Secularism in Iran: A Hidden Agenda?

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11.SecularisminIran: AHiddenAgenda?

Nastaran Moossavi

In a country where honest responses to simple questions such as “Are you a Muslim? Do you believe in God? Is the Holy Koran the word of God? Do you

pray and read the Holy Koran? When you were growing up did your father pray, fast, and read the Holy Koran?” led to mass executions in the late 1980’s,1 it is very difficult to know who is secular and to what extent. In this kind of situation people do not trust each other easily and often deny their true identity. It is infinitely more complicated to conduct a survey that asks questions like “What is your religion, if any?”2 Therefore, this assessment of religious identification among Iranians has shortcomings in terms of a quantifiable evaluation.3

However, those living in Iran distinguish the extent of adherence to religion among themselves by other means. They also use other measures to find out who believes in a different interpretation of religion, even when people do not identify themselves. One way to document such distinctions is through one’s appearance, especially in the case of women.4 Another source of information on the issue is the various life styles people take up.5 Furthermore, membership in certain social organizations or affiliation to specific religious institutions separates believers and non-believers from each other and also indicates differences among believers.

A more direct way of knowing who is secular today in Iran, and in what terms, is to look at the literature published in recent years on secularism, in its broadest meaning, and follow the people who spoke up and expressed their ideas on the issue. This chapter attempts to review this literature and come up with clues for understanding the debate about secularism in Iran.

In the absence of a reliable social survey, the focus must be on reviewing the writings of those who have considered themselves secular by whatever definition,

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and also those who have raised certain doubts about the legitimacy of the existing Islamic government from a religious point of view. It is widely believed that the debates on issues such as secularism, Islamic government, and the proper role of clergymen in the government date back to the years around the Constitutional Revolution in Iran in 1906.

Certain articles of the Supplement to the Constitution Acts, approved then, reflect how power was consolidated between religious and non-religious parties. One of these articles asserted that the representatives of people in the parliament would select five qualified clergymen from a list of twenty presented by the high ranking clerics. The role of these clergymen was to ensure that every new law and regulation in civic affairs was in accordance with Sharia’h. Observing this agreement, some, like Ahmad Kasravi,6 decided that the Constitutional Revolution had failed since it had offered the clerics the upper hand in supervis-ing the newly constitutional government. According to him, the Constitutional Revolution was expected to put an end to the misery of Iranians, who were suffering from despotism and “harmful” religious teachings equally. He is one of those who believed “…religion is not something useless. We expect benefits from religion… Religion is for the purpose of helping the people to advance and religious people must be superior to irreligious people.”7

It is interesting to note that the debate on secularism which emerged again in the mid-1990’s focused on two of Kasravi’s premises and tried to justify them. However, there has been no direct reference to him or to his ideas. In 1943, he wrote against the clerical establishment, saying:

Should this establishment remain, it will always be a shackle for the nation; it will prevent progressing (as it has done so far).8

This statement is reminiscent of the criticism of “religious intellectuals” against the Islamic government during the past decade, which claimed that “Islam does not need clerics.”9 Kasravi, in his attempt to cleanse Islam from all its faults, tries to reconcile it with science. He is against clergymen who believe “God’s religion cannot be measured with the rational faculties.”10 Kasravi finds Islam, science, and civilization compatible. Again, this is echoed in the recent discussions that find a rational philosophical trend in Islam, and therefore assert that Islam does not hinder scientific and technological progress.

The point in linking these periods is that secularism, as it began in 1906, is still an “unfinished project.” It should be understood as an ongoing process, with its ups and downs. Being a time bound phenomenon, people at different times have articulated their ideas on secularism differently. The determination to realize its goals has also differed in various periods. During the Constitutional

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Revolution, there was a range of demands expressed by different political figures and parties. These demands included the complete separation of religion from government (and sometimes its elimination), as well as an emphasis on the right of supervision by clerical institution over legislation.

At the present time, the demands that can be expressed in public may not have the same radical intonation, but they raise deeper concerns about the relationship between religion and government, the role of clerics in Shi’ism, the significance of rational thinking, and other relevant issues. The process that has begun is more problematic and painstaking for those who want to replace the existing interpretation of Shi’ism with another one.

It is unknown how far redefining and reinterpreting the sources of Islam will create reliable grounds for criticizing the official religion. Ever since the Constitutional Revolution, attempts to formulate an alternative interpretation of Islam and the struggle of “Religion against Religion” have continued in Iran.11 It was repeated by people like Kasravi until the 1940’s, taken up as an agenda by Mujahedin-e Khalgh12 in the mid 1960’s, and elaborated by Shariati13 in the 1970’s. Once again we hear the same voice, but in a different variation.

This new round of effort is said to be due to the changes that Iranian society underwent after the domination of Islamists in the 1979 revolution. For the first time, the Shi’ite clerics got the opportunity to run a government. It was then time to see how a certain interpretation of Shi’ism is able to adjust itself to the requirements of modern-day Iran.

Though it took some time for the Islamist leaders of the revolution to gain control over all the dissidents and either wipe them out physically or silence them, the revolution had to demand that the people acknowledge its legitimacy from the outset. The first and second articles of the new Constitution explain explicitly that the basis of the government is a combination of Islamic values and republicanism. The very act of establishing an Islamic government was posed to people in a referendum vote.14 The amazing endorsement of 98.2 percent of voters solidified the new government’s position.

The disillusionment with the clerical authorities and criticism against their interference in every aspect of life occurred in the years following the end of the war with Iraq in the late 1980’s. Now the dismay went beyond the “outsiders”—apostates, and secularists who had struggled to undermine the clerics since the beginning of the Constitutional Revolution. The heart of Islamism was attacked by its own children, from within. This process has its advantages and disadvantages since it is such an internal conflict. On one hand, it is unlikely to cut off its own roots, for fear of losing a firm basis on which to promote Islamic values, and in fear of absolute denial by its “spiritual fathers.” On the other


hand, these internal opposition groups know the limitations of Islamism better than their intellectual and political rivals outside the governing circles.

The final decision to be taken was, of course, individual for “religious intellectuals,” but prior to making this choice they tried to deal with the issue collectively. One strategy was to speak up and tell their audiences and readers how another interpretation of Islam could exist; an interpretation that has as its primary requirement curtailing the power of the clerics. Exploring the history of Islam, as well as adopting different ways of argument with more emphasis on rational thinking and a positivist outlook, served them well in making their points.

One of the prominent figures of the new trend, better known to the West than others, is Abdolkarim Soroush.15 Some of his basic views can be formulated as follows:

• Religion, due to its celestial nature, is not limited to historical and human decrees. However, our understanding of religion is time dependent and changes as the human knowledge is transformed.

• Islam (and any other religion) is modified by its essence, not its change-able formal components. Therefore, a true Muslim is one who is devoted and committed to the essence of Islam.16

• There is a distinction between political secularity and philosophical secularity. The tension between these two distinctions has always existed in Shi’ism in Iran, though Shi’ism is alien to secular politics.

• Authorization to reinterpret Islam is allowed for the most highly learned man of the time. Such a person is not necessarily a clergyman who is most educated in Islamic theology. Men with high qualifications in modern knowledge and education are in a better position to revise Islamic thought and practice.

For the religious critics of Islamic government, the problem of reconciling Islam and democracy, intellectualism and religiosity, rationality and faith, and similar issues are yet to be worked on.17 Among themselves they discuss whether rationalism is only a tool that an intellectual is equipped with. Does it mean that anybody may be wrong and subject to questioning, that one can keep on questioning about anything without restriction? Do human beings need evidence of proof to believe things are right? On the other hand, does religiosity necessitate that one simply believe in the sayings of one specific person and/or some specific people? If the essence of Islam is absolute obedience to God, is then the term “religious intellectualism” paradoxical?


It is said that though materials are written and translated on the differen-tiation between reason and intellect, between discursive reason and intellectual intuition, there is no conflict between religiosity and intellectual intuition.18 Some scholars are not sure what intellectual intuition exactly means and implies. So they recommend that it is preferable to dismiss the whole idea and stay safe in the domain of religion or, at most, rephrase the current attempt as “Revisionism.”19 This trend emphasizes the right of Ijtihad 20 in Shi’ism, saying that the new wave of revising Islam in Iran has nothing to do with the Enlightenment as it emerged in Europe. Despite different ways of articulation, the “religious intellectuals” all agree that religion should be separated from government, but not from politics. On other issues, such as the negation of Velayat-e Faqih,21 or denial of the right of clerics for mediating between God and people, their ideas and commitment to religious reform varies in degrees.

In addition to these internal debates, certain journals started asking opinions of some intellectuals that were known as “non-religious.” The Iranian Diaspora was also encouraged to join the debate on secularism. The fact that some of these “non-religious” intellectuals were welcome to participate in the debates showed a change in attitude among people who had once helped with the construction of the Islamic government, but then changed into its mild critics. They were seeking allies in order to push for reform and challenge the governing clerical power.22 In their attempt to increase the scope of their influence, they turned to their rivals at the eve of the 1979 revolution,23 and sought their intellectual assistance to enrich the process of dialogue. Some of these “old” rivals (i.e., remaining leftists and seculars from the suppressions of the 1980’s onward) were in a mood of self defeatism, and some had already started to revise their previous beliefs. It is now believed that the new coalition includes religious reformers from one side and secular neo-liberals from the other side.

The product of such exchanges of views has been a significant number of articles, books, and interviews published inside and outside Iran and posted on various Web sites. One could add the number of participants in discussion meetings to the circulation figures for those books; the number of subscribers to the journals that publish such articles; and finally, the number of visitors to these Web sites, in order to estimate the percentage of secular persons in Iran with respect to the whole educated population. But the major part of the current students’ movement and women’s movement has been dominated by the religious reformist discourse. This is not to deny the existence of other tendencies or believe they will permanently remain marginalized since the social dynamism incurred in these years is still operative.

Of course, some people find the literature on secularism confusing and


comment that Iranians do not know what we precisely mean by terms like secular, laïcité, modernity, secularization, etc., especially when we apply it to our own society.24 This might be true, especially when one notes that no exact equivalent of these words exist in the Persian language. This situation creates frequent misinterpretations and misunderstandings, but also forces writers and readers to explain themselves as clearly as possible. Therefore, there is a set of common questions; whether “secularism implies separation of religion from government or from politics,” if “laïcité is the same as secularism,” and in what ways “modernity, modernization, and modernism are different from each other.” It is not to say that all these challenges are happening in the domain of language. On the contrary, the need for naming these phenomena properly specifies how crucial it is to understand the options the religious reformers are offering to the society.25

“Religious intellectuals” have been repeatedly asked to respond and clarify in what ways their interpretation of Islam guarantees freedom of expression and how women and non-believers are to be treated. When terms such as “Islamic democracy,” “Islamic civil society,” and “religious secularism” are created, one doubts the possibility of mixing these concepts. One “non-religious” scholar claims that in the late 1970’s Iranians combined religion and revolution and shaped one of the most extraordinary revolutions in history. According to him, it is not surprising that an unexpected intertwining of intellectualism and religion was created.26 The desire to benefit from Enlightenment values and remain a faithful Muslim and/or an Iranian patriot still permeates the intellectuals’ minds. Despite all that has happened in the last 100 years, Iranian intellectuals continually face the same challenges.

The debate over secularism has brought together some intellectuals, who have made revisions in their previous theories and practice, from both sides of the religious and non-religious spectrum. Their main agenda is to recreate secularism in an Islamic way and turn it into the ideology of the opposition movement in Iran. Meanwhile, ordinary people have been dealing with the pressure of Islamism in different ways. Deeply rooted middle-class values, and the revival of them in public life in recent years, have offered options to people, especially to youth, to experience different life styles. Many visitors from the West are surprised by the emergence of a youth culture in such a restricted country like Iran. On the other hand, the authorities have taken the issue of regulating the youth problem more seriously.27 They are aware that the concept of secularism has its own attraction for many young people.

Therefore, the youth have become the battlefield between secularists and fundamentalists. Struggles over women preceded this new conflict, and are still


going on. Undoubtedly, women and youth have tried to organize independently and find an outlet for their problems with the clerical establishment, but there are certain limitations in going beyond the offered options given censorship and the exclusion of alternatives. The need to hear more voices is crucial now. It is not fruitful to compel Iranians to choose between the dichotomies of “bad” and “worse” that are expressed in the current discussions on secularism. Iranians have sought their independence from foreign powers, political freedom, and social justice since the Constitutional Revolution. Yet the right to keep religion away from government has yet to be fought for.

Organizing scholarly debates and raising social awareness on secular values requires relatively peaceful conditions. The road towards setting up a democratic society in Iran is already rough. It may be completely blocked if the existing dispute over the Iranian government’s nuclear program keeps on threatening, and if no diplomatic resolution is found. If the U.S. government takes coercive military measures against Iran all the attempts that have been made so far will be in vain. As in the early 1950’s it will constrain the emergence of internal alternatives to our problems.28

I believe any plan for taking military action against Iran will strengthen fundamentalism within the country and the region. All the other social and political groups will be forced to withdraw their demands under the threat of a foreign invasion. It is obvious that the debate on the role of religion and democracy cannot be carried on in a wartime situation, as the example of Iraq indicates. On the other hand, any future arrangement between the U.S. and the Iranian governments that keeps silent about human rights violations in Iran will undermine the democratization process and weaken the secular movement.

EndnotEs

1. For more details, see Abrahamian, Ervand, Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

2. American Religious Identification Survey, 2001. < http://www.trincoll.edu/Academ-ics/AcademicResources/values/ISSSC/research/ARIS+2001.htm>.

3. Actually, there exists a mechanism in Shi’ism that lets Muslims conceal their faith in anticipation of damage or injury. Taqiyyah becomes the norm of public behavior when ordinary people fear the danger of being persecuted for their belief.

4. Men are distinguished from their clothing, such as wearing a tie or letting their shirt fall loose over their pants, and the way they shave.

5. There are certain public spaces that the fundamentalists avoid, especially if they are not segregated for men and women. The way one manages her/his leisure time is determined, to a large extent, by how adherent one is to religious beliefs.


6. Ahmad Kasravi (1890-1946) has been a controversial figure for his direct attack on Shi’ite clergy. He was assassinated by the clandestine Devotees of Islam (Fedaiyan- Eslam). Except for his books on the history of Constitutional Revolution, his other works have been banned on and off since 1946. There is a bibliography of Kasravi’s works in Kasravi, Ahmad, On Islam and Shi’ism, trans. M.R. Ghanoonparvar, Costa Meza: Mazda Publishers, 1990, pp. 54-57.

7. Ibid. p. 95.

8. Ibid. p. 98.

9. Quoted from an interview with Abdolkarim Soroush published in www.BBCPer-sian.com on August 22, 2004.

10. On Islam and Shi’ism, p. 99.

11. “Religious intellectuals” consider Jamal ad-Din Asad-abadi (d. 1879) and Hadi Najmabadi (d.1902) as the leaders of the first generation of Shi’ite modernism.

12. An Islamic oppositional guerrilla organization formed in 1965 that considered the establishment of a classless monotheist society as its ultimate goal.

13. Ali Shariati, the twentieth century Iranian sociologist and Islamologist differenti-ates “religion of revolution” from “religion of legitimation.” He has discussed the difference between them in Shariati, Ali, Religion vs. Religion, trans. Laleh Bakhtiar, Chicago: ABC International Group, 2003.

14. “If democracy is invalidating any rule that people have not voted for it, naturally this does not reconcile with religion. Nevertheless, asking for people’s consent and the approval of majority for realization the rules of sharia’h is acceptable in Islam. Actually, this is what religious democracy mean.” The quotation is from Mesbah Yazdi, an orthodox conservative theoretician well known for his opposition with Abdolkarim Soroush. www.mesbahyazdi.com

15. For more information, see Soroush, Abdolkarim, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam, trans. Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Moreover, many of his ideas can be searched for in his official website at the following address: www.drsoroush.com/English.htm

16. Nikfar, Mohammadreza, “Zaat-e yek Pendar” {Essence of a Thought} Negah e-Nou, 13: 16-27.

17. It is worth mentioning that some clergy men have also joined the debate, but with more cautious on how far intellectualism and religion can go along together. Mohsen Kadivar, Mojtahed Shabestari, and Yousef Eshkevari joined the debate as soon as it started in mid 1990’s.

18. Ideas of some scholars like Burkhart, Huston Smith, and Seyed Hossein Nasr have been translated and read in these years.

19. Malekan, Mostafa, “Ho’zeh va Donyaye Jadid”{Seminaries and the New world}, Rah-e Nou, 1(13): 18-26.

20. The Shi’ite and the Sunni scholars believe that the Islamic law has derived its sources from the Quran, the Sunna (the model behavior of the prophet, as related in collec-


tions of sayings or Hadith that are in variations and localized as necessary), the Qiyas (analogical reasoning, subject to the clergymen’s determination), and the Ijma (Con-sensus of the community, subject to the community leaders’ determination). Shi’ism has added a fifth element to these sources that is Ijtihad, (ongoing reinterpretation by religious authorities of the present time).

21. The Guardianship of the Jurisconsult in the absence of the Twelfth Imam has been asserted in the Constitution Acts of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Article 110 ex-plains the authorities given to the Grand Juriconsult, among which is the right to appoint the highest rank of the Judiciary, the head of the Islamic Republic Broad-casting Agency, the head of Military, and the General Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards. It should be noted that there is less dispute over the authority of the jurist in Shi’ism, but the extent of this authority has been questioned and the Islamic theologians and clerics have differed on the issues of the leadership and advisory role of the jurists.

22. The reformers participated in the political power and supported the Iranian presi-dency from 1997 until their recent defeat in 2005.

23. Kashi, Ghlolamreza, “Bohran dar Roshanfekri-eh Dini” {Crisis in Religious Intel-lectualism} in www.nilgoon.org, p.2.

24. Sometimes the interaction between the Iranian Diaspora and those living in Iran happens through internet, for instance this criticism can be found in correspon-dences in Persian posted to www.Secularismforiran.com

25. This paper does not mean to assess the class combination of the seculars, religious reformers, and official ideologues. Therefore it takes the whole Iranian society as listeners of the debates.

26. www.BBCPersian.com has conducted a series of interviews with prominent figures of “religious” and “non-religious” intellectuals in 2005 and 2006.

27. More information on the official policies on the youth is available at: http://www.nyoir.org/eng/default.htm

28 The coup d’etat against Muhammad Mossadeq in 1953 designed by the CIA and carried out by the supporters of Muhammad Reza Shah prepared the ground for 25 years of dictatorship in Iran.

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Secularism in Iran: A Hidden Agenda?