SANDIGANBAYAN, CALIMLIM v Ramirez.doc

7/27/2019 SANDIGANBAYAN, CALIMLIM v Ramirez.doc

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People v. Sandiganbayan

GR. No. 144159

Facts: Respondent MANUEL S. ALBA is a high ranking government official being the CityAdministrator of Quezon City with a salary grade of 27 while respondent JEREMIAS T.CRUZ is a private person. In his sworn complaint, complainant, LUIS PABALAN, stated

that he is the owner of a lot located at Susano Road, Novaliches, Quezon City, where theCongregation of Evangelist Church of the Philippines (IEMELIF) headed by respondentArchitect JEREMIAS T. CRUZ encroached when improvements on their structure weremade sometime in February 1997. The construction was done without the necessarybuilding permit. The Quezon City building official was, accordingly, informed andconsequently after hearing, the Assistant Building Official ordered the demolition of thestructure. The Order becomes final and executory upon failure of the religiouscongregation (IEMELIF) to appeal on time to the DPWH.

On November 4, 1998, however, IEMELIF, through respondent JEREMIAS T. CRUZ, wroterespondent City Administrator, Mr. MANUEL ALBA requesting the latter that said order be

not enforced pending appeal to the DPWH stating, among others, that the Order of theAssistant Building Official is illegal and the implementation of the same will causeirreparable damage and injury to the church (IEMELIF).

The letter of IEMELIF was received on November 5, 1998 by the Office of the respondentMANUEL ALBA but a Memorandum ordering the recall of the demolition order was datedNovember 4, 1998 or a day before the receipt of said letter.

The complainant objected and in a letter requested respondent ALBA to revoke the Orderrecalling the demolition, but respondent City Administrator refused and failed to respondand, as a result, the Building Official was not able to effect the demolition.

In his Counter-Affidavit, the respondent alleged, inter alia, that he acted on the appeal ofrespondent Cruz and recalled the demolition order which was issued by the buildingofficial. He did so on the basis of the authority delegated to him under the January 12,1994 Memorandum issued by the Mayor, as well as the guidelines implementing the saidmemorandum, where it was stated that no demolition shall be allowed pending anappeal to higher authorities.

The Graft Investigator found probable cause against the respondent for violation ofSection 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and recommended the filing of the Information

against him. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation.

On October 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the SB a Motion for Leave to OrderReinvestigation and/or Quash Information on the following grounds:

THE FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THEOMBUDSMAN, WHICH WAS THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION FILED AGAINST THEACCUSED, WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE OF THIS CASE.


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THE FACTS RECITED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT SUFFICIENT IN SUBSTANCE TOINDICT THE ACCUSED CRIMINALLY, BECAUSE THEY WERE BASED ON ERRONEOUSPREMISES CONTAINED IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED

MANUEL ALBAS MOTION TO QUASH ON THE BASIS OF A MEMORANDUM ISSUED BY THEQUEZON CITY MAYOR, WHICH MEMORANDUM HAS ALREADY BEEN SUPERSEDED.

HELD: We agree with the petitioner. The records show that the SB quashed theinformation with the ruling that the respondent acted on the basis of the January 12,1994 Memorandum to him of then Mayor Ismael Mathay. Under Section 3, Rule 117, ofthe Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion to quash an information may be filed only forthe following grounds:

SEC. 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on anyof the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various

offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse orjustification; and


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(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, orthe case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

To quash means to annul, vacate or overthrow.[23] The absence of probable cause forthe issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ground for the quashal of the Information butis a ground for the dismissal of the case.

It bears stressing that, even before the effectivity of the Revised Rules of CriminaProcedure, the Regional Trial Court issues a warrant for the arrest of the accused onlyupon a finding of probable cause based on the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor,the affidavits and other evidences appended to the Information, whatever evidence theProsecutor may adduce upon order of the court. If the court finds that there is noprobable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, it may dismiss the case. Thedismissal of the case is without prejudice to the refiling thereof unless barred byprescription

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions ofthe Sandiganbayan are NULLIFIED. The records are remanded to the Sandiganbayan forfurther proceedings.

Calimlim v. Ramirez

Facts: Sometime in 1961, a judgment for a sum of money was rendered in favor ofIndependent Mercantile Corporation against a certain Manuel Magali by the MunicipalCourt of Manila in Civil Case No. 85136. After said judgment became final, a writ ofexecution was issued on July 31, 1961. The Notice of Levy made on September 21, 1961on a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9138 registered in thename of "Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim", specified that the said levywas only against "all rights, title, action, interest and participation of the defendantManuel Magali over the parcel of land described in this title. " The Certificate of Saleexecuted by the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan on October 17, 1961 in favor ofIndependent Mercantile Corporation However, when the Sheriff issued the final Deed ofSale on January 25, 1963, it was erroneously stated therein that the sale was withrespect to "the parcel of land described in this title" (referring to TCT No. 9138) and notonly over the rights and interest of Manuel Magali in the same.

On February 23, 1967, Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in therespondent Court to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No.9138 in order that the same may be cancelled

On November 21, 1967, petitioner Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of Domingo

Magali, upon learning that her husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled,filed a petition with the respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for thecancellation of TCT No. 68568. Order dated June 3, 1968 dismissing the petition

The herein petitioners did not appeal the dismissal of the petition they filed in LRCRecord No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568. Instead, on January 11, 1971,they filed the complaint in Civil Case No. SCC-180 Named as defendant in said civil casewas herein private respondent Francisco Ramos who claimed to have bought theproperty from Independent Mercantile Corporation on July 25, 1967.


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Private respondent Francisco Ramos filed a Motion To Dismiss Civil Case No. SCC-180 onthe ground that the same is barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations.Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court, in its Order dated April 21, 1971,dismissed Civil Case No. SCC- 180 on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment. A MotionFor Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the respondent Judge in hisOrder of September 2, 1971. A second Motion For Reconsideration was similarly deniedin the Order dated September 29, 197 1. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are deemed estopped from questioning thejurisdiction of the respondent Court in having taken cognizance of the petition forcancellation of TCT No. 68568.

HELD: NO. We are of the opinion that the ruling laid down in Sibonghanoy may not beapplied herein. Neither its factual backdrop nor the philosophy of the doctrine thereinexpounded fits the case at bar. e Court stated that Tijam is an exception to the generalrule because of the presence of laches:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisionsso numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of theaction is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of theparties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements whichstemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of [Tijam]. It is to be regretted,however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which wereobviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in [Tijam]which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objectionto jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedlyupheld that rendered the supposed ruling in [Tijam]not as the exception, but rather thegeneral rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issueof jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. In Tijam, the lack of jurisdiction wasraised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after thequestioned ruling had been rendered. Hence, the Court ruled that the issue ofjurisdiction may no longer be raised for being barred by laches.

The petitioners in the instant case may not be faulted with laches. They can hardly bepresumed to have abandoned or waived such right by inaction within an unreasonablelength of time or inexcusable negligence. In short, their filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180which in itself is an implied non-acceptance of the validity of the proceedings had in LRCRecord No. 39492 may not be deemed barred by estoppel by laches.

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SANDIGANBAYAN, CALIMLIM v Ramirez.doc