Sea Mines in Amphibious Warfare

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TH EFFECTS OF SEA MININGUPON A IPHIBIOUS W R F R R

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyCommand and.Genera1 Staff College in partialfullfillrnent of the requirements for thedegreeWASTER OF MILITARY ART ND SCIEN-

JAMES E. BALL LCDR. USNB A University of Hawaii, Honolulu. Hawaii, 1977

Fort Leavenworth. Kansas1992

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.


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MASTER O MILITARY ART A N D SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PA GE

Name o f candidate: LCDR James F Ball, USNTitle of thesis: The Eff ec ts of Sea Mining upon AmphibiousWarfare.

Approved by:

Thes is Committee ChairmanTC ~ i c h a r v . e n d a l i . . S .

Consulting Faculty

Accepted this 5th day of June 1992 by:

Director. Graduate Degre ePrograms

Th e opinions and conclusions expressed herein ar e those ofthe student author and do not necessarily represent theviews of the U.S . Army Command and General Staff College orany government agency. Referen ces to this study shouldcontain the foregoing statement.)


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THE EFFECTS OF SEA MINING UPON AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE by L DRJames F Ball. USN 138 pagesThi s study investigates the effects of sea mining uponamphibious warfare. The methodology involves case studiesof amphibiou s assaults conducted at Gallipoli. Normandy.Wonsan and the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm.Th e cases are examined in terms of forces involved. miningconducted and the effect t he mining and the minecountermeasures had upon the achievement of s urprise in theassaultThe stud y attempts to determine if th e determining factor isthe level of mine techn ology the level of countermeasur estechnology. or the size of the forces committe d. Itemphasizes the importance o f rapid and complete minecounterm easures to the achievement of surpri se in theamphibious assault.Based upon the four case studie s conducted the determinantappears to be force leve ls. At Normandy where levels wereadequate the operation was successful . At Gallipoli andWonsan the results were either failure or inconclusive. Th ePersian Gulf st udy points out that fail ure would have beenthe likely result. A recommendation to prevent furtherdeterioration of the mine counterm easures force ispresented.


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CKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The assistance of Lieutenant s Colonel Kendall and Pitt. andMajor Huben. is gratefully acknowledg ed. Commander Jame sClark and Lieutenant Commander Homer Kaufman both expertsin the mine warfare field. contributed expert advice andsupport during the duration of this effort. Th e staff ofthe Combined Arms Research Library. through their efforts.made much of this work possible.


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TABLE OF ONTENTS

ABSTRACTACKNOWLEEGEMENTSLIST OF FIGURESCHAPTER

INTRODUCTION

Thesis QuestionDefinition of TermsHistorical SignificanceREVIEW OF LITEFSTURE:Boo ksPeriodicalsGovernment Publications

METHODS AND PROCEDURESCASE STUDIES IN MINE WARFAREIntroductionGallipoli StudyNormandy StudyWonsan StudyDesert Storm StudyCONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

APPENDIXBIBLIOGRAPHY

PAGEi iivvi


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L I S T OF FIGURES

FIGURERelative Costs of WWII Mining and SubmarineCampaignsRusso Japanese War Mining LossesWorld War I Mining LossesGerman Influence MinesMinesweeper Losses in World War I1Mine s Laid and Swept in World War I1Gallipoli Shore Batterie sGallipo li Assault FormationMine Caused Speed Restrictions at NormandyMinesweepers in Commission 1946 1953

P A G E5

15

17

19

24

25

56

58

92

96


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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The .lity of the U S Navy to con uct timely mineclearance operations has fallen to a dangerously low level.Large magnitude sweep operations such as those required torapidly clear the areas needed for large scale amphibiousoperations are no longer possible. Effective levels of mineclearance will require long periods of time. telegraph theintent to conduct an amphibious assault. and make such anoperation tactically unfeasible.

Of all the forms of naval warfare. mining is arguablythe most cost effective. well conceived and properly laidminefield presents a constant and serious threat to enemyvessels and is minimally affected by weather or

environmental conditions. It may be planned to suit avariety of operational scenarios. It may be defensivedesigned to protect friendly ports or coastal areas. or itmay be offensive. designed to attack the enemy in hisharbors and deny him the use of the sea.

Mining may be covert or overt. either approach stillrequires the direction of valuable and scarce resources tomine countermeasures. It also requires an investment oftime. the scarcest and most fragile of resources in militaryoperations. To achieve this effect it is not necessary to


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lay a sing le mine. the mere announcement o f mining s tillrequires that an opponent commit resources for verification.

Mine s do not grow obsolete. Th e moored contact minehas been in the arsenal since the American Civil War. Th echemical horn fused spherica l moored mined laid by theIranians in 1986-88 and by the Iraqi' s in 1990-91 are copiesof a Russian design dating from 1908. Ground infl uencemines that use magnetic. acoustic, or pressure fusing wer edeveloped by the Germa ns and operationally employed duringWorld War 11 Since that time. ther e ha s been consid erableimprovement in these devices but no chan ge in th e basicoperating concept.

However. there has been a quantum leap in thesophistication o f the mine. and a number of minemanufacturers are off eri ng to upgrade older mines withmoder n elect roni cs and sensors.' A typical soph isti catedanti-landing mine is the Manta. made by Misar S .p .A . ofBrescia .Italy. Th is is a 200 Kilogram mine. tr apezoidal inshape. with a glass-reinforced plastic (G RP ) oute r case. Itfunctions in a depth range from 2.5 to 100 meters and has aneffec tive range of 20-30 meters . Th e Manta features dualfusing. it is acoustically arm ed and fired by magneticsignature. A hydrostatic anti-handling d evic e will detonatethe mine i f it is lifted from the bottom. Th e weapon can be

Klau s Benz, Mine Warfare at Sea .14 (Dec/Jan 1990-91): 28-34


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set to arm at any time up to 63 day s after laying. has a 511day operational l if e in the water. and has a storage life of30 years.2 A Manta is believed responsible for the damagesustained by th e USS Princ eton (CG-59) in the Persian Gulfon 18 February 1991. Th e Bofors GMI 100 Rockan offerscomparable features. with an added advantage. Th e mine hasa waterplane shap e that allow s it to be laid directly from aseawall. The'shape is engineered so that the mine glideshorizontally t o a distanc e twice the water depth .3

There ha s not been a corresponding quantum leap in minecountermeasures technology. With some changes. mines arestill cleared much the same way they were cleared duringWorld War 11 Moored contact mines a re positively buoyant:i.e.. they float. and a re swept by cutting them fr ee oftheir moorings. Th is is accomplished by towing a long wir ebehind a minesweeper whi ch veer s down to a preset depth andout to a preset distance. Cutting devi ces are attached tothis wire and a s the mine anchor cables slide down the sweepwire they are captured and severed. Th e mines then float tothe surfa ce and are disposed o f in a variety of fashions.

Influence mines areMagnetically fuzed mines

more difficult t o clear.are swept by pu1 sin g.a large

Italy's Mine Makers . nternational eview, 15(Mar 1983): 369.Mark Hewish, Protecting Coastal Waters . nternational

e Paview. 2 (Ja n 1988): 29-32.


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electrical current into the water from a cable towed by aminesweeper. Acoustically fuzed mined can be detonated byintroducing noise into t he water . The magnetic fieldgenerated by a s hip can be reduced by the processes ofdeperming or degaussing. Th e magnetic sweeping. acousticsweeping. and magnetic field reduction techniques wer edeveloped by t he Briti sh during World War I 1 in respo nse toGerman mining operations.'

Modern influence mines require clearance techniqueswhich a re a sophisticated version of those mentioned above.Mines like the abov e mentioned Manta can be equipped with avariety of devices to counter sweep attempts. Shipcounters. whi ch c an be set s o a mine ignores a certainnumber of shi ps before detonating. a re quite common.Variable arming delays are available which turn mines o n andoff at predetermined times. Mine s no longer conform to theclassic cylindrical o r spherical s hapes so their detectionwith sona r is much more difficult. Non-ferrous material isnow commonly used f o r m i n e cases and moorings with acorresponding reduction in the magnetic si gnature of themine. Valsella S.p.A.. an Italian mine maker. offers theVS-SS5. a small mine laid in c lusters--around arger mines, .which will detect a nd destroy approaching minesweeping

Peter Elliot. llied in Wn War 11,(Annapolis. Naval Institute Press. 1979 34.


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e q ~ i p m e n t . ~inally. integrated circuit technology hasallowed the development of small memory devices for mineswhich allow the mines to be programmed for specific targetswhile ignoring others.

Costs of Minina/Submarine Campaians

Enemycasualties intonsrmonth

US shipinvestment perenemy ton casualty

Tons of enemycasualties percrewman required

Tons o f enemycasualty percrewman lost

Costs of USlosses per enemy

MINING28O.OOO

$16

SUBMARINES110.000

FIGURE ONE

Naval Mine Warfare , nternational ev-EditorialSuoPlemsntNov 1986).


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Mines are proliferating. The sea mine i s viewed as apurely defensive weapon by the majority of the world. Assuch. there ar e little restrictions on their sale and minesare genera lly made available to any country which can affordthem. Both the United States and the Soviet Union haveexporte d l arge numbers a s part of their milita ry aidprogra mmes. Italy. in particular. has developed asophist icated mine manufacturing industry that aggres sivelypursues sal es abroad. Misar. Valsella. and Technovar make acomplete spectrum of mines for almost every imaginableapplic ation. including a number which ar e purpose-built forcountering amphibious landings.

Othe r firms. such a s Bofors A.G. of Sweden and BritishAerospace and Electronics BAE) also aggressively marketsophisticated mines. For those who cannot afford the lowcost o f new mines. these companies offer packages whichupgrade their existing arsenals to modern sp e ~ i f i c a t i o n s . ~

Bas ic mines are not difficult to manufacture for acountry with an established weapons industry. Th e Iraniansmade an d employed hundreds of mines known as SADAP-02.copies of t he Russia n M-08 design dating almost to the turnof the century. Th e Iraqis undertook a similar effortduring Desert Storm and prior to the war exhibited and

Benz 28 The Chinese firm o f Dalien BAE o f the UnitedKingdom and Misar o f Italy all offer such programmes.


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offered for sale a variety of mines, some quitesophisticated.

Minoo ar c arguably tho most cost effec tive weaponavaila ble in the world. An Iranian SADAF-02 caused ove r$150 million in damage to the USS Samuel B Roberts in 1988.Two Iraqi mines caused over $40 million in damage to US STripoli and USS Princeto n. A naval officer offered thefollowing comment.

They are cheap, reason ably simple. reliable. produciblein great numbers. ea sily stockpile d. and possess adevastating wallop. They require countermeasures whichdemand a great investment in forces and technology. Forthose who wage naval war. these are virtues to esteem.In pounds of explosive per dollar they ar e navalwarfare's greatest bargain . 7Th e Naval Ordnance Laboratory conducted an analysis

after World War I1 to determine which of the campaignsagainst Japanese shipping. the mining o r t he submarine. w asmost cost effective. Th e results are illuminating and aredepicted in Figure 1.

Finally, mines are absurdly easy to employ. Th e UnitedStates and other technologically advanced nations usesophisticated mine laying techni ques utilizing a variety ofplatforms. Th is allows the minefields to be emplaced with

speed and precision. Howeve r. if neither is required. thenany surface vessel can be used as a minelayer. the Iranians

Robert H Smith, Unit-d Statas Naval nstituteProraedings. 106 (Apr 1980): 29.


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used landing craft. the Iraqis used a tug. and the Koreansand Vietnamese used sampans. all effectively.

From the introduction it is possible to see that minesare a significant threat to naval operations in all areas.Chief among the U.S. Navy s many missions is powerprojection. of which amphibious warfare plays an inportantpart. It is essential to almost all types of forced entryoperations. and plays a paramount role throughout theoperational continuum. Because of the inherently fragile

nature of amphibious assaults success often depends uponsurprise. The increasing sophistication of mines, theirproliferation. and the decrease in mine countermeasureforces may have rendered such surprise unattainable.Therefore. the primary research question of this thesisshall be: the orolifer tion af

ise inassaults

Subordinate Questions:a. Does the loss of tactical surprise make a

large-scale amphibious operation unfeasible?b Based on historical data. what level of losses

can be expected by amphibious forces entering a mined area?c. What level of mine clearance effort is required

to sweep an amphibious operating area for a large-scaleassault?


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d Given c above and assets available in 1991what would be the duration of such a sweep effort?

e Would the sweep effort alert an enemy topotential landing areas?

f Given historical data what level of lossescan be expected by the mine clearance forces?

g Given b and f above and current force levelswould expected losses render an amphibious assault forcecombat ineffective?

h Are current minesweeping techniques adequate toclear an amphibious operating area in a timely manner?

i How does mine technology affect the durationof mine sweeping operations?

j Is the potential loss of the large scaleamphibious option a matter of great concern in the currentstrategic environment?

The following assumptions are incorporated into theresearch and conclusions of this thesis:

1 That mine technology will continue toimprove

2 That mines will continue to be freely sold onworld weapons markets

3 That there will be no change in current andprojected U S Navy force structure

4 That amphibious assault will continue to beregarded as a desirable means of power projection


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5. That the likelihood of achieving surpri se inan amphibio us assault is inversely proportional to theamount o f time devoted to mine clearance

Amphibious and mine warfare writings are heavily lacedwith jargon and technical terminology. T o aid inunderstanding and provide clarification the followingdefinition of te rms is provided:

1 Amphibious operation : An atta ck launchedfrom the sea by naval and landing forces, embarked in shi psor craft involving a landing on a hostile shore . As anentity. a n amph ibio us operation consists of five phases.planning embarkation. rehearsal. movement, and assault.Amphibious operatio ns are divided into assaults. raids.demonstrations. and withdrawals.

2. Amphibious assault: Th e principal type ofamphibious operation which involves establishing a force ona hostile shore.

3 Amphibious Objective Area: A geographicalarea. delineated in the initiating directive. for purposesof command and control with in which i s located th e objectiveto be secured by the amphibious task force. Thi s area mustbe of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of theamphibious task force s mission and must provide sufficientarea for conductin g necessary sea. air. and land operati ons.

4 Amphibious lift: The total capacity ofassault shipp ing utilized in an amphib ious operation.


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expressed in terms of personnel. vehicles. and measurementor weight tons of supplies.

5 Sea Echelon: A portion of the assaultshipping which withdraws from or remains out of thetransport area during a n amphibious landing and operat es indesignated ar eas to seaward in an on call or unscheduledstatus.

6 Transport area: An area assigned for thepurpose of debarking troops and equipm ent.

7 Fire Support Area: An appropriate maneuverarea assigned to fire support sh ips from which to delivergunfire support to an amphibious operation

8 Li ne of departure: A suitable markedof fsh or e coordinating line to assist assault cr aft to landon designated beaches at schedule d times

9 Boat Lane: A lane for amphibious assaultlanding cra ft. which extends seawards from th e landingbeaches to the line of departure. Th e width of the lanes isdetermined by the width of t he corresponding beach.

10 Assault echelo n: Th e element of a forcethat is scheduled for initial assault o n the objective area.

11 Assault follow on echelo ns: That echelo n ofthe assault troops. vehicles. aircraft equipment. andsup plie s which. while not needed to initiate the assault. i srequired to support and sustain the assault.


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12. Commander Amphibious Task Force: Thecommander of the naval and ground forces involved in anamphibious operation. Command of the landing force isrelinquished when the Commander. Landing Forc e hasestablished hi s headquarters ashore.

13. Commander. Landing Force: Th e commander ofthe assault elements of a n amphibious operation.

14. Landing Area: That part of the objectivearea within which are conducted the landing operations of an

amphibious force . It includes the beach. the approaches tothe beach. the transport areas. the fire suppor t areas. theair occupied by close supporting aircraft and the landincluded in the advance inland to the initial objective.

15 Landing Site: A continuous segment ofcoastline over which troops. equipment. and suppli es can belanded by surface means.

16. Landing Beach: That portion of a coastlineusually required for the landing of a battalion landingteam. Also identified as a tactical locality over which aforce larger or smaller than a battalion may be landed.

17 Landing Cra ft: A craft employed inamphib ious operations. specif ically designed for carryingtroops and equipment an d for beaching. unloading. a ndretracting.

18 Landing force: A task organization oftroops assigned to an amphibious assault.


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19 Mine: An explosive device laid in the waterwith the intention of damaging or sinking ships or ofdeterring shipping from entering an are a

20 Mineable water: Waters where naval mines ofany given type may be effective against any given targ et

21 Mined area: An area declared dangerous dueto the presence or suspected presence of mines

22 Minefield: An area of water containingmine s laid with or without a pattern

23 Mine hunting: Th e employment o f shipsaircraf t or divers to locate and dispose of individualmines

24 Mine sweeping: The technique o f searchingfor or clearing mines using mechanical or explosive gearwhich removes or destroys the mine or produces in thearea the influence fields necessary to actu ate it

2 5 Influence Mine: mine actuated by theeffect of a target on som e physical condition in th evicinity of t he mine or o n radiations emanating from themine Common types are magnetic acoustic pressure andseismic

26 Contact mine: A mine actuated by physicalcontact with a target

27 Moored mine: A mine of positive buoyancyheld below the surface by a mooring attached t o a sink er oranchor on the bottom


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28. Bottom mine: A mine of negative buoyancywhich remains on the seabed. Also known as a ground mine.

29. Beach minefield: A mine field laid in thevery sha llow water approaches t o a beach. typically insidethe thr ee and one-half fathom 21 feet) depth curve.

Data presented in support of th is thesis shall have thefollowing limitations:

1.2.3

capabilities.4.5.

Dat a from 1914 to present.Mine effects on amphibious operations.United State s and NATO mine clearance

Western European and USSR mine technology.Unclassified open-source data.

Th is stu dy shall be significant in that it will se rveto draw attention to the potential loss of a powerful toolof power projection. the amphibio us assault. Th e Navy mustonce again be made awar e of the unique vulnerability oflarge scale surf ace amphibious assaults to mine warfare andmust make every effort t o ensure that mine countermeasurescapabi lity do es not deteriora te past the point that a rapidassault through a mined area is no longer possible. Asecondary significance will be to open debate on counter-amphibious mining a s a unique subset of mine warfare.

Mines have long been used a s an instrument of navalwarfare. Th e explosive kegs Bushnell floated down the

14


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Delaware and the torpedoes which Farragut damned a s heentered Mobile Bay were in fact mines. During the course oftho Civil War tho Union Navy suffered considerable loss fromthese devices. particularly in the restricted waters of theMississippi River. Twenty seven Union ships were lost tomines during the Civil War while only nine were lost t oshore batteries.8

During the Russo-Japanese War both side s employed minesliberally. Th e Russians used mines extensively during thesiege of Port Arthur. specific ally to deter a landing by t heJapanese Army . Th e Japanese lost eleven ships. includingtwo battleships. t o Russian mines and were forced to takethe base by siege from landward. Figure Two show s losses tomines during the Russo-Japanese War. g

W P e Russian Japanese TotalBattl ehip 1 3Cruiser 1 1Coaster 0 2l i m l a r 1 0 1D et r 1 3Gunboat 2 4

Piaure TwoSunk by friendly mines

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Texta w nd C ~ Q E Ft. Leavenworth. KS: Departmentof the Army . 8-17Oliver W. Bagby. Naval Mining and Naval Mines . m i t a dm1 (D EC 1925) 2244-2257.


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Mine s had their first major effect during World War I .When th e Gallipo li operatio n commenced. Allied naval forcesattempting t o force the Dardane lles and bombard Istanbulwere met by dense Turkish minefields. The se minefieldsaccomplished two missions. they directly sank a number ofships. and they forced the ships into defined areas whichwere covered by coastal artill ery. Th e Allies were forcedto retreat and the decision was made to take Istanbul byamphibious assault via t he Gallipoli peninsula. The Turk semployed controlled mines in connection with other obstaclesto canaliz e the allied landing efforts.1 Th e minefie ldsrestricted t he are a available for fire support. assault. andresupply shippin g. The y also prevented Allied naval forcesfrom interdicting the lines of com municat ion extendi ng fromIstanbul to the Gallipoli Peninsula. allowing Axis forcesunrestricted resupply and reinforcement. Allied forces wereeventually forced to withdraw and the magnitude o f thedefeat was nearly t he death knell for amphibious warfare .

World War I also provides the example of theNorth Se a Barrage. Allied forces. attempt ing to restrictGerman acce ss to the Atlantic Ocean. placed over 60 000mines in an enormous barrier acros s the North Sea extendingfrom the Orkneys to Norway. Thes e mines were partiallyeffective in reducing the German U-Boat menace accounting

lo Ibid. 224916


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for si x submar ines but we re at least an equal headac he tothe Allies in that they had to clear them at wars endlosing novoral ships in the procesS l1 Once laid minesrecognize no fla gs

Approximately 205.000 min es were laid in World War Iresulting in the loss of 63 Allied and 60 Central Power swarships A detailed breakdown o f losses is providedbelow 2

Ty pe Allied Central TotalBattlreklp 6 0 6Crui ser 3 2 5Li gh t 2 2 4

CruiserTo rp ed o 2 0 2

gunboatMon ito r 1 2 3Sl oo p 5 0 5D st r 28 15 43To rp ed o 6 10 16

BoatMimo~raf 1 23 2A=xlllary 2 0 2Others 3 0 3s b l P z ? i m s 4 6 10To ta ls 63 60 123

Figure ThreeThere were two great mining campaigns in World War 11.

one conducted by the Germans against the Allies and oneconducted by the Americans against the Japanes e Th e Germancampai gn began at the onset of war in 1939. Extensive

l1 Ibid 2248.l2 Ibid 2247.


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mining was conducted in the English Channel. the North Sea.and the Norwegi an fiords. Utiliz ing first motor t orpedoboats and destroyers. and later aircraft. t he Germ ansheavily mined British waters. On one occasion the Thameswa s closed for 36 hours while the channel was swept.13

After Pearl Harbor the Germans Initiated OperationPaukenschlag (Drumroll). an at tack by submarine on coastaltraffic off the U.S . Eastern Seaboa rd. U-Boats laid sma llminefields off t he approaches to New Yor k harbor and theChesap eake Bay , forcing the brief closure of both.Wilming ton NC. and Charleston. S C were closed for eightand ten days respectively. Th e fields were effective. onethirty mine field laid at the Chesape ake approach es in Ju ne1942 sank or damaged four ship s before it wa s cleared.14

Th e Germans inaugurated the use of subma rines andaircraft a s mine layers. and introduced magnetic. acoust ic.and pressure fuzing to the world of mine warfare. Th e firstmagnetic mines were operationally employed in the fall o f1939. rapidly followed by acoustic and pressure activatedmines.l hese mi ne s were no rm al ly laid by aircraft wi thparachute retardation. Later when arming delays made itsafer surface craft were used. Due t o the crude sensors of

l3 Peter Elliot.pAnnapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1979): 31l4 Ibid. 70l5 Ibid. 30.

18


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the time the min es wer e found to be most effective inshallow wate r. While a contact mine would blow a large holein a shi ps hull. a ground influen ce mine would normallybreak a shi ps back without rupturing the hull. Thi s type ofdamage would take many month s in a dockyard to repair. andat worst would cause the ship to be written off as a totalloss. a not uncommon occurrence.16 Th e Ger mans primarilyemployed si x types o f influence mines:17

German Influence MinesDmsimmator FuzingMagnetic

I MK 1 DualMag/acousticA2 Acoustic

MA 101 DualMag/acoustic

AcousticAcoustic

o u e nCoarse sensitivity.Long slo w pulse required foractivation. Ideal for slowertargets

Increased sensitivity.12 ship counter installed.Easily swept.

4 microphones inparall el. Used sound buildup to detonat e.10 s hip counter.Explosive sweep

Figure Four

Ibid. 2 4l7 Ibid. 54


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They chose this a s an effective and inexpensive way tocombat the Royal Navy the only Britis h force not matched insize and quality by the Axis During the Dunkirkevacuation an amphib ious withdrawal the Britis h lost 7minesweepers An additional five were damaged but madeport l o

Th e British were caught at the beginning of the war witha tiny mine countermeasures force and responded to theGerm an effort with a wholes ale construction program and bylarge convers ions of commercial fishing boats to minesweepers Over 800 commercial vessels were requisitioned forminesweeping duti es by th e Royal Navy at the start of WorldWar 11 Of these 223 were sun k while sweeping Germanmines lg German technology forced the British to developmagnetic and acoustic minesweeping methods which ar e still

in use todayBy June 1944 the Germans had constructed extensive

defensive minefields along the French coast particularly inthose areas they deemed vulnerable to amphibious assaultAdditionally they had emplaced offensi ve fields in thedeparture channels of British ports and along likely coursesleading from thos e ports to the invasion beaches Notingthat the Allies did not mine the Bay of the Seine the

o Ibid 35l Ibid 30


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Germ ans correctly deduced that it wa s a likely invasion areaand heavily mined it. Hitler commented.

We have got to lay mines and still more mines in theSeine Bay with the tenacity of a bulldog. It isincomparably more effective to sink a whole cargo at seathan to have to fight th e unloaded material and personnelon land .20T o maintain su rprise t he fields could not be swept

until immediately prior to the invasi on. The allies had. bythis time. amassed a large fleet of mine craft. over 2total, and were able to sweep the channels and beachapproach lanes in slightly more than 24 hours. Surprisewas nearly lost when minesweeping units approached withinvisual r ange of the French coast on 5 June 1944. The seniorGerman naval officer at Normandy, Admiral Friedrich Ruge.believes the units wer e sighted but not reported. Suc h areport would have led to the discove ry of t he invasion fleetand allowed the Germans an additional 4 hours to preparetheir defenses. Th e success at Normandy wa s due in largepart to this effort. made possible by the early recognitionof a substan tial threat and the early commitment ofresources to combat it. Even with the mine clearance effortsixteen ships were lost t o mines during the operation.

2 Arnold Lott, m s Annapolis. NavalInstitute Press. 1959). 189.Friedrich Ruge, - Rafael.Pres idio Press. 1979). 176


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Th e German s gave considerable thought to the defensivemine fields surrou nding Normandy. designing complicatedmixed-type fie lds covered by large caliber coastalartillery. Recognizing that fields in shallow water areparticularly difficult to swee p they developed a seri es ofshallow water mines designed to destroy landing craft. Th isconcept did not reach fruition as the German Navy, in chargeof th e mining. disagreed with t he Army and held back itsef forts.22

Recognizing the utility of mine warfare. the UnitedStates employed substantial numbers of mines against theJapanese. Th e shallow waters around the Japanese homeislands and the large numbers of restricted stra its andchoke points make Japan particularly vulnerable to thismethod of warfar e. Using submarines initially, and lateraircraft the U.S. Navy and Army Air Cor ps conductedOperation Starvation. laying thousands of sophisticatedmin es around the Japane se home islands. causing great los sesto their naval and merchant fleets.

Th e Japanese had no effective minesweeping capability.despite their earlier lessons from the Russians. and werepowerless in the face of th is campaign which stru ck directly

p ~ p ~ ~22 Ibid. 175 Th e German Army and Navy were not noted fortheir cooperation. A specifi c mine type had been developedto counter the Allied landing craft threat but it sproduction and deployment were delayed by the local Ger manNaval Headquarters. Admiral Ruge was assigned to Rommel sstaff and had no authority ove r local naval co mmander s.


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Wines Laid and Swept in World War I1

Laid Swept

Moored Ground total Moored Ground total

Lant 97 000 23 000 120.000 2569 5926 8495

Wed 30.000 25.000 55.000 7460 663 8123

~aciric 30.000 21.000 51.000 6000 6000 12.000

Total l57.000 79.000 226.000 16.029 12.589 28.618Figure Six

World War I served as the genesis of a number oftechnological advanc e in mine warfar e Alread y mentioned isthe German development of the influence fuze in it s variouspermutations an innovation rapidl y copied by the all iesTh e Britis h developed and fielded a number of minesweepingdevices the first magnet ic and acousti c sweeps and byplacing large magnetic coils in a Welling ton bomber andflying at wavetop height they introduced th e first airbornemine countermeasures 26 An American Lieutenant Commander

6 Elliot 32.


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named Hyman Rickover did important work in magneticsweeping. the first of his many contributions. and theUniversity of California at San Diego developed the firsthigh frequency mine hunting sonar.*7

After the great demobilization following World War I1the U.S. Navy in general. and the mine forces in particular.had been greatly reduced in number and capability. Thismission had been primarily conducted by the reserves. andwith their departure from active service the ability both to

employ and counter mines was attenuated.At this point it is worthy to note the position that the

mine warfare mission held in the naval hierarchy. Thisparticular form of naval warfare has always been regarded asunglamorous. It is physically difficult. particularlydangerous. and does not offer the glamour and excitement ofservice in the cruiser or destroyer forces. the prestige ofaviation. or the benefits of service in a submarine.Perhaps most critically. particularly in peacetime. t is acareer swamp. Senior officers ordered to duty in the mineforces have had the kiss of death laid on their careers. OneFirst Lord of the British Admiralty summarized the prevalentattitude with the following comment. . . . unpleasant workfor a naval officer. an occupation like rat catching .2e

27 Lott. 66.28 Ibid. 17-19.


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Th e post World War I1 focus on nuclear weaponry andhigh performance aircraft combined with the drasticroduction in budg ts c usod the Navy t o quickly cast off itsmine warfare forces. Th e force available in 1950 wa s but ashad ow of that aflo at only five year s previously. ninetynine percent of which had been deacti vated. Th e Kor ean Warwa s to provide the Navy with another lesson. its third inthe 20th century. on the importance of mine warfare. Th eNorth Koreans had no e ffectiv e naval capability against theUSN. wh ich ranged freely along the Korean coast. projectingpower inland via naval air and long range gunner y. Th eydiscovered. with th e help of their Soviet mentors. that thenaval mine i s a poor mans friend. a weapon who se effect isextremely disproportionate t o its cost.

Following the successful amphibious operation atInchon. where only one small enemy field was discovered.Gen . Macarthur decided to attempt a repeat performance atthe North Korean port city of Wonsan on the east coast ofthe peninsula. Th e amphibious task force arrived only tofind that the are a had been heavily mined and that thebeaches were unapproachable. Nearly one week and threemineswe epers later. the Second Marine Division landed atWonsan long after th e ground forces had overrun the area andwere far to the north. Th e task force commander lamented.


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W e have lost control o f the seas to a nation without anavy. using pre World War On e weapons. laid by ves selswhich were utilized at the time of the birth of C h r i ~ t . 2 ~

Admiral Forest Sherman. then Chief o f Naval Operationssaid.

They caught us with our pants down. Thos e damn minescost us eight days delay in getting the troops ashore andmore tha n two hundred casualtie s. That's bad enough. butI can all too easily thi nk of circumstances when eightdays delay offs hore could mean losing a wa r. .. We lv e eenplenty submarine conscious and air conscious. No w we'regoing to start getting mine conscious-beginning lastweek. 0

Mines continued to plague United Nations operationsthroughout the remainder o f the Korean War. The amphibiouswithdrawal of forces from Hungham following the Chineseintervention required a heavy minesweeping e ffor t. onefortunately possible by that time. Logist ics over theshore. naval gunfire. and port operations were all ef fec teda s the North Korean s continued to lay mines using s mallfishing junks. A major expansion o f the mine warfare forceallowed the UN forces to c ope with this threat.31

9 C R. Wages. Mines Th e Weapons that Wait , nitedPror-88(May 1962) 103.30 Lott. 27731 Paolo Coletta, Yaited State- Naval I w t u t a P r o r a a w85 (Nov 1959): 82. Th e best benefit of this debacle wasthat it provoked experime ntatio n into novel cou nterme asures.Aircraft. helicopters. and combat swimm ers wer e used todetect mines, and unsuccessful attempt at countermining withbombs was attempted. and a spli nter fleet of motor la unches28


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After the lessons o f the Korean War the Navy grea tlyexpanded the mine force and when Vietnam arrived they wereroady for a challenge that failed to materialize. Som eisolated incid ents occur red, primarily in port areas. andlargely as a result of direct actio ns by combat swimm ers.Such operations. when encountered, were dealt with by navalspecial operations forces. Th e U. S. did use mines to closeHaiphong harbor in 1972. and the only large scale mineclearance operation during the war wa s Operation End Sweep.our post-war removal of the weapo ns. Th is operationfeatured the first large scal e use of the CH 53 helicopterto tow minesweeping eq uipment.

Following the Vietnam War the U.S. Navy began anextensive drawdown. Many of the ship s had been run hardwith little maintenance for years and were found to bebeyond economical repair. Th e mine forces were sharply cutand what resource s remained were dedicated to development o fthe airborne option. The se forces wer e used in the multi-national clearance of the Sue z Canal following the CampDavid Accords. and t o clear the harbor of Jeddah. SaudiArabia after the Libyan mining in 1985 . Both operationswere limited in scope and executed in a benign environment.

wa s used for minesweeping. These launch es were the genes isof the 57 foot MS B minesweeping boat).2


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The advent of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 found bothantagonists well equipped with mines and willing to usethem. The Persian Gulf is arguably one of the most mineablebodies of water in the world. It is shallow. not exceeding200 feet of depth across most of its expanse and it issharply compartmented by shallows. oil fields. and variousother unnavigable areas. Little tactical or technicalsophistication is needed to effectively mine anywhere in theGulf. Both sides mined each others harbors and naval bases.

and as the Arab countries began to actively support Iraq theIranians began to covertly mine their harbors and oilproduction facilities.

The United States essentially entered the conflict inMay 1987 when the USS Stark was damaged by an Iraqi Exocetmissile while on patrol northeast of Jubail. Saudi Arabia.The increasing US involvement coupled with strengtheningArab support for Iraq caused the Iranians to respond. likethe North Koreans. with the poor mans weapon. As more andmore vessels began to strike mines in the Gulf the U.S.responded by deploying a mine countermeasures forceinitially airborne only. followed by surface vessels. Theforce began operations in late 1987 and continued untilearly 1990. when they returned to the United States.Despite their efforts the Iranians continued to mine more orless at will until the war ended in the summer of 1988.


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Th e mine countermeasure s force returned to the Pers ianGul f less than si x months after returning home. Respondingt tho incroaaod U S naval prosnncn in tho Gulf. and thethreat of amphibious assault. Iraq began to heavily mine th enorthern reaches of the Persi an Gulf in November 1990.Floating mines began to appear in the areas south of Kuwaitby Thanksgiving 1990. Th e Iraqis continued to mine untiltheir forces were destroyed. U.S .. British. and Saudiminesweepers were able to swee p two long narrow cha nnels toenable the use of battleship gunfire but we re unable toclear sufficient area for the amphibious task force. Had anassault been required th e amphibious tas k for ce would havebeen forced into incompletel y swept water. plac eing 3 shipsand over 30.000 personnel at severe risk . Had adequate mineclearance force s been available the amphibious task forcecould have covered a much larger area and tied down moretroops. and naval g unf ire shipd could have provided moretimely and accurate support to forces advancing north up thecoast.32 Th e USS Tripoli and the USS Princeton were bothheavily damaged by Iraq mine s during th e operation.

Th e Iraqis admitted to emplaceing slightly ov er 1600mines in the northern Persian Gulf. Th e US. British.Belgian, Australian. and Saudi minesweeping force completedclearing these mines in September 1 991. Undoubtedly.

Norman Priedman, The Seaward Flank , W t e d St-Naval nstitut17 (Jul 1991): 81-83.


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residual mines from thes e fields will plague mariners in thePersia n Gulf for years to come

Th e significance of this study is to determine if wehave possibly onc e again allowed our mine countermeasuresforces to deteriorate to dangerous levels and by doing solost or severely compromised our ability to conduct majoramphibious assault s in a timely manner Amphibiousassaults depend heavily on surprise for a successful outcom eand the activities of a mine sweeping force are difficult toconceal Small numbers of minesweepers lengthen theclearance times and inv ite a possibly fatal compro mise


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Chapter Tvo

Review of Literature

Literature on the subject of mine warfare is dividedroug hly into tactical and technical branches. further sub-divided in to books. professional journals and periodicals.There is also a limited amount of primary so urce materialavailable locally. primarily in the form of fleet lessonslearned and af te r action reports.

Literature on mine warfa re is cyclic in nature and it svolume corresponds to level of interest at t he time. Duringthe co ur se of my initial research I examined the indices forNaval Institute Proceedings from 1900 to the present. Arash of article s appear in 1900. 1918-1920. 1945. 1950-1953and 1988-1990. The se writi ngs reflect interest after theRusso-Japanese War. World War s On e and Two. Korea. and thePersian Gulf conflict. Similar patterns are exhibited to alesser degree in military tra de journals such a sInternational Defense Review. Jane s Defense Weekly.Seapower. and Armada Inte rnati onal.

The re are few books written on mining. and no ne focusexclusively on its amphibious aspects.n s a detailed study of mine warfa re in theEuropean Theater of Operations in World War Two . Th e bookprovides an excellent over view of the major amphibiousoperations in the E m and the mine sweepi ng effort that was

33


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required to support each. Also provided are a series oftables detailing forces. losses. and mining eff orts by thevariou s powers . Publish ed by the Naval Ins titute Pres s. itis a technical history abo ve all else.

r us qe a is a similar. less detailed. andsomewhat anecdotal history that is oriented more toward s theAmerican contribution t o mine warfare. Thi s history alsocovers the Korean war. It supplements the mass of detailpresented in A l l i e d s w e a in War a ndprovides insight into the organization and servic e politicsof the American mine force.

That W is a recent public ation that pro vid esa good summa ry history of mine warfare.is a history of Genera l Erwin Rommel's preparation for theAllied invasion in Normandy. Thi s is the only work inEnglis h that add ress es counter-amphibious mining in anydetail. As briefly discussed in Chapter On e it wa s amatter of obvious interest for the German High Command.

Literature pertaining to the case studies variesconsiderably. Gallipoli is very well documented due to itshistorical significance. Th e major figures of Gallipoli.Sir Ian Hamilton and Lima n Van Sa nders both publisheddiaries shortly after the end of World War I . Thes epublications are essential to any understanding of t hiscomplex operation. Th e Turkish General Staff has alsopublished a history of its actions during t his time.


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In almost every case all authors writing about Gallipoliunderstand the effects of the mines used there and coverthem adnquatoly. Tho ontiro operation. from both militaryand naval aspects. is very well documented and easy toresearch

Normandy is likewise well covered in the literature.For an understanding of the enormity of the naval effort itis necessary to consult Morison s epic work. U d tatesk v a l O~rratipIlS n qPl;ld War u The problems on theGerman side are well covered in Ruge s Rommnl in NormandvThe previously mentioned works on minesweeping both coverthe Normandy operation in detail. focusing on the uniqueproblems of assault minesweeping

The Korean operations are well covered in officialCINCPACFLT interim evaluation reports and by the USMCofficial histories. The Wonsan operation is covered indetail in both sources. which should be consideredcomplimentary. Lott s work. t Da Seq. ends witha discussion of Wonsan. The sources generally corroborateeach other.

Information on Operation Desert Storm is drawn from thearticles which have appeared since its conclusion. mypersonal recollections. and the interview of an officerinvolved in the mine clearance effort. The works publishedto date on these operations are contradictory, and in someinstances. considerably at variance with the facts. I have


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used some information from Droert V i c t u which I personallyknow t o be accurate. however. Desert Storm writings must beapproached with c are until the historical data can beproperly handled.

A s ever. th e Jales. series are comprehensive so ur ce s ofdata both on force siz e and composition. and technicaldetails of particular weapon s. he Dic rv ofNaval v rovides additional data on theAmerican mine force and should be regarded a s an excellentsupplement to Janes.

Trade journals. particularlyReview are an excellent sou rce of technical data on thevarious facets of mine warfare. These magazines have aEurope an focus. and most European nav ies demons trate acontinuing committment to mine warfare v ice the cyclicalswin gs of the USN. Th e depth and currency of thisliterature is sufficient to allow a reader to keep currentwith the pace of technology and provides a means to compareU S and European initiatives in the field.

Milita ry periodicals. particularly th e nited StatesN val nd the n n Cnrprovide th e bulk of historical and tactical writings on mine

warfare. The se article s are in large part historical.depicting the authors contribution to a particular operationor providing a n analysis of a particular event a s seen fromthe authors viewpoint. Th e remainder ar e tactical.


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describing a particular threat or describing the tactics andtechniques of mine warfare.

Thana articlas ara largely writtan by naval officers.the majorit y o f which had recent mine warfare experi ence atthe time of writing. As previously mentioned. the articlestend to be grouped around particular periods of time whenmining activity was significant.

Th e articles in these professional journals provide awindow into the depth of tactical and technical knowle dge atthe time. Th e earliest works are often quite lengthy anddwell on th e technical charac teristi cs of the mines. and thepractical diffic ulties faced by the mariner s who laid andswept them. World War On e was the U S Na vy 's first greatexcursion into mine warfare and the immedi ate postwarliterature of the early 1920's are simply lessons learned .Th e Naval Institute Proceedi ngs have often functioned a s apublic forum for such lessons. especially in earlier yearswhen no official vehicle was in place for the promulgationof such information.

Th e nuts and bolts nature of these early articles isalso due to the junior rank of the writers. the majority ofwhich were Lieutenant Commanders or junior. These personneltended. in that age. t o be preoccupied with the technicaldetails o f the profession. natural given the nature o f theireducation at the United Sta tes Naval Academy and the natureof their daily duties. A strategic analysis of the North


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Sea Barrage i s nowhere to be found. although t he literatureabounds with anecdotal storie s of its emplacement and laterremoval

Th e professional literature is quiescent during the1930 s. Th is decade found the Navy concerned with th eassimilation of the aircr aft carrier and the fleetsubmarine. Th e great airpower debates were raging and thebattleship versus aircraft carrier controver sy wa sbeginning. Th e Marine Corps was developing the amphibiousdoctrine it was to use in World War I and the Navy wasevaluating its ability to support this doctrine. Minewarfare had been relegated to what wa s then its primary rol eo f harbor defense. The re were few mine craft in commissionand few officers assigned to the mission. Tho se that wer eso assigned were evidently not inclined to writ e about it.

After the end of World War I interest in mine warfareat all levels in the Navy appeared to accelerate. Th eexperience of the thousands of sailors who were assignedminesweeping duties wa s reflected in the literature. Forthe first time the junior officers writing these arti clesbegan to attempt an analyses beyond th e technical. Th esuccess of Operation Sta rvation and Operation Paukenshlagimpressed the officers who were assigned t o evaluate themand a number of super b articles are found in Proce eding sfrom 1945-1950. number of these pieces wer e written by


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intelligence officers who we re assigned to debrief Japaneseand German commanders.

Th e Marina Carps had not bean savarly af foc tad by seamines in any of its World War I1 operations. They were.however, nearly always present to some degree and t hus werea factor meriting conside ration . Th e primary threat in thePacific were friendly minefields (possibly one of the greatoxymoro ns of milita ry te rminol ogy) which had to be sweptbefore beaches could be reache d. At Guadalc anal the SSPresident Coo lidge carrying 5050 troo ps and heavy weaponswas su nk in such a friendly minefield. '

The y did amass a great deal of experi ence dealing withland mine s on the beaches and in the shallows. and foundthese to be a s vexing then as they are today. A seniorMarine officer lamented.

Th e present day mine problem i s one of the greatestheadac hes faced by future amphib ious operati ons. Fromthe four fathom line inward. experts are baffled by th eproblem at present but a re undoubtedly seeking asolution. Unless we can completely isolate th e landingareas t he Pacific war style of mine clearance cannot beu t i l i ~ e d . ~Th e Pacific st yle of clearance referred to by LTCO L

Carter involved t he use of combat swimme rs and smallminesweeping boats as close to the beach as possible. Th isis possible only when th e enemy can be isolated from the

Lott. 78Donald H Carter, Mines-An Amphib ious Threat . arinem r 2 (Dec 1 9 4 8 40-43.


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beachhead and prevented from engaging these units withdirect fire.

Th e mine warfare debacles of the Korean War occasioned asignifican t amount of professional writ ing. The se articles.written at all levels o f the heirarchy. demonstrate t heconcern over our initial failures in the area. Th e need toorganize and train assault minesweeping ele ments was againrecognized. Th e first mention of the helicopter a s a minewarfare asset i s found in a 1951 article.3 Mostimportantly. the highest levels of the Navy became awa re ofthe significanc e of the mine warfare threat.

From the mid 1950's to the early 197 0's the literatureis once again nearly devoid of writing on the subject. Th eNavy was focused on t he introduction of nuclear power andthe assumption o f a strategic deterrance role via the fleetballistic missile submarine program. Mine warfare was not alarge problem in the Vietnam War and th e majority of effo rtswere undertaken by the special operations forces. However.the mining of Haiphong and its subsequent clearance viaairborne methods sparked a number of articles. These areprimarily technical in nature. deal ing with the practicalproblems encountered in planning and condu cting this ratherlarge operation. Ther e are several good overviews.

E.L. Barker, The Helicopter in Combat , U t e d Stat-U v a l Lnatitute Prn-anQiaes, 77 Nov 1951): 1209.40


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including one by its commander4 Th is operation and theclearance of the Su ez Canal provide t he bulk of th e datafaund batwaan 1955 and 1986. From 1986 to th a p r a ~ a n t h obulk of the professional literature concerns experiences inthe Persi an Gul f. both from Operation Earnest Will andDesert Shield/Storm. Th e Earnest Will literature againdeals with the problems of organizat ion, deployment. andoperations as the threat was small and the weapons used ofobsolete design. Data from Desert Shield/Storm is stillpending analysis and that writing which has appeared t o datehas been largely of the I told you so variety

A significant primary sourc e are th e Commander inChief. U.S. Pacific Fleet Interim Evaluation Reports for theKorean War . These document. issued quarterly for theduration of t he conflict. are divided into various navalwarfa re areas including mine and amphibious warfare. Theyevaluate the state of training. organization. staffadequacy, intelligence. planning. and tactics andtechniques

Each provides an analysis of the successes and fai lureso f that particular quarter including descriptions ofoperations and le ssons learned. Conclusions are drawn basedon th e evidence and. where appropriate. recommen dations arepresented.

Brian McCauley, Operation End Sweep .Proraadingg. 100 (Mar 1974 : 19-25.


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Doctrinal publications to be used in the course of theresearch include JCS Public ation 3-02 Amphib ious Operations.and the Naval Warfare Publication s eries for mine warfareand amphibious operations. These publications have remainedunchanged in their basic form for many years. JC S Pu b 3-02incorporates th e basic amphib ious doctrine used by the Navyand Marine Corps and represents an effort to ensurecommonality of doctrine. Th e WP are Navy specific and thusnot subjec t to pre-emption by joint doctri ne. The se aretechnical publications which are useful when extracting thetactics techniques. and proced ures involved in minecountermeasures.


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hapter Three

Methods and Procedures

Th e thesis and its eventual conclus ions will be basedon a compilation of historical data and a comparison of th ishistorical data to current conditions. Th e delimitation o f1914 is necessary a s it represents the earliest of a mineinfluenced amphibio us operati on

Th e study will examine four major operationsGallipoli. Normandy. Wonsan. and the amphibio us portion ofOperati on Desert Storm. examining the effect o f mining uponeach and further examining the effec t of minecountermeasures upon surprise. Th is will be done bycomparing the size of the mine sweeping problem to the sizeo f the mine sweeping fleet committed to a given operation.and comparing the time required for mine sweeping to theenemy reactio n. Th e mine countermeasures and amphibiousforces involved will be drawn from available sourcedocumentation. For total force comparisons at various timesthe data from that ye ars anes ill be used.The effe ct o f changing technology. i. e. influence fuzing.will be considered in those cases where i t is determined tobe applicable.

Examination of t he data should yield a s eries of simplerelationships that will sho w the eff ect o f technology upon

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clearance time. force totals upon clear ance time. andclearance time upon surprise. I will attempt t o identifythose instances where su rprise was lost but the eff ec t wa snegligible due to other factors. An example being theisolation of a n amphibious objective area by airpower ofnaval gunfire. Th e preponderance of data will behistorical. extracted from resear ch and information derivedfrom interviewing office rs experienced in the field. Afterestablishing the relationships discussed above I willattempt to determi ne if the over riding factor in minefieldclearance speed i s sheer numbers of swe ep assets vice levelof technology. and I will examine the effects of variouslevels of mine sophistication upon clearance speed. Giventhe assumpt ion that surpri se is inversely proportional tothe time devoted to mine countermeasures. will themexamine the timelines required for U S forces to clear abrigade sized amphibious operating area to determine ifthose times are excessive.


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CH PTER FOURC SE STUDIES IN MINE W RF RE

IntroductionAmphibious warfare. the sudden strike from the sea that

surp rise s an enemy. upsets his plans. and potentiallychanges a war o r campaign in a single stroke. has been atool of military strategists since man first took to thewat er. Before the advent of the airborne operatio n it wa sthe only tool available for such a str ike which did notentail long marches exposure to detection. and expendit ureof large amounts of scarc e resources. With s ome veryspecific exceptions. the nautical phase of the amphibiousoperation is not affected by terrain. Water is flat andfeatureless. offering fe w restrict ions to movement andconferring no advantage to the defender. Th e approach can bemade in stealth with the attack falling at a ny point uponthe coastline. and the fo rces are not exhausted by th eeffort of getting t o the battle are a.

Any nation having a littoral is subject to amphibiousinvasion. Coastlin e length often exceeds theat of landborders by several tim es and an irregular coastline such asNorway s or th e East Coast of the United S tate s can addthousands o f miles of exposure. The problem i s analogous tothat faced by law enforcement. there are simply too manyplaces which must be watched by to o f ew people.


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Th e flexibility and utility of amphibious warfare i scounterbalanced by its vulnerab ility in several areas. Th ecombat power of a landing forc e is initially very we ak andthe success of such an operation hinges upon a rapidbuildup of military muscle on the beach. Thi s must be donequickly before an enemy can react and focus his forcesagainst t he beachhead. and it must be don e in a s benign anenvironment as possible. Therefore . it is almost axiomaticthat amphibious assaul ts should be conducted against l ightlydefended areas or in areas where the attacker can quicklydevelop a decisive positive force rati o. Thes e area s mustbe isolated from the defenders until sufficient combat poweris massed to overcome them.

Th e amphibious assault initially requires extensive firesupport. Th is support has traditionally come from ship sassigne d for that purpose. and from the aircraft of t heMarine Air Wings. Th is must co ntinue until the landingforce has established its organic fire support means in th eobjective area. Naval guns can deliver a high volume offire but must be able to range t he beach. generally re quir eobserver assistance. and the ships need freedom of maneuver.particularly if a significant counterbattery threat exists.Air support is dependant on a variety of factors. not theleast being weather. an d generally req uire s the same levelof observation a s naval gunf ire.


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Amphibious assaults are very sensitive to disruptions intiming and synchronizat ion. Th e right men and material mustraaa h the baach at tha critical t imo if tho momantum o theassault is to be maintained. Assaults are normallyconducted in waves or serials, and the disruption of any on ecauses a ripple eff ect in all following. These ripples canseve rely disrupt assau lt timing and result in poorly timeddelivery of preparatory fires. beach congestion. and a lossof assault momentum.

Despite these limitations this option continues to be afavorite of strategic and operational planners. It hasfeatured in all recent wars to a greater or lesser degreeand its use has become a trademark for som e commanders. Asuccessful amphibious operation can yield results completelyout of proportion t o the resources and effort exp ended .Similarly. a failed amphib ious assault can produce adisaster of like dimension.

Th e true heart of naval warf are is the inherent mobilityof the forces and the mine is the answer to that mobility.Minefields become the terrain of the nautical landscape. andcan be used by th e defender to impose parameters upon theamphibious threat. Th e minefields now become the No-Go orSlo-Go areas familiar to military st af f officer. the gap s

and lanes in the fields become ave nues of approach. andsuddenly the threat is considerably diminished and eminent lymore predictable.


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A nation which feels threatened by attac k from the seacan achieve economi es of force by employing mines Byestablishing protective fields and focusing sens ors andweapons syst ems upon these fields a good degree ofprotection c an be achieved with relativ ely few forces

These fields are obstacles in the purest sense and mustbe breached by any force attempting to pass through th emAs on land this breaching process takes time that mostcritical and unrecoverable resource Th e time spent inbreaching minefield will be used by an alert enemy toanalyze the assault mass forces for the defense and if thebeachhead cannot be isolated then the assault will l ikelyfail

Th e four case studies which follow will examine theeffect of the mine upon th e amphibious assault I willexplore how they were used how the attacking forcesapproached the problem of breaching and most importantlywhat their effect wa s upo n the operat ion


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GALLIPOLI

Gallipoli is to amphibious warfare what Cambrai is tothe cavalryman, the first testing o f modern techniques andequipment applied to an ancient problem. In the case ofGallipoli that test wa s to fail in the blood of over half amillion men. blood which wa s shed in large part because les sthan 500 mines caused a vital loss of surprise.

Any discussion of th is operation first req uires someexplanation of the circumstances which bought the youngBritish, Anzac, and Turkish soldie rs to this bleak peninsulain European Turkey. Th e great German assault in August 1914had stalled against the defenses of the Anglo-French Ententeand both si des had begun to settl e into what would become

the murderous positional w arfare of the Western Fr ont .In the south as th e war began. the entry of Turkey on

the side of the Central Powers was by no means assured.Turk ey was not threatened by any of the protagonists. had noexisting treaty obligations. and had no particular need togo to war . Both the Allies and the Central Powe rs hopedthat she would re main neutra1.l

Turkey was. in any case. in poor condition to fightenemies such as Great Britain or France. For a hundred

Alan Moorehead.v New York: Harper and Row.1956 . 11.


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year s prior to 1914. the Ottoma n empir e had been derisive lyknown as the sick man o f Europe . As is the case with manysi ck men. a large body of interested relativ es had gatheredaround the sickbed. waiting for the demise and the eventualprobate of the estate. Much of this estate was gone.Saloni ka. Crete. and th e Aegean Island s to the Greeks. Egyptand Cyprus t o Great Britain. and Bulgaria to its owni n d e p e n d e n ~ e . ~

Tur key had tried. not alw ays successfully. to engage intreaties and alliances with the powers of Europe but w asgenerally rebuffed. Her reputation for misrule. corruption.and cruelty had so alienated the major European p owers thatthey wer e unwilling to treat with her. and her crumbling andfailing state made it unnecessary that they do so. But. a swar approached. this frog suddenl y began t o appear

For Tur key was cursed by geography to lie at thecrossroads of empire. Occupying the northeasternMediterranean littoral. and extending east to Iraq she satathwart the major lines of communication between Britain andher empire. and controlled access to the Balkans via theBlac k Sea . In July 1914. the Germans suddenly becameacutely aware of the Blac k Sea and its importance. They

Morehead. 11.Barbara Tuchman. h e w New YorkMacmillan. 1962). 163.


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sought to resurrect an offer of alliance previously made bythe Turks but left dangling. Negotiations were brought tofruition an July 28 1914 whan tha Turks formally raquesteda secret alliance with the Central Powers following theAustrian declaration of war on Serbia.4

Still this situation could have been salvaged but for afoolish and arrogant move on the part of the British. TheTurks had contracted and paid for two battleships. theSultan Osman and the Reshadieh to be built in British yardsand delivered in the summer of 1914. The money. over thirtymillion dollars had been raised by popular subscriptionfrom the Turkish population and tremendous national pridewas invested in their acquisition. Using a variety ofsubterfuges. the British delayed the departure of thevessels from May until July. when Winston Churchill as

First Lord of the Admiralty. ordered them requisitioned. Nocompensation or repayment was ~ f f e r e d . ~he Turks signed analliance with Germany the day they received notification ofthe British action.

However. after signing a treaty with Germany wherebythey undertook to declare war on Russia and close theDardanelles. the Turks then failed to do these things. TheTurks feared Russia resented England. and mistrusted

Tuchman. 164.Tuchman. 165.


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Germany , and were not at all sur e they had backed the righthorse. They thus opted to sit out the opening battles o fthe war to see which way the wind was likely to blow. Theywere allowed this luxury for slightly over one week.

Tw o German warships. SMS Goeben and S MS Breslau. w erecruising t he Mediterranean when wa r broke out in Europe.These vessels inaugurated the war by shelling the Algerianports of Bone and Phillipeville. after which they set coursefor th e eastern Mediterranean with the Royal Navy inpursuit. After so me equivocation by the Turk s and sometactical miscalculation by the Royal Navy. the ship s wereallowed to enter th e Dardane lles on August 10th. 19 14.

In a transparent attempt to preser ve Turk ish neutrality.the ships were commissioned into t he Turkish Navy as theJawus and the Midilli. Th e German crews remained. donningred fezzes to s ign ify their c hange o f allegiance.'

For three months the ships sat idle in the port o fIstanbul. then. on October 28th the ships attacked theRussian ports of Odessa. Sevastopal. and Feodosiya. Th isattack was carried out without the sanctio n of the Turkishgovernment. and they attempted to disavow it withoutsuccess . On November 4th. Russia declared war on Turkey.followed th e next day by Franc e and Great B ritain. 8

Tuchman. 165Tuchman . 185Tuchman. 187


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Turkey's frantic attempts at disavowal were not withoutreason. The country was in absolutely no condition tofight. the efforts of Enver Pasha and the Young Turksnotwithstanding. The Germans had established a militarymission in 1913 to train the Turks. and had achievedconsiderable progress. Nevertheless. the series of BalkanWars of independence prior to 1914 had drained and expendedthe Ottoman Army. Excepting only a few elite units. thisarmy had gone unpaid for months. and some units werereportedly on the verge of m ~ t i n y . ~his army was barelyready to maintain order within its domains. and was notprepared to challenge the great powers of Europe. However.with the assistance of the German Military Mission under thecommand of General Liman Von Sanders. it was to proveadequate to the task.

The months of October. November. and December went byquietly. marked by only a few incidents. The Turks salliedforth two small expeditions. one aimed at the RussianCaucasus. and the other at Egypt. and Allied warshipspatrolling the entrance to the Dardanelles shelled the fortsguarding the mouth of the straits.1 The British submarineB11 entered the straits on December 13th and sank the

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Turkish battleship Messudieh. These were all local actions.not part of any larger strate gic or operational plan.

In Europe the trenches now extended from the North Seato Switzerland. and the antagonists had already sufferedover a million casua lties. The British. long intrigued bythe operational possib ilities of a thrust into centralEurope through t he Balkans. began to reexamine some longdiscarded plans for a naval assault on Istanbul. Th isappeared t o offer relief for the Russians. who had suff eredfrom th e disastrous battles at Tannenburg and the MasurianLak es would knock Turkey out of the war. and would divertGerman forces from the Western Front. thus offering som epossibility for decisive a ction.l l Th is thinking wa sbolstered by a Russian request in late Decembe r inquiring ifsome sort of action against the Turk s could be undertaken torelieve pressure in the Caucasus.12

Thi s request wa s taken by the British with so mereluctance. While the plight of the Russian s wasrecognized. and the operational value of suc h a move wasaccepted. a body of the Imperial Genera l Staff felt therequest would divert precious resour ces from the WesternFront. and thus could not be honored. Th is view was brief lysuppor ted by the Secreta ry of War. Lor d Kitchener. but a

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review o f the Russian condition caused him to change hisposition regarding the need for such an operation. H e wouldnot. however. agre e to commit any ground troops.13

Thi s thrust the burden of the action onto th e Admiralty.under the leadership of the First Lord. Winston Churchill.and the First Sea Lord. Fleet Admiral Sir John (Jac kie)Fisher.14 The y envisioned a forcing of the stra its bybattleships which would bombard Istanbul and f orce Turkishcapitul ation. Th is had nearly occurred in 1807 when aBritis h admiral had sailed to within eight mile s of t he citybefore losing t he wind a nd being forced to retire. = Th isthey proposed to do using a squadron of battlesh ips of theMajestic and Canopus classes . These were obsolete ship swhose armament wa s inadequate for a sea battle with theGerman Hig h Sea s Fleet but perfect ly suit able for destroyingthe antique forts guarding the straits . Vice AdmiralSackville-Carden. commanding the squadro n blockading theDardanelles. was tasked to prepare such a plan.

H e responded promptly o n 11 January 1915. stating hisopinio n that suc h a plan was feasib le and laying out his

l3 Moorehead. 36l4 Fisher wa s a highly opinionated. irascible. and forcef ulman who had participated i n the moderi zation of the Roy alNavy at the turn of the century. H e was returned to activeduty and elevated to the peerage at the beginning of thewar. He is one o f the notable characters o f the Royal Navy.pugnacious. irreverant. and driven .l5 Moorehead. 36


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force requir ements. The se wer e: 12 battleships. 3 battlecruisers. 3 light cruisers. 1 flotilla lead er, 16destroyers. 6 submarines. 4 seaplanes. and 12 minesweepers.Th e plan wa s exceedingly simple. to demolish the Turkishforts by indirect battleship gunfire. and then to sail upthe straits led by t he minesweepers. Th e plan was rapidlyapproved by the Admiral ty, with t he only major chang e beingthe addition of the new battleship Queen Elizabeth.16 Th eFrench agreed to augment this f orce with four battleships

and their auxiliaries. With this assistance from theAllies. and after quelling som e last minute argu ments withinthe Admiralty. the necess ary orders were issued to set t heplan in motion.

EUROPEAN SIDE ASIAN SIDE30 Heavy Guns 31 Heavy Guns6 Medium guns 8 Medium Guns3 Medium Howitzers 4 M ed iu m ~ o w i t z e r s ' ~

Figure Seven

T o understand what happened during the course of thenaval attack s it is necessary to understand the geographyof the Dardane lles. Th e straits are forty miles long.

Moorehead. 3l7 Sherman Miles, Notes on the Dardane lles Campaign of1915 . undated reprin t from 73 )- Cnastal a r t u e r v Journal11


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Accordingly. it was decided to close the range and engagethe fo rts with direct point blank f ire .21

Thi s was d one on February 25th with better results.Cardens second in command. Vice Admiral De Robeck. led anatta ck right into the mouth of the straits. engaged t hefort s and landed armed shore parties to capture thefacilities and destroy the enemy guns . Th e shore partieswere essentially unopposed. and the Tur ks abandoned theirfortificat ions at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Th eminesweepers swept for si x miles into the straits. foundno mines. and returned . The y reported difficulty makingway against t he southerl y current. a problem which was tosurface again later .

Other problems had begun to sur fac e with the Gallipolimine sweeping force. which then numbered thirty five.twenty-one of which were British. and fourteen French.Th e British sweepe rs in use were North S ea fishingtrawlers. taken up from trade with their crews. and riggedwith a crude minesweeping s yste m. They were not undernaval discipline. but were simply contracted to perf ormthe function. Th e Turks. recovering from the attacks o f25 Feb. had begun to move and hide their mobile batteries.The minesweepers. working at night to sweep the Narrows.

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found themse lves constantly illuminated by searchligh tsand exposed to harassing fire.23 Th e dilemma of Gallip oliwa s making itself felt. the mineswe epers could not remo vethe mines until the guns were suppressed. and the gunscould not be suppressed until the mines were swept.

Th e crews of th e minesw eepers felt that it was simpl ytoo much. In the words on one of their officers.

The men recognized swe eping ri sks and did not mind beingblown up. but they hated the gunfir e. and pointed outthat t hey wer e not supposed t o swe ep under fire. they hadnot joi ned for that .24Thi s naturally infuriated the officers of th e Royal Navy

who were charged with seeing the action through. CaptainRoger Keyes. Chi ef of Staff to Carden. called for volu nte ersfrom the RN and offered t he civilian crews a bonus foranother try at the mines. On March 10 1915. under Keyes'leadership. the flotilla again attempted to sweep to t heNarrows. Th e searchlights again illuminated the force. andthe Turkis h batter ies began a duel with the mineswe epers andtheir supporting battleship. H MS Canopus. Th e attempt wa s afailure. Rattled by the fire the sweeper s stru ck mines andfailed to deploy their equipment properly.25 Anothe r attemptthe following night met with like results . Th e crews of the

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minesw eepers were not trained for the task at hand andlacked the'resolut ion to carry it thr ough .

By March 13th. new crew s had been assembl ed for theflotilla. and Captain Keyes was ready to try it again. Thi stime the force swept mines under concentrated Turkish fireuntil all but three of the force had been put out of acti on .A l arge number of mine s were cut free and exploded thefollowing day . Th e commander. encouraged by the positiveresults. sched uled the full scale naval assault for 17 or 8March. 6

To lose all but three of an attacking force would hardlyseem a positive result. but the minesw eepers were regardedas expendable by the Admiral ty. Churchill. on March 14th.sent the following cable to Carden.

I do not understand why minesweepers should beinterfered with by firing which causes no casualt ies.Tw o or three hundred casualties would be a moderate priceto pay for sweeping up as far as the Narrows Th iswork has to be done whatever the loss of li fe and smallcraft a nd the soo ner it i s done the better .Z7March 18th dawned su nny and calm. and the Allied fleet

under Admiral de Robec k prepared to assault the straits.28Th e fleet wa s arranged in three divisions comprised of

6 Moorehead. 6027 Moorehead. 59.28 D e Robeck had relieved Carden on March 15th after Cardenwas diagnosed as being on t he verge of nervous collapse.Moorehead. 61.


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battleships and battle cruisers with the Britis h in thelead Th e minesweeping flotilla was stationed outside thentraits with ordoro to ontcr when the guns had beensilenced Th e planners envisaged that the channel would beope n by that evening and that the battleships would proceedto Istanbul the following day 29

At 1 1:35 a m the assault began wit h Queen ElizabethAgamemmnon Lord Nelson and Inflexi ble engaging the fortsat Chanak and Kilid Bahr which guarded the Narrows Th e

ships bombarded the forts until slightly after noon when theFrench battleshi ps were called forward to carry out theclose range attack on the inner defenses Thi s they didwith vigor and by 1:45 p m the Turkish fire hadpractically ceased 30

Th e French were then ordered to retire and De Robeckordered up the remaining division from outside the straitsAs the French departed down the south side of the straitsthrough Eren Keui Bay the battleship Bouvet struck a mineTraveling at high speed sh e capsized and sank within twominutes taking down 640 men 31 At this the Turkish gunnersreengaged but were again battered into submiss ion fallingsilent by 4:00 p m Th e minesweepers were called up

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sweeping three mines but they panicked when fired upon bythe Tur kish light batteries and fled the scen e

Shortly thereafter HMS Inflexible stru ck a mine nearwhere Bouvet had sunk and retired with heavy damage andcasualties Her sister ship Irresistible was nextStriking a mine in the sam e vicinity and losing power shewa s taken under heavy fire by the Tur ks as she driftedinshore HM S Ocean followed suit and by nightfall theAllies had lost one battleship had on e heavily damaged andretiring and two crewless and adrift in the Dardanelles

Keyes aboard the destroyer HMS Jed searched throughoutthe night for Irresi stible and Ocean but both had su nk 32Th e Britis h and French believing that they had located allthe minefields were at a loss to explain the losses

On e man get s the credit for this feat LieutenantColonel Geehl a Turkish coastal defense expert had taken asmall steamer Nousret into Eren Keui Bay on March 8th andlaid a line of twenty mines In the intervening ten da ysthe mineswe epers found but three and the Allies did notbelieve these to be part of a larger fiel d Aerialreconna issanc e had also failed to notice them 33 So me ofthese mines were Russian the Turks having gotten so shorton ordnance that they were reduced to collecting mines

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the straits being opened. Hamilton and his staff wereconcerned over risking the large. expensi ve sh ips in themine field^.^^ Secondly. D e Robeck had lost his nerve afterseeing three capital ship s lost in one afterno on. Despitethe urgings of Keyes the fleet went to anchor and thesplendi d minesweeping fleet he assembled would never beused. 8

Th e eff or t the Allies had undertaken and t he losses theyhad suff ere d did not g o unnoticed by Gen eral Lima n VonSanders. the head o f the German Military Mission and the manwho was to conduct the defense o f Gallipol i. H e offered thefollowing thought:

Th e Allies no w realized that the road to Istanbul couldnot be opened by action on the water alon e. It wasequally clear to me that they would not relinquish sucha high prize without further ef fo rt . Hence. alarge landing had to be counted upon. 39Th us th e element o f surprise was lost. and from that

point on it was a race between the Allies and the Tur ks.Instead of being a surprise. the campaign was telegraphed asfew have ever been. The object of the effort was now to seeif the defend ers could for tif y faster than the invader scould assemb le combat power ashore .

37 Hamilton. 41.3B Moorehead. 899 Liman Von Sanders. Fi ve Y e a r s In - (Baltimore:Williams and Wilkins. 1928) 56

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O n April 25th. the first t roop s landed at the toe of theGallipoli peninsula and the battle began which was t o lastuntil tha aighth f January 1916 Th e Alliad Navy shakenby th e losses o f March 18th. refused t o employ the largerand more capable forces they assembled. Th e Allied forcespiled ashore. o nly t o be held just inland of the beaches bythe Turk ish defenders. Th e following comment summari zes theposition of the naval forces:

The peninsula was no w for us little better than abottomless pit: swallowing all the men and munitio ns wecould throw into it. Th e Navy was left helpless off thebeach with n o more useful duty than to supply the needsof t he Army, and protect it a s far a s the restricted useof its gun power permi ttedM40Late r in the campaign plans were made to have the fleet

proceed up the strait. interdict t he road s supplying th eTurks. and att ack the rear of their positions at Bulair onthe neck of the peninsula. Such an operation might wellhave broken the resolve of t he defenders and allowed theAllie s t o break out of the ir beach head.4lThi.s ope rati onnever c ame to pass for the sa me reas on that it had failedpreviously. t he guns protecting the minefields could not besilenced. and without this precaution. the minesweeperscould not proceed.

4 C. O. Head, (London: Eyre andSpottiswoode, 1931) 136.41 Hamilton. 215.

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In January 1916 the Allied forces were evacuated fromthe Gallipoli peninsula in an operation that went as well asall the previous had gone wrong. The Allies suffered 252.000casualties out of 489.000 committed. the Turks 251.309casualties out of 500.000 committed; rates of 51 and 50percent respectively. 2 That these casualties were so highwas due. in large part. to the mine warfare efforts of theTurkish Army.

The failure was due to several factors. First amongthese was technology. The mines in use by the Turks weremoored contact mines of a type developed by the Russians in1908 which were set to float at a predetermined depth. Thisdepth is arrived at by computing the range of the tide, theaverage draft of your targets. and setting the length of themooring cable to cover this range. These mines are easily

swept by towing an underwater device through the minefielddesigned to snag or cut these cables. The mine. beingpositively buoyant. then rises to the surface and isdestroyed by gunfire. The minesweepers. naturally. must beof shallower draft than the mines they are sweeping. Thiswas not the case at Gallipoli. and four of the craft werelost in the fields.43 The sweep gear was primitive. as theOropesa sweep. which was to become the standard means for

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removing this type of mine wa s still in development Thes eminefi elds and the Allied countermeasures represented thepeak o f mina warfaro technology available at the time

Training was an equal cause of the failure Th e crewsof the minesweepers contracted fishermen we re not preparedto conduct a cleara nce operati on under fire The y had beenhired for what they regarded as a large explosive ordnancedisposal operation and were unwilling to attempt thisopposed Royal Navy crews and officers should have been

assigned this task from t he beginningTh e final and most significant failure was the failure

o f nerve on the part of the senior commander Vice AdmiralJohn D e Robeck By the time the Army landed theminesweeping flotilla wa s larger better trained and betterequipped than at any point previou s Nonetheless heforswore the attempt despite the urgings of his chief ofstaff and the long distance chiding o f Churchill Th eevents of March 18th had demonstrated that the Turkish gu nsat the Nar rows could be silenc ed by naval gunfire and thatbeing the case the mines could be swept and the passage t oIstanbul opened Thi s failure more than any otheraccounts for the tragedy of Gallipo li

Th e subordinate thesis questions can be answered a s01 lo ws

Q Does the loss of tactical surprise make a largescale amphibious assault unfeasible?


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A. In this case, yes. The minesweeping ef fo rt s and thenaval assault on the Narrows alerted Gensral Von Sandersthat something wa s afoot. Only a cursory analysis wasrequired to arrive at the fact that an amphibious assaultwas forthcoming. Th e details of the defense were relativelysim ple to a trained professional land forces officer.

Q Based on historical data. what level of lo sses canbe expected by amphib ious forc es entering a mined ar ea.

A

Documents

Sea Mines in Amphibious Warfare