SC 3 Attachments - National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel … 3... · 2017-03-20 · SC 3 Attachments SC 3 Roster 12-23-16 2 Bob Dickerson Resume 10-26-16 3 Bryan Jones Resume

SC 3 AttachmentsSC 3 Roster 12-23-16 2Bob Dickerson Resume 10-26-16 3Bryan Jones Resume 10-26-16 5Chris Cary Profile 10-26-16 7

Biographical profile page 1.pdf 7Profile pages 2 and 3 8

Ramkumar Selvaraj Resume 10-26-16 10IN15-0601 SC RA 7-20-16 12IN16-0801 Troutt 10-17-16 14IN16-1001 Jeang 12-19-16 15IN16-1101 Subhedar 12-19-16 16IN16-1201 Beaudoin 12-19-16 17IN16-1301 Napier 12-21-16 18IN16-1301 Napier Background Information 12-21-16 19NB12-0801 Failed Letter Ballot Comments 11-3-16 21NB12-0801 Webb Suggestions 11-3-16 22NB13-1405 10-31-13 SG Locomotive 23NB13-1405 Additional Information Stone 10-26-16 26NB13-1405 Stone Comments 10-26-16 32NB15-2210 Failed Letter Ballot Comments 12-22-16 35NB15-2210 Webb Revision 11-10-16 36NB16-0810 Troutt 10-17-16 38NB16-1302 SG Graphite Approved 7-20-16 39NB16-1303 SG Graphite Approved 7-20-16 40NB16-2602 Underwood 12-21-16 41NB16-2901 Price 10-28-16 43NB16-3001 Kincs 10-28-16 44NB16-3002 Kincs 10-28-16 45

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SC 3 Roster 12-23-16Attachment Page 2

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Bob Dickerson Resume 10-26-16Attachment Page 3

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Bob Dickerson Resume 10-26-16Attachment Page 4

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Bryan Jones Resume 10-26-16Attachment Page 5

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Bryan Jones Resume 10-26-16Attachment Page 6

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Chris Cary Profile 10-26-16/Biographical profile page 1.pdfAttachment Page 7

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NAME: CHRIS W. CARY III. HONORS AND AWARDS – None IV. U.S. and FOREIGN PATENTS – None V. PUBLICATIONS – None VI. SPEECHES AND SEMINARS – None VII. CONTACTS (individuals who could be contacted for updates of this biographical

profile.) Chris W. Cary 1450 KY HWY 389 Carrollton, KY 41008 502-732-4177 Douglas W. Cary 8000 Rollington Rd. Pewee Valley, KY 40056 502-241-5531

Chris Cary Profile 10-26-16/Profile pages 2 and 3Attachment Page 8

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NAME: CHRIS W. CARY VIII. PROFESSIONAL RECORD Date of Each Position GIVE IN SEQUENCE AND IN COMPLETE DETAIL

From Mo. Yr.

To Mo. Yr.

Complete and specific description of outstanding engineering work to which the candidate has contributed conception of a project – its execution or management – extent of repsonsible chanrge in development of he design, construction, new process or important research.

6/88 5/95 Savannah River Site, Aiken SC: Served as Pressure Equipment Coordinator for an operating area with several hundred pressure vessels, ensuring compliance of pressure vessels and safety valves and performing/checking safety valve calculations and designs; served on the Site Pressure Protection Committee, establishing policies and engineering procedures for overpressure protection. Provided engineering support for assembly and testing of nuclear production equipment.

1/96 6/96 Lenzing Fibers AG, Morristown, TN: Provided engineering support for a rayon manufacturing plant. Primary responsibility was for equipment in recovery of sodium sulfate from sulfuric acid by evaporation, crystallization and drying.

7/96 Current Dow Corning Corporation, Carrollton, KY: Provided reliability engineering support for a silicone manufacturing facility. Leader of corporate engineering team for Bolted Flanged Joints, and Reliability Engineer for heat exchangers and fired equipment.

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Ramkumar Selvaraj Resume 10-26-16Attachment Page 10

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Interpretation IN15-0601

Proposed Interpretation

Inquiry: IN15-0601 Source: Mr. Nate Manzon, PMC Engineering Solutions Subject: NBIC Part 3 Section 3 Edition: 2013 Question 1: May installation of a flush patch in a pressure

retaining part be classified as a “Repair” if any of its attachment welds are made using a backing strip along with the welds receiving the same degree of volumetric examinations as original construction when the original vessel design and construction of the pressure retaining part did not use backing strips in its design and construction.

Reply 1: No. If backing strips were not considered and used in the original design and construction, and are used on the flush patch installation, the work must be classified as an Alteration.

Question 2: May installation of a flush patch in a pressure retaining part be classified as a “Repair” if any of its attachment welds are made using a backing strip along with the welds receiving a lesser or higher degree of volumetric examination such that the applicable flush patch butt weld design joint efficiency is lower or higher than original construction when the original vessel design and construction of the pressure retaining part did not use backing strips in its design and construction.

Reply 2: No. If backing strips were not considered and used in the original design and construction, and are used on the flush patch installation, and if the applicable joint efficiency of the weld made using a backing strip is lower or higher than that of the joint efficiency used on the original design, there would be a change in the joint efficiency applicable to design of the part which would mandate that the work be classified as an Alteration.

Committee’s Question:

If a flush patch plate in a pressure retaining item (PRI) is installed with attachment welds using backing strips and the attachment welds receive the same or higher degree of volumetric examination required by the original code of construction with no reduction in joint efficiency as original construction is this considered a repair?

Committee’s Reply:

Yes

Rationale: SC Vote

IN15-0601 SC RA 7-20-16Attachment Page 12

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NBIC Vote

IN15-0601 SC RA 7-20-16Attachment Page 13

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NB16‐0810

NBIC Part 3, Section 3, paragraph 3.4.3

EXAMPLES

OF ALTERATIONS

a) An increase in the maximum allowable working pressure (internal or external) or temperature of a

pressure‐retaining item regardless of whether or not a physical change was made to the pressure‐

retaining item;

b) A decrease in the minimum temperature;

c) The addition of new nozzles or openings in a boiler or pressure vessel except those classified as repairs;

d) A change in the dimensions or contour of a pressure‐retaining item;

e) In a boiler, an increase in the heating surface or steaming capacity as described on the original

Manufacturer’s Data Report;

f) The addition of a pressurized jacket to a pressure vessel;

g) Except as permitted in NBIC Part 3, 3.3.3 s); replacement of a pressure retaining part in a pressure

retaining item with a material of different allowable stress or nominal composition from that used in the

original design;

h) The addition of a bracket or an increase in loading on an existing bracket that affects the design of the

pressure‐retaining item to which it is attached;

i) The replacement of a pressure relieving device (PRD) as a result of work completed on a pressure‐

retaining item (PRI) that changes the resultant capacity to exceed the minimum required relieving

capacity (MRRC) required by the original code of construction as described on the original Manufacturer’s

Data Report.

j) In a Heat Recovery Steam Generator (HSRG), an increase in heat input (e.g. adjustments or modification

to a Gas Turbine which increases the exhaust energy or the addition of or an increased firing rate of duct

burners).

IN16-0801 Troutt 10-17-16Attachment Page 14

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IN16-1001 12-19-16

-------------------------------------------- QUOTE --------------------------------------------

3.4.3 EXAMPLES OF ALTERATIONS …..

h) The addition of a bracket or an increase in loading on an existing bracket that affects the design

of the

pressure-retaining item to which it is attached;

…..

----------------------------------------- QUOTE END -----------------------------------------

Edition : 2015

Question 1 : If an increase in loading on an existing bracket cause only increase of local stress in

pressure part without physical change (reinforcing) of pressure part,

is the requierment of Alteration applicable as per 3.4.3 h)?

Question 2 : In 3.4.3 h), does the word 'pressure-retaining item' include an existing braket itself (non-

pressure part)?

IN16-1001 Jeang 12-19-16Attachment Page 15

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IN16-1101 12-19-16 We would like to have code interpretation on the NBIC Part -3 code cl. 57.3 and Figure 5.7.5 b Inquiry: In case of alteration of Heat Exchanger - Tube side only, is it allowed mention MAWP for tube side only on the Alteration nameplate, as alteration was done only on tube side. Reply: Yes or No Background: Repair organisation added 3 nozzles on Tube side of the Heat exchanger and shell side was not touched. Since alteration nameplate needs to mark with MAWP, is it allowed to mention MAWP only on Tube side as the work was carried out only on Tube side. The word Tube side also can be punched below MAWP. Hope to receive your kind reply. With best regards, Pradeep Subhedar

IN16-1101 Subhedar 12-19-16Attachment Page 16

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IN16‐1201 12‐19‐16

Back ground information:

We did a routine repair on a pressure vessel by replacing a window patch with a nozzle in the

bottom head of the vessel. The vessel has been fabricated with the 1956 edition of the

ASME/BPVC and the original material of the head is ASTM A‐201‐A. The repair was made

according to the 1998 edition of the code using the stress values of the 1952 edition. The

material of the new part is SA‐516 Gr 70N with the same minimum thickness as the original

head. The only document available was the G.A of the vessel.

Inquiry #1 : If we do a routine repair according to NB‐23, section 3.3.2, of a vessel using a

material with a greater allowable stress, according to the actual code, and keeping the same

minimum thickness of material, do we need to perform new calculation?

Reply #1 : Yes or No

Inquiry #2 : When we do calculation for alteration or repair and the code of construction used to

build the vessel is a previous 1999 edition, can we use the actual code of construction with

greater allowable stress values ?

Reply#2 : Yes or No

Inquiry #3: If the answer is no, de we have to use the most applicable code edition previous

1999 with the old allowable stress values if you don’t have access to the original edition of the

code of construction ?

Reply #3 : Yes or No

Hubert Beaudoin, ing.

+1‐514‐650‐4135

[email protected]

IN16-1201 Beaudoin 12-19-16Attachment Page 17

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IN16‐1301 12‐21‐16 Jeremy Napier Koch Industries

Purpose To determine if a liquid pressure test must be deemed impracticable before NDE can be performed to verify the integrity of repairs to pressure retaining items and connecting welds of replacement parts.

Scope: Examination and test requirements for Repairs as outlined in NBIC Part 3, paragraph 4.4.1 and for Alterations as outlined in NBIC Part 3, paragraph 4.4.2.

Background See attached letter.

Proposed Interpretation and Replies

Question 1: Does the NBIC Part 3 require that a liquid pressure test be deemed not practicable before the Inspector may accept (subject also to Jurisdictional acceptance when required) nondestructive examination per paragraph 4.4.1(e) to verify the integrity of a “repair”?

Proposed Reply: No

Question 2: Does the NBIC Part 3 require that a liquid pressure test be deemed not practicable before the Inspector may accept (subject also to jurisdictional acceptance when required) nondestructive examination per paragraph 4.4.1(e) to verify the integrity of “connecting welds”, as defined in paragraph 4.4.2 (a)(2) for an “alteration”?

Proposed Reply: No

IN16-1301 Napier 12-21-16Attachment Page 18

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IN16-1301 Napier Background Information 12-21-16Attachment Page 19

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IN16-1301 Napier Background Information 12-21-16Attachment Page 20

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NB12-0801 Failed Letter Ballot Comments 11-3-16Attachment Page 21

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Letter Ballot item: NB12-0801- Repair or Alteration of Plate Heat Exchangers Comment: Reluctantly, I will vote to “disapprove” this item, as I believe the critical nature of material selected in original design and manufacture is not adamantly communicated to the stakeholders of the code. Having the benefit of an extended review with the PM, it is very apparent the manufacture of plate heat exchangers is very unique and at times proprietary, deserving of an approach somewhat reminiscent of the guidance offered in the PRD-Supplement. To my disapproving vote, I would like to offer the noted changes as shown for Subcommittee consideration. –M. Webb, 10-7-16. 3.3.3 EXAMPLES OF REPAIRS u) For plate heat exchangers (PHE’s), repair activities are those actions necessary in replacing

parts bearing certification or manufacturer’s stamping with no-change in material allowed for parts as described on the Manufacturer’s Data Report (MDR) or verifiable Original Equipment Manufacturer’s (OEM) drawing. Repair activities for PHE’s are further described or limited to: in addition to all of the applicable examples of repair above:

1) Welding on any pressure part;

2) In kind replacement of endplates, welded nozzles,

3) The addition or repair of load bearing attachments (e.g., welded supports or lifting lugs)

to the endplates.

3.4.3 EXAMPLES OF ALTERATIONS j) For plate heat exchangers (PHE’s), in addition to all the applicable examples of alterations

above, the following changes from what is listed on the MDR or described on the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM)-drawing:

1) For heat transfer plates:

a) A change in material grade or nominal thickness; b) A reduction in number beyond any minimum, or when no minimum is specified; c) An increase in number beyond any maximum, or when no maximum is specified; d) A change in model type;

2) Any change in material whether described at 3.3.3 s) or as described at 3.4.3 g): a) A change in connection bolt or frame compression bolt diameter or material grade; b) A change in material grade or nominal dimensions of any end plates or nozzles.

NB12-0801 Webb Suggestions 11-3-16Attachment Page 22

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Subgroup Locomotives National Board Item No. NB13-1405 Current Level: Subcommittee Repairs and Alterations NBIC Part 3 Paragraph(s): S1.2.14 Title: Throttle Pipes, Dry Pipes, Superheater Headers & Front End Steam Pipes Date Opened: April 2013 Background: The reason for adding this section is to provide guidance for repair of these locomotive boiler components. Two accidents have occurred to steam locomotives over the past 30 years when the dry pipe collapsed and caused the locomotive to operate out of control. Although neither accident caused injury equipment damage did occur. In addition other accidents that resulted in injury and fatalities have occurred to steam locomotives during the years of 1910 - 1950 when these were in normal railroad service. Proposed Action:

Throttle Pipes, Dry Pipes, Superheater Headers & Front End Steam Pipes 1) Throttle pipes, dry pipes, superheater headers, and front end steam pipes made from cast iron and have cracks greater than 0.25 inches (6 mm) in length or width or have corroded to less than the minimum allowable thickness shall be removed from service. Cracks not exceeding 2.00 inches (50.8 mm) in length or 0.25 inches (6.4 mm) in width may be repaired by brazing. Pinholes and defects not exceeding 0.25 inches (6.4 mm) in diameter may be repaired by brazing. Repair by brazing of cracks and defects exceeding these limits may be made only with the approval of the Inspector. If the brazed metalrepair enters into the interior of components subject to steam flow, the interior repaired surfaces should be ground smooth to prevent any braze metal protusion between the original and repaired surfaces. Repairs using other methods may be made using NBIC Part 3, 3.3.4.8 "Repair Of Pressure-Retaining Items Without Complete Removal Of Defect" and NBIC Part 3, 3.2.6 "Reference To Other Codes And Standards". 2) Cracks in throttle pipes, dry pipes, superheater headers, and front end steam pipes made from steel may be repaired by welding. All welded repairs shall be done in accordance with NBIC Part 3 and ASME Section I Part PW. The welds shall be full penetration-type and shall be volumetrically examined when required by the applicable NBIC or ASME code requirements, and when required by the Inspector. 3) Weld build-up may be used for repair of steel components provided the corroded section does not exceed 10 square inches (64.52 square centimeters) in area and the depth of corrosion is less than 50% of the original wall thickness. If the corrosion depth or area exceeds one or both of these values, either the corroded section shall be replaced by a new section installed using full penetration welds or the

Formatted: Left: 0.7", Right: 0.7", Top: 0.5", Bottom: 0.5"

NB13-1405 10-31-13 SG LocomotiveAttachment Page 23

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entire component replaced. All weld build-up repairs shall be done in accordance with NBIC Part 3 and ASME Section I Part PW. Welds shall be volumetrically examined when required by the applicable NBIC or ASME code requirements and when required by the Inspector. If the weld build-up enters into the interior of components subject to steam flow, the interior welded surfaces shall be ground smooth to prevent weld metal protusion between the original and repaired surfaces. 4) When new replacement sections or flush patch plates are installed in steel components the interior edges of the new and original surfaces subject to steam flow shall be aligned and level with each other and should be ground smooth to prevent forming raised edges. Welds shall be full penetration-type and shall be in accordance with NBIC Part 3 and ASME Section I Part PW. The welds shall be volumetrically examined when required by the applicable NBIC or ASME code requirements, and when required by the Inspector. Replacement flanges may be installed by welding in accordance with NBIC Part 3 and ASME Section I Part PW. 5) Throttle pipes, dry pipes and superheater headers, shall be supported by hangers, brackets or other structural method to prevent placing bending loads on the adjacent mating parts and attachment fasteners. When required by the original design, pins, bolts and nuts used to attach these parts and to each other and to the boiler shall be equipped with a retainer or another method to prevent loosening. Changing the location, number, size, or design of the hangers, brackets or other structural method and the associated fasteners used to support the throttle pipe, dry pipe or superheater header is considered an alteration. 6) Front end steam pipes shall be arranged to fit into position on adjacent mating parts and attachment fasteners without being forced and without bending or damaging the attachment fasteners. Changing the location, number, size or design of the fasteners used to secure the front end steam pipes is considered an alteration


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July 27, 1936, locomotive 4405, Mazama, ureg. \.iUlUe YUKe UW"-t: ULlt: w

old fracture in bottom bend covering approximately 90 percent of cross-sectionalarea; one injured.

**September 26,1936, locomotive 4014, near Cascade Summit, Oreg. Undesiredemergency application of the brakes, caused by defective vent valve on tender;one injured.

*October 18, 1936, locomotive 2806, Surf, Calif. Insufficient clearance between throttle lever and valve on boiler head; one injured.

October 18, 1936, locomotive 3243, Gridley, Calif. Eccentric rod broke; oldfracture covered approximately 50 percent of cross-sectional area; one injured.

*November 17, 1936, locomotive 2350, Volta, Calif. Insufficient clearancebetween reverse lever and feed valve bracket; one injured.January 4, 1937, locomotive 1787, Berenda, Calif. Injector throttle valve

bonnet blew out due to poor fit in valve body; one injured.*January 23, 1937, locomotive 4401, Suisun-Fairfield, Calif. Glass in cab

storm window broke; one injured.**April 8, 1937, locomotive 1273, Oakland, Calif. Lubricator plug bushing

broke off at seat on lubricator; old cracks in bushing; one injured.April 11, 1937, locomotive 4322, Randolph, Ariz. Stearn pipe sleeve at water

column connection failed at fillet between sleeve and flange; steam pipe notbelled or flanged over end in accordance with company's standard practice andbrazing between pipe and sleeve extended only about three-fourths inch fromtop of sleeve, permitting pipe to pull out of coupling nut when sleeve failed;defective installation of steam pipe resulted in strain on pipe and sleeve. Aheavy deposit of bronze had been applied by fusion welding just above sleeve inan attempt to repair a circumferential crack in steam pipe; two injured.

*April 16, 1937, locomotive 4367, Argo, Nev. Driving wheel tire broke dueto thermal crack; one injured.

*April 29, 1937, locomotive 4324, Curvo, Ariz. Feed water pump did notoperate properly; one injured.

May 9, 1937, locomotive 3265, Malaga, Calif. Water glass burst; water-glassframe not true and water glass had been filed in attempt to fit it to frame. Inattempting to escape from the steam and water, the firing valve was inadvertentlyopened wider and fire suddenly backed through firebox door of oil burning locomotive in such volume that it spread over oil tank and badly damaged first car;two injured.

*June 3, 1937, locomotive 3762, Massie, Nev. Rear axle of tender broke atold fracture, causing derailment of 15 cars; two killed.June 16, 1937, locomotive 1209, East Portland, Oreg. Explosion of accumulated

gases in firebox while cleaning carbon from firebox; "Clean carbon out of firebox"was reported 22 times since June 1; one injured.

Fifteen accidents; 2 killed, 17 injured.

TENNESSEE, ALABAMA & GEORGIA RAILWAY:

December 3,1936, locomotive 301, Pigeon Mountain, Ga. Sand pipes cloggedaccount of sand being wet; one injured.

One accident; one injured.

TENNESSEE CENTRAL RAILWAY:

*June 7. 1937, locomotive 505, Stone River, Tenn. Brake hanger broke;one injured.


TERMINAL RAILROAD ASSOCIATION OF ST. LOUIS:

**March 16, 1937, locomotive 330, St. Louis, Mo. Coal board split, causingemployee to fall; one injured.


TEXAS & PACIFIC RAILWAY:

**February 23, 1937, locomotive 909, Mineola, Tex. Employee scalded bydischarge from blow-off cock which was apparently accidentally opened and bysteam from cylinder cock which was held open by pieces of broken cylinderpacking ring; one injured.

April 21, 1937, locomotive 458, Shreveport, La. Insufficient clearance betweencab handhold and tender deck; one injured.

May 21, 19~7, locomotive 603, Edgewood, Tex. Steam pipe in front end burst;upper wall of 90° angle in the cast iron steam pipe was reduced from % inch toabout ~ inch in thickness; steam pipe not company's standard; one injured.

'.

and ~~:;e;'Ct~ -f~li forward position, catching employee's leg betweenfoot brace; valves dry and teeth in quadrant worn; one injured.

Four accidents; four injured.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD:

July 24, 1936, locomotive 9080, Baxter, Wyo. Left guide rail of rniddcrosshead fell from locomotive and became wedged on track, resultingment of 26 cars of a mixed train; right guide rail had previously fallen of'all guide bar bolts were missing; bolt holes in guide bars and rails wer.and elongated; bolts reported repeatedly since July 1; two killed.

**August 3, 1936, locomotive 7008, near Seymour, Nebr. WOOl(provided to be used to relieve the weight from driving boxes when jourfell from locomotive and struck track employee; one injured.January 14, 1937, locomotive 2301, Ault, Colo. Fire tube failed a,

weld; one injured.March 30, 1937, locomotive (0. W. R. & N.) 2152, Dodson, Oreg.

steam pipe sleeve at connection to cab turret steam valve failed in aibreak for its full circumference; sleeve greatly overheated at time of aand brazing between steam pipe and sleeve did not extend full lengthone injured.

**April 19, 1937, locomotive 1931, Frankfort, Kans. Governor pcompressor broke off at connection to governor; pipe not properly cla:injured.June 6, 1937, locomotives (0. S. L.) 9509 and (U. P.) 3601, Mans:

Locomotives uncoupled, causing emergency application of the brakes; 01June 9, 1937, locomotive (0. W. R. & N.) 4913, Albina, Oreg. Tendc

at crossover, caused by spring buffer slipping by corner of wearing plateblock while rounding curve; shoulder on wearing plate did not peribuffer to return to normal position after coming out of curve; one injur

Seven accidents; two killed, six injured.

WABASH RAILWAY:

January 3, 1937, locomotive 2917, Adrian, Mich. Crown sheet failiby overheating due to low water; top water-glass cock was closed ;,accident; three killed.

**February 27, 1937, locomotive 1562, St. Louis, Mo. Insufficientbetween vertical handhold at back of cab and tender deck when on sh.one injured. .

April 1, 1937, locomotive 603, near Sturgeon, Mo. Reverse lever unl«went forward rapidly, striking employee's foot; one injured.

**April 11, 1937, locomotive 2919, Peru, Ind. Dump grate plate b'part of plate missing; one injured.Four accidents; three killed, three inj ured.

WESTERN MARYLAND R.HLWAY:

August 8, 1936, locomotive 1126, near Confluence, Pa. Driving sprigib broke or lost out, throwing excessive weight on one side of locomo!resulted in derailment of locomotive and tender; one injured.

April 11, 1937, locomotive 921, George's Creek Junction, Md. Air Iinoperative; cotter key for attaching plunger to piston sheared off; on

Two accidents; two injured.

WESTERN PACIFIC RAILRO.\D:

*February 28, 1937, locomotive 40, Keddie, Calif. Reverse lever lat

one inj ured.One accident; one injured.

NB13-1405 Additional Information Stone 10-26-16Attachment Page 26

Attachment Page 26

..56 REPORT OF THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF LOCOMOTIVES

Texas & Pacific AccidentMay 21, 1937

PLATE 11

Plate 11 shows a front-end steam pipe that failed while the locomotive was hauling a passenger train ata speed of approximately 45 milesper hour. The fireman had his foot on the pedal of the mechanicallyoperated fire door and was looking at the fire at the time of failure which instantly filled the cab with fireand gas. The fireman was severely burned but the automatic closing of the door when his foot was removed from the pedal shut off the flow of fire and gas from the firebox and undoubtedly saved him fromfatal injuries. The engineer, who was not seriously injured, was enabled to stay in the cab and closethe throttle and apply the brakes.


Attachment Page 27

I

iiI!

12 REPORT OF THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF LOCOMOTIVES

**December 20, 1937, locomotive 2003, Thomo.sville, Ga. Defective conveyorslide hook slipped out of hole in conveyor slide when employee attempted to close

the slide; one injured.Fcbruary 22, 1938, locomotive 1520, near Selma, N. C. Driving spring hanger

broke; one injured.March 3, 1938, locomotive 1659, Stony Creek, Va. Cast iron steam pipe at

front end burst; thickness of pipe at point of failure varied from 1-%6 inches to~16 inch; steam pipe contacted side of smoke box, preventing free expansion of the

pipe; one injured.Four accidents; four injured.

BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD:

**August 15, 1937, locomotive 6159, GR Cabin, Ohio. Piece of sheet metalforming an inside shield over cab window jarred loose from its fastening to cabwall and swung down, striking employee; one injured.'October 23, 1937, locomotive 4266, Ribold, Pa. Stoker slide hook disengaged

from slide plate; hook not proper fit in holes in slide plate; one injured.November H), 1937, locomotive (B. & O. C. '1'.) 2856, Chicago, Ill. Injector

steam pipe collar broke off in spanner nut at injector thrott.lc valve connection;end of ~tealll pipe not belled over collar; proper repairs not made when spannerHut was reported leaking on 1'\ ovember 3, fi, and 18; two inj ured.February 12, If)38, locomotive 6221, Bakerstown, Pa. Hiuges of tender cistern

.filling hole cover broke through rivet holes; one injureci.April 25, 1938, locomotive 5138, Mt. Vernon, Ohio. Penstock hook bent, caus

ing employee to fall from tender; hook badly pitted and rusted away; hook was not

company's standard; one injured.June 11, 1938, locomotive 7115, Keyser, W. Va. Side rod collar bolt broke and

was thrown from locomotive, striking a pedestrian; one injured.Six accidents; seven i nj ured.

BOSTON & l\'!AINE RAILROAD:

**Augu~t 12, 1937, locomotive 1364, East Lynn, Mass. Push pole lying on

rear of tank behind fuel space; one injured.December 29, H)37, locomotive 2723, Westboro, N. H. Bonnet of feed water

pump throttle valve became disconnected from valve body; one injured.March 16, 1938, locomotive 3029, Scotia, N. Y. Tool box which was attached

to back cab wall fell account of bolts breaking; bolts for securing tool box weresmaller than company's standard and one of the two bolts had been broken for

some time; one injured.May 6, 1938, locomotive 1498, Waltham, Mass. Cab apron worn; one injured.=May 26, 1938, locomotive 3653, North Billerica, Mass. Lubricator steam

pipe pulled out of sleeve of the union connection to throttle valve; pipe not

properly brazed in -leeve ; one injured.May 31, 1938, locomotive 4020, East Deerfield, Mass. Fireman lost his

balance and fell from top of tender while attempting to take water; water spoutout of reach and no means available to pull it around; one injured.

Six accidents; six inj ured.

CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RAILWAY:

June 14, 1938, locomotive 710, Sylacauga, Ala. Employee's hand cut by

broken glass in cab door; one injured.'One accident; one injured.

CENTRAL RAILROAD OF NEW JERSEY:

July 22, 1937, locomotive 787, Hazlet, N. J. Driving box grease cellar guardplate was thrown from moving locomotive and through a window in a passengercar in a train on adjacent track; holes in grease cellar inside lugs not drilledaccording to company's standard; threads in keeper bolt hole in poor condition;cellar bolt and cellar bolt hole worn; one injured.November 19, H)37, locomotive 874, Bloomsbury, N. J. Locomotive separated

from train, resulting in sudden stop; rear coupler top lock lifter worn, permittingcoupler lock to function and knuckle to open; one injured.

**June 29, 1938, locomotive 159, Sea Bright, N. J. Brake hanger guard wasthrown from tender and struck an automobile which was near rail crossing,

.. , .. _.. ,~ ,'h~ rl~;,,"r "f thp <I.llt.()mohile: one injured.

REPORT OF THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF LOCOMOT

CHICAGO & EASTERN ILLINOIS RAILWAY:

*October 6, 1937, locomotive 1945, St. Anne, Ill. Main crankfracture extended over approximately 80 percent of cross-sectionalof failure; one injured.One accident; one injured.

CHICAGO & NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY:

November 24, 1937, locomotive 2361, Ames, Iowa. Fire tub:safe end weld; overheated in welding; one injured.

*January 25, 1938, locomotive 2068, Hawarden, Iowa. Drainpipe under right boiler check stopped up; one injured.Two accidents; two injured.

CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD:

July 29, 1937, locomotive 5057, Denver, Colo. Water glass bursNovember 16, 1937, locomotive 7015, Sandwich, Ill. Air pi

employee fell from side rod while attempting to open steam thremergency air pump which was located under running board; "Air 1slow and stopping" was reported on October 27; one injured.

December 6, 1937, locomotive 2585, near Canton, Ill. Blow-off (rod handle was loose; one injured.Three accidents; three inj ured.

CHICAGO GREAT ""ESTERN RAILROAD:

October 23, 1937, locomotive 476, South Des Moines, Iowa.burst; one injured.January 22, 1938, locomotive 882, Bolton, Ill. Top portion of

of No.4 driving box shoe broke off and struck sectionman whoabout 60 feet from the track; "All driving boxes pounding bad" allright I\ o. 4 dri ving box wedge." were reported on January 9, 12, U ..one injured.January 28, 1938, locomotive 877, Melbourne, Iowa. Crown

caused by overheating due to low water; two killed, one injured.March 1, 1938, locomotive 478, Waterloo, Iowa. Water glas

missing from one side of water-glass guard; one injured.April 17, 1938, locomotive 88-1, Oneida, Iowa. Derailment cal

cated driving wheel tires; tires overheated due to brake friction; th**May 6, 1938, locomotive 750, Weitman, Iowa. Injured whi

to adjust rib of stoker divider which had moved to left side; lock I

was loose; one injured.Six accidents; two killed, eight injured.

CHICAGO, J.\:hLWAUKEE, ST. PAUL & PACIFIC RAILROAD:

*May 3, 1938, locomotive 2600, Belvidere, S. Dak. Light inlamp inoperative account of bulb not properly screwed in socket; (

May 20, 1938, locomotive 8073, Tomah, Wis. Injector steamnut at injector connection broke into two pieces; old fracture CO\

mately 75 percent of one of the breaks; one injured.Two accidents; two injured.

CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY:

August 14, 1937, locomotive 3025, McAlester, 'Okla. Insuffici.between vertical cab handhold and tender deck supporting block wl

one· injured.. September 11, 1937, locomotive 1550, Camden, Ark. Crowncaused by overheating due to low water; one killed.December 20, 1937, locomotive 902, Blue Island, Ill. Air hose at I

was ruptured; one injured.January 3, 1938, locomotive 2507, Clearing, Ill. Cab steam he:

was frozen; one injured.**February 1, 1938, locomotive 2051, Limon, Colo. Employee',

on edge of cab apron while ascending gangway steps; apron proje:gangway step when on curve; one injured.

March 5, 1938, locomotive 4055, Lawrence, Kans. Main cranthrough old fracture covering approximately 75 percent of cross-se

1 " __ •• __ "- __ 1. __ ...•• 1=__ 1__ ..l c __ t)() ..-In __ .......... _ .............. ....J; ......... +hn


Attachment Page 28

52 REPORT OF THE CHIEF IXSPECTOR O.F LOCO~IOTIVES

Atlantic Coast Line AccidentMarch 3, 1938

1'1. \TE IIi.

1'1.1:<' IIi ,II,)\I";·I l"I,I·ir"l1 :·I'llnr l'n,I";I'':lln pipe llI:11 f:liled whilo Ilw ICl('IlIIlOlil(, \1·:1, h,lIII;Il.~:1 fr.'i ... lu t r.iu.'l! :! < 1'1'l'd "r :IPI'I'()\ i m.u cl" :ill Illi ie..; I'l'r 1101 I I'. I'!,"; ulI i ll~ ill I Ill' ..;priIHI"; i lljl 11':, of oru- l'lllplo\'pt' T he fa i IIII't'(lri"ill'll!'d ill all '11'1',1 w lu-rv t h» \I:ill of t he pipe ,,·,I.';";"I·t'Il·,i\:I'8111[\..; invh ill Ihil'kIlP";';.lhl' 1'l'lIlaindE'[' ofi he pip!' I·ari!'d f["'11l [lp·I'I'·follrrlI, 1II'II1l' a nd t hrcc-sivt ee m h« i ncho« in I hick [\("";. Tile pipe had heeu,Ipplil'd wit h t he t hi n :\1'(',1 be.ui ne he.i vi lv 011 I hi' ";llIlIke ho\.

REPOR'


Attachment Page 29

18 HEPOHT OF THE CHIEF IKSPECTOR OF LOCOMOTIYES

DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA & WESTERN RAILROAD:

June 8,1937, locomotive 2141, Hallstead, Pa. Valve rings broken; one injured.Onc accident; one injured.

DE:-IVER & RIO GRANDE 'WESTERN RAILROAD:

August 17, 1936, locomotive 1703, Midvale, Utah. Radius rod broke; oldfracture covered approximately 50 percent of cross-sectional area; one injured.

**December 7, 1936, locomotive 1503, Agate, Utah. Squirt hose valve accidentally opened; valve improperly located; one injured.

December 12, 1936, locomotive 3415, Sierra, Colo. Top board and supportingbrackets at rear of tender coal space out of proper alignment; one injured.

**December 22, 1936, locomotive 1190, Grand Junction, Colo. Throttle diffi-ult to operate; throttle reported on December 21, 22, 23 (two times), 25, and 27;

o ne injured.**December 27, 1936, locomotive 1151, Helper, Utah. Reversing gear difficult

to operate account of valves being dry; dry pipe and/or throttle reported Icaking13 times since December 1; one injured.March 1, 1937, locomotive 1705, Brendel, Utah. Left main pin failed due to

lid fractures; left main rod reported pounding on February 9, 11, 25, and 27; one

injured.June 26, 1937, locomotive 1148, Kaysville, T'tah. Lost footing due to rough

-iding locomotive; one injured.Seven accidents; seven injured.

ERIE RAILROAD:

August 10, 1936, locomotive 3323, Cameron, K. Y. .Main steam pipe in front=nd burst; thickness of steam pipe walls varied from % inch to 1% inches, due todefective casting, and side wall contained an air pocket approximately 7}~ inches'eng and metal on sides of this pocket was about }16 inch thick; t.hree injured.

*August 10,1936, locomotive 1767, Mo nterev, Ind. Reverse lever jerked fromemrlO~'ee's grasp and went to corner, striking his leg; valves dry; one injured.

*?\ovemb"r 20,1936, locomotive 2707, Osborn, Ohio. Air hose on tender burst;one injured.

December 21,1936, locomotive (N. Y. S. & w.: 34, Avon, K. Y. Handrailhroke off at both ends due to being fractured at both fittings and wasted away toabout ~~2 inch in thickness at root of threads; one injured.

January 27, 1937, locomotive 3338, Akron, Ohio. Insufficient clearance between fire door pedal and hinge on door over stoker transfer hopper; one injured.February 18, 1937, locomotive 2027, Buffalo, N. Y. Reverse lever jerked while

being moved; right valve was dry and binding due to rings too tight account ofsxcessive carbon in valve chest and valve body; link blocks worn; reverse leverlatch handle was badly bent, due to connecting straps between handle and dogbeing too short, preventing proper hold on lever; one injured.

March 4, 1937, locomotive 3333, Shongo, N. Y. Stoker elevator pawl shifterwould not latch in neutral position account of catch pin missing; one injured.June 30, 1937, locomotive 4017, Marion, Ohio. Bell ringer inoperative; one

injured.Eight accidents; 10 injured.

FLORIDA EAST COAST RAILWAY:

January 15, 1937, locomotive 702, Fort Pierce, Fla. Handrail broke due to old:racture; one injured.


FORT WORTH & DENVER CITY RAILWAY:

January 24, 1937, locomotive 456, near Wichita Falls, Tex. Squirt hose valveworked open; insufficient means for holding squirt hose in position when not inuse; valve insufficiently packed and packing dry, permitting valve handle towork open; one injured.


GRAND TRUNK WESTERN RAILWAY:

*August 15, 1936, locomotive 3741, Stillwell, Ind. Piston rod broke throughflaw at keyway in crosshead fit; 1 injured.

November 11, 1936, locomotive 3737, Port Huron, Mich. Oil feed pipe to aircompressor failed near lubricator connection; one injured.

December 31, 1936, locomotive 6039, Perry, Mich. Main crank pin brokeiust inside wheel fit; old fracture covered 75 percent of the area of the crank pin;'wo injured.

Three accidents; four injured.

HEPOHT OF THE CHIEF l~SPECTOn OF LOC0:\IOTlVES 19

GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY;

**November 19, 1936, locomotive 1702, Northtown Junction, Minn. Reverselever jerked violently forward, shearing stop bolt in quadrant and going to extremeforward end of quadrant where it stuck; one injured.

**December 12, 1936, locomotive 3048, Howard Lake, Minn. Mechanicalstoker failed to function due to bucket chain becoming stuck in elevator housing;one injured.

March 27,·1937, locomotive 1458, Stanwood, Wash. Driving spring hangerbroke at gib hole; approximately 40 percent of break was old fracture; one injured.June 12, 1937, locomotive 2124, near Blaisdell, N. Dak. A piece of cast iron

steam pipe in smoke arch, approximately 13 by 25 inches, blew out; failure originated at a vertical crack that started from the inside of pipe; thickness of steampipe walls varied from % inch to 1Yt6 inches, due to core being improperly placedin casting. A 12-inch crack in pipe wall opposite the failure had been repairedby fusion welding; one injured.

Four accidents; four injured.

GULF, COLORADO& SANTA FE RAILWAY;

January 19, 1937, locomotive (A. T. & S. F.) 1385, Berwyn, Okla. Headlightburned out; headlight step not conveniently located; one injured.February 5, 1937, locomotive (A. T. & S. F.) 1266, near Arlington, Tex. Main

crank pin broke off due to old fracture covering approximately 80 percent ofcross-sectional area; one inj ured.

June 23, 1937, locomotive (A. T. & S. F.) 3923, Cozart, Tex. Main pin brokeat inside of main rod bearing; 80 percent old fracture; one injured.

Three accidents; three injured.

ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD:

November 17, 1936, locomotive 1853, Pinckneyville, Ill. Defective wirecovering on air hose for cleaning cab caught on nail head projecting from deckand pulled the nail out. The nail flew up and struck engineer's eye, resulting inprobable permanent disability; one injured.

December 5, 1936, locomotive 1085, Sitka, Tenn. Fire door frame stud blewout; not more than one-half thread had been tapped in stud hole in boiler backhead and stud had been screwed into sheet only about three and one-half threadswith threads mutilated; one injured.

December 14, 1936, locomotive 265, New Orleans, La. Insufficient clearancebetween cab handhold at gangway and tender deck; one injured.February 13, 1937, locomotive 2013, Gordon, Ill. Fire door pedal improperly

located; one injured.February 17, 1937, locomotive 1895, Cruse, Ill. Locomotive uncoupled from

train due to low coupler on rear of tender; one injured.May 1, 1937, locomotive 558, Bossier City, La. Pipe from main reservoir to

high pressure head of air-compressor governor broke off at collar of union togovernor; one injured.

May 17, 1937, locomotive 3562, Memphis, Tenn. Water glass burst; oneinjured.June 29, 1937, locomotive 1531, Fonda, Iowa. Fire-door pedal moved out of

position when adjustable latch became disengaged, causing employee to fall; firedoor hanger bolt cotter key missing; one injured.Eight accidents; eight injured.

INDIANA HARBOR BELT RAILROAD:

*April 2, 1937, locomotive 408, Hammond, Ind. Glass in cab storm windowbroke; one injured.


INTERNATIONAL-GREAT NORTHERN RAILROAD:

October 21, 1936, locomotive 342, Palestine, Tex. Axle broke inside the hubof left main driving wheel; old fractures covered approximately 36 percent ofcross-sectional area at point of failure; wheel improper fit and had been workingon axle. Locomotive was returned to service on date of accident after havingbeen removed account of left main wheel loose on axle; one injured.


KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY;

August 21, 1936, locomotive 497, Baxter Springs, Kans. Fire tubes leakingat fusion welded beads to back flue sheet, caused by overheating due to accumulation of mud about 3 inches thick on back flue sheet. "Bad leaks in firebox"


Attachment Page 30

56 REPORT OF TIlE CHIEF Ii\'SPECTOR OF LOCO:\[OTIYES

Great Northern Railway AccidentJune 12 1937

PLATE 14

Plate J.! shows a east-iron front end steam pipe that failed while the locomotive was hauling a freight trainat a speed of approximately ~5 miles per hour, resulting in the serious injury of one employee ." The failureoriginated at a vertical crack that started from tbe inside of the pipe; the crack had apparently beenpresent for a considerable period of time.

, IPLATE 15

I'latc 15 shows brazing that had been applied in an attempt to repair a crack in tbe side opposite tbe breakin the steam pipe shown in plate 14.


Attachment Page 31

Members; I’ve attached the 1937 ICC summary of the photo of the front end steam pipe failure from my previous e-mail for your review along with the details of two additional accidents. These three failures show the potential for cast iron front end steam pipes to rupture and shatter through brittle fracture once a crack occurs. The potential for failure is increased when the steam pipe when is worn and when it is stressed as a consequence of being forced into assembly as a result of misalignment. The same cracking and rupture failure potential exists with the other cast iron locomotive boiler components, including the cab turret, if the part is worn or if its bolt flange or the associated piping components that attach to it are misaligned and then forced together at assembly. The existence of a crack in cast iron front end steam pipes and other cast iron locomotive boiler parts demonstrates that the part is life expired as result of wear and long term cyclic stress (long operating life) and now needs to be replaced. The repair of these cracked pressure vessel parts by welding or brazing is not feasible based the boiler industry experience to date. When a steel pressure vessel part cracks the crack may result in a bell mouth failure (the two sides of the cracked surface may spread open along the length of the crack) but usually without the massive rupture failure that occurs with cast iron parts. 1) The first front end steam pipe failure occurred on the Texas & Pacific on May 21, 1937. See the attached report summary and Picture/Plate #11. The front end steam pipe was made from cast iron and the ICC attributes the failure to it not being made to the company standard and also having a reduced wall thickness at the 90 degree bend. It is possible the front end steam pipe did not fit but was forced into position. The reduced thickness problem appears to have been caused by the combination of wear and a manufacturing problem in which the wall section that failed was cast thinner than the required design standard by the core shifting during the casting process. My analysis of the failure photograph is that the front end steam pipe did not fit up to the front tube sheet to enable it to make the connection to the joint ring at the superheater header. The connection was made by forcing the front end steam pipe into position. This twisted and strained the front end steam pipe at the large 90 degree bend and caused the cast iron pipe wall to crack along the radius at the bottom of the large 90 degree bend. The crack them spread out into two planes which met eventually and led to the rupture. The installation of this front end steam pipe was performed and approved by an experienced crew and the foreman in one of the T&P’s main shops or roundhouses. 2) The second cast iron front end steam pipe failure occurred on the Atlantic Coast Line on March 3, 1938. See the attached report summary and Picture/Plate #16. It was caused by the cast iron front end steam pipe bursting over a large area that had worn thin.

NB13-1405 Stone Comments 10-26-16Attachment Page 32

Attachment Page 32

This ICC assigns the primary failure to the front end steam pipe not fitting correctly and being forced into position. The defective installation placed a section of steam pipe pipe wall into direct contact with the smokebox wall. The contact caused this section of the front end steam pipe to wear thin until it burst. The wear occurred through abrasive wear created by the combination of vibration and thermal expansion of front end steam pipe against the smokebox wall during operation. The contact with the smokebox wall also limited free expansion of the steam pipe. The restricted expansion in turn created high stress in one section of the steam pipe wall which then created the initial crack once the pipe wall had worn thin. The defective installation of this front end steam pipe was performed and approved by an experienced crew and the foreman in one of the ACL main shops or roundhouses. It then passed subsequent inspections over a period of several months or years during which no one noticed that the front end steam pipe was misaligned and in direct contact with the smokebox wall and was becoming worn. These defective conditions continued unnoticed until the failure occurred. 3) The third cast iron front end steam pipe failure occurred on the Great Northern on June 12 ,1937. See the attached report summary and Pictures/Plates #14 & #15. It was caused by the front end steam pipe first cracking and then bursting over a large area that had both worn to a varying degree and was originally cast thin. The thin casting was caused by a manufacturing error in which the core shifted during casting process. This front end steam pipe had a history of cracking problems and had a previous crack repaired by some type of fusion welding. 4) The potential for cast iron locomotive boiler parts to crack is increased if the parts' bolt flange or associated piping components are misaligned and then forced together at assembly. I consider this to be a particular problem with the cab turret due to the limited inspection that it usually receives during overhauls. The original draft for NB13-1405 included a section requiring "the front end steam pipes to be aligned and assembled without being forced into position”. Our committee removed this rule as unnecessary but I recommend it be reinstated back into NB13-1405 to inform and warn NBIC inspectors and users of the failure potential for cast iron front end steam pipes when they are worn or misaligned. I would like our groups’ NBIC inspector members Paul Welch and Mark Jordan to comment on this item since I consider the cracking potential of cast iron boiler fittings and piping to be necessary information for an NBIC inspector to have in order to perform his work correctly. Bob Farrell and Linn, place this subject on the January 2017 meeting agenda.


Attachment Page 33

5) The NBIC and ASME B&PVC Section I and VIII rules, per my review of to date, prohibit the assembly and repair of cast iron pressure vessel components and boiler parts by welding or brazing. This makes use of the cast iron welding or brazing repair methods difficult, and possibly impossible, to qualify. The reason for the prohibition is that the ASME B&PVC and the NBIC limits welded/brazed repairs to materials that have a proven history of successful repairs by use of readily available methods. Cast iron does not qualify for this approved classification because of the difficulty obtaining good welds on a repeatable basis. This has been discovered by the ASME B&PVC and NBIC as a result of past repairs and failures on cast iron pressure vessel components and boiler parts during which it was found that some repairs worked while many others failed. The only repair method for cast iron pressure vessel components I’ve found to date is in ASME B&PVC Section VIII Part UVCI-78. It allows repair by installing a single threaded pipe plug on defects of short length. In addition ASME B&PVC Section VIII Part UCI-36 (b) Openings & Reinforcements prohibits the attachment of cast iron flanges, nozzles and openings by welding or brazing. If the committee wants to approve use of welding/brazing repairs to cast iron pressure parts the members must first identify and qualify an acceptable welding or brazing method. 6) Most of the cast iron locomotive pressure parts are made from SA-48 Cast Iron or a close equivalent to it. However the ASME Section II has dropped use of the original SA-48 Cast Iron from its approved material list and has replaced it with SA-278 Gray Iron Castings For Pressure Containing Parts For Service Up To 450 Degrees F. This could make it a challenge arrange an approved repair method for the SA-48 cast iron castings. Dick


Attachment Page 34

NB15‐2210 Failed Letter Ballot Comments

NB15-2210 Failed Letter Ballot Comments 12-22-16Attachment Page 35

Attachment Page 35

To be added to S3.5.5 Plugging of leaking or damaged tubes:

mf) As an alternative to e) any R Certificate Holder, with the concurrence of the Inspector, may install graphite tube plugs utilizing a tube plugging kit provided by an ASME Certificate Holder authorized to use the G designator. The kit shall include the following items:

1. Certified graphite plugs and certified cement ingredients, both accompanied by the appropriate documentation.

2. The qualified cementing procedure of the ASME Certificate Holder authorized to use the G designator, and a step-by-step procedural checklist that shall be followed explicitly. The procedure shall address the entire tube plugging process including plug configuration, tube hole cleaning and preparation, mixing and applying of the cement, application of the plugs, securing the plugs during the curing process, controlling the curing process, and leak testing, thereby meeting S3.3.

3. To qualify the cement technician performing the repair, aAdditional materials shall be provided and used which would allow the individual performing the installation shall use to demonstrate the ability to follow the procedure, prior to performing the repair. This repair demonstration, in conjunction with the procedural checklist, shall serve as a valid cement technician certification for a single repair operation. (what manner of evaluation represents a successful demonstration? A try-and- pull- it-apart-test, twist-test, or?)

The R Certificate Holder shall review the material certifications including verification that the shelf life of the cement has not been exceeded, and assure that the certified cement technician individual performing the repair installation has completed the qualification repair demonstration, and has access to the procedure and checklist. The Inspector shall review and verify the procedure as well as the other elements of the certified kit, as provided by the authorized G-designated ASME Certificate Holder, have been administered and completed prior to his acceptance. The R-certificate Holder shall note on the Line 8 of the R-1 Form the installation of cemented graphite tube plugs in accordance with this section.

See background information document for additional info.

Formatted: Top: 0.5"

Formatted: Strikethrough





NB15-2210 Webb Revision 11-10-16Attachment Page 36

Attachment Page 36

Background information on impregnated graphite tube plugging:

Cementing tube plugs is a proven field reliable and simple operation that has been effectively

used by graphite equipment users for over half a century. With the introduction of the G mark and part

UIG in the Code in 2010, and the subsequent inclusion of graphite pressure equipment repair

procedures to the NBIC books, the option for end users to use the procedure was obsoleted for vessels

marked with the ‘G’ mark indicator.

It is the opinion of this group that cementing plugs for tube plugging should be given some

special consideration in regards to required certifications as detailed in part UIG.

Some key points:

Cementing tube plugs is a very simple and effective operation.

All tube plugging will be performed by an “R” Certificate Holder

A cemented tube plugging operation can be performed successfully in as little as a day or two.

While there are alternative tube plugging options, cementing is far and away the most effective

and longest lasting option.

There is little to no chance of doing further damage to the part as a result of a failed tube

plugging operation. If the plug doesn’t hold, or isn’t properly installed, the resulting action is

simply back to remove the plug and install a new one in its place

In some jurisdictions, outside contractors are not allowed to perform code repairs on pressure

vessels without obtaining a state license. In actual cases like these, a user would be forced to

pull a vessel out and ship it to a repair organization certified for graphite to get the repair

completed. This can result in weeks of downtime, rather than days, for such a simple operation.

There are very few repair organizations that have graphite repair included in their scope

nationwide.

While commonly viewed as the graphite version of welding, cementing is a much less complex

operation. There is no “fusing” of material as there is in welding, where the weld filler and base

materials mix in the welded zone. A poorly cemented plug can be removed and the surrounding

material is not affected. Proper combination of ingredients to produce adequate cement,

applying enough cement to cover the joining surface, and properly curing the joint are the key

factors in a good joint. All of which will be covered in the procedure specification.

The nature of tube plugging is to simply seal a hole. This sets tube plugging apart from most

other cementing operations which can be critical to vessel fit, form, and function.

All of the design work is included in the kit. The proper bore diameter, and surface preparation

steps are detailed, the plug is pre‐made and ready to use, the cement mixing recipe is included,

and the curing procedure is also part of the given procedure.

It is our belief that tube plugging operations do need to be controlled, but think limiting them to

only repair organizations certified for graphite is unnecessary. We think that this proposal covers all the

important bases by maintaining that an ASME certificate holder authorized to use the G designator

provides the kit, a certified repair organization does the work, providing certified graphite materials with

all the proper documentation, providing a qualified cementing procedure, and by requiring that the

Inspector representing the repair organization get involved, similar to any other routine repair. All the

material is as required by the Code, and the joining methodology remains controlled by the use of the

qualified procedure.

NB15-2210 Webb Revision 11-10-16Attachment Page 37

Attachment Page 37

NB16‐0810

NBIC Part 3, Section 3, paragraph 3.4.3

EXAMPLES

OF ALTERATIONS

a) An increase in the maximum allowable working pressure (internal or external) or temperature of a

pressure‐retaining item regardless of whether or not a physical change was made to the pressure‐

retaining item;

b) A decrease in the minimum temperature;

c) The addition of new nozzles or openings in a boiler or pressure vessel except those classified as repairs;

d) A change in the dimensions or contour of a pressure‐retaining item;

e) In a boiler, an increase in the heating surface or steaming capacity as described on the original

Manufacturer’s Data Report;

f) The addition of a pressurized jacket to a pressure vessel;

g) Except as permitted in NBIC Part 3, 3.3.3 s); replacement of a pressure retaining part in a pressure

retaining item with a material of different allowable stress or nominal composition from that used in the

original design;

h) The addition of a bracket or an increase in loading on an existing bracket that affects the design of the

pressure‐retaining item to which it is attached;

i) The replacement of a pressure relieving device (PRD) as a result of work completed on a pressure‐

retaining item (PRI) that changes the resultant capacity to exceed the minimum required relieving

capacity (MRRC) required by the original code of construction as described on the original Manufacturer’s

Data Report.

j) In a Heat Recovery Steam Generator (HSRG), an increase in heat input (e.g. adjustments or modification

to a Gas Turbine which increases the exhaust energy or the addition of or an increased firing rate of duct

burners).

NB16-0810 Troutt 10-17-16Attachment Page 38

Attachment Page 38

Item Number: NB16-1302 NBIC Location: Part 3, S3.2 p)

p) Completed repairs shall be subjected to a pressure test. The test pressure shall not be less than the

maximum allowable working pressure or twice the operating pressure, whichever is loweroperating

pressure or more than maximum allowable working pressure. The test pressure shall be maintained for

30 minutes minimum.

Justification:

Present pressure range requirements are excessive and cause unnecessary hardship. This action brings

them more in line with the general requirements in Part 3.

NB16-1302 SG Graphite Approved 7-20-16Attachment Page 39

Attachment Page 39

rferrell

Text Box

Page A-6

Item Number: NB16-1303 NBIC Location: Part 3, S3.5.1f)

f) All damage should shall be examined and should be evaluated to determine the cause. Identification

and elimination of the cause is essential in helping to prevent a recurrence

NB16-1303 SG Graphite Approved 7-20-16Attachment Page 40

Attachment Page 40

rferrell

Text Box

Page A-7

NB16‐2602 12‐21‐16 Robert V. Underwood HSB Global Standards

Purpose To define the terms “practicable” and “impracticable” throughout the NBIC Part 3.

Scope: To define the terms “practicable” and “impracticable” in the Glossary in Section 9 of the NBIC Part 3.

Background The terms “practicable” and “impracticable” are used throughout the NBIC Part 3 in relation to welding, alternative PWHT methods, alternative NDE Methods, pressure testing, and in several supplements. HSB gets many questions each year about what “practicable” means. The reply in Interpretation 98‐38 (attached) states that the determination of “practicable” is based on technical consideration of the nature and scope of the alteration activity and not a “desire to save time and/or expense.” This interpretation relates only to pressure testing and alterations. We are proposing that this definition be addressed in the Glossary in Section 9 of the NBIC Part 3.

Proposed Revision

See page 2 with proposed definition which comes from Interpretation 98‐38.

NB16-2602 Underwood 12-21-16Attachment Page 41

Attachment Page 41

Practicable ‐ The terms practicable (and impracticable) are used throughout the NBIC. The

determination of whether an activity is practicable or impracticable shall be based on technical

consideration of the nature and scope of the repair or alteration activity. The desire to save time

and/or expense does not constitute whether an activity is practicable or impracticable.

NB16-2602 Underwood 12-21-16Attachment Page 42

Attachment Page 42

National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors National Board Inspection Code

Submission of Public Review Comment 2017 Draft Edition

Comments Must be Received No Later Than: October 10, 2016

Instructions: If unable to submit electronically, please print this form and fax or mail. Print or type clearly.

Date: Commenter Name: Commenter Address: Commenter Phone: Commenter Fax: Commenter Email: Section/Subsection Referenced: Comment/Recommendation: Proposed Solution: � New Text � Revise Text � Delete Text

Source: � Own Experience/Idea � Other Source/Article/Code/Standard Submit Form To: Bradley Besserman, NBIC Secretary, The National Board of Boiler & Pressure

Vessel Inspectors, 1055 Crupper Avenue, Columbus, OH 43229, email: [email protected]

PLEASE SUBMIT ONLY ONE COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION PER PAGE Make additional copies as needed

NB Use Only

Commenter No. Issued: Project Committee Referred To:

Comment No. Issued:

9/9/16

Robert Price243 Lincoln Ave.

Mt. Holly, NJ 08060(609) 841-5093

N/A

[email protected] below

1. Add mechanical Repair and example to NBIC Part 3 Scope, 1.1, Scope of Work 1.6.1 c),3.3.2, Routine Repair, 3.3.3, Examples of Repairs, 3.3.4.4-a) add example of MechanicalTube replacement in water tube, fire tube boilers or heat exchangers.

2. Add check-box to the NB forms R-1 and R-2. Mechanical repairs, i. e. rolling tubeswithout welding or replacement of threaded piping as defined in ASME Section 1PG-112.3.5 classified as P-4b piping.

ASME Sections I, IV, VIII div. 1

NB16-2901 Price 10-28-16Attachment Page 43

Attachment Page 43

NB16-3001 Kincs 10-28-16Attachment Page 44

Attachment Page 44

NB16-3002 Kincs 10-28-16Attachment Page 45

Attachment Page 45

Documents

SC 3 Attachments - National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel … 3... · 2017-03-20 · SC 3 Attachments SC 3 Roster 12-23-16 2 Bob Dickerson Resume 10-26-16 3 Bryan Jones Resume