Scientific Objectivity in Journalism

Journalism 1 20

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Scientific objectivity in journalism? How journalists and academics define objectivity, assess its attainability, and rate its desirability

Senja PostUniversity of Koblenz-Landau, Germany

AbstractJournalism critics have repeatedly proposed that journalists adopt scientific standards of objectivity. A comparative survey of 134 German journalists (34%) and 163 academics (33%) from different subject areas was conducted to investigate to what degree scientific criteria of objectivity resonate in journalists attitudes toward and understandings of objectivity. Results show that journalists and academics equally think that objectivity is attainable and desirable. Yet members of both professions dealing with cultural or historical subjects consider it less desirable than members dealing with social or natural scientific subjects. Journalists and academics define objectivity in different terms. Journalists think objectivity demands trying to let the facts speak for themselves, and academics think it requires systematic methods and transparent accounts. In others words, respondents attitudes toward objectivity depend on the subjects they deal with, while their understandings of objectivity depend on their professional belonging.

KeywordsJournalism studies, journalistic ethics, journalistic practice, objectivity in journalism, objectivity in science, science communication, sociology of knowledge, survey research

Corresponding author:Senja Post, Department of Communication Psychology, University of Koblenz-Landau, Landau D-76829, Germany. Email: [email protected]

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2 Journalism

Journalism and scientific objectivity

Scientific objectivity has repeatedly been regarded as a model for journalists to follow. For the first time, such normative comparisons between journalists and scientists were prominent in the late 19th and early 20th centuries when scientists sought objectivity by observing and depicting the objects of their inquiries in a quasi-mechanical way (Daston and Galison, 2007: 115190). Although the US press was still widely partisan before the 1920s (Schudson, 1978: 155159; Streckfuss, 1990; Vos, 2012), influential publishers proposed that journalists follow the scientific ideal to give mechanical-like accounts of reality that were true to the given facts (Schiller, 1979: 49; Vos, 2012). When objectivity was codified in journalistic codes of ethics and handbooks in the 1920s (Schudson, 1978: 121144, 2001; Streckfuss, 1990; Vos, 2012), many sources envisioned journalists work-ing like scientists, registering or weighing (Vos, 2012: 444) the news (Schiller, 1979: 56; Schudson, 2001: 161162; Streckfuss, 1990: 975).

From the 1940s, US journalists increasingly criticized the ideal of factual objectivity as they found it more important to deliver interpretations of the facts they reported (Schudson, 1978: 134143; Weaver and McCombs, 1980: 487488). As a consequence, journalism critics again proposed scientists as a model for journalists. By that time, the scientific concept of objectivity had changed. Karl Popper (1965 [1959]: 93111) had argued influentially that investigators could neither observe nor depict any given facts because human observations and their representations were necessarily guided by pre-conceptions of reality. Instead, Popper (1965 [1959]: 3134) suggested checking whether investigators presuppositions corresponded with reality. Following this, it became cru-cial for scientists to disclose their methods so that everybody could reproduce their tests of hypotheses under the same or similar conditions (Popper (1965 [1959]: 3134).

When journalists increasingly interpreted the facts they reported, journalism critics pointed out that journalists generalize facts or connect them without checking the valid-ity of their assertions. Proposing that journalists put their assertions on representative empirical bases, test the validity of their claims in systematic ways (Dennis, 1990; Donsbach, 2004: 151152; Meyer, 1973: 8; Tankard, 1976: 6071), and make their methods transparent (e.g. Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2007: 69), they drew on the new sci-entific standards of objectivity.

Proposing that journalists use scientific criteria of objectivity, critics imply that such criteria would enhance the quality of journalistic reporting. They argue that, like scien-tists, journalists seek to describe and explain reality and can thus borrow from the stand-ards and practices scientists have developed over centuries. Although critics have repeatedly put forth these ideas, little is known about how they resonate in practicing journalists attitudes toward and understandings of objectivity. Do journalists accept sci-entific criteria of objectivity and do they think that objectivity is appropriate for their goals? Is the scientific concept of objectivity adequate to the job journalists aim to ful-fill? The goal of this article is to shed light on these knowledge gaps for the case of German journalists and academics. It seeks to investigate journalists and academics attitudes toward and understandings of objectivity and to answer to what degree their concepts of objectivity converge. The goal is, essentially, to test whether the proposition that journalists use scientific criteria of objectivity is practical or reasonable with respect


Post 3

to journalists goals and working conditions. In the following, the literature will be reviewed to answer what is known about (1) the acceptance of objectivity among scien-tists and German journalists and (2) journalists and academics understandings of objec-tivity. Based on this, the research questions of this study will be derived.

Literature review

Acceptance of objectivity

The pursuit of objectivity implies that it is attainable and desirable. Yet these assumptions are debated. Some challenge the idea of an external reality existing independently of the subjects perceiving and describing it. In their view, scientific facts and journalistic informa-tion cannot be objective as they do not reflect reality but the social and cognitive conditions underlying them (for science: for example, Kuhn, 1967; Polanyi, 1964 [1946]; for journal-ism: for example, Tuchman, 1978; Fishman, 1978; Glasser, 1984; Merrill, 1990). Others question that objectivity is desirable because it reinforces social structures by favoring established modes of thinking or inhibits specific insights or conclusions (for science: for example, Code, 1991: 323324; for journalism: cf. Schudson, 1978: 160; Glasser, 1984; McQuail, 1992: 188; Lichtenberg, 2000: 249). This is why some claim that scientists or journalists rather ought to empathize with people (cf. Merton, 1972; Bell, 1998), partici-pate in social debates, or criticize social grievances (for science: for example, Habermas, 1979; for journalism: Glasser, 1984) than seek to be objective. Others yet defend objectiv-ity. Although many concede that it may not be fully attainable, they suggest pursuing it as a regulative idea (for science: Popper, 1965 [1959]: 89; for journalism: Lichtenberg, 2000: 249). They argue that even if the truth may not be captured perfectly, it can still be approximated. In this view, it is possible to distinguish more from less appropriate accounts of reality (Lichtenberg, 2000: 241; Popper, 1965 [1959]: 4950).

While there is no empirical data on how these epistemic positions are distributed among practicing academics, several surveys indicate that most journalists in Germany and the United States commit themselves to objectivity. In a survey of 50 leading editors at 50 US newspapers in the 1970s, Boyer (1981) found that about two-thirds believed objectivity was more or less attainable. More than 10 years later, Donsbach and Klett (1993) showed that almost all US journalists as well as four in five German journalists believed that objectivity was very important. In addition, findings on their self-image show that most German journalists consider themselves a neutral reporter of events (Kcher, 1986: 5455; Schnbach et al., 1998: 222224). Most of them want to get information to the public neutrally and precisely and to present reality as it is (Weischenberg et al., 1998: 242246, 2006: 279).

Some journalists, however, seem to be skeptical about objectivity. In the 1970s, about one-third of the leading editors at 50 leading US newspapers thought that objectivity is in a pure sense unattainable a myth and that the obsession with objectivity is itself a distortion of reality (Boyer, 1981). There are no similar data on German journalists. Yet data on their self-image show that most German journalists consider themselves a spokesperson for the underdog (Kcher, 1986: 55; Schnbach et al., 1998: 223; Weischenberg et al., 1998: 242246) although this share seems to have decreased recently


4 Journalism

(Weischenberg et al., 2006: 279). In addition, most journalists aim at taking up griev-ances (Kcher, 1986: 55; Schnbach et al., 1998: 223) or want to criticize bad states of affairs (Weischenberg et al., 1998: 242246, 2006: 279). Thus, presumptively, many journalists do not consider objectivity an exclusive goal but one that may collide with alternative ideals in day-to-day practice.

Criteria of objectivity

Telling from ethical and methodological guidelines, one can assume that the commonly accepted scientific meaning of objectivity corresponds to Poppers theory of knowledge, his critical rationalism. One of its premises is the methodological, inter-subjective test of hypotheses (Anderson, 2008: 3351). Many authors agree that in journalism, objectiv-ity requires factuality and accuracy (Merrill, 1990; Westerstahl, 1983: 406; cp. McQuail, 1992: 185). But while some apply the need for accuracy to factual statements (cf. Ekstrom, 2002), some extend it to relational statements (Meyer, 1973; Tankard, 1976). They argue that as journalists frequently start their investigations with concrete assump-tions (Stocking and LaMarca, 1990), they should test them in a scientific fashion (Dennis, 1990; Donsbach, 2004: 151152; Meyer, 1973: 8; Tankard, 1976: 6071). Some authors have proposed that journalists also base their presentation of sources views on scientific methods by selecting them in proportion to their distribution in society (Meyer, 1973: 115245; Rothman and Lichter, 1987; Snyderman and Rothman, 1990; Tankard, 1976: 5354; Weaver and McCombs, 1980: 489490).

Yet some authors have pointed at differing working conditions. They argue that scien-tists deal with repetitive, foreseeable occurrences aiming at discovering regularities, whereas journalists deal with singular occurrences aiming at giving timely cross-cut sec-tions of day-to-day affairs (Lippmann, 1997 [1922]: 215217; Park, 1940). These differ-ences raise doubts about the practicability of scientific criteria of objectivity in journalism especially about journalists capabilities to test assumptions. Some sources suggest indeed that, with respect to objectivity, journalists are more concerned about the truth of their facts than about the validity of their assumptions (cf. Tankard, 1976; Merrill, 1990; Ekstrom, 2002). Little support for the scientific criteria of objectivity was also found in a survey of 175 German newspaper editors in the early 2000s. Only 48 percent of them thought objectivity required that the content of a news report must be considered true by several observers of the reported events (Knirsch, 2005: 7276). Instead, almost all agreed that an objective news report contains all relevant information and that reports on controversies put equal weight on the views of both sides (Knirsch, 2005: 7276). Wide support for the latter had already been documented in the 1990s. At that time, a great majority of the German journalists also believed that objectivity required going beyond the statements of the contending sides to the hard facts of a political dispute (Donsbach and Klett, 1993: 65).

Assumptions and research questions

The goal of this article is to determine journalists and academics attitudes toward and understandings of objectivity. Specifically, it seeks to answer three research questions:


Post 5

1. To what degree do academics and journalists consider objectivity attainable?

As several authors have pointed out, academics and journalists work in different condi-tions and may thus consider objectivity attainable to different degrees. Scientists assert a high degree of control over the objects of their inquiry as they deal with repetitive inci-dents. In experimental research, they even induce certain incidents to occur. For these reasons, they can determine causal relationships relatively unambiguously. Journalists, as well as scholars from the humanities, by contrast, have no control over the occurrence they investigate. They mostly deal with singular, unique incidents. Most often, they reconstruct certain developments or occurrences from hindsight. This is why they can determine causal relationships only by making occurrences and the developments that led to them plausible. For these reasons one, can assume that

a. Academics are more convinced that objectivity is attainable than journalists and that

b. Professionals dealing with (natural) scientific phenomena are more con-vinced that objectivity is attainable than professionals dealing with social phenomena, who, in turn, are more convinced that objectivity is attainable than professionals dealing with historical or cultural phenomena.

Journalists and academics may think that objectivity is more or less attainable but still think that it is undesirable. This study seeks to clarify.

2. To what degree do academics and journalists consider objectivity an appropriate goal?

As epistemological discussions of objectivity have shown, the pursuit of objectivity may have certain advantages and disadvantages, depending on the subject and purpose of an inquiry. As was argued, the strength of objectivity lies in its potential to reveal inter-subjective, that is, more or less indisputable aspects of reality. Its limitation is a conse-quence of this. The realm of objective knowledge excludes subjective insights such as those that follow from empathy or value judgments. It seems plausible that the limita-tions of objectivity are particularly relevant when dealing with issues in a social context, which is why it is assumed that

a. Academics consider the advantages of objectivity more relevant than jour-nalists, while journalists consider the limitations of objectivity more relevant than academics and that

b. Professionals dealing with natural (scientific) phenomena consider the advantages of objectivity more relevant and its limitations less relevant than professionals dealing with social or cultural subjects.

In the course of the 20th century, philosophers of knowledge have proposed different criteria of objectivity. Around 1900, philosophers believed that objectivity was about determining the given facts as they were. Karl Popper later argued that objectivity was


6 Journalism

about testing ones assumptions in a way that everybody can reproduce the outcome under the same or similar conditions. Although historical studies show that journalists have adopted the scientific ideal of factual objectivity in the early 20th century, survey results suggest that they have not adopted the two requirements of objectivity that follow from Poppers philosophy of knowledge systematic and transparent methods that allow everybody to reproduce the results in question. This study asks the following question:

3. How do journalists and academics think they can attain objectivity?

In particular, it is assumed that

a. Journalists think more than academics that objectivity is about being exact about the facts, while

b. Academics think more than journalists that objectivity is about applying sys-tematic methods and making them transparent.

Method

The inquiry is based on a comparative survey of journalists and academics fulfilling two criteria. First, subjects with a high norm-awareness were sought. They were assumed to work in leading positions in the most acknowledged and influential newsrooms or aca-demic institutes. Journalists were selected from the most widely circulated German daily newspapers (>100,000). Academics were selected from the most renowned research departments according to the German university ranking. The selection of journalists was restricted to newspapers to ensure that the members of both professions present their findings primarily in print. Second, participants dealing with comparable subjects were sought, that is, cultural, natural, and social phenomena. Journalists were recruited from the arts and culture, the science, politics, and economics sections. Academics were selected from the humanities, the natural sciences, and social sciences sections.

The subjects were selected in two steps. First, the newspapers and academic depart-ments were identified. Based on a list compiling the circulations of all German news-papers (Schtz, 2009), 63 dailies were selected. Based on the German university ranking, the leading departments of classical subjects within each subject area were identified.1 Second, the subjects were recruited. The journalists were selected propor-tionally to the newspapers circulations. For each newsroom and section, they were drawn randomly from a compilation of the leading German editors (Zimpel, 2010). The academics were selected randomly from the websites of the most renowned aca-demic institutes. Only full professors were recruited. Overall, 404 journalists were selected evenly from the science, politics, economics, and culture sections, and 500 academics were selected, 150 each from the natural sciences and humanities and 200 from the social sciences.2

In February 2011, the journalists and academics were sent a standardized paper-and-pencil questionnaire. After 1 month each, they were sent two more requests to partici-pate. The questionnaire contained questions on the job conditions, the professional goals, objectivity, and other professional norms (e.g. accuracy). For both professions,


Post 7

the questionnaires were nearly identical. They differed only in naming different profes-sions (e.g. journalism vs science) and using different job-related terms (e.g. information vs data).

Of the 404 journalists addressed, 14 were ineligible. Of the 390 eligible ones, 134 (34%) participated. And 127 journalists were sent a postcard that was attached to the question-naire to confirm their participation. The return rate was highest among political editors (44%), second among art/culture (34%) and economics editors (31%), and weakest among science editors (26%). Of the 500 academics contacted, three were ineligible. Of the 497 eligible ones, 163 (33%) participated and 147 confirmed their participation. The return rate was highest among natural scientists (37%), second among scholars from the humanities (32%), and weakest among social scientists (26%). On average, the participating journal-ists are 47 years old. In all, 72 percent are male and 27 percent female.3 The academics have an average age of 51 years; 74 percent of them are male and 25 percent are female.

In the sample, the journalists and academics from different subfields are nearly evenly distributed. Of the participating journalists, 19 percent are from the science, 33 percent from the politics, 23 percent from the economics, and 25 percent from the culture sec-tions. Thus, the science editors are slightly underrepresented, and the politics editors slightly overrepresented. Of the academics, 34 percent work in the natural sciences, 32 percent in the social sciences, and 29 percent in the humanities. In all, 4 percent did not mention their area of research.

In the following, the views of journalists and academics will be contrasted in mean comparisons. In addition, professionals dealing with comparable subjects will be com-pared, that is, science editors will be contrasted with natural scientists, politics and economics editors with social scientists, and culture editors with scholars from the humanities.

Results

Attainability of objectivity

It was assumed that academics are more convinced than journalists that objectivity is attainable. In order to test this, respondents were asked to assess the possibilities of being objective in several aspects of their work.4 The question was, How objective can a jour-nalist in your editorial section (academic in you subject) be in the following steps of their work? Respondents were asked to rate each work step on a 5-point scale from 2 (can impossibly be objective) to +2 (can totally be objective). When collecting singular facts, journalists and academics equally think that objectivity is attainable (Table 1). Without any significant difference, the members of both professions are a bit more skep-tical about being objective when inferring states of affairs from singular facts. Asked about the possibility of being objective when determining the causes or assessing the consequences of something, their answers differ. As assumed, journalists have more doubts about the feasibility of objectivity when determining causes and consequences than academics.5

It was further assumed that professionals dealing with natural scientific subjects are more convinced that objectivity is attainable than professionals dealing with social or


8 Journalism

Tab

le 1

. Pr

actic

abili

ty o

f obj

ectiv

ity in

sev

eral

ste

ps in

jour

nalis

ts a

nd s

cien

tists

wor

k.Q

uest

ion:

How

obj

ectiv

e ca

n a

jour

nalis

t in

you

r se

ctio

n (a

cade

mic

in y

our

subj

ect)

be

in t

he fo

llow

ing

wor

k st

eps?

Rat

ings

on

a 5-

poin

t sc

ale

from

2

(one

can

not

poss

ibly

be

obje

ctiv

e)

to +

2 (o

ne c

an b

e to

tally

obj

ectiv

e).

Mea

n ra

tings

of r

espo

nden

ts (

stan

dard

dev

iatio

ns)

How

obj

ectiv

e ca

n a

jour

nalis

t in

you

r se

ctio

n (a

n ac

adem

ic in

you

r su

bjec

t) be

whe

n

Jour

nalis

ts w

ritin

g ab

out

A

cade

mic

s fr

om t

he

Scie

nce

Polit

ics/

econ

omy

Art

s/cu

lture

To

tal

Nat

ural

sc

ienc

esSo

cial

sc

ienc

esH

uman

ities

Tot

alO

ne-fa

ctor

A

NO

VA

c

olle

ctin

g sin

gula

r fa

cts?

1.

52

(1.0

46)

1.57

(0

.701

)1.

45

(0.6

86)

1.53

(0

.771

)1.

50

(1.0

19)

1.43

(0

.842

)1.

32

(0.8

09)

1.43

(0

.911

)F

= 0

.653

; df =

5;

ns

infe

rrin

g st

ates

of a

ffairs

fr

om s

ingu

lar

fact

s?

0.70

8 (1

.160

)0.

689

(1.0

06)

0.77

8 (0

.801

)0.

712

(0.9

90)

1.04

(0

.885

)1.

06

(0.8

45)

0.65

8 (0

.966

)0.

930

(0.9

09)

F =

1.8

93; d

f = 5

; ns

d

eter

min

ing

the

caus

es o

f so

me

stat

e of

affa

irs?

0.87

5 (0

.992

)0.

595

(0.8

43)

0.67

9 (0

.863

)0.

667

(0.8

76)

1.19

(0

.658

)1.

10

(0.9

63)

0.62

2 (0

.861

)1.

001

(0.8

57)

F =

4.5

25; d

f = 5

; p

< .0

05

ass

essin

g th

e co

nseq

uenc

es

of e

vent

s or

dev

elop

men

ts?

0.66

7 (0

.817

)0.

164

(1.0

80)

0.31

0 (0

.891

)0.

294

(1.0

04)

0.61

5 (0

.771

)0.

796

(0.9

35)

0.18

4 (1

.062

)0.

559

(0.9

34)

F =

3.6

78; d

f = 5

; p

< .0

05

Base

s: 2

4 jo

urna

lists

from

the

sci

ence

, 73

75 jo

urna

lists

from

the

pol

itics

/eco

nom

ics,

and

26

28 jo

urna

lists

from

the

art

s/cu

lture

sec

tions

; 52

natu

ral s

cien

tists

, 47

49

soci

al s

cien

tists

, and

32

37 s

chol

ars

from

the

hum

aniti

es

all

of w

hom

con

side

r ob

ject

ivity

mor

e or

less

att

aina

ble

and

wor

thw

hile


Post 9

cultural subjects. The results partly confirm this. Professionals dealing with natural sci-entific subjects are more convinced that objectivity is possible when determining causes and consequences than professionals dealing with cultural subjects. But there is a remark-able contrast between academics and editors dealing with social subjects. Social scien-tists are almost as convinced that causes and effects can be determined objectively as natural scientists. Politics and economics editors, by contrast, doubt that causes and con-sequences can be determined objectively almost as much as culture editors. This differ-ence may be due to different working conditions. Social scientists deal with recurring incidents. For this reason, they may be able to control the subjects of their investigation and determine causes and consequences relatively unambiguously. Political and eco-nomics editors, by contrast, usually deal with unique occurrences and can often only speculate about causal relationships in hindsight. This may explain their different degrees of skepticism toward the possibilities to be objective when determining causes and consequences.

Desirability of objectivity

It was assumed that academics consider the advantages of objectivity more and the limi-tations of objectivity less relevant than journalists. To test this, they were asked, One can argue for or against objectivity for several reason. How relevant are the following rea-sons for your work? Respondents were asked to rate two arguments for and three argu-ments against objectivity on a scale from 2 (irrelevant for my work) to +2 (relevant for my work). The journalists and academics are about equally convinced that the pur-suit of objectivity has epistemic advantages. They think that by seeking objectivity, one has a good chance of giving a truthful account of particular states of affairs and that one obtains results one can rely on (Table 2). As assumed, journalists and academics dealing with cultural phenomena consider these arguments less relevant than professionals deal-ing with natural or social phenomena.

The journalists and academics consider the limitations of objectivity similarly irrel-evant. Academics think a little more than journalists that it is irrelevant that the pursuit of objectivity makes it difficult to empathize with those affected by human or social problems.6 They equally think that it is irrelevant that striving for objectivity, one easily overlooks deeper issues behind the facts and makes it impossible to declare oneself against objectionable views. As assumed, there are differences between pro-fessionals dealing with different subjects. Professionals who deal with cultural phe-nomena consider it more relevant than professionals who deal with social or natural scientific phenomena that objectivity does not allow them to go beyond the facts or to voice their opinions against objectionable views. When it comes to the lack of empa-thy, there is an unexpected difference between natural scientists and science journal-ists. Natural scientists consider the lack of empathy almost completely irrelevant, whereas the science journalists think much less so. This may be due to the fact that in their research, natural scientists are totally detached from social or individual human problems. Science journalists, by contrast, report natural scientific findings and pre-sumably seek to point out their social significance for example, for the environment and medical cures.


10 Journalism

Tab

le 2

. R

elev

ance

of a

rgum

ents

for

and

agai

nst

obje

ctiv

ity.

Que

stio

n: T

here

are

a n

umbe

r of

rea

sons

arg

uing

for

or a

gain

st t

he p

ursu

it of

obj

ectiv

ity. H

ow r

elev

ant

are

the

follo

win

g re

ason

s fo

r yo

u w

ork?

R

atin

gs o

n a

5-po

int

scal

e fr

om

2 (i

rrel

evan

t fo

r m

y w

ork

) to

+2

(rel

evan

t fo

r m

y w

ork

).

Mea

n ra

tings

of r

espo

nden

ts (

stan

dard

dev

iatio

ns)

Jour

nalis

ts w

ritin

g ab

out

A

cade

mic

s fr

om t

he

One

-fact

or

AN

OV

A

Scie

nce

Polit

ics

/ ec

onom

yA

rts/

cultu

reT

ota

lN

atur

al

scie

nces

Soci

al

scie

nces

Hum

aniti

esT

ota

l

Try

ing

to b

e ob

ject

ive,

one

has

a

good

cha

nce

of g

ivin

g tr

uthf

ul

acco

unts

of p

artic

ular

sta

tes

of

affa

irs.

1.23

(0

.813

)1.

34

(0.7

08)

0.81

3 (1

.120

)1.

19

(0.8

67)

1.34

(0

.783

)1.

39

(0.6

40)

0.75

0 (1

.149

)1.

16

(0.9

49)

F =

4.6

82;

df =

5; p

< .0

01

Pur

suin

g ob

ject

ivity

, one

obt

ains

re

sults

one

can

rel

y on

.1.

08

(0.8

81)

0.87

7 (0

.957

)0.

303

(1.1

04)

0.76

9 (1

.016

)1.

19

(0.9

73)

2.00

(1

.021

)0.

262

(1.2

70)

0.82

0 (1

.159

)F

= 6

.066

; df

= 5

; p

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Scientific Objectivity in Journalism