Cogito: From Descartes to SartreAuthor(s): Weimin MO and Wang WeiReviewed work(s):Source: Frontiers of Philosophy in China, Vol. 2, No. 2 (April 2007), pp. 247-264Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27823291 .Accessed: 08/06/2012 01:30

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Front. Philos. China 2007, 2(2): 247-264 DOI 10.1007/s 11466-007-0016-0

RESEARCH ARTICLE

MO Weimin

Cogito: From Descartes to Sartre*

? Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag 2007

Abstract Cogito, as the first principle of Descartes' metaphysical system, initiated the modern philosophy of consciousness, becoming both the source and

subject of modem Western philosophical discourse. The philosophies of Maine

de Biran, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others developed

by answering the following questions? Is consciousness substantial or not?

Does consciousness require the guarantee of a transcendental subject? Is Cogito epistemological or ontological? Am I a being-for-myself or a being-for-others? Outlining the developmental histoiy of the idea of Cogito from Descartes to

Sartre is important for totally comprehending the evolution and development of Western philosophy.

Keywords Cogito, consciousness, substance, transcendental subject, Descartes, Sartre

When Descartes deduced from Cogito soul and body?mind and material?as two separate substances, he established the subject in its true meaning in the

history of philosophy. Nourished by the Cartesian Cogito, Western philosophy has been making its way for more than three centuries. Almost the entire history of Western philosophy has unfolded either by reinterpreting the philosophy of Cartesian Cogito or by criticizing it from different angles. Does consciousness have substantiality? Does consciousness need to be justified by a transcendental

subject? Is Cogito epistemological or ontological? Am I a being-for-myself or a

being-for-others? Kant, Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre reflected on the problem of Cogito after Descartes and made milestone contributions. Tracing the

Translated by Wang Wei from Xueshu Yuekan ' & ?'J (Academic Monthly), 2006, (3): 69-76

MO Weimin (M) Department of Philosophy, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China E-mail: weimingmo@ftidan.edu.cn

*This paper is supported by a national project (No. 05FCZD0010) granted by the Innovation Base of Philosophy and Social Science.

248 MO Weimin

developing course of the problem of Cogito from Descartes to Sartre helps us

comprehend the evolution and progress of Western philosophy in general.

1 The Ego of "Cogito" is not substance

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a number of philosophers attempted to use other concepts to weaken or transform the active and constructive function and the substantial-standing of the Cartesian subjective ego. Maine de Biran tried to remould the Cartesian Cogito?"I think"?by his own term volo?"I will".

First, Biran regarded the active aspects of moi as ego; then, by identifying the

ego and itself ("soi-m?me"), he criticized Descartes for establishing the substantial

ego (soul) of thinking and absolute being. He was also not content with Descartes

regarding the impersonal substance of free-thinking soul as the basis of the

experience of Cogito. As soul (substantial ego) transcends any individual

manifestations of will, it becomes the ego without self. As it hides far behind the

automatic appearance of existent ego, it becomes the powerless abstract ego.

Evidently, the "I" of "I think" is no longer the "I" of "I am." Biran tried to

substitute the Cartesian "I think, therefore I am" by "I will, therefore I am." He

thought that the force of will in personal existence is more fundamental than the

Cartesian substantial ego's Cogito. The initial consciousness of the empirical ego differs from the impersonal, transcendental, substantial ego. Body does not

oppose itself to soul as in Cartesian philosophy; rather, it is a component of ego and exists as authentically as ego does.

Biran denounced Descartes for confusing the phenomenal ego with the

substantial ego, whereas Kant went far beyond this. In Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, Kant focused on criticizing the four kinds of deductive paralogism in Cartesian

philosophy, namely the substantiality of soul (the thinking being) from Cogito, ergo sum?"I think, therefore I am"?the simplicity of soul (the thinking "I"), the personality of soul and the ideality of the existence of the objects of outer

senses. Because the Cartesian substance of soul transcends the empirical multitude, it lacks the eternity of an object that substance as substance must

possess and is given as the eternal in experience. Therefore, the Cartesian

substance of soul is void and barren without objective meaning. The Cartesian

Cogito (soul or the thinking being) is no more than a logical subject in the ideality, and not at all a real subject as foundation of thinking. Therefore, "die Seele ist

Substanz ... Begriff nicht im mindesten weiter f?hre" (Kant 1956, 379a, A351). As to the simplicity of soul, Kant pointed out that the Cartesian proposition of Cogito and ergo sum is really a tautology, since "I think" (Cogito) means

"I am thinking", immediately asserting my existence. The simplicity of "I" as

soul origins directly from "I am", viz. the indivisible absolute logical unity of

representation, and is not deduced from "I think" (Kant 1956, 379a, 382a, A354).

Cogito: From Descartes to Sartre 249

Furthermore, "Die Einfachheit aber der Vorstellung von einem Subjekt ist darum

nicht eine Erkenntnis von der Einfachheit des Subjekts selbst ..." (Kant 1956, 383a, A355). Thus, Kant criticized Descartes for insisting on the simplicity of soul so as to separate the soul as subject and the material as object, thus denying that soul has any material component. Although Kant also thought that the

thinking subject does not belong to any tangible material, he did not hold this

position for the same reason as Descartes, for Kant regarded the thinking subject as the object of inner sense, so it does not exist in space. Besides, the extensive substance related to our outer sense is also simple and is able to think. By proving the identity which necessarily combines with my consciousness is not therefore the same as the identity which combines with another's consciousness, Kant refuted the Cartesian viewpoint that soul is personality. By proving that the

thinking "I" has an original connection with the extensive material, Kant criticized the fourth paralogism. In general, Kant wanted to transform the Cartesian subject of consciousness into

" ' which has no substantiality or personality, is not

self-knowing as ego but just as object of reason. That is to say, consciousness was

transformed into being-in-itself which had not yet become being-for-itself. At the same time, Kant admitted that the material being, with extension and movement

and as the object of outer sense, can also be the thinking subject. In Recherches Logiques, Husserl insisted?just like Descartes?on the

"descriptive psychology" of the true immanence of consciousness or Cogito activity. However, during his phase of "transcendental phenomenology", he blamed Descartes for confusing psychological phenomenon with pure

phenomenon. He asserted that the Cartesian ego or Cogito activity is none other than psychological apperception with empirical components. Far from being pure, it is not truly absolute "fact" and still needs phenomenological reduction to purify it. The consciousness which Descartes finally reached is merely psychological consciousness. Only transcendental consciousness purified by phenomenological reduction can be the foundation of being of the world. The roots of the modern dichotomy of dualism lie in Cartesian doubt's identifying the

ego with mind, spirit and reason when his doubt makes suspension of judgment of the world and body. However, according to Husserl, the posing of the purely independent soul as substance not only damages the consistency of ego, but also renders the suspension of meaningless judgement. Because Descartes did not

grasp the genuine meaning of transcendental subjectivity, he was not qualified as a transcendental philosopher in a rigid sense and he merely gave a direction to

Husserl, who would found the transcendental phenomenology. While both Husserl and Kant criticized Descartes for regarding soul and ego

as substance, and both of them pointed out that Descartes did not understand

that beyond the ego as being-in-itself derived from the suspension of judgement, it is impossible to find its congener and the world, Husserl denounced Kant, just like Descartes, for his similar ignorance of consciousness and rational ideas.

250 MO Weimin

According to Husserl, Kant merely set the psychological consciousness in time, instead of transcendental consciousness, as the foundation of knowledge, and

simply set a priori of knowledge by the intellect and reason which appear as

psychological factors. Thus Kant came to the self-contradictory conclusion that

subject or consciousness is both antecedent to the world and within the world. It is obviously a false conclusion; in fact, any exterior thing is at the same time the

thing within consciousness. Therefore, it is impossible to elicit from consciousness that the reality exists exterior to consciousness. If we generalize that Kant

opposed the Cartesian factual ego using the transcendental ego, we can also say that Husserl opposed the Cartesian and Kantian psychological ego using the

transcendental ego. When Sartre criticized the ontological faults of Cartesian rationalism, he

pointed out, "La conscience n'a rien de substantiel, c'est une pure ' apparence',

en ce sens qu'elle n'existe que dans la mesure o? elle s'appara?t. Mais c'est

pr?cis?ment parce qu'elle et pure apparence, parce qu'elle est un vide total

(puisque le monde entier est en dehors d'elle), c'est ? cause de cette identit? en

elle de l'apparence et de l'existence qu'elle peut ?tre consid?r?e comme

l'absolu."1 (Sartre 1943, p. 23). That is to say, because only consciousness

revealing itself can be pure revelation, consciousness does not have substantiality.

Similarly, appearance and existence are identified in consciousness, and thus

consciousness has the absoluteness. That is to say, the reason why consciousness

has no substantiality is that consciousness only exists as pure appearance as far as

it appears itself, and the reason why consciousness has absoluteness is that

appearance and existence achieve identification in consciousness.

2 Consciousness does not require transcendental ego

It seems that Husserl's phenomenology made it possible for philosophy to find its concrete basis in real life experience?the true reason why Sartre showed zeal for

it. In his article "Une id?e fondamentale de la ph?nom?nologie de Husserl:

l'intentionnalit?," he repeatedly insisted that Husserl affirmed that things cannot

be dissolved to consciousness, nor can things enter people's consciousness. After

transcendental reduction of phenomenology, Husserl found the transcendental

ego as his philosophy's starting point. However, Sartre was more radical than

Husserl and declared that all things, including the ego, exist outside of our

consciousness and cannot be assimilated by it; it is not in Cogito that we find

ourselves, but in the world, among others. My "ego" is not the substance; it is the

1 ^Consciousness has nothing substantial, it is pure 'appearance' in the sense that it exists only

to the degree to which it appears. But it is precise because consciousness is pure appearance, and because it is total emptiness (since the entire world is outside it)?it is because of this

identity of appearance and existence within it that it can be considered as the absoluteness."

Cogito: From Descartes to Sartre 251

object which I must construct with my actions in the world and relations with

others.

Like Kant and Husserl, Sartre also attacked Descartes for regarding consciousness as substantial, and he insisted that consciousness exists because it

appears itself. He differed, however, from Kant and Husserl in that he thought that all things, including Cogito or ego, are exterior to consciousness. He put

emphasis on the primacy of consciousness, especially the primacy of the subject, and firmly opposed the standpoint of transcendental philosophy. In his essay La transcendance de I fEgo, Sartre elaborated on such ideas in detail.

According to Sartre, in Kant's philosophy, consciousness is sometimes

without "I" ("Je"), for Kant thought Cogito "doit pouvoir accompagner toutes nos repr?sentations"2 (Sartre 1966, pp. 13-14). "I" actually does not reside in all

states of our consciousness and optimally synthesizes our experiences. Otherwise, there would be no need for Kant to say "it should accompany." In fact, for Kant, the transcendental consciousness is no more than the prerequisite for the existence

of an empirical consciousness. In Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, Kant argued that

rational psychology had falsely regarded the mere "logical subject of thought" as

"I" and a "thinking thing". In Kant's view, is just a phenomenon, stipulated

just as the things that are represented in space. The transcendental subject is

neither the integration of apperception, nor the correlation of a transcendental

object. When Kant discussed objects and their relationship with knowledge, he

did not involve subject. We know the transcendental subject not only by such

thoughts as its predication, for a transcendental object as thing-in-itself is itself

unknowable, it is neither material nor thinking being. Husserl remoulded Kant's transcendental consciousness. Transcendental

consciousness is no longer the totality of logical conditions. Rather, it is

imprisoned in our empirical consciousness and forms our empirical consciousness.

Sartre agreed with Husserl in regarding "I" ("Je") as the outcome of the synthesis and transcendence of consciousness in Recherches Logiques, but opposed the

traditional viewpoint espoused by Husserl in Id?es Directrices Pour une

Ph?nom?nologie, that the transcendental "I" ("Je") is behind each consciousness and becomes the necessary structure of consciousness. According to Sartre, such a view was contrary to Husserl's definition of consciousness. Sartre thought that phenomenology did not need to resort to this unifying and individualizing "I". In Le?ons sur la Conscience Interne du Temps, Husserl never resorted to the

synthetic strength of "I" when researching the subjective unity of multiple consciousnesses, for it is consciousness itself that unifies by the "mutual reversal"

game of intentionality. Such intentionality is the concrete and continuous

persistence of these past consciousnesses. Consciousness constantly returns to

should be able to accompany all of our representations".

252 MO We imi

itself and thus has nothing to do with the relationship between consciousness

and "I." Sartre believed that the phenomenological idea of consciousness denies

the unifying and individualizing function of "I". Moreover, even the unification

and individuality of "I" are offered by consciousness. The "I" of "I think"

(Cogito) is not a self-evident object and self-evidence is not the fountainhead

of consciousness. Only consciousness itself can be the fountainhead of

consciousness. Thus, there is no reason for the transcendental "I" to exist (Sartre

1966, pp. 22-23). Because the transcendental T" lets consciousness disengage itself and divides

consciousness, it would kill consciousness. Because consciousness is the

consciousness that is conscious of itself, the consciousness of consciousness

understands consciousness itself as absolute immanence, which is totally different

from the consciousness" positional understanding of its object. Thus, Sartre called

the consciousness of consciousness "irreflexive consciousness," viz. first-degree consciousness. In the irreflexive consciousness, there is no place for "I".

Consciousness which is conscious of itself is absolute and pure consciousness.

Importing the three-dimensional, opaque, and personal "I" into the absolute and

pure consciousness would pollute the pure consciousness and fix it, as well as

blur it.

Husserl regarded consciousness as the unification of "being" and "appearance" and he de-substantialized the phenomenon of consciousness, rendering it totally different from Descartes' substantialized consciousness. Husserlian Cogito was

also different from the Cartesian Cogito. Nevertheless, Sartre denounced Husserl

for his looking upon "I" as the necessary structure of consciousness in

The Fourth Meditation' of M?ditations Cart?siennes. In Sartre's view, Husserl

exalted the opaque "I" to the absolute rank of pure consciousness. The originally

light consciousness becomes heavy and hence loses the quality by wrhich it can

afford itself absolute existence with non-existential force. The inner T" is merely an object of consciousness. If the "I" is exalted as the necessary structure of

consciousness, all the achievements of phenomenology would be irrecoverably lost (Sartre 1966, pp. 23-26). Whereas the Cartesian "I" and "thinking" are on the same layer upon which

"I think" (Cogito) makes its transition to thinking substance, Sartre thought that

the Cartesian "I" transcends consciousness. Any transcendence, however, must

be suspended. Therefore, Sartre asserted that Husserl did not recognize that

any transcendence would be suspended and thus falsely regarded "I" ("Je") as

transcendental consciousness. Whereas both Kant and Husserl consider "I" ("Je") as the formal structure of consciousness, psychologists affirm the material

presence of "I" ("Mo/") in all our consciousnesses. However, Sartre insisted on

reconciling the "I" ("Je") as the unification of action with the "I" ("Mo/") as the

unification of states and qualities (Sartre 1966, p. 43). That is to say, Sartre

Cogito: From Descartes to Sartre 253

thought that ego has two aspects, the formal aspect and the material aspect, and

that it is ultimately the unification of states of qualities and action. Ego is the

irrational synthesis of subjectivity and passivity, as well as the synthesis of

immanence and transcendence.

Sartre put emphasis on the self-origination and independence of consciousness

in order to deny the priority and supremacy of the subject and get rid of the

difficult problem of solipsism in Western philosophy. Consciousness is absolutely immanent and has primacy. Consciousness is caused by the fact that consciousness

must face the "I" and combines with "I," whereas ego is not the necessary structure of consciousness and is a mere object of consciousness. Obviously, ego and consciousness are correlative, but this relation relies on states and qualities as

media. Ego directly becomes the unification of states and action. States are the

media of body and consciousness, while qualities are the media of states, action, and ego. States are established by consciousness, while qualities are established

by states. Therefore, consciousness is the foundation of all these. Of course, Sartre did not say that consciousness is the absolute foundation, the principle of

everything, or the foundation of itself.

Kant examined the condition of the possibility of experience, while Husserl's

phenomenology reduced the world to the correlative condition of the intentional

object of consciousness. Sartre considered such methods as arbitrarily starting from abstraction and he himself would start from the concrete and examine, like

Heidegger, man in the world and the relation that unifies man and the world. In

L'?tre et le n?ant, he explicitly pointed out that consciousness is full consciousness

and consciousness can only be limited by itself. However, consciousness

does not precede its own being, for consciousness is not the fountainhead.

Consciousness is a fulfilled being, and exists by itself. Sartre did not intend

to show that consciousness is its own foundation of being: he only showed

that nothing is the cause of consciousness, and consciousness is the cause of its own way of being. Consciousness exists only through a process of nihilation or negation that is ascribed to it. In short, consciousness does not come from

nothingness. Prior to consciousness there is no nothingness of consciousness. "La

conscience'est ant?rieure au n?ant et 'se tire' de l'?tre"3 ( Sartre 1943, p. 22). Sartre proved on an ontological level that consciousness is naturally supported

by a being other than itself, for consciousness is the consciousness of something and consciousness is the relation to the transcendent being. Consciousness can

always transcend its present existence (existent) and make its way to the meaning of its being. It always goes beyond the ontic (ontique) to the ontological

(ontologique). Sartre held that Husserl made his most important discovery in

3"Consciousness is prior to nothingness and 'is derived' from being."

254 MO Weimin

rigidly defining consciousness as transcendence. However, Sartre thought that

Husserl falsely regarded "the consciousness as object" as non-reality, a relativity of "the consciousness of action," of which the being is perceived. Sartre firmly believed that consciousness is not consciousness as the active ego, and that while

the being of the perceived cannot be reduced to the being of perceiver, nor can

it be reduced to consciousness. The perceived being should exist even as

non-reality. That is to say, the being of phenomenon is not the being perceived of

the phenomenon (Sartre 1943, pp. 24-26). "La conscience est un ?tre pour lequel il est dans son ?tre question de son ?tre en tant que cet ?tre implique un ?tre autre

que lui"4 (Sartre 3943, p. 29).

3 The being of Cogito

In order to substitute phenomenal monism for the dualism of being and appearance

(para?tre), modem philosophy reduced existence to a series of manifestations

of existence. However, Sartre thought, "L'existant, en effet, ne saurait se r?duire

? une s?rie finie de manifestations, puisque chacune d'elles est un rapport ? un sujet en perp?tuel changement"5 (Sartre 1943, p. 13). Therefore, modem

philosophy cannot successfully overcome dualism. Sartre held that appearance

appears and appearance exists, so the view of appearance became the starting

point from which Sartre would discuss the relationship between being and

nothingness; only by such an approach can philosophers overcome the dualism in

modem philosophy. Because consciousness is the same thing as that which is conscious of,

Sartre regarded consciousness as being and opposed reducing consciousness to

knowledge. In other words, consciousness is not the being to be understood, but

the being that understands. Sartre would discard the primacy of knowledge and

dispel the fantasy of the supremacy of knowledge. In other words, he opposed

importing the subject-object dualism into consciousness. Reflexion is not superior to reflected consciousness. It is not reflexion that reveals itself as the reflected

consciousness. On the contrary, it is the irreflexive consciousness that makes

reflexion possible: the pre-reflexive Cogito is the requisite of the Cartesian

Cogito. Sartre grasped a kind of being that departs from knowledge yet serves as

the foundation for knowledge. In other words, he apprehended the ontological basis of knowledge.

4 "Consciousness is a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself." 5 "Yet the existent in fact can not be reduced to a finite series of manifestations since each one

of them is a relation to a subject constantly changing."

Cogito: From Descartes to Sartre 255

Sartre from nothingness discussed freedom, from freedom discussed bad faith, and from bad faith discussed the being of consciousness as its condition of

possibility.

Regarding the problem of the relationship between being and nothingness, Sartre was against Hegel, for being is to be whereas nothingness is not to be.

Hegel arrived at nothingness through being. Sartre thought that being and

nothingness are complementary to each other, and that they are two equally necessary components of the real thing. Being can be thought without nothingness; because nothingness is the negation of being, it needs being to manifest itself as

the negation of being. While being can be without nothingness, nothingness

completely depends on being, it gains its being from being. This is what "le n?ant

hante l'?tre"6 means (Sartre 1943, p. 57).

Being is prior to nothingness and provides the foundation for nothingness, thus

allowing nothingness to serve its function. Nothingness exists inside being. Only in the substratum of being is it possible for nothingness to be nihilated. However,

being is not the origin of nothingness. Where then does nothingness originate? "L'?tre par qui le n?ant vient au monde doit ?tre son propre n?ant"7 (Sartre 1943,

p. 57). Only man can be looked upon as such nothingness. "L'homme est l'?tre

par qui le n?ant vient au monde"8 (Sartre 1943, p. 59). Sartre further questioned: What should man be in his being in order to let nothingness come into being

through man? His answer: Man should be as a free man. The reason is: "...il

n'y a pas de diff?rence entre l'?tre de l'homme et son '?tre-libre"9 (Sartre 1943,

p. 60). The reality of man might diffuse a kind of nothingness that would allow

oneself to be independent. Although Descartes, following the Stoic school, called

such a possibility as "freedom," Sartre regards it as merely an abstract and

superficial word. Sartre made concrete and deep inquiries: If nothingness should

depend on man's freedom to come into the world, then what on earth should

man's freedom be? Freedom is not what Descartes understood as the sense of

the human soul that can only be assumed and described. Freedom belongs to the

structure of for-itself. The human being restricts the appearance of nothingness, so the human being appears free. "Ainsi la libert? comme condition requie ?

la n?antisation du n?ant n'est pas une propri?t? qui appartiendrait, entre autres, ?

l'essence de l'?tre humain. Nous avons d?j? marqu? d'ailleurs que le rapport de

l'existence ? l'essence n'est pas chez l'homme semblable ? ce qu'il est pour les

choses du monde. La libert? humqine pr?c?de l'essence de l'homme et la rend

6 "nothingness haunts being." 7 "The Being by which Nothingness arrives in the world must nihilate Nothingness in its

Being." 8 "Man is the being through whom nothingness comes to the world."

9 "Because there is no difference between being of man and his 'free being'".

256 MO Weimin

possible, l'essence de l'?tre humain est en suspens dans sa libert?"10 (Sartre 1943,

pp. 59-60). Furthermore, Sartre held that human freedom cannot be separated from the being of human reality (as Heideggerian Dasein). There is no difference

between the human being and the being of man as freedom (?tre-libre). Because

any nothingness roots in the nihilation inside the immanence, in the final analysis, Sartre's freedom lies in the subjectivity of consciousness: "c'est dans 1'immanence

absolue, dans la subjectivit? pure du cogito instantan? que nous devons d?couvrir

l'acte orginel par quoi l'homme est ? lui-m?me son propre n?ant"11 (Sartre 1943,

p. 81). Freedom is not the property of human essence, rather the being of

consciousness, and consciousness ought to be the consciousness of freedom. So

human freedom precedes the essence of man and makes it possible. Descartes

regarded freedom as a function that belongs exclusively to the human soul, whereas Sartre started from consciousness and united human being and human

freedom in consciousness.

Freedom is the existence of this type of human being, who diffuses his own

nothingness and renders his past disfunction; while at the same time his own past in nihilating forms is also his own future. Thus, the human being sways between

the past and future like a pendulum, naturally bringing him anguish ^angoisse"). Sartre held that "c'est dans l'angoisse que l'homme prend conscience de sa libert?

ou, si Ton pr?f?re, l'angoisse est le mode d'?tre de la libert? comme conscience

d'?tre, c'est dans l'angoisse que la libert? est dans son ?tre en question pour elle-m?me"12 (Sartre 1943, p. 64). Kierkegaard described anguish as anguish in

the presence of freedom. Heidegger, on the other hand, regarded anguish as the

comprehension of nothingness ("/a saisie du n?ant"). (Ibid.) Essentially, Sartre

synthesized Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's view of freedom. While Bergson's

theory of duration of ego insisted that my "ego" is free inside my consciousness

and cannot be transcended by consciousness, Sartre held that my being is freedom

only as being and our freedom appears to itself. "Ego" does not exist in the

consciousness as absolute immanence, therefore Sartre concluded that Bergson obscured anguish and could not see ontological freedom. Actually, anguish can

neither be obscured nor nullified. I can do no more than let myself have bad faith

10'Thus freedom as the requisite condition for the nihilation of nothingness is not a property which belongs among others to the essence of the human being. We have already noticed

ftirthermore that the relation with man of existence to essence is not comparable to what it is

for the things of the world. Human freedom precedes essence in man and makes it possible; the

essence of the human being is suspended in his freedom.''

""It is in the absolute immanence, in the pure subjectivity of instant Cogito that we should discover the original activity by which man is for himself his proper nothingness." 12 "It is in anguish that man gets the consciousness of his freedom, or if you prefer, anguish is

the mode of being of freedom as consciousness of being; it is in anguish that freedom is, in its

being, in question for itself."

Cogito: From Descartes to Sartre 257

("mauvaise foi") when I comprehend the anguish in which I find myself. There is

always the danger of bad faith concerning consciousness in its being, for the

being of consciousness is at the same time is not its being and is its being. This

possible bad faith should be the unity of being and non-being in the same

consciousness; that is, being for not being ("?tre-pour-n '?tre-pas") (Sartre 1943,

P-80). Sartre reviewed the various ideas of several important thinkers in the history of

Western philosophy concerning Cogito: Descartes substantialized the thinking "I". Although Husserl remained within the limits of descriptive function o? Cogito and thus avoided Descartes' mistake, he became a phenomenologist by enclosing himself in the question of Cogito. Heidegger tried to avoid Husserl's descriptive

phenomenology by analyzing being without resorting to Cogito, but his Dasein was innately deprived of the category of consciousness and was thus unable to regain the category of consciousness. According to Sartre, philosophy should start from Cogito, inquire Cogito in the being of Cogito, and find the means in

Cogito itself for us to avoid the instantaneity. Sartre comprehended Cogito as the

pre-reflexive Cogito and regarded it as the prime condition of any reflexion. Consciousness has the power of nothingness.The conscious being as

consciousness exists as both presence to itself and departure from itself. The

barely-discernible distance that being brings to its being is nothingness. For-itself should be its own nothingness. For-itself is the being that stipulates its own existence. Nothingness is always elsewhere {"ailleurs"). It is through consciousness or for-itself that nothingness inquires into being. "Le n?ant est la

possibilit? propre de l'?tre et son unique possibilit?"13 (Sartre 1943, p. 115). Nothingness is the nothingness of being and can only come into being by the

peculiar being of human reality. So Sartre regarded man as the unique foundation of the nothingness inside being.

Being of consciousness (for-itself) is contingent. For-itself is supported by the eternal contingency of in-itself which fades away little by little but can never

be removed. Sartre called such contingency facticity of for-itself ("facticit? du

pour-soi") (Sartre 1943, p. 119). It is this facticity that can say that for-itself is, for-itself exists, though we never realize the facticity and always grasp the

facticity through for-itself. Sartre reminded us that we should not confuse the facticity of for-itself with the Cartesian substance with thinking attribute. The latter is in-itself establishing itself by regarding for-itself as an attribute; it can

produce thinking without vanishing in the process. Sartre's for-itself is the

nihilation of in-itself. In-itself can only be established by resolving itseif into for-itself. So in-itself is not a substance having for-itself as an attribute, but in

its decompression it will be nihilated into a for-itself which becomes its own

foundation.

13 "Nothingness is the peculiar possibility of being and its unique possibility."

258 MO Weimin

Sartre insisted that research on human reality should start with cogito. However, the Cartesian cogito was actually conceived from an instantaneous angle in

temporal dimension. Descartes restricted human reality to the being of cogito, and thus making human reality have only an unimaginable and instantaneous

truth. In fact, cogito should also in its own way intervene between the past and

the future. Avoiding Husserl's confusing consciousness of cogito, Heidegger elaborated upon Dasein (or human reality) so as to show that cogito is a

self-escaping process in the project of its various possibilities of what it is.

This project of itself beyond itself becomes Heideggerian comprehension

("comprehension') (Sartre 1943, p. 121). According to Sartre, "L'en-soi concret

et r?el est tout entier pr?sent au c ur de la conscience comme ce qu'elle se

d?termine elle-m?me ? ne pas ?tre"14 (Sartre 1943, p. 122). We cannot talk

about human reality while neglecting the consciousness of Cogito. We must start

from Cogito, for comprehension becomes comprehension only when it is the

comprehension of consciousness. However, Sartre endowed Cogito with profound

meaning; that is to say, Cogito is the re-throwing outside itself For-itself

ceaselessly stipulates that itself not be in-itself. For-itself can only support nihilation by stipul ating itself as the deficiency of being. Nihilation becomes thus

the original relation between being-for-itself and being-in-itself. Value haunts freedom. The relationship between value and for-itself is very

particular: value "est l'?tre qu'il a ? ?tre en tant qu'il est fondement de son n?ant

d'?tre."15 Sartre also regarded the possibility as that which for-itself lacks to

become itself, for the possibility exists as an actual deficiency of being. Ego is

in-itself, it is not for-itself, nor does it belong to for-itself Thus, Sartre made the

being of Cogito break through the substantialist limit of Cartesian Cogito's instantaneousness and transcend temporally to the value and the possibility

(Sartre 1943, p. 141). It is only in the temporal transcendence that can Cogito refuse the instantaneousness and transcend to its possibility.

4 Being for others

Subject comes from the world and is beyond consciousness; it is the absolute

consciousness that connects "I" and the world. The subject in the world will

certainly contact others, and my being associates with others' beings. Concerning the problem of others' beings, Sartre argued that Husserl, just like Kant, did not

avoid solipsism. Sartre himself thought that he was able to avoid solipsism by

denying the priority of "I".

14 "the concrete and substantial in-itself fully presents in the core of consciousness and it

presents as the thing other than itself, which is stipulated by consciousness." 15 "value is the being which for-itself should be, for for-itself is the foundation of the nihilation

of its being."

Cogito: From Descartes to Sartre 259

The immanence of consciousness is the immanence of Cogito. Sartre started

from Cogito and found that human reality is being-for-itself. Each individual

has the problem of the immanence of Cogito as well as the problem of

its being-for-itself. Thus there is a division between the immanence of my

Cogito and the immanence of others' Cogito. Sartre, however, thought that

being-for-itself does not yet cover the entirety of human reality, and does not

follow up on the relationship between man and being. The being of man is not

only being-for-itself, but also being-for-others ("?tre-pour-autruF). In other

words, Sartre would extend the Cartesian Ccogito. Sartre's discussion of for-itself as condition and his criticism of Heidegger's view of death both elaborate upon the being for others of for-itself.

Meanwhile, Sartre defined the essential characteristics of the body as knowable

for others. Thus, the nature of my body leads me to the existence of others and

my being-for-others. Being-for-myself is as fundamental as being-for-others. "Car la r?alit?-humaine doit ?tre dans son ?tre, d'un seul et m?me surgissement,

pour-soi-pour-autrui"16 (Sartre 1943, p. 255). My judgment upon myself affirms

the appearance of myself as an object to others. Thus others become the

indispensable medium between "I" and myself. Sartre would comprehend

pre-ontologically the existence of others and the relationship between my being and others' beings. L?vinas' theory of others finally resorted to God as the

absolute others whereas Sartre's theory of others, which asserted that I determine

others and others determine me, intended to avoid solipsism without resorting to

God?which is neither ego nor others.

Sartre denounced Husserl and Kant for establishing the epistemologica! relation

between my being and others' beings. In Sartre's view, they did not avoid

solipsism: "C'est que, en effet, si mon ego empirique n'est pas plue s?r que celui

d'autrui, Husserl a conserv? le sujet transcendantal, qui en est radicalement

distinct et qui ressemble fort au sujet kantien"17 (Sartre 1943, p. 272). For Husserl,

my intentional reality is the only reality, while others are mere objects of empty intention and are principally evasive and cast off. Sartre asserted that Hegel

was more persuasive than Husserl on the solution of the problem of others.

In La Ph?nom?nologie de Esprit, Hegel did not set Cogito as the starting

point of philosophy; instead, he stated that the possibility of Cogito is provided

by the being of others. Being-for-others is indispensable to my conscious

being as self-consciousness. Although Hegel studied the relationship between

,6 "Because within one and the same upsurge the being of human reality must be

for-itself-for-others." It is highly important to point out that Sartre mistranslated Heidegger's Dasein as "human reality".

17"Because, in fact, if my empirical ego isn't more certain than that of others, Husserl has

conserved the transcendental subject which is radically different from it and resembles very much to the Kantian subject".

260 MO Weimin

being-for-itself and being-for-others, Sartre asserted that Hegel's research remained within the limits of epistemology and that knowledge was still the

measure and basis when he discussed the problem of being. Furthermore, Sartre criticized Hegel for his epistemological and ontological optimism. If Husserl's fault was measuring being by knowledge, then Hegel's fault was identifying knowledge and being. "C'est que mon rapport ? autrui est d'abord et fondamentalement une relation d'?tre ? ?tre, non de connaissance ? connaissance, si le solipsisme doit pouvoir ?tre r?fut?"18 (Sartre 1943, p. 283). That is to say, only by apprehending the problem of the relationship between self and other on an ontological level can we refute solipsism.

Heidegger also strongly believed that the relationship between human realities should be a relation of being, which should ensure the mutual dependence of human reality in its essential being. Heidegger also set being-with-others as the essential structure of my being. "Certes Heidegger ne part pas du cogito, au sens

cart?sien de la d?couverte de la conscience par elle-m?me..."19 (Sartre 1943, p. 284) Dasein is my Dasein, but Sartre thought Heidegger measured my human

reality in terms of being in the world, thus rendering the problem of others

meaningless, "Autrui n'est plus d'abord telle existence particuli?re que je rencontre dans le monde?et qui ne saurait ?tre indispensable ? ma propre existence, puisque j'existais avant de la rencontrer?, c'est le terme ex-centrique qui contribue ? la constitution de mon ?tre"20 (Sartre 1943, p. 284). Sartre thought that Heidegger tried to substitute being-with Mitsein", "?tre-avec") for

being-for-others ("?tre-pour-autrui"), which was still pure affirmation without foundation. Later on, when Sartre discussed the relationship with others, he

explicitly pointed out, "Z '?tre-pour- autre pr?c?de et fonde l'?tre-avec-Yautre"21

(Sartre 1943, p. 455). Sartre interrogated Heidegger: "Mais c'est pr?cis?ment cette coexistence qu'il faudrait expliquer. Pourquoi Heidegger s'est-il cru autoris? ? passer de cette constatation empirique et ontique de Y ?tre-avec ? la position de la coexistence comme structure ontologique de mon '?re-dans-le-monde'? Et quel type d'?tre a cette coexistence? Dans quelle ,esure la n?gation qui fait d'autrui un autre et qui le enti?rement, n'allons-nous pas tomber dans un

monisme? Et si on doit la conserver comme structure essentielle du rapport ?

18 "Because my relation to the others is first and fundamentally the relation between being and

being, and not the relation between knowledge and knowledge, if the solipsism should be refuted." 19 Certainly, Heidegger does not start from the Cartesian Cogito and it is established by

consciousness discovering itself. 20

"The other is no longer first a particular existence which I encounter in the world?and which could not be indispensable to my own existence since I existed before encountering it. The Other is the ex-centric limit which contributes to the constitution of my being." 21

The being-for-others precedes and founds the being-with-others

Cogito: From Descartes to Sartre 261

autrui; quelle modification faut-il lui faire subir pour qu'elle perde le caract?re

d'opposition qu'elle avait dans l'?tre-pour-autrui et pour qu'elle acqui?re ce

caract?re de liason solidarisante qui est la structure m?me de l'?tre-avec"22 (Sartre 1943, p. 286)? Sartre connected Heidegger's ontological view with Kant's view

of the abstract subject: Heidegger said that human reality coexists by means of its

ontological structure, that is to say by means of nature, in the name of essence

and universal, so failed to explain any concrete being-with. In other words, the

ontological coexistence ("coexistence ontologique") that appears as the structure

of my "being in the world" cannot serve as the foundation of the ontic being-with ("?tre-avec ontique") at all. Sartre even asserted that "Il serait vain, en

cons?quence, de chercher dans Sein und Zeit le d?passe,ent simultan? de tout

id?alisme et de tout r?alisme"23 (Sartre 1943, p. 288). In Sartre's view, the reason why other's being is not a groundless hypothesis is

that there is a Cogito correlative to others' beings. Descartes only guessed the

existence of others, while Sartre affirmed the existence of others. "Une th?orie de l'existence d'autrui doit donc simplement m'interroger dans mon ?tre, ?claircir et pr?ciser le sens de cette affirmation et surtout, loin d'inventer une preuve,

expliciter le fondement m?me de cette certitude"24 (Sartre 1943, p. 290). Sartre meant that Descartes did not prove the existence of others. Nevertheless, Sartre

held that the only possible starting point concerning the problem of others is the

Cartesian Cogito. Only Cogito can base us on the factual necessity of existence

of others and then combine the Cogito of the existence of others with my own

Cogito. We must require for-itself ("pour-soi") to provide us with for-others

("pour-autrui"). Absolute immanence is expected to throw us into absolute transcendence. What I shall find in the innermost of myself is not reasons to

believe others, but the others themselves other than "I". What Cogito is expected

22 "But it is precisely this co-existence which must be explained. Why does it become the

unique foundation of our being? Why is it the fundamental type of our relation with others?

Why did Heidegger believe that he was authorized to pass from this empirical and ontic establishment of being-with to a position claiming co-existence as the ontological structure of

my 'being-in-the-world?' And what type of being does this co-existence have? To what extent

is the negation which makes the Other an other and which constitutes him as non-essential

maintained? If we suppress it entirely, are we not going to fall into a monism? And if we are to

preserve it as an essential structure of the relation to the Other, then what modification must it

undergo in order to lose the character of opposition which it had in being-for-others and acquire this character as a connection which creates solidarity and which is the very structure of

being-with?" 23

"Consequently it would be in vain to look in Sein und Zeit for a simultaneous surpassing of

all idealism and of all realism." 24

"A theory of the Other's existence must therefore simply question me in my being, must

make clear and precise the meaning of that affirmation; in particular, far from inventing a

proof, it must make explicit the very foundation of that certainty."

262 MO Weimin

to reveal to us is that others concern our existence concretely and "from the ontic

angle." The other cannot appear as an object, "En aucune fa?on, autrui ne nous

est donn? comme objet"25 (Sartre 1943, p. 307). The other is, in principle, the man looking at me. If the other is objectified, the being-of-looking ("?tre-regard") of the other would be subverted. The other is the being watching me while I have

not yet looked at him. If I am to be objectified, the other's looking at me would

be his necessary condition, for the other's looking makes me lose any objectivity. "Je suis regard? dans un monde regard?"26 (Sartre 1943, p. 309). It is through the

world that the other looks at me. The looking not only remoulds myself, but also

totally changes the world. Nevertheless, Sartre held that we should not primarily seek others in the world, and that we should seek others in consciousness which

makes itself to be what it is. Because the certainty and factual necessity of others

is exactly the certainty and factual necessity of my consciousness, I am forever in

danger in the present world that I can only foresee. "Le conflit est le sens originel de l'?tre-pour-autrui"27 (Sartre 1943, p. 404). Although the other is not given to

us as an object, the other is the object for me just as I am the object for the other.

"Cet objet qu'autrui est pour moi et cet objet que je suis pour autrui, ils se

manifestent comme corps"2* (Sartre 1943, p. 341). Sartre started from the absolute

immanence of my consciousness and integrated my consciousness onto my body as a life object through a series of reflexive actions. Sartre turned then to

investigate my body and the other's body. Descartes thought that mind is easier to know than body and completely

separated reflexive thinking from bodily movements. Thus, he irrecoverably

expelled the body from consciousness. However, Sartre started from our being in

the world and regarded for-itself as the relationship with the world, thinking that

the world exists in the face of consciousness. Only in the world can we have a

body. The original relationship between us and the world, that is our being

emerging from the being itself, is body's disclosing as the foundation of body.

Although Sartre was not content with the solution provided by Descartes, which

excluded the body from consciousness, he did not give primacy to the body. The

body merely shows the indi viduality and contingency of the original relationship between us and things as tools. The body is not the contingent thing that is

annexed to my soul, on the contrary, the body is my being's perennial structure.

Body is the permanent condition for the consciousness of the world and for my consciousness projecting to transcend my future. It is proper to say that in his

milestone work L'?tre et le n?ant, Sartre still reiterated the ideas in his earlier La

25"The other is in no way given to us as an object/' 26

"I am looked-at in a world which is looked-at." 27

"Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others." 28 "This object which the Other is for me and this object which I am for him are manifested each other as a body.

Cogito: From Descartes to Sartre 263

transcendance de l'Ego, i.e. that ego or subject is not the perpetual structure of

consciousness.

Frankly speaking, Sartre indeed revised in Critique de la Raison Dialectique his earlier view of human relationships and began to emphasize the impact of

social and historical events on individuals; however, his subjectivist principles

prevented him from properly treating the relationship between "I" and the Other, immanence and transcendence, freedom and necessity.

Although Merleau-Ponty also rejected the Cartesian conception of the ego as substance and inner life, he was different from Sartre in many respects.

Merleau-Ponty would have used his philosophy of perception to weaken or

even replace Sartre's philosophy of consciousness. Sartre set the nihilating consciousness as the starting point of philosophy?which Merleau-Ponty

opposed. Merleau-Ponty insisted that the synthesis of consciousness is only a

temporary, fragmentary and lateral synthesis of separate parts. Both Husserl and

Sartre held that consciousness has intentionality, while Merleau-Ponty thought that the body has intentionality and that the attitude of existence is body's

grasping the world and others. I perceive by means of my body, and both subject and object dissolve in the ambiguous perception of existence.

If we say that Merleau-Ponty substituted his theory of perception of existence for Sartre's pre-reflexive Cogito, then philosophers such as Cavaill?s, Bachelard,

Canguilhem, L?vi-Strauss, Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze mostly advocate their

philosophies without the Cartesian Cogito or even philosophies opposing the

Cartesian Cogito. Ricoeur claimed to hold himself at an equal distance from the

Cogito exalted ("cogito exalt?") by Descartes and from the Cogito humiliated

{?'cogito humili?") by Hume and Nietzsche (Ricoeur, 1990, pp. 27-35), alternating between the Cogito philosophy and the zn?-cogito philosophy. Obviously, Sartre's existential philosophy acted as a link between the preceding and the

following movements in the history of French philosophy. It showed unique features that cannot be found in Husserlian phenomenology or Heideggerian

ontology, but while Sartre denounced Kant, Husserl and even Heidegger for

solipsism, he himself tended to assume the primacy of consciousness. Not

only are the others consciousness and what consciousness itself is, but also the two kinds of attitude toward the others can be viewed as a relation between

consciousness and consciousness. If we say that Husserl elaborated a philosophy of consciousness as epistemology, then we can say that Sartre developed a

philosophy of consciousness as ontology.

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