SCA_MELO Notes Compiled

RULE 62 INTERPLEADER Diane Shayne

(WHAT) Elements: • Parties with conflicting interest • Party plaintiff has no interest or an interest not disputed by the

claimants • Same subject matter

(WHEN)

• OCAMPO V TIRONA: interpleader is proper before judgment has become final

• ALVAREZ V COMMONWEALTH: there must be an active assertion or demand by the party with conflicting interest

• WACK WACK GOLF V LEE: party-plaintiff should not have been adjudged of its liability with finality or not independently liable

• RAMOS V RAMOS: estate was already impleaded; an interpleader is an action in rem, thus the individual heirs need not be sent summons; interest must be actual, not inchoate

• BELTRAN V PHHC: conflicting interest was between PHHC and GSIS; conflict of interest must be against the interest of the party plaintiff

• SY-QUIA V SHERIFF OF ILOCOS: interpleader is an action employed to avoid double vexation (not double liability) for the same liability.

• DE JESUS V LA SOCIEDAD: to avoid risk of paying damages for withholding payment of claims, file an interpleader; an interpleader is an equity remedy, thus must be filed in good faith.

• MESINA V IAC: an interpleader must be filed within a reasonable time from notice (in GF); in this case, there was a sign of GF, when the complaint was later amended to replace JOHN DOE as MARCELO MESINA.

(WHERE TO FILE)

• depends on which court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to BP 129 • basis of jurisdiction: amount and nature of claim

• DE CAMILO V JP OF MALANGAS: an interpleader on real property

claims VS issue of ownership as defense

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

o NB: issue of ownership is within CFI jurisdiction; o In this case, subject matters were distinct, thus no conflict;

party plaintiff has interest: to prolong his unlawful detainer/occupation/possession.

• MAKATI DEV’T CORP V TANJUATCO: o amt of vexation= amt of SM; o Thus, jurisdiction was within the JP since the property was

valued at Php 5,198 and was capable of pecuniary estimation.

• RCBC V METROCON: party plaintiff, with UD case amicably settled, has no more conflicting claims with defendant

o Decision was fishy though: the amicable settlement between the mortgagor (LEYCON) and lessee (METROCON) was to the detriment of mortgagee (RCBC); obviously there is history between LEYCON and METROCON and they must’ve colluded against RCBC

RULE 63 DECLARATORY RELIEF and RULE 64Diane Shayne

(WHO) any person interested (WHAT)

• in a deed, contract, will or other written instrument or • prejudiced by a statute, regulation, EO or ordinance

ALLIED BROADCASTING v REPUBLIC:

o petition for declaratory relied is not within the original jurisdiction of the SC even if only questions of law are involved

o belated complaint and estopped since Allied already complied with the law

WHERE TO FILE:

• RTC o Exception: case of SALVACION v CB

WHEN • where there’s a justiciable controversy ripe for

adjudication; • file before breach or violation

SALVACION v CB

o SC has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over petition for declaratory relief

Except: where the petition has far-reaching implications and raised questions that should be resolved and may be treated as one for mandamus

o Height of injustice: to be denied a civil action where the heinous crime has undoubtedly been committed against the rape victim

TOLENTINO v BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY:

o Relief asked is improper: No actual justiciable controversy exists because there is no personal violation of a right to speak of or any prejudice or damage to him by the said law recognizing the right of accountants to use a trade name.

o The law did not preclude other profession from use of trade name


o Petitioner had no interest o 4 element (JARL)

justiciable controversy action must be before any breach or violation ripe for adjudication legal interest

CUTARAN v DENR

o definition of justiciable controvery: a definite and concrete dispute touching on legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest

o courts have no judicial power to review cases involving political question and as a rule will desist from taking cognizance of speculation or hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and in cases that has been moot.

o Case was premature. DENR has not yet granted the ancestral land claim by their Carantes. Action should have been for forcible entry—a regular civil action.

CALTEX v PALOMAR

o Element of a justiciable controvery Assertion of a claim Denial of a right Legal interest Ripe for adjudication

o One must make positive antagonistic assertion of a right and denial of such real right (NOT THEORETICAL) by the other.

MIRANDO v WELLINGTON TY

o Lack of legal interest of squatters; petition for declaratory relief will not prosper

DELUMEN v REPUBLIC (justiciable controversy)

o An active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other concerning a real and not a theoretical question or issue


o SC: dec. relief is not proper when issue is moot and abstract.

LIM v REPUBLIC

o No controversy on citizenship o Procedure to regain citizenship is to file a declaration or

oath of allegiance DELA LLANA v COMELEC

o Not a justiciable controversy because it’s simply a consultative referendum; it will not affect the constitution.

SAMSON v ANDAL

o Apply petition for declaratory relief BEFORE breach OLLADA v CB

o Petition for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after a contract, statute, or right has been breached or violated

o It is proper only if adequate relief is not available through other existing means/forms of an action or proceedings (like specific performance)

o Asked for injunction because he already suffered injury; petition inapplicable since there has already been a violation of a right.

SARMIENTO v CAPADAS

o Ratio of prohibition of petition for declaratory relief after breach: to avoid multiplicity of suits

o In the case at bar, if declaratory relief was allowed, the judgment there, notwithstanding another action would still lie against the importer respondent for violation of the barter law. Instead of 1 case, 2 cases results: petition for declaratory relief and complaint against illegal confiscation of imported goods as a consequence of the breach of the barter law.

o Barter permits were issued; the 1st shipment came in. The defense of petitioner it that: it is a continuing violation


SC held: breach, continuing or otherwise, is still a breach, and thus petition for declaratory relief must fail. He should file an injunction instead.

TANDA V ALDAYA

o Judicial decisions is not within the ambit of “instrument” (as a basis of right to claim declaratory relief) because otherwise action will be barred due to res judicata.

EDADES v EDADES

o Petition for DR is not the proper action in the determination of hereditary rights

DEGALA v REYES

o In a petition for DR, non-joinder of necessary parties is jurisdictional defect, because otherwise, that would deprive the declaration of the final and pacifying function of the action. It is calculated to subserve such function, as the party will not be bound by the declaration and may raise identical issues in another action.

o Without the necessary party, there’s no complete relief. BAGUIO CITIZEN’S ACTION v CITY COUNCIL OF BAGUIO

o City council awarding public land to squatter o DR, necessary party was the Mayor and the City Council o Other squatters need not be impleaded for the court to

acquire jurisdiction (apply Rule 63 sec 5) WHO SHOULD BE PARTIES?

• 2 or more contending interest • SOLGEN- if issue involves constitutionality, validity of law • CITY PROSECUTOR- issue involved validity of an ordinance

SEC 5, EXCEPTIONS

• Reformation of contracts (provided by law) • Quieting of title (with notice by publication) • Consolidation of ownership (with notice by publication)


RULE 64 • Review of judgment of COA and COMELEC • Old ROC failed to mention the resort to Certiorari

ARATUC v COMELEC

o A petition fore review on appeal includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment, while certiorari deals exclusively with GAD, which may not exist even when the decision is otherwise erroneous. Certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weigh pertinent considerations, a decision derived at without rational deliberation. While the effect of an error in judgment may not differ from that of an indiscretion, as a matter of policy, there are matters that by their nature ought to be left for final determination to the sound discretion of certain officers or entities, reserving to the SC to insure the faithful observance of DP only in cases of patent arbitrariness.

o Under the existing constitutional and statutory provision (wait, ha, case was decided in 1979, so 1973 Consti to), the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court over orders, rulings and decisions of the Comelec is not as broad as it used to be and should be confined to instances of GAD amount to patent and substantial denial of DP.

DARIO v MISON o The jurisdiction of the SC over cases emanating from the

CSC is limited to complaints of lack or excess of jurisdiction, complaints that justify certiorari under R65.

o While RA6656 states tat judgments of the CSC are “final and executory” and hence, unappealable, under R65, certiorari precisely lies in the absence of an appeal. Accordingly, the court accepts Commissioner Mison’s petition which clearly charges the CSC with GAD, a proper subject of certiorari, although may not have so stated in explicit terms

AMBIL Jr v COMELEC (2000) o Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a party to an

election case within the jurisdiction of the Comelec in


division cannot dispense with the filing of MR of a decision, resolution or final order of the Division of COMELEC because the case would not reach the COMELEC EN BANC without such MR having filed and resolved by the Division. The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases dispensing with an MR prior to the filing of the petition. In truth, the exceptions do not apply to election cases where an MR is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the COMELEC EN BANC, whose final decision is what is reviewable via certiorari by the SC.

ABS-CBN v COMELEC o This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this

procedural requirement [of filing a motion for reconsideration] may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.

o The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only twenty (20) days before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari is therefore justified.

REPOL V COMELEC o Interlocutory orders merely rule on an incidental issue and

do not terminate or finally dispose of the case as they leave something to be done before it is finally decided on the merits.

o Since the Comelec 1st Division issued on the interlocutory order of Jan 12 2004, the same Division should resolve Repol’s MR of the Order. The remedy of the aggrieved


party is neither to file an MR for certification to the COMELEC EN BANC nor to elevate the issue to this Court via a petition fore certiorari under R65.

RULE 64 v RULE 65

Rule 64 Rule 65 30 days to file Filing of MR interrupted; left with balance, days left at least not less than 5 days

60 days to file after denial of MR

Attached a certified true copy of all annexes

Certified true copies of those questioned orders only

Only final judgments or orders can be elevated

any

Based on: GADALEJ Based on: GADALEJ

RULE 65 CERTIORARI Diane Shayne

R65: certiorari volumus • Literally means: we wish to be certified • Commanding the lower court to elevate records • Involves questions of jurisdiction

(WHO) SEC 1: tribunal, board, officer exercising JUDICIAL or QUASI-JUDICIAL decision

TUASON v RD

o President Marcos has no juridical power o What is judicial/quasi-judicial function?

Determination of facts Application of the law Adjudication

o PD 20: made a determination of facts and declared the rights of parties, resulting to undue deprivation to the Tuasons. Law should have an equal application of the law to members of the same class.

o Certiorari: actions against a governmental body and not to private courts/tribunal/board or officer

MERALCO SECURITIES v BOARD OF TAX

o Exercise of power over quasi-judicial agency (WHAT) Acts:

• Without jurisdiction: without legal authority • In excess of jurisdiction: conditions which authorize its

exercise are not present • Grave Abuse of discretion: had jurisdiction but exercised in an

arbitrary, despotic, whimsical and capricious manner • Cite Angara v Fedman as the case which distinguished the

disparity of the 3 acts NO appeal, P,S, A remedy in the ordinary course of law

INTESTATE ESTATE OF CAMEN de LUNA v IAC o Findings of the trial court are accorded with great respect

absent any evidence from the respondent, aside from


allegations that valuation was without basis and purely conjectural; the valuation of the estate of 10M by the TC was upheld.

o Determination of whether the administration and liquidation of an estate have been attended with greater difficulty and have required a high degree of capacity on the part of the executor or administrator rests on the sound discretion of the court which took cognizance of the estate.

LALICAN v VERGARA

o Certiorari is not a remedy when a motion to quash has been denied. Issue should have been raised on appeal after the adverse result of the trial.

GOLD CITY INTEGRATED V IAC

o The issue of attorney’s fees was finally disposed of by the RTC—meaning, nothing has left to be done by the court. Appeal should have been the remedy and not a petition for certiorari.

ST. PETER MEMORIAL PARK INC V CAMPOS

o GR: the extra-ordinary writ of certiorari is not proper when ordinary appeal is available. The writ is granted in cases where it is shown that appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effect of the order complained of.

o Certiorari/injunction/mandamus was granted because appeal would not be adequate. In an appeal, only the evidence presented in the lower court will be admitted for review. In this case, the appellant filed an MNT because of a newly discovered evidence warranting that lot #19 of St. Peter is different from the lot of private respondents. MNT was granted, case was ordered to proceed.


VALENCIA v CA o Certiorari lies against a judgment allowing execution

pending appeal, when such writ of execution was issued for “no good reason”.

o Respondent court cannot insist that appeal was the proper remedy, since as the title of writ states: it’s a WRIT PENDING APPEAL. Appeal would not be the adequate and speedy remedy.

NEA (NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMIN) v CA

o Dismissal of appeal for failure to comply with the requisite ROA and amended ROA amounts to GADALEJ because the lower court merely gave a vague judgment (of such failure to comply) without saying what the deficiencies of the records were.

o Certiorari lies when there’s no other P-S-A remedy. As in this case, the land of NEA was going to be foreclosed or in peril of disposition through an auction.

o ISSUE that no MR was filed-untenable. Issue is imbued with public interest because petitioner is a power supplier. If further delay in the proceeding is allowed, public service will also suffer.

ABRAHAM v NLRC

o GR: file an MR before certiorari, to give the court the opportunity to rectify its own mistake

Except: Order is patent nullity Questions raised in the certiorari

proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court

Urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the Government/petitioner or SM of action is perishable

MR is useless


Petitioner is deprived of DP and there is extreme urgency for relief

In criminal case, relief from order of arrest urgent and the granting of such relief by the TC is improbable

Proceeding in the LC are a nullity for lack of DP Proceeding was ex-parte or petitioner had no

opportunity to object Issue is pure question of law or where

public interest is involved METRO TRANSIT ORG. INC. V CA

o Petitioner should’ve filed an MR prior to Certiorari because this case does not fall under the exception: that there must be a concrete, compelling and valid reason for failure to comply. Petitioner insists that Certiorari was proper for fear that delay will make their COA moot and academic.

o Certiorari is not a shield from the adverse consequence of an omission to file the required MR.

o Also, Petitioner was ultimately asking the SC to weigh evidence and correct the judgment of the CA. SC is not a trier of fact, it can only hear the case on issues of jurisdiction (GADALEJ). SC held that LA decision as affirmed by NLRC and CA established that Petitioners failed to establish the guilt of PR (no proof of stealing 2k tokens), thus petition for certiorari is DENIED.

CONTI v CA o CA was ordered to hear the petition for certiorari because

Conti was denied DP. Her MR in his dishonesty case before the CSC has been pending for the last 2 years.

o Case was remanded to CA. Certiorari is proper. o New rules in CivPro allows the CA to review

orders/resolutions of quasi-judicial agencies like the CSC (see Rule 97, ROC or RAC No.1-95) by way of petition for review within 15days from notice of the assailed judgment, final order/resolution.


ESCUDERO v DULAY

o GR: SCA under R65 will not be a substitute or a cure for failure to file a timely petition for review on certiorari under R45

Except: where the application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice

This case falls under the exception: because evidence show that the transaction was not a sale but loan (an equitable mortgage) due to the inadequate consideration paid by the “buyer”/creditor. The SP was P42,500 where the land is values at P131,000 being located near the Mactan Airport. Court granted the redemption by the Sps Escudero.

LEONOR v CA

o Judgment, when void can be slain on plain sight! o When court lacks jurisdiction, judgment is void and thus,

such judgment cannot be a source of right. RELIEFS GRANTED:

• Annul or modify the proceeding of such T/B/O • Such incidental reliefs as the law and justice may require

o In LEONOR v CA: SC proceeded with the merits of the case. SC is not just a toothless promoter of

procedural niceties, which are understood and appreciated only by lawyers and jurists. It cannot shrink from its quintessential role as the fountain of speedy, adequate and substantial justice. If the Court, as the head and guardian of the judicial branch, must continuously merit the force of the public trust and confidence—which is ultimately the real source of its sovereign power, possessing neither the purse nor the sword—and if it must decisively discharge its sacred duty as the last sanctuary of the oppressed and the weak, it must, in


appropriate cases like the one before us, proactively provide weary litigants with immediate legal and equitable relief, free from the delays and legalistic contortions that oftentimes result from applying purely formal and procedural approaches to judicial dispensation (LUPET noh!? Ikaw man hiritan ni Paganiban ng ganito, titiklop ka rin diba?! For your reading pleasure lang yun succeeding sentences. The entire paragraph was too poetic to ignore.)

• ATTY J MEJO posed a question:

o If it is a void decision, can you still file certiorari even if beyond the reglementary period of 60D

o ANG HIRAP NAMAN! (Do not quote me. I’m guessing.) YES. Because it’s a void judgment. It can be treated

as if no binding judgment at all exist, thus not a basis for reckoning the 60D period.

NO. Because point of reckoning must be 60D from the date of the notice of “void” judgment. Right of action accrues at that point. If period is relaxed, it may be subject to abuse. Period can be relaxed but not stretched to absurdity. Court can deny petition by virtue of laches, even if the petitioner argues that the date of notice of “void” judgment doesn’t stand as the proper reckoning period.

WHO CAN FILE

• Any person aggrieved thereby PASTOR v CA

o “Daughter-in-law” was no party to the lower court proceeding but aggrieved by the decision, and thus can file the petition for certiorari and prohibition.

TANG v CA

o “ person aggrieved” is one who was party in the proceedings before the lower court


RECONCILING CASE OF PASTOR AND TANG PASTOR TANG

ISSUE Ownership Collateral PARTY Daughter-in-law had direct

interest (indispensible) Parties were merely adjoining lot owners

ERROR Void decision of probate court for lack of jurisdiction

Error in judgment of the RTC

o TANG should’ve filed for easement or prohibition later but

definitely not a petition for certiorari o ATTY MELO says: The Pastor decision is more liberal and in

accordance with substantial justice. Certiorari deals with issues of jurisdiction not of facts

CASTRO V PPL o OSG did not raise any errors of jurisdiction, certiorari will

not lie. TANJUAN V PHIL POSTAL BANK

o GR: issue of fact cannot be entertained in a certiorari o EXCEPTION:

In NLRC cases, CA can adjudicate questions of fact Note however, if the same was raised to the SC, it

cannot prosper because the SC cannot receive evidence, although it may have the power (e diba omnipotent sila! Pwedeng umasa na exception yun case mo due transcendental importance. Chances are, dadaan ka sa butas ng karayom, mag-appeal ka na lang kasi.)

COMPARING RULE 65 AND RULE 45

RULE 65 RULE 45 Grounds of GADALEJ Issues of fact Applies to both final and interlocutory orders

Only final judgment can be questioned

Period of 60D Period of 15D Respondent files Adverse party files


Generally requires MR MR not required Appeal does not stay judgment appeal stays judgment

Atty Melo: Between the 2, which is better for you to file? ANS: 45

• More expedient, because it has to be filed 15D from notice of final judgment

• 65 cannot be used to replace a lost appeal • In reality, more than 70% of petition for certiorari gets dismissed

summarily.

RULE 65 PROHIBITION Diane Shayne

Prohibition MATAGUINA V CA

o SC: MENR had no jurisdiction to issue writ of execution against a party who is not party to the instant case (recognition of the separate juridical entity of Corp from the individual-owner)

AURILLO V RABI

o When the TRO expired, there exist no legal bar for Aurillo to file a case for prohibition.

o GR: prohibition is preventive; party acts on his own peril, subject to the outcome of the petition

Prohibition can also include UNDOING WHAT HAS BEEN DONE

Court retains jurisdiction to reverse what has been done.

More accurately, the case held: Jurisprudence has it that prohibition will give

complete relief not only by preventing what remains to be done but by undoing what has been done.

ATTY MELO ASKED: How far back should it be undone?

ANS: Go back to the status quo (ante litem motam). Go back to the last actual, peaceable, uncontested situation between the parties

MORFE v JP of MALANGAS

o The write of mandamus has for its object to compel the inferior tribunal in the proper case, as a JP, to comply with the function which the law specifically prescribes as duty resulting from its office when there is no other P-S-A remedy; and that of prohibition, has for its object that of preventing an inferior tribunal in the proper case, as a JP, from executing or continuing to exercise an act in excess of its jurisdiction, when there is no other P-S-A remedy in the ordinary course of law.


VERGARA V RUGUE (1977) o The function of prohibition is to prevent unlawful and

oppressive exercise of legal authority. o The extraordinary remedy of prohibition is not to correct

judgment but to restrain usurpation and compel observance of jurisdictional limitations. This is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished. This remedy will lie only to prevent an encroachment, excess, usurpation, or improper assumption of jurisdiction on the part of an inferior court or tribunal or to prevent some great outrage upon the settled principles of law and procedure, but if the LC/tribunal has jurisdiction of the person and the SM of the controversy, the writ will not lie to correct errors or irregularities in procedure, or to prevent an erroneous decision or an enforcement of a erroneous judgment or even in cases of encroachment, usurpation, and abuse of judicial power or the improper assumption of jurisdiction, where an adequate and applicable remedy by appeal, writ of error, certiorari, other prescribed methods of review are available.

o Vergara questions the reversal of the CA, but res judicata has already attached. Vergara was merely finding ways to delay execution. In this case, unlike in Rabi, you cannot undo anything because the decision of the LC is valid. Nothing needs to be undone.

• Difference between Aurillo and Vergara Aurillo Vergara

Act can still be undone Cannot be undone Prohibition was filed before the decision, but after filing pet. to nullify prelim investigation in the RTC

before filing (before filiing what?! hindi ko to gets, hindi kasi ako nakikinig, help!)

NACIONALISTA PARTY v BAUTISTA

o Case involved questioning the title to the authority of the Comelec Chairman to hear the election complaint.


Petitioners should’ve filed for Quo Warranto, not a prohibition, which questions one’s jurisdiction/authority.

o RATIO: the principle is one founded in policy and convenience, for the right of one claiming a title or interest under or through the proceedings of an officer having an apparent authority to act would be safe, if it were necessary in every case to examine the legality of the title of such officer up to its original source, and the title of interest of such person were held to be invalidated by some accidental defect or flaw in the appointment, election or qualification of such officer or in the rights of those from whom appointment or election emanated; nor could the supremacy of the law be maintained, or the execution enforced, if the acts of the judge having colorable title were to be deemed invalid.

ENRIQUEZ v MACADAEG o When an MTD on the ground of improper venue is

erroneously denied, mandamus is not the proper remedy for correcting the error. It being a case where the judge is proceeding in defiance of the ROC by refusing to dismiss an action, which should not be maintained in this court, the remedy is prohibition.

ASINAS v CFI o While the court exceeds its jurisdiction in ordering the

payment of said expenses, which are not administration expenses, yet as the remedy of appeal is adequate to correct the said error, the extraordinary remedy of prohibition does not lie.

RULE 65 MANDAMUS and COMMON MATTERSDiane Shayne

SEC 3. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person • Unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law

specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or

• Unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and

• There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law ANGCHANGCO JR v OMBUDSMAN

o GENERAL RULE: Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use, and not a discretionary duty.

o ALTHOUGH: It is also available to compel action, when refused on matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. (In simple terms, mandamus will be used to direct the official to act, BUT NOT to act one way or the other).

o EXCEPT: in cases of gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess in authority

o IN THE CASE AT BAR, the Court finds the inordinate delay (of more than 6 years) by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints against petitioner to be violative of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to speedy disposition of cases

LAMB v PHIPPS o Discretionary acts, defined: as the liberty to decide

according to the principles of justice and one’s sense of right or wrong.

o Ministerial duty: performed in a given state of facts; to act in a prescribed manner without using one’s sense of right or wrong or principles of justice; action is prescribed by law.

o Trent’s dissent, concept of “legal discretion”: means reasonable and just discretion afforded by law. This is now the main opinion ; in case of GADALEJ, file mandamus.


CARBUNGCO v AMPARO o Mandamus is proper in this case. o Rule 72, Section 8 of the Rules of Court states that the

appellant in a detainer case must deposit in court within the first ten days of the succeeding month the rental corresponding to the previous month. Otherwise, the appellee would have the right to ask for execution pending appeal. This provision is mandatory. The court is left no discretion to either extend the period of deposit prescribed by law, postpone the making of said deposit, or otherwise relieve the appellant of the consequences of her failure to make the deposit within the prescribed period. The law has prescribed a period and this requirement must be complied with strictly. Its compliance must be enforced by the courts. In this case, the deposit was actually made 3 days after the end of the 10-day period. Pending appeal, failure to make the deposit of rental within the prescribed period, however short the delay, gives the appellee the right to execution of the judgment, which the court is bound to grant and enforce.

UNIV OF SAN CARLOS v CA o Award of academic distinction is within the academic

freedom of the Petitioner-university; mandamus will not lie to obtain grant of such distinction.

PERALTA v SALCEDO o Non-exhaustion of admin remedies o The petition is clearly premature as when the petition was

filed, the Director had just submitted his recommendation to the Secretary of Education, who had not yet acted on the matter. The Court can only take action when the Sec. of Educ. has rendered a decision on the matter. No recourse to the courts can be had until all administrative remedies have been exhausted and SCA have been held not entertainable if superior admin officers could grant relief.

MADRIGAL v LECAROZ o Quo warranto was the apt remedy


G&S TRANSPORT CORP v CA o Contract for taxi service is within the corporate prerogative

of NAIA; there is no legal duty to be enjoined, thus mandamus will not lie.

Submit the ff:

1. Certification of NFS and verification must be submitted (without which, it’s a scrap of paper); the former cannot be filed by the counsel while the latter can be filed in behalf of the client. 2. Certified true copies of assailed main order or the order of denial, within 60D

i. GR: non-extendible period ii. Except: for compelling reasons

Where to file: • SC, CA, RTC • Sandiganbayan, in exercise of appellate jurisdiction

SEC 7

• Petition shall not stay unless there’s a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction issued

Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus: COMMOM MATTERS SANTIAGO v VASQUEZ

o Court may continue with the case since no TRO or writ of PI. Miriam should’ve simply secured permission from the Sandiganbayan to leave the country.

ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK v CA o CA already lost jurisdiction. o Such issuance of decision rendered the pending SC case

moot. JOY MART CONSOLIDATED CORP v CA

o SC: CA should’ve ruled on the matter, RTC committed GADALEJ

o CA’s non-issuance of TRO is not equal to the RTC’s authority to dispose of the writ of PI; it only meant that the RTC can proceed to hear and decide the case.


GO v JUDGE ABROGAR o Judicial courtesy only applies of the hearing in the lower

court, in a strong possibility, would render moot or moribund the proceedings in the SC.

o Even if issue (execution) is resolved in LC, certiorari is proper since petition in SC is not rendered moot by such decision, because the property can still be recovered.

o Ang tanong ko naman: What if the SM is not subject to recovery?

RULE 66 QUO WARRANTO Diane Shayne

AGAINST WHO? • An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or

franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:

a. A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise; b. A public officer who does or suffers an act, which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; c. An association, which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority to do so.

Distinguished

Quo Warranto Mandamus Remedy to try the right to an office or franchise and to oust the holder from its enjoyment

Only lies to enforce clear legal duties, not to try disputed title

POTOT v BAGANO

o 2 years of abandonment, action for quo warranto has prescribed

ABAYA v ALVEAR o In times of war (Jap Occupation), there was an abnormal

condition. Change in composition of towns in each circuit changed temporarily to meet exigencies of admin of justice. As the RP government was losing control of certain areas, the jurisdiction of the courts then was correspondingly deduced. Such change, not attributable to Abaya, thus he did not voluntarily leave his post: NO ABANDOMENT.

TEVES v SINDIONG o Doctrine of Abandonment is not strictly construed in a

period of war because the jurisdiction was re-arranged because certain provinces were already occupied by the enemy; no intent to abandon on the part of Teves.


SERAFIN v CRUZ o “reinstatement of a dismissed officer” is not a valid ground

for removal of duly appointed and confirmed chief of the municipal police (Admin Code)

o the extraordinary legal remedy of quo warranto DOES NOT LIE against a duly and legally appointed chief of the municipal police who has duly qualified for and has entered upon the performance of his duties, in order to reinstate another who has been legally dismissed from the office in question.

LACSON v ROMERO o 3 steps to appointment

nomination confirmation of CA acceptance

o Lacson never accepted the “promotion” thus there was no vacancy created. Romero’s appointment to replace Lacson is invalid

o This situation amounts to removal without just cause. o Ratio the rule: to prevent possible abuse of appointing

power Who can file?

• SolGen, private prosecutor • Private individual claiming the right to office.

ACOSTA v FLOR

o Acosta had no legal standing because plaintiff had no basis to claim to office as the municipal president of Laoag.

o Ratio of the rule: quo warranto maybe be used as form of harassment

o SC held: the court need not look at the validity of the title of the incumbent, when petitioner clearly had no right to the office; mere allegation of petitioner will not suffice.

GARCIA v PEREZ (the proverbial Inggitera!)

o Garcia has no legal right, to speak of, over the position


o Preference in appointment (say, by virtue of seniority) cannot be equated to entitlement to appointment; the former is not sufficient to sustain a quo warranto proceeding.

CRUZ v RAMOS o Quo warranto will not prosper because there’s no

dimunition of benefit/salary to the petitioners. o They have no standing to sue because they are not

claiming the right to office of the one elected o Remedy: the SolGen has the legal standing to file for quo

warranto. VERAGUTH v ISABELA SUGAR Co. MADRIGAL v LECAROZ

o Prescription of 1 year from ouster/usurpation or when the right of office accrues

Where to file:

• RTC, CA, SC • SolGen-Manila • Comelec

Part C of quo warranto, as applied to associations, relatively a dead provision because of PD902-A which deals with intra-corporate matters, petition for rehabilitation, insolvency, suspension of payments fraudulent schemes as a ground forfeiture of a franchise. Election Protest and Quo Warranto: An election contest is a special statutory proceeding designed to contest the right of a person, declared elected, to enter and hold office. It is an adversary proceeding for a controversy between two contending candidates for the same office. It is neither a civil action nor a criminal proceeding. Strictly speaking, it is neither an action at law nor a suit in equity; it is a summary proceeding of a political character.

QUO WARRANTO (under the Omnibus Election Code)

A petition for quo warranto is filed within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election by any voter to contest the


election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.

The failure of the petitioner to question the eligibility of the respondent before or during the election cannot be pleaded as putting the petitioner in estoppel to institute quo warranto proceedings, because the right to an elective provincial or municipal office can be contested under existing legislation only after the proclamation.

In quo warranto proceedings, where the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even if he were eligible since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy.

When the grounds for quo warranto are separable from grounds of election protest, two independent actions may be proceed.

The source of the provision on contest for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines of the candidate-elect is Commonwealth Act No. 357-766 and Commonwealth Act No. 657, to wit: “Any elector may contest the election of a provincial or municipal officer-elect on the ground of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines by filing a petition for quo warranto within the same period and in accordance with the same procedure prescribed in Section 173.” This is to recognize the common provision that no person who has voluntarily borne arms or engaged in rebellion against the Republic shall be eligible to office and such an act constitutes a complete disability until removed. But take note, that in the case of Casin v Caluag a person may be declared in a special civil action of quo warranto to be disloyal to the Republic of the Philippines and ineligible to hold public office, although said person has been or will be acquitted of the crime of treason. Because the law provides as a ground of disqualification, not the conviction of the candidate of the crime of treason or any other act constituting disloyalty, but the mere fact of being disloyal.


Candidate-elect may also be ineligible or disqualified to hold position in the government for conviction for the following charges:

a. Espionage and other offenses against the national security; b. Membership in the outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines

and similar associations; c. Penalized of capital offenses under the Revised Penal Code; d. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and e. Illegal recruitment which the law considered as economic

sabotage

RULE 67 EXPROPRIATION Diane Shayne

Distinction between eminent domain and expropriation

• Eminent domain – one of the inherent powers of the state. It is the

right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for

public use or to meet a public exigency and is said to be an essential

part of governance even in its most primitive form and thus

inseparable from sovereignty. (Air Transportation Office vs. Gopuco,

Jr., as cited in Riano)

• Expropriation – the process by which the power of eminent domain is

carried out.

o A taking, as of privately owned property, by government under

eminent domain. (Black‘s Law Dictionary)

o The commencement of a complaint for expropriation is

necessary only when the owner does not agree to sell his

property or if he is willing to sell but does not agree with the

price offered. (Riano)

SEC 1

• Complaint

• Specific public purpose

• 2 phases:

o PUB USE

o JUST COMPENSATION

Who files

• RP, inherent to the state, executive branch

• Must have an enabling law

• Local government with delegated power

Where to file

• RTC

SEC 2

• Upon filing of complaint

• Proper Notice to defendant

• Deposit, in money or cert of deposit, assessed value of the real

property for purposes of taxation or for personal property,

provisionally determined by the court

2

• Certificate of deposit, in Manaay v Juico 175 SCRA 343: CARP involved

a lot of property; impossible for the government to pay LO the entire

value in cash so certificates of deposit were allowed

• PURPOSE OF DEPOSIT:

o Indemnity in case the property will not be condemned

o An advance to just compensation in case condemned

DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS (SEC 3)

• If a defendant has no objection or defense to the action or the taking

of his property,

o He may file and serve a notice of appearance and a

manifestation to that effect, specifically designating or

identifying the property in which he claims to be interested,

within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he shall be

entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.

• If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in

the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his

property,

o he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the

summons.

o The answer shall specifically designate or identify the property in

which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent

of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and

defenses to the taking of his property.

o No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be

alleged or allowed in the answer or any subsequent pleading.

• A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the

court, in the interest of justice, may permit amendments to the answer

to be made not later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof.

• However, at the trial of the issue of just compensation, whether or not

a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may present

evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his

property, and he may share in the distribution of the award.

ORDER OF EXPROPRIATION (SEC 4)

• If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to

expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to

defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of

3

expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the

property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose

described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to

be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing

of the complaint, whichever came first.

• A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be

appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall

not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be

paid.

• After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted

to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the

court deems just and equitable.

2 PHASES

• determination of the right to expropriate

o order issue of condemnation

o can be appealed

o period: 30 because multiple appeal (rule 109), roa required

o once deposit paid, writ of possession is ministerial

• determination of the right to just compensation

Stages of expropriation

Period to appeal from order of expropriation

• MUNICIPALITY OF BINAN VS. GARCIA (180 SCRA 576)

o There are two stages in every action for expropriation.

1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to

exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety

of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the

suit.

2. Determination by the Court of the just compensation of

the property sought to be taken.

o In actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since

no less than 2 appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal

from an order of condemnation is 30 days counted from notice

of said order and not the ordinary period of 15 days prescribed

for actions in general, conformably with the provision of Sec 39,

BP 129, in relation to par 19(b) of the Implementing Rules to

the effect that in ―appeals in special proceedings in accordance

4

with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein

multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be 30

days, a record of appeal being required. x x x‖

SEC 5 DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION

• Not more than 3 competent and disinterested person as commissioner

Meaning of just compensation

• Just compensation – the full and fair equivalent of the property

sought to be expropriated. The measure is not the taker‘s gain but the

owner‘s loss. The compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to

the owner but also to the taker. Even as undervaluation would deprive

the owner of his property without due process, so too would its

overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the public. (NPC vs.

De la Cruz, as cited in Riano)

• Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates immediate payment of the initial just

compensation prior to the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of

the Government.

• Republic vs. Gingoyon (478 SCRA 474)

o Rule 67 merely requires the Government to deposit with an

authorized government depositary the assessed value of the

property for expropriation for it to be entitled to a writ of

possession; The staging of expropriation proceedings in this

case with the exclusive use of Rule 67 would allow for the

Government to take over the NAIA 3 facilities in a fashion that

directly rebukes our 2004 Resolution in Agan vs. PIATCO

o Even assuming that RA 8974 does not govern in this case, it

does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should then apply. After

all, adherence to the letter of Sec 2, Rule 67 would in turn

violate the Court‘s requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there

must first be payment of just compensation to PIATCO before

the Government may take over the property. It is the plain

intent of RA 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule

67 with the scheme of ―immediate payment‖ in cases involving

national government infrastructure projects.

5

o RA 8974 plainly requires direct payment to the property

owner, and not a mere deposit with the authorized

government depositary – without such direct payment, no

writ of possession may be obtained.

BARANGGAY SAN ROQUE V HEIRS OF PASTOR

• An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation and

falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

o If it is primarily for a recovery of a sum of money, the claim is

considered capable of pecuniary estimation , and whether the

jurisdiction of the court is between the MTC and the RTS

depends on the amount of the claim.

o HOWEVER, where the basic issue is something other than to

recover a sum of money or where the money claim is purely

incidental or a consequence of the principal relief sought, the

court has considered such actions, where the SM of the litigation

may not be estimated in terms of money and are cognizable

only by the CFI

o RATIO: besides determination of damages, such cases demand

inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more

within the competence of the CFI

• 2 phases of expropriation, citing NAPOCOR v JOCSON

in an expropriation suit, the court determines the authority of the

government entity, the necessity of expropriation and the observance

of due process.

NAPOCOR V JOCSON

• Cited the case of Biñan for the 2 stages of expropriation

o The first is concerned with the determination of the

authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent

domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of

the facts involved in the suit.

It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action,

"of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a

lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned,

for the public use or purpose described in the

complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to

6

be determined as of the date of the filing of the

complaint."

An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a

final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the

action and leaves nothing more to be done by the

Court on the merits.

So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final

one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the

proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to

the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the

propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard."

o The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned

with the determination by the Court of the "just

compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is

done by the Court with the assistance of not more than

three (3) commissioners.

The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the

evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners

would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the

second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to

be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . .

• PD 42 effectively removes the discretion of the court in determining

the provisional value.

o What is to be deposited is an amount equivalent to the

assessed value for taxation purposes.

o No hearing is required for that purpose.

o All that is needed is notice to the owner of the property

sought to be condemned.

• Determination of just compensation is a judicial function (citing EPZA v

Dulay)

VISAYAN REFINING V CAMUS

• Military and aviation purpose is a public purpose

• Expropriation proceedings may be maintained upon the exclusive

initiative of the Governor-General, without the aid of any special

legislative authority (to pay for the land to be acquired) other than

that already on the statute books.

7

o if the Government complies with the requirements of law

relative to the making of a deposit in court, provisional

possession of the property may be at once given to it, just as is

permitted in the case of any other person or entity authorized

by law to exercise the power eminent domain.

o Special legislative authority for the buying of a piece of land by

the Government is no more necessary than for buying a paper of

pain; and in the case of a forced taking of property against the

will of the owner, all that can be required of the government is

that should be able to comply with the conditions laid down by

law (DUE PROCESS) as and when those conditions arise.

• The power of ED is inseparable from sovereignty, being essential to the

existence of the state and inherent in government even in its most

primitive forms. No law is necessary to confer this right upon any

government exercise sovereign powers.

CITY OF MANILA V CORRALES

• Just compensation= market value

• Reasonable Market Price: The owner of the property should not take

advantage of the necessity of the public purpose of requiring the

government to pay more than their property is worth; neither should

the government be permitted to the property of private persons at a

less price than it is reasonably worth at the time of the expropriation

• Owner has right to its value for the use for which it would

bring the most in the market.

• Market value: value which purchasers would generally pay for it

• LO is entitled to recover the value of the land at the time it was

expropriated. He should not be charged with the expense necessary to

put the property so taken in the condition in which the public desires to

use it.

• Method of Ascertaining Value

o Value of the property cannot always be fixed by its actual rental

value. There is a difference between the actual value of the

property and the price for which it is rented at any particular

time. Rent is variable quantity. Value of the property cannot

always be capitalized on its rental value. Neither can the value

8

of property for expropriation purpose be based upon its actual

cost of construction.

o The inquiry must always be: What is the property worth on

the market, not merely as to its current use, but with

reference to the use to which it is plainly adapted

(malamang, potential transformation of the land, say from agri

residentialcommercial); that is to say, what is it worth,

from its availability for a valuable purpose?

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF RIZAL V CARO DE ARAULLO

• Just compensation

• MV: unaffected by the subsequent change in the condition of the

property

• Condition of the property at the time taken, not at filing since in this

case, filing came way later

• Increase and decrease in value: no such thing as steady increase in

value of land, value must be determined by the general economic

condition prevailing and must be established by proof.

REPUBLIC V VDA DE CASTELVI

• “taking”

o physical taking

o not momentary

o under a color of authority

o public purpose

o oust enjoyment of property

• ELEMENTS OF TAKING:

1. expropriator must enter a private property

2. entrance must be for more than a momentary period

3. under a warrant or color of legal authority

4. purpose must be devoted to a public use

5. utilization of the property for public use must be in such a

way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all the beneficial

enjoyment of the property.

• Momentary: limited period, not indefinite

• Mere notice of intention to expropriate cannot bind the LO;

expropriation must commence in court

9

• lease contract: momentary taking, and enjoying rentals thus no oust of

enjoyment

• Under the ROC, just compensation must be determined as of the date

of filing of the complaint.

o Assumption: taking coincides with the commencement of the

expropriation proceeding or subsequent to the filing of the

complaint for ED

Market value (-consequential damage) + (consequential benefit)

• Consequential benefit cannot exceed damage, otherwise LO will be

deprived of proper compensation

EPZA V DULAY

• Short version: P.D. Nos. 76 464, 794 and 1533 was declared unconsti

because it deprives the court of its discretion, judicial determination of

just compensation

• We declared as unconstitutional and void, for being, inter alia,

impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives which

tends to render the Court inutile in a matter which, under the

Constitution, is reserved to it for final determination, the method of

ascertaining just compensation prescribed in P.D. Nos. 76 464, 794

and 1533, to wit: the market value as declared by the owner or

administrator or such market value as determined by the assessor,

whichever is lower in the first three (3) decrees, and the value

declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest

in the property or the value as determined by the assessor, pursuant

to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever is lower, prior to the

recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government office to

acquire the property, in the last mentioned decree.

SEC 8 REPORT

• Amend

• Study further

• Reject

• Accept

• Court has control of over commissioner

10

SEC 9

• Conflicting claimant

o Payment to court

SEC 11

• Appeal will not delay taking

• Will not stay order of expropriation

TAKING before FILING

• Because there’s maybe leasing

• There’s negotiation, then offer

• Nego necessary?

o Necessary:

govt need not resort to court if there’s settlement

in cases of delegated power of ED, law requires LGU to

make an offer

o Not necessary:

IF GOVERNMENT DOES NOT PAY

• Remedy:

o Cannot return

o Cannot execute because public funds cannot be executed

o Corcusuela, irrigation case by NIA, no payment

Went to RTC for WRIT of exec

SC: 10 years, government cannot escape liab, congress

has already allotted for the project, cannot say that

there’s no fund to pay, and the project was earning

money, NIA must pay through a writ of execution

APPROPRIATIONS FOR PAYMENT

• Specific

STATE CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS CONSENT

• By taking/filing case of expropriation, the RP government waives its

immunity

INTEREST

• From the time of taking (Benguet Consolidated inc v Republic)

11

• To hold government to pay immediately

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED v REPUBLIC

• the fact that Benguet had a subsisting mineral claim over the land will

not prevent the government from expropriating the land so long as it

will serve a public purpose (to build a PMA training institution for AFP

officers and DND

• Also, Benguet already waived their right to question the right to

expropriation, as they were already questioning the amount of

compensation in their MR.

RULE 68 FORECLOSURE Diane Shayne

Defendants

• Mortgagor

• Junior encumbrances

o If not included in the case

Cannot annul but decision not binding

Can exercise equity of redemption

• Purchasers etc

Indispensable and necessary parties in foreclosure complaint

• Indispensable: Mortgagor and mortgagee.

• Plaintiff: mortgagee

Modes of foreclosure of real estate mortgage

• Judicial – Rule 68

o Used if there is no special power inserted in or attached to the

REM contract allowing an EJF sale

• Extrajudicial – Act No. 3135, as am. by Act No. 4118

o Used if there is a special power inserted in or attached to the

REM contract allowing an EJF sale.

Modes of foreclosure of chattel mortgage

• Judicial – Rule 68; Replevin under Rule 60

SENO v PESTOLANTE

• RTC has jurisdiction, basis of value is the actual amount of the chattel

not the remaining balance of the debt

• Foreclosure or writ of replevin: valid to recover possession by M’gee

Complaint in action for foreclosure (Sec 1)

• In an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage or other encumbrance

upon real estate, the complaint shall set forth:

o The date and due execution of the mortgage;

o Its assignments, if any;

o The names and residences of the mortgagor and the mortgagee;

o A description of the mortgaged property;

o A statement of the date of the note or other documentary

evidence of the obligation secured by the mortgage, the amount

claimed to be unpaid thereon; and

13

o The names and residences of all persons having or claiming an

interest in the property subordinate in right to that of the holder

of the mortgage, all of whom shall be made defendants in the

action.

Sec 2 if facts in section 1 are true:

• Order payment of

o Equity of redemption 90-120 days, or before the confirmation of

sale

• Public auction R39

LIMPIN V IAC

• Assignees of mortgagor assumes the rights and obligations of the

mortgagor

• Limpin only assumes the right of Butuan Bay to redeem

• Effects of the foreclosure sale retroact to the date of

registration of the mortgage

• It is well settled that a recorded mortgage is a right in rem, a hen on

the property whoever its owner may be. The recordation of the

mortgage in this case put the whole world, petitioners included, on

constructive notice of its existence and warned everyone who

thereafter dealt with the property on which it was constituted that he

would have to reckon with that encumbrance.

• Hence, Limpin's subsequent purchase of the "interests and

participation" of Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation in the lots

covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, as well as the sale of the

same to Sarmiento on November 21, 1981, were both subject to said

mortgage.

• On the other hand, Ponce's purchase of the lots mortgaged to him at

the foreclosure sale on October 12, 1983, was subject to no prior lien

or encumbrance, and could in no way be affected or prejudiced by a

subsequent or junior lien, such as that of Limpin. Petitioner Sarmiento

having acquired no better right than his predecessor-in-interest,

petitioner Limpin, his title must likewise fail.

• The fact that at the time Ponce foreclosed the mortgage on October

21, 1983, the lots had already been bought by Limpin and

subsequently sold to Sarmiento is of no consequence, since the settled

doctrine is that the effects of the foreclosure sale retroact to the

14

date of registration of the mortgage, i.e., March 1, 1973 in the

present case.

QUIMSON V CA

• Right of redemption (1 year) runs from date of registration of sale.

Actual notice of sale by the judgment-debtor or redemptioner is

immaterial.

• The person entitled to the right of redemption is necessarily the owner

of the property sold and not any third party.

• Redemption price: amount fixed by the court in the order of

execution with interest at the rate specified in the mortgage, and all

the costs and other judicial expenses incurred by reason of the

execution, sale and for the custody of the said property, not just the

amount for which the property was acquired at the foreclosure sale.

Right of Redemption

• Judicial foreclosure

o Applies only if a mortgagor is a bank or financial institution

o Period: 1 year from the registration of sale

• Extrajudicial

o 1 year period from date of sale

o except: mortagor corp with mortgagee bank, 3months to

redeem from date of foreclosure or registration in the RD,

whichever is higher

RAMOS V MANALAC

• After the confirmation of sale, writ of possession is ministerial

o the issuance of a writ of possession in a foreclosure

proceedings is not an execution of judgment within the

purview of section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, but is

merely a ministerial and complementary duty of the court

can undertake even after the lapse of five (5) years,

provided the statute of limitations and the rights of third persons

have not intervened in the meantime (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61

Phil., 201).

o This is the correct interpretation of section 6, Rule 39, in relation

to section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. This is a case where

15

the judgment involved is already final executed, and the

properties mortgaged sold by order of the court, and the

properties mortgaged sold by order of the court, and purchaser

thereof has transferred them to a third person, who desires to

be placed in their possession.

o In the exercise of its interlocutory duty to put and end to the

litigation and save multiplicity of an action, no plausible reason

is seen why the court cannot issue a peremptory order to place

the ultimate purchaser in the possession of the property.

o The general rule is that after a sale has been made under a

decree in a foreclosure suit, the court has the power to

give possession to the purchaser, and the latter will not

be driven to an action at law to obtain possession. The

power of the court to issue a process and place the purchaser in

possession, is said to rest upon the ground that it has power to

enforce its own decrees and thus avoid circuitous action

and vexatious litigation (Rovero de Ortega vs. Natividad, 71

Phil., 340).

GRIMALT V VELASQUEZ

• Notice of hearing needed

• Failure to notify: ground to nullify the foreclosure

• In this case however, foreclosure sale was not affirmed since the

mortgagor, even before the confirmation of sale, deposited to the

sheriff the full amount of the judgment, +interest+cost (validly

redeemed the mortgaged property). Sy, the purchases in the

foreclosure sale ordered to be reimbursed for his purchase price

without interest.

o Persons who bid at a foreclosure sale are assumed to know that

the mere fact of being the highest bidder does not vest such

bidder with the ownership of the property.

o The action by which the ownership of the property is

conveyed is the approval of the sale by the court.

o If the debtor discharges the obligation at any time before

a valid order is entered, confirming the sale, the right of

the bidder is limited to the return of the money paid by

16

him to cover his bid. The debtor, in paying the creditor the

amount of the judgment for the purpose of discharging his

property from the lien of the mortgage of discharging his

property from the lien of the mortgage, infringes no right

whatever of the bidder.

o Consequently, it is error to require the mortgagor to pay the

bidder interest upon sum deposited by him.

o Interest is payable by virtue of a contractual undertaking, or as

a result of the breach of an obligation after the obligor has been

put in default.

o With respect to one who becomes a bidder at a foreclosure sale,

the owner of the mortgaged property is in no sense a

debtor of any person who voluntarily takes part in the

bidding.

o The mortgagor by paying to the plaintiff the amount of her debt,

for the purpose of freeing her property from the lien of the

mortgage, makes use of a right, which in no sense violates any

right of the bidder. The latter, by making his bid and depositing

the money, does not acquire a right but a mere expectancy,

subject to the contingency of a valid approval of the sale by the

court before the mortgage on the property is discharged by

payment.

SY v CA, SIHI

• EJF: amount of redemption under sec 78 of the GBA amending 3135

WTR banks is = to mortgage debt +interest and cost/expenses

• SIHI is a financial intermediary is within the purview of sec 78 of the

GBA, which amends Act 3135 insofar as redemption price when the

mortgagee is a bank or banking or credit institution, that the amount

at which the property shall be redeemable from SIHI is the amount

due under the mortgage deed, or the outstanding obligation of

mortgagor + interest+expenses. Thus, when the petitioner failed to

pay this entire amount (Sy only paid the purchase price plus the

1% interest per month until date of redemption), no valid

redemption was effected by him and consequently, there was no legal

obstacle for SIHI to consolidate its title over the property.

17

TOLENTINO V CA

• Valid tender of payment: filing of action to enforce foreclosure (formal

offer to pay/redeem) + check payment (established as payment to

commercial usage

• Tolentino can redeem other property mortgage to BPI, but not

anymore the property validly redeemed by Dela Cruz pursuant to CA

141 (homestead patent) from BPI

• The right of redemption is not an obligation but an absolute privilege.

A bonafide tender of the redemption price and formal offer to redeem

is not essential where the redemption is being exercised by way of

judicial action. A redemption is not rendered invalid by the fact that

the sheriff accepted a check rather than casj. The exercise of this right,

being optional, no importance can be attached to the facts that a stop

payment order was issued.

• Redemptioner should pay: auction price + 1% interest per month upt

to the time of redemption, together with the taxes or assessment paid

by the purchaser after the purchase.

• Payment by check: A check as a medium of payment in commercial

transaction is too firmly established by usage to permit any doubt

upon this point at the present day

GRAVINA V CA

• Personal notice, not required in Act 3135

• Requires only posting and publication if the value is more than Php400

• DECISION

o Section 3 of Act No. 3135 (Mortgage Law) requires only the

posting of the notices of sale in three public places and the

publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation.

Personal notice is not required.

Sec. 3 Notice shall be given by posting notices of the

sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public

places of the municipality or city where the property is

situated, and if such property is worth more than four

hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a

week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of

general circulation in the municipality or City.

18

o In the case of Philippine National Bank vs. International

Corporate Bank, 129 SCRA 508, 509, the Court likewise ruled

that:

The contention of private respondent in its opposition

that the extrajudicial foreclosure is null and void for

failure of the petitioner to inform them of the said

foreclosure and the pertinent dates of redemption so that

it can exercise its prerogatives under the law is untenable.

There being obviously no contractual stipulation therefor,

personal notice is not necessary and what governs is the

general rule in Section 3 of Act 3135, as amended, which

directs the posting of notices of the sale in at least three

(3) public places of the municipality where the property is

situated, and the publication thereof in a newspaper of

general circulation in said municipality.

o There is no merit in petitioners' contention that the sale of the

foreclosed property to Lucila Edna Tan, an employee of the

bank, was invalid. In the first place, the Tans did not buy the

property from the mortgagee, the Daily Savings and Loan

Association, but from the Mercantile Financing Corporation.

Secondly, it is not prohibited for the bank to sell to its employee

property acquired by the bank at a mortgage foreclosure sale.

The claim of the petitioners that there was collusion between

DLSA and the Tans was not proven. The Court of Appeals held:

As to the argument of the appellant that there was

conspiracy and collusion among the plaintiffs and the third

party defendants, the trial court held that there was no

sufficient proof to sustain the defense and We see no

cogent reason for Us to disturb these findings of fact on

appeal.

OUANO V CA

• No republication provision as agreed: renders the foreclosure VOID

• Posting and republication is jurisdictional; it cannot be waived because

of public policy

• Purpose of notice: to inform the public of all interested parties to

participate in the auction

19

• To allow waiver amount to private auction

• DECISION:

o It is a well-settled rule that statutory provisions governing

publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be

strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations therefrom

will invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable. In

a number of cases, we have consistently held that failure to

advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance with

statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect

invalidating the sale. Consequently, such defect renders the sale

absolutely void and no title passes.

o Petitioner, however, insists that there was substantial

compliance with the publication requirement, considering that

prior publication and posting of the notice of the first date were

made.

o In Tambunting v. Court of Appeals, we held that

republication in the manner prescribed by Act No. 3135 is

necessary for the validity of a postponed extrajudicial

foreclosure sale. Thus we stated:

Where required by the statute or by the terms of the

foreclosure decree, public notice of the place and time of

the mortgage foreclosure sale must be given, a statute

requiring it being held applicable to subsequent sales as

well as to the first advertised sale of the property.

[emphasis supplied].

o Petitioner further contends that republication may be waived

voluntarily by the parties.

This argument has no basis in law.

The issue of whether republication may be waived is not

novel, as we have passed upon the same query in

Philippine National Bank v. Nepomuceno

Productions Inc:

Petitioner therein sought extrajudicial foreclosure of

respondent's mortgaged properties with the

Sheriff's Office of Pasig, Rizal. Initially scheduled on

August 12, 1976, the auction sale was rescheduled

20

several times without republication of the notice of

sale, as stipulated in their Agreements to Postpone

Sale. Finally, the auction sale proceeded on

December 20, 1976, with petitioner as the highest

bidder.

Aggrieved, respondents sued to nullify the

foreclosure sale. The trial court declared the sale

void for non-compliance with Act No. 3135. This

decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of

Appeals. Upholding the conclusions of the trial and

appellate court, we categorically held:

• Petitioner and respondents have absolutely

no right to waive the posting and publication

requirements of Act No. 3135

*in practice: bank post alternative dates of auction in case the original dates

don’t push through

* prove that the paper is of general circulation

YULIENCO V CA

• Under 3135, jurisdiction to issue writ of possession lies in the court

where the province, city, municipality, where the property is situated.

• DECISION

o Act 3135, otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the Sale of

Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real

Estate Mortgages,” mandates that jurisdiction over a

petition for a writ of possession lies in the court of the

province, city, or municipality where the property subject

thereof is situated. Section 7 of the said Act is clear on this

matter, thus:

SEC. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this

Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance

[now Regional Trial Court] of the province or place where

the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him

possession thereof during the redemption period,

furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the

property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the

21

debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without

violating the mortgage or without complying with the

requirements of this Act….

o Since the land subject of the controversy is located in Quezon

City, the city’s RTC should rightly take cognizance of the case, to

the exclusion of other courts.

o Neither can this Court consider the pendency of Special Civil

Case No. 93-2521 before Branch 61 of the Makati RTC a

procedural obstacle. Said action for injunction, reformation,

and damages does not raise an issue that constitutes a

prejudicial question in relation to the present case.

A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case

the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the

issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which

pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into

play in a situation where a civil action and a

criminal action are both pending and there exists in

the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved

before the criminal action may proceed, because

howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved

would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or

innocence of the accused in the criminal case.The

rationale behind the principle of prejudicial

question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

Here, Special Civil Case No. 93-2521 and the present

one are both civil in nature and, therefore, no

prejudicial question can arise from the existence of

the two actions. It taxes our imagination how the

questions raised in Special Civil Case No. 93-2521 would

be determinative of Land Registration Case No. Q-11564

(99). The basic issue in the former is whether the

promissory note and mortgage agreement executed

between petitioners and private respondent ACC are valid.

In the latter case, the issue is whether respondent, armed

with a TCT in its name, is entitled to a writ of possession.

22

Clearly, the two cases can proceed separately and take

their own direction independently of each other.

o In the present case, petitioners cannot anchor their case

on the purported interest they have, as owners, over the

land and the improvements thereon. They have been

stripped of their rights over the property when, as

mortgagors, they failed to redeem it after foreclosure

took place. A mortgagor has only one year after

registration of sale with the Register of Deeds within

which to redeem the foreclosed real estate. After that

one-year period, he loses all his interests over it. This is

in consonance with Section 78 of Republic Act 337,

otherwise known as the “General Banking Act,” which

provides:

SEC. 78. …In the event of foreclosure, whether judicially

or extrajudicially, of any mortgage on real estate which is

security for any loan granted before the passage of this

Act or under the provisions of this Act, the mortgagor or

debtor whose real property has been sold at public

auction, judicially or extrajudicially, for the full or partial

payment of an obligation to any bank, banking, or credit

institution, within the purview of this Act, shall have the

right, within one year after the sale of the real

estate as a result of the foreclosure of the

respective mortgage, to redeem the property by

paying the amount fixed by the court in the order of

execution… (Emphasis supplied.)

o Likewise, Section 6 of Act 3135 states:

SEC. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made

under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the

debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor

or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having

a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or

deed of trust under which the property is sold, may

redeem the same at any time within the term of one

year from and after the date of the sale;… (Emphasis

supplied.)

23

o Well established is the rule that after the consolidation of title in

the buyer’s name, for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the

writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance

to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a

ministerial function.

The writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon

the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the

corresponding bond.

The judge issuing the writ following these express

provisions of law neither exercises his official discretion

nor judgment.

As such, the court granting the writ cannot be charged

with having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse

of discretion.

JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE

• Complaint

• Judgment

• 90-120 days

• sale

• confirmation

• register w/ RD

• mortgage title remains but title is annotated

• if no right of redemption: new title issued

Judicial

• Pay fees

• Posting and publication

• Sale

• Certificate of sale

Equityofredemption

RULE 69 PARTITION Diane Shayne

Rule 69 Partition

(Sections 1 to 13)

Partition defined

• Villamor vs. CA (162 SCRA 574)

o Partition – a division between two or more persons of real or

personal property which they own as copartners, joint tenants or

tenants in common, effected by the setting apart of such

interests so that they may enjoy and possess it in severalty.

o The purpose of partition is to put an end to the common tenancy

of the land or co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the

individual interest of each joint owner vesting in each a sole

estate in specific property and giving to each one the right to

enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the

other.

MTC may have jurisdiction in actions for partition

• Real property - P20,000.00/P50,000.00

• Personal property – P300,000.00/P400,000.00

Final order decreeing partition and accounting appealable (Sec 2)

Appeal period – 30 days

• If after the trial the court finds that the plaintiff has the right thereto, it

shall order the partition of the real estate among all the parties in

interest. Thereupon the parties may, if they are able to agree, make

the partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance,

and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the

parties, and such partition, together with the order of the court

confirming the same, shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the

place in which the property is situated.

• A final order decreeing partition and accounting may be appealed by

any party aggrieved thereby.

Note:

• Three stages in the action for partition each of which could be the

subject of appeal:

o Order of partition where the propriety of partition is determined;

o Judgment as to the accounting of the fruits and income of the

property;

25

o Judgment of partition

• The action hence, admits multiple appeals and would require a record

on appeal (Municipality of Binan vs. Garcia, as Cited in Riano) [hence

the 30-day appeal period]

Action for partition raises two issues

1. Whether plaintiff is co-owner of property

2. Assuming plaintiff is co-owner, how to divide the property between plaintiff

and defendant or among the co-owners

Who are indispensable parties

• All the co-owners (Rule 3, Sec 7)

Who may effect partition

• Alejandrino vs. CA (295 SCRA 536)

o Partition of the estate of a decedent may only be effected by:

1. The heirs themselves extrajudicially,

2. The court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course

of administration proceedings,

3. The testator himself, and

4. The third person designated by the testator

Extrajudicial partition by heirs (Sec 1, Rule 74)

• If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or

the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives

duly authorized for the purpose,

• The parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the

estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public

instrument filed in the office of the RD, and

• Should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of

partition.

• If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate

by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the RD.

• The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public

instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the

sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an

affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to

the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for

26

partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the RD, a bond with the said

RD, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property

involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and

conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed

under section 4 of this rule.

• It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files

a petition for letters of administration within 2 years after the death of

the decedent.

• The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be

published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided

in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be

binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no

notice thereof.

Partition of personal property (Sec 13)

• The provisions of this Rule shall apply to partitions of estates

composed of personal property, or of both real and personal property,

in so far as the same may be applicable.

• ATTY MELO: There’s no SC case involving partition of personal

property. Jurisdiction will most likely be based on the value of

the property.

Complaint in action for partition of real estate (Sec 1)

• A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do

so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature

and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of

which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other

persons interested in the property.

Commissioners to make partition when parties fail to agree

(Sec 3)

• If the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the court shall

appoint not more than 3 competent and disinterested persons as

commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to

the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of

the property as the court shall direct.

27

Oath and duties of commissioners (Sec 4)

• Before making such partition, the commissioners shall take and

subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform

• their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with

the other proceedings in the case.

• In making the partition, the commissioners shall view and examine the

real estate, after due notice to the parties to attend at such view and

examination, and

• Shall hear the parties as to their preference in the portion of the

property to be set apart to them and the comparative value thereof,

and

• Shall set apart the same to the parties in lots or parcels as will be most

advantageous and equitable, having due regard to the improvements,

situation and quality of the different parts thereof.

Assignment or sale of real estate by commissioners (Sec 5)

• When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate,

or a portion thereof, cannot be divided without prejudice to the

interests of the parties, the court may order it assigned to one of the

parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties

such amounts as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the

interested parties asks that the property be sold instead of being so

assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell

the real estate at public sale under such conditions and within such

time as the court may determine.

Report of commissioners; proceedings not binding until confirmed

(Sec 6)

• The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court

of all their proceedings as to the partition, or the assignment of real

estate to one of the parties, or the sale of the same.

• Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of court shall serve copies

thereof on all the interested parties with notice that they are allowed

ten (10) days within which to file objections to the findings of the

report, if they so desire.

• No proceeding had before or conducted by the commissioners shall

pass the title to the property or bind the parties until the court shall

28

have accepted the report of the commissioners and rendered judgment

thereon.

Action of the court upon commissioners‘ report (Sec 7)

• Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the

preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but

after the interested parties have filed their objections to the report or

their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, upon hearing,

accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or,

• For cause shown, recommit the same to the commissioners for further

report of facts; or

• Set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or accept the

report in part and reject it in part; and

• May make such order and render such judgment as shall effectuate a

fair and just partition of the real estate, or of its value, if assigned or

sold as above provided, between the several owners thereof.

Accounting for rent and profits in action for partition (Sec 8)

• In an action for partition in accordance with this Rule, a party shall

recover from another his just share of rents and profits received by

such other party from the real estate in question, and the judgment

shall include an allowance for such rents and profits.

Power of guardian in such proceedings (Sec 9)

• The guardian or guardian ad litem of a minor or person judicially

declared to be incompetent may, with the approval of the court first

had, do and perform on behalf of his ward any act, matter, or thing

respecting the partition of real estate, which the minor or person

judicially declared to be incompetent could do in partition proceedings

if he were of age or competent.

Costs and expenses to be taxed and collected (Sec 10)

• The court shall equitably tax and apportion between or among the

parties the costs and expenses which accrue in the action, including

the compensation of the commissioners, having regard to the interests

of the parties, and execution may issue therefor as in other cases.

29

The judgment and its effect; copy to be recorded in registry of deeds

(Sec 11)

• If actual partition of property is made, the judgment shall state

definitely, by metes and bounds and adequate description, the

particular portion of the real estate assigned to each party,

o The effect of the judgment shall be to vest in each party to the

action in severalty the portion of the real estate assigned to him.

• If the whole property is assigned to one of the parties upon his paying

to the others the sum or sums ordered by the court, the judgment

shall state the fact of such payment and of the assignment of the real

estate to the party making the payment,

o The effect of the judgment shall be to vest in the party making

the payment the whole of the real estate free from any interest

on the part of the other parties to the action.

• If the property is sold and the sale confirmed by the court, the

judgment shall state the name of the purchaser or purchasers and a

definite description of the parcels of real estate sold to each purchaser,

o The effect of the judgment shall be to vest the real estate in the

purchaser or purchasers making the payment or payments, free

from the claims of any of the parties to the action.

• A certified copy of the judgment shall in either case be recorded in the

registry of deeds of the place in which the real estate is situated, and

the expenses of such recording shall be taxed as part of the costs of

the action.

Neither paramount rights nor amicable partition affected by this Rule

(Sec 12)

• Nothing in this Rule contained shall be construed so as to prejudice,

defeat, or destroy the right or title of any person claiming the real

estate involved by title under any other person, or by title paramount

to the title of the parties among whom the partition may have been

made;(in simple terms, hindi binding to a 3rd party who did not

take part in the partition case and he claims to have been

deprived of his right over the property)

• nor so as to restrict or prevent persons holding real estate jointly or in

common from making an amicable partition thereof by agreement and

30

suitable instruments of conveyance without recourse to an action. (nor

restricts the party from amicably settling to partition the

property)

Notes from Riano:

• Partition presupposes the existence of a co-ownership over a property

between two or more persons.

• Rule allowing partition originates from Art 494 that no co-owner shall

be obliged to remain in the co-ownership and he may demand at any

time the partition of the property owned in common.

• Instances when a co-owner may not demand partition:

o Agreement among the co-owners to keep the property undivided

for a certain period of time but not exceeding 10 years;

o Partition is prohibited by the donor or testator for a period not

exceeding 20 years;

o Partition is prohibited by law;

o Property is not subject to a physical division and to do so would

render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended;

o Condition imposed upon voluntary heirs before they can demand

partition has not yet been fulfilled.

• Prescription does not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his

co-owner or co-heirs as long as there is recognition of the co-

ownership expressly or impliedly.

• Action for partition cannot be barred by prescription as long as the co-

ownership exists.

• While action to demand partition does not prescribe, a co-owner may

acquire ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear

repudiation of the co-ownership and the co-owners are apprised of the

claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.

• Modes of partition:

o By agreement of the parties; or

o Judicial proceedings under Rule 69.

MELO LECTURE:

• WHO: co-owners of undivided interest

• WHEN: Partition anytime (imprescriptible)

o Except: if there’s an agreement not to partition; period of

indivision cannot exceed 20 years (Art 1083, NCC)

31

• WHERE: RTC

• PROCEDURE:

1. File complaint containing

a. Nature and extent of title

b. Adequate description if the real estate

c. Join defendant and interested parties

2. Answer

3. Trial

4. Order of Partition, 2 results:

a. If parties AGREES accounting of rents and profits

b. If parties DO NOT AGREE (see step 5)

5. Court appoints not less than 3 commissioners to report;

commissioners will consider the preferences of the

parties, order surveying, set apart the property in the

most advantageous and equitable division (considering

the improvements, situation and quality of the different

parts)

6. Upon filing of report, COC serves copies to the parties

who have 10 days to comment (sabi ng codal, object).

7. Court can either APPROVE or DISAPPROVE the report

8. If approved, there will be an order of execution, then

later, registration of the property in the RD. If disapprove,

the commissioners do the who process of determination

again.

MELO CASES:

RUSSEL V VESTIL

• RTC has jurisdiction over the case because an action to nullify

Declaration of heirs and Deed of Confirmation of Previous Oral

Partition is not capable of pecuniary estimation

o where the basic issue is something other than the right to

recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely

incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought,

this Court has considered such actions as cases where the

subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of

money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first

instance.

32

o Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are

specific performance, support, foreclosure, annulling a deed of

sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and rescission.

o Since the main purpose of the petitioners’ action is to

declare null and void the document which the private

respondents made, it is action which is incapable of pecuniary

estimation. While the complaint also prays for partition, it

is only incidental to the main action.

RUGIAN V RUGIAN

• Failure to implead the an indispensible party (a co-owner of the

property action for partition will not prosper

o There being no documentary evidence to support the contention

of defendant that the land was conveyed to him by his father,

and it appearing that a third person, Mariano Ruguian, had an

interest in the land, and he not being made party to this suit,

the SC held that the partition of the land cannot be granted. An

action will not lie for the partition of an undivided interest in

land without the joinder of all co-owners.

MIRANDA V CA

• After the issuance of the order of partition, such order is already

final/definitive judgment (since no appeal has been filed within the

reglementary period). If such order leaves out the rendition of

accounting, upon appeal, the succeeding judge can no longer review,

reverse or amend order of partition because the courts want to end the

controversy and determine with finality the rights of the parties (or

simply, put an end to litigation) already. Allowing such would result to

the possibility of 2 lower courts giving conflicting decision as to the

same case, thus prolonging litigation.

• Partition and Accounting are separate orders and are appealed

separately.

• NOTE here that Judge Tantuico, the successor, reviewed the evidence

only presented to the earlier Judge, Mendoza, and substituted his own

appreciation of the facts by reversing the earlier decision of Mendoza

to approve partition. Judge Tantuico based his new order from Dy

Chun v Mendoza where the order of partition was decided to be an

interlocutory. Court held that an order of partition is not interlocutory

33

because after such order, nothing is left to be done by the court on the

merits of the case WRT to partition.

• MELO summarized the doctrine as:

o the order of partition is not a interlocutory order, because what

was only left was the order of accounting.

o the succeeding judge had no authority to review the judgment

of the previous judge

otherwise:

it would result to an unsound policy where a new

judge can change an earlier judgment on the

merits of the case by a succeeding judge

there would be a possibility of 2 orders on the same

issue by the same court which can be both subject

to an appeal

o doctrine under the case of Fuentabella and Dy Chun that an

order of partition is an interlocutory order is now

ABANDONED.

o Order of accounting: is incidental and an interlocutory order

which cannot be appealed per se; what you may only appeal is

the approval report by the commissioner by the court.

MUNICPALITY OF BIñAN V GARCIA

• Action for partition is subject to multiple appeals; it requires

ROA and given an appeal period of 30days from the receipt of

order

o In actions for eminent domain and for partition, no less than 2

appeals are allowed by law and the period for appeal is 30 days

counted from notice of order and not the ordinary period of 15

days prescribed for actions in general.

o A two-phase feature is found in an action for partition. The first

phase is the determination of w/n a co-ownership exists

and a partition is proper, and may be made by voluntary

agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This

phase ends with a declaration (a) that plaintiff is not entitled to

have partition because a co-ownership doesn’t exist or the

partition is legally prohibited, or (b) that co-ownership exists,

partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents

and profits received by defendant is in order. In either case, the

34

decision is a final one and may be appealed by the party

aggrieved.

o The second phase commences when the parties fail to

agree upon the partition directed by the court. Partition

shall then be done for the parties by the court with the

assistance of not more than 3 Commissioners. This stage

may also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself

and its approval by the court after the parties have been heard

and awarded recovery of their share in the rents and profits in

the real property in question. This order shall also be final and

appealable.

Accounting: basically which property goes to who

o the order of partition is final and executory and thus

appealable

MELO QUESTION:

• After the court approves the partition by the commissioners, is that

subject to appeal?

• ANSWER: YES. Appeal under Rule 45. Since there is nothing else to

dispose of and thus final and executory, the order is subject already to

appeal.

RULE 70 EJECTMENT Diane Shayne

REYES V STA MARIA

• 3 actions to recover real property

o accion interdictal: to recover material possession or who has a

better right to possess

o accion publiciana: to recover possession de jure (fact of

ownership)

o accion reivindicatoria: to recover both ownership and

possession

• In accion interdictal, it is possible that the lessee has a better right to

possess over the owner while there is a lease contract subsisting

• CASE DECISION:

o The lower court erred in stating that the facts are only

constitutive of an action for unlawful detainer since the

complaint shows on its face that respondents' refusal to deliver

the possession of the property was due to their adverse claim of

ownership of the same property and their counter-allegation

that they had bought the same from a certain Pablo Aguinaldo

Forcible Entry Unlawful Detainer

Grounds One is deprived of physical

possession of real property by

means of force, intimidation,

strategy, threats or stealth

(FISTS).

One illegally withholds possession

after the expiration or

termination of his right to hold

possession under any contract,

express or implied.

Start of

unlawful

deprivation Possession of defendant is illegal

from the beginning

Possession of defendant is

originally legal but became illegal

due to the expiration or

termination of the right to

possess.

Prior

possession

The issue is which party has prior

de facto possession

Does not require prior physical

possession

Procedure Action is summary in nature

Jurisdiction Jurisdiction lies in the proper MTC or MeTC

Prescriptive

period

Action must be brought within 1 year from the date of actual entry

on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last

demand, in case of unlawful detainer

Issue The issue is the right to physical possession

Nature of action Real actions

36

makes the petitioners' action one for recovery of their right to

possess the property (possession de jure) as well as to be

declared the owners thereof as against the contrary claim of

respondents.

o There are three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession

of real pro. property, namely, (1) the summary action for

forcible entry or detainer (accion interdictal) which seeks the

recovery of physical possession only and is brought within one

year in the justice of the peace court; (2) the accion publiciana

which is for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary

action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of First

Instance; and (3) accion de reivindicacion which seeks the

recovery of ownership, also brought in the Court of First

Instance.

o The only issue in forcible entry and detainer cases is the

physical possession of real property possession de facto

and not possession de jure. If plaintiff can prove a prior

possession in himself, he may recover such possession even

from the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his

prior possession, if he has in his favor priority of time, he has

the security that entitles him to stay on the property until he is

lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either

accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Petitioners' action

was not merely for recovery of possession de facto. Their

action was clearly one of accion publiciana for recovery of

possession de jure if not one of accion reivindicatoria for

declaration of their ownership of the land. Such accion

publiciana or the plenary action in an ordinary civil

proceeding to determine the better and legal right to

possess (independently of title) clearly falls within the

jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance and not of the

Municipal Courts.

37

HILARIO V CA

• MTC has EOJ despite the defense of ownership was a raised

• Sec 16: defense of ownership MTC can determine provisional

ownership to determine the issue of possession, without prejudice to

an actual case in court to settle issue of ownership

• CASE DECISION:

o Issue: Whether or not the conflicting positions of the parties

would involve the question of ownership and thus divest the

MTC of its jurisdiction over the case?

petitioner’s claim: their right to possess the subject

property pursuant to the deed of sale and

private respondents’ insistence: they remained

owners of the realty because the purported deed of sale is

in reality a mortgage contract

Held: No. Sec. 33 of BP 129 stats that the Metropolitan Trial

Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts

shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible

entry and unlawful detainer, provided that when in such cases,

the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings

and the question of possession cannot be resolved without

deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall

be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. At

present, all forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases have to be

tried pursuant to the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure

regardless of whether or not the issue of ownership of the

subject property is alleged by the party. Decision of the MTC is

affirmed: that case involved UD, and thus MTC had jurisdiction.

WILMON AUTO SUPPLY V CA

• UD case in the MTC will not be abated when an action to annul the sale

is pending in the RTC

o UD case involves material possession

o Annulment of Sale involves possession de jure

• An ejectment case is not abated by the ff:

1. Injunction suits

2. Accion publiciana

38

3. Writ of possession case" where ownership is concededly the

principal issue

4. Action for quieting of title to property

5. Suits for specific performance with damages

6. Action for reformation of instrument

7. Action for reconveyance of property or "accion reivindicatoria"

8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document

affecting property

MUñOZ V CA

• Case differentiated FE and UD

Forcible Entry Unlawful Detainer

The possession of the land by the

defendant is unlawful from the

beginning as he acquires it by force,

intimidation, strategy or stealth

The possession of the defendant is

inceptively lawful but it becomes

illegal by reason of the termination of

his right to the possession of the

property under his contract with

plaintiff

The law does not require a previous

demand to vacate the premises

Demand by plaintiff is jurisdictional

Plaintiff must prove that he was in

prior possession of the premises until

he was deprived of it by the

defendant

Plaintiff need not be in prior

possession

The one-year period is generally

counted from the date of actual entry

on the land

From the date of last demand

39

• PR Garcia alleged that possession was illegal from the beginning (thus

implying forcible entry) BUT

o Garcia failed to show any muniment of title

o FISTS as ground were not raised

o Date of entry was not alleged to determine reckoning of

prescription

o Petitioner has been in physical possession for the last 12 years

• CASE DECISION:

o When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible

entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how the

entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the

action should either be accion publiciana or reinvindicatoria.

o There was no mention in the complaint that he or his co-

owneres were in prior possession of the property. While it is true

that possession of the tenant is possession of the owner, the

complaint failed to state that Loreta Garcia was in prior

possession of the property at the time of entry by the

petitioners. While the complaint stated that the petitioners

obtained possession of the premises through stealth, it failed to

aver when this entry was accomplished or when the private

respondent learned of this entry. The failure of the private

respondent to allege the time when unlawful deprivation took

place is fatal because this will determine the start of the

counting of the one year period for the filing of the summary

action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.

o If the private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises

and that possession of it was deprived from him for more than

12 years, he should present his claim before the RTC in an

accion publiciana or reinvindicatoria.

SUMULONG V CA

• Sumulong raised the ground of stealth and strategy

o BUT: the facts of the case defy the existence of stealth

(clandestine and secret) or strategy (by machination) because

negotiations between the parties for months

40

• It’s not the designation of FE in the complaint which governs but the

allegation which constitute elements of UD. In case of the latter,

ejectment prospers.

ONG V PAREL

• Case of no FE

• Counting of the period of prescription

o in case of stealth or strategy 1 year counted from discovery

o in case of UD 1 year from unlawful deprivation

• in this case, plaintiff failed to allege prior actual/physical possession

• court protects the one with the immediate need to the property.

• CASE DECISION:

o Section 1, Rule 70 provides that in actions for forcible entry, the

plaintiff is allegedly deprived of the possession of any land or

building by force, intimidation, threat, stealth, or strategy and

that the action is filed any time within one year form the time of

such unlawful deprivation of possession, except in stealth, in

which the one-year period is to be counted from the tine plaintiff

learned thereof.

o The spouses aver that the overhang and hollow block wall were

constructed through stealth and strategy. Stealth is defined as

any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and

to gain entrance into or remain within the residence of

another without permission. They failed to establish

encroachment of their property through stealth as it was not

shown when and how the alleged entry was made on the portion

of their lot. On the other hand, Parel stated that the overhang

and wall had already been existing when her grandmother was

in possession of the two lots, as she was the one who had them

made. Furthermore, Parel is in possession of the property; the

spouses have not proved any prior possession, which is required

in forcible entry cases.

o Spouses failed to allege and prove with specificity that Parel

unlawfully entered their portion of the lot either by force,

intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; this action must thus

fail.

o It cannot also be considered as an action for unlawful detainer,

in which one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the

41

expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under

any contract, express or implied. There is no allegation that

Parel’s possession changed from legal to illegal anytime

from their alleged illegal entry before plaintiffs made

their demand to vacate. Nor was there any showing that

they merely tolerated Parel’s possession.

o Where the complaint fails to specifically aver facts

constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as

where it does not state how entry was effected or how

and when dispossession started, the action should either

be accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

In UD, demand is jurisdictional.

• Exception to demand:

o FE

o Expiration of the term

Demand forms

• Oral, but subject to proof

• Written notice

• Posting allowed if no person is present in the premises

COTIAMCO V DIAZ

• Evidence of notice to vacate duly admitted, failure to allege the

existence of a notice to vacate in complaint is not fatal

• In the present ROC, case would not have prospered in favor of

Cotiamco, because demand is mandatory to be alleged in a UD

complaint

PENAS JR V CA

• UD, demand counted from the last demand (demand has to be a

new one)

o Except when the demand is only a reference to an earlier

demand, that will not reset the period. That the demand from

the earlier demand is still not waived. (Caniza)

CANIZA V CA

• Possession by mere tolerance is not indefinite and with an implied

promise to vacate upon demand

42

• It is also important to note that the 1 year period to file the complaint

for desahucio is reckoned from the date of last demand to vacate. The

reason being that the lessor has the option to waive his right of

action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain

meanwhile in the premises.

MUNOZ v CA 214 SCRA 216 1992

• Entry by FISTS, subsequently tolerated, cannot be transformed as UD

• RATIO: if this is allowed, no one will use FE, and the 1 year period

prescription therein; tolerance to stay will be allowed and plaintiffs will

simply rely on filing UD

CETUS DEVELOPMENT INC V CA

• No cause of action for UD because upon demand to pay, respondents

immediately paid

• In a month to month lease, there is no lease K. Thus, to incur delay,

there must be demand. Cetus made one demand to pay and vacate,

otherwise respondents will be ejected. After demand to pay and

payment within the prescribed period, THERE’S NO BREACH OF K yet.

Cetus should have made a second demand.

• CASE DECISION:

o Under Sec 2: Two requisites in an ejectment suit,

1) there must be failure to pay rent or comply with the

conditions of the lease, and

2) there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate

within 15 days in case of lands, and 5 days in case of buildings.

In this case, there’s no cause of action for ejectment since PRs

paid after the 1st demand.

• MELO SAYS:

o 1st demand is demand to put lessess in delay (mora)

solution: in lease K, write that rent should be paid at a

certain date without need of demand (thus after that

date, there’s delay already)

o 2nd demand is demand to comply with section 2 (demand to

pay)

o There must be proper demand

1st demand: specific performance

2nd to pay and vacate

43

o Law gives lessee 2 opportunities to pay

HEIRS OF SUICO V CA

• The allegation of ownership was raised merely to underscore

respondents’ claim that petitioners’ demand for rental increase for

several times was harsh and oppressive disregarding the close

relationship between the petitioners’ grandma and the respondents’

parents. Notably, respondents never asked for the value of their bldg.,

but only sought that the complaint be dismissed, or in the alternative,

that the lease period be fixed, with moral damages, attorney’s fees,

and litigation expenses in either case. Also, the respondents in fact did

not set up the defense of MTC’s lack of jurisdiction on the basis of

issue of ownership.

• The parties to the oral lease in question (grandma Emilia and

respondents’ parents) did not fix a specified period therefor. However,

since the rentals were paid monthly, the lease, even if verbal, may be

deemed to be on monthly basis, expiring at every month. In such

case, a demand to vacate was not even necessary for judicial

action after the expiration of every month.

• As to the issue of RTC’s extension lease period for 5 years from 1993-

1998, the Court reversed this. Instead, the SC found MTC’s ruling

more in accord with justice and equity. The respondents and their

parents had been in possession of the premises for 43 yrs. At

first, respondents were paying relatively meager price at P30 a

month, then P360, before a demand to increase it at P1200 was

made. This meager rent was due to the fact that the original lessor,

grandma Emilia, and defendants’ parents were close. Obviously, the

respondents had already benefitted from this fact. Also, the

extension of 5 yrs was almost obtained (since this case was

resolved already in 1997).

• The RTC also erred when it ruled that after the expiration of the

5-yr lease period, the property vacated shall become the

property of the petitioners. The Civil Code provides that the lessors

would only become the owners if they choose to reimburse the

respondents, as of the termination of term, ½ of the value of the

house constructed. If they refuse to reimburse, the respondents’

remedy is to remove the house.

44

MARA INC V ESTRELLA

• A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry may

within 10 days from the filing of a complaint present a motion to

secure from the competent court, in the action for forcible entry, a

writ of preliminary injunction to restore him in his possession.

The court shall decide the motion within 30 days from the filing

thereof.” This has been incorporated in Sec. 3, Rule 70.

• Injunction initially dissolved by posting of counterbond by de Leon;

counterbond was a check and not given to the lessor

• The injunction contemplated in article 539 is an exception to

the general rule that the writ of injunction is not proper where

its purpose is to take property out of the possession or control

of one person and place it in the hands of another whose title

has not clearly been established by law.

• In this case, the Torrens titles of Mara, Inc. to the four lots appear

to be unassailable. De Leon in his answer merely pretended lack

of knowledge of said titles. He has also not shown any

indubitable right to possess the said lots. The judge should not

have dissolved the bond.

BALAGTAS V CA

• To stay execution

o perfection of appeal

o Supersedeas bond (past rental/damages) within the period of

appeal

o Periodically deposit monthly which becomes due during the

pendency of thhe appeal (amount depends on the amount or

rental adjudged by the court)

• Otherwise: issuance of writ of execution is ministerial

• CASE DECISION:

o Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge acted without and/or

in excess of his jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion

in denying petitioner's Motions for Immediate Ejectment

Execution.

45

o Held: Yes. Under Rule 701 of the Revised Rules of Court,

judgment in favor of the plaintiff must be executed immediately

in order to prevent further damages to him arising from

continued loss of possession. However, the defendant may stay

execution:

(a) by perfecting an appeal and filing a supersedeas

bond, and

(b) by paying promptly from time to time either to the

plaintiff or depositing with the Court of First Instance the

adjudged reasonable value of the use and occupation of

the property.

This rule is mandatory, the exception being when the delay is

due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. 2 In

the case at bar, it is uncontradicted that private respondents

posted their respective supersedeas bonds to answer for

rentals and damages accruing down to the time of the

perfection of their appeals in January, 1977. What is

controverted is whether or not there is compliance with the

second requisite which is the payment of the monthly rentals

as they fell due. Private respondents insist that they correctly

1 Section 8. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal

has been perfected, and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by the municipal or

city court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents,

damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless during the pendency

of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the

contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the municipal or city court to exist. In the absence of a contract,

he shall deposit with the court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the

preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment, on or before the tenth day of each

succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the municipal or city court, with

the other papers, to the clerk of the Court of First Instance to which the action is appealed. Should the

defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal,

the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, of which the defendant shall have notice, and upon proof of

such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of

possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition

thereof on its merits.

46

paid P1,000 as rentals as provided in the Letter-Contract2

dated April 21, 1976 (Exhibit A), which was sustained and

upheld by the Pasay City Court as the new lease contract

governing the relations between the petitioner and private

respondents.

o The Court held that since the dispositive part of the decision of

the Pasay City Court adjudged and ordered the

respondents "to each pay to the petitioner Two Thousand

Pesos (P2,000.00) monthly rentals from May 1, 1976 until

each of them finally and respectively vacates his/her

respective apartment-premises subject matter of these

summary complaints," anything said in the body of the

opinion about the P1,000.00 discount if a lessee pays his/her

rental within the first three days of the month, is merely an

obiter.

o Where there is conflict between the dispositive part and

the opinion of a decision, the former must prevail over

the latter. When respondents effected monthly deposits of less

than P2,000.00, they violated the condition imposed by Section

8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.

o The law providing that in case the defendant appeals, he

must pay to the plaintiff or into the CFI the amount fixed

as rent on or before the 10th day of each calendar month,

and that failure to do so shall cause the judgment to be

executed, is mandatory and cannot be evaded. The court

has no discretion to give or not to give effect to such failure to

pay. Failure of the defendant to deposit on time the

monthly reasonable value of the use and occupation of

the property or the rents fixed in the judgment is a

ground for execution of such judgment as a matter of

right the duty of the court to order such execution being

ministerial and imperative.

2 Rental. P2,000.00 per month period payable by you to us, through our collector, within the first three days of

each corresponding month period; provided, however, that you shall be granted by us an initial discount of

Pl,000.00 for each monthly rental paid on time, but this discount shall not in anywise amend the aforesaid

rental,

47

CHUA V CA

• bond was filed out of time

• lame excuse that the amount of the bond is unknown to them: court

said, they could have mathematically computed back rentals

• excuse of not knowing where to file the supersedeas: should’ve been

filed in the MTC who issued the judgment (it’s in the ROC)

o Period to pay supersedeas: within period to file appeal

• CASE DECISION:

o Issue: After the expiration of the period for perfecting an

appeal, did the RTC have the authority to se the amount of and

accept a supersedeas bond to stay the immediate execution of

a decision in an ejectment suit pending appeal?

o Held: NO. As a genera rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff

in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order to

prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of

possession of the property in question. To stay immediate

execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending, the

foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must

concur:

(1) the defendant perfect his appeal;

(2) he files a supersedeas bond; and

(3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due

during the pendency of the appeal.

o In this case, the bond was filed out of time. The motion for

execution was filed 18 days from the date the petitioners

received a copy of the MTC’s decision, after the appeal had

already been perfected. Because no supersedeas bond has been

filed within the period to appeal, a writ of execution should have

been issued as a matter of right. Petitioners manifestly failed to

adduce a compelling reason to justify a departure from the

aforecited rule.

DE LAUREANO V ADIL

• The reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises

is that fixed by the inferior court in its judgment because the

rental stipulated in the lease contract that had expired might no longer

be the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises by

the reason of the change or rise in value.

48

• The purpose of the supersedeas bond is to secure payment of

the rents and damages adjudged in the appealed judgment.

Hence, the bond is not necessary if the defendant deposits in court the

amount of back rentals as fixed in the judgment. In other words, the

supersedeas bond answers only for rentals was in the judgment

and not for those that may accrue during the pendency of the

appeal which are guaranteed by the periodical deposits to be

made by the defendant.

• Since respondent only filed an inadequate bond based on the error of

the city court, he should be allowed to file the correct amount 30 days

from notice.

Complaint:

• Plaintiff has 5 days for writ of PMI

• Court can also dismiss the complaint outright

• 10 days to answer

• 10 days to answer to CC

o no MTD,

o all pleadings must be verified

o summary proceedings: your pleading forms part of evidence

o note the prohibited pleadings (see case of Wilmon v CA)

• preliminary conf

o like pre-trial

o failure to appear, order of default

• order prelim conf

o setting out facts, stipulations

• 10 days to submit evidence in the form of affidavits

o no hearings in ejectment

• decision

o sometime takes more than usual

o MTC decision immediately exec

to stop/stay execution: appeal, supersedeas and periodic

deposit

if RTC affirms, execution cannot be stayed anymore

because RTC decision is executory

LEASE K

• Can you include provision that lessor can eject for non payment?

49

o NO. Rule 70 exists to prevent self-help.

• Stipulation is not void per se, but cannot be enforced with force

(FUTILE DIBA?)

o If lessee doesn’t want to vacate, ejectment must be filed by

lessor.

o When can the provision be relevant?

If lessee abandons the property (say, bumaha, dahil

kay Ondoy) and lessor enters possession (nung natuyo

yun baha, nasalisihan yung nangungupahan), lessee

cannot recover through an ejectment case anymore

(wala ka nang karapatan, overstaying ka na nga eh).

Ejectment

• Enforceable against heirs and successors

• Everyone in the bldg even if not related to the lessee is considered a

successor.

• Remedy against “new” successors/occupants: file a motion to include

the current occupants

RULE 71 CONTEMPT Diane Shayne

Contempt

1. Direct

• near or in the presence of the court

• generally, refusal to follow the order of the court

2. Indirect

Another Classification

• civil

o against the interest of a litigant

o equated to indirect

• criminal

o against the court, tending to impede or obstruct admin of justice

o equated to direct

Power of contempt

• Inherent in the court, no enabling

• Admin-needs implementing law

• Quasijudicial- empowered

ANG V CASTRO

• Not a case for direct contempt

• Order to appear: did not appear, not a direct contempt

• Indirect contempt

Rule on Subjudice

• Statements criticizing the court while proceedings are pending

• General rule

o Such statements can be punished for contempt if it will tend to

pressure the court to decide one way or the other or influence

decision of the court

o Defenses: fair reporting

o Diverse rules on post litigation comments:

3 doctrines (GODOY CASE)

English: attack on the institution and should not go

unpunished

American: once terminated, free for all; more

importance to right of the ppl to comment or

criticize the action of the adjudge since the purpose

51

of subjudice is to prevent influence which is not

present anymore if the case has terminated;

criticism open for all; judge is a private citizen and

subject to criticism

Philippine doctrine: balancing of interest

• Gr: American

• Except: if case results to degradation of faith

in the justice system by the public

• Differentiate insults from criticism

o Case of in re sotto: disciplined not as

Senator, but as a lawyer; contempt

can go side by side an admin case for

discipline; contempt does not preclude

libel

PROCEDURE

• DIRECT, summary judgment, no hearing, DP because in flagrente

delicto and endangering proceedings in the court

• INDIRECT, there must be a charged by a litigant of the court;

respondent is given opportunity to comment; decision can be

appealed; execution can be stayed by appeal +bond

Direct and indirect contempt (Español vs. Formoso)

Direct Contempt Indirect Contempt

Direct contempt is a contumacious act

done facie curiae and may be punished

summarily without hearing – one may be

summarily adjudged in contempt at the

very moment or at the very instance of

the commission of the act of contumely.

Indirect or constructive contempt is one

perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court

and may include misbehavior of an officer of a

court in the performance of his official duties

or in his official actions, disobedience of or

resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,

judgment, or command of a court, or

injunction granted by a court or judge, any

abuse or any unlawful interference with the

process or proceedings of a court not

constituting direct contempt, or any improper

conduct tending directly or indirectly to

impede, obstruct or degrade the

administration of justice.

52

Criminal and civil contempt (Riano)

Criminal Contempt Civil Contempt

Conduct directed against the authority and

dignity of the court or a judge acting

judicially; an obstructing of the

administration of justice, which tends to

bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.

Failure to do something ordered to be done

by a court or a judge for the benefit of the

opposing party therein and is therefore, an

offense against the party in whose behalf the

violated order was made.

Purpose is to punish. To vindicate the

authority of the court and protect its

outraged dignity.

Purpose is to compensate for the failure to

do something ordered by the court for the

benefit of a party.

Conducted in accordance with the principles

and rules applicable to criminal case, in so

far as such procedure is consistent with the

summary nature of contempt proceedings.

The strict rules that govern criminal

prosecutions apply to prosecutions for

criminal contempt that the accused is to be

afforded many of the protections provided in

regular criminal cases and that proceedings

under statutes governing them are to be

strictly construed. However, criminal

proceedings are not required to take any

particular form as long as the substantial

rights of the accused are preserved.

Generally held to be remedial and civil in

nature, for the enforcement of some duty,

and essentially a remedy resorted to, to

preserve and enforce the rights of a private

party to an action and to compel obedience

to a judgment or decree intended to benefit

such a party litigant. The rules of

procedure governing contempt proceedings

or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are

inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings.

53

MELO CASES:

• HALILI V COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

o Contempt defined

Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or

dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the

authority and administration of the law into disrespect or

to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their

witnesses during litigation (12 Am. jur. 389, cited in 14

SCRA 813).

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the

court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and

dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or

disobedience of the court's orders, but such conduct as

tends to bring the authority of 'the court and the

administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to

impede the due administration of justice (17 C.J.S. 4).

o Contempt powers inherent in all courts

And is essential to the preservation of order in judicial

proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders,

and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due

administration of justice

o Enunciated the 2-fold aspect of contempt, citing Slade Perkins

case

o Court may suspend or debar a lawyer whose acts show

his unfitness to continue as a member of the bar

The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any

conduct on his part showing his unfitness for the

confidence and trust which characterize the attorney and

client relations, and the practice of law before the courts,

or showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good

moral character as to render him unworthy of public

confidence (7 C.J.S. 733).

It is a well-settled rule that the statutory grounds for

disbarment or suspension are not to be taken as a

limitation on the general power of the courts in this

54

respect. The inherent powers of the court over its officers

cannot be restricted (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567).

• SLADE PERKINS C DIR. OF PRISONS

o The CFI of Manila had jurisdiction over the offense

charged against the petitioner – contempt of court. It had

jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner who was properly

brought before the court. It has jurisdiction to hear and to

decide upon the defenses offered by her.

o The general rule is that when the court has jurisdiction

over the offense and over the person, its judgments,

orders or decrees cannot be collaterally attacked by

habeas corpus.

o The power to punish contempt is inherent in all courts; its

existence is essential to the preservation of order in

judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of

judgments, orders and mandates of the courts, and

consequently, to the administration of justice. Statutes

recognize the power of the CFI and of the judges thereof to

punish contempts of court.

o There 2 kinds of contempts:

1)Direct contempts, which may be punished summarily;

and

2) constructive contempts, which may be punished only

after due hearing.

Direct contempt is misbehavior in the presence of or so

near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration

of justice, including the refusal of a person present in

court to be sworn as a witness or to answer as a witness

when lawfully required.

Meanwhile, any of the following acts constitutes an

indirect contempt:

55

a. disobedience or or resistance to a lawful writ,

process, order, judgment, or command of a court,

or injunction granted by a court or judge;

b. misbehavior of an officer of the court in the

performance of his official duties…;

c. a failure to obey a subpoena;

d. the rescue or attempted rescue of a person or

property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an

order of the court held by him;

e. the person defeated in a civil suit… shall entern or

attempt to enter upon the real estate for purpose

of executing acts of ownership or possession….

As to constructive contempts, the court shall

determine whether the accused is guilty of the

contempt charged; and if he be adjudged guilty, he may

be fined or imprisoned.

If contempt consists in violation of injunction, he

may be ordered to make restitution to the party injured;

when contempt consists of omission to do an act, he

may be imprisoned until he performs it.

Exercise of contempt has 2-fold aspect:

1) the proper punishment of the guilty party for his

disrespect to the court or its order, and

2) to compel his performance of some act or duty

required of him by the court, which he refuses to

perform.

Due to this 2-fold aspect, contempts are classified as civil

or criminal.

Civil contempt is the failure to do something

ordered to be done by a court or judge in a civil

case for the benefit of the opposing party therein;

and

criminal contempt is a conduct that is directed

against the authority and dignity of a court or of a

56

judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or

discrediting the authority and dignity of the court or

judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act.

Because of this 2-fold attribute, contempt is sui generis

although it being largely criminal in nature is universally

conceded.

o In a case, the court reiterated the 2 classes of contempt:

1) criminal and punitive in nature – those prosecuted to

preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the

courts, and to punish for disobedience of their orders; and

2) civil, remedial, and coercive in nature – those

instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private

parties to suits, and to compel obedience to orders and

decrees made to enforce the rights and administer the

remedies to which the court has found them to be

entitled.

In criminal contempt, the government, the courts, and

the people are interested in their prosecution.

In civil contempt, the parties chiefly in interest in their

conduct, and prosecution are the individuals whose

private rights and remedies they were instituted to

protect or enforce.

A criminal contempt involves no element of personal

injury.

But if contempt consists of refusal to do an act which is

ordered by the court to do in favor of the other party,

then that person is committed until he complies with the

order of the court. Such commitment is in the nature of

an execution to enforce judgment.

In another case, the court said that it is not the fact

of punishment but rather its character and purpose

57

that makes the difference between the 2 kinds of

contempts.

For civil contempt, the punishment is remedial

and for the benefit of the complainant, and a

pardon cannot stop it.

For criminal, the sentence is punitive in the

public interest to vindicate the authority of

the court.

o In the present case, the distinction between civil and criminal

contempts, is not an important consideration. The question

whether the contempt for which the petitioner was

committed is civil or criminal does not affect either the

jurisdiction or the power of the court in the premises. The

dividing line between these 2 kinds of contempts

becomes indistinct in those cases where the 2 gradually

merge into each other.

• LIM SE V ARGEL

o Issue: W/N Atty. Adaza should be cited for contempt.

o Held: Yes.

Atty. Adaza’s characterization of the mandatory injunction

as “unjust and a miscarriage of justice” and as devoid of

factual and legal basis is unfounded and unwarranted. He

treated a resolution of the Court as if it were a pleading of

the adversary which he could assail in unrestrained or

abrasive language. His unjustified and disrespectful

characterization carries with it obvious derogatory

implications or innuendos which clearly constitute direct

contempt or contempt in facie curiae.

• ANG V CASTRO

o Petitioner is guilty of indirect contempt (NOT DIRECT).

o Respondent Judge Castro erroneously argued that failure of

petitioner to appear, despite notice, on the scheduled hearing of

the contempt charge for the use of derogatory language in his

two letters addressed to the Office of the Presidential Assistant

on Legal Affairs in an administrative complaint against him

58

constitutes direct contempt as the acts actually impeded,

embarrassed and obstructed him in the administration of justice.

o The use of disrespectful or contemptuous language

against a particular judge in pleadings presented in

another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct,

contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the

presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the

administration of justice.

o If the pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious

statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the

proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt because it is

equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so

near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of

justice. Being guilty of indirect contempt, petitioner may he

may appeal pursuant to Section 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of

Court. which reads:

SEC. 10. Review of judgment or order by Court of

appeals or Supreme Court; bond for stay. — The

judgment or order of a Court of First Instance made in a

case of contempt punished after written charge and

hearing may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the

Supreme Court, but execution of the judgment or order

shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the person

in contempt, in an amount fixed by the Court of First

Instance, conditioned that if the appeal be decided

against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or

order. The appeal may be taken as in criminal cases.

• IN RE: KELLY

o Facts: Kelly was charged and found guilty of contempt by the

Supreme Court. On February 24, 1916 he filed a motion for

reconsideration of the contempt on order. While the said case

was under reconsideration, he composed a letter to Don Vicente

Sotto, the editor of the independent, criticizing the action of

contempt before the court. The Court found that the said letter

was intended to obstruct or interfere with and impede the

administration of justice in the Contempt proceedings and the

motion made therein. It also held that Kelly’s publication of the

59

said letter tended to influence and affect the decision of the

Court. It ordered Kelly to appear before it and show cause why

a contempt order should not be issued against him. Kelly

argued that there was no law in the Philippines authorizing the

Supreme Court to punish him for the alleged contempt

committed.

o Issue: Whether or not the Court has authority to punish Kelly

for contempt for his offense?

o Held: Yes. The power to fine for contempt, imprison for

contumacy, or enforce the observance of order, are powers

which cannot be dispensed with in the courts, because they are

necessary to the exercise of all others. Courts of justice are

universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation,

with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum in the

presence and submission to their lawful mandates, and as

corollary to this provision, to preserve themselves and their

officers from the approach of insults and pollution.

• IN RE: LOZANO AND QUEVEDO

o Issue: W/N the SC has the power to punish for contempt,

the editor and the reporter of a newspaper, for publishing

and inaccurate account of the investigation of a CFI judge

notwithstanding the investigation was conducted behind

closed doors and its confidential nature?

o Held: YES.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the SC of

the Phil. This power extends to administrative proceedings

as well as to suits at law.

Newspaper publication tending to impede obstruct

embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice

in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal

contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts.

The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended.

It is regarded as an interference with the work of

the courts to publish any matter, which their policy

requires should be kept private.

60

The constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and

press must be protected in its fullest extent; but license

or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should

not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As

important as its maintenance of an unmuzzled press

and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is

the maintenance of the independence of the

Judiciary.

The administration of justice and the freedom of the

press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred

and neither should be violated by the other. The right of

legitimate publicity must be scrupulously

recognized and care taken at all times to avoid

impinging upon it. On the other hand, the courts must

be permitted to proceed with the disposition of their

business in a orderly manner free from outside

interference obstructive of their constitutional

functions. (BALANCING OF INTERESTS between 2

important rights)

The editor and the reporter of a newspaper who published

an inaccurate account of the investigation of a CFI judge

notwithstanding the investigation was conducted behind

closed doors, and a resolution of the SC which makes

such proceedings confidential in nature. Lozano (editor)

and Quevedo (writer) were declared in contempt and

were fined.

• PEOPLE V GODOY

o Facts: Judge cited Reynoso for contempt based on the latter’s

article in the newspaper (allegedly libelous to said judge).

o Issue: whether contempt may be committed for criticizing a

tribunal after the same has rendered decision or taken final

action on a matter which is the subject of criticism

o Held: There’s a need to make a distinction between adverse

criticism of the court's decision after the case is ended and

"scandalizing the court itself." The latter is not criticism; it is

personal and scurrilous abuse of a judge as such, in which case

it shall be dealt with as a case of contempt. Contempt

61

proceedings dismissed. Such comments may constitute a

libel against the judge, but it cannot be treated as in

contempt of the court's authority.

o Doctrine: In case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair

criticism of the court, its proceedings and its members, are

allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court, even

though the case has been terminated, if the publication is

attended by either of these two circumstances:

(1) where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in

other words, to scandalize the court; or

(2) where there is a clear and present danger that the

administration of justice would be impeded. And this

brings us to the familiar invocation of freedom of

expression usually resorted to as a defense in contempt

proceedings.

• IN RE: SOTTO

o Mere criticism or comment of the correctness or wrongness,

soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a

pending case made in good faith may be tolerated since it

might enlighten the Court and contribute to correction of

the error committed.

o However, in this case, Sotto did not only criticize the

decision of the Court. He even intimidated the Court to

change its members, and reorganized it. Sotto attacked the

honesty and integrity of the Court especially when he said that

the SC has committed in the past few years for many blunders

and injustices. It tends to undermine the confidence of the

peoplt in the integrity of the Court.

o His defense of good faith is not convincing because in his

petition he even alleged that the principal promoter of

this contempt proceeding was Justice Perfecto, conveying

the idea that the SC only acted in the case through the

instigation of Justice Perfecto. This Court added that as

important as the freedom of the press is the maintenance of the

independence of the judiciary. The court must be permitted to

proceed with its business without the obstruction from outside.

62

o Besides, as a lawyer, and thus, an officer of court, Sotto is

under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct

and communication to the courts. In view of the foregoing,

Sotto was found guilty of contempt by virtue of such

publication in Manila Times.

• ZALDIVAR V SANDIGANBAYAN

o The SC not only has plenary disciplinary authority over

attorneys but also has the inherent power to punish for

contempt.

The former stems from the Court’s constitutional mandate

to regulate admission into the practice of law, which

includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of

law;

the latter is “necessary for its own protection against an

improper interference with the due administration of

justice.”

The disciplinary authority over members of the Bar is

broader than the power to punish for contempt.

A lawyer punished for contempt is also punished for

professional misconduct necessitating exercise of the

Court’s disciplinary power but the latter may be exercised

without the action constituting contempt as well.

Any act on the part of the lawyer which visibly

tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade

the administration of justice constitutes both

professional misconduct calling for the exercise of

disciplinary action against him, and contumacious

conduct warranting application of contempt power.

o Gonzalez’s call for the members to inhibit themselves as they

are “acting as offended party, prosecutor, and arbiter all at

once” misapprehends the nature of the proceeding and the

court’s role in it. Disciplinary proceedings are sui generis

(neither purely civil nor criminal); it is an investigation of the

Court into the conduct of its officers. There is no plaintiff or

prosecutor therein.

63

o Undeniably, members of the Court are, to a certain degree,

aggrieved parties. But in the exercise of disciplinary powers, the

Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual

personalities of its members. Finally, the power to exclude

persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of

its power to admit persons to said practice. This power is vested

exclusively in the Court and it cannot abdicate just as much as it

cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally vested upon it.

Public policy demands that as a Court, it should exercise the

power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. For all the

members to inhibit themselves in this case is to abdicate

the responsibility which the Constitution has burdened

them.

o Gonzalez did not deny that he issued the statements; he

acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements

attributed to him are substantially correct. He was in effect

saying the following:

The SC deliberately rendered an erroneous or wrong

decision when its per curiam decision dated 27 April 1988.

The SC has improperly pressured him to render decisions

favourable to their colleagues and friends, including the

dismissal of two cases against two members of the Court.

The SC was preventing him from prosecuting “rich and

powerful persons.”

The Sc has allegedly dismissed judges without rhyme or

reason and disbarred lawyers without due process.

o The total picture that Gonzalez is trying to show is that

the Court is an unjudicial institution able and willing to

render clearly erroneous decisions by way of reprisal

against its critics, and is a body that acts arbitrarily and

capriciously in denying judges and lawyers due process of

law.

o Respondent ‘s statements, especially the charge that the Court

deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the

Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of

64

the Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak

vengeance upon respondent here, constitute the grossest kind

of disrespect for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase

and degrade the SC and, through the Court, the entire system

of administration of justice in the country.

o Gonzalez invoked his constitutional right to freedom of

speech and expression. He should be reminded that said

freedom of speech and of expression, like all

constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom

of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and

accommodated with the requirements of equally

important public interests, in this case being the

maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of

the administration of justice, and the capacity of the

Court to effectively prevent and control professional

misconduct on the part of lawyers who are indispensable

participants in the task of rendering justice to every man.

o Furthermore, the right of criticism is not unlimited; it must be

bona fide and not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.

o Proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in

general is not essential for a finding of contempt or for the

application of the disciplinary authority of the Court.

o Lastly, while the remedy of libel suits by individual

members of this Court may well be available against

Gonzalez, it is not an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where it

is not only the individual members of the Court but the

Court itself as an institution that has been falsely

attacked, libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy.

ON FINALS:

10 question

1-2 objective

50%

65

comprehensive

bonus question

Documents

SCA_MELO Notes Compiled