24
Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted

Management OSChunxiao Li

Anand RaghunathanNiraj K. Jha

Page 2: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Outline

Background: Security & Virtualization

Security challenges in virtualization-based

architecture

A secure virtual machine execution

environment

Implementation & results

Security analysis

Conclusion1

Page 3: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

The goal of computer security

Computer security: a branch of information

security applied to computers

Three objectives of

information security: Confidentiality Integrity Availability

Integrity:Data validation,One-way Hash,Digital signature

Availability: Defending DoS, Back up / restore, Load balancing

Confidentiality:

Authentication,Authorization,Access control,Encryption/Decryption

2

against DoS,

Page 4: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

What is virtualization? Virtualization: Technology for creating a software-controlled

environment to allow program execution in it [1]

[1] http://www.ok-labs.com/virtualization-and-security/what-is-virtualization

[2] Barham et al., “Xen and the art of virtualization,” SOSP 20033

Page 5: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Relationship between virtualization and security

On the one hand, virtualization can be utilized to

enhance security Secure logging (Chen et al., 2001) Terra architecture (Garfinkel et al., 2003)

On the other hand, virtualization also gives rise to

several security concerns Scaling, transience, software lifecycle,

diversity, mobility, identity and data lifetime [1]

Virtual machine-based rootkits (VMBR) [2][1] Garfinkel et al., “When virtual is harder than real,” HTOS 2005[2] King et al., “Subvirt: Implementing malware with virtual machines,” IEEE S&P 2006 4

Page 6: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Outline

Background: Security & Virtualization

Security challenges in virtualization-based

architecture

A secure virtual machine execution

environment

Implementation & results

Security analysis

Conclusion5

Page 7: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Security challenges in virtualization-based architecture

6

Our work tries to solve one of the

fundamental security concerns in

virtualization

The trusted computing base of a VM is too

large

Page 8: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

A Security challenge of virtualization-based architecture Trusted computing base (TCB): a small amount of

software and hardware that security depends on and

that we distinguish from a much larger amount that

can misbehave without affecting security [1]

Smaller TCB more security

A

TCB

[1] Lampson et al., “Authentication in distributed systems: Theory and practice,” ACM TCS 1992 7

B

C

Page 9: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

A Security challenge of virtualization-based architecture (Contd.)

Security challenge : TCB for a VM is too large

Smaller TCB

Actual TCB8

Page 10: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Xen architecture and the threat model

Management VM – Dom0

Guest VM – DomU

Dom0 may be malicious Vulnerabilities Device drivers Careless/malicious

administration

Dom0 is in the TCB of DomU because it can

access the memory of DomU, which may cause

information leakage/modification9

Page 11: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Outline

Background: Security & Virtualization

Security challenges in virtualization-based

architecture

A secure virtual machine execution

environment

Implementation & results

Security analysis

Conclusion10

Page 12: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Towards a secure execution environment for DomU

Scenario: A client uses the service of a

cloud computing company to build a

remote VM

A secure network interface

A secure secondary storage

A secure run-time environment Build, save, restore, destroy

11

Page 13: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Towards a secure execution environment for DomU

(Contd.) A secure run-time environment is the most

fundamental

The first two already have solutions: Network interface: Transport layer security (TLS) Secondary storage: Network file system (NFS)

The security mechanism in the first two rely on a secure run-time environment

All the cryptographic algorithms and security protocols reside in the run-time environment

12

Page 14: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Domain building

Building process

13

Page 15: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Domain save/restore

14

Page 16: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Page3

Domain save/restore (Contd.)

Dom0

Page1Page2

Page3Page4Page5

DomU memory

Storage

Page1Page2

Page3

S

Xen Layer

15

Page 17: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Page3

Domain save/restore (Contd.)

Dom0

Page1Page2Page3Page4Page5

DomU memory

Storage

Page1Page2 Xen

Layer

Page1Hash

Page3Page33egap

Hash

WS Page4$

16

Page 18: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Outline

Background: Security & Virtualization

Security challenges in virtualization-based

architecture

A secure virtual machine execution

environment

Implementation & results

Security analysis

Conclusion17

Page 19: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Implementation & results

Modification of Xen system only affects domain build, save and restore

Normal work in DomU has little performance degradation

18

Page 20: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Outline

Background: Security & Virtualization

Security challenges in virtualization-based

architecture

A secure virtual machine execution

environment

Implementation & results

Security analysis

Conclusion19

Page 21: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Security analysis

Malicious Dom0 in original Xen system

may: Access any memory page of DomU and

read its content Access any memory page of DomU and

change its content Randomly start and shut down the

domain, and thus control the availability of all VMs

We successfully solved the first two

security concerns, with a small execution

time overhead

20

Page 22: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Outline

Background: Security & Virtualization

Security challenges in virtualization-based

architecture

A secure virtual machine execution

environment

Implementation & results

Security analysis

Conclusion21

Page 23: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Conclusion

Virtualization technology can both benefit and

undermine computer security in different ways

One of the fundamental security concerns of

virtualization-based architecture is that the TCB of a

VM is too large

A protection mechanism in Xen virtualization system

proposed, which successfully excludes the

management domain out of the TCB with small

execution time overhead22

Page 24: Secure Virtual Machine Execution Under an Untrusted Management OS Chunxiao Li Anand Raghunathan Niraj K. Jha

Thank you!