Roel Ebralinag, et al vs. Division Superintendent of School of CebuGR 95770, 29 December 1995; En Banc Resolution, Kapunan [J]

FACTS:Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated raising the same issue whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.

All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.

Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the expulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any religious ceremony. The children of Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority.

ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?HELD:YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not justified.Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. The only

limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent.

Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in “external acts” or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion

G.R. No. L-68828 March 27, 1985

RELI GERMAN, RAMON PEDROSA, TIRSO SANTILLAN, JR., MA. LUISA ANDAL, NIEVA MALINIS, RICARDO LAVIÑA, CESAR CORTES, DANILO REYES, JOSE REYES, JOSEFINA MATE, LOURDES CALMA, MILDRED JUAN, OLIVE GUANZON, FERNANDO COCHICO, SHERMAN CID, NAZARENO BENTULAN, ROSLINA DONAIRE, MARIO MARTINEZ, BEATRIZ TEYLAN, ANGELINA LAPID, ROSEMARIE FLORES, DANIEL VAN SOTO, EDGARDO MERCADER, NELLY AGUSTIN, MARILY MAGCALAS, DAVID CHAN, ARSENIO SALANSANG, NELSON DE GUZMAN, MARCIANO ARANETA, CESAR MENESES, DIONISIO RELLOSA, MARIO SANTIAGO, SEVERINO SANTOS, LEONORA SANTOS, NIMFA DORONILLA, FLORENCE GUINTO, ROSALINA MANANSALA, PERCIVAL OSTONAL, TOMMY MACARANAS, ROGER NICANDRO, petitioners, vs.GEN. SANTIAGO BARANGAN and MA. JOR ISABELO LARIOSA, respondents.

Facts:One afternoon in October 1984, Reli German et al went to JP Laurel Sreet to pray and worship at the St. Luke Chapel. But they were barred by General Santiago Barangan from entering the church because the same is within the vicinity of the Malacañang. And considering that German’s group is expressively known as the August Twenty One Movement who were wearing yellow shirts with clench fists, Barangan deemed that they were not really there to worship but rather they are there to disrupt the ongoings within the Malacañang.ISSUE: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to worship and pray at St. Luke’s is a violation of their freedom to worship and locomotion.HELD: No. In the case at bar, German et al were not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. There has been a clear manifestation by Barangan et al that they allow German et al to practice their religious belief but not in the manner that German et al impressed. Such manner impresses “clear and present danger” to the executive of the state hence the need to curtail it even at the expense of curtailing one’s freedom to worship.

American Bible Society vs. City of ManilaGR No. L-9637 | April 30, 1957

Facts: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November, 1898. The defendant appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.

During the course of its ministry, plaintiff sold bibles and other religious materials at a very minimal profit.

On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A). Plaintiff now questions the imposition of such fees.

Issue: Whether or not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant).

Held: Section 5 of Article III of the Constitution, provides that: No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.

It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices. It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.

A.C. No. L-350. August 7, 1959

Genaro Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al.

106 Phil 2

FACTS: RA 1265 is a law that makes a flag ceremony compulsory for schools. The implementing rule Dep Order 8 says that the anthem must be played while the flag is raised. It also says that everyone must salute the flag and no one is to do anything while the ceremony is being held. After the flag everyone is to recite the patriotic pledge. Gerona’s children attending the Buenavista Community School in Uson, Masbate refused to salute the flag, sing the anthem and recite the pledge. They did not do so out of religious belief. They are Jehovah's Witnesses. They consider the flag to be an image in the context of what is prohibited in their religion and because of this they were expelled from the school. Gerona wrote to Sec of Ed that their children be exempt from the law and just be allowed to remain silent and stand at attention. Sec of Ed denied the petition. Writ of preliminary injunction was petitioned and issued.

ISSUE: Is Dep Order 8 unconstitutional?

RULING: Flag salute ceremony is secular and the dep order non-Discriminatory therefore it is constitutional. The freedom of belief is limitless and boundless but its exercise is not. If the belief clashes with law then the former must yield. Petitioners salute the flag during boy scout activities. Their objection then rests on the singing of anthem and recitation of pledge. The pledge is judged to be completely secular. It does not even pledge allegiance to the flag or to the Republic. The anthem is also secular. It talks about patriotism. It does not speak of resorting to force, military service, or duty to defend the country. There was no compulsion involved in the enforcement of the flag salute. They were not criminally prosecuted under a penal sanction. If they chose not to obey the salute regulation they merely lost the benefits of public education.

G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,

vs.

JUAN RUIZ, respondent.

Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.

Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 “advantageous to the government” does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress.” The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to “to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists,” the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government.

G.R. No. L-53487 May 25, 1981

ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEÑA, NICETAS DAGAR and JESUS EDULLANTES, petitioners,

vs.

Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City Branch V, BARANGAY COUNCIL of Valencia, Ormoc City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C. VELOSO, Councilmen GAUDENCIO LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGAN and MAXIMINO NAVARRO, Barangay Secretary CONCHITA MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer LUCENA BALTAZAR, respondents.

Facts: The case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day. That issue was spawned by the controversy as to whether the parish priest or a layman should have the custody of the image. On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia".

Issue: Is the holding of fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, valid and constitutional?

Held: Yes. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated.

If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.

RAUL GONZALEZ v. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA.

 280 U.S. 1 (1929)

Facts: Gonzalez brought the suit against the archbishop in the CFI of Manila and prayed for judgment declaring that he, the lawful heir to the chaplaincy and its income; establishing the right of the petitioner and his successors to be appointed to and receive the income of the chaplaincy during their infancy whenever it may be vacant and, pending such appointment, to receive the income for their maintenance and support. The trial court directed the archbishop to appoint Gonzalez as chaplain; and ordered payment to him the sum being the aggregate net income of the chaplaincy during the vacancy, less the expense of having the prescribed masses celebrated in each year. It reserved to the petitioner any legal right he may have to proceed in the proper court for cancellation of the certificate of registration of the property in the name of the archbishop.

Issue: Is the Gonzalez legally entitled to be appointed the chaplain?

Ruling: The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands reversed the judgment and absolved the archbishop from the complaint, 'without prejudice to the right of proper persons in interest to proceed for independent relief,' in respect to the income accrued during the vacancy, or in respect to the reformation of the certificate of registration so as to show the fiduciary character of the title. Without deciding whether such disposition of the surplus was proper or what should be its disposition in the future, that a son of the last incumbent, who was properly refused appointment as chaplain because he had not the qualifications prescribed by the Canon Law, was not entitled, as the nearest relative, to the accrued surplus.

[G.R. No. 119673. July 26, 1996]

IGLESIA NI CRISTO (INC.), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION PICTURES AND TELEVISION and HONORABLE HENRIETTA S. MENDEZ, respondents.

Facts: Iglesia ni Cristo has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates INC's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992 INC submitted to the MTRCB the VTR tapes of its TV program. These TV programs allegedly “offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical interpretations and its “attacks” against contrary religious beliefs. 

Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Is a prior submission to MTRCB a case of prior restraint?

Ruling: The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the CA is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground. Finally, it is also opined that "the determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors and that a system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies.

G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION, defendant-appellant.

Benjamin Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) member, has been an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory (ERF) since 1958. He was also a member of the EPWU (Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union). Under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between ERF and EPWU, a close shop agreement is being enforced which means that employment in the factory relies on the membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment in the said factory one must be a member of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano tendered his resignation from EPWU claiming that as per RA 3350 he is an exemption to the close shop agreement by virtue of his being a member of the INC because apparently in the INC, one is forbidden from being a member of any labor union. It was only in 1974 that his resignation from the Union was acted upon by EPWU which notified ERF about it. ERF then moved to terminate Victoriano due to his non-membership from the EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is not exempt from the close shop agreement because RA 3350, which provides that close shop agreements shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization, is unconstitutional and that said law violates the EPWU’s and ERF’s legal/contractual rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.

HELD: No. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an INC member may refuse to join a labor union and despite the fact that there is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority therein. Further, the right to join a union includes the right not to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It recognizes both the rights of unions and employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it recognizes the workers’ right to join or not to join union. RA 3550 recognizes as well the primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right.

G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners, vs.HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.

Facts: Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into exile. Corazon Aquino’s ascension into presidency was challenged by failed coup attempts as well as by plots of Marcos loyalists and the Marcoses themselves. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

The case for the petitioners is founded on the assertion that their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed by the following provisions of the Constitution:

Art. 3. Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws.

Art. 3. Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.

The petitioners contend that the President has no power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only the Courts may do so “within the limits prescribed by law”. Nor may the President impair the right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

Also, the petitioners claim that under international law, particularly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guaranteed the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines. Thus:

Art. 13 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, AND TO RETURN TO HIS COUNTRY.

Likewise, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:

Art. 12 4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

The respondents argue that the issue in this case involves a political question which is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. Furthermore, they argue that the right of the state to national security prevails over individual rights, citing Section 4, Art. II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Issues: Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the Philippines. Assuming that she has the power to bar, was there a finding made that there is a clear and present danger to the public due to the return? And have the requirements of due process been complied with in the making of the finding?

HELD: The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of constitutional provisions, it must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. Such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

It is found by the Court that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, that there exist factual bases for the President's decision. Hence, this act cannot be said to have been done arbitrarily or capriciously. Further, the ponencia (the coups, the communist threat, peace and order issues especially in Mindanao, Marcos loyalists plotting) bolsters the conclusion that the return of Marcos will only exacerbate the situation in the country.

Another reason of the Court...“We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.” Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is

within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.

WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

CAUNCA VS SALAZAR

Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.

Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the advance payment it gave?

Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.

RUBI ET AL VS PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDOROG.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919

Facts:Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on areservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very low culture”.One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which provides:With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.

was challenged.ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation. 2. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.HELD:I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.II. No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to the changing times.The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say thatdue process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.”

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.

Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions; For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.

Issue:

The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.

Held:

The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.

We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in

the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.