Noel vs. CA

Facts:

Hilaria and Gregorio (Sps. Nanaman) were childless. Gregorio, however, had a child named Virgilio, by another woman, which they reared as if like it was their own. When Gregorio died, Hilaria administered the properties left his husband. With the help of Virgilio, they enjoyed the land to the exclusion of Gregorio’s brother and other children by also another woman. Virgilio declared te land in his name for taxation purposes reflected in a Tax Declaration. Sometime after, the land was mortgage by Hilaria and Virgilio to the private respondent, DELESTE. The same land was subsequently sold to Deleste and another tax declaration was issued, now, in favor of the private respondent.

When Hilaria died, the other children of Gregorio filed an intestate claim over the estate of their father. Also, Gregorio’s brother raised that he should be included as heir of Gregorio. Hence, the case was consolidated. The petition was further amended to include the estate of Hilaria and his brother and his brother’s son to be additional petitioners.

Juan Nanaman (Brother of Gregorio ) as appointed as administrator of the land, included the entire lot (34.7 hectares) in the list of assets of the estate. Edilberto Noel subsequently took over as administrator of the estate. Noel was not able to take possession of the land since it was in the possession of DELESTE and some heirs of Hilaria.

Thereafter, DELESTE and the heirs of the Sps. Nanaman(children of gregorio and relatives of Hilaria_ executed an amicable settlement of the Nanaman Estate, Deleste agreed to relinquish his rights over ½ of the entire land sold to him by Hilaria and Virgilio in favor of the heirs. It was approved by the court but was rendered null and void because not all heirs have agreed.

The court ordered noel to file an action to recover the ENTIRE land from Deleste, which he did.

RTC: Sale of entire land even if the said land was conjugal is valid since Hilaria acted as an administratrix of the estate of Gregorio, in which proceeds were used to pay debts of the conjugal property.

CA: Noel appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision of February 18, 1980, the appellate court ruled that the transaction between Hilaria and Virgilio on one hand and private respondent on the other, was indeed a sale. It found that no fraud, mistake or misrepresentation attended in the execution of the deed of sale and that no proof was shown that the contract was merely a mortgage.

The appellate court, however, agreed with Noel that Hilaria could not validly sell the 37.7-hectare land because it was conjugal property, and Hilaria could sell only her one-half share thereof.

CA AMENDED: Decision of the trial court affirmed. They relied heavily that the respondents slept on their rights, raising the ground of prescription.

ISSUE: whether or not the contract of sale is valid.

Under Spanish law which was effective at the time of death of Gregorio. Hilaria could only obtain the undivided ½ share of the estate which she could validly alienate. And with respect to Virgilio, the Spanish law does not give right over an illegitimate child inheritance. Hence, with respect to his share, he cannot validly alienate it.

SC: On the other hand, Virgilio was not an heir of Gregorio under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889. Although he was treated as a child by the Nanaman spouses, illegitimate children who were not natural were disqualified to inherit under the said Code (Cid v. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 [1968]). Article 998 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which gave an illegitimate child certain hereditary rights, could not benefit Virgilio because the right of ownership of the collateral heirs of Gregorio had become vested upon his death (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 2253; Uson v. Del Rosario, 92 Phil. 530 [1953]). Therefore, Virgilio had no right at all to transfer ownership over which he did not own.

In a contract of sale, it is essential that the seller is the owner of the property he is selling. The principal obligation of a seller is "to transfer the ownership of" the property sold (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 1458). This law stems from the principle that nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him (Azcona v. Reyes, 59 Phil. 446 [1934]; Coronel v. Ona, 33 Phil. 456 [1916). NEMO DAT QUAD NON HABET .

Ratio: What Noel is trying to tell us is that a person cannot sell what he does not own. However, nowhere in the decision states that the sale will be void if there is no ownership by the seller at the time of perfection. This is consistent with Article 1459 which states that the vendor must have a right to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered.

Nool vs. CA

Two (2) parcels of land are in dispute and litigated upon here. The first has an area of 1 hectare. It was formerly owned by Victorino Nool and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-74950. With an area of 3.0880 hectares, the other parcel was previously owned by Francisco Nool under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-100945. Both parcels are situated in San Manuel, Isabela. The plaintiff spouses,

Conchita Nool and Gaudencio Almojera, now the appellants, seek recovery of the aforementioned parcels of land from the defendants, Anacleto Nool, a younger brother of Conchita, and Emilia Nebre, now the appellees.

Conchita and Gaudencio (C&G) mortgaged the real properties with the DBP. Thereafter, the properties were foreclosed. Within the redemption period, C&G contacted Anacleto to redeem the foreclosed properties, which he did. As a result, the two lands were transferred in the name of A. As part of their agreement and understanding, A agreed to buy from C&G the properties for 100k, 30k of which the price was paid to C&G and upon payment of the balance of 14k, C&G will regain the two hectares of land, which the defendant failed to pay. On the same day the agreement was made, another covenant was entered into by the parties; whereby A agreed to return the lands to C&G at any time C&G have the necessary amount to redeem the land. A signed the private writing, agreeing to return subject lands when plaintiffs have the money to redeem the same; A having been made to believe, then, that his sister, Conchita, still had the right to redeem the said properties.

RTC: Private writing only an option to sell and considered validly withdrawn for want of consideration. Hence, the said writing is not binding.

Worthy to stress is that the DBP where the land was mortgaged, certified that the redemption period of the foreclosed property prescribed, making DBP as the rightful owner of the land. It is only upon a conditional sale that it was redeemed by A, which was evidenced by a certificate of title.

ISSUE: W/N the sale is valid, making the right of repurchase likewise valid.

Held: Not valid.

One repurchases only what one has previously sold. In other words, the right to repurchase presupposes a valid contract of sale between the same parties. Undisputedly, private respondents acquired title to the property from DBP, and not from the petitioners.

In the present case however, it is likewise clear that the sellers can no longer deliver the object of the sale to the buyers, as the buyers themselves have already acquired title and delivery thereof from the rightful owner, the DBP. Thus, such contract may be deemed to be inoperative[20] and may thus fall, by analogy, under item no. 5 of Article 1409 of the Civil Code: Those which contemplate an impossible service. Article 1459 of the Civil Code provides that the vendor must have a right to transfer the ownership thereof [object of the sale] at the time it is delivered. Here, delivery of ownership is no longer possible. It has become impossible.

Furthermore, Article 1505 of the Civil Code provides that where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or

with consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the sellers authority to sell. Here, there is no allegation at all that petitioners were authorized by DBP to sell the property to the private respondents. Jurisprudence, on the other hand, teaches us that a person can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell; the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than what the seller can legally transfer. No one can give what he does not have neno dat quod non habet. On the other hand, Exhibit D presupposes that petitioners could repurchase the property that they sold to private respondents. As petitioners sold nothing, it follows that they can also repurchase nothing. Nothing sold, nothing to repurchase. In this light, the contract of repurchase is also inoperative and by the same analogy, void.

Villanueva: The problem in Nool is that it equated the primary obligation in a contract of sale to transfer ownership and deliver possession as “service”. It must not be forgotten, a contract of sale gives rise to a real obligation, which is “to give” and not an obligation “to do” which is the prestation in a “service”. Further, a contract of sale can be enforced by specific performance, which is “to give” to the prestation due. On the other hand, “service” cannot be subject to the remedy of specific performance, since it will constitute involuntary servitude.