ofthese requirements are assessed taking into consideration topological characteristics of

possible areas of operation, national and alliance fiscal and production possibilities tosustain existing capabilities, or incorporate others d uring the course of operations. This,in turn, will require a sustained degree of readiness 43 articulated with expected tempo ofthe military operations.

The relationships of objectives, roles and missions, having tasks as their linking elements,define a matrix of cross impacts.

Objectives

A B C D

Missions

1 Tasks Tasks Tasks Tasks a

Roles2 Tasks Tasks Tasks Tasks b

3 Tasks Tasks Tasks Tasks c

4 Tasks Tasks Tasks Tasks d

Figure 3: Cross-Impact matrix of objectives, tasks, missions, and roles

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Strategy links tactical intended results with the purpose of defense through logic and usestasks, missions and roles both to instruct its formulation and assess its results.

Canada offers an example of the relationship of mission, objectives, and tasks 44 :

Defense Mission : Defend Canada and Canadian interests and values while contributing to international peace and security Defense Objective :To conduct surveillance and control of Canadas territory, aerospace and maritime areasof jurisdiction. This Defense Objective will be met by

Defense Tasks :1. Protecting Canadian sovereignty through surveillance and control of Canadas

territory, airspace and maritime areas of jurisdiction; and2. Mounting an immediate, effective and appropriate response for the resolution of

terrorist incidents that affect, or have the potential to affect, national interests.

Tasks determine the chain of operations and actions [tactical] expected to be accomplishedto achieve an objective. The defense mission instructs strategy formulation establishing thevalidity of linked task results for defense objectives and security goals. Defense roles

provide parameters to assess the degree of efficacy of these valid results to the envisagedsuccess defense and security policies determine. That means that strategy completes itselfwithin tactical possibilities and within political determinants -- with no significance isolatedfrom anyone anywhere in the hierarchical ladder 45 . Finally, it should be kept in mind thatobjectives, roles and missions are enormously sensitive issues; they make explicit demandson fiscal resources.

C) Derivative elementsDerivative elements mediate the process of disaggregating tasks attending both the criteriaformulated based on 1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and 2) the

practiced categories of operations. Together, they offer the criteria for developing guidelinesfor making decisions about the employment of the force components, reflecting howdecision-makers define the hierarchy of tasks and describe through missions theirunderstanding of the countrys requirements of security and defense.

1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

ISR exists to ensure that threats will be detected well in advance, tailoring theappropriate (form, nature and intensity) response. Asymmetric threats, for example, suchas computer network and terrorist attacks, are more difficult to predict than large-scaleconventional attacks, and therefore have significantly less strategic warning associatedwith them. The response to asymmetric attack, however, is unlikely to trigger therequirement for the national mobilization of conventional forces. As a conclusion,readiness requirements that anticipate a longer period of increasing tension marked byhostile activities - with warning indicators and instances of crises prior to the outbreak of

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a conflict - may be undertaken with the expectation of warning time prior to theemergence of a threat necessitating mobilization.

2) Operations

Operations are doctrinally defined actions taken in the pursuit of defense tasks, such asconvoying, combat air patrol, interdiction, reconnaissance, and replenishment at sea.These actions inevitably involve a degree of coordination; nonetheless, they need notnecessarily result in either desired or desirable results.

The assemblage of practiced operations are doctrinally defined and categorized, varyingfrom country to country and time to time according to the practiced conceptual systemused to determine those categories and the criteria used to allocate operations withineach category. Currently, the general trend is to define two broad categories foroperations: one reflecting the bulk of the required warfare effort against a specific typeof assets (submarine warfare, mine warfare, etc.); the other reflecting requiredsupporting actions to provide efficiency of the operation in the first category(replenishment, surveillance, intelligence, patrol, etc.).

Across the spectrum of operations, small-scale contingencies are the dominant trend inthe current defense environment, expanding its limits toward war-like operations anddiplomatic actions.

The US uses 15 categories for smaller-scale contingencies, which are defined as therange of military operations: 1) beyond peacetime engagement but short of major theaterwarfare; 2) opposed interventions; 3) coercive campaigns; 4) humanitarian intervention;5) peace accord implementation; 6) follow-on peace operations; 7) interpositional

peacekeeping operations; 8) foreign humanitarian assistance; 9) domestic disaster reliefand consequent management; 10) no-fly zone enforcement; 11) maritime interceptoperations; 12) counterdrug operations and operations in support of other agencies; 13)

noncombatant evacuation operations: 14) shows of force; 15) and strikes. Thesecategories and the criteria to allocate contingencies in each one of them have been afocus of debate, making it a major issue in the post-Cold War era to offer a publicrationale for capabilities needed to handle the full range of contingencies without puttingundue strains on budget and political possibilities.

Combined as derivative elements of the capability construct, ISR and operations attend four basic purposes:

1) To collect authoritative information about the security and defense context.

2) To provide criteria to identify required tasks to be performed (application domaindecomposition).

3) To orient representational abstractions for those tasks and the development ofappropriated metrics.

4) To define interactions and relations among objectives and tasks to ensure that a)constraints and boundary conditions imposed by context are accommodated, b) identify

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data to be collected and appropriately addressed, and c) control the flow of informationthat allow the derivation of tasks be stopped or restarted, assuring that the scope andscale of tasks are represented with discernible detail.

THE CONJUNCT OF REGULATING FACTORSRegulating factors are the spectrum of normative instructions linking the requirements of

the concepts of employment with the possibilities of force components. This spectrum comprisesA) Doctrine, B) Readiness Guidelines, and C) Rules of Engagement (ROE).

A) DoctrineDoctrine is the arsenal of experiences and practices that guides the selection of operational

protocols, instructing the individual and collective use of military assets toward higher levelsof efficacy and ef ficiency, and exploring operational and support structures to performmilitary operations 46 .

Doctrine is associated with tactical success, while operational protocols are associated withthe technical performance of military assets. The ability to interpret the adequacy ofoperational protocols and translate them into successful tactical actions makes practical themilitary operational art.

B) ReadinessReadiness is defined as the level of preparedness for personnel and materiel to respond toconsidered tasks. The time assigned to a force component to reach the specified readinesslevel is the time required to be fully manned and equipped at organizational strength,including training and logistics stocks necessary for the operations or actions assigned.

Readiness req uirements are specified at three levels: 1) tactical, 2) structural and 3)mobilizational. 47

1) Tactical Readiness

Tactical readiness determines the level of training and maintenance necessary for timelydeployment of military assets. It explores operational and support structure possibilitiesto accomplish a predetermined range of tasks with expected degree of success andacceptable level of risk.

Higher degrees of tactical readiness, either to prepare for immediate deployment orsimply to communicate policy intentions, demand military assets be kept in higher statesof alert with its systems energized and manned, causing personnel fatigue and increased

rates of material damage. In turn, the consequent personnel fatigue and highermaintenance demands burden the support structures, stressing the logistics possibilitiesto the point that this degree of readiness has a limit beyond which an expected degree oftactical success can no longer be maintained.

2) Structural Readiness

Structural readiness determines military organizational architecture and logisticrequirements to avail, when demanded, large scale and higher periods of tactical

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readiness, either increasing the range of possible tasks or diminishing risk probability.However, structural readiness has its costs. Higher degrees of structural readiness requirethe dedication of vast amount of capital and resources for future actions, inherentlycreating inefficiency. Maintaining large repair facilities, albeit inactive, and enormouslogistical structures are expensive; similarly, structural readiness demands a top heavy

military personnel structure based upon the assumption that it is more difficult and timeconsuming to prepare officers than soldiers. In addition, structural readiness relies on atime cushion for bolstering military capabilities.

3) Mobilizational Readiness

Mobilizational readiness determines priorities for the conversion of the peace timesocial, technological, industrial and economic national possibilities into military assetsand support requirements to avail and maintain tactical efforts through the organizationaland logistic possibilities created by the structural readiness. Mobilizational readinessalso has its costs, mainly in terms of preparing and maintaining an inventory ofconversion possibilities. One highly efficient and stunningly brilliant example ofmobilizational readiness is the US Interstate Highway System, the brain child of theformer Commander In Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force (Europe) in World WarII, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who launched the project during his Presidency.

The proper balance of tactical, structural and mobilizational readiness requirements willreflect both an enlightened concept of employment possibilities and a correct assessment of timerequirements to deploy military capabilities and generate an ability to sustain that effort.Location decisions also impact readiness alternatives. Furthermore this balance changes as theconcept of employment changes. US readiness spending per person in uniform, for example,averaged 22 percent more (in inflation-adjusted terms) during the Clinton years than on the eveof the 1990-1991 Gulf War 48 .

C) Rules of EngagementRules of engagement are directives delineating the circumstances and limitation under whichthe use of force would be initiated, continued and terminated. These rules have a politicalfiber with two mutually complementary dimensions. The first one, judicial, refers to thelimitations imposed by domestic and international law, in peace and war, to the use of force.The second one, functional, refers to the limitations imposed by the defense roles. Theworkings of waft and weft produce the pattern in this weave, painting a picture of the rules.As more cloth emerges over time first pattern changes, then cycles, become apparent overtime -- representing mood swings in national will.

The choices regarding the States appropriate degree of readiness depend upon the size,location, and specification of force components possibilities, the spectrum of anticipated tasksmade possible by practiced doctrine and authorized by the ROE, complemented by anunderstanding of the interaction among these decisions. All issues related to force design arecentered in these elements. The optimal size of a given military is only possible to be assessedwhen affixed to the capabilities determined to give the nation state the greatest prospect ofsuccess within the bounds of costs possibilities as assessed with the socio-political domain. A

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proper construct of capabilities makes explicit the tradeoffs among the required elements to produce this optimum.

The functional merit of the construct is in reducing all military capabilities to the samecomponents level -- abstracted into an ideal model, while recognizing that the difference amongactual resulting capabilities is directed by the scope of its components and the relationship theyestablish. The assumption here is that if the total parts constituent of a construct and theirrelationships are known, the nature of the optimum whole can be derived from the nature of the

parts . The result determines a common nature for all possible emergences of capabilities belonging to the same system of knowledge.

The number and qualitative dimension of personnel and equipment, the number of levels oforganizations, the characteristics of the technology employed, and the articulation of tasks intomission within the concepts of employment are all important determinants of this ever changingoptimum. They are a function of the states perceived need for defense, making militarycapabilities a living entity with a changing composite of relationships, whose linkages areenacted by two inner factors: Jointness and C4ISR (Command, Control, Computing,Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance). These factors provide theanimus of a military, allowing the mechanisms at work within the capabilities to attempt toimprove continually their relationships to produce the optimum levels of force and procedures toenforce required tasks over time.

JointnessThe most succinct definition of jointness is that offered by Gen Colin Powell, former

chair man of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: We train as a team, fight as a team, and win as ateam 49 . Jointness is a major factor that contributes to capability potential. It is the idea of unityof effort and acting accordingly. In the end, it is the degree to which force components areintegrated which is the measure of jointness, encompassing organizational expediencyrequirements and statutory jurisdiction alike 50 .

The current emphasis on jointness is on the establishment of rules and conventions thatallow efficient control of military operations through established mechanisms. Incrementaldemands for jointness have created demand for flexible military capabilities in their composition,generating raids for new appropriations (operations and maintenance). Force design sees thisdemand as a reactive-corrective measure to improperly devised capabilities. From the

perspective of force design, jointness determines the degree of integration of force structurerequirements and tasks possibilities from their conception. Relatively homogeneous serviceoperational doctrine does not provide an indication as to the degree of jointness if dissociatedfrom jointly designed capabilities.

Interoperability stems from good functioning and close coordination of all forcecomponents in the effort to provide specific operational efficiency. Decisions regardingtechnology in interoperability are incorporated in specific pieces of equipment, the degree ofautomation and the connectivity between different equipment. Jointness depends on assuringcohesive operations for extended periods with a focus on how best to support taskaccomplishment.

Jointness, as a requirement of force design, derives from the stability of those patterns ofrelationship required to produce a capability, which implies the ability of its components to store

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scope. The former tends to concentrate military assets to optimize the industrial production andrepair potential of depots and shipyards; the latter tends to maximize tasks with fewer assets.

Determining and assigning defense tasks takes into account force components potentialwithin the sc

Documents

SECURITY, DEFENSE, AND FORCE DESIGN Establishing Capability-based Defense Planning