Sun. 2 Oct. 2011

EURASIA REVIEW Revolt In Syria: An Alternative View From Iran ……………1

NYTIMES Key Syrian City Takes On the Tone of a Civil War ……..….7

KHALEEJ TIMES Syria’s continuing turmoil ……………………………….…12

SUNDAY LEADER Will Bashar Assad Go The Gaddafy Way? ...........................13

THE INTERNATIONAL The domestic and international implications of Syria's

unrest……………………………………………………….16INDEPENDENT

Syria 'targets protesters living in UK' ……………………....19 Muslim sectarianism will halt democracy in its tracks …….21

THE NATIONAL Hamas is 'backing protesters' says Syria …………………...24

LATIMES AP Enterprise: Global Islamic Group Rising in Asia ……...29

LATIMES Stirling prize: Zaha Hadid's Brixton school beats Olympic

velodrome………………….……………………………….34

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HOME PAGERevolt In Syria: An Alternative View From IranMaysam Behravesh,Eurasia Review,2 Oct. 2011,

The Syrian situation has been wrapped in a shroud of ambiguity and complexity, which is largely due to the blanket ban imposed by the regime of Bashar al-Assad upon the presence of foreign media in the country. There are conflicting accounts of uprisings unfolding on an almost daily basis, with some pointing to the outbreak of a popular revolution aimed at establishing democracy, and others crying foul and claiming that a massive foreign conspiracy against the Ba’athist government is under way. The first narrative is advocated by Assad’s regional and Western opponents, such as the US and Saudi Arabia, and the second portrayal is vehemently sponsored by his staunch proponents, particularly Iran and Hizbullah.

The Internal Security-Political DynamicsAs a Tehran-based observer who is extensively exposed to the second account of events in Syria, I think the Syrian predicament goes both ways. Damascus’s official narrative that Sunni Salafists, foreign terrorist groups, and armed gangs are to blame for the violence is largely, but not entirely, spurious. It mostly appears a matter of projecting the domestic discontent with the regime and its violent clampdown on dissent upon foreigners, which might be partly articulated in terms of the diversionary theory of conflict. No impartial student of international politics can simply buy the story that thousands of civilian deaths in Syrian cities and towns so far – at least 2700 according to the UN – have been caused solely by armed extremists targeting people and security forces alike. If this is really the case and all the government is doing, as it claims, is to safeguard the people against terrorists, why has it then proscribed foreign journalists from getting in and reporting the developments? This does not mean, however, that foreign-supported Sunni extremists have no role in the turmoil and Syria’s is a purely democratic revolt against tyranny, much in tune with

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the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and even Libya. On the contrary, most of the Sunni autocracies of the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia and Jordan, have every interest in the ouster of Assad and his replacement by a favourable Sunni-dominated establishment.

As the chief regional incubator of extremism, Riyadh is home to Salafist and Wahhabist ideologues, who with the support of the central government, are not averse to provoking sectarian sentiments in the largely Sunni population of impoverished Syrian towns where the bulk of the unrest takes place. One only needs to briefly follow the Saudi-funded Al Arabiya news network and work out how King Abdullah and Co. view and would like to represent the crisis. They have made no secret of deploying military forces in Bahrain and most probably in Yemen, which is indicative of the fact that Riyadh is proactively seeking to preserve the status quo wherever it is in its interests and change it wherever it does not serve it well. The question that jumps to mind here is, why have large Syrian cities such as Aleppo and Damascus remained relatively calm; why haven’t they experienced massive unrest as we witness in smaller cities like Homs and Dar’a?

The fact is that Bashar al-Assad has both proponents and opponents among the Syrian population. Failure to take both sides of the issue into account – likely foreign sources of provocation and insurrection in this case – is perhaps a principal reason why the representations offered in the Western media of the turmoil appear partly biased and one-sided. Is the Syrian uprising a popular democratic one in pursuit of greater political freedoms, civil liberties, better conditions of living, and self-determination? Yes, it is, but not in absolute terms. It is not purely a case of Al-Sha’b Yurid Isghat al-Nizam (The nation wants the collapse of the regime) as it was in Tunisia and Egypt, but more complex than that. Rather, it might be safer to argue that the Syrian people are generally discontented with the regime and seek fundamental reforms, as is the case with almost all Middle East nations, but in the face its firm resistance to change on the one hand and the possibility of Syria being engulfed in chaos and civil war on the other, considerable portions of them, mostly middle class, prefer

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to tolerate the status quo until real reforms take place in the long term. Thus, the argument of some regional and Western analysts that all Syrians have staged a revolution to get rid of the regime is more like wishful thinking. The corrupt, autocratic, but also pragmatic regime of Assad is tolerated, if not supported, by parts of the Syrian society as it is also opposed by a great number of people there.

The External Implications of Syrian TurmoilThe potential fall of Assad and the probable ensuing power vacuum would make a great deal of difference for the Middle East geopolitics as it involves a number of significant actors in the region and beyond. An unstable, insecure, and lawless Syria will likely degenerate into a hotbed of terrorist activity with regional but also trans-regional implications. It will also turn into a sphere of influence or, as a US Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) analyst describes, a “proxy battleground” (1) for the regional and international powers – partly similar to Lebanon – seeking to advance their conflicting national interests in such a strategically significant locus. Geopolitically speaking, there is a lot at stake indeed, which is perhaps why the BRICS group of emerging powers have opposed the US and EU intervention in the crisis and prefer a peaceful negotiated solution to it, that will help preserve the status quo.

Along the way, Turkey is deeply averse to seeing an unstable Syria with an ambitious Kurdish minority that seeks autonomy and that may find itself capable of advancing their separatist aspirations once civil war and instability prevails in the country. (2)Ankara naturally desires a stable and secure neighbourhood, but as an emerging power poised to lead the Muslim world, it cannot remain silent in the face of growing violence exercised by the Syrian regime against civilians, which is why the Turkish government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan has vigorously protested the way Assad is handling the crisis. Turkey’s concerns vis-à-vis the situation in Syria largely apply to Iraq too, which is bracing itself for the drawdown, if not full withdrawal, of American military forces and most probably fears the potential overflow of insecurity and extremism from it western neighbor.

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Saudi Arabia’s opposition to Assad and her attempts to provoke grass roots confrontations with his regime is largely prompted by Riyadh’s strong aspiration to contain its powerful regional rival, Iran, and corner it into a position of geopolitical stasis. Along parallel lines, it aspires to undercut the Shiite crescent in the region, composed in one way or another of the Islamic Republic, Iraq to some extent, Syria, and Hizbullah. What geopolitical advantages may this offer Riyadh? Greater regional influence, increased domestic control, more self-confidence in dealings with the West, and an upper hand in the Muslim world. The Saudi regime can take the strategic initiative abroad while assured of greater stability and security at home. It is a matter of national identity as well as regional balance of power.

As for Israel, contrary to many pro-Assad analysts based in the Middle East, who argue that the turmoil in Syria has been instigated and staged by “Zionists” to derail the resistance movement in the region, one may contend that Tel Aviv has grave reservations as to the fall of Assad regime – who has often proved to be a conservative, cautious, and self-restraining opponent of Israel – and his replacement with a new government as it is absolutely uncertain what type of establishment with what political leanings will gain power in Syria once Assad loses it. (3) Tel Aviv would like to see a Damascus meeker and milder than before, and furthermore, favours a Saudi-like or Saudi-inclined regime in the restive country, which should be more sympathetic to and tolerant of Israeli policies in the region, but what if it proves to be a bolder and more assertive revolutionary government like that of post-Mubarak establishment, which seems more likely to emerge in case the current Ba’athist regime collapses. Notably, the rise to power of a democratic, independence-seeking, more resistant, more self-confident, anti-Israeli, and pro-Palestinian leadership in Damascus will leave Israel more vulnerable than ever; it will jeopardize its national security. The new Syrian government might not stand the continued Israeli occupation of Golan Heights so liberally as Assad tolerates now.

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Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, Syria is Iran’s sole strategic Arab partner in the region and appears even closer than Iraq to it, which is why the potential loss of Assad holds enormous consequences for the regional, but also international, standing of the Islamic Republic. First, Iran will be more isolated in a relatively hostile environment where such key actors as Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan and United Arab Emirates – all allies, in one way or another, of the United States – play an influential role. For Tehran, this means greater strategic loneliness, lesser room for manoeuvre, and higher susceptibility to compromise on its national ambitions. Second, the potential collapse of Assad regime will deny Iran a safe and reliable communication channel with its anti-Israeli proxies like Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. This might affect Tehran’s influence and control over them in the long-run and in consequence undermine their support for its plans to recover its pre-eminent position of power in the Middle East. It might also push them into revising their policies and adopting more independent stances on regional issues of great significance. Third, what is usually overlooked by many commentators is that for Iran, Syria serves as a buffer state which has so far managed to keep its bitter nemeses, including Israel, at bay. Surrounded by a strong US military presence on its eastern and western borders, a rival Turkey intent upon hosting a NATO radar system on its soil, an unreliable Pakistan on its southeastern side, and adverse Sunni Arab states across the Persian Gulf, the fall of Damascus will likely entangle Tehran in a state of strategic paralysis, making it feel more threatened than ever from outside.

The recent statements made by Iranian political leaders and Majlis (parliament) lawmakers who subtly criticize the Ba’athist regime and demand it to show more restraint towards protesters demonstrate the growing concerns of Tehran over the Syrian situation and its heightened awareness of the increasing moral price it pays for backing Assad. In the words of Mohammad Ali Sobhani, the former Iranian ambassador to Lebanon and Jordan, “we should change our position on the Syrian developments. Definitely, the unilateral support for a country killing its people can have negative consequences for Iran, as it affects Iran’s position vis-à-vis the popular movements in the ME [Middle

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East].” (4) A key component of Tehran’s regional public diplomacy, which gained momentum after the outbreak of popular uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), has been its extensive efforts to project itself as a revolutionary proponent of the downtrodden, the oppressed, the disenfranchised, or the dispossessed of the region. Iran’s unwavering support for Damascus in the face of the latter’s growing brutalization of protesters and civilians undermines this very strategy and dilutes the Iranian government’s costly campaign to win the “hearts and minds” of regional nations. The shift of attitude among some of senior Iranian officials towards the Assad regime also indicates their mounting reservations and doubts as to its survival. Notably, in these uncertain circumstances straightforwardness and impartiality will serve Tehran’s interests best.

Assad and His Chances for SurvivalIt is greatly difficult to anticipate the future prospects of Syria’s Ba’athist regime. Whether Bashar Al-Assad will survive the uprising or the uprising will survive him, depends on the extent to which his government shows resilience and adaptability and accommodates change and power-sharing. But one thing is for sure, that the more the regime uses violence against civilian dissidents, the greater it exposes itself to instability and vulnerability. Brutality, particularly in such a highly emotionally charged and religiously oriented society where retaliation and radicalization are strong possibilities, imprints its scar on the souls and minds of people, driving them towards radical options. This is what we witnessed most evidently in Libya and see to a similar extent in Yemen now. Systematic violence in the face of non-violent dissent can take its practitioner, which is usually the state, to a tipping point from which return might not be possible.

Will the Assad regime survive? It is a big moot point; it might be too late to restore peace or the status quo, but the government must take action as swiftly as possible to implement structural reforms in the country, allowing for more political participation, civil liberties, economic progress, social equality etc. Yet, this is not enough. Assad should also brace himself to compromise, to share power with the legitimate opposition of the country – not

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with those Saudi-backed Salafists for whom democracy is a swear word and who should be contained. This said, the current situation in Syria does not allow for much optimism; it is quite unlikely to be resolved anytime soon. Even if the dust settles and order is restored by force of gun, Syria will not be the same Syria as it was before the uprising, but fire under the ashes. It is not that people should suppress their demand for change; it is that the regime should change itself for the better, if it does not want to be changed totally. After all, one cannot confiscate a whole country, establish a crony dictatorship, and get away with it.

Maysam Behravesh obtained an MA in British Studies from the Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran, with his thesis exploring contemporary Iranian-British relations from a constructivist standpoint

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Key Syrian City Takes On the Tone of a Civil WarThis article was reported by a correspondent for The New York Times in Homs, Syria, and written by Anthony Shadid in Beirut, Lebanon. NYTIMES,1 Oct. 2011,

HOMS, Syria — The semblance of a civil war has erupted in Homs, Syria’s third-largest city, where armed protesters now call themselves revolutionaries, gun battles erupt as often as every few hours, security forces and opponents carry out assassinations, and rifles costing as much as $2,000 apiece flood the city from abroad, residents say.

Since the start of the uprising in March, Homs has stood as one of Syria’s most contested cities, its youth among the best organized and most tenacious. But across the political spectrum, residents speak of a decisive shift in past weeks, as a largely peaceful uprising gives way to a grinding struggle that has made Homs violent, fearful and determined.

Analysts caution that the strife in Homs is still specific to the city itself, and many in the opposition reject violence because they fear it will serve as a pretext for the government’s brutal crackdown.

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But in the targeted killings, the rival security checkpoints and the hardening of sectarian sentiments, the city offers a dark vision that could foretell the future of Syria’s uprising as both the government and the opposition ready themselves for a protracted struggle over the endurance of a four-decade dictatorship.

“We are done with the protesting phase,” said a 21-year-old engineering student here who spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal. “We’ve now entered a more important phase.”

Homs is a microcosm of Syria, with a Sunni Muslim majority and minorities of Christians and Alawites, a heterodox Muslim sect from which President Bashar al-Assad draws much of his leadership.

Six months of protests and crackdown here have frayed ties among those communities, forging the conditions for urban strife.

An armed opposition is battling security forces in the most restive neighborhoods. Insurgents have tried to protect the same peaceful protesters the government has relentlessly sought to arrest. Tension has grown so dire that members of one sect are reluctant to travel to neighborhoods populated by other sects. Men in some parts of the city openly carry weapons.

Perhaps the most dramatic facet of the struggle is a series of assassinations this past week that have left nearly a dozen professors, doctors and informers dead in a paroxysm of violence that echoes the sectarian vendettas still besetting Iraq. Unlike the uprising’s early days, when the government exercised a near monopoly on violence, fear is beginning to spread in the other direction, as insurgents kill government supporters and informers, residents say.

One of those killed was Dr. Hassan Eid, the chief of thoracic surgery at the National Hospital here and an Alawite from Al Zuhra, one of a handful of neighborhoods where his sect makes up a majority and where buildings and streets are still plastered with

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the portraits of Mr. Assad. He was shot to death in front of his house as he headed off to work, residents said.

Al Ouruba, a government-aligned newspaper, called him a “symbol of dedication” and said he treated victims of the violence “without discriminating between any of them.” But in Sunni Muslim locales, residents called him a government informer who helped security forces detain the wounded who were treated at his facility.

By nightfall, a hint of triumphalism echoed in parts of the city, as some people celebrated his death.

“He was responsible for the death of many young men,” said a 65-year-old resident of Homs, who gave his name as Rajab. “He was killed because he deserved it.”

Soon after dawn the next day, gunfire erupted as children went to school.

“They shot Abu Ali,” an old man who collects garbage and cleans the streets in the neighborhood said a short time later.

Abu Ali, the name most knew him by, was another informant, the residents said.

“The guys were aware of him a long time ago,” said an activist in his late 40s who gave his name as Abu Ghali. “But now it’s different. He kept reporting, so they had to kill him. I don’t think he died right away though.”

Abu Ghali added that it was not difficult to get information on informers. “You can do anything with money,” he said. “You just bribe an officer, and be generous with him, and you can get all you want.”

The killings took place during two bloody days in Homs, a city along the Orontes River and not too far from the historic medieval castle Krak des Chevaliers. Residents said that after Abu Ali died, three Alawite teachers were killed at a school in the neighborhood

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of Baba Amr. (Government newspapers did not confirm those deaths.) In the afternoon, Mohammed Ali Akil, an assistant dean at Al Baath University in Homs, was found dead in his car on a highway. Students said he had shown support for the uprising and criticized Mr. Assad’s leadership in his lectures.

“It is true that we were scared during your lectures, but you were a wonderful professor,” a student posted on Facebook. “May you rest in peace. We won’t forget you.”

Near the Lebanese border — where residents say weapons flow across a porous border from Turkey, Saudi Arabia and even Qatar — Homs strikes an odd posture. Many of its Sunni residents are at once fearful and proud, empowered by their opposition to dictatorship. Many Alawites are terrified; they are often the victims of the most vulgar stereotypes and, in popular conversation, uniformly associated with the leadership.

In Alawite villages, only government television is watched. To do so in Sunni neighborhoods amounts to treason. There, Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya are the stations of choice. Suspicions give currency to the wildest of rumors; in one, a female butcher in Homs named Um Khaled asks the armed gangs to bring her the bodies of Alawites they capture so that she can cut them up and market the meat to her customers.

Centuries-old connections between sects still knit together the city, even as the suggestion of civil war threatens to sever them forever. The countryside, residents say, is roiled by far more sectarian hatred. Government checkpoints separate Sunni from Alawite.

“One side kills an Alawite, the other kills a Sunni,” a 46-year-old activist said.

The uprising’s overall toll has been grim: By the United Nations’ count, more than 2,700 people have died. The revolt still draws much of its strength from the countryside, and the two largest cities, Aleppo and Damascus, remain relatively quiescent. Though protests have flagged lately, Homs has stayed defiant.

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Armed men often protect the perimeter of protests in places like Bab al-Sbaa, Khaldiya and Baba Amr, where some stores are shut and buildings are scarred by broken windows and bullet holes. Some of them have carried out the assassinations of informers, or “awayniyeh,” as they call them. Others scout government checkpoints and occasionally set up their own, temporary versions.

“They have rocket-propelled grenades and Kalashnikovs,” said a driver in his late 50s who lives in the neighborhood of Khaldiya. “They should be armed,” he added. “They protect us.”

A woman who gave her name as Suleima lives on Al Joura Street in Baba Amr. She earns a living by preparing kibbe, a dish of minced meat with cracked wheat, for wealthier clients in other neighborhoods of Homs. For three days, gunfire kept her inside her house and telephones were down.

“You never know when they will start shooting again,” she said.

Angry and exhausted, she professed neutrality in a conflict that makes such a notion ever more difficult.

“Neighbors accuse me of being with the regime, so I laugh,” she said at her house, which she shares with her daughter. “What on earth did this regime give me? Absolutely nothing. But neither did the revolutionaries. I work, I eat. If I don’t work, I starve. At least I worked before. Now I’m at home, hardly leaving it, and hardly making a living.”

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Syria’s continuing turmoil Editorial,Khaleej Times,2 October 2011

The Syrian opposition groups’ meeting in Istanbul highlights their urgent efforts to streamline an effective resistance against

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President Bashar Al Assad’s regime. It is for this reason that the Syrian National Council, the largest grouping of the opposition, is making efforts to forge links with other groups and form a bigger alliance. Meanwhile, the Syrian forces continue fighting opposition activists at home.

Assad now faces a bigger challenge in trying to suppress rebellion in his security forces. This has spurred violent clashes between government forces and defecting units that joined hands with the opposition. Unfortunately, civilians continue to become inadvertent targets even when not directly pitted against the government forces. On Friday, at least 11 were killed in the city of Ratsan.

With no signs of ceasing, the protests against the regime are in full swing. But the sacrifices being made by the opposition ranks on the streets may need more than just passion and call for revenge for blood spilled. This is why it is doubly important for the opposition groups outside the country to harness efforts into launching an effective campaign outside against the brutalities under way in Syria.

The continuing unrest in Syria has also witnessed the failure of the international community to reach a consensus on how best to deal with the situation. Earlier it ?was the decision on sanctions and now it is the lack of support to refer Syrian leadership to the International Criminal Court for the brutalities against civilians. It may take a while for the world powers to come to an agreement on wider sanctions and/or even military intervention. Whether that actually comes about is the question, given the furore created over the NATO strikes on Libya, despite the success achieved. Syria may prove a different case and prompt a rethink before any military option is considered, since its alliance with Iran and militant group Hezbollah in Lebanon may prove a deterrent. This is why efforts are under way to support the opposition groups to bring about a change internally. With defections having started within the forces, it may take more time and commitment to shape this into a bigger anti-regime movement than ?at present.

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At the same time, the Syrian opposition groups should make efforts to engage with the regime through intermediaries in order to reach a political solution and not jeopardise further lives. This is an option that even Assad should consider long and hard for force can only prove useful for so long. Compromises are inevitable and this is something he needs to understand sooner rather than later.

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Will Bashar Assad Go The Gaddafy Way?Gamini Weerakoon,The Sunday Leader (Sri Lankan Sunday newspaper privately owned)2 Oct. 2011,

Last week in Bahrain, courts imposed barbaric sentences on 20 doctors and medical personnel who had treated injured demonstrators in the capital of Manama.The demonstrators had sustained their injuries in pro democracy demonstrations against the ruling al Khalifa family. The sentences imposed ranged from one to 15 years imprisonment while another demonstrator was sentenced to death for allegedly killing a policeman.Bahrain, situated in the Persian Gulf, is right across the Gulf waters, in front of Iran and is home to the American Fifth Fleet. The sentences were pronounced on Thursday and obviously did not draw comments from the United States or other Western governments even though there has been much concerned about violation of human rights elsewhere. But human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch did call it a ‘travesty of justice’ according to reports. A Washington Post report also noted that the Pentagon had notified the US Congress of a plan to sell to Bahrain armoured Humvees and anti tank missiles worth $ 53 million.

Double standards, paradoxes and sheer political chicanery of the by powers involved in Middle East conflicts continue to be reported.

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It has been reported that since March this year 1500 protestors who had come out demanding that their President Bashar Assad step down from office had been killed.

Demonstrations are continuing with hundreds of thousands of demonstrators coming out to the street every day in cities spread across Syria. The Syrian president Bashar Assad has had no qualms in ordering violence to be unleashed on his people including gun fire.

The United States and its ally the European Union in this instance, are concerned about human rights violations, loss of life and while making unilateral calls for President Assad to end the violence against his own people, have been attempting to get the United Nations Security Council to adopt a resolution calling for strict sanctions against the Assad regime.

China and Russia have been strongly opposed this move. On Wednesday at the Security Council, Russia refused to go along with the European draft resolution to bring on sanctions against Syria because it would result in emergence of criminal gangs within the country and encourage violenceVitaly Churkin the Russian Ambassador at the UN had said that the European draft resolution was a continuation of the NATO policy of ‘regime change’ as what happened in Libya.

Russia has been maintaining that the UN resolution of imposing a no fly zone in Libya had been exploited by NATO to bring about a regime change in Libya by deploying NATO air attacks on Libyan defence installations. Russians have also expressed concerns about the possibility of NATO deploying military action in Syria. However Syria is becoming increasingly isolated in the region. Turk Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been very cautious about his relations with Syria, with whom his country shares a 850km border. Turkey has been very cautious about the Kurds occupying regions on both sides of their common border being unduly disturbed. He sent his foreign minister to Syria to appeal to President Assad and demanded that Syria speeded up its

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reforms to calm its disturbed citizenry and an also immediate pull out troops from Syrian towns.

Saudi Arabia too has been concerned about Arab Springs breaking out in its neighbourhood and King Abdullah issued a rare statement demanding that Syria stop killing its citizens. Saudi Arabia, it is well known, has not been pleased with Syria for its close military and strategic relations with Iran. The new Egyptian regime too issued a statement condemning the killings in Syria while the Arab League too made a surprise statement expressing their concerns about the loss of life.President Assad however, still firmly rejects foreign criticisms about events in Syria and claim that the opposition to him comes mainly from terrorist gangs and enemy agents. Iraq is self sufficient in food and fuel and this perhaps is the reasons behind the Syrian leader’s aloofness.

But increased isolation internationally could be disastrous to President Assad as China and Russia will find it increasingly embarrassing to support him in the Security Council. Western analysts say that the American President may soon ask Assad to step down. If Russia and China pull out their support or keep silent, the fate of Gaddafy may befall Bashar Assad as well.

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The domestic and international implications of Syria's unrestAlexander WeinstockThe International (a news organization that investigates economic and social issues across the world. We couldn't know which country it belongs to..)OCTOBER 01, 2011

Despite President Bashar Al-Assad’s claims in his speech on June 20 of the country’s immunity to social unrest, Syria has been unable to avoid the wave of protests that started in the Middle East last winter. Mild protests began in January, but full-fledged demonstrations that began on March 18, just one day before the NATO intervention in Libya, immediately resulted in 25

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protesters dead in clashes with police, as reported by Al Arabia. The conflict has only escalated, with government tanks having been used to put down ever-growing demonstrations. The towns of Daraa, Homs and Jisr Al-Shughour remain constant hotbeds of violence between security forces and certain segments of the population. Casualties continue to rise on both sides: government sources cite 700 dead police and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reports that over 3,000 protesters have been killed to date.

Syrian democracy activist Mr. Ammar Abdulhamid, in an interview with The Wall Street Journal, claimed that international reaction was too reserved. Initially, only a dozen or so Syrian officials were declared personae non-grata and had their bank accounts frozen by the EU and US. However, since then, the list has expanded to include 50 of Syria’s officials as well as an embargo on Syrian oil. Yet this still contrasts the West’s quick response in Libya, where NATO’s bombing campaign, coupled with activity by British SAS on the ground, began almost immediately after the start of social unrest in the country and continued well into September.

The Syrian people’s demandsThe protesters have made approximately five broad demands for civil liberties, anti-corruption and Kurdish rights, all generally similar to protesters’ demands in other Arab Spring countries. President Al-Assad responded by removing the governor of Daraa from duty, which was one of the protesters’ more direct demands. A little over a week later, he reformed the Cabinet of Ministers, remarking in a public address that “Syria’s political system requires fresh blood.” Mr. Al-Assad followed up on these reforms, repealing the State of Emergency, which was in effect for over fifty years and prohibited even the most peaceful of demonstrations, and granting citizenship to approximately 300,000 members of Syria’s Kurdish population. This action marked a major shift in Syria’s immigration policy, which before was much stricter, especially toward Kurds. The Kurds, lacking Syrian passports, were not allowed to hold public office or travel abroad.

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Despite these attempts by the Syrian government to satisfy some of the people’s demands, many protests continue across the country to this day, with many opposition groups calling for Mr. Al-Assad’s resignation. A National Council of 50 opposition members, which plans to act as a transitional governing body after Al-Assad resigns from office, was formed in late August. The Council’s demands for the Syrian president’s resignation were supported by France, Germany, Great Britain and the United States.

Mr. Al-Assad, however, has dismissed such protests as foreign conspiracy. Stores of weapons allegedly smuggled from neighboring Jordan and Iraq were seized by Syrian authorities in June, says PressTV. The Iranian news channel claims these were meant to arm the protesting masses for an upcoming civil war. According to some US diplomatic cables uncovered by WikiLeaks and published in The Washington Post, the State Department was funding Syrian opposition groups prior to the uprisings. As reported by the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), the Syrian government claims that some digital cameras and mobile phones confiscated from certain protesters by Syrian security revealed fabricated propaganda. For example, some photographs of demonstrations in support of Palestinian residents in the West Bank were allegedly edited to look like demonstrations against Mr. Al-Assad and the Syrian government.

However, many of the protesters’ demands still remain on the table, most notably those for more stringent measures against corruption and popular elections. Despite Mr. Al-Assad’s reform of the Cabinet, the changes still came about from within the ruling Ba’ath party, and protesters are strongly at odds with the party’s decade-long status of sole governing power.

A call for aid: Possible Western intervention?As the heat on Syrian streets continued to rise, some, like US Senator Mark Kirk (R-IL), raised the possibility of another Western intervention in support of the protesters. Some groups such as the Syrian Revolution General Commission (SRGC), a coalition of 40 opposition groups, appealed to the UN in early

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September to send in human rights monitors, reports Reuters. While a relatively benign measure at first glance, the group may be attempting to bring about Western military involvement akin to the one in Libya. "If the [Syrian] regime refuses [to let the monitors in], it will open the door on itself for other actions such as no-tank or no-fly zones," said Commission spokesman Ahmad Al-Khatib. Some Western officials supported the idea of direct intervention from the beginning. Senator Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.), as quoted by The Washington Times, said almost immediately after the start of unrest in Syria that he would support US involvement.

Most political analysts, however, have been fairly certain from the start that the Libyan scenario will not be repeated in Syria. Dr. Robert Jackson, an international security expert for Chatham House said in an interview with Deutsche Welle early last summer that it is unlikely “that the US will get involved with a direct intervention in Syria. There is too much opposition from Russia and the UN Security Council.” This is not surprising considering that Russia hosts a naval base in Syria’s port city of Tartus. Dr. Jackson’s colleague, Ms. Xenia Dormandy, claims lackluster support from Americans for an intervention, citing public opinion as “spending needs to be focused at home, rather than on more operations overseas.” In Syria itself, there is grassroots opposition to the ideas of SRGC. Protests against foreign intervention and sanctions staged by Syrian students in front of the UN Commission’s Headquarters in Damascus last summer illustrate more conservative sentiments. Further calls from the SRGC in mid-September for a no-fly zone in Syria drew "a tepid response from the Obama administration and European governments" who do not want to get involved with another Libya-type campaign, reports the Wall Street Journal.

Whether or not Mr. Al-Assad heeds the protesters and steps down, the country has been transformed from these incidents. Reforms have already started and Syrians will be expecting more from their government, Mr. Al-Assad, and his successor. The international implications of the Syrian changes may be more far-reaching, depending on how decisive the changes in the country’s political

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structure will be, and the international community will need to adapt in its dealings with the new Syria.

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Syria 'targets protesters living in UK'Scotland Yard investigating claims of threats and harassment Independent,By Emily DuganSunday, 2 October 2011

Scotland Yard confirmed yesterday it is investigating claims that Syrian embassy staff in London have monitored and harassed protesters in Britain and targeted their families back home.

The Foreign Office has held several meetings with the Syrian ambassador to discuss the allegations and is encouraging witnesses to contact the Metropolitan Police. Officials said they would wait to see evidence from the investigation before deciding on any further action.

On Monday the Government will come under pressure to act as Amnesty International publishes a report documenting abuses suffered by anti-government protesters in countries outside Syria, including Britain. It shows that pro-reform Syrian activists are being spied on and physically attacked across three continents. Visits by security forces to relatives in Syria are also common, the report alleges, with family members interrogated, threatened, detained and tortured.

London-based protesters against the Assad regime are to demonstrate outside the Syrian embassy on Tuesday carrying placards that bear their names beside the slogan "We Are Not Afraid".

Emad Darkazalli, 35, will be among them. He left Syria in 2005 and organised the first protests outside the Syrian embassy in February. He told The IoS how he and his mother in Damascus were later targeted.

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Soon after the embassy protest, officials discovered his phone number and called him "all the time" threatening him, he said. When he helped create the Free-Syrian League in April, the calls became more threatening. "They said: 'now the real trouble starts, we know your family in Syria," he said.

"They went to my house in Damascus twice and met my mother." They shouted at her using foul language then ransacked his room, seizing his computer and photos.

He claims that in July secret police broke into the house again while his mother was out. Neighbours warned her not to return. She sold her jewellery and fled to Jordan.

The Syrian embassy declined to comment on the allegations.

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Muslim sectarianism will halt democracy in its tracksWorld View: The ancient hatreds of the Sunni and Shia communities, exploited by rulers clinging to power, means the Arab Awakening won't succeed east of EgyptPatrick Cockburn,Independent,Sunday, 2 October 2011

A war of extraordinary brutality is being waged across the Muslim world which is largely ignored by the media. It is a war in which victims are assassinated or massacred with no chance to defend themselves. Most of those who die are poor people murdered in obscure places without the world paying any attention.

Few places are more obscure than a dusty road at Mastung, 30 miles south of Quetta in Balochistan province, Pakistan. But it was here late last month that between eight and 10 gunmen stopped a bus filled with Shia pilgrims on their way to Iran. According to the bus driver, the gunmen ordered the pilgrims off his bus and opened fire, killing 26 and wounding six. The Sunni fundamentalist group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi claimed responsibility. A

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year ago there was an even worse atrocity in the same area, when a suicide bomber blew himself up at a Shia rally and killed 57 people.

Earlier in the month, 1,500 miles away at Nukhayb in Al Anbar province, western Iraq, there was a similar incident to the massacre at Mustang. A bus carrying Shia pilgrims from Karbala to a shrine in Syria was stopped at a fake checkpoint and uniformed men told the women, children and old men to stand to one side. The rest of the pilgrims were taken to another location and slaughtered. It is fair to assume in overwhelmingly Sunni Anbar that the killers were Sunni.

The conflict between Shia and Sunni has been becoming deeper and more dangerous ever since the triumph of militant Shi'ism in the Iranian revolution of 1979. Sectarian hostility became worse when, in 2005, Iraq became the first Shia-dominated Arab state since the time of the Fatimids 800 years ago. The civil war between Sunni and Shia in Iraq which followed in 2006-7 has left a legacy of hatred and fear that has not abated. Tens of thousands were tortured and killed. Al-Qa'ida in Mesopotamia slaughtered Shia, and the Mehdi Army and the Shia-dominated security forces butchered Sunni and drove them out of most of Baghdad.

Since the start of the Arab uprisings this year, Shia-Sunni hostility has deepened again wherever the two communities seek to live side by side. Rulers have appealed to the Sunni and Shia loyalties of their people to stay in power. In Syria and Bahrain the democratic movement against authoritarian rule, the Arab Awakening, has been thwarted by officially sponsored sectarianism. In Syria, President Bashar al-Assad has been clinging to power by playing the sectarian card for all it is worth. The ruling elite, drawn from the Alawites, an offshoot of Shi'ism, is being told that they must sink or swim with the Assad regime or face elimination or exile. Assad and his family rely on Alawite officers and Alawite-dominated units to shoot demonstrators and control the main towns and cities. The Sunni majority understandably react by holding Alawites as a whole responsible for the atrocities.

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The same thing has happened in Bahrain. Cherif Bassiouni, the American-Egyptian lawyer conducting an inquiry sponsored by the Bahrain government into the events of earlier this year, told me he had seldom seen a more polarised society. He compared the situation to Sarajevo in 1992 when Serb gunners firing at Muslim civilians told him they were avenging the defeats suffered at the hands of the Turks by their Christian ancestors over the past 600 years.

Sectarianism in Bahrain pervades every aspect of life. When repression started in March, the government portrayed democratic protests as a Shia coup d'etat orchestrated by Iran. Respected consultants at Salmaniya hospital were tortured to make them confess that they had stored weapons, splashed blood on uninjured demonstrators, and even secretly killed patients by deliberate neglect. Shia shrines and mosques were bulldozed.

Bahrain's King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa is finding the sectarian genie is difficult to get back in the bottle. In a speech at the end of last month he spoke of Bahrainis' "common future, regardless of the diversity of our sects" and "the inevitability of co-existence". But last week the Bahraini government closed the door on compromise when a military court gave 20 medical practitioners long sentences for helping those injured in the protests. Thirteen received 15 years in prison and two others were sentenced to 10 years. This can only suggest that the al-Khalifa royal family intends either to remain in a state of simmering war with the majority of Bahrain's Arabs or that it plans to drive them out and replace them with Sunnis. Either way, the violence is likely to get worse.

While decrying sectarianism, the United States and its allies have done their bit over the years to pump it up. In Iraq, US ambassadors and generals were continually pretending that Shia militants were the pawns of Iran. This fed into the extreme and not-so-extreme Sunni claim, made in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, that any drive by the Shia for civil and political rights, is an Iranian inspired plot. Communities

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which benefit from Sunni or Shia sectarianism find it hard to give up. In Iraq, it determines the chances of staying alive and getting a job. The two are intertwined: a few years ago I had a Sunni driver in Baghdad who, through various connections, was offered a well-paid Interior Ministry job as a computer specialist. I remember him agonising for weeks over whether to take the job in this mainly Shia ministry until deciding it was just too dangerous and he would probably be killed if he did.

A similar pattern is repeated elsewhere. In Bahrain, sacked Shia point out that Sunni who have taken their jobs are in no hurry to give them back. In Syria, Alawites provide not just most of the senior army officers but some 60-70 per cent of ambassadors, 50 per cent of university professors and a majority of oil and gas executives, according to the opposition. Given that Alawites are some 12 per cent of the Syrian population, equal rights for the Sunni means that a lot of these people will be out of a job.

Sectarianism is likely permanently to enfeeble Iraq and Syria, two of the Arab states who once helped determine the region's future. It will absorb the attention of the Sunni monarchies of the Gulf and put them at odds with Iran and Iraq. It explains why the democratic uprisings that succeeded in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya are faltering east of the Egyptian border.

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Hamas is 'backing protesters' says SyriaPhil Sands The National (publishing from Emirates)Oct 2, 2011

Damascus // Syria's relationship with Hamas is increasingly strained over the Palestinian group's refusal to openly endorse Damascus and its tactics in suppressing an anti-regime uprising, according to figures close to both sides.

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Once firm allies, the Syrian authorities, led by President Bashar Al Assad, and the Islamic resistance movement, headed by Khalid Meshaal from his headquarters in Damascus, are now barely on speaking terms, regime officials and an Islamic cleric close to Hamas said.

An official in Syria's ruling Baath party even furiously accused Hamas of hedging its bets by funding anti-regime organisations, in the expectation Mr Al Assad could be toppled - an indication that the alliance might already be near to breaking point.

"In public Hamas says it is not with either side in the [Syrian] crisis but in reality they have turned their back on Syria and have sided with Syria's opponents," the Baathist said.

He spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the subject.

"We have information that Hamas is channelling money to anti-regime groups in Europe. They have decided to bet against the regime," the Baathist said. He gave no further details but described the move as a "serious mistake".

A respected Islamic scholar in Damascus with links to Hamas dismissed that claim but said there had effectively been a freeze in formal contacts with top-level Syrian authorities, despite efforts by Hamas leaders to arrange meetings.

"There is nothing positive between the regime and Hamas at the moment," he said. "The regime wants Hamas to change its attitude and openly support them but people inside Hamas believe they have to be with the Syrian people on this issue."

Alongside Iran, Syria and Lebanon's Hizbollah, Hamas has been a key member of the "axis of resistance" ranged against Israel and its allies, including the United States, which has been at pains to try to break down the four-way alliance.

Damascus has provided important political support to Hamas, and hosting the resistance group's leadership-in-exile has burnished

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Syria's credentials as a staunch defender of Arab rights in the struggle to win back territories illegally occupied by Israel.

But unlike Iran and Hizbollah, which have very publicly thrown their support behind Mr Al Assad, Hamas has been silent.

In March, shortly after the Syrian uprising began, tensions between the two parties broke into the open after regime officials accused Yousef Al Qaradawi, the Qatar-based Islamic cleric and spiritual head of the Muslim Brotherhood - including Hamas - of inciting sectarian hatred in Syria after he backed demonstrators in a sermon.

Shortly afterwards, Syrian media reported that Hamas had rejected Mr Al Qaradawi's remarks, only for the Hamas leadership in Damascus to publicly say it had done no such thing.

In June, the disagreement turned bloody when more than a dozen Syrian-Palestinians were killed after trying to storm the heavily mined frontier with Israel during a protest, organised by a pro-regime Palestinian faction with at least tacit approval from the Syrian authorities which police the border.

Those deaths provoked an angry backlash inside Syria's 500,000 strong community of Palestinian refugees, dominated politically by Hamas and Fatah, who said the border protest had been designed to distract attention from Syria's internal problems by spilling Palestinian blood.

At least 11 Palestinian Syrians were in killed Damascus' Yarmouk Camp the following day, during a demonstration at the offices of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC), the pro Syrian-regime fringe group behind the border incident.

The crowd set fire to the PFLP-GC's offices and cars and, in response, the Palestinian security guards at the compound fired live ammunition at the protesters. Syrian security forces stayed away, Yarmouk residents said.

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There have been no subsequent outbreaks of such violence and neither side has openly spoken about the condition of their relationship.

But tensions have been simmering, fuelled by protests in Damascus neighbourhoods with large Palestinian communities, including Qaboun and Qadam. Many Palestinians - although not all - say they sympathise with the anti-regime demonstrators but are obliged to remain neutral.

It is Hamas's Muslim Brotherhood connection that has so troubled Syrian officials, highlighting the tenuous nature of the regime's alliance with the resistance group against Israel while simultaneously suppressing its sister organisation at home.

Membership of the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood is a capital offence - membership of Hamas is not - and the organisation's Syria wing has unequivocally sided with anti-regime protesters. Qatar, home to Mr Qaradawi, has led growing Arab criticism of Damascus over its crackdown.

Meetings between Hamas figures and Qatari officials, as well as the conclusion of a rapid Egypt-sponsored reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah, has exacerbated Syrian concerns that they are losing influence over one of their key foreign policy levers.

Following the overthrow of president Hosni Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood's influence in Egypt has also grown.

Turkey, another close ally-turned-opponent of the Syrian regime, has also been courting Syria's Muslim Brotherhood and hosting its exiled leadership, adding to suspicions in Damascus that a hostile Sunni Islamic front is forming against it.

That concern is tinged with sectarian undertones, and a feeling among Syria's ruling Alawite minority that the region's Sunni powers want the regime toppled.

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"Radical Islam is on the rise," the Baathist official said. "Turkey, the Gulf, the Muslim Brotherhood are all extremists at heart even if they show a different face to the public. They see a chance to get rid of a secular state [Syria] and they have tricked the United States and Europe into playing a part in that plan.

"Europe and the US are making a strategic mistake. They are trying to hand power to the Islamic movements that will be waging war against them in 10 years from now."

Syria has cast the anti-regime uprising as an armed Islamic insurgency, backed by foreign states. The US, EU, United Nations and other Arab countries have given that claim little credence, characterising the uprising as a largely peaceful call for democracy and civil rights that Mr Al Assad's regime has tried to break using lethal force.

According to the UN, security units have killed more than 2,700 people since March, with tens of thousands arrested. Syrian officials say 1,400 people have died - all at the hands of militant groups.

The cleric with links to Hamas said the Syrian authorities were mishandling their relationship with the group and would face a final rupture if the pressure continued.

"Hamas now has other options that it did not have before," he said. "It can move to Egypt now, it can go to Qatar, it is not so dependent on Syria as it used to be.

"If Syria pushes them to come out in public support [for the suppression of anti-regime protests], Hamas will refuse and, if it comes to that, relocate, it would be the political sensible decision to make."

He said Hamas would "not make the same mistake as Hizbollah", whose popularity as a champion of the downtrodden, certainly among many Syrians, has taken a hit because of its support for Mr Al Assad.

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A Syrian official, also speaking on condition of anonymity, acknowledged the relationship with Hamas was in a fragile condition and needed to be handled carefully.

"Hamas has not been supportive enough [of the Syrian regime] and it has made mistakes in its strategy recently that have weakened it," he said. "But we have to be pragmatic.

"We are not looking for any extra enemies at the moment, we need friends, so if some people close to Hamas are silent or even criticise Syria, we should not get into an argument with them now."

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AP Enterprise: Global Islamic Group Rising in AsiaLATIMES (original story is by Associated Press) 1 Oct. 2011,

JAKARTA, Indonesia (AP) — The chanting crowd at the radical Muslim protest in Indonesia stood out for its normalcy: smartly dressed businessmen, engineers, lawyers, smiling mothers, scampering children.

At a time when al-Qaida seems to be faltering, the recruitment of such an educated, somewhat mainstream following is raising fears that Hizbut Tahrir, an enigmatic global movement, could prove more effective at radicalizing the Islamic world than outright terrorist groups.

Active in 45 countries, Hizbut is now expanding in Asia, spreading its radical message from Indonesia to China. It wants to unite all Muslim countries in a globe-spanning bloc ruled by strict sharia law. It targets university students and professionals, working within countries to try to persuade people to overthrow their governments.

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The movement's appeal to an often influential part of society worries experts. Its goal of an Islamic state may be far-fetched, but it could still undercut efforts to control extremism and develop democracy in countries such as Indonesia, which the U.S. hopes will be a vital regional partner and a global model for moderate Islam.

"Our grand plan over the next five to 10 years is to reinforce the people's lack of trust and hope in the regime," said Rochmat Labib, the group's Indonesia chairman in a rare interview with a Western reporter. "That's what we are doing now: converting people from democracy, secularism and capitalism to Islamic ideology."

Hizbut Tahrir, which means The Party of Liberation, is also raising its profile in the U.S. after operating largely underground since the 1990s. Its first major event was a 2009 conference, followed by another one in Chicago this June.

Starkly conflicting views swirl around Hizbut. It has been described as both a peaceful movement to restore one-time Islamic glory and a breeding ground for future suicide bombers, "a conveyer belt to terrorism," in the words of Zeyno Baran, an expert on Islam in the modern world.

Banned in most countries, Hizbut remains legal in others, including the United States, Great Britain, Australia and Indonesia, where its leaders say it has spread to all 33 provinces. It is closely monitored everywhere, and often operates on the knife-edge of legality.

"The rhetoric they have goes to the fringe of democracy," said Hans Joergen Bonnichsen, the former head of Denmark's intelligence service. But the Danish Justice Ministry has twice asked the nation's top prosecutor if Hizbut could be banned under Danish law, and both times the answer was no.

Its new frontier in Asia ranges from Indonesia and neighboring Malaysia to Pakistan and China, where Beijing has accused it of inciting violence among Muslim Uighurs in the remote west. It

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has also become the most widespread, and persecuted, radical Muslim group in Central Asia.

The Indonesia chapter is believed to be the largest, with a following estimated in the hundreds of thousands, according to Sidney Jones, an expert on Islam in Southeast Asia.

"They are a real force here. They are a greater long-term threat to Indonesia than people who use violence," said Jones, a Jakarta-based analyst with the International Crisis Group think tank. "Collectively, hardline civil society can have a bigger effect than jihadists and terrorists."

Her words are echoed by anti-terrorism expert Zhang Jiadong of China's Fudan University, who said Hizbut is "more harmful than terrorist organizations, because it has more influence on ordinary people." The group, estimated at up to 20,000 members in China, is more likely to foment riots or rebellions than terrorist attacks, he said.

Ismail Yusanto, the group's urbane spokesman in Indonesia, insists that "we are a peaceful Islamic movement."

"We believe people can be influenced by their environment, so so-called terrorists could be influenced by everyone, not just us. But Hizbut itself is committed to not being violent. There is no evidence," he says, when asked whether some adherents later veer to violence.

The claims of nonviolence contrast with the movement's fiery rhetoric, which calls for the annihilation of Israel — that's what led to it being outlawed in Germany in 2003 — and exhorts Muslims to fight coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. One flyer shows a decapitated Statue of Liberty with New York City aflame in the background.

The U.S. State Department says the group "may indirectly generate support for terrorism but there is no evidence that it has committed any acts of terrorism."

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Hizbut followers may later "graduate" to terror under the tutelage of other groups. Often cited are the first British suicide bombers, Asif Hanif and Omar Khan Sharif, who attacked a Tel Aviv bar in 2001 and had past Hizbut links.

Reports have also linked Hizbut to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the Sept. 11 mastermind, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the former al-Qaida chief in Iraq, but they have never been proven.

Hizbut calls for the establishment of a caliphate, uniting all Muslim nations under centralized Islamic rule in emulation of such entities that flourished in the past.

This is to be attained by changing Muslim mindsets to think beyond national borders, then pressing the message among political leaders, the armed forces and other power brokers until governments crumble.

Taquiddin an-Nabhani, a Palestinian lawyer who founded the movement in 1953, didn't rule out violence during the last stage of creating the caliphate, or the possibility of fighting Western nations to protect it or expand it into non-Muslim countries. In earlier days, Hizbut staged failed coups in Jordan, Syria and Egypt, and it is now largely banned in the Middle East.

In Indonesia, Jones said, Hizbut appeals to those who believe that neither the country's earlier dictatorship or present democracy has worked.

She said it has been able to infiltrate the top cleric body, the Indonesian Ulema Council, and local governments and exercises some clout on issues such as introducing sharia law, banning non-mainstream Muslim sects and opposing the operations of Western companies in Indonesia.

Unlike many Islamist groups, it welcomes women, who make up about a third of the membership, according to Ratu Erma, the head of its women's organization. It also enjoys a following among parts of the elite.

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"Some of them work by day in Jakarta's main business district making the wheels of capitalism turn and after work talk about overthrowing the country's infidel system. It's one of the conundrums about the HT," says Greg Fealy, an Indonesia expert at Australian National University who is adamant that at least in Indonesia the group is nonviolent.

In Malaysia, young hard-liners disillusioned with the moderating stances of mainstream political parties have turned to Hizbut because "they feel it is sticking to Islamic principles more closely," said Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman of Singapore's Nanyang Technological University.

Nawab, an expert on the group in Asia, said that Hizbut, which barely filled a meeting room in Malaysia in 2004, recently drew more than 1,000 to a conference and is present in every state but one.

Leaders and followers interviewed in both countries dodge questions about their numbers and inner workings, even the whereabouts of the current global leader, Ata Khalil Abu-Rashta, except to say he is based in the Middle East.

Behind its public face, Hizbut is built along Marxist-Leninst lines with secretive cells as key building blocks. Nawab says "students" may go through up to five years of arduous training and indoctrination to prove their commitment and become members. Some 60 percent don't make the grade.

Hizbut members have been imprisoned in Russia, Central Asian nations and elsewhere, but some experts say the broad definition of terrorism in these countries — rather than any acts committed — landed many of them in jail, and sometimes before execution squads.

Within the U.S., opinion is divided. The State Department doesn't name Hizbut as a terrorist group, but the New York City Police Department, in a document obtained by The Associated Press, identified it as a "tier one extremist group" in 2006.

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The British government came close to banning the group after the 2005 London bombings, and government officials say membership has shrunk to fewer than 2,000 members. But Britain remains an important base for fundraising, propaganda efforts and recruiting senior members. Many leaders in Indonesia and Malaysia were once asylum seekers in the U.K. who got an education and made connections and then returned home.

Ed Husain, who described his time as a British member in the 2007 book "The Islamist," said that globally the movement is "strong, robust, growing."

"I still believe that the message and ideology of Hizbut Tahrir is as potent as ever," he said in an interview. "Their antidemocratic, anti-West, anti-Israel and anti-Muslim governments stance remains firm. As such, they implant confrontational, radical ideas and thus attitudes among young Muslims."

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Stirling prize: Zaha Hadid's Brixton school beats Olympic velodromeEvelyn Grace Academy wins the 16th RIBA Stirling prize, giving Hadid top award for second year runningVanessa Thorpe, arts and media correspondent,Guardian,1 Oct. 2011,

Architect Zaha Hadid's Z-shaped school in Brixton, south London, has beaten the hot favourite, the Olympic velodrome, to win the 16th annual RIBA Stirling prize for architecture.

Victory for Evelyn Grace academy gives Hadid's practice a Stirling prize for the second year running, although it is the architect's first major building project in Britain. Last year her practice won for the Maxxi Museum of 21st Century Arts in Rome.

"Schools are among the first examples of architecture that everyone experiences and have a profound impact on all children

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as they grow up," said Hadid. "I am delighted that the Evelyn Grace academy has been so well received by all its students and staff."

The prestigious £20,000 award, handed over by the Royal Institute of British Architects, the Architects' Journal and construction products manufacturer Benchmark at a ceremony in Rotherham, is intended to celebrate the best new European building "built or designed in Britain". It was expected to go to Michael Hopkins's eye-catching east London Olympic venue, popularly known as "the Pringle". But Hadid's school triumphed with its bold approach to solving a difficult problem: how to bring four schools together on a small site under one "academy" umbrella. Evelyn Grace had to be squeezed into 1.4 hectares, while the average secondary school takes up more like 8ha. The school is also situated in the area of the capital with the highest crime rate in western Europe.

Rather than building the sort of glass atrium that has been adopted by many new schools, Hadid's team opted to spend the money on better-lit classrooms and corridors with more space. But her design does have one remarkable, central feature: a bright-red 100m sprint track running right through the site. There is also a multiuse Astroturf pitch, while another quiet corner is home to a wildflower garden.

RIBA president Angela Brady, who chaired the judges, said: "The Evelyn Grace academy is an exceptional example of what can be achieved when we invest carefully in a well-designed new school building. The result – a highly imaginative, exciting academy that shows the students, staff and local residents that they are valued – is what every school should and could be."

The school is run by the Ark (Absolute Return for Kids) Academy organisation, a charity set up by Arpad "Arki" Busson, the hedge-fund multimillionaire.

The final shortlist of the six rival structures competing for this year's award included not just Hopkins's velodrome, but Rab Bennetts's careful remodelling of the Royal Shakespeare and Swan Theatres in Stratford-on-Avon, an innovative cultural centre in

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Derry, the re-facing and transforming of a 1980s office building in north London, and the extension of the Folkwang Museum in Essen, Germany, by David Chipperfield Architects, who have also won the Stirling prize before. This was the first year previous entrants were eligible for consideration and all six shortlisted practices had been shortlisted before.Full coverage of the prizegiving ceremony will be broadcast in a special edition of BBC2's Culture Show on Sunday.

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Bloomberg: ‘Donilon Discusses Syria With King Abdullah in Saudi Arabia’..

Globe&Mail: 'Venezuela's Chavez expresses solidarity with Gadhafi and Syrian President'..

Yedioth Ahronoth: 'Leftists, settlers clash near Jerusalem'..

Washington Post: 'Occupy Wall Street’ only growing stronger'..

LATIMES: 'Iran's growing bluster spells danger'..

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