Securing Data in Transit -

SECURING DATA IN TRANSITUsing TLS in Constrained Devices

Copyright 2015 wolfSSL Inc.1

Session Presenters


Chris ConlonwolfSSL Inc.

[email protected]

Jacob BarthelmehwolfSSL Inc.

[email protected]

What We’re Covering Today

1. Introduction and History of wolfSSL (5 min)

2. Overview of SSL/TLS, and Crypto (15 min)

3. TLS Enabling a Simple HTTP Client (10 min)

4. Emerging Ciphers and Algorithms (10 min)

5. Time-Permitting Q & A (5 min)


wolfSSL IncHistory, Introduction, and Products

4 Copyright 2015 wolfSSL Inc.

wolfSSL History


About wolfSSL

Founded: 2004

Locations: Bozeman, MTSeattle, WAPortland, OR

Our Focus: Open Source Embedded Security (Apps, Devices, IoT, and Cloud)


Products: - wolfSSL- wolfSSL FIPS- wolfCrypt- wolfSSH- wolfSCEP- wolfSSL Inspection- yaSSL

One Billion Endpoints!


Factory Automation

Automotive / Smart Car

Smart Grid

Cloud Services

Routers

Databases

Connected Home

SensorsBattlefield Communication

Smart Energy Machine-to-Machine

Games

Appliances

Internet of Things

Mobile / Smartphones

Strategic Partnerships


History and GoalsSSL / TLS


SSL/TLS - History and Protocols

● SSL / TLS / DTLS versions


Notes:● SSL 2.0 is insecure● SSL = “Secure Sockets Layer”● TLS = “Transport Layer Security”● DTLS = “Datagram TLS”

SSL/TLS - Goals

● Enable secure CLIENT / SERVER communication

Privacy + Prevent eavesdroppingAuthentication + Prevent impersonationIntegrity + Prevent modification


SSL/TLS - Simplified Analogy


Goals:A. Talk to the desired personB. Talk privately (securely)

Alice Bob

? ?




Alice Bob




Alice Bob


● Goals:

○ Talk to the desired peer■ X.509 certificates (RSA, ECC)

○ Talk privately (securely)■ Encryption, Integrity checks


MITM Attacks

● Man in the Middle Attacks● One of the most prominent attacks TLS tries to prevent


RFC and ProtocolsSSL / TLS


TLS - Protocol Specs

● Protocol Specifications

○ RFC 6101: SSL 3.0○ RFC 2246: TLS 1.0○ RFC 4346: TLS 1.1○ RFC 5246: TLS 1.2○ “Draft”: TLS 1.3


TLS - Protocols and Location


TLS - Sub Protocols

Handshake Protocol

● Responsible for negotiating a session, includes:○ Session identifier○ Peer certificate○ Compression method○ Cipher spec○ Master secret○ “is resumable”


1234 (A)

(B)

TLS - Sub Protocols


1234 (A)

(B)

TLS - Sub Protocols

Change Cipher Spec Protocol

● Signals transitions in ciphering strategies● Sent by both client and server

● Notifies receiving party that subsequent records will be protected under newly negotiated CipherSpec and keys


1234 (A)

(B)

TLS - Sub Protocols

Alert Protocol

● Convey severity and description of alert● Either “warning” or “fatal”● Fatal results in immediate termination of

connection● Encrypted and compressed as per CipherSpec


1234 (A)

(B)

TLS - Sub Protocols

Record Protocol

● Layered protocol (Sending Side)○ Fragments input data into blocks○ (optionally) compresses data○ Applies MAC○ Encrypts○ Transmits the result


1234 (A)

(B)

TLS - Sub Protocols

Record Protocol

● Layered protocol (Receiving Side)○ Decrypts received data○ Verifies data (using MAC)○ Decompresses○ Reassembles○ Delivers result to higher level


1234 (A)

(B)

Cipher SuitesSSL / TLS


Cipher Suites: Structure

● Combination of algorithms:

Hash Functions: MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, ..Block and Stream Ciphers: AES, 3DES, ChaCha20, ...Public Key Algorithms: RSA, ECC, NTRU, ...


CIPHER SUITE

Cipher Suites: Structure

Protocol_keyexchange_WITH_bulkencryption_mode_messageauth


Examples:

SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHASSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHATLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHATLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHATLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA

X.509 Certs and KeysSSL / TLS


Making Sense of X.509

● X.509 is a standard for PKI (public key infrastructure)

● Some things specified by it include:○ Public key certificates○ Certificate revocation lists○ Certificate path validation algorithm (CA / cert chain structure)

● Structure is expressed in ASN.1 syntax


X.509v3 Certificates

Structure of X.509v3 certificate is as follows:

● Certificate○ Version○ Serial Number○ Algorithm ID○ Issuer○ Validity

■ Not Before■ Not After

○ Subject○ Subject Public Key Info

■ Public Key Algorithm■ Subject Public Key

○ Issuer Unique Identifier (optional)○ Subject Unique Identifier (optional)○ Extensions (optional)

■ …○ Certificate Signature Algorithm○ Certificate Signature


X.509v3 Certificates

● Filename Extensions○ .pem

■ “Privacy-enhanced Electronic Mail”■ Base64-encoded DER certificate

○ .der, .cer, .crt■ Binary DER form

● Others include○ .p7b, .p7c (PKCS#7) – standard for signing/encrypting data○ .p12 (PKCS#12) – bundle certs and private keys○ .pfx (predecessor to .p12)


-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----……-----END CERTIFICATE-----

Certificate Chain

● A list of certificates followed by one or more CA certificates, where:

○ The Issuer of each certificate matches the Subject of the next○ Each cert is signed by the private key of the following cert○ The last cert in the chain (although not sent in the SSL/TLS

handshake) is the “root CA”


Certificate Chain


SSL / TLS on DevicesSecuring a simple HTTP client with TLS


wolfSSL Library

Features● C-language based SSL/TLS library● Standards up to TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2● Focused on size and speed optimization, progressive● Minimum footprint size of 20-100 kB● Minimum RAM usage: 1-36kB

● Web server integration (NGINX, Lighttpd, Mongoose, GoAhead)

● OpenSSL Compatibility Layer● Hardware Crypto Support● Suite-B Compatible, FIPS 140-2 (Level 1) in process● Dual Licensed (GPLv2 and Commercial)


wolfSSL + FRDM-K64FUsing wolfSSL in a Simple Embedded Client App


wolfSSL + FRDM-K64F

● Why are we using FRDM-K64F?○ Simplicity, relevance

● Could as easily use any number of embedded platforms:○ Microchip PIC32MX/MZ○ STMicro STM32F2/F4/F7○ Freescale Kinetis, Coldfire○ ...


wolfSSL + FRDM-K64F

● wolfSSL is available for download from wolfssl.com:

● And also from GitHub:


wolfSSL + FRDM-K64F

● Or might already be in your IDE!

○ Keil MDK-ARM “Software Pack”

○ Microchip MPLAB Harmony

○ Freescale MQX-SSL


wolfSSL + FRDM-K64F

● wolfSSL has tight integration for Freescale platforms (among others)

○ FREESCALE_MQX - MQX operating system○ FREESCALE_MMCAU - mmCAU HW crypto○ FREESCALE_K70_RNGA - K70 HW RNG○ FREESCALE_K53_RNGB - K53 HW RNG


wolfSSL + FRDM-K64F

● This platform is being used currently for a new product!

Smart Door Lock Product

● Door Lock = Freescale FRDM-K64F● Home Gateway = Freescale i.MX6● Security = wolfSSL


wolfSSL + FRDM-K64F

● Drop wolfSSL into an Existing Project


wolfSSL + FRDM-K64F

● wolfSSL / wolfCrypt Code Structure


wolfSSL + FRDM-K64F

● Configuring the SSL/TLS library

○ Configuring wolfSSL (user_settings.h)○ Project Properties -> Compiler -> Preprocessor○ Add WOLFSSL_USER_SETTINGS

○ This file contains wolfSSL-specific configuration defines○ Based on wolfSSL’s main settings.h file


wolfSSL + FRDM-K64F

● Include wolfSSL header file in main.c

● Initialize wolfSSL library

● Optionally, enable debug output (also define DEBUG_WOLFSSL)


#include “wolfssl/ssl.h”

/* initialize wolfSSL library */wolfSSL_Init();

/* enable wolfSSL debug output */wolfSSL_Debugging_ON();

wolfSSL + FRDM-K64F

● Create wolfSSL context (ex: using TLS 1.2)

● Enable (or set) peer verification

● Load trusted root CA certificate, from DER-formatted buffer


WOLFSSL_CTX* ctx;ctx = wolfSSL_CTX_new(wolfTLSv1_2_client_method());

/* turn on peer verification, register verify callback */wolfSSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, myVerify);

int ret;ret = wolfSSL_CTX_load_verify_buffer(ctx, ca_cert_der_2048, sizeof(ca_cert_der_2048), SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)

wolfSSL + FRDM-K64F

● After socket has been created and connect()’ed, create wolfSSL session:

● Pass established socket file descriptor to wolfSSL

● Initiate SSL/TLS connection, do handshake with peer


WOLFSSL* ssl;if ((ssl = wolfSSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) err_sys("wolfSSL_new failed");

wolfSSL_set_fd(ssl, sockfd);

ret = wolfSSL_connect(ssl); if (ret != SSL_SUCCESS) err_sys("wolfSSL_connect failed");

wolfSSL + FRDM-K64F

● Write data using:

● And read data using:


wolfSSL_write(ssl, msg, msgSz);

wolfSSL_read(ssl, reply, sizeof(reply));

wolfSSL + FRDM-K64F

● Shutdown SSL/TLS session

● Free resources:


wolfSSL_shutdown(ssl);

wolfSSL_free(ssl);wolfSSL_CTX_free(ctx);wolfSSL_Cleanup();

Peak RAM Usage

● RSA Cipher Suites

● ECC Cipher Suites


Math Library Key Size Peak Stack Use Peak Heap Use

fast 1024 10k 9k

fast 2048 13k 11k

normal 1024 6k 14k

normal 2048 7k 17k

Math Library Key Size Peak Stack Use Peak Heap Use

fast 256 7k 12k

normal 256 6k 15k

wolfSSL + FRDM-K64F

It’s as simple as that!(try it yourself and see)


Emerging CiphersWhat’s hot in the crypto world!


Emerging Ciphers

● ChaCha20● Poly1305● Curve25519● Ed25519

Created by Daniel Bernstein a research professor at the University of Illinois, Chicago

Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD used in Google over HTTPS

Ed25519 and ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD used in Apple’s HomeKit (iOS Security)


ChaCha20 Info

● Based from Salsa20 stream cipher using a different quarter-round process giving it more diffusion

● Fast stream cipher that also can have block characteristics● Can be used for AEAD encryption with Poly1305● Was published by Bernstein in 2008

Used by● Google Chrome● TinySSH● Apple HomeKit● wolfSSL

Copyright 2015 wolfSSL Inc.55reference 1

ChaCha20 Quarter Round

The heart of ChaCha20 is the quarter round. Operations performed are (note ^ means xor)

a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 16; c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 12; a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 8; c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 7;

Where a,b,c, and d are 32 bit unsigned integers.


ChaCha20 Matrix

Data for encryption is arranged into a matrix

constant(0) constant(1) constant(2) constant(3) key(4) key(5) key(6) key(7)key(8) key(9) key(10) key(11)input(12) input(13) input(14) input(15)


ChaCha20 Operation

To complete a double round 8 quarter rounds are performed. The first 4 quarter rounds consist of a column round. All data used from the matrix x is in similar columns. The last 4 quarter rounds consist of a diagonal round. All data used in the quarter round from the matrix x is in a diagonal pattern.

QUARTERROUND( x0, x4, x8,x12)QUARTERROUND( x1, x5, x9,x13)QUARTERROUND( x2, x6,x10,x14)QUARTERROUND( x3, x7,x11,x15)QUARTERROUND( x0, x5,x10,x15) QUARTERROUND( x1, x6,x11,x12)QUARTERROUND( x2, x7, x8,x13)QUARTERROUND( x3, x4, x9,x14)


0 1 2 34 5 6 78 9 10 1112 13 14 15

0 1 2 34 5 6 78 9 10 1112 13 14 15

ChaCha20 Performance


Poly1305 InfoWhy it’s used

Extremely fast in comparison to othersTo provide authentication of messages

Introduced by a presentation given from Bernstein in 2002

Naming scheme from using polynomial-evaluation MAC (Message Authentication Code) over a prime field Z/(2^130 - 5)


Poly1305 Performance


Poly1305 Outline Of Operation

Algorithm● Set an accumulator h to 0● Divide the message into chunks c● h = h + c and then h = rh, where r is part of the key● Periodically reduce h modulo 2^130 - 5● After all chunks ( c ) processed reduce h modulo 2^130 - 5● Add key to h


Curve25519

Used by● Tor● Google Chrome● Apple iOS● wolfSSL


Generic Montgomery curve. Reference 5

Curve25519 Visualization


Curve25519 Visualization


Curve25519 Performance


Curve25519 Performance


Ed25519

Used by● Tera Term● GnuPG● wolfSSL

Copyright 2015 wolfSSL Inc.68reference 4 Generic Twisted Edwards Curve. Reference 6

Ed25519 Terms● A is the public key point● a is the public key● H(*) is the Sha512 hash of *● B is the unique point (x, 4/5) ∈ E for which x is positive● M is the message● l is the prime 2^252 +

27742317777372353535851937790883648493


Ed25519 Sign / VerifySteps for signature1. computing r = H(hb, . . . , h2b−1, M)2. computing R = rB3. computing S = (r + H(R, A, M)a) mod l

VerificationSB = R + H(R, A, M)A


Ed25519 Sign


Ed25519 Verify


Ed25519 Fast Single VerifySB = R + H(R, A, M)A is changed to R = SB - H(R, A, M)A

Saving having to decompress R


Ed25519 Performance


Ed25519 Performance


References1. ChaCha20 http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf2. Poly1305 http://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf3. Curve25519 http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf4. Ed25519 http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/ed25519-20110926.pdf

Generic Graph Images of Curves From5. "Montgomery curve1" by Krishnavedala - Own work. Licensed under

CC BY-SA 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons - https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Montgomery_curve1.svg#/media/File:Montgomery_curve1.svg

6. "Twisted Edwards curve" by Krishnavedala - Own work. Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons - https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Twisted_Edwards_curve.svg#/media/File:Twisted_Edwards_curve.svg


http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf

http://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf

http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf

http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/ed25519-20110926.pdf

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Montgomery_curve1.svg#/media/File:Montgomery_curve1.svg




THANKS! QUESTIONS?


WOLFSSL

[email protected]

+1 (425) 245 - 8247

CHRIS CONLON

[email protected]

JACOB BARTHELMEH

[email protected]

Session Introduction

• Abstract• As designers and developers race to pack cool and eye catching features

into “Internet of Things” and connected devices, the security of those devices oftentimes takes a back seat. After all, how many times does a manufacturer hear end customers ask: “Is that refrigerator secured with TLS 1.2 or SSL 3.0?”. Security analysts and hackers aside, the answer is, hardly ever.

One of the most prominent ways of securing connected devices today is with TLS, or “Transport Layer Security”. This session will start with a basic introduction of TLS, working its way up to a demonstration of how easy it can be to integrate TLS into an existing Internet-connected device. Also included will be considerations on what ciphers, algorithms, and key sizes are preferential for various types of projects, touching on both the enterprise server side as well as the resource constrained device side. The open source wolfSSL SSL/TLS library will be used for demonstration purposes.


Session Introduction

• Key Takeaway

• Key takeaways from this session will include an overview of the TLS protocol, considerations when choosing what algorithms, ciphers and key sizes to use, and an understanding of how to add TLS to a new or existing application or device.

• Intended Audience

• The intended audience of this session is designers and engineers interested in using SSL/TLS to secure their projects or devices. Helpful prerequisites include a general understanding of C programming.


Documents

Securing Data in Transit -