Sandoval - Consti Q&A

Sandoval - Political Law Reviewer PJG

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1. Distinguishsovereigntyfromdominion.Held:SovereigntyistherighttoexercisethefunctionsofaStatetotheexclusionof anyother State. It isoften referred to as thepowerofimperium,which isdefinedasthegovernmentauthoritypossessedbytheState.Ontheotherhand,dominion,ordominium,isthecapacityofthe State to own or acquire property such as lands and naturalresources.(SeparateOpinion,Kapunan,J.,inIsaganiCruzv.SecretaryofDENR,G.R.No.135385,Dec.6,2000,EnBanc,SeeFootnote86)2.HowdidSpainacquirethePhilippines? Held:1.ThePhilippinespassedtoSpainbyvirtueofdiscoveryandconquest.Consequently,alllandsbecametheexclusivepatrimonyand dominion of the Spanish Crown. The SpanishGovernment tookchargeofdistributingthelandsbyissuingroyalgrantsandconcessionstoSpaniards,bothmilitaryandcivilian(AntonioH.Noblejas,LandTitlesand Deeds, p. 5 [1986]; These grants were better known asrepartimientosandencomiendas.Repartimientoswerehandoutstothemilitaryas fitting reward for theirservices to theSpanishcrown. Theencomiendasweregiven toSpaniards toadministeranddevelopwiththerighttoreceiveandenjoyforthemselvesthetributesofthenativesassigned to them.Ponce, supra,p.12, citingBenitez,Historyof thePhilippines, pp. 125126). Private land titles could only be acquiredfrom the governmenteitherbypurchaseorby the variousmodesofland grant from the Crown (Narciso Pena,Registration of Land Titlesand Deeds, p. 2 [1994]). (Separate Opinion, Puno, J., in Cruz v.SecretaryofEnvironmentandNaturalResources,347SCRA128,166,EnBanc[PerCuriam])2.WhenSpainacquiredsovereigntyoverthePhilippinesbyvirtueofitsdiscoveryandoccupationthereofinthe16thcenturyandtheTreatyof


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Tordesillas of 1494 which it entered into with Portugal (Under theTreaty of Tordesillas, the world was divided between Spain andPortugal,withtheformerhavingexclusivepowertoclaimalllandsandterritorieswestoftheAtlanticOceandemarcationline[Lynch,TheLegalBasesofPhilippineColonialSovereignty,62Phil.LJ279,283[1987])thecontinentsofAsia, theAmericas andAfricawere considered as terranullius although alreadypopulatedbyotherpeoples (SeeAkehurst,aModern Introduction to International Law, 5th ed., 142143). Thediscovery and occupation by the European States, who were thenconsidered as the only members of the international community ofcivilizednations,oflandsinthesaidcontinentsweredeemedsufficientto create title under international law (See Cruz, International Law,1996ed.,pp.106107)(SeparateOpinion,Kapunan,J.,inIsaganiCruzv.SecretaryofDENR,G.R.No.135385,Dec.6,2000,347SCRA128,271,EnBanc[PerCuriam])3. Discuss the concept of "jura regalia" and how it evolved in thePhilippines. Does it negate native title to lands held in privateownershipsincetimeimmemorial?Held:Generally,undertheconceptofjuraregalia,privatetitletolandmust be traced to some grant, express or implied, from the SpanishCrown or its successors, the American Colonial government, andthereafter,thePhilippineRepublic. ThebeliefthattheSpanishCrownis theoriginofall land titles in thePhilippineshaspersistedbecausetitleto landmustemanatefromsomesourcefor itcannot issueforthfromnowhere (Pena,RegistrationofLandTitlesandDeeds,1994 rev.ed.,p.15).In its broad sense, the term "jura regalia" refers to royal grants (1Bouvier's LawDictionary, 3rd revision, p. 1759),or those rightswhich


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theKinghasby virtueofhisprerogatives (Black's LawDictionary,6thed.,p.1282).InSpanishlaw,itreferstoarightwhichthesovereignhasoveranything inwhichasubjecthasarightofpropertyorpropriedad(76 Corpus Juris Secundum, citingHart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 566).These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by the king as thesovereign.ThetheoryofthefeudalsystemwasthattitletoalllandswasoriginallyheldbytheKing,andwhiletheuseoflandswasgrantedouttootherswhowerepermitted tohold themunder certain conditions, theKingtheoretically retained the title (Washburn, p. 44; see also Williams,PrinciplesOfTheLawOnRealProperty,6thed.[1886],p.2;Bigelow,p.2).Byfictionoflaw,theKingwasregardedastheoriginalproprietorofall lands,andthetrueandonlysourceoftitle,and fromhimall landswere held (Warvelle, Abstracts and Examination of Title to RealProperty [1907], p. 18). The theory of jura regalia was thereforenothingmore thananatural fruitofconquest (1DictionaryofEnglishLaw[Jowitt,ed.]p.797).The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to landsheldinprivateownershipsincetimeimmemorial.InthelandmarkcaseofCarinov. InsularGovernment (41Phil.935,212U.S.449,53 L.Ed.594[1909]),theUnitedStatesSupremeCourt,reversingthedecisionofthe prewar Philippine Supreme Court, made the followingpronouncement:x x x Every presumption is and ought to be taken against theGovernment ina case like thepresent. Itmight,perhaps,beproperand sufficient to say thatwhen,as farbackas testimonyormemorygoes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of privateownership,itwillbepresumedtohavebeenheldinthesamewayfrombeforetheSpanishconquest,andnevertohavebeenpublicland.xxx(Carinov.InsularGovernment,supranote75,at941)


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The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence ofnative title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue ofpossession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial andindependentofanygrantfromtheSpanishCrown,asanexceptiontothetheoryofjuraregalia.xxxCarinowasdecidedbytheU.S.SupremeCourtin1909,atatimewhendecisionsoftheU.S.Courtwerebindingasprecedentinourjurisdiction(Section10,PhilippineBillof1902). WeappliedtheCarinodoctrine inthe 1946 case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]),where we stated that [a]ll lands that were not acquired from theGovernment either by purchase or by grant, belong to the publicdomain,but [a]nexceptiontotherulewouldbeany landthatshouldhavebeeninthepossessionofanoccupantandofhispredecessorsininterest since time immemorial, for suchpossessionwould justify thepresumptionthatthelandhadneverbeenpartofthepublicdomainorthat ithadbeenprivatepropertyevenbefore theSpanishconquest.(Id., at 892). (Separate Opinion, Kapunan, J., in Isagani Cruz v.SecretaryofDENR,G.R.No.135385,Dec.6,2000,347SCRA128,268270,EnBanc[PerCuriam]4. Whatwas thebasis for theearlySpanishdecreesembracing thetheoryofjuraregalia?IsthisalsothebasisofthedeclarationinSection2,ArticleXIIofthe1987ConstitutionthatalllandsofthepublicdomainareownedbytheState? Consequently,didSpainacquiretitleoveralllandsinthePhilippinesinthe16thcentury?


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Held:DominiumwasthebasisfortheearlySpanishdecreesembracingthetheoryofjuraregalia.ThedeclarationinSection2,ArticleXIIofthe1987ConstitutionthatalllandsofthepublicdomainareownedbytheState is likewisefoundedondominium. Ifdominium,not imperium, isthe basis of the theory of jura regalia, then the lands which Spainacquiredinthe16thcenturywerelimitedtononprivatelands,becauseit could only acquire lands which were not yet privatelyowned oroccupiedby theFilipinos. Hence,Spainacquired titleonlyover landswhich were unoccupied and unclaimed, i.e., public lands. (SeparateOpinion,Kapunan, J., in IsaganiCruz v. SecretaryofDENR,G.R.No.135385,Dec.6,2000,EnBanc,SeeFootnote86)5. WhatistheDoctrineofConstitutionalSupremacy?Held: Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law orcontract violates any norm of the Constitution, that law or contract,whetherpromulgatedby the legislativeorby theexecutivebranchorentered intobyprivatepersons forprivatepurposes, isnullandvoidandwithoutany forceandeffect. Thus, since theConstitution is thefundamental,paramountandsupreme lawofthenation, it isdeemedwrittenineverystatuteandcontract.(ManilaPrinceHotelv.GSIS,267SCRA408[1997][Bellosillo])6. Whatare selfexecutingandnonselfexecutingprovisionsof theConstitution?Held: Aprovisionwhich laysdownageneralprinciple, suchas thosefoundinArticleIIofthe1987Constitution,isusuallynotselfexecuting.But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operativewithouttheaidofsupplementaryorenablinglegislation,orthatwhichsupplies sufficient rulebymeansofwhich the right it grantsmaybe


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enjoyedorprotected,isselfexecuting.ThusaconstitutionalprovisionisselfexecutingifthenatureandextentoftherightconferredandtheliabilityimposedarefixedbytheConstitutionitself,sothattheycanbedeterminedbyanexaminationandconstructionofitsterms,andthereisno language indicatingthatthesubject isreferredtothe legislaturefor action. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 [1997][Bellosillo])7. Are provisions of the Constitution selfexecuting or nonselfexecuting?Why?Held: Unless it isexpresslyprovidedthata legislativeact isnecessarytoenforcea constitutionalmandate, thepresumptionnow is that allprovisions are selfexecuting. If the constitutional provisions aretreatedasrequiringlegislationinsteadofselfexecuting,thelegislaturewouldhavethepowerto ignoreandpracticallynullifythemandateofthefundamentallaw.Thiscanbecataclysmic.(ManilaPrinceHotelv.GSIS,267SCRA408[1997][Bellosillo])8. Is theFilipinoFirstPolicyexpressed inSection10,ArticleXIIoftheConstitutionaselfexecutingprovision?Held: Yes. It isamandatory,positivecommandwhich iscomplete initselfandwhichneedsno furtherguidelinesor implementing lawsorrulesfor itsenforcement. From itsverywordstheprovisiondoesnotrequire any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judiciallyenforceable. When our Constitutionmandates that [i]n the grant ofrights,privileges,and concessions covering thenationaleconomyandpatrimony,theStateshallgivepreferencetoqualifiedFilipinos,itmeansjustthatqualifiedFilipinosmustbepreferred. (ManilaPrinceHotelv.GSIS,G.R.No.118295,May2,1997,267SCRA408[Bellosillo])9. GiveexamplesofnonselfexecutingprovisionsoftheConstitution.


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Held: By itsverynature,ArticleIIoftheConstitution isadeclarationofprinciplesand statepolicies. Theseprinciples inArticle IIarenotintendedtobeselfexecutingprinciplesreadyforenforcementthroughthecourts. Theyareusedby the judiciaryasaidsorasguides in theexercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in itsenactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan,Incorporated v. Morato (246 SCRA 540, 564, July 17, 1995), theprinciplesandstatepoliciesenumeratedinArticleIIandsomesectionsofArticleXIIarenotselfexecutingprovisions,thedisregardofwhichcan give rise to a cause of action in courts. They do not embodyjudicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines forlegislation. (Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 [1997], En Banc[Panganiban])10. WhenareactsofpersonsconsideredStateactioncoveredbytheConstitution?Held: Inconstitutional jurisprudence,theactofpersonsdistinct fromthe government are considered state action covered by theConstitution(1)whentheactivityitengagesinisapublicfunction;(2)whenthegovernmentissosignificantlyinvolvedwiththeprivateactorastomakethegovernmentresponsibleforhisaction;and(3)whenthegovernment has approved or authorized the action. (Manila PrinceHotelv.GSIS,267SCRA408[1997][Bellosillo])

TheDoctrineofStateImmunityfromSuit11. DiscussthebasisofthedoctrineofStateimmunityfromsuit.Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that [t]heStatemaynotbesuedwithoutitsconsent,reflectsnothinglessthana


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recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an expressaffirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from thejurisdictionofcourts.Itisbasedontheveryessenceofsovereignty.AshasbeenaptlyobservedbyJusticeHolmes,asovereignisexemptfromsuit,notbecauseofany formalconceptionorobsoletetheory,butonthe logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right asagainst theauthority thatmakes the lawonwhich the rightdepends.True, thedoctrine,not too infrequently, isderisivelycalledthe royalprerogativeofdishonestybecause itgrants thestate theprerogativeto defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its nonsuability. Wehavehadoccasion toexplain in itsdefense,however,thatacontinuedadherencetothedoctrineofnonsuabilitycannotbedeplored, for the lossof governmentalefficiencyand theobstacle totheperformanceof itsmultifarious functionswouldbe far greater inseveritythanthe inconveniencethatmaybecausedprivateparties, ifsuch fundamentalprinciple is tobeabandonedand theavailabilityofjudicial remedy is not to be accordingly restricted. (Department ofAgriculturev.NLRC,227SCRA693,Nov.11,1993[Vitug])12. Is the ruleabsolute, i.e., that the Statemaynotbe suedatall?HowmayconsentoftheStatetobesuedgiven?Held:Therule,inanycase,isnotreallyabsoluteforitdoesnotsaythatthestatemaynotbesuedunderanycircumstances. Onthecontrary,ascorrectlyphrased,thedoctrineonlyconveys,thestatemaynotbesuedwithoutitsconsent;itsclearimportthenisthattheStatemayattimesbe sued. TheState's consentmaybegiveneitherexpresslyorimpliedly. Express consentmaybemade throughageneral law (i.e.,Commonwealth ActNo. 327, as amended by PresidentialDecreeNo.1445[Sections4950],whichrequiresthatallmoneyclaimsagainstthegovernment must first be filed with the Commission on Audit whichmustactuponitwithinsixtydays.Rejectionoftheclaimwillauthorizetheclaimant toelevate thematter to theSupremeCourtoncertiorari


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and, in effect, sue the State thereby) or a special law. In thisjurisdiction,thegenerallawwaivingtheimmunityofthestatefromsuitis found inActNo.3083,where thePhilippinegovernmentconsentsandsubmitstobesueduponanymoneyclaiminvolvingliabilityarisingfromcontract,expressor implied,whichcouldserveasabasisofcivilaction between the private parties. Implied consent, on the otherhand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thusopening itself toacounterclaimorwhen itenters intoacontract. Inthis situation, the government is deemed to have descended to thelevelof theother contractingparty and tohavedivested itselfof itssovereign immunity. This rule x x x is not, however, withoutqualification.Notallcontractsenteredintobythegovernmentoperateasawaiverofitsnonsuability;distinctionmuststillbemadebetweenone which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function andanotherwhichisdoneinitsproprietarycapacity.In United States of America v. Ruiz (136 SCRA 487), where thequestionedtransactiondealtwiththeimprovementsonthewharvesinthenavalinstallationatSubicBay,weheld:The traditional ruleof immunityexemptsaState frombeingsued inthecourtsofanotherStatewithoutitsconsentorwaiver.Thisruleisanecessaryconsequenceof theprincipleof independenceandequalityof States. However, the rulesof International Law arenotpetrified;theyareconstantlydevelopingandevolving.Andbecausetheactivitiesof stateshavemultiplied, ithasbeennecessary todistinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is thatState immunitynowextendsonly toacts jure imperii. The restrictiveapplicationofState immunity isnowtherule intheUnitedStates,theUnitedKingdomandotherstatesinWesternEurope. Xxx


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The restrictiveapplicationofState immunity isproperonlywhen theproceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreignsovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stateddifferently,aStatemaybe said tohavedescended to the levelofanindividualandcanthusbedeemedtohavetacitlygiven itsconsenttobesuedonlywhen itenters intobusinesscontracts. Itdoesnotapplywherethecontractsrelatetotheexerciseofitssovereignfunctions.Inthis case theprojects are an integralpartof thenavalbasewhich isdevotedtothedefenseofboththeUnitedStatesandthePhilippines,indisputably a functionof the governmentof thehighestorder; theyarenotutilizedfornordedicatedtocommercialorbusinesspurposes.(Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, Nov. 11, 1993[Vitug])13. WhenisasuitagainstapublicofficialdeemedtobeasuitagainsttheState?Discuss.Held:1.Thedoctrineofstateimmunityfromsuitappliestocomplaintsfiledagainstpublicofficials foractsdone in theperformanceof theirduties. The rule is that thesuitmustbe regardedasoneagainst theStatewherethesatisfactionofthejudgmentagainstthepublicofficialconcernedwillrequiretheStateitselftoperformapositiveact,suchasappropriationoftheamountnecessarytopaythedamagesawardedtotheplaintiff.Theruledoesnotapplywherethepublicofficialischargedinhisofficialcapacityforactsthatareunlawfulandinjurioustotherightsofothers.Publicofficialsarenotexempt,intheirpersonalcapacity,fromliabilityarisingfromactscommittedinbadfaith.Neitherdoesitapplywherethepublicofficialisclearlybeingsuednotin his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts


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complainedofmayhavebeen committedwhileheoccupiedapublicposition.(AmadoJ.Lansangv.CA,G.R.No.102667,Feb.23,2000,2ndDiv.[Quisumbing])2. Asearlyas1954,thisCourthaspronouncedthatanofficercannotshelterhimselfby theplea thathe isapublicagentactingunder thecolor of his officewhen his acts arewhollywithout authority. Untilrecently in1991(Chavezv.Sandiganbayan,193SCRA282[1991]),thisdoctrine still found application, thisCourt saying that immunity fromsuit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and nonaccountability norgrant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of theRepublic. (Republic v. Sandoval,220 SCRA124,March19,1993, EnBanc[Campos,Jr.])14. StateinstanceswhenasuitagainsttheStateisproper.Held:SomeinstanceswhenasuitagainsttheStateisproperare:1) WhentheRepublicissuedbyname;2) When the suit is against an unincorporated governmentagency;3) When the suit ison its faceagainstagovernmentofficerbutthecaseissuchthatultimateliabilitywillbelongnottotheofficerbuttothegovernment.Republic v. Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124, March 19, 1993, En Banc[Campos,Jr.])15. Has the government waived its immunity from suit in theMendiola massacre, and, therefore, should indemnify the heirs andvictimsoftheMendiolaincident?Consequently,isthesuitfiledagainsttheRepublicbypetitionersinsaidcasereallyasuitagainsttheState?


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Held: Petitioners x x x advance the argument that the State hasimpliedlywaiveditssovereignimmunityfromsuit.Itistheirconsideredview that by the recommendationmade by the Commission for thegovernment to indemnify the heirs and victims of the MendiolaincidentandbythepublicaddressesmadebythenPresidentAquinointheaftermathofthekillings,theStatehasconsentedtobesued.XxxThisisnotasuitagainsttheStatewithitsconsent.Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regardingindemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of theincident by the government does not in anywaymean that liabilityautomaticallyattachestotheState.ItisimportanttonotethatA.O.11expressly states that thepurposeof creating theCommissionwas tohaveabodythatwillconductaninvestigationofthedisorder,deathsandcasualtiesthattookplace.Intheexerciseofitsfunctions,A.O.11providesguidelines,andwhatisrelevanttoOurdiscussionreads:1. Its conclusions regarding theexistenceofprobable cause for thecommissionof anyoffense andof thepersonsprobably guiltyof thesame shall be sufficient compliance with the rules on preliminaryinvestigation and the charges arising therefrommay be filed directlywiththepropercourt.Ineffect,whatevermaybe the findingsof theCommission, the sameshall only serve as the cause of action in the event that any partydecidestolitigatehis/herclaim.Therefore,theCommissionismerelyapreliminaryvenue.TheCommissionisnottheendinitself.Whateverrecommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the Stateimmediately, such recommendation not having become final andexecutory.Thisispreciselytheessenceofitbeingafactfindingbody.


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Secondly,whateveractsorutterancesthatthenPresidentAquinomayhavedoneor said, the samearenot tantamount to theStatehavingwaived its immunity from suit. The Presidents act of joining themarchers, days after the incident, does notmean that therewas anadmissionbytheStateofany liability. Infacttoborrowthewordsofpetitionerxxx,itwasanactofsolidaritybythegovernmentwiththepeople. Moreover, petitioners rely on President Aquinos speechpromising that the governmentwould address the grievances of therallyists.Bythisalone,itcannotbeinferredthattheStatehasadmittedany liability,much lesscan itbe inferred that ithasconsented to thesuit.Althoughconsenttobesuedmaybegiven impliedly,still itcannotbemaintainedthatsuchconsentwasgivenconsideringthecircumstancesobtainingintheinstantcase.Thirdly,thecasedoesnotqualifyasasuitagainsttheState.XxxWhile theRepublic in thiscase is suedbyname, theultimate liabilitydoesnotpertaintothegovernment.Althoughthemilitaryofficersandpersonnel, then party defendants, were discharging their officialfunctions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to beofficial the moment they exceeded their authority. Based on theCommissionfindings,therewaslackofjustificationbythegovernmentforcesintheuseoffirearms.Moreover,themembersofthepoliceandmilitary crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P.Blg. 880 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing themarchers.


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As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannotshelterhimselfby theplea thathe isapublicagentactingunder thecolor of his officewhen his acts arewhollywithout authority. Untilrecently in1991(Chavezv.Sandiganbayan,193SCRA282[1991]),thisdoctrine still found application, thisCourt saying that immunity fromsuit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and nonaccountability norgrant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of theRepublic. Themilitaryandpoliceforcesweredeployedtoensurethatthe rallywould be peaceful and orderly aswell as to guarantee thesafety of the very people that they are dutybound to protect.However,thefactsasfoundbythetrialcourtshowedthattheyfiredattheunrulycrowdtodispersethelatter.Whileitistruethatnothingisbettersettledthanthegeneralrulethatasovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in thecourts exceptwhen ithas given its consent, it cannotbe invokedbyboththemilitaryofficerstoreleasethemfromanyliability,andbytheheirs and victims to demand indemnification from the government.Theprincipleofstateimmunityfromsuitdoesnotapply,asinthiscase,when the reliefdemandedby the suit requiresno affirmativeofficialaction on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of anyobligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity, eventhoughtheofficersoragentswhoaremadedefendantsclaimtoholdoractonlybyvirtueofatitleofthestateandas itsagentsandservants.This Court hasmade it quite clear that even a high position in thegovernmentdoesnotconfera licensetopersecuteorrecklessly injureanother.TheinescapableconclusionisthattheStatecannotbeheldcivillyliableforthedeathsthat followedthe incident. Instead,the liabilityshouldfallonthenameddefendantsinthelowercourt.InlinewiththerulingofthisCourtinShaufv.CourtofAppeals(191SCRA713[1990]),hereinpublicofficials,havingbeen foundtohaveactedbeyondthescopeof


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theirauthority,maybeheldliablefordamages.(Republicv.Sandoval,220SCRA124,March19,1993,EnBanc[Campos,Jr.])16. MaytheGovernmentvalidlyinvokethedoctrineofStateimmunityfromsuitifitsinvocationwillserveasaninstrumentforperpetratinganinjusticeonacitizen? Held:Toourmind,itwouldbetheapexofinjusticeandhighlyinequitableforustodefeatpetitionerscontractorsrighttobedulycompensatedforactualworkperformedandservicesrendered,whereboththegovernmentandthepublichave,foryears,receivedandacceptedbenefitsfromsaidhousingprojectandreapedthefruitsofpetitionerscontractorshonesttoilandlabor. Incidentally,respondentlikewisearguesthattheStatemaynotbesuedintheinstantcase,invokingtheconstitutionaldoctrineofNonsuabilityoftheState,otherwiseknownastheRoyalPrerogativeofDishonesty. RespondentsargumentismisplacedinasmuchastheprincipleofStateimmunityfindsnoapplicationinthecasebeforeus. Underthesecircumstances,respondentmaynotvalidlyinvoketheRoyalPrerogativeofDishonestyandconvenientlyhideundertheStatescloakofinvincibilityagainstsuit,consideringthatthisprincipleyieldstocertainsettledexceptions.Trueenough,therule,inanycase,isnotabsoluteforitdoesnotsaythatthestatemaynotbesuedunderanycircumstances.(Citationsomitted) Thus,inAmigablev.Cuenca,thisCourt,ineffect,shredtheprotectiveshroudwhichshieldsthestatefromsuit,reiteratingourdecreeinthelandmarkcaseofMinisteriov.CFIofCebuthatthe


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doctrineofgovernmentalimmunityfromsuitcannotserveasaninstrumentforperpetratinganinjusticeonacitizen.Itisjustasimportant,ifnotmoreso,thattherebefidelitytolegalnormsonthepartofofficialdomiftheruleoflawweretobemaintained.(Citationsomitted) AlthoughtheAmigableandMinisteriocasesgenerouslytackledtheissueoftheStatesimmunityfromsuitvisavisthepaymentofjustcompensationforexpropriatedproperty,thisCourtnonethelessfindsthedoctrineenunciatedintheaforementionedcasesapplicabletotheinstantcontroversy,consideringthattheendsofjusticewouldbesubvertedifweweretouphold,inthisparticularinstance,theStatesimmunityfromsuit. Tobe sure, thisCourtas the staunchguardianof thecitizensrightsandwelfarecannotsanctionan injusticesopatenton itsface,andallowitselftobeaninstrumentintheperpetrationthereof.JusticeandequitysternlydemandthattheStatescloakofinvincibilityagainstsuit be shred in this particular instance, and that petitionerscontractorsbedulycompensatedon thebasisofquantummeruitfor construction done on the public works housing project. (EPGConstruction Co. v. Vigilar, 354 SCRA 566, Mar.16, 2001, 2nd Div.[Buena])

Citizenship17. To what citizenship principle does the Philippines adhere to?Explain,andgiveillustrativecase.Held: ThePhilippine lawoncitizenshipadherestotheprincipleof jussanguinis. Thereunder,achildfollowsthenationalityorcitizenshipoftheparentsregardlessoftheplaceofhis/herbirth,asopposedtothe


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doctrineof jus soliwhichdeterminesnationalityorcitizenshipon thebasisofplaceofbirth. Private respondentRosalindYbascoLopezwasbornonMay16,1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses,TelesforoYbasco,aFilipinocitizenandnativeofDaet,CamarinesNorte,and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a yearbefore the1935Constitution took intoeffect and at that time,whatservedastheConstitutionofthePhilippinesweretheprincipalorganicactsbywhichtheUnitedStatesgovernedthecountry.ThesewerethePhilippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act ofAugust29,1916,alsoknownastheJonesLaw. Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to becitizensofthePhilippineIslands.xxx Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines whowereSpanishsubjectsonApril11,1899andresided therein includingtheir children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Privaterespondentsfather,TelesforoYbasco,wasbornonJanuary5,1879 inDaet,CamarinesNorte,afactdulyevidencedbyacertifiedtruecopyofan entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be aPhilippinecitizen. Byvirtueofthesame laws,whichwerethe laws inforce at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein privaterespondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of thePhilippines.Thesigningintolawofthe1935PhilippineConstitutionhasestablishedtheprincipleof jus sanguinisasbasis for theacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipxxx. Soalso,theprincipleof jussanguinis,whichconferscitizenshipbyvirtueofblood relationship,was subsequently retainedunder the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private


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respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having beenborntoaFilipinofather. Thefactofherbeingborn inAustralia isnottantamounttoherlosingherPhilippinecitizenship.IfAustraliafollowstheprincipleofjussoli,thenatmost,privaterespondentcanalsoclaimAustralian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.(Vallesv.COMELEC,337SCRA543,Aug.9,2000,EnBanc[Purisima])18. Whatarethewaysofacquiringcitizenship?Discuss.Held:Therearetwowaysofacquiringcitizenship:(1)bybirth,and(2)by naturalization. Theseways of acquiring citizenship correspond tothetwokindsofcitizens:thenaturalborncitizen,andthenaturalizedcitizen.Apersonwhoatthetimeofhisbirthisacitizenofaparticularcountry,isanaturalborncitizenthereof.As defined in the x x x Constitution, naturalborn citizens are thosecitizensofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyacttoacquireorperfecthisPhilippinecitizenship.On the other hand, naturalized citizens are thosewho have becomeFilipinocitizensthroughnaturalization,generallyunderCommonwealthActNo.473,otherwiseknownastheRevisedNaturalizationLaw,whichrepealedtheformerNaturalizationLaw(ActNo.2927),andbyRepublicActNo.530. (AntonioBengson IIIv.HRET,G.R.No.142840,May7,2001,EnBanc[Kapunan])19. Tobenaturalized,whatmustanapplicantprove?Whenandwhatare the conditions before the decision granting Philippine citizenshipbecomesexecutory?Held:Tobenaturalized,anapplicanthastoprovethathepossessesallthequalificationsandnoneofthedisqualificationsprovidedby lawtobecomeaFilipinocitizen. ThedecisiongrantingPhilippinecitizenship


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becomesexecutoryonlyaftertwo(2)yearsfromitspromulgationwhenthecourt is satisfied thatduring the interveningperiod, theapplicanthas (1)not left the Philippines; (2)hasdedicatedhimself to a lawfulcalling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense orviolationofgovernmentpromulgated rules;or (4) committedanyactprejudicialtotheinterestofthenationorcontrarytoanygovernmentannouncedpolicies(Section1,R.A.530).(AntonioBengsonIIIv.HRET,G.R.No.142840,May7,2001,EnBanc[Kapunan])20. What qualifications must be possessed by an applicant fornaturalization?Held:Section2,Act473providesthefollowingqualifications:(a) Hemustbenot less than21 yearsof ageon thedayof thehearingofthepetition;(b) He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuousperiodofnotlessthantenyears;(c) He must be of good moral character and believes in theprinciples underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must haveconductedhimself inaproperand irreproachablemannerduring theentireperiodofhisresidenceinthePhilippinesinhisrelationwiththeconstitutedgovernmentaswellaswith thecommunity inwhichhe isliving;(d) HemustownrealestateinthePhilippinesworthnotlessthanfive thousand pesos, Philippine currency, ormust have some knownlucrativetrade,profession,orlawfuloccupation;(e) HemustbeabletospeakandwriteEnglishorSpanishandanyoftheprincipallanguages;and(f) Hemusthaveenrolledhisminorchildrenofschoolage,inanyof the public schools or private schools recognized by the Bureau ofPrivateSchoolsofthePhilippineswherePhilippinehistory,governmentand civic are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum,


20

duringtheentireperiodoftheresidenceinthePhilippinesrequiredofhimpriortothehearingofhispetition fornaturalizationasPhilippinecitizen.(AntonioBengsonIIIv.HRET,G.R.No.142840,May7,2001,EnBanc[Kapunan])21. What are the disqualifications under Section 4, Act 473, in anapplicationfornaturalization?Held:Section4,Act473,providesthefollowingdisqualifications:(a) Hemustnotbeopposedtoorganizedgovernmentoraffiliatedwith any association or group of persons who uphold and teachdoctrinesopposingallorganizedgovernments;(b) He must not be defending or teaching the necessity orproprietyofviolence,personalassault,orassassinationforthesuccessandpredominanceoftheirideas;(c) He must not be a polygamist or believer in the practice ofpolygamy;(d) Hemustnothavebeenconvictedofanycrimeinvolvingmoralturpitude;(e) Hemustnotbesuffering frommentalalienationor incurablecontagiousdiseases;(f) He must have, during the period of his residence in thePhilippines (ornot less than sixmonths before filinghis application),mingledsociallywith theFilipinos,orwhohavenotevincedasinceredesire to learnandembrace thecustoms, traditionsand idealsof theFilipinos;(g) HemustnotbeacitizenorsubjectofanationwithwhomthePhilippinesisatwar,duringtheperiodofsuchwar;(h) HemustnotbeacitizenorsubjectofaforeigncountrywhoselawsdonotgrantFilipinos theright tobecomenaturalizedcitizensorsubjectsthereof.


21

(AntonioBengsonIIIv.HRET,G.R.No.142840,May7,2001,EnBanc[Kapunan])22. Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of aFilipinomother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenshipfourteen(14)yearsafterhehasreachedtheageofmajority?Held: Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, thecitizenshipofa legitimatechildbornofaFilipinomotherandanalienfatherfollowedthecitizenshipofthefather,unless,uponreachingtheageofmajority, thechildelectedPhilippinecitizenship. C.A.No.625which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935Constitution,prescribestheprocedurethatshouldbefollowedinordertomakeavalidelectionofPhilippinecitizenship. However, the1935Constitution andC.A.No.625didnotprescribe a timeperiodwithinwhichtheelectionofPhilippinecitizenshipshouldbemade.The1935Charteronlyprovidesthattheelectionshouldbemadeuponreachingthe age of majority. The age of majority then commenced uponreaching twentyone (21) years. In the opinions of the Secretary ofJustice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippinecitizenship,thisdilemmawasresolvedbybasingthetimeperiodonthedecisionsofthisCourtpriortotheeffectivityofthe1935Constitution.Inthesedecisions,theproperperiodforelectingPhilippinecitizenshipwas,inturn,basedonthepronouncementsoftheDepartmentofStateoftheUnitedStatesGovernmenttotheeffectthattheelectionshouldbemadewithinareasonabletimeafterattainingtheageofmajority.Thephrasereasonable timehasbeen interpreted tomean that theelectionshouldbemadewithinthree(3)yearsfromreachingtheageofmajority.Thespanoffourteen(14)yearsthat lapsedfromthetimethatpersonreached theageofmajorityuntilhe finallyexpressedhis intention to


22

electPhilippinecitizenship isclearlywaybeyondthecontemplationoftherequirementofelectinguponreachingtheageofmajority.Philippinecitizenshipcanneverbetreatedlikeacommoditythatcanbeclaimedwhenneededand suppressedwhenconvenient. Onewho isprivileged toelectPhilippine citizenshiphasonlyan inchoate right tosuch citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor,enthusiasm and promptitude. (Re:Application forAdmission to thePhilippineBar,VicenteD.Ching,BarMatterNo.914,Oct.1,1999,EnBanc[Kapunan])23. HowmayPhilippinecitizenshipberenounced? Is theapplicationfor an alien certificate of registration, and the possession of foreignpassport,tantamounttoactsofrenunciationofPhilippinecitizenship?Held:Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that theprivaterespondentisaFilipinocitizen,shehasnonethelessrenouncedherPhilippinecitizenship. Tobuttressthiscontention,petitionercitedprivaterespondentsapplicationforanalienCertificateofRegistration(ACR)and ImmigrantCertificateofResidence (ICR),onSeptember19,1988, and the issuance toherof anAustralianpassportonMarch3,1988. Xxx In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, suchrenunciation must be express. Petitioners contention that theapplicationofprivaterespondentforanaliencertificateofregistration,andherAustralianpassport, isbereftofmerit. This issuewasput torestinthecaseofAznarv.COMELEC(185SCRA703[1990])andinthemore recent case of Mercado v. Manzano and COMELEC (G.R. No.135083,307SCRA630,May26,1999).


23

InthecaseofAznar,theCourtruledthatthemerefactthatheisanAmericandidnotmeanthathe isno longeraFilipino,andthatanapplication foranaliencertificateof registrationwasnot tantamounttorenunciationofhisPhilippinecitizenship. And, inMercadov.ManzanoandCOMELEC, itwasheldthatthefactthatrespondentManzanowasregisteredasanAmericancitizeninthe Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding anAmerican passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed acertificateofcandidacy forvicemayorofMakati,were justassertionsof his American nationality before the termination of his Americancitizenship. Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind YbascoLopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an aliencertificate of registration are not acts constituting an effectiverenunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim ofFilipinocitizenship. Forrenunciationtoeffectivelyresult inthe lossofcitizenship, the samemust be express. As held by this Court in theaforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate ofregistrationdoesnotamounttoanexpressrenunciationorrepudiationofonescitizenship. Theapplicationofthehereinprivaterespondentforanaliencertificateofregistration,andherholdingofanAustralianpassport, as in the case ofMercado v.Manzano,weremere acts ofassertionofherAustraliancitizenshipbeforesheeffectivelyrenouncedthesame.Thus,atthemost,privaterespondenthaddualcitizenshipshewasanAustralianandaFilipino,aswell. Moreover,underCommonwealthAct63, the fact thatachildofFilipinoparent/swasborninanothercountryhasnotbeenincludedasa ground for losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since privaterespondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship,petitioners claim that respondent must go through the process of


24

repatriationdoesnotholdwater. (Vallesv.COMELEC,337SCRA543,Aug.9,2000,EnBanc[Purisima])24. HowmayFilipinocitizenswholosttheircitizenshipreacquirethesame?Answer: Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may x x xreacquire the same in themannerprovidedby law. CommonwealthActNo.63enumeratesthethreemodesbywhichPhilippinecitizenshipmay be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) byrepatriation,and (3)bydirectactofCongress. (Frivaldov.COMELEC,257SCRA727,June28,1996,EnBanc[Panganiban];AntonioBengsonIIIv.HRET,G.R.No.142840,May7,2001,EnBanc[Kapunan])25. Distinguishnaturalizationfromrepatriation.Held:NaturalizationisamodeforbothacquisitionandreacquisitionofPhilippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippinecitizenship,naturalization isgovernedbyCommonwealthActNo.473,as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode forreacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth ActNo.63 (AnActProviding for theWays inWhichPhilippineCitizenshipMayBeLostorReacquired [1936]). Under this law,a formerFilipinocitizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possesscertain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned inSection4ofC.A.473.Repatriation,ontheotherhand,maybehadundervariousstatutesbythose who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armedforces (Section4,C.A.No.63); (2) service in thearmed forcesof thealliedforcesinWorldWarII(Section1,RepublicActNo.965[1953]);(3)serviceintheArmedForcesoftheUnitedStatesatanyothertime(Sec.1,RepublicActNo.2630[1960]);(4)marriageofaFilipinowomantoan


25

alien (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8171 [1995]); and (5) political andeconomicnecessity(Ibid).Asdistinguishedfromthelengthyprocessofnaturalization,repatriationsimplyconsistsofthetakingofanoathofallegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippinesandregisteringsaidoathintheLocalCivilRegistryoftheplacewherethepersonconcernedresidesorlastresided.InAngatv.Republic(314SCRA438[1999]),weheld:[P]arenthetically, under these statutes (referring to RANos. 965 and2630),thepersondesiringtoreacquirePhilippinecitizenshipwouldnotevenbe required to fileapetition incourt,andall thathehad todowastotakeanoathofallegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippinesandtoregisterthatfactwiththecivilregistryintheplaceofhisresidenceorwherehehadlastresidedinthePhilippines.Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the originalnationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost hiscitizenshipwillbe restored tohispriorstatusasanaturalizedFilipinocitizen. On theotherhand, ifhewasoriginallyanaturalborncitizenbefore he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to hisformerstatusasanaturalbornFilipino.(AntonioBengsonIIIv.HRET,G.R.No.142840,May7,2001,EnBanc[Kapunan])26. WhomayvalidlyavailofrepatriationunderR.A.No.8171?Held:R.A.No.8171,whichhaslapsedintolawonOctober23,1995,isan actproviding for the repatriation (a)of FilipinowomenwhohavelosttheirPhilippinecitizenshipbymarriagetoaliensand(b)ofnaturalbornFilipinoswhohave lost theirPhilippinecitizenshiponaccountofpoliticaloreconomicnecessity. (GerardoAngatv.Republic,G.R.No.132244,Sept.14,1999[Vitug])


26

27. BeforewhatagencyshouldapplicationforrepatriationunderR.A8171befiled?Held: UnderSection1ofP.D.No.725,datedJune5,1975,amendingC.A. No. 63, an application for repatriation could be filed with theSpecial Committee onNaturalization chaired by the SolicitorGeneralwith the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of theNational Intelligence Coordinating Agency as the other members.AlthoughtheagencywasdeactivatedbyvirtueofPresidentCorazonC.Aquinos Memorandum of March 27, 1987, it was not, however,abrogated. TheCommitteewas reactivatedon June8,1995. Hence,theapplicationshouldbefiledwithsaidAgency,notwiththeRegionalTrial Court. (GerardoAngat v.Republic,G.R.No. 132244, Sept. 14,1999[Vitug])28. MayanaturalbornFilipinowhobecameanAmericancitizenstillbeconsideredanaturalbornFilipinouponhisreacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenshipand,therefore,qualifiedtorunforCongressman?Held: Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.Thismeans that anaturalized Filipinowho losthis citizenshipwillberestored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On theotherhand,ifhewasoriginallyanaturalborncitizenbeforehelosthisPhilippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as anaturalbornFilipino.In respondent Cruzs case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when herenderedservice intheArmedForcesoftheUnitedStates. However,hesubsequentlyreacquiredPhilippinecitizenshipunderR.A.No.2630,whichprovides:


27

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship byrenderingserviceto,oracceptingcommission in,theArmedForcesoftheUnited States, or after separation from theArmed Forces of theUnited States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquirePhilippinecitizenshipbytakinganoathofallegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippinesandregisteringthesamewithLocalCivilRegistryintheplacewhereheresidesorlastresidedinthePhilippines.Thesaidoathofallegianceshallcontainarenunciationofanyothercitizenship.HavingthustakentherequiredoathofallegiancetotheRepublicandhaving registered the same in the Civil Registry of Mangatarem,Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondentCruz isdeemedtohaverecoveredhisoriginalstatusasanaturalborncitizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipinofather. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him torecover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippinecitizenship.PetitionerscontentionthatrespondentCruzisnolongeranaturalborncitizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship isuntenable.[T]hetermnaturalborncitizenwasfirstdefinedinArticleIII,Section4ofthe1973Constitutionasfollows:Section 4. A naturalborn citizen is one who is a citizen of thePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyacttoacquireorperfecthisPhilippinecitizenship.Tworequisitesmustconcurforapersontobeconsideredassuch:(1)apersonmustbeaFilipinocitizenfrombirthand(2)hedoesnothavetoperformanyacttoobtainorperfecthisPhilippinecitizenship.Under the1973Constitutiondefinition, therewere two categoriesofFilipinocitizenswhichwerenotconsiderednaturalborn:(1)thosewho


28

werenaturalizedand(2)thosebornbeforeJanuary17,1973(thedateofeffectivityof the1973Constitution),ofFilipinomotherswho,uponreaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Thosenaturalized citizens were not considered naturalborn obviouslybecausetheywerenotFilipinosatbirthandhadtoperformanacttoacquirePhilippine citizenship. Thosebornof Filipinomothersbeforethe effectivityof the1973Constitutionwere likewisenot considerednaturalbornbecausetheyalsohadtoperformanacttoperfecttheirPhilippinecitizenship.The present Constitution, however, now considers those born ofFilipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution andwho elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching themajority age asnaturalborn.Afterdefiningwhoarenaturalborncitizens,Section2ofArticle IV adds a sentence: ThosewhoelectPhilippine citizenship inaccordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemednaturalborn citizens. Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos areconsidered not naturalborn citizens. It is apparent from theenumerationofwho are citizensunder thepresentConstitution thatthereareonly twoclassesofcitizens: (1) thosewhoarenaturalbornand (2) thosewho arenaturalized in accordancewith law. A citizenwho is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo theprocessofnaturalizationtoobtainPhilippinecitizenship,necessarily isa naturalborn Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in the saidenumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losingPhilippinecitizenship,subsequentlyreacquire it. Thereasonthereforeis clear: as to such persons, they would either be naturalborn ornaturalizeddependingon the reasons for the lossof their citizenshipand themode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisitionthereof. As respondentCruzwasnot requiredby law to go throughnaturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he isperforce a naturalborn Filipino. As such, he possessed all thenecessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of


29

Representatives. (AntonioBengson IIIv.HRET,G.R.No.142840,May7,2001,EnBanc[Kapunan])29. Distinguishdualcitizenshipfromdualallegiance.Held: Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrentapplication of the different laws of two or more states, a person issimultaneouslyconsideredanationalbythesaidstates. For instance,suchasituationmayarisewhenapersonwhoseparentsarecitizensofastatewhichadherestotheprincipleofjussanguinisisborninastatewhich follows thedoctrineof jus soli. Such aperson, ipso facto andwithout any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered acitizenofbothstates.Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which aperson simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two ormorestates.Whiledualcitizenshipisinvoluntary,dualallegianceistheresultofanindividualsvolition.(Mercadov.Manzano,307SCRA630,May26,1999,EnBanc[Mendoza])30. What is the main concern of Section 5, Article IV, 1987Constitution,oncitizenship?Consequently,arepersonswithmeredualcitizenshipdisqualified to run forelective localpositionsunderSection40(d)oftheLocalGovernmentCode?Held:InincludingSection5inArticleIVoncitizenship,theconcernofthe Constitutional Commissionwas notwith dual citizens per se butwith naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to theircountriesoforiginevenafter theirnaturalization. Hence, thephrasedual citizenship in R.A.No. 7160, Section 40(d) (LocalGovernmentCode) must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.Consequently,personswithmeredualcitizenshipdonotfallunderthisdisqualification.Unlikethosewithdualallegiance,whomust,xxx,be


30

subjecttostrictprocesswithrespecttotheterminationoftheirstatus,forcandidateswithdualcitizenship, itshouldsuffice if,uponthefilingof their certificate of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship toterminatetheirstatusaspersonswithdualcitizenshipconsideringthattheir condition is theunavoidable consequenceof conflicting lawsofdifferentstates.By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same timeforswearallegiancetotheothercountryofwhichtheyarealsocitizensandtherebyterminatetheirstatusasdualcitizens.Itmaybethat,fromthepointofviewoftheforeignstateandofitslaws,suchanindividualhas not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of nomoment.(Mercadov.Manzano,G.R.No.135083,307SCRA630,May26,1999[Mendoza])31. Cite instanceswhenacitizenofthePhilippinesmaypossessdualcitizenship considering the citizenship clause (Article IV) of theConstitution.Held:1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreigncountrieswhichfollowtheprincipleofjussoli;2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alienfathersifbythelawsoftheirfatherscountrysuchchildrenarecitizensofthatcountry;3) Thosewhomarryaliens ifby the lawsof the latters countrytheformerareconsideredcitizens,unlessbytheiractoromissiontheyaredeemedtohaverenouncedPhilippinecitizenship.(Mercadov.Manzano,G.R.No.135083,307SCRA630,May26,1999[Mendoza])32. Doesresjudicataapplyincaseshingingontheissueofcitizenship?


31

Held:Petitionermaintainsfurtherthatwhencitizenshipisraisedasanissue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution ordecision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in anysubsequentproceedingchallengingthesame;citingthecaseofMoyYaLim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]). Heinsiststhatthesameissueofcitizenshipmaybethreshedoutanew. Petitioner iscorrect insofarasthegeneralrule isconcerned, i.e.,theprincipleofresjudicatagenerallydoesnotapplyincaseshingingonthe issueofcitizenship. However, inthecaseofBurcav.Republic(51SCRA 248 [1973]), an exception to this general rulewas recognized.The Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of resjudicatamaybeapplied incasesofcitizenship, the followingmustbepresent:1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in acontroversywheresaidpersonisaparty;2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative tookactivepartintheresolutionthereof,and3) thefindingoncitizenshipisaffirmedbythisCourt.AlthoughthegeneralrulewassetforthinthecaseofMoyYaLimYao,thecasedidnotforeclosetheweightofpriorrulingsoncitizenship. Itelucidatedthatreliancemaysomehowbeplacedontheseantecedentofficialfindings,thoughnotreallybinding,tomaketheefforteasierorsimpler. (Valles v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543,Aug. 9, 2000, EnBanc[Purisima])

CivilianSupremacyClause


32

33. The President issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) ordering thedeploymentofmembersofthePhilippineMarines inthemetropolistoconduct jointvisibilitypatrolswithmembersofthePhilippineNationalPolice in various shopping malls. Will this not violate the civiliansupremacyclauseunderSection3,Article IIoftheConstitution? Doesthisnotamounttoan"insidiousincursion"ofthemilitaryinthetaskoflaw enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of theConstitution?Held: ThedeploymentoftheMarinesdoesnotconstituteabreachofthe civilian supremacy clause. The callingof themarines in this caseconstitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian lawenforcement.xxxThelimitedparticipationoftheMarinesisevidentintheprovisionsof the LOI itself,which sufficientlyprovides themetesandboundsof theMarines'authority. It isnoteworthy that the localpoliceforcesaretheonesinchargeofthevisibilitypatrolsatalltimes,the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro ManilaPolice Chief is the overall leader of the PNPPhilippineMarines jointvisibilitypatrols.UndertheLOI,thepoliceforcesaretaskedtobriefororientthesoldiersonpolicepatrolprocedures.Itistheirresponsibilitytodirectandmanage thedeploymentof theMarines. It is, likewise,their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines andrender logisticalsupporttothesesoldiers. Inviewoftheforegoing, itcannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme overcivilianauthority.Moreover, thedeploymentof theMarines toassist thePNPdoesnotunmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does itamount to an insidious incursion of themilitary in the task of lawenforcementinviolationofSection5[4],ArticleXVIoftheConstitution.Inthisregard, it isnotcorrecttosaythatGeneralAngeloReyes,Chiefof Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law


33

enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post inderogation of the aforecited provision. The real authority in theseoperations,as stated in the LOI, is lodgedwith theheadofa civilianinstitution,thePNP,andnotwiththemilitary. Suchbeingthecase, itdoesnotmatterwhethertheAFPChiefactuallyparticipatesintheTaskForceTulungansincehedoesnotexerciseanyauthorityorcontroloverthesame. SincenoneoftheMarineswas incorporatedorenlistedasmembersofthePNP,therecanbenoappointmenttoacivilianpositiontospeakof.Hence,thedeploymentoftheMarinesinthejointvisibilitypatrolsdoesnotdestroytheciviliancharacterofthePNP.Consideringtheabovecircumstances,theMarinesrendernothingmorethanassistancerequired inconductingthepatrols. Assuch,therecanbe no insidious incursion of the military in civilian affairs nor cantherebeaviolationoftheciviliansupremacyclauseintheConstitution.It isworthmentioningthatmilitaryassistancetocivilianauthorities invarious forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippineexperiencerevealsthat it isnotaversetorequestingtheassistanceofthe military in the implementation and execution of certaintraditionallycivilfunctions.xxx[S]omeofthemultifariousactivitieswhereinmilitaryaidhasbeenrendered,exemplifyingtheactivitiesthatbring both the civilian and the military together in a relationship ofcooperation,are:1. Elections;2. AdministrationofthePhilippineNationalRedCross;3. Reliefandrescueoperationsduringcalamitiesanddisasters;4. Amateursportspromotionanddevelopment;5. Developmentofthecultureandthearts;6. Conservationofnaturalresources;7. Implementationoftheagrarianreformprogram;8. Enforcementofcustomslaws;


34

9. Compositecivilianmilitarylawenforcementactivities;10. Conductoflicensureexaminations;11. Conductofnationwidetestsforelementaryandhighschoolstudents;12. Antidrugenforcementactivities;13. Sanitaryinspections;14. Conductofcensuswork;15. AdministrationoftheCivilAeronauticsBoard;16. Assistanceininstallationofweatherforecastingdevices;17. Peace and order policy formulation in local governmentunits.This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resultingfroma systematic,unbroken,executivepractice, longpursued to theknowledgeofCongressand, yet,neverbeforequestioned. Whatwehavehereismutualsupportandcooperationbetweenthemilitaryandcivilianauthorities,notderogationofciviliansupremacy.In theUnitedStates,wherea long traditionof suspicionandhostilitytowards theuseofmilitary force fordomesticpurposeshaspersistedandwhoseConstitution,unlikeours,doesnotexpresslyprovideforthepowertocall,theuseofmilitarypersonnelbycivilianlawenforcementofficersisallowedundercircumstancessimilartothosesurroundingthepresentdeploymentofthePhilippineMarines.(IBPv.Hon.RonaldoB.Zamora,G.R.No.141284,Aug.15,2000,EnBanc[Kapunan])

TheRighttoaBalancedandHealthfulEcology34. IstherighttoabalancedandhealthfulecologyanylessimportantthananyofthecivilandpoliticalrightsenumeratedintheBillofRights?Explain.


35

Held:WhiletherighttoabalancedandhealthfulecologyistobefoundundertheDeclarationofPrinciplesandStatePoliciesandnotundertheBillofRights,itdoesnotfollowthatitislessimportantthananyofthecivilandpoliticalrightsenumerated inthe latter. Sucharightbelongstoadifferentcategoryofrightsaltogetherfor itconcernsnothing lessthan selfpreservation and selfperpetuation, the advancement ofwhichmayevenbesaidtopredateallgovernmentsandconstitutions.Asamatteroffact,thesebasicrightsneednotevenbewritten intheConstitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception ofhumankind. If theyarenowexplicitlymentioned in the fundamentalcharter,itisbecauseofthewellfoundedfearofitsframersthatunlessthe rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health aremandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, therebyhighlightingtheircontinuingimportanceandimposinguponthestateasolemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance thesecond, thedaywouldnotbe too farwhenallelsewouldbe lostnotonly for the present generation, but also for those to come generationswhichstandtoinheritnothingbutparchedearthincapableof sustaining life. (Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792[1993][Davide])35. TheProvinceofPalawanandtheCityofPuertoPrincesaenactedordinancesprohibiting thecatchingand/orexportationof live tropicalfishes,andimposingpenaltiesforviolationsthereof,inordertostoptheillegalpracticeof cyanide fishingwhichdestroys the coralsandothermarine resources. Several fishermen apprehended for violating theordinances in question challenged their constitutionality contendingthattheordinancesviolatedtheirpreferentialrightassubsistenceandmarginal fishermen to the use of our communal marine resourcesguaranteedby theConstitution,underSection7,ArticleXIII. Willyousustainthechallenge?


36

Held: Thepreferentialrightofsubsistenceormarginalfishermentotheuseofmarine resources isnot absolute. In accordancewith theRegalianDoctrine,marineresourcesbelongtotheState,and,pursuanttothefirstparagraphofSection2,ArticleXIIoftheConstitution,theirexploration,developmentandutilizationxxxshallbeunder the fullcontrol and supervision of the State. Moreover, their mandatedprotection, development and conservation x x x imply certainrestrictionsonwhatever rightofenjoyment theremaybe in favorofanyone. Whatmustbeborne inmind istheStatepolicyenshrined intheConstitutionregardingthedutyoftheStatetoprotectandadvancethe rightof thepeople toabalancedandhealthfulecology inaccordwith the rhythm and harmony of nature (Section 16,Article II). Theordinancesinquestionaremeantpreciselytoprotectandconserveourmarineresourcestotheendthattheirenjoymentmaybeguaranteednot only for the present generation, but also for the generations tocome. The right toabalancedandhealthfulecologycarrieswith itacorrelativeduty to refrain from impairing theenvironment. (Tanov.Gov.SalvadorP.Socrates,G.R.No.110249,Aug.21,1997)

AcademicFreedom36. HowshouldtheStatespowertoregulateeducationalinstitutionsbeexercised? Held: Section4[1],ArticleXIVoftheConstitutionrecognizestheStatespowertoregulateeducationalinstitutions:The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and privateinstitutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonablesupervisionandregulationofalleducationalinstitutions.


37

As may be gleaned from the above provision, such power toregulate is subject to the requirementof reasonableness. Moreover,the Constitution allows merely the regulation and supervision ofeducational institutions, not the deprivation of their rights. (MiriamCollegeFoundation,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,348SCRA265,288,Dec.15,2000,1stDiv.[Kapunan])37. Discusstheacademicfreedomofinstitutionsofhigherlearning. Held:1.EquallymandatedbyArticleXIV,Section5[2]ofthe1987Constitution is that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in allinstitutions of higher learning. Academic freedom of educationalinstitutionshasbeendefined as the rightof the schoolor college todecideforitself,itsaimsandobjectives,andhowbesttoattainthemfree from outside coercion or interference save possibly when theoverridingpublicwelfarecallsforsomerestraint.Ithasawidesphereof autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. Saidconstitutionalprovisionisnottobeconstruedinaniggardlymannerorinagrudgingfashion.Thatwouldbetofrustrateitspurposeandnullifyits intent (Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, et al., supra;Tangonanv.Pano,etal.,supra.) While it is true that an institutionof learninghas a contractualobligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete thecourse they seek to pursue (Licup, et al. v. University of San Carlos[USC], et al., supra.), since a contract creates reciprocal rights andobligations, the obligation of the school to educate a studentwouldimply a correspondingobligationon thepartof the student to studyand obey the rules and regulations of the school (Capitol MedicalCenter, Inc.,etal.v.CourtofAppeals,etal.,supra.). Whenastudentcommits a serious breach of discipline or failed to maintain therequired academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right. In this


38

connection, this Court recognizes the expertise of educationalinstitutions in the various fieldsof learning. Thus, they are affordedamplediscretion to formulate reasonable rulesand regulations in theadmissionofstudents (YapChinFah,etal.v.CourtofAppeals,etal.,G.R. No. 90063, December 12, 1989), including setting of academicstandards. Within the parameters thereof, they are competent todeterminewhoareentitledtoadmissionandreadmission.(UniversityofSanAgustin,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,230SCRA761,774775,March7,1994[Nocon]) 2. Section 5[2], Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees allinstitutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutionalacademicfreedomincludestherightoftheschoolorcollegetodecideforitself,itsaimsandobjectives,andhowbesttoattainthemfreefromoutside coercion or interference save possibly when the overridingpublicwelfare calls for some restraint (Tangonan v. Pano, 137 SCRA245,256257 [1985]). Theessential freedoms subsumed in the termacademicfreedomencompassesthefreedomtodeterminefor itselfonacademicgrounds:(1) Whomayteach,(2) Whatmaybetaught,(3) Howitshallbetaught,and(4) Whomaybeadmittedtostudy. (Isabelo,Jr.v.PerpetualHelpCollege of Rizal, Inc., 227 SCRA 591, 595 [1993]; Ateneo de ManilaUniversityv.Capulong,222SCRA643,660[1993];Garciav.TheFacultyAdmission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 68 SCRA 277, 285[1975].TheaboveformulationwasmadebyJusticeFelixFrankfurterinhisconcurringopinioninSweezyv.NewHampshire,354U.S.234,263)Therightoftheschooltodiscipline itsstudents isatonceapparent inthe third freedom, i.e., how it shall be taught. A school certainlycannotfunctioninanatmosphereofanarchy.


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Thus,therecanbenodoubtthattheestablishmentofaneducationalinstitution requires rules and regulations necessary for themaintenanceofanorderlyeducationalprogramandthecreationofaneducational environment conducive to learning. Such rules andregulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students,faculty,andproperty(Angelesv.Sison,112SCRA26,37[1982]). Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the studentdiscipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field oflearning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline.Accordingly,therighttodisciplinethestudentlikewisefindsbasisinthefreedomwhattoteach. Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty todevelop discipline in its students. The Constitution no less imposessuchduty.[Alleducationalinstitutions]shallinculcatepatriotismandnationalism,foster loveofhumanity,respect forhumanrights,appreciationoftherole of national heroes in the historical development of the country,teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical andspiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline,encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific andtechnological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency (Section3[2],ArticleXIV,Constitution).InAngeles v. Sison,we also said that disciplinewas ameans for theschool to carry out its responsibility to help its students grow anddevelop intomature, responsible,effectiveandworthycitizensof thecommunity.(Supra,at37)


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Finally,nowhereintheaboveformulationistherighttodisciplinemoreevidentthaninwhomaybeadmittedtostudy.Ifaschoolhasthefreedomtodeterminewhomtoadmit,logicdictatesthatitalsohasthe right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as uponwhom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and thewithholdingofgraduationprivileges. Thus,inAteneodeManilav.Capulong(222SCRA643[1993]),theCourt upheld the expulsion of students found guilty of hazing bypetitionertherein,holdingthat:Noonecanbesomyopicastodoubtthattheimmediatereinstatementofrespondentstudentswhohavebeeninvestigatedandfoundguiltybythe Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner universitysdisciplinaryrulesandstandardswillcertainlyundermine theauthorityoftheadministrationoftheschool. Thiswewouldbemost loathetodo.More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner universitysacademicfreedomwhichhasbeenenshrinedinthe1935,1973andthepresent1987Constitution(Id.,at659660).(MiriamCollegeFoundation, Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,348SCRA265,Dec.15,2000,1stDiv.[Kapunan])38. Mayauniversityvalidlyrevokeadegreeorhonorithasconferredtoa studentafter thegraduationof the latterafter finding that suchdegreeorhonorwasobtainedthroughfraud?Held: In Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School ofTheology (68 SCRA 277 [1975]), the SC pointed out that academicfreedom of institutions of higher learning is a freedom granted toinstitutionsofhigher learningwhich is thusgivenawidesphereofauthority certainly extending to the choice of students. If such


41

institutionofhigherlearningcandecidewhocanandwhocannotstudyin it, itcertainlycanalsodetermineonwhom itcanconferthehonoranddistinctionofbeingitsgraduates.Where it isshownthattheconfermentofanhonorordistinctionwasobtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke orwithdrawthehonorordistinction ithasthusconferred. Thisfreedomofauniversitydoesnotterminateuponthegraduationofastudent,foritispreciselythegraduationofsuchastudentthatisinquestion.(UP Board of Regents v. Hon. Court of Appeals and ArokiaswamyWilliam Margaret Celine, G.R. No. 134625, Aug. 31, 1999, 2nd Div.[Mendoza])39. Whataretheessentialfreedomssubsumedinthetermacademicfreedom?Held: InAteneodeManilaUniversityv.Capulong(G.R.No.99327,27May 1993), this Court cited with approval the formulation made byJustice Felix Frankfurter of the essential freedoms subsumed in theterm academic freedom encompassing not only the freedom todetermine x x x on academic groundswhomay teach,whatmay betaught (and) how it shall be taught, but likewise who may beadmittedtostudy.Wehavethussanctioneditsinvocationbyaschoolin rejecting students who are academically delinquent (Tangonan v.Pano, 137 SCRA 245 [1985]), or a laywoman seeking admission to aseminary(Garciav.LoyolaSchoolofTheology,68SCRA277[1975]),orstudents violating School Rules on Discipline. (Ateneo de ManilaUniversityv.Capulong,supra.)(Isabelo,Jr.v.PerpetualHelpCollegeofRizal,Inc.,227SCRA595597,Nov.8,1993,EnBanc[Vitug])40. BetweentheCOAsfindingsandconclusionsandthatofprivateauditors,whichshouldprevail?


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Held:Moreover,astheconstitutionallymandatedauditorofallgovernmentagencies,theCOAsfindingsandconclusionsnecessarilyprevailoverthoseofprivateauditors,atleastinsofarasgovernmentagenciesandofficialsareconcerned.ThesuperiorityorpreponderanceoftheCOAauditoverprivateauditcanbegleanedfromtherecordsoftheConstitutionalCommissionxxx.Thefindingsandconclusionsoftheprivateauditormayguideprivateinvestorsorcreditorswhorequiresuchprivateaudit.Governmentagenciesandofficials,however,remainboundbythefindingsandconclusionsoftheCOA,whetherthematterfallsunderthefirstorsecondparagraphofSection2,unlessofcoursesuchfindingsandconclusionsaremodifiedorreversedbythecourts.ThepoweroftheCOAtoexamineandauditgovernmentagencies,whilenonexclusive,cannotbetakenawayfromtheCOA.Section3,ArticleIXCoftheConstitutionmandatesthat:Sec.3.NolawshallbepassedexemptinganyentityoftheGovernmentoritssubsidiaryinanyguisewhatsoever,oranyinvestmentofpublicfunds,fromthejurisdictionoftheCommissiononAudit.ThemerefactthatprivateauditorsmayauditgovernmentagenciesdoesnotdivesttheCOAofitspowertoexamineandauditthesamegovernmentagencies.TheCOAisneitherbypassednorignoredsinceevenwithaprivateaudittheCOAwillstillconductitsusualexaminationandaudit,anditsfindingsandconclusionswillstillbindgovernmentagenciesandtheirofficials.AconcurrentprivateauditposesnodangerwhatsoeverofpublicfundsorassetsescapingtheusualscrutinyofaCOAaudit.(DevelopmentBankofthePhilippinesv.CommissiononAudit,373SCRA356,January16,2002,EnBanc[Carpio])


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41. IstheconstitutionalpoweroftheCOAtoexamineandauditgovernmentbanksandagenciesexclusive?Doesitprecludeaconcurrentauditbyaprivateexternalauditor?Held:TheresolutionoftheprimordialissueofwhetherornottheCOAhasthesoleandexclusivepowertoexamineandauditgovernmentbanksinvolvesaninterpretationofSection2,ArticleIXDofthe1987Constitution.ThisSectionprovidesasfollows:Sec.2.(1)TheCommissiononAuditshallhavethepower,authority,anddutytoexamine,audit,andsettleallaccountspertainingtotherevenueandreceiptsof,andexpendituresorusesoffundsandproperty,ownedandheldintrustby,orpertainingto,theGovernment,oranyofitssubdivisions,agencies,orinstrumentalities,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationswithoriginalcharters,xxx.(2)TheCommissionshallhavetheexclusiveauthority,subjecttothelimitationsinthisArticle,todefinethescopeofitsauditandexamination,establishthetechniquesandmethodsrequiredtherefore,andpromulgateaccountingandauditingrulesandregulations,includingthoseforthepreventionanddisallowanceofirregular,unnecessary,excessive,extravagant,orunconscionableexpenditures,orusesofgovernmentfundsandproperties.(Emphasissupplied)TheCOAvigorouslyassertsthatunderthefirstparagraphofSection2,theCOAenjoysthesoleandexclusivepowertoexamineandauditallgovernmentagencies,includingtheDBP.TheCOAcontendsthisissimilartoitssoleandexclusiveauthority,underthesameparagraphofthesamesection,todefinethescopeofitsaudit,promulgateauditingrulesandregulations,includingrulesonthedisallowanceofunnecessaryexpendituresofgovernmentagencies.ThebarelanguageofSection2,however,showsthattheCOAspowerunderthefirst


44

paragraphisnotdeclaredexclusive,whileitsauthorityunderthesecondparagraphisexpresslydeclaredexclusive.Thereisasignificantreasonforthismarkeddifferenceinlanguage.DuringthedeliberationsoftheConstitutionalCommission,CommissionerSerafinGuingonaproposedtheadditionofthewordexclusiveinthefirstparagraphofSection2,therebygrantingtheCOAthesoleandexclusivepowertoexamineandauditallgovernmentagencies.However,theConstitutionalCommissionrejectedtheadditionofthewordexclusiveinthefirstparagraphofSection2andGuingonawasforcedtowithdrawhisproposal.Xxx.XxxInsharpcontrast,theConstitutionalCommissionplacedthewordexclusivetoqualifytheauthorityoftheCOAunderthesecondparagraphofthesameSection2.ThiswordexclusivedidnotappearinthecounterpartprovisionsofSection2inthe1935and1973Constitutions.ThereisnodisputethattheCOAsauthorityunderthesecondparagraphofSection2isexclusiveasthelanguageoftheConstitutionadmitsofnoothermeaning.Thus,theCOAhastheexclusiveauthoritytodecideondisallowancesofunnecessarygovernmentexpenditures.Othergovernmentagenciesandtheirofficials,aswellasprivateauditorsengagedbythem,cannotinanywayintrudeintothisexclusivefunctionoftheCOA.ThequalifyingwordexclusiveinthesecondparagraphofSection2cannotbeappliedtothefirstparagraphwhichisanothersubsectionofSection2.Aqualifyingwordisintendedtoreferonlytothephrasetowhichitisimmediatelyassociated,andnottoaphrasedistantlylocatedinanotherparagraphorsubsection(Felipev.DelaCruz,99Phil.940[1956];Tironav.Cudiamat,14SCRA264[1965]).Thus,thefirstparagraphofSection2mustbereadthewayitappears,withoutthe


45

wordexclusive,signifyingthatnonCOAauditorscanalsoexamineandauditgovernmentagencies.Besides,theframersoftheConstitutionintentionallyomittedthewordexclusiveinthefirstparagraphofSection2preciselytoallowconcurrentauditbyprivateexternalauditors.TheclearandunmistakableconclusionfromareadingoftheentireSection2isthattheCOAspowertoexamineandauditisnonexclusive.Ontheotherhand,theCOAsauthoritytodefinethescopeofitsaudit,promulgateauditingrulesandregulations,anddisallowunnecessaryexpendituresisexclusive.Xxx Manifestly,theexpresslanguageoftheConstitution,andtheclearintentofitsframers,pointtoonlyoneindubitableconclusiontheCOAdoesnothavetheexclusivepowertoexamineandauditgovernmentagencies.TheframersoftheConstitutionwerefullyawareoftheneedtoallowindependentprivateauditofcertaingovernmentagenciesinadditiontotheCOAaudit,aswhenthereisaprivateinvestmentinagovernmentcontrolledcorporation,orwhenagovernmentcorporationisprivatizedorpubliclylisted,orasinthecaseatbarwhenthegovernmentborrowsmoneyfromabroad. Intheseinstancesthegovernmententersthemarketplaceandcompeteswiththerestoftheworldinattractinginvestmentsorloans.Tosucceed,thegovernmentmustabidewiththereasonablebusinesspracticesofthemarketplace.Otherwisenoinvestororcreditorwilldobusinesswiththegovernment,frustratinggovernmenteffortstoattractinvestmentsorsecureloansthatmaybecriticaltostimulatemoribundindustriesorresuscitateabadlyshatterednationaleconomyasinthecaseatbar.BydesigntheConstitutionisflexibleenoughtomeettheseexigencies.Anyattempttonullifythisflexibilityinthe


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instancesmentioned,orinsimilarinstances,willbeultravires,intheabsenceofastatutelimitingorremovingsuchflexibility.ThedeliberationsoftheConstitutionalCommissionrevealeloquentlytheintentofSection2,ArticleIXDoftheConstitution.AsthisCourthasruledrepeatedly,theintentofthelawisthecontrollingfactorintheinterpretationofthelaw(Peoplev.Purisima,86SCRA542[1978];othersomitted).Ifalawneedsinterpretation,themostdominantinfluenceistheintentofthelaw(DeJesusv.CityofManila,29Phil.73[1914]).Theintentofthelawisthatwhichisexpressedinthewordsofthelaw,whichshouldbediscoveredwithinitsfourcornersaided,ifnecessary,byitslegislativehistory(ManilaLodgeNo.761v.CourtofAppeals,73SCRA162[1976]).InthecaseofSection2,ArticleIXDoftheConstitution,theintentoftheframersoftheConstitutionisevidentfromthebarelanguageofSection2itself.ThedeliberationsoftheConstitutionalCommissionconfirmexpresslyandevenelucidatefurtherthisintentbeyondanydoubtwhatsoever. ThereisanotherconstitutionalbarriertotheCOAsinsistenceofexclusivepowertoexamineandauditallgovernmentagencies.TheCOAsclaimclashesdirectlywiththeCentralBanksconstitutionalpowerofsupervisionoverbanksunderSection20,ArticleXIIoftheConstitution.Xxx Historically,theCentralBankhasbeenconductingperiodicandspecialexaminationandauditofbankstodeterminethesoundnessoftheiroperationsandthesafetyofthedepositsofthepublic.Undeniably,theCentralBankspowerofsupervisionincludesthepowertoexamineandauditbanks,asthebankinglawshavealwaysrecognizedthispoweroftheCentralBank.Hence,theCOAspowertoexamineandauditgovernmentbanksmustbereconciledwiththeCentralBankspowertosupervisethesamebanks.TheinevitableconclusionisthattheCOAandtheCentralBankhaveconcurrent


47

jurisdiction,undertheConstitution,toexamineandauditgovernmentbanks. However,despitetheCentralBanksconcurrentjurisdictionovergovernmentbanks,theCOAsauditstillprevailsoverthatoftheCentralBanksincetheCOAistheconstitutionallymandatedauditorofgovernmentbanks.AndinmattersfallingunderthesecondparagraphofSection2,ArticleIXDoftheConstitution,theCOAsjurisdictionisexclusive.Thus,theCentralBankisdevoidofauthoritytoallowordisallowexpendituresofgovernmentbankssincethisfunctionbelongsexclusivelytotheCOA.(DevelopmentBankofthePhilippinesv.CommissiononAudit,373SCRA356,January16,2002,EnBanc[Carpio])

EconomicPolicy42. Does theConstitutionalpolicyofa selfreliantand independentnationaleconomyruleoutforeigncompetition?Held: The constitutional policy of a selfreliant and independentnationaleconomydoesnotnecessarily ruleout theentryof foreigninvestments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economicseclusionnormendicancyintheinternationalcommunity.Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on equality andreciprocity, the fundamental law encourages industries that arecompetitive in both domestic and foreign markets, therebydemonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic tradeenvironment,butone in favorof the gradualdevelopmentof robustindustries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets.(Tanadav.Angara,272SCRA18[1997])


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43. IsPHILSECO(PhilippineShipyardandEngineeringCorporation),asa shipyard, a public utility and, hence, could be operated only by acorporationatleast60%ofwhosecapitalisownedbyFilipinocitizensinaccordancewithArticleXII,Section10oftheConstitution? Held:PetitionerassertsthatashipyardisapublicutilitypursuanttoSection13(b)ofCommonwealthActNo.146.Respondents,ontheother hand, contend that shipyards are no longer public utilities byexpress provision of Presidential Decree No. 666, which providedincentivestotheshipbuildingandshiprepairindustry. Indeed,P.D.No.666datedMarch5,1975explicitlystatedthatashipyardwasnotapublicutility.xxx However, Section 1 of P.D. No. 666 was expressly repealed bySection20ofBatasPambansaBlg.391,theInvestmentIncentivePolicyAct of 1983. Subsequently, Executive Order No. 226, the OmnibusInvestmentsCodeof1987,wasissuedandSection85thereofexpresslyrepealedB.P.Blg.391. TheexpressrepealofB.P.Blg.391byE.O.No.226didnotreviveSection1ofP.D.No.666,declassifyingtheshipbuildingandshiprepairindustry as a public utility, as said executive order did not provideotherwise. When a lawwhich expressly repeals a prior law is itselfrepealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unlessexpresslysoprovided(AdministrativeCodeof1987,Book I,Chapter5,Section 21). Consequently,when the APT [Asset Privatization Trust]draftedtheASBR[AssetSpecificBiddingRules]sometimein1993,P.D.No.666nolongerexistedinourstatutebooks.Whileitistruethattherepealofastatutedoesnotoperatetoimpairrightsthathavebecomevestedoraccruedwhile thestatutewas in force, therearenovestedrightsof theparties thatshouldbeprotected in thecaseatbar. The


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reasonissimple:saiddecreewasalreadyinexistentwhentheASBRwasissued. AshipyardsuchasPHILSECObeingapublicutilityasprovidedbylaw,thefollowingprovisionoftheArticleXIIoftheConstitutionapplies:Sec.11. No franchise,certificate,oranyother formofauthorizationfortheoperationofapublicutilityshallbegrantedexcepttocitizensofthePhilippinesortocorporationsorassociationsorganizedunderthelaws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum ofwhose capital isowned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, orauthorizationbeexclusiveincharacterorforalongerperiodthanfiftyyears.Neithershallanysuchfranchiseorrightbegrantedexceptunderthe condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, orrepealbytheCongresswhenthecommongoodsorequires.TheStateshall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the generalpublic. Theparticipationof foreign investors inthegoverningbodyofanypublicutilityenterpriseshallbelimitedtotheirproportionatesharein its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of suchcorporationorassociationshallbecitizensofthePhilippines. Theprogenitorofthisconstitutionalprovision,ArticleXIV,Section5ofthe1973Constitution,requiredthesameproportionof60%40%capitalization. The JVA [Joint Venture Agreement] between NIDC[National Investment and Development Corporation] and Kawasaki[Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. of Kobe, Japan] entered into onJanuary27,1977manifeststheintentionofthepartiestoabidebytheconstitutionalmandateoncapitalizationofpublicutilities.xxxAjointventureisanassociationofpersonsorcompaniesjointlyundertakingsomecommercialenterprisewithallofthemgenerallycontributingassetsandsharingrisks.xxx.Consideredmoreofapartnership(Aurbachv.SanitaryWaresManufacturingCorporation,


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G.R.No.75875,180SCRA130,147[1989]),ajointventureisgovernedbythelawsoncontractsandonpartnership.ThejointventurecreatedbetweenNIDCandKawasakifallswithinthepurviewofanassociationpursuanttoSection5ofArticleXIVofthe1973ConstitutionandSection11ofArticleXIIofthe1987Constitution.Consequently,ajointventurethatwouldengageinthebusinessofoperatingapublicutility,suchasashipyard,mustobservetheproportionof60%40%Filipinoforeigncapitalization.(JGSummitHoldings,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,345SCRA143,Nov.20,2000,1stDiv.[YnaresSantiago])TheRightsofIndigenousCulturalCommunities/IndigenousPeoples

44. Does R.A. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous PeoplesRights Act infringe upon the States ownership over the naturalresourceswithintheancestraldomains?Held: Petitionersposit that IPRAdeprives the Stateof itsownershipoverminerallandsofthepublicdomainandothernaturalresources,aswell as the States full control and supervision over the exploration,development and utilization of natural resources. Specifically,petitioners and the SolicitorGeneral assail Sections 3[a], 5, and 7 ofIPRA as violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution whichstates, inpart,that[a]ll landsofthepublicdomain,waters,minerals,coal,petroleum,andothermineraloils,all forcesofpotentialenergy,fisheries,forestsortimber,wildlife,floraandfauna,andothernaturalresourcesareownedbytheState.(Section2,ArticleXII,Constitution)TheywouldhavetheCourtdeclareasunconstitutionalSection3[a]ofIPRA because the inclusion of natural resources in the definition ofancestral domains purportedly results in the abdication of Stateownershipovertheseresources. Xxx


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Section 3[a] merely defines the coverage of ancestral domains, anddescribes the extent, limit and composition of ancestral domains bysetting forth the standards and guidelines in determiningwhether aparticulararea is tobeconsideredaspartofandwithin theancestraldomains.Inotherwords,Section3[a]servesonlyasayardstickwhichpointsoutwhatpropertiesarewithin theancestraldomains. Itdoesnot confer or recognize any right of ownership over the naturalresourcestotheindigenouspeoples.Itspurposeisdefinitionalandnotdeclarativeofarightortitle. The specificationofwhatareasbelong to theancestraldomainsis,toourmind,importanttoensurethatnounnecessaryencroachmentonprivatepropertiesoutside theancestraldomainswill resultduringthe delineation process. The mere fact that Section 3[a] definesancestraldomainsto includethenaturalresourcesfoundthereindoesnotipsofactoconvertthecharacterofsuchnaturalresourcesasprivatepropertyofthe indigenouspeoples. Similarly,Section5 inrelationtoSection 3[a] cannot be construed as a source of ownership rights ofindigenous people over the natural resources simply because itrecognizes ancestral domains as their private but communityproperty. The phrase private but community property is merelydescriptive of the indigenous peoples concept of ownership asdistinguished fromthatprovided intheCivilCode. xxx. Incontrast,the indigenous peoples concept of ownership emphasizes theimportance of communal or group ownership. By virtue of thecommunal character of ownership, the property held in commoncannot be sold, disposed or destroyed because it was meant tobenefitthewholeindigenouscommunityandnotmerelytheindividualmember.


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That IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over naturalresourcestotheindigenouspeoplesisalsoclearfromthedeliberationsofthebicameralconferencecommitteeonSection7whichrecitestherightsofindigenouspeoplesovertheirancestraldomainsxxx. Further,Section7makesnomentionofanyrightofownershipoftheindigenouspeoplesoverthenaturalresources.Infact,Section7[a]merely recognizes theright toclaimownershipover lands,bodiesofwatertraditionallyandactuallyoccupiedbyindigenouspeoples,sacredplaces, traditionalhuntingand fishinggrounds,andall improvementsmadebythematanytimewithinthedomains. NeitherdoesSection7[b],whichenumerates certain rightsof the indigenouspeoplesoverthenaturalresourcesfoundwithintheirancestraldomains,containanyrecognitionofownershipvisvisthenaturalresources. WhatisevidentisthattheIPRAprotectstheindigenouspeoplesrights and welfare in relation to the natural resources found withintheir ancestral domains, including the preservation of the ecologicalbalance therein and the need to ensure that the indigenous peopleswill not be unduly displaced when the Stateapproved activitiesinvolving the natural resources located therein are undertaken.(SeparateOpinion,Kapunan, J., in Cruz v. Secretary of EnvironmentandNaturalResources,347SCRA128,284293,Dec.6,2000,EnBanc[PerCuriam])45. Hastheconceptofnativetitletonaturalresources,likenativetitletoland,beenrecognizedinthePhilippines? Held: The concept of native title to natural resources, unlikenative title to land,hasnotbeen recognized in thePhilippines. NCIPand Flavier,etal. invoke the caseofReavies v. Fianza (40Phil.1017[1909],215US16,54LEd72)insupportoftheirthesisthatnativetitletonatural resourceshasbeenupheld in this jurisdiction. They insist


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thatitispossibleforrightsovernaturalresourcestovestonaprivate(asopposed to apublic)holder if thesewereheldprior to the 1935Constitution. However, a judicious examination of Reavies revealsthat,contrarytothepositionofNCIPandFlavier,etal.,theCourtdidnotrecognizenativetitletonaturalresources.Rather,itmerelyupheldthe right of the indigenous peoples to claim ownership of mineralsunderthePhilippineBillof1902. WhilexxxnativetitletolandorprivateownershipbyFilipinosofland by virtue of time immemorial possession in the concept of anowner was acknowledged and recognized as far back during theSpanishcolonizationofthePhilippines,therewasnosimilar favorabletreatment as regardsnatural resources. Theunique valueofnaturalresourceshasbeen acknowledgedby the State and is theunderlyingreason for itsconsistentassertionofownershipandcontroloversaidnaturalresourcesfromtheSpanishregimeuptothepresent. Naturalresources, especially minerals, were considered by Spain as anabundantsourceofrevenuetofinance itsbattle inwarsagainstothernations. Hence, Spain, by asserting its ownership over mineralswherever these may be found, whether in public or private lands,recognized the separabilityof titleover lands and thatovermineralswhich may be found therein (Noblejas, Philippine Law on NaturalResources1961RevisedEd.,p.6). Ontheotherhand,theUnitedStatesviewednaturalresourcesasasourceofwealthforitsnationals.Astheownerofnaturalresourcesover the Philippines after the latters cession from Spain, theUnitedStatessawitfittoallowbothFilipinoandAmericancitizenstoexploreand exploitminerals in public lands, and to grant patents to privatemineral lands. x x x. Although theUnited Statesmade adistinctionbetween minerals found in public lands and those found in privatelands, title in thesemineralswas inall cases sourced from theState.Theframersofthe1935Constitutionfounditnecessarytomaintainthe


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Statesownershipovernatural resources to insure their conservationfor future generations of Filipinos, to prevent foreign control of thecountry through economic domination; and to avoid situationswhereby the Philippines would become a source of internationalconflicts, thereby posing danger to its internal security andindependence. ThedeclarationofStateownershipandcontrolovermineralsandothernaturalresourcesinthe1935Constitutionwasreiteratedinboththe1973and1987Constitutions. (SeparateOpinion,Kapunan, J., inCruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 347 SCRA128,284293,Dec.6,2000,EnBanc[PerCuriam])46. Enumerate the Constitutional provisions recognizing andprotectingtherightsandinterestsoftheindigenouspeoples.Held: The framersof the1987Constitution, lookingback to the longdestitution of our less fortunate brothers, fittingly saw the historicopportunitytoactualizethe idealsofpeopleempowermentandsocialjustice, and to reach out particularly to the marginalized sectors ofsociety, including the indigenous peoples. They incorporated in thefundamental law several provisions recognizing and protecting therightsandinterestsoftheindigenouspeoples,towit:Section22.TheStaterecognizesandpromotestherightsofindigenouspeoples within the framework of national unity and development.(ArticleIIoftheConstitution,entitledStatePrinciplesandPolicies)Section5.TheState,subjecttotheprovisionsoftheConstitutionandnationaldevelopmentpoliciesandprograms,shallprotecttherightsofindigenousculturalcommunitiestotheirancestrallandstoensuretheireconomic,social,andculturalwellbeing.


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The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary lawsgoverningproperty rightsand relations indetermining theownershipandextentofancestraldomains.(ArticleXIIoftheConstitution,entitledNationalEconomyandPatrimony)Section1.TheCongressshallgivethehighestprioritytotheenactmentofmeasures that protect and enhance the right of all the people tohumandignity, reduce social,economicandpolitical inequalities,andremovecultural inequalitiesbyequitablydiffusingwealthandpoliticalpo

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