S O C I A L S C I E N C E

Genesis of Suicide TerrorismScott Atran

Contemporary suicide terrorists from the Middle East are publicly deemed crazedcowards bent on senseless destruction who thrive in poverty and ignorance. Recentresearch indicates they have no appreciable psychopathology and are as educated andeconomically well-off as surrounding populations. A first line of defense is to get thecommunities from which suicide attackers stem to stop the attacks by learning how tominimize the receptivity of mostly ordinary people to recruiting organizations.

A ccording to the U.S. Department ofState report Patterns of Global Ter-rorism 2001 (1), no single definition

of terrorism is universally accepted; however,for purposes of statistical analysis and policy-making: “The term ‘terrorism’ means pre-meditated, politically motivated violence per-petrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usuallyintended to influence an audience.” Ofcourse, one side’s “terrorists” may well beanother side’s “freedom fighters” (Fig. 1).For example, in this definition’s sense, theNazi occupiers of France rightly denouncedthe “subnational” and “clandestine” FrenchResistance fighters as terrorists. During the1980s, the International Court of Justice usedthe U.S. Administration’s own definition ofterrorism to call for an end to U.S. support for“terrorism” on the part of Nicaraguan Contrasopposing peace talks.

For the U.S. Congress, “‘act of terrorism’means an activity that—(A) involves a vio-lent act or an act dangerous to human life thatis a violation of the criminal laws of theUnited States or any State, or that would be acriminal violation if committed within thejurisdiction of the United States or of anyState; and (B) appears to be intended (i) tointimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii)to influence the policy of a government byintimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect theconduct of a government by assassination orkidnapping.” (2). When suitable, the defini-tion can be broadened to include states hostileto U.S. policy.

Apparently, two official definitions of ter-rorism have existed since the early 1980s:that used by the Department of State “forstatistical and analytical purposes” and thatused by Congress for criminal proceedings.Together, the definitions allow great flexibil-

ity in selective application of the concept ofterrorism to fluctuating U.S. priorities. Thespecial category of “State-sponsored terror-ism” could be invoked to handle some issues(3), but the highly selective and politicallytendentious use of the label terrorism wouldcontinue all the same. Indeed, there appearsto be no principled distinction between “ter-ror” as defined by the U.S. Congress and“counterinsurgency” as allowed in U.S.armed forces manuals (4).

Rather than attempt to produce a stipu-lative and all-encompassing definition ofterrorism, this arti-cle restricts its focusto “suicide terror-ism” characterizedas follows: the tar-geted use of self-de-structing humansagainst noncomba-tant—typically ci-vilian—populationsto effect politicalchange. Although asuicide attack aimsto physically destroyan initial target, itsprimary use is typi-cally as a weapon ofpsychological war-fare intended to af-fect a larger publicaudience. The pri-mary target is notthose actually killedor injured in the at-tack, but those made to witness it. Theenemy’s own information media amplifythe attack’s effects to the larger target pop-ulation. Through indoctrination and train-ing and under charismatic leaders, self-contained suicide cells canalize disparatereligious or political sentiments of individ-uals into an emotionally bonded group offictive kin who willfully commit to diespectacularly for one another and for what

is perceived as the common good of alle-viating the community’s onerous politicaland social realities.

Recent HistorySuicide attack is an ancient practice with amodern history (supporting online text). Itsuse by the Jewish sect of Zealots (sicari) inRoman-occupied Judea and by the IslamicOrder of Assassins (hashashin) during theearly Christian Crusades are legendary ex-amples (5). The concept of “terror” as sys-tematic use of violence to attain politicalends was first codified by MaximilienRobespierre during the French Revolution.He deemed it an “emanation of virtue” thatdelivers “prompt, severe, and inflexible”justice, as “a consequence of the generalprinciple of democracy applied to our coun-try’s most pressing needs.” (6 ). The Reignof Terror, during which the ruling Jacobinfaction exterminated thousands of potential

enemies, of whatever sex, age, or condi-tion, lasted until Robespierre’s fall ( July1794). Similar justification for state-spon-sored terror was common to 20th-centuryrevolutions, as in Russia (Lenin), Cambo-dia (Pol Pot), and Iran (Khomeini).

Whether subnational (e.g., Russian anar-chists) or state-supported (e.g., Japanese ka-mikaze), suicide attack as a weapon of terroris usually chosen by weaker parties against

CNRS–Institut Jean Nicod, 1 bis Avenue Lowendal,75007 Paris, France, and Institute for Social Research,University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48106–1248,USA. E-mail: satran@umich.edu

Fig. 1. Chanting demonstrators in Pakistan-held Kashmir defendingOsama bin Laden’s actions and ambitions as freedom-fighting (Novem-ber 2001). [AP Photo/Roshan Mugal]

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Author manuscript, published in "Science 299 (2003) 1534-1539"

materially stronger foes when fighting meth-ods of lesser cost seem unlikely to succeed.Choice is often voluntary, but typically underconditions of group pressure and charismaticleadership. Thus, the kamikaze (“divinewind”) first used in the battle of the Philip-pines (November 1944) were young, fairlywell educated pilots who understood that pur-suing conventional warfare would likely endin defeat. When collectively asked by Adm.Takijiro Onishi to volunteer for “special at-tack” (tokkotai) “transcending life anddeath,” all stepped forward, despite assuranc-es that refusal would carry no shame or pun-ishment. In the Battle of Okinawa (April1945) some 2000 kamikaze rammed fullyfueled fighter planes into more than 300ships, killing 5000 Americans in the mostcostly naval battle in U.S. history. Because ofsuch losses, there was support for using theatomic bomb to end World War II (7).

The first major contemporary suicideterrorist attack in the Middle East was theDecember 1981 destruction of the Iraqiembassy in Beirut (27 dead, over 100wounded). Its precise authors are still un-known, although it is likely that AyatollahKhomeini approved its use by parties spon-sored by Iranian intelligence. With the as-sassination of pro-Israeli Lebanese Presi-dent Bashir Gemayel in September 1982,suicide bombing became a strategic politi-cal weapon. Under the pro-Iranian Leba-nese Party of God (Hezbollah), this strategysoon achieved geopolitical effect with theOctober 1983 truck-bomb killing of nearly300 American and French servicemen.American and France abandoned the mul-tinational force policing Lebanon. By 1985,these attacks arguably led Israel to cedemost of the gains made during its 1982invasion of Lebanon.

In Israel-Palestine, suicide terrorism be-gan in 1993, with attacks by Hezbollah-trained members of the Islamic ResistanceMovement (Hamas) and Palestine IslamicJihad (PIJ) aimed at derailing the OsloPeace Accords (8). As early as 1988, how-ever, PIJ founder Fathi Shiqaqi establishedguidelines for “exceptional” martyrdom op-erations involving human bombs. He fol-lowed Hezbollah in stressing that God ex-tols martyrdom but abhors suicide: “Allahmay cause to be known those who believeand may make some of you martyrs, andAllah may purify those who believe andmay utterly destroy the disbelievers”; how-ever, “no one can die except by Allah’sleave” (9, 10) (Fig. 2).

The recent radicalization and networkingthrough Al-Qaida of militant Islamic groupsfrom North Africa, Arabia, and Central andSoutheast Asia stems from the Soviet-AfghanWar (1979–1989). With financial backing fromthe United States, members of these various

groups were provided opportunities to pool andto unify doctrine, aims, training, equipment,and methods, including suicide attack. Throughits multifaceted association with regionalgroups (by way of finance, personnel, and lo-gistics), Al-Qaida aims to realize flexibly its

global ambition of destroying Western domi-nance through local initiatives to expel Westerninfluences (11). According to Jane’s Intelli-gence Review: “All the suicide terrorist groupshave support infrastructures in Europe andNorth America.” (12).

Calling the current wave of radical Is-lam “fundamentalism” (in the sense of “tra-ditionalism”) is misleading, approaching anoxymoron (supporting online text).Present-day radicals, whether Shi’ite (Iran,Hezbollah) or Sunni (Taliban, Al-Qaida),are much closer in spirit and action toEurope’s post-Renaissance Counter-Refor-mation than to any traditional aspect ofMoslem history. The idea of a ruling eccle-siastical authority, a state or national coun-cil of clergy, and a religious police devotedto physically rooting out heretics and blas-phemers has its clearest historical model inthe Holy Inquisition. The idea that religionmust struggle to assert control over politicsis radically new to Islam (13).

Dubious Public PerceptionsRecent treatments of Homeland Security re-search concentrate on how to spend billions toprotect sensitive installations from attack (14,15). But this last line of defense is probablyeasiest to breach because of the multitude of

vulnerable and likely targets (in-cluding discotheques, restau-rants, and malls), the abundanceof would-be attackers (need-ing little supervision once em-barked on a mission), the rel-atively low costs of attack(hardware store ingredients,no escape needs), the difficul-ty of detection (little use ofelectronics), and the unlikeli-hood that attackers would di-vulge sensitive information(being unaware of connec-tions beyond their operationalcells). Exhortations to putduct tape on windows may as-suage (or incite) fear, but willnot prevent massive loss oflife, and public realization ofsuch paltry defense can under-mine trust. Security agenciesalso attend to prior lines ofdefense, such as penetratingagent-handling networks ofterrorist groups, with only in-termittent success.

A first line of defense is toprevent people from becomingterrorists. Here, success appearsdoubtful should current govern-ment and media opinions aboutwhy people become humanbombs translate into policy (seealso supporting online text oncontrary academic explanations).

Suicide terrorists often are labeled crazed cow-ards bent on senseless destruction who thrive inthe midst of poverty and ignorance. The obvi-ous course becomes to hunt down terroristswhile simultaneously transforming their sup-porting cultural and economic environmentfrom despair to hope. What research there is,however, indicates that suicide terrorists haveno appreciable psychopathology and are at leastas educated and economically well off as theirsurrounding populations.

Psychopathology: A FundamentalAttribution ErrorU.S. President George W. Bush initiallybranded 9/11 hijackers “evil cowards.” ForU.S. Senator John Warner, preemptive as-saults on terrorists and those supporting ter-rorism are justified because: “Those whowould commit suicide in their assaults on thefree world are not rational and are not de-terred by rational concepts” (16). In attempt-ing to counter anti-Moslem sentiment, some

Fig. 2. Wreckage in Gaza after an Israeli attack that killed SalahShehadeh, Hamas military commander. It features the greenHamas flag, and Arabic graffiti reads: “We are resisters, deathin the way of Allah is the life.” [AP Photo/Adel Hana]

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groups advised their members to respond that“terrorists are extremist maniacs who don’trepresent Islam at all” (17).

Social psychologists have investigated the“fundamental attribution error,” a tendency forpeople to explain behavior in terms of individ-ual personality traits, even when significant sit-uational factors in the larger society are at work.U.S. government and media characterizationsof Middle East suicide bombers as craven ho-micidal lunatics may suffer from a fundamentalattribution error: No instances of religious orpolitical suicide terrorism stem from lone ac-tions of cowering or unstable bombers.

Psychologist Stanley Milgram found thatordinary Americans also readily obey destruc-tive orders under the right circumstances (18).When told by a “teacher” to administer poten-tially life-threatening electric shocks to “learn-ers” who fail to memorize word pairs, mostcomply. Even when subjects stressfully protestas victims plead and scream, use of extremeviolence continues—not because of murderoustendencies but from a sense of obligation insituations of authority, no matter how trite. Alegitimate hypothesis is that apparently extremebehaviors may be elicited and rendered com-monplace by particular historical, political, so-cial, and ideological contexts.

With suicide terrorism, the attributionalproblem is to understand why nonpathologi-cal individuals respond to novel situationalfactors in numbers sufficient for recruitingorganizations to implement policies. In theMiddle East, perceived contexts in whichsuicide bombers and supporters expressthemselves include a collective sense of his-torical injustice, political subservience, andsocial humiliation vis-a-vis global powersand allies, as well as countervailing religioushope (supporting online text on radical Is-lam’s historical novelty). Addressing suchperceptions does not entail accepting them assimple reality; however, ignoring the causesof these perceptions risks misidentifyingcauses and solutions for suicide bombing.

There is also evidence that people tendto believe that their behavior speaks foritself, that they see the world objectively,and that only other people are biased andmisconstrue events (19). Moreover, indi-viduals tend to misperceive differences be-tween group norms as more extreme thanthey really are. Resulting misunderstand-ings— encouraged by religious and ideo-logical propaganda—lead antagonisticgroups to interpret each other’s views ofevents, such as terrorism/freedom-fighting,

as wrong, radical, and/or irrational. Mutualdemonization and warfare readily ensue.The problem is to stop this spiral fromescalating in opposing camps (Fig. 3).

Poverty and Lack of Education AreNot Reliable FactorsAcross our society, there is wide consensusthat ridding society of poverty rids it of crime(20). According to President Bush, “We fightpoverty because hope is the answer to ter-ror. . . . We will challenge the poverty andhopelessness and lack of education and failedgovernments that too often allow conditionsthat terrorists can seize” (21). At a gatheringof Nobel Peace Prize laureates, South Afri-ca’s Desmond Tutu and South Korea’s KimDae Jong opined, “at the bottom of terrorismis poverty”; Elie Wiesel and the Dalai Lamaconcluded, “education is the way to eliminateterrorism” (22).

Support for this comes from research pi-oneered by economist Gary Becker showingthat property crimes are predicted by povertyand lack of education (23). In his incentive-based model, criminals are rational individu-als acting on self-interest. Individuals chooseillegal activity if rewards exceed probabilityof detection and incarceration together withexpected loss of income from legal activity(“opportunity costs”). Insofar as criminalslack skill and education, as in much blue-collar crime, opportunity costs may be mini-mal; so crime pays.

Such rational-choice theories based oneconomic opportunities do not reliably ac-count for some types of violent crimes (do-mestic homicide, hate killings). These calcu-lations make even less sense for suicide ter-rorism. Suicide terrorists generally are notlacking in legitimate life opportunities rela-tive to their general population. As the Arabpress emphasizes, if martyrs had nothing tolose, sacrifice would be senseless (24): “Hewho commits suicide kills himself for hisown benefit, he who commits martyrdomsacrifices himself for the sake of his religionand his nation. . . . The Mujahed is full ofhope” (25).

Research by Krueger and Maleckova sug-gests that education may be uncorrelated, oreven positively correlated, with supporting ter-rorism (26). In a December 2001 poll of 1357West Bank and Gaza Palestinians 18 years ofage or older, those having 12 or more years ofschooling supported armed attacks by 68points, those with up to 11 years of schoolingby 63 points, and illiterates by 46 points. Only40% of persons with advanced degrees support-ed dialogue with Israel versus 53% with collegedegrees and 60% with 9 years or less of school-ing. In a comparison of Hezbollah militantswho died in action with a random sample ofLebanese from the same age group and region,militants were less likely to come from poor

Fig. 3. Demonization worksboth ways. (A) Demonstra-tor’s placard outside thePalestinian embassy in Bei-jing vilifying the UnitedNations and the UnitedStates (April 2002). [Reu-ters/Andrew Wong] (B) An-ti-Moslem sign outsideJacksonville, Florida, church( January 2003). [Photocourtesy of Florida Times-Union]

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homes and more likely to have had secondary-school education.

Nevertheless, relative loss of economic orsocial advantage by educated persons mightencourage support for terrorism. In the periodleading to the first Intifada (1982–1988), thenumber of Palestinian men with 12 years ormore of schooling more than doubled; thosewith less schooling increased only 30%. Thiscoincided with a sharp increase in unemploy-ment for college graduates relative to highschool graduates. Real daily wages of collegegraduates fell some 30%; wages for thosewith only secondary schooling held steady.Underemployment also seems to be a factoramong those recruited to Al-Qaida and itsallies from the Arabian peninsula (27).

The Institutional Factor: OrganizingFictive KinAlthough humiliation and despair may helpaccount for susceptibility to martyrdom insome situations, this is neither a completeexplanation nor one applicable to other cir-cumstances. Studies by psychologist ArielMerari point to the importance of institu-tions in suicide terrorism (28). His teaminterviewed 32 of 34 bomber families inPalestine/Israel (before 1998), surviving at-tackers, and captured recruiters. Suicideterrorists apparently span their population’snormal distribution in terms of education,socioeconomic status, and personality type(introvert vs. extrovert). Mean age forbombers was early twenties. Almost allwere unmarried and expressed religious be-lief before recruitment (but no more thandid the general population).

Except for being young, unattached males,suicide bombers differ from members ofviolent racist organizations with whomthey are often compared (29). Overall, sui-cide terrorists exhibit no socially dysfunc-tional attributes (fatherless, friendless, orjobless) or suicidal symptoms. They do notvent fear of enemies or express “hopeless-ness” or a sense of “nothing to lose” forlack of life alternatives that would be con-sistent with economic rationality. Merariattributes primary responsibility for attacksto recruiting organizations, which enlistprospective candidates from this youthfuland relatively unattached population. Char-ismatic trainers then intensely cultivate mu-tual commitment to die within small cellsof three to six members. The final stepbefore a martyrdom operation is a formalsocial contract, usually in the form of avideo testament.

From 1996 to 1999 Nasra Hassan, a Pa-kistani relief worker, interviewed nearly 250Palestinian recruiters and trainers, failed sui-cide bombers, and relatives of deceasedbombers. Bombers were men aged 18 to 38:“None were uneducated, desperately poor,

simple-minded, or depressed. . . . They allseemed to be entirely normal members oftheir families” (30). Yet “all were deeplyreligious,” believing their actions “sanctionedby the divinely revealed religion of Islam.”Leaders of sponsoring organizations com-plained, “Our biggest problem is the hordesof young men who beat on our doors.”

Psychologist Brian Barber surveyed 900Moslem adolescents during Gaza’s first In-tifada (1987–1993) (31). Results show highlevels of participation in and victimizationfrom violence. For males, 81% reportedthrowing stones, 66% suffered physical as-sault, and 63% were shot at (versus 51, 38,and 20% for females). Involvement in vio-lence was not strongly correlated withdepression or antisocial behavior. Adoles-cents most involved displayed strong indi-vidual pride and social cohesion. This wasreflected in activities: for males, 87% de-livered supplies to activists, 83% visitedmartyred families, and 71% tended thewounded (57, 46, and 37% for females). Afollow-up during the second Intifada(2000 –2002) indicates that those still un-married act in ways considered personallymore dangerous but socially more mean-ingful. Increasingly, many view martyr actsas most meaningful. By summer 2002, 70to 80% of Palestinians endorsed martyroperations (32).

Previously, recruiters scouted mosques,schools, and refugee camps for candidatesdeemed susceptible to intense religious in-doctrination and logistical training. Duringthe second Intifada, there has been a surfeit ofvolunteers and increasing involvement ofsecular organizations (allowing women). Thefrequency and violence of suicide attackshave escalated (more bombings since Febru-ary 2002 than during 1993–2000); planninghas been less painstaking. Despite thesechanges, there is little to indicate overallchange in bomber profiles (mostly unmar-ried, average socioeconomic status, moder-ately religious) (28, 30).

In contrast to Palestinians, surveys with acontrol group of Bosnian Moslem adoles-cents from the same time period reveal mark-edly weaker expressions of self-esteem, hopefor the future, and prosocial behavior (30). Akey difference is that Palestinians routinelyinvoke religion to invest personal traumawith proactive social meaning that takes in-jury as a badge of honor. Bosnian Moslemstypically report not considering religious af-filiation a significant part of personal or col-lective identity until seemingly arbitrary vio-lence forced awareness upon them.

Thus, a critical factor determining suicideterrorism behavior is arguably loyalty to in-timate cohorts of peers, which recruiting or-ganizations often promote through religiouscommunion (supporting online text on reli-

gion’s role) (33). Consider data on 39 recruitsto Harkat al-Ansar, a Pakistani-based ally ofAl-Qaida. All were unmarried males, mosthad studied the Quran. All believed that bysacrificing themselves they would help se-cure the future of their “family” of fictive kin:“Each [martyr] has a special place—amongthem are brothers, just as there are sons andthose even more dear” (34). A SingaporeParliamentary report on 31 captured opera-tives from Jemaah Islamiyah and other Al-Qaida allies in Southeast Asia underscoresthe pattern: “These men were not ignorant,destitute or disenfranchised. All 31 had re-ceived secular education. . . . Like many oftheir counterparts in militant Islamic organi-zations in the region, they held normal, re-spectable jobs. . . . As a group, most of thedetainees regarded religion as their most im-portant personal value. . . secrecy over thetrue knowledge of jihad, helped create asense of sharing and empowerment vis-a-visothers.” (35).

Such sentiments characterize institutionalmanipulation of emotionally driven commit-ments that may have emerged under naturalselection’s influence to refine or overrideshort-term rational calculations that wouldotherwise preclude achieving goals againstlong odds. Most typically, such emotionallydriven commitments serve as survival mech-anisms to inspire action in otherwise paralyz-ing circumstances, as when a weaker personconvincingly menaces a stronger person intothinking twice before attempting to take ad-vantage. In religiously inspired suicide terror-ism, however, these emotions are purposelymanipulated by organizational leaders, re-cruiters, and trainers to benefit the organiza-tion rather than the individual (supportingonline text on religion) (36).

Rational Choice Is the Sponsor’sPrerogative, Not the Agent’sLittle tangible benefit (in terms of rational-choice theories) accrues to the suicide bomb-er, certainly not enough to make the likelygain one of maximized “expected utility.”Heightened social recognition occurs onlyafter death, obviating personal material ben-efit. But for leaders who almost never con-sider killing themselves (despite declarationsof readiness to die), material benefits morelikely outweigh losses in martyrdom opera-tions. Hassan cites one Palestinian official’sprescription for a successful mission: “a will-ing young man. . . nails, gunpowder, a lightswitch and a short cable, mercury (readilyobtainable from thermometers), acetone. . . . The most expensive item is transporta-tion to an Israeli town” (30). The total cost isabout $150.

For the sponsoring organization, suicidebombers are expendable assets whose lossesgenerate more assets by expanding public

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support and pools of potential recruits. Short-ly after 9/11, an intelligence survey of edu-cated Saudis (ages 25 to 41) concluded that95% supported Al-Qaida (37). In a December2002 Pew Research Center survey on grow-ing anti-Americanism, only 6% of Egyptiansviewed America and its “War on Terror”favorably (38). Money flows from those will-ing to let others die, easily offsetting opera-tional costs (training, supporting personnel,safe houses, explosives and other arms, trans-

portation, and communication). After aJerusalem supermarket bombing by an 18-year-old Palestinian female, a Saudi telethonraised more than $100 million for “the Al-Quds Intifada.”

Massive retaliation further increasespeople’s sense of victimization and readi-ness to behave according to organizationaldoctrines and policies structured to takeadvantage of such feelings. In a poll of1179 West Bank and Gaza Palestinians inspring 2002, 66% said army operationsincreased their backing for suicide bomb-ings (39). By year’s end, 73% of LebaneseMoslems considered suicide bombingsjustifiable (38). This radicalization of opin-ion increases both demand and supply formartyrdom operations. A December 2002UN report credited volunteers with swell-ing a reviving Al-Qaida in 40 countries(40). The organization’s influence in thelarger society—most significantly its di-recting elites—increases in turn.

Priorities for Homeland SecurityThe last line of defense against suicide ter-rorism—preventing bombers from reachingtargets—may be the most expensive and leastlikely to succeed. Random bag or body

searches cannot be very effective against peo-ple willing to die, although this may providesome semblance of security and hence psy-chological defense against suicide terrorism’spsychological warfare. A middle line of de-fense, penetrating and destroying recruitingorganizations and isolating their leaders, maybe successful in the near term, but even moreresistant organizations could emerge instead.The first line of defense is to drasticallyreduce receptivity of potential recruits to re-

cruiting organiza-tions. But how?

It is important toknow what probablywill not work. Rais-ing literacy rates mayhave no effect andcould be counterpro-ductive should great-er literacy translateinto greater exposureto terrorist propagan-da (in Pakistan, liter-acy and dislike forthe United States in-creased as the num-ber of religious ma-drasa schools in-creased from 3000 to39,000 since 1978)(27, 38). Lesseningpoverty may have noeffect, and could becounterproductive ifpoverty reduction for

the entire population amounted to a down-ward redistribution of wealth that left thoseinitially better off with fewer opportunitiesthan before. Ending occupation or reducingperceived humiliation may help, but not if thepopulation believes this to be a victory in-spired by terror (e.g., Israel’s apparentlyforced withdrawal from Lebanon).

If suicide-bombing is crucially (though notexclusively) an institution-level phenomenon, itmay require finding the right mix of pressure andinducements to get the communities themselvesto abandon support for institutions that recruitsuicide attackers. One way is to so damage thecommunity’s social and political fabric that anysupport by the local population or authorities forsponsors of suicide attacks collapses, as hap-pened regarding the kamikaze as a by-product ofthe nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Na-gasaki. In the present world, however, such astrategy would neither be morally justifiable norpractical to implement, given the dispersed anddistributed organization of terrorist institutionsamong distantly separated populations that col-lectively number in the hundreds of millions.Likewise, retaliation in kind (“tit-for-tat”) is notmorally acceptable if allies are sought (41). Evenin more localized settings, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, coercive policies alone may

not achieve lasting relief from attack and canexacerbate the problem over time. On the in-ducement side, social psychology research indi-cates that people who identify with antagonisticgroups use conflicting information from the oth-er group to reinforce antagonism (19). Thus,simply trying to persuade others from without bybombarding them with more self-serving infor-mation may only increase hostility.

Other research suggests that most peo-ple have more moderate views than whatthey consider their group norm to be. Incit-ing and empowering moderates from withinto confront inadequacies and inconsisten-cies in their own knowledge (of others asevil), values (respect for life), and behavior(support for killing), and other members oftheir group (42), can produce emotional dis-satisfaction leading to lasting change and in-fluence on the part of these individuals (43).Funding for civic education and debate mayhelp, also interfaith confidence-buildingthrough intercommunity interaction initiatives(as Singapore’s government proposes) (35).Ethnic profiling, isolation, and preemptive at-tack on potential (but not yet actual) supportersof terrorism probably will not help. Anotherstrategy is for the United States and its allies tochange behavior by directly addressing andlessening sentiments of grievance and humilia-tion, especially in Palestine (where images ofdaily violence have made it the global focus ofMoslem attention) (44) (Fig. 4). For no evi-dence (historical or otherwise) indicates thatsupport for suicide terrorism will evaporatewithout complicity in achieving at least somefundamental goals that suicide bombers andsupporting communities share.

Of course, this does not mean negotiatingover all goals, such as Al-Qaida’s quest toreplace the Western-inspired system ofnation-states with a global caliphate, first inMoslem lands and then everywhere (see sup-porting online text for history and agenda ofsuicide-sponsoring groups). Unlike othergroups, Al-Qaida publicizes no specific de-mands after martyr actions. As with anavenging army, it seeks no compromise. Butmost people who currently sympathize with itmight.

Perhaps to stop the bombing we need re-search to understand which configurations ofpsychological and cultural relationships are lur-ing and binding thousands, possibly millions, ofmostly ordinary people into the terrorist orga-nization’s martyr-making web. Study is neededon how terrorist institutions form and on simi-larities and differences across organizationalstructures, recruiting practices, and populationsrecruited. Are there reliable differences be-tween religious and secular groups, or betweenideologically driven and grievance-driven ter-rorism? Interviews with surviving Hamasbombers and captured Al-Qaida operatives sug-gest that ideology and grievance are factors for

Fig. 4. Moslem youth with Quran dressed as a Palestinian suicide bomberdemonstrating outside the United Nations office in Jakarta, Indonesia(April 2002). (Indonesia is the most populous Moslem nation.) [Reuters/Darren Whiteside]

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both groups but relative weights and conse-quences may differ.

We also need to investigate any significantcausal relations between our society’s policiesand actions and those of terrorist organizationsand supporters. We may find that the globaleconomic, political, and cultural agenda of ourown society has a catalyzing role in moves toretreat from our world view (Taliban) or tocreate a global counterweight (Al-Qaida).Funding such research may be difficult. As withthe somewhat tendentious and self-serving useof “terror” as a policy concept (45), to reducedissonance our governments and media maywish to ignore these relations as legitimate top-ics for inquiry into what terrorism is all aboutand why it exists.

This call for research may demand morepatience than any administration could politi-cally tolerate during times of crisis. In the longrun, however, our society can ill afford to ig-nore either the consequences of its own actionsor the causes behind the actions of others. Po-tential costs of such ignorance are terrible tocontemplate. The comparatively minor expenseof research into such consequences and causescould have inestimable benefit.

References and Notes1. “Patterns of global terrorism” (U.S. Department of

State, Washington, DC, May 2002); available atwww.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/. “The U.S. Gov-ernment has employed this definition of terrorism forstatistical and analytical purposes since 1983.”

2. U.S. Code Congress. Admin. News, 98th Congress,2nd Session, v. 2, par. 3077, 98 STAT. (19 October1984).

3. Until 1983, official U.S. positions on “terror” followedthe term’s common meaning in use since the FrenchRevolution, referring to state-sponsored terror. Forexample, under “sources relating to Operation Endur-ing Freedom and the struggle against terrorism,” theU.S. Navy’s Web guide on terrorism regularly links toDepartment of Defense articles on Iraq (www.history.navy.mil/library/guides/terrorism.htm).

4. The recent Guatemalan truth commission report sin-gled out the U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA),now at Fort Benning, Georgia, for counterinsurgencytraining that “had a significant bearing on humanrights violations during the armed conflict.” A 1998human rights report released by the Guatemala Arch-diocese Human Rights Office also linked SOA gradu-ates in Guatemala’s military intelligence (D-2, G-2)to a civilian-targeted campaign of kidnappings, tor-ture, and murder that left tens of thousands dead.References available online through Network Solidar-ity with the People of Guatemala (NISGUA), “U.S.Army School of the Americas cited in GuatemalanTruth Commission Report,” 17 July 2001; availableat www.nisgua.org/articles/school_of_the_americas.htm.

5. B. Lewis, The Assassins (Basic, New York, 2002).6. M. Robespierre, “Principes de morale politique,”

speech delivered to French National Convention, 5February 1794; available at http://membres.lycos.fr/discours/1794.htm.

7. A. Axell, Kamikaze (Longman, New York, 2002).8. A precipitating event was the exiling of 418 Palestin-

ians suspected of affiliation with Hamas (18 Decem-ber 1992), the first mass expulsion of Arabs fromPalestine since 1948.

9. Quran, chapt. 3, verses 140–146.

10. Compare this statement with that of Hamas leaderAbd Al-’Aziz Al-Rantisi, Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), 25April 2002.

11. U.S. Department of Justice, Al Qaeda Training Man-ual, online release 7 December 2001; available atwww.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm.

12. “Suicide terrorism: A global threat,” Jane’s BioSecu-rity (2002); available at www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/usscole/jir001020_1_n.shtml.

13. B. Lewis, What Went Wrong (Oxford Univ. Press, NewYork, 2002). The notion of a distinct religious author-ity, or clergy, was traditionally alien to Islam. The defacto modern clergy recognized by Islamic suicideattackers includes mullahs of Pakistan and Afghani-stan, as well as the 19th-century administrative of-fice of ayatollah in Iran and the former Ottomanoffice of State Attorney, or mufti (e.g., in Palestine,Syria, and Arabia). Many in this “clergy” also opposesuicide bombing.

14. D. Malakoff, Science 295, 254 (2002).15. D. Chapin et al., Science 297, 1997 (2002).16. D. Von Drehle, Washington Post, 7 October 2002, p.

A1. Warner’s example of “rational deterrence” wasthe Cold War doctrine MAD (mutually assured de-struction). MAD’s key premise was the apparentlyirrational threat of guaranteeing one’s own destruc-tion in order to destroy the enemy.

17. Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations,“Confronting anti-Arab or anti-Muslim sentiments,”21 September 2002; available at www.uua.org/uuawo/issues/respond/confront.html.

18. S. Milgram, Obedience to Authority (Harper & Row,New York, 1974).

19. L. Ross, C. Stillinger, Negotiation J. 7, 389 (1991).20. R. Clark, Crime in America (Simon & Schuster, New

York, 1970).21. White House news release, 22 March 2002; available

at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020322-1.html.

22. J. J. Jai, Christian Science Monitor, 10 December 2001,p. 7.

23. G. Becker, Pol. Econ. 76, 169 (1968).24. “They are youth at the peak of their blooming, who

at a certain moment decide to turn their bodies intobody parts. . . flowers.” Editorial, Al-Risala (Hamasweekly), 7 June 2001.

25. Sheikh Yussuf Al-Qaradhawi (a spiritual leader of theMuslim Brotherhood), Al-Ahram Al-Arabi (Cairo), 3February 2001.

26. A. Krueger, J. Maleckova, NBER Working Paper no.w9074, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cam-bridge, MA, July 2002; available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/W9074.

27. T. Friedman, Longitudes and Attitudes (Farrar, Strauss,Giroux, New York, 2002). Leaders of Al-Qaida’s in-ternational cells are often middle-class, European-educated converts to radical Islam. Family historiesindicate little religious fervor before emigration to asolitary existence in Europe and subsequent belong-ing to a local prayer group or mosque (available tapespreach a revolutionary end to daily, personal alien-ation through collective action to destroy perceivedimpediments to “restoring” Islam’s values and dom-inance). As with other radical Islamic groups, ordinarycell operatives are often resident Middle East bache-lors from middle-class families.

28. A. Merari, paper presented to Institute for SocialResearch seminar series, “The Psychology of Extrem-ism,” Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, 11 February2002.

29. R. Ezekiel, The Racist Mind (Viking, New York, 1995).30. N. Hassan, The New Yorker, 19 November 2001;

available at www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?011119fa_FACT1.

31. B. Barber, Heart and Stones (Palgrave, New York, inpress).

32. D. Brooks, The Atlantic Monthly 289 (6), 18 ( June2002); available at www.theatlanticmonthly.com/issues/2002/06/brooks.htm.

33. Unlike people willing to blow themselves up, for

frontline soldiers in an apparently hopeless battle,there usually remains hope for survival [G. Allport, J.Gillespie, J. Young, J. Psychol. 25, 3 (1948)]. Thedistance between no hope and some (however small)is infinite, which represents the ultimate measure ofdevotion that religions typically uphold as ideal.While commitment to die for nonkin cannot be ren-dered within standard theories of Expected Utility,there are moves theorists attempt, such as invoking“infinite utility.” Using “infinite utility” to patch the-ories of rationality creates holes elsewhere in thesystem. Thus, expected utilities are usually weightedaverages, which has scant sense when one term isinfinite. The deeper point is that notions of maximi-zation of anticipated benefits cannot account forsuch behaviors, and ad hoc moves to maintain ratio-nal utility at all costs result in a concept of rationalityor utility doing little explanatory work. In sum, reli-ance on rational-choice theories may not be the bestway to understand and try to stop suicide terrorism.

34. D. Rhode, A. Chivers, New York Times, 17 March 2002,p. A1.

35. “White Paper—The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests,”(Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore, 9January 2003); available at www2.mha.gov.sg. Re-cruitment and indoctrination into Jemaah Islam-iyah are similar in other radical Islamic groups:“The first stage . . . involved religious classes organ-ised for a general mass. . . . The second stage . . .involved identifying those who were captivatedenough to find out more about the plight of Mus-lims in other regions. [ JI spiritual leader] IbrahimMaidan identified potential members from thosewho were curious enough to remain after classesto enquire further. He engaged those students’interest and compassion and finally invited thosehe deemed suitable to join JI. This recruitmentprocess would usually take about 18 months. Thefew who were selected as members were made tofeel a strong sense of exclusivity and self esteem. . . a strong sense of in-group superiority.”

36. In much the same way, the pornography, fast food, orsoft drink industries manipulate innate desires fornaturally scarce commodities like sexual mates, fattyfoods, and sugar to ends that reduce personal fitnessbut benefit the manipulating institution. [S. Atran, InGods We Trust (Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 2002)].

37. E. Sciolino, New York Times, 27 January 2002, p. A8.38. “What the world thinks in 2002: How global publics

view: Their lives, their countries, the world, America”(Survey Rep., Pew Research Center, 4 December2002); available at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID�165.

39. Reuters News Service, 11 June 2002; accessed athttp://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl�story&u�/nm/20020611/wl_nm/mideast_palestini.

40. C. Lynch, Washington Post, 18 December 2002, p.A27.

41. R. Axelrod, W. Hamilton, Science 211, 1390 (1981).42. M. Bazerman, M. Neale, Negotiating Rationally (Free

Press, New York, 1991).43. A. Eagly, S. Chaiken, The Psychology of Attitudes

(Harcourt Brace, Fort Worth, TX, 1993).44. One possibility is to offer and guarantee a clear

resolution of “final status” acceptable to majorities ofIsraelis and Palestinians. Without clear resolution offinal status before implementation of “confidencebuilding” measures, with an understanding by allparties of what to expect in the end, it is likely thatdoubts about ultimate intentions will undermine anyinterim accord—as in every case since 1948. [S.Atran, Politics and Society 18, 481 (1990)].

45. N. Chomsky, 9-11 (Seven Stories Press, New York,2001).

46. Thanks to D. Medin, N. Chomsky, R. Gonzalez, M.Bazerman, R. Nisbett, and reviewers.

Supporting Online Materialwww.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/299/5612/1534/DC1SOM Text

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