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PANZERTRUPPENThe Complete Guide to theCreation &Combat Employment ofGermany's Tank Force1943-1945

Also by Thomas L. JentzGERMANY'S PANTHER TANK: THE QUEST FOR COMBAT SUPREMACY

PANZERTRUPPEN: 1933-1942

PANZERTRUPPENThe Complete Guide to the Creation

& Combat Employment ofGermany's Tank Force 1943-1945

Book Design by Robert Biondi.

Copyright 1996 by Thomas L. Jentz.Library of Congress Catalog Number: 96-67793.

All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or used in any formsor by any means - graphic, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying orinformation storage and retrieval systems - without written permission from thecopyright holder.

Printed in the United States of America.ISBN: 0-7643-0080-6

We are interested in hearing from authors with book ideas on related topics.

Published by Schiffer Publishing Ltd.77 Lower Valley Road

Atglen, PA 19310Phone: (610) 593-1777FAX: (610) 593-2002

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Please include $2.95 postage.Try your bookstore first.

ContentsIntroduction 6

Chapter 21 DEFEAT IN NORTH AFRICA 8

Chapter 22 SURROUNDED AT STALINGRAD TO THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE TO RETAKE KHARKOV 21

Chapter 23 REORGANIZATION OF THE PANZERTRUPPEN - OCTOBER 1942 THROUGH DECEMBER 1943 .47

Chapter 24 OPERATION ZITADELLE 74

Chapter 25 DEFENSE OF SICILY 102

Chapter 26 THE THIRD YEAR ON THE EASTERN FRONT 108

Chf!1pter 27 DEFENSE OF ITALy 135

Chapter 28 REORGANIZING AND REBUILDING THE PANZERTRUPPEN IN 1944 ~ 152

Chapter 29 INVASION OF NORMANDY TO THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE 177

Chapter 30 THE LAST YEAR ON THE EASTERN FRONT 204

Chapter 31 FORMATION OF THE LAST UNITS 232

Chapter 32 DEFENSE OF THE FATHERLAND 246

AppendicesAppendix A: Formation of Panzer Units for the Heer 249Appendix B: Panzer Inventory, Gains, and Reported Losses 276Appendix C: Technical Specifications of the Opponents Tanks 292Appendix D: Penetration Capabilities of Tank Guns 296Appendix E: Recommended Books 297Appendix F: Glossary of German Military Terms 298

INTRODUCTION

Having failed to win their strategic objectives, theHeer (German Army) was overextended deepin enemy territory facing numerically superiorforces in the Fall of 1942. Now it was the Allies turn tolaunch the offensives that would keep the Heer off bal-ance. With few exceptions the days of employingmassed Panzer formations to gain strategically deci-sive objectives had come to an end. And, these few ex-ceptions were almost invariably failures. Forced ontothe defensive the Panzertruppen modified their tacticsbecoming expert at counterattacks that spoiled their op-ponents drives and inflicted heavy casualties. They be-came so proficient that the Allied armies took years toretake territory that the Heer had overran in a few weeksor months. This book presents how the Panzertruppenfought during their defensive struggle with details onthe units, organizations, type of Panzers, and tactics.

Many other books have successfully covered thehistory of the Panzertruppen at division, corps, army,and army group level. These have dealt with the strate-gic decisions of the high command, the successes andthe mistakes. A listing of other books that have verythoroughly related the history of the higher level strat-egy and tactics are listed as Appendix E. After readingmany of these published accounts, I was still left withmany unanswered questions. How many Panzers wereactually available with each unit at the start of each cam-paign? When were new units formed and committed toaction? What was their organization and equipment?What were the Panzers armament, armor protection,and capabilities? What tactics were used by the smallerunits from platoons up to regiments? How did they sur-vive in the face of overwhelming numerical superiority?

The answers to all of these questions were obtainedby digging through original records for the past twenty-

6

five years. The content of this book is derived solelyfrom these original records consisting of war diaries,reports, and technical and tactical manuals written dur-ing the war. No attempt has been made to analyze thecontent or to interject personal opinion. The story is toldas recorded by those responsible for decisions in de-veloping the Panzertruppen and by those who fought inthe Panzers. The only editing of reports was done toeliminate information that was not pertinent to under-standing development or tactics of the Panzers andPanzer units.

In presenting how the Panzers fared in combat, onlyoriginal combat and experience reports written directlyafter the actions were used to relate the thoughts of thetroops that fought in the Panzers. This establishes afoundation for the reader to evaluate their performancefree from the influence of assumptions, generalities,opinions, and other uninformed statements expressedby armchair armor experts. The reader should be awarethat many of these original experience reports are bi-ased in that they do not describe routine activity butwere written to relate the unusual. Most of the Germanreports were written with the motive of initiating improve-ments to the Panzers or changing tactics.

Throughout this book, I have retained the names ofthe Panzers, Panzer units, rank, and title as they wereused in the original reports. These names can not betranslated without loss of identity and meaning. As eachnew name is introduced, the American equivalent is in-cluded in parenthesis when the equivalency is not obvi-ous (Le. Division, Brigade, Regiment, Bataillon,Kompanie). The Panzer-Abteilung frequently ismistranslated as being a detachment or a unit. It is nota German battalion which at the time consisted of fivecompanies. With its two to four Panzer-Kompanien

INTRODUCTIONunder command, it is roughly the equivalent of an Ameri-can tank battalion. To somewhat ease the impact ofGerman terms on the English speaking reader, I haveinserted hyphens to break up some of the longer namesand have blatantly hacked o.ff suffixes that are normallyappended to German nouns. A glossary of terms is in-cluded as Appendix F.

Many thanks are due to George Wagner (now re-tired) of the Captured Records Section at the NationalArchives for his advice and guidance in digging my waythrough the mountain of available records. I would alsolike to thank his replacement, Robin Cookson, who hasbeen a great help in locating the odd box of records.Thanks are also due to Heer Meyer and Heer Loos atthe Militaerarchiv and Heer Nielges and Frau Kuhl atthe Bildarchiv for their friendly assistance in extractingdata from the massive collection of documents and pho-tographs. Special thanks go to Werner Regenberg (spe-cializing in research on units outfitted with capturedtanks) and Leo Niehorster (specializing in unit organi-zations) for reviewing and providing additional detailsfor the list of Panzer units presented in Appendix A.Thanks are also due to Steve 2aloga for providing dataon the T-70 and IS-2 Soviet tanks as presented in Ap-pendix D. Any omissions or mistakes are my own andmay be largely due to my stubborn refusal to use anydata that could not be verified in original records.

The research was the fun part, providing constantrewards as long-sought-atter facts and figures were fi-nally discovered. The hard part was beating the datainto some semblance of order and the tedious hours oftranslation so that the information would be made avail-able to the many interested readers who don't have a

7

command of the German language. Peter Frandsen isthanked for his efforts in reviewing the manuscript as arepresentative for the average armor enthusiast. Thanksare also due to professional proofreader StanleyThawley for his role in degermanizing sentence struc-ture in the translations.

Any difficulty you may find while attempting to readthrough this book as if it was a light work of fiction isentirely your own fault for even attempting to embarkon such an endeavor. It took over five times the lengthof World War II to compile this information. There is muchmore information contained in these two volumes thanany single person actively involved with thePanzertruppen knew at the time. It is impossible for themost casual observer to even start to comprehend themost obvious facts after a few hours of light reading.Don't be quick to jump to conclusions. Keep an openmind, absorb the information at face value, and thenapply it to analyze and understand how armored battleswere fought in World War II.

This book is intended for those interested in factsand figures. As such it should be studied in conjunctionwith many other fine books on the subject. Your rewardwill be new discoveries on practically every page thatdebunk the old myths, propaganda, and erroneous mili-tary intelligence which have been insidiously infiltratedinto our common knowledge and many published histo-ries on World War II.

Tom JentzGermantown, Maryland6 June 1996

21

Defeat in North Africa

PzlI Pzlli PzIIISp PzlV PzlVSp PzBef TotalPz.Rgt.5:Available 19 53 43 7 15 6 143Operational 18 43 43 6 15 3 128Pz.Rgt.8:Available 14 43 44 3 15 2 121Operational 12 38 43 2 15 1 111

In preventing the British from achieving a complete breakthrough, the Panzer-Regiments lost 1 Pz.Kpfw.lI, 18Pz.Kpfw.lIl, 20 Pz.Kpfw.l1l Sp., 1 Pz.Kpfw.lV, and 10Pz.Kpfw.lV Sp. as total write-ofts during the period from 24to 29 October. This battle of attrition had left the Panzer-Regi-ments with the following operational strengths to face therenewed British assault in Operation Supercharge on 2 No-vember 1942:

T he German forces had overextended and lost the ini-tiative in North Africa. From now on they were forcedto react to their opponent's moves. With very few ex-ceptions, the days of employing massed Panzer formationsto gain strategically decisive objectives had come to an end.But even decimated Panzer units were still very dangerousopponents, expert at counterstriking and inflicting seriouscasualties.

Panzerarmee Afrika settled into a heavily mined defen-sive belt running parallel to the British positions at EI Alameinand held the Panzer-Regiments in reserve. When the Brit-ish launched their major offensive during the night of 23/24October 1942, Panzer-Regiment 5 and 8 were positionedwhere they could strike at any armored force that managedto break through the static defenses. Their operational strengthreported for the evening of 23 October 1942 was:

Pz.Rgt.5Pz.Rgt.8

PzlI Pzlli PzIliSp PzlV PzlVSp PzBef Total9 28 20 4 11 3 755 15 27 3 5 1 56

8

The following excerpts from the war diary of the15.Panzer-Division relate how Panzer-Regiment 8 attackedand held up the British advance - for one more day:

2 November 19420200 - Contact between Panzer-Grenadier-

Regiment 115 and Panzer-Regiment 8 was dis-rupted.

0220 - Intercepted enemy radio message: Ourtanks have passed through the gap in the minefieldand are now advancing on a wide front.

0320 - The forward elements of the enemy havebroken through to the headquarters ofPanzer-Regi-ment 8 and the main body is located on the Otto-Piste (track). Contact with Panzer-Regiment 8 is notavailable.

0445 - Telephone contact with Panzer-Regiment8 was restored.

0505 -As dawn broke enemy tanks could be seenon the telegraph track from the division commandpost. Artillery fire and shells fired by tanks are hittingclose to the division command post.

0636 - Our Panzers are advancing from thesouthwest toward the northeaston the Otto-Piste. Theenemy is pulling back. The burning tanks are theenemy's.

The 21.Panzer-Division has reached the Otto-Piste near A.P.412. From there they intend to strikesouth to hit the enemy in the flank at A.P.411.

0705 - Orders to Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment33:The enemy is located at A.P.411 with 80 tanks.21.Panzer-Division has been given the assignmentto immediately attack south. Panzer-Regiment 8 isattacking toward the east to close the gap.I.Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 8 is still at the old lo-cation. II.Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment8 is in the areaofA.P.507. Artillery to commence firing.

CHAPTER 21: DEFEAT IN NORTH AFRICA

This Pz.Kpfw.lV Ausf.F2 and Pz.Kpfw.11I Ausf.L of Panzer-Regiment 5 were knocked out at EI Alamein. (TIM)

ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH OF PANZER UNITSAt EI Alamein on 23 October 1942

15.Panzer-Division

~ ~'Tn\ leS leS le \ 'TnSleS leS le \

14 PzlI, 43 PzllI(kz), 44 PzlIl(lg), 3 PzIV(kz), 15 PzIV(lg), 2 PzBef21.Panzer-Division P R~ z. gt.5

~II. avo ~1.6~o 6~o'Tn\ leS le\ le \ 'Tn\ leS leS le \

19 PzlI, 53 PzllI(kz), 43 PzlIl(lg), 7 PzIV(kz), 15 PzIV(lg), 6 PzBef

9

PANZERTRUPPEN 1943-1945

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10

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f

CHAPTER 21: DEFEAT IN NORTH AFRICA0735 - The commander of the I.Abteilung/

Panzer-Regiment 8, Ritterkreuztraeger HauptmannBtiefelmayer, was reported killed.

0740 - Panzer-Regiment 8 accompanied by Ital-ian tanks is attacking in a generally northeasterly di-rection. The I.Abteilung still has nine operationalPanzers. The attack is slowly gaining ground to thenorth.

0803 - II.Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 8 re-ported: There are now 90 to 100 enemy tanks. Weare still located at the old position.

0810 .. Orders to Oberst Teege: 21.Panzer-Divi-sion is attacking south and has crossed assault line236. Commence attack.

0915 - Up to no~ II.Abteilung/Panzer-Regi-ment 8 knocked out 30 enemy tanks. The artilleryhad succeeded in knocking out 15 enemy tanks.I.Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 8 reported that 20were knocked out.

0940 - Situation ofPanzer-Regiment 8 at about0940: On the southeast wing only four Panzers arecombat ready near the oldposition ofthe I.Abteilung.

Hauptmann Stiefelmayer was killed. Contact with theinfantry in the forward line has still not been reestab-lished. To the left of the I.Abteilung, the Italian tanks,which had pulled back slightly, have been pulled for-ward again. Beside them to their left, the II.Abteilungwith 12 Panzers (1.5 km north of A.P.507) extendsup to the telegraph track. The regimental commandpost is behind the right wing ofHauptmann Siemenson the telegraph track. The enemy can be pushedback only very slowly. Panzer-Regiment 8 is push-ing further forward toward the north and northeast.

1040 - The advanced elements ofthe 21.Panzer-Division are located on height A.P.411. A Panzer-Kompanie, swung out to the right, is seeking to gaincontact with the right wing of Panzer-Regiment B.

1130 - Orders to Oberst Teege: Attack towardPoint 32, then turn toward the north. The Panzershave been promised additional artillery support.

1200 - The 21.Panzer-Division is atA. P.411 fac-ing east. Panzer-Regiment 8 should gain contact byadvancing, facing east along the Otto-Piste toward411. The Flak batteries are to take over flank protec-

120

110

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

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OPERATIONAL PANZERS IN PANZER-REGIMENT 823 October to 4 November 1942

120111

110

100

90

80

70

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240ct250ct

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PANZERTRUPPEN 1943-1945tion. Objective: Push forward to the east until the oldpositions are regained.

1215 - II.Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 8 is incontact with Panzer-Regiment 5 on the telegraphtrack.

1240 - Orders to Panzer-Regiment 8: QUicklystart to attack. New attack direction toward A.P.411to establish contact with the 21.Panzer-Division. Pullthe Italians along.

1255 - Panzer-Regiment 8 reported: Up to no~60 enemy tanks have been knocked out.

1303 - II.Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 8 is at-tacking again. They have only five Panzers in action.

1335 - Report from II.Abteilung/Panzer-Regi-ment 8: The enemy is attacking from the east to-ward the southwest. The 21.Panzer-Division(Panzer-Regiment 5) is hanging back.

1335 - Orientation from Major von Heuduck, la21.Panzer-Division: 200 enemy tanks are drivingsouthwest from minefield J.

1410 - II.Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 8 re-ported: 70 enemy tanks are attacking from the south-east.

1425 - Panzer-Regiment 8 repeated thatPanzer-Regiment 5 is not following the attack. Co-operation must occur. Closing up requested.

1605 - Oberst Teege was killed. Hauptmann Si-emens took over command of the rest of Panzer-Regiment 8.

1645 - Report from Panzer-Regiment 8. Enemycovering itself with a heavy smokescreen.

1845 - Chef des Stabes Deutsches Afrika-korps oriented the division commander on the armycommander's new decision: The army will preventfurther destruction of the divisions by the far superiorenemy tanks and artillery in the old stationary posi-tions bypulling units back to the west in short stagesin rearguard actions and build up a new defensivefront.

The time for divisions to break contact has notbeen determined.

This PZ.Kpfw.lV Ausf.G was abandoned during the retreat following the battles at EI Alamein. (NA)

12

CHAPTER 21: DEFEAT IN NORTH AFRICAFor tonight, the division expects further infantry

attacks supported by heavy artillery and tank action.The defensive forces are exceedingly weak in bothPanzers and artillery, compared to the opposing sec-tors. Italian troops are no longer available.

The combat force of Panzer-Regiment 8 hassunk to eight operational Panzers. Its commanderwas killed. The backbone of the division has beenbroken.Today's Results: About 60 enemy tanks destroyed.

The retreat out of Egypt continued back across Libya tothe positions at Marsa el Brega, where Rommel had achievedhis first success in North Africa on 31 March 1941. HerePanzerarmee Afrika rested and took stock, reporting thatbetween 23 October and 2 December, 29 Pz.Kpfw.lI, 94Pz.Kpfw.lll, 67 Pz.Kpfw.l1l Sp, 8 Pz.Kpfw.lV, 23 Pz.Kpfw.lVSp, and 8 Pz.Bef.Wg. had been lost as total write-ofts. On 2December 1942, the Panzer strength was reported as 4Pz.Kpfw.lI, 8 Pz.Kpfw.llI, 22 Pz.Kpfw.11I Sp, 16Pz.Kpfw.III(75), 2 Pz.Kpfw.IV, 12 Pz.Kpfw.lV Sp for a totalof 64, of which all but 11 were operational. An additional 22Pz.Kpfw.IV Sp were on the way to North Afrika, 11 joiningeach of the Panzer-Regiments in late December 1942.

The first unit sent as reinforcements was Panzer-Abteilung 190, which was originally intended to join its par-ent formation the 90.leichte Division. On 8 November 1942,six Pz.Kpfw.1I1 arrived at Bengasi with part of the 2.Kompanie/Panzer-Abteilung 190 and joined up with PanzerarmeeAfrika. Allied forces also landed in French North Africa on 8November 1942 and were advancing toward Tunisia. In re-sponse, the rest of the 2.Kompanie and the balance ofPanzer-Abteilung 190 landed in Bizerte, Tunisia in the pe-riod between 12 and 22 November 1942.

Rommel had also been promised a Tiger-Abteilung. Thefirst elements of this unit, schwere Panzer-Abteilung 501,landed at Bizerte, Tunisia on 23 November 1942. A total of20 Tigers and 25 Pz.Kpfw.III(75) were shipped to Tunisia forthe schwere Panzer-Abteilung 501.

The 10.Panzer-Division was also ordered to Tunisia inresponse to the Allied landings in French North Africa. Thebulk of Panzer-Regiment 7 landed in Tunis in the period from27 November to 5 December 1942. Ships carrying most ofthe 5.Kompanie and 8.Kompanie were sunk on 3 Decem-ber 1942. In total, 2 Pz.Kpfw.lI, 16 Pz.Kpfw.lIl, 12 Pz.Kpfw.lV,and 3 Pz.Bef.Wg. were lost in transit out of the original 21Pz.Kpfw.ll, 105 Pz.Kpfw.lll, 20 Pz.Kpfw.IV and 9 Pz.Bef.Wg.shipped with Panzer-Regiment 7.

As elements of units landed in Bizerte and Tunis, theywere rapidly organized into ad hoc Kampfgruppen andquickly sent out to stop the British and American units drivingeastward to occupy Tunisia. The commander of the schwerePanzer-Abteilung 501 , Major Lueder, given command of oneof these Kampfgruppen wrote the following combat reportdated 16 December 1942 on the initial actions of Tigers inTunisia:

The first Tigers of the 1.Kompanie/sehwere Panzer-Abtei/ung 501 were loaded onboard a ship in Reggio on 21 "November. The Abtei/ung commander, Major Lueder, flewin advance to Tunis on 22 November and upon arrival wasassigned command of a Kampfgruppe until his Abtei/ungarrived. On 4 December, he again took over command of theelements ofhis Abtei/ung that had arrived, which up to thenhad been led by Hauptmann Baron von Nolde until he waswounded and then by Leutnant Vermehren.

Up to 1 December, four Tigers and four Pz.Kpfw./// hadarrived in Tunisia. On 1 December, three Tigers and fourPz.Kpfw./// were operational. One Tiger was out of actiondue to problems with the engine.

After being assigned security tasks, the Tigers weremoved to an assembly area 7 kilometers east of Djedeida.The order to attack came at 1300 hours, and the Panzersimmediately started toward Djedeida to gain contact with theoncoming enemy tank force moving northwestward. At 1500,the Panzers encountered the first enemyactivity, weak infan-try forces 3 kilometers northwest ofDjedeida. The Kompaniewas hit by heavy artillery fire from the heights north ofTebourba and also repeatedly attacked by strafing aircraft.Hauptmann Baron von Nolde fell when an artillery shell ex-ploded while he was walking toward a Tiger.

The attack was carried forward against enemy tanks inthe olive groves 5 kilometers west of Djedeida. The field ofview and the field of fire were very limited in the thick olivegroves. Enemy tanks could only be fought at close range.Hauptmann Deichmann, who left his Panzer to obtain a bet-ter view, fell when hit in the stomach by a rifle shot. The Ti-gers were hit by General Lee tanks firing at a range of80 to100 meters. This resulted in deep penetrations, but the last10 mm of the side armor held. This proved that the armorwas excellent.

Two General Lee tanks were knocked out at a range of150 meters. Others were eliminated by the 8.8 em Flak guns.The rest pulled back. At dusk, the Tigers pulled back to the .old Stuetzpunkt and Panzer-Grenadiere took over the for-ward defense line. One Tiger had fallen out due to enginefailure and remained in the olive groves. A Pz.Kpfw./// wasdispatched to guard the Tiger.

Lessons: Although it was undesirable to send only a fewTigers into action, this was necessary due to the enemy situ-ation and the shortage ofourown forces. The approach marchwas engaged by long-range enemy artillery fire that couldn'tbe suppressed.

It is especially difficult to direct Panzers in combat in ol-ive groves because the thick tree crowns take away the com-manders' and gunners' view. An attacking Panzer is easilyknocked out by well-sited dug-in defenses.

In spite ofunfavorable conditions, the crews' trust in theirTigers has greatly increased because of the quality of thearmor.

One Tiger and three Pz.Kpfw.///s were operational on 2December 1942. With two additional Pz.Kpfw.///s fromPanzer-Abtei/ung 190 attached, and accompanied by an

13

PANZERTRUPPEN 19431945

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14

CHAPTER 21: DEFEAT IN NORTH AFRICA

ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH OF PANZER UNITSSENT AS REINFORCEMENTS TO NORTH AFRICA

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19 PzllI(lg), 11 PzVI 25 PzlIl(75), 20 PzVIKampfgruppe Panzer-Division Hermann Goering

3.Kp./Pz.Rgt.H.G.(Apr43)

2 PzlIl(lg), 8 PzIV(lg)

infantry Kampfgruppe, the unit advanced westward fromDjedeida to attack Point 186.4 east of Tebourba. Strong de-fenses were emplaced in the olive groves east of Tebourba.Four anti-tankguns, six General Stuart light tanks, two Ameri-can armored halftracks, and some trucks were shot up. Ourown losses included three Pz.Kpfw.///, of which one was atotal write-off. The infantry took over the defense line at dusk.The Panzers were pulled back to guard Djedeida.

Lessons: Combat in the olive groves was unavoidablebecause Tebourba is completely surrounded by olive grovesexcept in the northwest.

Close cooperation between the Tigers and escortingPanzers is necessary. The shortage of command resourcesmakes itself felt, especially the missing Befeh/spanzer andthe resulting lack ofcommunication with the next higher com-mand.

One Tiger and two Pz.Kpfw.///s were operational on 3December 1942. The unit again attacked toward Point 186along the combat route taken the previous day. The Panzerswere engaged by enemy artillery and mortar fire from posi-tions on the heights that couldn't be spotted. In addition, theywere attacked by strafing aircraft. Three anti-tank guns, a

15

PANZERTRUPPEN 19431945

Two Pz.Kpfw.l1l Ausf.Ns from the Stabskompanie/schwere Panzer-Abteilung 501 in Tunisia. (SA)

mortar position, and three ammunition carriers were de-stroyed.

A Tiger was hit in the area of the final drive by an enemy7.5 cm self-propelled anti-tank gun. It was sent back to thestarting point because its ability to remain operational ap-peared questionable. Both PZ.Kpfw.llls carried the attackfurther forward up to the olive groves southwest ofPoint 196.

The unit took up a hedgehog formation, remaining in theolive groves overnight. Several infantry losses occurred dueto the bitterly fighting, scattered enemy troops. At 0300 hours,the order was received to disengage from the opponent. ThePanzers returned to Djedeida, taking along the wounded anddead. Another anti-tank gun and an ammunition carrier weredestroyed on the return march.

Lessons: The lessons of the previous days were con-firmed. When fighting in close terrain with limited visibility,close cooperation with infantry forces is necessary, especiallywhen attacking through woods.

Maintenance on the vehicles was performed on 4 and 5December. This was difficult and time consuming because ofthe lack of the Werkstatt-Kompanie.

Three Tigers and four Pz.Kpfw.///s were operational on6 December 1942. Three additional Tigers were being re-paired. Before dawn the Panzers moved within 4 kilometerseast ofEI Bathan and into EI Bathan by 1030. The commanderof the 10.Panzer-Division, Generalleutnant Fischer, person-

ally gave the orders to take the heights east of the pass westof Tebourba and to engage the enemy artillery supposedlylocated on the other side of the pass. The objective wasreached without encountering any enemy activity. The en-emy battery didn't fire and therefore couldn't be spotted. Theunits turned south andpushed forward the Fallschirmjaegerattack on Point 145 from EI Bathan. Fleeing enemy columnsand tanks were observed as soon as the Tigers appeared.The fleeing enemy could only be engaged with difficulty, be-cause the hilly terrain constantlyprovided cover for the oppo-nent. Point 145 was secured and attempts were made to gaincontact with Kampfgruppe Gehrhardt, who was expectedfrom the southeast. One Tiger was hit in the idler wheel androadwheels by a self-propelled enemy 7.5 cm anti-tank gun.However, it remained drivable. From covered positions onthe heights northwest ofMedjerda, medium enemy batteriesfired at the Tigers without success. The territory that had beengained was secured for the night in cooperation with theFallschirmjaeger that had arrived.

Lessons: The morale effect of Tigers was especially no-ticeable on this day. Without problems the Tigers easily man-aged the march through the mountainous terrains.

On 7 December 1942 the Tigers were pulled back to anarea 1 kilometer south of EI Bathan. The Kompanie wasassigned tactically to Panzer-Regiment 7 (KampfgruppeGehrhardt).

16

CHAPTER 21: DEFEAT IN NORTH AFRICAOn 8 December 1942 the Panzers had to move to slightly

higher terrain because the ground was no longer crossabledue to persistent rainfall.

On 9 December, both Panzers (one Tiger and onePz.Kpfw.///) arrived that had taken part in the march fromBizerte to capture and disarm the Ville navy base. It rainedthroughout the day. At 2000 hours, attack orders came in forthe 10th.

On 10 December 1942, five Tigers and 4 Pz.Kpfw.///swere operational out of the seven Tigers and 5 Pz.Kpfw.///savailable. Near Massicault, the unit joined the formation ofPanzer-Regiment 7. Two Tigers were assigned to the leadcompany; the rest followed in reserve behind the main bodyof the Kampfgruppe. The objective was Medjez el Bab.Movement was restricted to the roads, the ground being toosoft because of rain.

Enemy resistance was first encountered 8 kilometerssouthwest ofFurma. From hull-down positions, enemy tanksfired at the lead Panzers. One Tiger shot up two enemy Gen-eral Stuart tanks and four armored half-tracks. The advancecontinued. Six kilometers short ofMedjez el Bab, the Panzerscame under fire from several enemy batteries. The columntook up defensive positions. The plan was to continue theattack after the Panzer-Grenadiere arrived and to advanceon Medjez el Bab from the north on both sides of the river.

During the approach march, the enemy tanks that hadbeen driven offassembled in the high ground north ofFurmaand attacked our artillery positions. The Tigers, which wereimmediately sent to the rear, encountered 20 to 25 GeneralStuart tanks and shot up 12 without suffering a single loss.Additional enemy tanks were knocked out by elements ofPanzer-Regiment 7. The night was spent on the road fromFurma to Medjez el Bab.

On 11 December 1942, the captured territory was moppedup by Kampfgruppe Gehrhardt. The Tiger took over defen-sive positions facing south against reported enemy tanks. Onlyseveral enemy armored cars were spotted; they immediatelypulled back. At 2000 hours, orders were received to pull theTigers out and send them to a Stuetzpunkt 7 kilometers eastof Djedeida at the disposal of the Armee.

Lessons.' If only a few Tigers are available, it is entirelysuitable to incorporate the Tigers into a Panzer advance. TwoTigers, assigned to the lead, served as battering rams anddrew fire from dug-in defensive weapons that were difficult tospot. The rest of the Kompanle, pulled along in reserve, wasto engage any threats expected to the flanks from enemytanks.

Tigers may not open fire too early against enemy tanks,in order to keep retreating enemy tanks within the effectiverange of our weapons as long as possible.

Tigers can maintain the convoy speed of the lighter tankswithout reaching or exceeding the ordered limit of30 kilome-ters per hour.

The previous methods used in employing Tigers in Tuni-sia were the result of the prevailing conditions. We should

strive for employment ofpure Tiger formations including theirescort tanks as the Schwerpunkt.

Seven of the eight available Tigers were operational on16 December 1942.

On 17 December 1942, Major Lueder also wrote the fol-lowing report on the effectiveness of enemy heavy weaponsand the usefulness of their own heavy weapons:

I. Enemy weapons:A. Enemy Tanks.' The 7.5 cm gun of the M3 (General

Lee) couldn't penetrate through the Tiger's armor at a rangeof 150 meters. The last 10 mm of the side armor held upagainst a hit on the side armor that had been guided by thesheet metal fender over the track.

The 3.7 cm gun of the M2 (General Stuart) is apparentlyvery accurate. Fire was especially heavily directed at thedriver's visor, commander's cupola, and the gap between theturret and hull. In one case, a shell fragment jammed theturret, temporarily taking the Tiger out ofaction. It is proposedthat a deflector channel be added like those installed on thePZ.Kpfw.11 and III.

B. Enemy anti-tankguns: At ranges of600 to 800 meters,the 3.7 cm and 4 cm anti-tank guns penetrate through thefront and side of the hull of the Pz.Kpfw./II. They succeedonly in damaging the Tiger's roadwheels and track which inno case results in immobiliZing the Tiger.

In one case, at an estimated range of600 to 800 meters,a self-propelled 7.5 em anti-tank gun hit a Tiger on the rightfront by the final drive. The Tiger was out of service tempo-rarily due to the resulting failure of the weld seam.

C. Enemy artillery: Up to now only minor roadwheel dam-age has been caused by shell fragments. Most hits on theTiger lay in the suspension comppnents, causing high wearon the roadwheels, rubber tires, track links, and track pins.Jamming the interleaved roadwheels has not occurred, andno Tigers were immobilized.

II. Our weapons.'A. The 8.8 em Kw.K. gun is very accurate. Up to no~

the Tiger has fired only at the M3 (General Lee) at ranges of100 to 150 meters. The front and side armor were cleanlypenetrated. The M2 (General Stuart) was shot through at allranges.

We should strive to supply the Tigers solely with Panzer-Kopfgranaten with tracers for better observation ofeach shot.

An enemybattery was engagedata range of7600 metersby using a gunner's quadrant. The enemy battery was si-lenced after six shots were fired at it. It is proposed that theTiger-Kompanie be outfitted with a Fe/dfunksprecher f (ra-dio set 11.f? to enable forward observers to direct their fire. Inaddition, the inverted image rangefinders should be ex-changed for converging image rangefinders. Large errorsresult from using the former type in terrain with no discerniblelandmarks.

17

PANZERTRUPPEN 19431945B. The 7.5 em Kw.K. (kurz) has proven to be very suc-

cessful in engaging mass targets with Sprenggranaten (highexplosive shells). The effectiveness of the Hoh/granate(shaped charge shells) has not been established, becauseup to now only the Tigers have fought with enemy tanks.

The initial attempt by the Allies to quickly occupy all ofTunisia was thwarted. Engagements to control the numerouspasses continued with the Germans managing to regain andhold significant territory. In the interim, Panzerarmee Afrikahad retreated back to and held off the British Eighth Army onthe Mareth Line in southeastern Tunisia.

The Germans exploited the lull in the Allied attacks bylaunching limited counterstrikes including Operation"Fruehlingswind" on 14 February 1943. The 1O.Panzer-Di-vision with Panzer-Regiment 7 (minus the II.Abteilung/

Panzer-Regi~ent7) supported by a Tiger-Kompanie fromthe schwere Panzer-Abteilung 501 and the 21.Panzer-Di-vision with Panzer-Regiment 5, hit the southern end of theAllied line at Sidi Bou Zid. The 3rd Battalion of the 1st U.S.Armored Regiment, starting the day with 53 Sherman tanks,was decimated after being hit from the front and then fromthe right rear. They were left with only six Shermans tanks atthe end of the day. The 2nd Battalion of the 1st U.S. ArmoredRegiment was sent in the next day with 54 Sherman tanks.All b~t four Shermans that remained behind as rearlink tankswere knocked out by the Pz.Kpfw.lIls and Pz.Kpfw.lVs of

the I.Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 7 and Panzer-Regiment5 without any assistance from the Tigers.

But this success was an isolated event. Any remainingoffensive strength in the Panzer units was lost in an attackthat failed to dislodge the British forces facing the MarethLine and in Operation "Ochsenkopf" in attacks that failed togain control of the passes near Beja, Tunisia.

The last Panzer units sent to Tunisia were the Stab and1.Kompanie/schwere Panzer-Abteilung 504 and the3.Kompanie/Panzer-Regiment Hermann Goering. The fol-lowing notes made by the company commander for their wardiary reveal how the 3.Kompanie/Panzer-RegimentHermann Goering was employed in defensive positionsawaiting Allied attacks in the final phases of the campaign inTunisia:

8 April 1943: At 1300 hours, drove into positions in theTina valley with 5 Panzers without incident. Intermittent lightharassing artillery fire.

9 April 1943: Uneventful. Light harassing artillery fire.Three Pz.Kpfw./Vs arrived toward evening.

10 April 1943: At 0130 hours, took up new defensive po-sitions in two groups, one on each side of the road. Toward1000 hours, enemy tanks gathered. Leutnant Lahusencounted 33 tanks. Artillery fire landed on both groups.

11 April 1943: From 1000 to 1430 hours, strong artilleryfire landed on the group on the right side ofthe road. Changed

This Tiger from the 1.Kompanie/schwere Panzer-Abteilung 504 was abandoned after the turret was jammed. The loader's hatch wasalso shattered by a hit. (TIM)

18

CHAPTER 21: DEFEAT IN NORTH AFRICA

OPERATIONAL PANZERS IN PANZER-REGIMENT 810 November 1942 to 31 March 1943

60

50

40

30

20

10

o10Nov 30Nov

20Nov20Dec 10Jan

10Dec 31Dec

56

31Jan 20Feb20Jan 10Feb

10Mar 31Mar28Feb 20Mar

60

50

40

30

20

10

o

~ PzlI Pzlli ~ PzIIISp D PzlIl(75) PzlVSp ~ PzBefpositions to hull down. Two Panzers were out ofaction due todamage to an idler wheel and roadwheels.

12April 1943: After 0100 hours, reoccupied the positionof the right group. Entire day uneventful.

13 to 17April 1943: Uneventful. Occasional light harass-ing artillery fire on both groups.

18Apri/1943: Uneventful throughout the day. About2300hours, after a short heavy artillery preparation, a British pa-trol of about 30 men attacked the left group. After about twohours the enemy patrol was thrown back by A 24 with sup-port from the Panzers.

19 to 21 April 1943: No unusual activity. Harassing fireand surprise barrages during the day and night.

22April 1943: Quietall day. Some harassing fire, increas-ing toward evening. 3./A 24 reported that the British wereassembling in a Wadi in front of the main battle line. In spiteof this, no action occurred through the night.

23April 1943: In the morning, 12 British tanks were spot-ted which joined in the attack against the neighbor on theright. They drove along the eastern side of the Djebel Egeland halted about 2500 meters away from the Kompanie po-

sition. Four Pz.Kpfw./Vs opened fire. Two British tanks weredestroyed; the rest turned back. At the end, an artillery bar-rage hit our positions.

At 2200 hours, Leutnant Lahusen with four Pz.Kpfw./Vsdrove over to the neighbor on the right. The remaining fivePanzers supported the 3./A 24 in repulsing an enemy pla-toon that had broken into the main defense line.

24 April 1943: Three Pz.Kpfw./Vs, on guard since 0300hours by the right-hand neighbor, covered the disengagementof T 3. After 0445 hours, all of the Panzers in the Kompaniewere located in the T3 sector. With the supportofthe Panzers,Batai/lon Lersch (T3) was assigned to cover the disengage-ment of their right-hand battalion. For this purpose Batai/lonLersch took up a hedgehog formation. The Panzers of theKompanie were dispersed in this hedgehog formation. Oneman was wounded by a shell fragment from light artillery fire.

About 1830 hours, Feldwebel Fragel was ordered to re-connoiter the zone in front of the position with an infantrygroup. During this action, he destroyed an artillery forwardobservation post and threw back an American infantry com-pany.

19

PANZERTRUPPEN 1943-194525April 1943: T 3 was pulled back after 0000 hours. The

Panzer-Kompanie took up hull-down positions in a Wadi.The day passed quietly.

26April 1943:At 0000 hours, the Panzer-Kompanie waspulled back further and took up alert positions in the moun-tains. No activity. The Kompanie rested.

27Apri/1943:About 0100 hours, the Kompanie changedpositions and took up positions behind the 5./734 north of theMedjerda valley. Uneventful.

28 April 1943: No activity.29 April 1943: The British broke into the position of the

5.Kompanie in the afternoon. During the night, twoPZ.Kpfw./Vs (Leutnant Lahusen and Unteroffizier Sonder-mann) drove a British infantry unit off the ridge and remainedguarding the ridge until morning.

30 April 1943: About 1300 hours, the S.Kompanie re-ported a British attack supported by 18 tanks. The Panzer-Kompanie was formed into two groups and drove into posi-tions on line with the 5.Kompanie. After a short E~xchangeoffire, the right group under Leutnant Lahusen had to pull backafter receiVing hits on a gun, gearbox, and final drive.

The left group under Oberleutnant Muenzner spotted fourenemy tanks on the slope on which the 5.Kompanie waslocated. Oberfeldwebel Kirschbaum laid down a smokescreenon the position up to the opponent. Under cover of this

20

smokescreen, Oberleutnant Muenzner drove to the next ridgeand shot up two enemy tanks at a range of 25 meters.Oberfeldwebel Kirschbaum also drove to the same ridge andwas knocked out by an enemy tank. The driver let the Panzerroll back down. Oberfeldwebel Kirschbaum had been killed,the gunner and loader wounded.

The commander's Panzer shot up an artillery forwardobservation post on the ridge. Following this action, nothingmore was seen of any British on the ridge. During the night,the infantry counterattacked the ridge and found it unoccu-pied. At night, the damaged Panzers were towed back to theWerkstatt.

In addition to the Panzers sent to Tunisia with the units,from 1 November 1942 to 1 May 1943 a total of 68 Pz.Kpfw.1I1and 142 Pz.Kpfw.lV had been shipped to North Africa asreplacements, of which 16 Pz.Kpfw.1I1 and 28 Pz.Kpfw.lVwere reported as having been sunk in transit. But these rein-forcements were insufficient to deal with the combined tankstrength of the American and British forces. Worn down byattrition (only 44 Pz.Kpfw.lIl, 25 Pz.Kpfw.IV and 1 Tiger werereported as operational in the last strength report compiledon 4 May), the last of the Panzer units had surrendered inTunisia by 13 May 1943.

22Surrounded at Stalingrad to the

Counteroffensive to Retake Kharkov

W hen the Russians launched their major offensiveto envelop Stalingrad, the Panzertruppen on theEastern Front were organized as shown in the Or-der of Battle dated 15 November 1942 and with the strengthshown in the table on the Operational Panzers at the Start ofthe Russian Offensive. The 6.Armee with three Panzer-Divi-sions and two Infanterie-Oivision (mot) were still tied up intheir attempt to capture Stalingrad. The 4.Panzer-Armee withthe 16. and 29.1nfanterie-Oivision (mot) were south ofStalingrad and the 22.Panzer-Oivision, 27.Panzer-Division,and Panzer-Verband 700 were west of Stalingrad. Thesewere the only Panzertruppen that stood in the way of theRussian offensive that succeeded in quickly enveloping andentrapping the 6.Armee in Stalingrad.

But this wasn't the only Russian offensive designed tocut off the overextended German forces. On 25 November1942, the Russians launched another offensive farther to thewest against Heeresgruppe Mitte. Details on what it waslike to be isolated and surrounded as a result of a major Rus-sian offensive were recorded by Oberleutnant Graf Rothkirch,company commander in Panzer-Regiment 31 as follows:

24 November 1942 - The Kompanie was deployed onthe left sector of the division with seven gun-armed Panzers:one Panzer in Wassilki, two Panzers in the Zungenwaeldchenand four Panzers along with a Pz.Kpfw.// in the woods southof Wassilki where the company command post was located.Deserters reported that a major Russian offensive wasplanned to start the next day.

25 November 1942 - The battalion ordered an increasedalert status after 0400 hours. About 0600 hours, firing fromall calibers, the opponent's artillery preparation suddenlystruck in unheard-of force. The 32 cm rockets were fired insalvoes for the first time. Similar to the Stalinorgan, within afew seconds 30 to 40 rockets rained down on the position. Inthe woods it was barely possible for the crews to get intotheir Panzers. There was no chance to bring along anyprovi-

sions such as food or blankets. This situation would causegreat discomfort in the coming days.

The four Panzers took up positions along the wood line.Communication was maintained by messengers with the in-fantry company to the right. About 0730 hours, a messagecame in that tanks were approaching. Utilizing mutual firesupport tactics, the four Panzers drove into positions directlybehind the infantry dugouts. Three T34 tanks could be ob-served beyond our firing range as they broke through be-tween Cholm-Beresuiski and into our own position. Becausethe Russians were laying down heavy caliber artillery shellsand rockets on the infantry positions and it was also appar-ent that the Panzers were receiving aimed artillery fire, or-ders were given to move back to the wood line to the rear.Two Panzers took over covering the area to the northeastwhile the other two Panzers set off to hunt down the T34tanks that had broken through. It took one and one-halfhoursfor the two Panzers to stalk and kill two of the T34 tanks. Thethird was destroyed by a Pak Btl. (self-propelled anti-tankgun) positioned in the woods. At the same time, the Pz.Kpfw.///5 em kurz located in the Zungenwaeldchen had destroyedthree Christie tanks. The Panzer located in Wassilki destroyeda T34 tank on the west bank of the Ossug.

The Russian artillery barrage continued in the same in-tensity until about 1430 hours. About 1530 hours, theKompanie commander received an order from theKampfgruppe to advance with four Panzers to Gradjakinoand destroy enemy tanks found there. The order was imme-diately carried out. The Panzer in Wassilki and both Panzersin the Zungenwaeldchen remained behind. Even at longrange, communication by radio worked excellently.

A Gruppe under Oberfeldwebel Doleski joined theKompanie commanded by Oberleutnant Graf Rothkirch inGradjakino. That same evening, the entire Kompanie wasordered to take over anti-tank defense behind the battalion.The Kompanie now consisted of two Pz.Kpfw.111 or IV with7.5 em Kw.K. kurz, three Pz.Kpfw.111 5 em Kw.K. lang, two

21

PANZERTRUPPEN 1943-1945

ORDER OF BATTLE - 15 NOVEMBER 1942

Pz.Rgt.203

Heeresgruppe NordI

A.O.K.16I

II.A.K.I

Gr.BrandenbergerI

8.Pz.Div.I

Pz.Rgt.10

A.O.K.11I

IIII.A.K.

I12.Pz.Div.

IPz.Rgt.29

Heeresgruppe MitteI

IXXXV.A.K.

I

9.Pz.Div. I.D.~~Gr.D.~~ 20.Pz.Div.I I I

Pz.Rgt.33 Pz.Abt.Gr.D. Pz.Rgt.29

IA.O.K.9

IXXXIX.Pz.K.

I5.Pz.Div. 1.Pz.Div.

I IPz.Rgt.31 Pz.Rgt.1

IPz.A.O.K.3

IXLVI.Pz.K.

I2.Pz.Div.

IPz.Rgt.3

19.Pz.Div.I

Pz.Rgt.27

IXLVII.Pz.K.

I18.Pz.Div.

IPz.Rgt.18

IPz.A.O.K.2

I

17.Pz.Div.I

Pz.Rgt.39

4.Pz.Div.I

Pz.Rgt.35

In Reserve

11.Pz.Div.I

Pz.Rgt.15

Heeresgruppe BI

A.O:K.6I

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I I I I I I I I IPz.Abt.127 Pz.Rgt.204 Pz.Rgt.2 Pz.Abt.103 Pz.Abt.160 Pz.Rgt.36 Pz.Rgt.24 Pz.Abt.116 Pz.Abt.129

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r--III.Pz.K.

II

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Pz.Rgt.4

22

CHAPTER 22: SURROUNDED AT STALINGRAD TO THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE TO RETAKE KHARKOV

18 Nov 1942-

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23

PANZERTRUPPEN 19431945Pz.Kpfw.111 5 em Kw.K. kurz, one 7.5 em Pak 40 Sfl., andone 7.62 em Pak 36 Sfl. The night passed quietly.

26 November 1942 - As on the previous day, the sameartillery barrage started at 0600 hours. The positions occu-pied during the night had to be abandonedbecause they couldbe directly observed by the enemy. The Panzers divided, tak-ing up positions in two depressions. Several minutes later, atank attack was reported on the left sector of the battalion.The Kompanie set off to counterattack. The Russian attackpassed by the battalion out of range of our weapons towardCholm-Beresuiski. The Kompanie had to maneuver very skill-fully in order not to be spotted by the exceptional enemy artil-lery observers and be decimated. In addition, anti-tank gunsand dug-in enemy heavy weapons opened up an unheard-ofbarrage. Two of our Panzer were already hit by artillery andanti-tank shells but could still be repaired by the proficientcrews during the action.

After an hour and a halt it was no longer possible to holdthe positions. The Kompanie again divided, taking up posi-tions in both depressions. This also lay under very strongartillery fire, which hit another Panzer but didn't cause anydamage. Two Panzers were requisitioned to secure thePanzer-Sehlueht (ravine) surrounding the battalion's sectoron the right. Keen all-round observation was necessary. Thenecessity for being alert was proven by the fact that threeT34 tanks suddenly broke into the position from the rear.These tanks were immediately surrounded without spottingthe Panzers and within several minutes were shot to pieces.The Kompanie also destroyed a towing vehicle and success-fully engaged five anti-tank guns.

At dusk, the Kompanle was pulled into the right battal-ion sector for overnight security. A KW I tank broke throughfrom behind and was knocked out. This tank exploded scat-tering parts in a 300 meter radius over the field. These posi-tions were held overnight and maintained the next day withonly short movements.

27 November 1942 - No tank kills were made today. TheKompanie limited itself to wiping out Russian infantry andshooting up enemy convoys. The Pak Sfl. and two Panzerswere hit by anti-tank rifles.

The spirit and morale of the crews must be especiallymentioned. By this evening, the crews had already been sit-ting in their Panzers for two and one-half days. During thistime they didn't have anything to eat and knew that suppliesweren't expected because the ring had been closed aroundthem since 26 November. They received fuel and ammuni-tion in frighteningly small quantities. Sleep couldn't be con-sidered, not even for the coming night. Happy and confidentfaces were always seen in spite of the fact that the situationhad started to become very serious. This is proof that themen appropriately fought with the roten Teufel (the red devilunit symbol for Panzer-Regiment 31) on their steel giants.

After today, two Panzers were positioned to guard theleft wing of the battalion during the night because the Rus-sians constantly attacked there at night. Their main task was

OPERATIONAL PANZERS AT START OF RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE

PANZ ERKAMP FWAGENII 38t III III III IV IV Bef

Organization kz 19 75 kz 19 Date

Heeresgruppe A1.Pz.Armee

3.Pz.Div. 13 19 25 5 3 18Nov13.Pz.Div. 4 7 14 1 3 18Nov23.Pz.Div. 5 12 15 4 4 18NovSS-Wiking 3 12 1 7 18Nov

Heeresgruppe B22.Pz.Div. 2 5 12 10 1 10 18Nov

2.Armee27.1?z.Div. 9 22 5 10 12 2 5 10Nov

4.Pz.Armee16.Inf.Div. 8 16 7 11 1 16Nov29.Inf.Div. 7 23 9 18 2 16Nov

6.Armee14.Pz.Div. 1 21 7 1 6 5 18Nov16.Pz.Div. 21 1 9 18Nov24.Pz.Div. 5 9 17 5 5 12 2 18Nov3.Inf.Div. 3 22 3 4 18Nov

60.Inf.Div. 4 12 2 3 18Nov

Heeresgruppe Mitte11.Pz.Div. 11 9 49 6 3 18Nov

2.Pz.Armee4.Pz.Div. 2 12 5 18Nov

17.Pz.Div. 9 30 18 3 18Nov18.Pz.Div. 5 22 6 4 9 2 18Nov19.Pz.Div. 7 37 8 3 10 3 18Nov

3.Pz.Armee2.Pz.Div. 11 10 8 12 4 8 1 18Nov

9.Armee1.Pz.Div. 3 7 16 8 6 5 6 4 18Nov5.Pz.Div. 15 23 10 7 10 6 7 18Nov9.Pz.Div. 26 30 32 7 5 2 18Nov

20.Pz.Div. 4 22 14 11 5 6 18NovInf.Div.GD 7 1 7 12 3 18NovI./Pz.Rgt.15 3 2 28 3 1 18Nov

Heeresgruppe Nord11.Armee

8.Pz.Div. 14 1 18Nov12.Pz.Div. 1 24 17 2 18 3 18Nov

16.ArmeePz.Rgt.203 7 2 18Nov

18.Armee PzVI1./s.pz.Abt.502 9 7 6 1 18Nov

to support the effort to eliminate enemy infantry. Both of thesePanzers were pulled back again at dawn.

28 November 1942 - The defensive tasks and positionsremained the same as before. A mounted reconnaissancepatrol was wiped out, a radio post destroyed, and an anti-tank rifle and several infantry shot up.

A Pz.Kpfw.11 arrived today with ammunition, mainly ar-morpiercing, some food, and also 60 liters of fuel. Since yes-terday, there had been rumors that the Russians had brokenthrough the main defense line southeast ofus, and were pur-suing with an unbelievably large number of tanks. Our at-tacks that should free us appear to have run into the sand,because the noise of combat moved farther away. A certainnervousness became noticeable after this occurred. Only thelocal successes, which should occur again today, bolsteredthe undiminished good mood.

About 1530 hours, an Oberfeldwebel arrived at the com-pany command post totally spent, collapsed, and reportedthat six tanks had broken into our positions and were rollingtoward our infantry positions and the battalion commandpost.Four Panzers attacked within a few minutes. Two T60, oneT34, and a heavy American tank with two gun turrets wereknocked out and went up in flames within 10 minutes. A fifthtank was knocked out by a Pak and a T34 tank f1ed.fhisattack was aided by the fact that the Komplln/e could choose

24

CHAPTER 22: SURROUNDED AT STALINGRAD TO THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE TO RETAKE KHARKOVthe direction to attack, driving with the wind in the heavysnow-storm. The Russians had to fight facing into the blowing snow.Four prisoners were brought in.

The totally spent Oberfeldwebellet himself be lifted intohis Panzer and very successfully took part in the attack. Againproofof the men's good spirits which must be highly regardedin these situations.

29 November 1942 -At dawn today, without infantry sup-port on the left wing of the battalion, two Panzers captured aRussian fieldwork and rolled up part of our own earthworksthat the Russians had occupied for several days. During theevening, in the same sector a KW I tank was knocked outthat had been destroying our positions by firing at a range of80 meters. A prisoner was brought in who was exceptionallywell oriented on the situation and dramatically portrayed forus the precariousness of our situation.

The so-called Panzer-Schlucht lay under heavy mortarfire all day. Toward evening, yelling Hurrah, the Russianscharged the right sector and were already within 5 meters ofour earthworks when the Panzer crews mounted up. Imme-diately, five Panzers drove off to surround the Panzer-Schlucht from all sides. This attack was beaten back in ex-actly the same way as four other attempts. A deserter stated

that 150 had been killed and wounded. These earthworkswere occupied by only 10 Pioniere, so it is readily apparentthat the prevention of a break-in was earned entirely by thePanzer crews.

30 November 1942 - Today began with the sad loss of aPz.Kpfw.IV that couldn't pull back out of its position becauseof lack of fuel and was wiped out by a direct hit. All day longthe Russians laid down heavy artillery fire on the position,especially on the Panzer-Schlucht. Having reinforced thering around us, the opponent could see in from all sides. Theyprecisely spotted the Panzers and concentrated fire on these,their most dangerous opponents. It was necessary to con-tinuously change positions, even if only for a few meters. Wedidn't know where we should move to at the end. The de-fense still completely held up in spite of this. Every Panzerwas hit additional times. A Pz.Kpfw.1115 em Kw.K. lang (tac-tical number 32) was destroyed. A Pak Sfl. was shot to pieces.The Russians moved into position 80 meters away, ready toattack.

Orders came to break out of the ring about 1300 hours.At 1615 hours, the Panzer-Grenadiere disengaged from theenemy. The Panzers took over the wounded, covered therear of the Panzer-Grenadiere, and followed them at about

A replacement Pz.Kpfw.lV Ausf.G in mint condition passes a Pz.Kpfw.1I1 Ausf.L that is being repaired. (WR)

25

PANZERTRUPPEN 1943-19451645 hours. All of the wounded were brought along. The im-mobilized Panzers were blown up.

The battalion arrived in Cholm-Beresuiski one hour later.1 December 1942 - About 0300 hours, the combined

battalions commanded by Stieber and Ihle broke through thewoods south of Wassilki. The Russians pursued by the hun-dreds. However, the breakout was achieved without signifi-cant losses.

The Kompanie was now attached to Infanterie-Regi-ment 195. Disregarding warnings of the consequences, allof the Panzers, even those that weren't operational, wereemployed for anti-tank defense of the I.Bataillon/lnfanterie-Regiment 195. This resulted in the loss ofa Pz.Kpfw.111 thatcould have been recovered. After enormous difficulties, theKompanie managed to free itself from being assigned sub-ordinate to Infanterie-Regiment 195 about 1400 hours.

At about 1600 hours, the commander of Panzer-Regi-ment 31 was informed of the arrival of the remains ofKampfgruppen Rothkirch, Kettner, and Doleski in Kropotowowith a strength ofone Pz.Kpfw. 7.5 em kurz, two Pz.Kpfw.1115 em lang, five Pz.Kpfw.111 5 em Kw.K. kurz, and one 7.62em PakSfl.

The 6.Panzer-Division, which had been resting and re-fitting in the West since the Spring of 1942, was rapidly loadedon rail cars and sent to the 4.Panzer-Armee to attempt tobreak through to the encircled German forces at Stalingrad.As related by the following excerpts from their war diary,Panzer-Regiment 11 went into action directly after beingunloaded:

3 December 1942 - At RemontnajaThe 2.Kompanie was unloaded from the rail transport

and pulled into bivouac west of Remontnaja.1015 hours - The Division la called: The enemy is attack-

ing Pochlebin from the north. The 6.Panzer-Division haspulled the 1. and 5.Kompanie/Panzer-Regiment 11 intoKotelnikowo. Panzer-Regiment 11 is to prepare for combat.

1030 hours - The division ordered: All Kompanien ofPanzer-Regiment 11 are to be sent forward. The regimental

commander is to move to division headquarters. The 1.,2.,5., and 8.Kompanien are to be assigned to the commander.of the II.Abteilung (Baeke). The Stab II.Abteilung, 2. and8.Kompanien are to move to Swenitschnyj. Abteilung Baekewill report directly to 6.Panzer-Division.

1100 hours - The opponent had swept through Pochlebinfrom north to south with tanks and overrun the 3.Kompanie/Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 114, which had been guard-ing the village.

1300 hours - The 6. and 7.Kompanien were unloadedfrom rail transport in Gaschun, southwest ofRemontnaja. Thecommander and elements of the Stabs-KompanieI.Abteilung had also arrived in the interim. The Kompanienwere ordered to bivouac east of the Regiment, if possible,so that they can be quickly moved to the front.

The opponent's tanks south ofPochlebin had turned westtoward Kajorekij and were repulsed by our Panzer-Jaegernthat were located there. The 1. and 5.Kompanie/Panzer-Regiment 11 and the II.Bataillon/Panzer-Grenadier-Regi-ment 114 were sent in by the division to attack this enemy.

1400 hours - Division la called that the opponent appearsto have turned awa}l. One speculates that on 4 Decemberthe enemy will move out ofPochlebin and attempt to envelopKotelnikowo. The division ordered the Stab I.Abteilung withthe 6. and 7.Kompanien to move to Korolew, west northwestof Ssemitschnaja.

It is foreseen that after presenting the results of recon-naissance to the division commander on 4 December, thecommander ofPanzer-Regiment 11 will take over commandof.both its Abteilungen.

1900 hours - The 1. and 5.Kompanie had encounteredenemy tanks south of Pochlebin as night fell. Positioned be-hind a ridge, the enemy had let both Kompanien come on.One enemy tank was knocked out. One ofour Panzers burnedout, with one killed and one wounded. Darkness ended thebattle.

During the night the 6. and 7.Kompanien were divertedto Ssemitschnyj. The march was extraordinarily difficult be-cause of the slick ground. It was thawing weather and thetrails were muddy. The regimental commander and the

ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH OF PANZER UNITSREPLACEMENT UNITS SENT TO EASTERN FRONT

6.Panzer-Division~ Pz.Rgt.11

\; II. . avo \; I.6~ 6~

\ rrL\ le \ le\ le \ \ rrL\ le \ le\ le \21 PzlI, 73 PzllI(lg), 32 PzlIl(75), 24 PzIV(lg), 9 PzBef

26

(Nov42)

CHAPTER 22: SURROUNDED AT STALINGRAD TO THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE TO RETAKE KHARKOVI.Abteilung commander were also ordered to move there inthe early morning of 4 December.

The 3.Kompanie was unloaded from rail transport inRemontnaja and remained there under orders from the divi-sion. The 4.Kompanie was to be pulled forward toSsemitschnaja and unloaded with orders to remain there.

4 December 1942 - At SsemitschnajaThe commander with the Regiments-Stab remained with

the division in Ssemitschnaja for the night of 3/4 Decemberin order to be available to attack on 4 December with twoAbteilungen (six Kompanien) in the event that aerial recon-naissance spotted strong enemy forces near Pochlebin.

0245 hours - The adjutant was ordered to the Division la.Reconnaissance had reported noise from tanks at Pochlebinduring the night. The division assumed that the enemy wasreinforcing, especially with tanks, and ordered: The entirePanzer-Regiment was to attack as early as possible. Thefollowing forces are available:

Abteilung Baeke with Stab II.Abteilung, 1., 2., 5., and8.Kompanien

Abteilung Loewe with Stab I.Abteilung, 4., 6., and7.Kompanien

II. (SPW) Bataillon/Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 1141.(Sfl.) Kompanie/Panzer-Jaeger-Abteilung 41I.Abteilung/Arlillerie-Regiment 76 with one leiehte and

one schwere BatterieThe 4.Kompanie, ordered to move to Ssemischnyj di-

rectly after unloading from rail transport in Ssemitschnaja,had problems during unloading and didn't arrive inSsemitschnyj until 0645 hours.

0530 hours - The regimental commander briefly orientedthe Abteilung commanders in Ssemischnyj and then droveto the commander of Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 114 inorder to use the reconnaissance reports available there toplan the attack. Unnecessary delays occurredbecause ofpoorreconnaissance sent in too late by the Grenadier-Regiment.The results of the reconnaissance contained nothing aboutthe enemy tanks. The advanced observation posts had onlyspotted enemy infantry moving into the defile betweenPochlebin and Majorskij.

The Regiment commander decided to immediately at-tack Pochlebin from the west and northwest and set the timefor disseminating orders as 0830 hours at the command postof Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 114. The Abteilung com-manders were informed to move their Kompanien into theassembly areas.

0830 hours - The following orders were given out: AttackPochlebin from the west and northwest to destroy the enemyand take Pochlebin. The attack will continue up to the AkssejRiver north ofPochlebin. Clean out the area aroundand northof Pochlebin.

1.Kompanie/Panzer-Regiment 11 and 1.Kompanie/Panzer-Jaeger-Abteilung 41 should hold the right wing andprevent the enemy from pulling out to the south. The mainbody of the II.Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 11 with its right

wing on Majorskij is to attack Pochlebin with the main effortto the left through Point 76.6. Starling at Point 94.4, 1./Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 11 is to attack Pochlebin fromthe northwest, with the main effort to the left through theKomlowaja defile 2 kilometers north ofPochlebin. II.Bataillon/Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 114 is to follow between thePanzer-Abteilungen in the event that the enemy retreats tothe north in order to be able to move forward to the road fromPochlebin to Wessel}!. The I.Abteilung/Arlillerie-Regiment76 with two Batterien is to support the attack and at the be-ginning of the attack is to fire on Pochlebin and the hills closeto Pochlebin in order to cause the enemy to start moving andthereby create targets for the Panzers. The sehwere Flak inKotelnikowo have orders to fire at Pochlebin when they re-ceive the radio message that the Panzer-Regiment hasstarted to attack.

0945 hours -1.Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 11 reportedthat they had arrived at the assembly area. The regimentalcommander ordered the attack to start.

0955 hours - The attack began but the II.Abteilung onlygained ground slowly. In 'a frontal attack on the hills byPochlebin, the II.Abteilung encountered heavy, well-aimedfire from excellently camouflaged enemy tanks and anti-air-craft guns. In a short time, three Panzers of the 8. mittlereKompanie had been hit. The Panzers exploded. In addition, 'several Panzers of the 2.Kompanie were burning becausethe fuel cans fastened on the rear deck of the Panzers werehit. Because of ignited fuel cans, the commander of the2.Kompanie had to leave his burning Panzer and was se-verely wounded while outside his Panzer. Loss of the com-mander caused a significant reduction in the combat value ofthe Kompanie.

Because of the difficulty in orientation, I.Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 11, which was supposed to attackPochlebin from Point 94.4, started out too far north and waspulled even farther north because it wanted to cut off the en-emy retreating to the north.

By radio, the regimental commandergave the I.Abteilungorders to turn toward Pochlebin, drove across the battlefieldtoward the Abteilung, and brought them back from the northto attack Pochlebin and to support the hard-pressed, haltedII.Abteilung. The attack of the I.Abteilung relieved the pres-sure on the II.Abteilung, and theirattackagain gainedground.The hills and village of Pochlebin were taken from the westand north at 1200 hours. As a result of the wide swing of theI.Abteilung, a hole occurred between the Panzer-Abteilungen which the opponent cleverly exploited to breakout. Elements of both Panzer-Abteilungen and the SPW-Bataillon immediately turned but couldn't prevent part of theenemy forces mounted on horses from breaking out. Thisdidn't alter the success of the attack.

II.Bataillon/Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 114, which upto now had followed the battle, was now ordered to mop upthe battlefield. Depressions in the terrain, deeply cut by gul-lies, favored the enemy dug-in on the ground in front of

27

PANZERTRUPPEN 1943-1945Pochlebin. The enemy let the Panzers roll past and then re-joined in the defense. Thus, an increasing number ofPanzerswere fired at from close range, especially by the long anti-tank rifles.

After Pochlebin was taken, the enemy infantry and dis-mounted cavalry units were pushed together in the ravinebetween Pochlebin and Majorskij. By nightfall, the 5.Kom-panie supported by two SPW-Kompanien had mopped upthe enemy, only a few of which had still offered resistance.

Shortly before nightfall, the Panzer-Regiment assembledon the south side of Pochlebin. The battlefield was totallyquiet. The results of the battle included 10 tanks knockedout, 14 guns captured, and 1200 counted prisoners. Another800prisoners were later reported by the SPW-Bataillon whichremained in Pochlebin. Cleaning up the battlefield the nextday brought in a large number of anti-tank rifles, machineguns and othercaptured equipmentsuch as about800 horses.

The battle was victoriously decided by the swift attack ofthe main body of the Panzer-Regiment, consisting of about90 Panzers. The 3.Kompanie and the leichten Zuege fromthe Regiments-Stab and Stab II.Abteilung/Panzer-Regi-ment 11 weren't unloaded until the day of the battle. A num-ber of Panzers had suffered mechanical breakdowns duringthe nighttime approach march to the assembly areas becauseof the difficult condition of the trails, marsh, and mud.

A significant part of the success was due to the//.Abtei/ung/Panzer-Regiment 11 and by the incisive andself-sacrificing combat of the 1. and 8.Kompanie. Specialrecognition was earned by Oberleutnant Ranzinger, com-mander of the 8.Kompanie, who mounted up again in an-other Panzer as each of three Panzers that he was in wereknocked out.

Our losses were one mitt/ere Kranken-Panzer-Wagenand one SPWas well as a 7~62 em Pak Sf/., eight killed, and28 wounded. Five Panzers were lost as total write-offs (ofwhich one had already been lost on 3 December) and 12Panzers were temporarily out ofaction (of which five had bro-ken down prior to the battle).

Another view of this same battle was recorded in the com-bat report from the II.Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 11 :

At 1000 hours on 4 December 1942, the Abteilung waslocated in the assembly area on the height northwest ofMajorskij with orders to reoccupy Pochlebin, which had beencaptured by the Russians the day before, and to destroy anyenemy forces found there.

The Abtei/ung formed up with the 5.Kompanie to theright front, 8.Kompanie left, 2.Kompanie echeloned to theleft rear, and the Abteilung-Stab behind the 8.Kompanie.The /.Abtei/ung was on the left and the //./Panzer-Grena-dier-Regiment 114 behind the /.Abteilung.

About 1000 hours, the Abtei/ung received orders fromthe Panzer-Regiment to quickly start because the Russianswere pulling out to the north. In a smooth advance toward the

northwest, receiving artillery fire, the Abtei/ung arrived onthe heights southwest of Pochlebin about 1045 hours.

As they crossed over the ridge southwest of Pochlebin,the Abtei/ung was hit by heavy anti-tank gun fire from thewestern edge ofthe village. Especially heavy fire was returnedby the 2. and B.Kompanien, who had moved to positionscloser to the village. The 2. and B.Kompanien knocked out anumber of anti-tank guns. In addition, the 8.Kompanie shotup five T34 tanks that were pulling back to the north.

In spite of this, Russian anti-tank guns managed to knockout four of the B.Kompanie Panzers. Three Panzers of the2.Kompanie were also knocked out ofaction and many oth-ers damaged. During this firefight, the 5.Kompanie went intoposition to engage the enemy anti-tank guns, infantry, andcavalry south of Pochlebin. The 5.Kompanie managed todestroy several anti-tank guns.

About 1205 hours, the Abteilung received a radio mes-sage that the Kompanie commanded by Scheibert had ar-rived 800 meters north of the village of Pochlebin. After thisthe Abteilung advanced toward Pochlebin again. TheAbteilung succeeded in storming past the south edge ofPochlebin and destroyed the strong infantry opponent de-fending themselves with anti-tank rifles and hand grenadesagainst our attack. On orders from the commander, the5.Kompanie advanced further toward the southeast to de-stroy the infantry dug-in in field positions and foxholes andcaptured 352 prisoners.

At 1430 hours, the Abteilung assembled east ofPochlebin and on orders from the Regiment started the re-turn march to Maiorskyj and Ssemitschnyj.

The 7.Kompanie remained behind with Batai/lon Kueperto defend Pochlebin.Losses: 8.Kompanie 4 Pz.Kpfw./V knocked out,

of which three were totalwrite-offs.

2.Kompanie 3 Panzers knocked out5.Kompanie 1 gun barrel failureStabs-Kompanie Sanitaets-M. T.~ knocked

out.Personnel losses.' 8 dead and 24 wounded.

Panzer tactics employed to combat the Russian armoredspearheads during this period are also revealed in the follow-ing report sent by General von Machensen, commander ofthe 1.Panzer-Armee to General Guderian on 21 March 1943:

While assigned to the 1.Panzer-Armee, the 11.Panzer-Division reported comparatively very high tank kills, whichinitiated the thought that this division had exploited a lessonthat was not generally known. I therefore asked the divisioncommander, Generalleutnant Balck, to write the report that Ihave enclosed. Even though it doesn't contain secret meth-ods, it is still full of new insights. In addition, GeneralleutnantBalek verbally explained.'

1. Well-trained, older Panzer crews are the decisive fac-

28

CHAPTER 22: SURROUNDED AT STALINGRAD TO THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE TO RETAKE KHARKOV

OPERATIONAL STATUS OF PANZER-REGIMENT 11From 7 December 1942 to 31 March 1943

64

125

150

100

50

25

75

o

(50)

(25)-12

44

150

125

100

7562

50

25

0-3

(25)

(50)

7Dec 20Dec 15Jan 30Jan 28Feb 17Mar14Dec 8Jan 22Jan 6Feb 7Mar 31 Mar

Total Writeoffs D PzlI E2d PZlIlIg ~ Pzll175 PzlVlg [22l PzBefRep~acements: 9 new PzlIl Ig, 7 new PzlV Ig by 8JanReplacements: 13 new PZlIllg by 15JanReplacements: 5 new PzlIllg, 3 new PzlV Ig by 22JanReplacements: 10 new PzlV Ig by 7Mar

tor for success. Their experience, in addition to their calm-ness and self-assuredness gained through previous suc-cesses, is the basis for all of the great achievements. Youngreplacement crews sent to the unit must first be trained. It ispreferable to start off with fewer Panzers than to set out withyoung crews who lack combat experience.

2. Wheneverpossible, let an identified opponentadvance.The one that rashly charges forward is disadvantaged. Anattempt should be made to fall on the enemy from the flankwhenever possible from an ambush position. In addition, inorder to surprise the enemy, it is often useful to prepare forcombat while it is still dark!

3. Cunningly and skillfully stalking the opponent like ahunter works. This is especially successful against tanks inbuilt-up areas. Dismounted crew members scout on foot tolocate especially suitable tanks to attack and establish a planof attack for each individual action before the attack. Tank-versus-tank actions in built-up areas are always conducted

methodically step-by-step, employing mutually covering firesupport, and often last an hour or longer for each enemy tank.

Experience in Combat Against Tanks by GeneralleutnantBalck. commander of the 11.Panzer-Division. dated 12 March1943:

During the period from 28 June 1942 to 11 March 1943,the division knocked out 1000 tanks, of which 664 wereknocked out by Panzer-Regiment 15and336 by other weap-ons. Of the latter, 65 were destroyed by tank-hunter teams inclose combat. This compares to our own losses of50 Panzersas total write-offs.

The division notes that, disregarding any small inaccu-racy, they consider these numbers to be correct, becausewhenever possible they themselves examined the number ofkills claimed. Confirmation of the claims by the troops wasconstantly confirmed by the numbers of knocked-out tanks

29

PANZERTRUPPEN 19431945that the Pionier-Bataillon reported that they had blown upwith explosives. When Barenkowa was taken, the troops re-ported 27 kills. A follow-up count on the next day revealed 54Russian tanks. Therefore, the troops had not included in theirclaims tanks that had been destroyed by the Luftwaffe orhad been abandoned in previous battles.

This achievement was due mainly to the high morale ofthe troops, their determined will to fight, and the quality oftheir commanders.

The following three main points result from looking backto determine what contributed to these successes:

1. The division must understand the enemy tank unit inorder to force him to fight under unfavorable conditions.

2. All weapons and all available means are to be concen-trated to fight tanks.

3. The tactics employed by the Panzer-Regiment andindividual Panzers.

Point 1: Whenever possible, the attack should be initi-ated in the rear of the enemy tank unit. Three times this Win-ter the division's Panzers started to attack the enemy in therear at the same time that the enemy started to attack. On 8December 1942, 39 tanks were knocked out near SowchosNr.79 without losing a single Panzer as a total write-off, andon 19 December, 35 tanks were knocked out in comparisonwith two total write-offs for us. An enemy unit was surroundedon 25 December 1942, but his destruction didn't occur until afew days later by troops from the 6.Panzer-Division becausethe 11.Panzer-Division had only eight Panzers left to op-pose at least 30 enemy tanks.

When our Panzer attack unexpectedly encountered anenemy position, usually the enemy was forced and seducedto immediately conduct fragmented and unplannedcounterstrikes. These cost the enemy high losses, ifone skill-fully let them close in. The first successful attack on 19 De-cember 1942 was followed by strong, fragmented, andunconcentrated Russian tank counterstrikes in which 30 en-emy tanks were knocked out in comparison to one Panzerloss as a total write-off. On 20 February 1943, the divisionstruck the Russian Rollbahn near Nowa Alexandrowka. Herenumerous tank counterattacks were defeated in the sameway; resulting in 15Russian tanks kills, andnota single Panzerwas lost as a total write-off.

If an opponent in a defensive position isn't surprised byan unexpected approach, surprise can be achieved by tacti-cal means. On 24 January 1943, the division attacked the 5-kilometer-long village of Meschnytschkaja. An open plain, 3kilometers wide, lay in front of the village. An enemy tankforce drove up and down the village street, constantly shift-ing superior forces into position at the right time and frustrat-ing every attempt to break in. A fake attack byPanzerspaehwagen and Pz.Kpfw.11 on the northern end ofthe village under cover of a heavy smokescreen was set upfor the next day. The fake attack was staged to draw the Rus-sian tanks to the northern end of the village, then to attackthe southern end supported by strong artillery and Stuka

30

preparations, and attack from the rear those Russian tanksthat were drawn toward the northern end.

The plan was completely successful. Almost all of theRussian tanks massed in front of the fake attack at the north-ern end of the village and were enveloped from the rear byour own Panzers. Twenty-one enemy tanks were knockedout in comparison to the loss of one Panzer as a total write-off. The entire Russian armored force was destroyed.

Finally, the Panzers must be held strictly together, re-gardless if there are many or a few enemy tanks. Never em-ploy them scattered. Expressly create a Sehwerpunktl'

Point 2: The basic requirements are to strictly follow tac-tical guidelines for digging in, emplacement, and employmentofanti-tankguns, mines, and close-combat tank-hunter teams.

If the terrain is not covered with woods or clumps ofbrushand depressions aren'tavailable, the defensive positions mustbe disguised artificially. Deep, slit trenches in short runs withnumerous foxholes are coveragainst tanks and restrict thosetanks that have broken into the position from working for-ward. The prerequisite is that enemy infantry be separatedfrom the tanks by centrally directed concentrated artillery fire.

An interesting example ofhow all available elements co-operated in the destruction of the enemy is: On 27 February1943, Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 209 set up a defense eastof Barwenkowo. Enemy tanks were expected, their directionofattack known. The Bataillon had laid a mine barrier duringthe night, guarded by an 8.8 em Flak gun. At dawn, five Rus-sian tanks charged at high speed. Two ran onto mines; onewas destroyed by the Flak gun. The other two broke into thevillage at high speed and were destroyed by close-combatteams. The first tank was destroyed by the commander ofPanzer-Pionier-Bataillon 209, the second tank by the nextoldest officer.

Point 3: The Panzer-Regiment reported the following:Attacks against Russian tanks are governed not only by

the tactical specifications but mainly by the quality of the op-posing enemy tank crews. This depends upon making theenemy insecure and to instigate movements that draw himout of favorable positions that can't be approached. If theenemy is attack happy; then immediately take up good posi-tions with a good field of fire, move some of the Panzers intoflanking positions, kill the engines so that the enemy can beheard, and then let the enemy close in on our front.

In combat in towns it is very advantageous to havePanzer-Grenadiere out front to seek out the enemy tanksand give timely warnings to our Panzers. However, in prac-tice this is possible only when enemy infantry are notpresent.Ifan advanced guard is not out, four guns must be constantlyready to provide overwhelming fire to force the enemy to re-veal his position and pull out of his cover. The Pz.Kpfw.IVcan be held back from combat in towns and employed only indifficult situations.

Often the next position must first be scouted by the com-mander on foot. Attacks over open ground against enemytanks under cover (edge of towns, wood lines, etc.) is pre-

CHAPTER 22: SURROUNDED AT STALINGRAD TO THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE TO RETAKE KHARKOVpared by a fake attack that draws the enemy tanks to a spe-cific location. But the actual attack will charge rapidly to adifferent location.

In general, night attacks against enemy tanks result inlosses without success and are difficult. Defend against nightattacks by taking up good positions, let the enemy get close,and then suddenly open fire.

Everything depends on preventing a surprise encounterwith an enemy defense line, constantly guarding against asudden attack in the flank, and opening fire from the greatestpossible number of guns. When hit by effective enemy fire,immediately withdraw and approach from a new direction. Interrain providing poor visibility, attack frontally with weakforces, and ifpossible, strike the enemy in the flank with strongforces.

In conclusion, it can be said that the division believesthat it has achieved its success only by the coordination ofallthree of these points. Failure in one of the three areas can-cels out success.

Connected to this, the value ofa good repair service mustbe pointed out. In addition, all Russian tanks should be im-mediately blown up in order to prevent later recovery andrepair by the enemy.

Even though they were successful in winning numerouslocal engagements, the weakened Panzer-Divisions did notsucceed in breaking through to relieve Stalingrad and werecontinuously forced to retreat west. As shown in the PanzerStrength chart for July 1942 to March 1943, operationalstrength rapidly deteriorated as broken down and damagedPanzers were left behind in territory controlled by the Rus-sians. Reinforcements sent in December 1942 and January1943 consisted of the 7.Panzer-Division, Panzer-Abteilung138, schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, 2.Kompanie/schwerePanzer-Abteilung 502, the Panzer-Lehr-Kompanie 233, andthe 5.Kompanie/Fuehrer-Begleit-Bataillon. In addition, 162Pz.Kpfw.1I1 and 40 Pz.Kpfw.lV were sent as replacementsto Heeresgruppe B and Don.

OPERATIONAL STATUS OF PANZER-REGIMENT 15From 20 November 1942 to 30 March 1943

75

50

o

25

53

71

55

.........................................4.9 .

61

70::::::::::::::::::::::::

34

58

70

o

75

50

25

20Nov 10Dec 20Dec 10Jan 21Jan 29Jan 10Feb 18Feb 28Feb 10Mar 30Mar

Total Wrlteoffs D PzlI ~ Pzlllkz ~ PzlIlIg PzlVkz ~ PzlVlg [I] PzBefReplacements: 1 Pzlllkz, 3 PzlIlIg, 1 PzlVkz, 1 PzIVlg, 1 PzBef by 20DecReplacements: 7 Pzlllkz, 6 PzlIlIg, 1 PzlVkz, 7 PzIVlg, 1 PzBef by 10JanReplacements: 15 new PzlIlIg, 2 PzBef by 2 1JanReplacements: 1 PzlVkz, 5 new PzlVlg by 29Jan

31

PANZERTRUPPEN 1943-1945Again the Russians launched offensive strikes which

threatened to cut off the retreat of the 1.Panzer-Armee and4.Panzer-Armee and capture the rail center at Rostov. Thenewly arrived schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503 was sent inwith their Tigers to counter this threat. Results of their firstaction were reported to Heeresgruppe Don at 0845 hourson 7 January 1943 as follows:

Panzer-Abte/lung 503 went into combat at midday on 5January with 16Pz.Kpfw. VI and23 Pz.Kpfw.111 (7.5 em) kurzoperational out of the available 20 Pz.Kpfw. VI and 25Pz.Kpfw.111 (7.5 em) kurz.

By the evening of 6 January, they probably knocked out18 enemy tanks, of which 14 were definitely T34 tanks.Whether the total number of kills is accredited solely toPanzer-Abteilung 503 is being clarified by a liaison officerwho was sent because radio contact with the Abteilung hasbeen disrupted.

Our own losses after one and a halfdays in combat were:

Pz.Kpfw. VI Pz.Kpfw.111(7.5) kurz

Totally destroyed 1 (towed back) 2Damaged by hits 5 (light) 7 (4 light)Mechanical breakdown 5 (3 already repaired) 2

The armor on two Pz.Kpfw. Vis was penetrated by en-emy 7.62 cm anti-tank guns, once in the side armorand oncein the vertical rear armor. The shells didn't enter the fightingcompartment.

Ten Pz.Kpfw. VI and 12 Pz.Kpfw.111 (7.5 em) kurz wereoperational again on 7 January.

The high losses from one and a half days in combat re-sulted from:

OPPOSITE: Acolumn ofTigers from the schwere Panzer-Abteilung503 cresting a hill. The "13" stenciled on the commander's cupoladesignates the 13th step in the procedure for sealing the Tiger forsubmerged fording. (CHY)

ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH OF PANZER UNITSREPLACEMENT UNITS SENT TO EASTERN FRONT

~ Pz.Abt.138

6~\Tn\Tn\Tn\

8 PzlIl, 30 PzIV(lg)

(Dec42) (Dec42)

5./Fuehr.Begl.Btl.

4 PzlIl(lg), 7 PzIV(lg)

7.Panzer-Division

~ II. ~~R~5 ~ I.6~ 6~

\ Tn\ le \ le\ le \ \ Tn\ le \ le\ le \21 PzlI, 91 PzllI(lg), 14 PzllI(75), 2 PzIV(kz), 18 PzIV(lg), 9 Pz8ef

(Jan43)

(Jan43)

~ s.Pz.Abt.503

6~\s\s\

25 PzlIl(75), 20 PzVI

(Jan43)

2./5. Pz.Abt.502

10 PzlIl(75), 9 PzVI

32

(Jan43)

Pz.Lehr-Kp.233

4 PzllI(lg), 8 PzIV(kz), 2 PzIV(lg)

ICHAPTER 22: SURROUNDED AT STALINGRAD TO THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE TO RETAKE KHARKOV

33

PANZERTRUPPEN 19431945

OPERATIONAL STATUS OF SCHWERE PANZER-ABTEILUNG 503From 5 January to 31 March 1943

50

45

40 3.9 ..

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

o

(5)

(10)

( 15)

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

o

(5)

(10)

( 15)5Jan 7Jan 20Jan 31Jan 28Feb 20Mar

6Jan 12Jan 24Jan 10Feb 10Mar 31 Mar

Total Writeoffs ~ Pzl1l75 PzVIIncluding 2.Kp./s.Pz.Abt.502 from 12Jan43 on

a. Commanders and drivers who still are not totally famil-iar with the equipment, which results in breakdowns, prima-rily transmission damage. The main cause of this was thatthe period ofretraining from Porsche Pz.Kpfw. VI to HenschelPz.Kpfw. VI was too short.

b. Commanders are still not correctly familiarized andmainly lack combat experience, especially in combat on theEastern Front. Desire is present but experience is lacking incoordinated actions.

In its first action, Panzer-Abteilung 503 prevented astrong enemy tank force from penetrating toProletarskaya.

A graphic description of what it was like to fight in a Tigerwas recorded by Leutnant Zabel in the following account ofhis impression of the enemy's ability to inflict battle damageto a Tiger:

On 10 and 11 February 1943 in an attack on the collec-tive farm west ofSserernikowo, Kampfgruppe Sander facedgreatly superior forces. The Tigers in the lead platoon drew

most of the enemy fire on themselves. The fire came mostlyfrom the right flank and the front from tanks, anti-tank guns,and infantry with anti-tank rifles, all opening fire at the long-est range possible.

At the beginning of the attack, my Tiger was hit on thefront of the superstructure by a 7.62 cm anti-tank