30
©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved 1 [email protected] Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation By Don Olsen For Presentation at Security Working Group Of CCSDS April 11-15, 2005 Athens Greece

Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

Embed Size (px)

DESCRIPTION

Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation. By Don Olsen For Presentation at Security Working Group Of CCSDS April 11-15, 2005 Athens Greece. Background. Satellite TT&C links are susceptible to electronic counter measures (ECM). Spoofing Eavesdropping - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Citation preview

Page 1: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

By

Don Olsen

For Presentation at

Security Working Group

Of CCSDS

April 11-15, 2005

Athens Greece

Page 2: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Background

• Satellite TT&C links are susceptible to electronic counter measures (ECM).– Spoofing

– Eavesdropping

– Denial/Jamming

• Satellite TT&C links can be protected against ECM by– Encryption,

– Authentication, and

– Spread spectrum

• This presentation will focus on AJ performance with spread spectrum.

Page 3: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Waveform Security and Jamming Mitigation

• Some systems provide anti-jam capability through spread spectrum.– This could include frequency hopping or pseudo-noise (PN)

spreading.

– The measure of the improvement achieved is called processing gain.

– Frequency hopping anti-jam waveforms:– Provide greater processing gain for same complexity than PN,

– But has disadvantage of susceptibility to partial band and smart jamming,

– Secure TRANSEC can protect against frequency agile, smart, narrow band jamming.

– Presentation will restrict discussion to frequency hopping.

• Power efficient modulation minimizes Eb/No in AWGN as well as jamming.

Page 4: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Waveform Security and Jamming Mitigation (Cont.)

• Coding needs to maximize the required channel BER (Pcbe) so that partial band jamming is a disadvantage.– BER is inversely proportional to Eb/Nj , for partial band noise jammed

(PBNJ) single diversity signals as shown next. – Nj is avg. jammer density.

– Curve is tangent to the AWGN curve. (p. 11)– The slope is equal to the diversity symbol repetition combining.– Error correction coding must permit operation with the Pcbe at or

above the tangent point,– For no Eb/Nj degradation from the Eb/No performance and– Forces jammer to jam entire hopping bandwidth.

• Interleaving is needed to protect the decoder from burst channel errors.– The graphs in the backup charts show the Pbe with both ideal and

non-ideal interleaving.

Page 5: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Scope and Limitations

• Spectral allocation limits S band electronic counter counter measures (ECCM) processing gain.

• X Band and Ka Band (21 GHz) would improve the processing gain over S band and are included herein as typical but not as exhaustive examples.

• C and Ku are not Government bands and not included.

• Since the uplink EIRP advantage is only bandwidth dependent Q band is included with its 3 dB bandwidth advantage.

Page 6: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Assumptions

• Satellites are at synchronous altitude.

• Secure TRANSEC will mitigate certain smart jammer attacks.

• The choice of modulation, coding and interleaving will greatly influence the performance in smart partial band jamming.

• Hop diversity count has a significant effect on the performance of a frequency hopped waveform in the presence of partial band jammers.– The interleaver needs to preserve a hop diversity of ~700.

– To keep diversity related performance losses to 0.3 dB.

Page 7: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Link Parameters

Link Up DownBand S X Q S X 21 GHzFrequency MHz 2000 8000 44000 2200 8000 20000RF Allocation Bandwdith MHz 80 500 2000 80 500 1000Data Rate kbps 2 2 2 100 100 100Satellite Range Nmi 22760 22760 22760 22760 22760 22760Jammer Range Nmi 22760 22760 22760 20 20 20Range Ratio 1 1 1 0.000879 0.000879 0.000879Rx Antenna Sidelobe Level dB 0 0 0 20 30 40Required Rx Eb/No dB 10 10 10 10 10 10

J/S Available with No Spreading dB -10 -10 -10 -51.12 -41.12 -31.12

Page 8: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

AJ Performance Versus Spread Bandwidth for Various Frequencies and Link Options

-70

-60

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

1 10 100 1000 10000 100000 1000000 10000000

Spread Bandwidth (kHz)

Req

uire

d Ja

mm

er t

o U

plin

k U

ser

Ter

min

al o

r S

atel

lite

Dow

nlin

k E

IRP

Rat

io

Up

S

X

21 GHz

Page 9: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Conclusions for Above Scenarios

• Uplink jammer EIRP needed to degrade a 60 dBW uplink is:

– 50 dBW with no frequency spreading

– 96 dBW with 80 MHz frequency spreading

– 130 dBW with 2 GHz frequency spreading

• The Jammer EIRP needed to degrade a 30 dBW EIRP synchronous altitude satellite downlink is:

– -38 dBW at S Band with no frequency spreading.

– 8 dBW at S Band with 80 MHz frequency spreading.

– 39 dBW at 21 GHz with 1GHz frequency spreading.

Page 10: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Backup Slides on AJ Performance with Imperfect Interleaving

Page 11: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

BPSK Channel Bit Error Rate in AWGN and Optimized Partial Band Jamming (Eb/Nj)

1.E-10

1.E-09

1.E-08

1.E-07

1.E-06

1.E-05

1.E-04

1.E-03

1.E-02

1.E-01

1.E+00

-5.00 0.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 25.00 30.00Eb/Nx Assuming Rate 1/2 Coding (dB)

Pcb

e

Pcbe AWGN

Pcbe PBNJ

Page 12: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Waveform Background

• Non-ideal interleaving will allow smart jammers to degrade performance.

– Slow hopping (many bits per hop) and partial band jamming creates burst errors.

– Convolutional and turbo codes are very susceptible to degradation from burst errors.

– Ideal interleaving will distribute bursts uniformly to mitigate the loss.

• Hop diversity is the number of hops across which the code block is spread.

– Or the number of hops across which the content of a convolutional code’s path memory is spread

– However, the interleaver may not provide enough depth or effective use of the hopping diversity.

– This limitation can degrade both processing gain and anti-jam capability.

• The analysis and graphs later in this briefing show the effect of limited hop diversity.

Page 13: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Hop Diversity Analysis Approach• The analysis calculates and plots the BER curve for various

Eb/Nj.

– and partial band fraction for various numbers of diversity hops, Nh

– with Eb/No set to 0.

• The envelope of Pbe for worst case jammer fraction at each Eb/Nj was determined.

– The set of envelope curves for various values of diversity were plotted.

• The model sums the binomial weighted probabilities of error for each number of jammed hops out of a set of Nh hops.

• This was repeated for several modulation and coding options.• The waviness of some of the lines is due to the size of the

step in the partial band fraction.

Page 14: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Definitions of Parameters• The partial band Gaussian noise jammer fraction is r .

• The code is either – Convolutional with rate, rc of ½ and constraint length 7

– Or convolutional turbo with rc of ½, constraint length 5 and 5120 bit block size.

• The decoder transfer model was obtained– By fitting a judicious curve to the Pbe versus Pcbe relationship,

– Where Pcej is the channel probability of error,

– Pbe is the decoder output probability of error,

– Given j of Nh diversity hops are jammed.

• Code parameters definitions:– The linear scale factor for the code probability of error transfer model is a.

– The exponential factor for the code probability of error transfer model is b.– It is closely related to half the minimum free distance of the code.

– The curve corner fitting tightness factor for the code transfer model is n.

• Pbe is the sum over j of the decoded binomial distribution weighted Pcej.

Page 15: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Analysis for DPSK Modulation Case

cbenNjN

cbejNcej PPPh

h

h

j )(

jo

cbcbej NN

REP

exp

o

cbcben N

REP exp

hN

j cejPjjhNhN

beP0

!!

!/1

11

Page 16: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Modulation Performance for Coherent DPSK and BPSK Cases Is Respectively

jo

cb

NNRE

cebj QP 2

o

cb

NRE

cben QP 2

o

cb

o

cbcben N

REQ

N

REQP 12

jo

cb

jo

cbcbej NN

REQ

NN

REQP

12

Page 17: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Where the complementary error function is given by Sklar in “Digital Communications” 2nd ed., p. 210 as:

duxQx

u

22

1 2

exp

Page 18: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Coding Parameters

Alpha Beta Nu RcSoft Decision Convolutional Coding 6.23 9.6 0.50605 0.5Hard Decision Convolutional Coding 6.60 4.9 0.60006 0.5Soft Decision Turbo Coding 7.89 89.0 0.145 0.5Hard Decision Turbo Coding 12.00 43.2 0.145 0.5

Page 19: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Performance of BPSK and Turbo Versus Rate 1/2, k = 7 Convolutional Coding for Both Hard and Soft Decisions in AWGN or Jamming

1.E-10

1.E-09

1.E-08

1.E-07

1.E-06

1.E-05

1.E-04

1.E-03

1.E-02

1.E-01

1.E+00

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

Eb/No (dB)

Pb

e

AWGN Turbo SoftAWGN Turbo HardAWGN Convo SoftAWGN Convo HardJammed Turbo SoftJammed Turbo HardJammed Convo SoftJammed Convo Hard

Page 20: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Theoretical Single Link Pbe Performance for BPSK Modulation, Soft Decision Turbo Coding and 768 Hop Block Diversity for Various

Partial Band Gaussian Noise Jammer Fractions

1.E-08

1.E-07

1.E-06

1.E-05

1.E-04

1.E-03

1.E-02

1.E-01

1.E+00

0 1 2 3

Eb/Nj (dB)

Pbe

1.0000

0.8660

0.7499

0.6494

0.5623

0.4870

0.4217

0.3652

Page 21: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Theoretical Single Link Pbe Performance for BPSK Modulation, Soft Decision Turbo Coding and 24 Hop Block Diversity for Various Partial

Band Gaussian Noise Jammer Fractions

1.E-08

1.E-07

1.E-06

1.E-05

1.E-04

1.E-03

1.E-02

1.E-01

1.E+00

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

EbNj (dB)

Pbe

1.0000

0.5623

0.3162

0.1778

0.1000

0.0562

0.0316

0.0178

Page 22: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Theoretical Single Link Pbe Performance for BPSK Modulation, Soft Decision Turbo Coding and 3 Hop Block Diversity for Various Partial

Band Gaussian Noise Jammer Fractions

1.E-08

1.E-07

1.E-06

1.E-05

1.E-04

1.E-03

1.E-02

1.E-01

1.E+00

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60

Eb/Nj (dB)

Pbe

1.0000

0.1000

0.0100

0.0010

0.0001

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Page 23: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Table of Graphs

Page Modulation Coding Decisions24 DPSK Convolutional Hard25 CDPSK Convolutional Hard26 BPSK Convolutional Hard27 CDPSK Convolutional Soft28 BPSK Convolutional Soft29 BPSK Turbo Hard30 BPSK Turbo Soft

Page 24: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Theoretical Single Link Pbe Performance for DPSK Modulation, Hard Decision Convolutional Coding and

Optimized Partial Band Gaussian Noise Jammer Fractions for Various Values of Block Hop Diversity

1.E-08

1.E-07

1.E-06

1.E-05

1.E-04

1.E-03

1.E-02

1.E-01

1.E+00

0 5 10 15Eb/Nj (dB)

Dec

oded

Pbe

768

384

192

96

48

24

12

6

3

2

1

Page 25: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Theoretical Single Link Pbe Performance for CDPSK Modulation, Hard Decision Convolutional Coding and

Optimized Partial Band Gaussian Noise Jammer Fractions for Various Values of Block Hop Diversity

1.E-08

1.E-07

1.E-06

1.E-05

1.E-04

1.E-03

1.E-02

1.E-01

1.E+00

0 5 10 15Eb/Nj (dB)

Dec

oded

Pbe

768

384

192

96

48

24

12

6

3

2

1

Page 26: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Theoretical Single Link Pbe Performance for BPSK Modulation, Hard Decision Convolutional Coding and

Optimized Partial Band Gaussian Noise Jammer Fractions for Various Values of Block Hop Diversity

1.E-08

1.E-07

1.E-06

1.E-05

1.E-04

1.E-03

1.E-02

1.E-01

1.E+00

0 5 10 15Eb/Nj (dB)

Dec

oded

Pbe

768

384

192

96

48

24

12

6

3

2

1

Page 27: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Theoretical Single Link Pbe Performance for CDPSK Modulation, Soft Decision Convolutional Coding and Optimized

Partial Band Gaussian Noise Jammer Fractions for Various Values of Block Hop Diversity

1.E-08

1.E-07

1.E-06

1.E-05

1.E-04

1.E-03

1.E-02

1.E-01

1.E+00

0 5 10 15Eb/Nj (dB)

Dec

oded

Pbe

768

384

192

96

48

24

12

6

3

2

1

Page 28: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Theoretical Single Link Pbe Performance for BPSK Modulation, Soft Decision Convolutional Coding and Optimized

Partial Band Gaussian Noise Jammer Fractions for Various Values of Block Hop Diversity

1.E-08

1.E-07

1.E-06

1.E-05

1.E-04

1.E-03

1.E-02

1.E-01

1.E+00

0 5 10 15Eb/Nj (dB)

Dec

oded

Pbe

768

384

192

96

48

24

12

6

3

2

1

Page 29: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Theoretical Single Link Pbe Performance for BPSK Modulation, Hard Decision Turbo Coding and Optimized

Partial Band Gaussian Noise Jammer Fractions for Various Values of Block Hop Diversity

1.E-08

1.E-07

1.E-06

1.E-05

1.E-04

1.E-03

1.E-02

1.E-01

1.E+00

0 5 10 15Eb/Nj (dB)

Dec

oded

Pbe

768

384

192

96

48

24

12

6

3

2

1

Page 30: Satellite TT&C Denial, Electronic Counter Measure and Mitigation

©2005, The Aerospace Corporation, All Rights Reserved [email protected]

Theoretical Single Link Pbe Performance for BPSK Modulation, Soft Decision Turbo Coding and Optimized Partial Band Gaussian Noise Jammer Fractions for Various Values of

Block Hop Diversity

1.E-08

1.E-07

1.E-06

1.E-05

1.E-04

1.E-03

1.E-02

1.E-01

1.E+00

0 5 10 15Eb/Nj (dB)

Dec

oded

Pbe

768

384

192

96

48

24

12

6

3

2

1