safety product innovation - asac 2012

Safety Product Innovation 1

ASAC 2012

A Theory of Safety Product Innovation:

The Case of the National Hockey League

The purpose of this paper is to develop a theory for the diffusion of safety products in the

workplace based on the adoption of safety products in the National Hockey League. We develop the

concept of safety product innovations (SPI) which is defined as new products (i.e., after adoption by

workers) designed to decrease the likelihood of sustaining an injury in the workplace. To illustrate the

factors affecting the adoption of SPI’s we investigate the adoption of hockey equipment in the NHL.

By the age of 22, Sidney Crosby had won a Stanley Cup, an Olympic gold medal, a National

Hockey League (NHL) scoring title, and an NHL MVP award. At the time, Crosby was viewed as the

best hockey player in the sport, and it seemed as if nothing could stop the former number one draft pick.

That all changed on January 5, 2011, when the young centre suffered hits to the head in two consecutive

games. Crosby experienced concussion symptoms and went on to miss the last 41 games of the season

and the first 20 games of the 2011-2012 season. With the NHL’s best player kept off the ice for almost

one year; and high profile players in the other major sports leagues also sidelined due to head injuries; the

topic of head injuries and protecting the players has flooded the media. The NHL is attempting to

improve the equipment and safety products used by the players to decrease the incidence of head injuries

without negatively affecting the entertainment aspect of the game. The purpose of this paper is to develop

a theory for the diffusion of safety products in the workplace based on the adoption of safety products in

the NHL.

Introduction


As industries continue to evolve and become even more technologically advanced, concerns and

precautions of workplace safety are also evolving with the goal of reducing the incidence of workplace

injuries across all industries. This research is very timely, as workplace safety is receiving more attention

in work environments and in the media across North America. We classify current research on workplace

safety initiatives into three broad categories, safety behaviours, the environment, and safety products.

The literature on workplace safety includes examples of safety behaviours, safe work

environments and safety products (Shannon, Robson, and Sale, 2001). There is a paucity of literature,

however, on how these safety product innovations arise and diffuse among the workforce. To fill this gap

in the literature, we investigate the adoption of safety products, and present the concept of safety product

innovations (SPI’s). The innovation literature differentiates between innovations and inventions, wherein

“An invention does not become an innovation until it has processed through production and marketing

tasks and is diffused into the marketplace” (Garcia & Calantone, 2002, p. 112). Thus, products designed

to improve workplace safety become SPI’s once adopted in the workplace, and until adoption, they

remain inventions. We define SPI’s as new products (i.e., after adoption by workers) designed to decrease

the likelihood of sustaining an injury in the workplace. SPI’s are designed to reduce the risk of injury in

the workplace, however the literature shows that many workers resist the adoption of SPI’s even when

aware of the inherent risks of not using SPI’s. Many factors affect the adoption of SPI’s, and

understanding the adoption process will assist in the design of SPI’s, and introduction of SPI’s in the

workplace.

To illustrate the factors affecting adoption of SPI’s we investigate the adoption of hockey

equipment in the National Hockey League (NHL) and aim to investigate adoption rates of SPI’s

introduced by the workers (i.e., the players) and SPI’s introduced by the employer (i.e., the NHL). The

NHL and other professional sports leagues are experiencing criticism for the high incidence of injuries

sustained by the players. In response to the criticism, the NHL is continuing to improve the standards of

safety equipment used within the league. Hockey equipment has evolved from simple homemade padding


to advanced lightweight products; however, the NHL has traditionally taken a considerable amount of

time before mandating the use of SPI’s. Similar to mandatory use of SPI’s in other industries, some

hockey equipment in the NHL is mandated and all players must adopt the equipment in order to play. We

investigate the diffusion of SPI’s within the NHL to establish a theory of SPI diffusion, and to provide a

starting point for future research on the adoption of SPI’s in the workplace.

Background Literature

Workplace safety. Injuries in the workplace occur on a daily basis across all industries. Injuries

and accidents in the workplace are prevalent despite efforts to improve workplace safety (Holcom,

Lehman, & Simpson, 1993). In 2001, the cost of all unintentional workplace injuries in the United States

amounted to $132 billion and organizations lost approximately 130 million workdays due to injuries (Seo,

2005). Aside from sustaining a physical injury, the threat of suffering an injury at work is a source of

considerable stress for employees when their perceived work environment is unsafe (Cox, 1997). To

reduce stress experienced by the employees, managers can increase their commitment to safety and

promote employee participation in safety programs (Hoffman & Stetzer, 1996). Seo (2005) found that

higher perceived safety climate is a significant causal predictor of higher levels of safety behaviour and

can counteract the strain and other ill effects experienced when the demands of the job are viewed as

outside the worker’s control (Karasek, 1979). The physical consequences of working in an unsafe

environment, and the ergonomics of the work environment can determine the workers’ quality of health

and life outside of the workplace (Cox, 1993; Cox, 1997; Kirschenbaum, Oigenblick, & Goldberg, 2000).

The interpersonal and psychosocial aspects of the workplace can also negatively affect the relationships

and personal health of the employees (Pugliesi, 1999).

Shannon, Robson, and Sale (2001) provide an extensive list of research on workplace safety

focusing on the risk behaviours affecting workplace safety and the traditional workplace health promotion

(WHP) programs designed to reduce the incidence of injury. WHP programs and other safety initiatives


focus on changing the individual behaviours of the workers, however the programs often receive low

levels of participation, and safety behaviours often decrease with time (Shannon et al., 2001). While

interventions to change individual behaviours have improved workplace safety, to maximize workplace

safety, the safety system and culture must be addressed (Shannon et al., 2001; Hale & Hovden, 1998).

Safety equipment is also used to reduce the incidence of workplace injuries, however the time taken for

employees to adopt safety products can vary. Buxton’s (1946) study of coal miners showed that some

workers do not adopt the safety products until forced to do so by industry or organizational regulations.

Safety product innovations. Safety product innovation (SPI) is a classification for a product that is

used by workers in a workplace to decrease the likelihood of sustaining an injury. SPI’s are new products

designed to meet the unique demands of a work environment and the specific tasks the workers undertake

on a daily basis. A SPI is a broad classification that encompasses other safety products like personal

protective equipment (PPE). PPE is worn to protect the wearer’s body from injury in work, sports, and

combat situations (Peoples, Gerlinger, Craig, & Burlingame, 2005). The introduction of SPI’s to an

industry and the adoption by employees and management has been virtually unstudied. Current research

alarmingly shows that a high percentage of SPI’s are introduced following serious injuries in the

workplace (Stout & Linn, 2002). Understanding the reasons SPI’s are introduced, and who introduces

them can assist in determining the most effective method of diffusing SPI’s. Another gap in the literature

on SPI’s is the process by which the innovations become regulated and adopted within industries, and at

what point they become mandated by a regulating body. Exploring the origins of SPI’s and the parties

that introduce the innovations to an organization or an industry can assist in understanding the process of

SPI diffusion.

SPIs and workplace safety programs have reduced the incidence of workplace injuries over the

last century. Catastrophes throughout history (e.g., the mining explosion at Monongah, West Virginia,

that killed 362 men) have increased awareness that high risk of injury or death at work is not acceptable

(Stout & Linn, 2002). “Risk” is the probability of physical harm, and “accidents” are the unexpected


failures of “safety” which is the steady state of injury prevention (Turner & Tennant, 2009). The high

incidence of workplace accidents has resulted in the development of preventive strategies such as

legislation and regulation of mandatory safety practices and equipment. Following the 1972 disaster at

Sunshine Mine near Kellogg, Idaho, the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) was formed and

the MSHA mandated that all miners carry breathing devices (Stout & Linn, 2002). Workplace safety

initiatives (i.e., WHP programs and other safety guidelines) and products are often introduced following a

safety disaster or a series of accidents in the workplace. In mines, increased ventilation, explosion-proof

equipment, rock dusting, and the development of rescue plans, strict smoking policies, and safety teams

have increased the likelihood of miners surviving explosions and fires (Stout & Linn, 2002).

SPIs utilized within safety programs further minimize the incidence of workplace injuries. In

most cases, the use of SPI’s alone cannot prevent injury and employees can experience a false sense of

security when using SPI’s. An example of this behaviour is the tendency for individuals driving vehicles

to drive less carefully when wearing a seatbelt (Cohen & Einav, 2003; Peltzman, 1975). A collective

approach to safety can decrease the incidence of workplace injury through the combination of safety

behaviours and the use of safety products. SPI’s like personal protective equipment (PPE) play

instrumental roles in reducing injuries and illnesses when used appropriately, however workers frequently

complain of equipment being uncomfortable and the equipment is often discarded (Nunneley, 1989).

Improper fit and the added weight of PPE creates discomfort, and perceptions of the equipment being

unfashionable can negatively affect usage (Akbar-Khanzadeh, Bisesi, & Rivas, 1995). According to

Akbar- Khanzadeh et al. (1995), managers should solicit employees’ assistance in the selection and

testing of PPE and the more the wearer knows about the equipment and its purpose, the greater the

likelihood the correct PPE will be worn consistently.

The demand for safety products differs across industries and safety products are enhanced and

tailored to meet the specific needs of an industry. The hazardous work circumstances that often precede

workplace injuries (Turner, Chmiel, Hershcovis, & Walls, 2010) differ between industries, and therefore


different industries require unique SPI’s to meet industry-specific safety needs. Some of examples of

SPI’s include: breathing devices, steel-toe boots, knee pads, and helmets for miners (Buxton 1946; Stout

& Linn, 2002); ear protectors, goggles, safety gloves, safety boots, helmets and leg protectors in the

logging industry (Klen &Vayrynen, 1983); and respirators (e.g. particulate air filter respirators), face

shields, rubber boots for pesticide exposure, sunscreen (Schenker, Orenstein, & Samuels, 2002), and

hearing protection on farms (Reed, Browning, Westneat, & Kidd, 2006).

Diffusion of innovations. Extensive research exists on the different models and processes of

innovation diffusion. Understanding the market in which an innovation will be introduced is essential for

the commercial success of a product (Dougherty, 1990), and understanding the diffusion process is

important for entrepreneurs and managers when identifying markets. The diffusion of innovations can

affect the development of marketing strategies, product design, and the business plan; however, new

product developers often fail to accurately assess the market (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1986). The market

and target population must be accurately assessed in the development of effective SPI’s. If innovators

neglect to assess the needs of the targeted individuals, adoption of the SPI’s is less likely to occur.

The diffusion of innovations is one of the major mechanisms of social and technical change

(Katz, Levin, & Hamilton, 1963). Diffusion is the process by which an innovation spreads, and the

diffusion process is the spread of a new idea from its source of invention or creation to its ultimate uses or

adopters (Rogers, 1962). From a sociological perspective of diffusion, Katz (1961) stated that social

structures serve as boundaries within which innovations spread. Social structures such as social norms,

different degrees of social integration, or status variations within the larger social structure, can affect the

rate of adoption. Rogers (1962, p. 12) lists four crucial elements in the analysis of the diffusion of

innovations: (1) the innovation, (2) its communication from one individual to another (3) in a social

system (4) over time. Individuals adopt new ideas at different times, and according to Rogers (1962),

innovativeness is a continuous dimension and early adopters are more innovative than other adopters are.

The diffusion of innovations within a social group has been researched using different models (Mahajan


& Peterson, 1978; Wind, Mahajan, & Cardozo, 1981), with the majority of the models including a

diffusion rate at time t (Sultan, Farley, Lehmann, 1990; Mahajan & Peterson, 1985).

Adoption is a decision process on the part of the adopter that is affected by the product, and the

individuals’ characteristics such as age, social status, financial position, area of specialization, cognitive

ability, and communication behaviours (Bernhardt & Mackenzie, 1972; Rogers, 1962). According to

Rogers (1962) adoption or rejection of an innovation takes place in several stages, and begins with

awareness of an innovation and the formation of an attitude based on the individual’s perception of the

innovation. After developing a perception of the innovation, the individual decides to confirm or reject

the innovation, then implements it and then confirms his/her decision.

Rogers’ (1962) model of diffusion is an orderly sequence of events, in which all members of a

population eventually adopt an innovation. The present paper seeks to understand the adoption rates of

SPI’s in the workplace, and to understand the patterns of adoption and the groups of workers that adopt

the SPI in different stages before the SPI is mandated. The model proposed by Rogers (see Figure 1)

includes the most widely accepted method of adopter categorization (Mahajan, Muller, & Srivastava,

1990). A normal curve of distribution displays the five different adopter categories based on relative time

of adoption of the innovation (See Figure 1). “Innovators” are the first 2.5% of the individuals to adopt a

new idea, and early adopters are comprised the next 13.5% of adopters. The “early majority” includes the

next 34% of the adopters; the “late majority” is comprised of 34% of the total adopters; and the final 16%

of adopters are the “laggards”.


A select few innovators in a social group initially adopt a product; influencing others group

members to adopt (Schmittlein & Mahajan, 1982). According to Rogers and Shoemaker (1971),

interpersonal communication is accountable for rapid growth in the diffusion process. Mahajan et al.

(1990) analyzed the literature on the importance of adopter categories, and posited that adopter categories

can assist in targeting the potential innovators for a new product, and can assist in predicting the

continued acceptance of a product and in the development of market strategies for the different adopter

categories. Rogers’ model was used to analyze the implementation and adoption of new practices and

innovations in clinical settings (Landrum, 1998; Lee, 2004; Lekan-Rutledge, 2000). Lee (2004) used

Rogers’ model to describe nurses’ behaviours during the process of adopting workplace innovations (i.e.,

computers for patient care and documentation). However, Rogers’ model of diffusion has been criticised

for its’ assumption that all members adopt an innovation. Mahajan and Peterson (1985) present other

adopter distributions, and Peterson (1973) argues that in most marketing situations new products are

likely to exhibit non-normal adoption distributions.

Methods

Figure 1. Rogers Model of Diffusion (Rogers, 1962)


We adopt an inductive case study design (Yin, 2008) to develop a theory for the diffusion of

SPI’s. The focal case is the NHL, with a specific interest in the development of SPIs in this setting. To

develop the in-depth case study we draw on books, articles, websites, blogs and other secondary sources

of data. We also draw on the review of workplace safety, innovation, and diffusion literature, to frame

our study of SPIs adopted by the players in the NHL. Identifying the initial adopters (i.e., the innovators)

of a SPI is central to understanding the diffusion process. The relationship between the innovating body

(i.e., the worker or the employer) and the time taken for 100% adoption also remains unstudied. Employer

regulated SPI’s require all employees to use the innovation in the workplace and workers not complying

with the mandate are refused the right to work. We observe the NHL’s process of mandating SPI’s and

present several propositions for the diffusion of SPI’s.

The Case of SPIs in the NHL

The National Hockey League

The NHL is regarded as the world’s elite level of professional hockey competition (Perlini &

Halverson, 2006). After the National Hockey Association (NHA) disbanded, the NHL was organized in

1917, in Montreal, Quebec. At its birth, the league was comprised of four teams, but through expansions,

contractions and relocations the league now boasts 30 active franchises. Rivalries between teams have

been present for decades, especially between members of the “original six” teams (i.e., the Boston Bruins,

Chicago Blackhawks, Detroit Red Wings, Montreal Canadiens, New York Rangers, and the Toronto

Maple Leafs) that all date back to the NHL’s first decade, and pre-date the other 24 teams by over forty

years. As the fans embrace the rivalries, the NHL continues to reach new financial milestones and set new

revenue records. The NHL set an all-time sponsorship record in 2010-2011, and netted more than $2.9

billion after the 2011 Stanley Cup Playoffs, which made it the fifth consecutive year of record total

revenue (NHL, 2011).


We argue that NHL players are equivalent to employees of the NHL. As employees, the players

deserve the same rights awarded to workers in other industries. In 1967, the NHL Players’ Association

(NHLPA) was established as the labour union for the professional hockey players in the NHL (NHLPA,

2011). The NHLPA represents NHL players in all matters dealing with their rights and working

conditions, and assures that the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement are met. The players elect

representatives from the 30 teams to form the Executive Board that provides assistance and guidance to

members of the union.

Injury in hockey. Hockey is one of the fastest and most violent games in the world (Sim, Simonet,

Melton, & Lehn, 1987) and hockey players are at risk of sustaining injury each time they step on the ice.

In the NHL there were over 1000 injuries accounting for over 6000 missed games during the 2000-2001

season (Janski & Meyer, 2004). Sim et al. (1987) collected data on the incidence of injuries in numerous

leagues and from different age groups (i.e., prior to the mandatory use of helmets or face masks), and

found facial contusions and lacerations to be the most frequent type of injury sustained by hockey players

(i.e., 75% of all injuries). The majority of injuries occurred in the head, scalp, face, or eye region. A study

conducted by Hayes (1975) included twenty-one Canadian, and nine American college hockey teams

during the 1970-1971 season, and found an incidence of 1.17 injuries per team per game. Tegner and

Lorentzon (1991) observed all twelve Swedish elite hockey teams during the 1988-1989 season and found

the overall incidence of injury to be 53.0 per 1000 player-game hours. Injuries suffered in hockey can be

very severe, and in Canada, hockey is the cause of several spinal injuries and deaths each year (Tator &

Edmonds, 1984; Tator, Ekong, Rowed, Schwartz, Edmonds, & Cooper, 1984).

A study of elite American amateur (Junior A) hockey players identified the face as the most

common injury site and facial lacerations as the most common type of injury sustained (Stuart & Smith,

1995). During the course of a game, elbows, sticks and pucks that reach speeds of 120 miles per hour

(Sutherland, 1976) can strike a player’s face. Even more serious than lacerations and bruises are dental

and eye injuries that have permanent debilitating consequences. Beginning in the 1950’s, players were


allowed to raise their sticks over their shoulders, and the slapshot was born (Stoner & Keating, 1993).

Players began curving their sticks, and suddenly shots were reaching speeds upwards of 100 miles per

hour and sticks were raised above players’ shoulders.

Removing physical contact from the sport would likely decrease the incidence of head injuries in

the NHL; however, physical contact is central to hockey culture and creates excitement for both the

players and the fans. Research indicates that norms of aggression and violence within the game start at a

young age whereby young hockey players strive to model their play after the aggressive acts of

professional hockey players (Collings & Condon, 1996; Smith, 1978). Janksi and Meyer (2004) provide

an extensive list of research to support the claim that the existence of aggressive and violent behaviour is

justified on both individual and team levels. Research has shown that aggression is inversely correlated

with precautionary behaviour and players who do not take precautions are viewed as more heroic than

players that take precautions (Russell, 1974).

Head injury in hockey. Due to the increased rate of reported head injuries in ice hockey,

concussions have become a major public health concern in recent years (Stevens, Lassonde, de

Beaumont, & Keenan, 2006; Wiebe, Comstock, & Nance, 2011). NHL hockey players perform at an elite

level while employed in a workplace where they experience high levels of impact, and head injuries

cannot be completely prevented (Herring et. al, 2006). However, the use of proper safety equipment can

reduce the incidence of concussions caused by physical blows to the head or by movement of the brain in

the skull, and in recent years, rule and equipment changes have reduced the incidence of head injuries in

organized contact sports (Torg, Vegso, Sennet, & Das, 1985). However, according to Herring et al.

(2006), the use of helmets decreases the incidence of skull fracture and major head trauma but may

actually increase the incidence of concussion. Research suggests that athletes are more likely to play

“recklessly” when using mandatory safety product innovations (SPI’s) such as helmets and full facial

protection in hockey (Janski & Meyer, 2004; Murray & Livingston, 1995; Stuart, Smith, Malo-Ortiguera,

Fischer, & Larson, 2002; Stoner & Keating, 1993) and the use taping and support sleeves in rugby union


(Marshall et al., 2005). Mandatory helmet and facemask usage has been effective in reducing eye injuries

(Pashby, 1979; 1993); however helmet and facemask mandates have been correlated with increases in

head and neck injuries (Sim et al., 1987). Sim et al. (1987) propose these findings are due to the

improvement and development of the players (i.e., conditioning and skills) and the inability of SPI’s to

evolve at the same rate as the athletes (Sim et al., 1987).

NHL players are getting bigger and faster (Wennberg & Tator, 2003) and the fans want to see

lighting quick slapshots, big hits, and violent fights. Despite awareness of head injuries, physical contact

remains a desirable aspect of the game. Health considerations regarding concussions have shown that

athletes experiencing repetitive blows to the head suffer long term consequences detrimental to their

future well-being (Bailes & Cantu, 2001) and that head injuries can be career-ending even when the

injury is recognized and managed appropriately (Benson, Meeuwisse, Rizos, Kang, & Burke, 2011).

Researchers estimate that 1.6 to 3.8 million traumatic brain injuries occur in the United States each year

due to sports and recreation (Langlois, Rutland-Brown, & Wald, 2006). In hockey, when the player’s

body and head are in motion and strike a solid object, there is a high degree of acceleration-deceleration

energy, and head injuries are likely to occur (Bailes & Cantu, 2001). Head injuries occur when; a player is

struck on the head with a stick or puck (i.e., low-mass/high-velocity impact); a player is struck by another

player; or when a player contacts the surface of the ice, goalpost, or the sideboards (i.e., high-mass/low-

velocity impact; Bailes & Cantu, 2001; Bishop & Wells, 1989).

The enforcement of rules and safety regulations in hockey has increased awareness of head

injuries and there has been a decreased incidence of head injuries (Rampton, Leach, Therrien, Bota, &

Rowe, 1997). However, efforts to lessen the incidence of injury or concussion have focused on the

equipment worn (Bailes & Cantu, 2001). Research has shown that safety product innovations (SPI’s) can

reduce the likelihood of sustaining certain injuries, but not others. In some cases, use of a SPI can

increase the incidence of the injury it was intended to prevent. For example, the incidence of concussions

increased following the NHL’s mandate (1979-1980 season) that all players entering the league wear


helmets (Wennberg & Tator, 2003). The launch of the NHL-NHLPA Concussion Program by the NHL

and the NHLPA in 1997 aimed to examine the concussion from a scientific perspective and to contribute

new knowledge to the study of head injuries (Meeuwisse, Burke, & Benson, 2003). NHL team doctors are

required to document all concussions sustained during regular season games using standardized injury

report forms (Meeuwisse & Burke, 2001). Benson et al. (2011) reported that between the 1997-1998

season and the 2003-2004 season there were 559 physician-diagnosed, regular-season in-game

concussions with an overall rate of 5.8 concussions per 100 players per season.

In organized football, the incidence of serious head injuries and fatalities has decreased

substantially since four-way chinstraps were innovated and since more absorptive materials were placed

in the lining of the helmet in a suspension configuration (Bailes & Cantu, 2001). After improvements to

helmet design and following the addition of the facemask, the incidence of serious head injuries in

football declined, however there was a simultaneous increase in spinal cord injury as players began using

their helmets as battering rams (Bailes & Cantu, 2001; Torg et al., 1985). Similarly, in ice hockey, players

often adopt a false sense of security when wearing protective equipment (Murray & Livingston, 1995)

and the increased sense of security promotes a reckless style of play. Research has shown that the

aggressive style of play that accompanies the use of head and facial protection is correlated with an

increase in cervical spine injuries (Reynen & Clancy, 1994). When wearing safety equipment players

often perceive themselves as immune to injury and are more willing to risk the personal safety of not only

themselves, but also of others (Murray & Livingston, 1995).

Changes in Sport

The majority of professional sports leagues have experienced changes to process (e.g., rule

changes), equipment changes, and in some sports even structural changes (e.g., moving the pitching

mound back in professional baseball). Changes to a sport can have substantial implications for the fans,

players (i.e., the workers) and the organizations (i.e., the owners or managers). Changes can affect; levels


of performance and production (e.g., goals in hockey or batting averages in baseball); fan attendance; and

revenue. Fans follow the industry of professional sports almost religiously and there are few, if any other

industries that are followed as closely by the general public on a daily basis (Chacar & Hesterly, 2004). In

order to boost attendance the NHL has implemented policies to curb violence, increase scoring, and to

create an unbalanced schedule that features more games between regional rivals (Paul, 2003). In Major

League Baseball (MLB), despite opposition by some fans (Chacar & Hesterly, 2004), league officials

introduced changes to make the game more entertaining. In 1893, the pitching mound was moved back to

facilitate higher batting averages and to increase home runs and scoring (Chacar & Hesterly, 2004). The

majority of changes to professional sports enhance athletic performance and the entertainment factor of

the sport. Process and structural changes may enhance athletic performance, but at what cost to the

athlete?

Before the NHL alters rules and regulations, the safety of the players needs to be evaluated.

Hockey is one of the most physically demanding sports in the world and has a reputation for roughness

and physical risk. Despite league regulations that players wear a wide assortment of protective equipment,

hockey players face a high risk of injury (Sutherland, 1976) and there is a high incidence of head injuries

(Warren & Bailes, 1998). Changes implemented to increase the entertainment value of the sport must first

assess the potential impact such changes could have on the safety of the players, as the number of injuries

sustained in the sport has increased in direct proportion to its’ popularity (Sutherland, 1976). Another

concern is the speed at which players resume play after sustaining injury. A player returning to

competition following a concussion is four times as likely to sustain a second concussion (Wilberger,

1993). Repeated head injuries are very concerning as research has shown that multiple mild head injuries

can lead to significant long term neurobehavioral and cognitive problems (Cantu, 1988, 1997; Wekesa,

Asembo, & Njorai, 1996) and even death (Saunders & Harbaugh, 1984).

SPI’s in the NHL


Hockey equipment continues to evolve. Initially, padding was worn to keep warm while playing

hockey on the frozen ponds, and in the 1920’s soccer shin-guards were added to minimize the impact of

sticks and frozen pucks (Biasca, Wirth, & Tegner, 2002). In the late 1930’s, shoulder protection with

leather caps were introduced along with elbow pads made from leather tubes filled with horsehair, and

wrist-hand protections were comprised of leather palms with cloth-covered bamboo strips protecting the

wrist (Stoner & Keating, 1993). While there are numerous safety product innovations (SPI’s) used in the

NHL, this paper investigates the diffusion of three SPI’s introduced to reduce the incidence of head

injuries in the NHL: the goalie mask, helmet, and visor. Many former NHL players are missing teeth,

have faces covered in scars and some have experienced permanent eye damage (Stoner & Keating, 1993).

The goalie mask was the first SPI introduced designed to protect an NHL player’s face; and following the

adoption of the goalie mask, helmets and visors were innovated and diffused in the league. We examine

the roles the workers and employers play in the creation and adoption of SPI’s.

The Goalie Mask

On November 1, 1959, three minutes into a game between the Montreal Canadiens and the New

York Rangers, a puck shot by the Rangers’ Andy Bathgate broke the nose of the Canadiens goaltender

Jacques Plante (Fischler, 1994). After receiving stitches, Plante agreed to return to the game only if head

coach Hector Blake would allow him to wear the protective mask he had been wearing in practices since

1956. Blake had previously not allowed Plante to wear the mask during games, but Blake had no other

goaltender to replace Plante, so he told Plante that he could wear the mask only until the cut healed.

Plante returned to the game wearing a crude homemade mask and became the first NHL goalie to wear a

mask in a regular season game (Fischler, 1994). The Canadiens won that night, and in the following

games Plante refused to play without the mask (Plante, 2001). The Canadians went on to win 18 games in

a row, and Blake stopped pressuring Plante to remove the mask (Hunter, 1998).


While Plante is credited with wearing the first goalie mask (i.e., that resembles the modern day

mask), the origins of the mask date back to the 1929-1930 season when Montreal Maroons goalie Clint

Benedict suffered a series of injuries to the face (Hynes & Smith, 2008). On January 7, 1930, Benedict

was hit by a puck in the face and knocked unconscious. Benedict’s nose was badly broken, and his

cheekbone shattered. Six weeks later Benedict resumed play against the New York Americans wearing

what some argue was the first goalie mask (Hynes & Smith, 2008). The mask was manufactured by a

Boston sporting goods company and was made of leather and wire and protected the forehead, mouth, and

nose, but not the eyes. Some descriptions classify the mask as a football faceguard and others refer to it as

a boxer’s sparring mask. While it is uncertain how many games Benedict wore the mask for, it is thought

that he wore it for up to four games (Hynes & Smith, 2008). Benedict did however complain that the

mask impaired his vision and the impairment was the reason for eventually discarding the mask (Stoner &

Keating, 1993).

Prior to NHL goalies wearing masks, amateur hockey players donned baseball catcher’s masks

that had been around since 1877. Japan’s national team goalie, Teiji Honma, wore a baseball catcher’s

mask at the 1936 Winter Olympics in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany (Hynes & Smith, 2008). There

is also evidence that in 1927 the goalie for the Queen’s University women’s hockey team, Elizabeth

Graham, wore a fencing mask in a game after suffering serious dental damage (Hynes & Smith, 2008).

Despite the use of goalie masks by amateur goalies, in the macho world of professional hockey coaches

argued that wearing a mask impeded the goalie’s vision and that wearing a goalie mask indicated that the

goalie wearing it lacked courage; one of the key characteristics to playing the position (Hynes & Smith,

2008). In the interest of maintaining ticket sales, coaches and general managers refused to let their goalies

wear the masks even though goalies suffered serious physical injuries and psychological consequences

due to working in an unsafe environment (Hynes & Smith, 2008).

The initial adopters of the goalie mask in the NHL did so in response to injury. It is accepted that

most pre-mask goalies received hundreds of stitches in their face and head, and broken jaws, noses and


cheekbones were also common (Hynes & Smith, 2008). After suffering horrific injuries, goalies

underwent emergency medical procedures in the dressing rooms (often without anaesthetic) and usually

returned to play with their injuries. In 1954, in an effort to reduce the incidence of injuries suffered by

goalies, Delbert Louch, an inventor from St. Mary’s, Ontario, created a clear plastic full-face shield that

he marketed as the “shatterproof face protector for all sports” (Hynes & Smith, 2008). Louch’s full-face

shield was the precursor to today’s visor, yet after Louch sent masks to each of the NHL’s six starting

goalies, he received criticism from the players that the shield was too warm, obscured their vision, and

that it had the tendency to fog up. Jacques Plante had the same complaints about the Louch mask and

modified it for use in practice by cutting a large eye opening and contouring the sides to improve

visibility.

The mask that Plante wore in the game on November 1, 1959, was a fibreglass creation made by

Montrealer Bill Burchmore. Burchmore was a sales manager for Fibreglass Canada Ltd., and after

attending a game in 1958 in which Plante was hit in the forehead by a puck, Burchmore came up with a

fibreglass mask moulded to fit the contours of a goalies face. Burchmore wrote to Plante to tell him of the

mask, and eventually Plante agreed to have a plaster face-mould made. After wearing the mask at the

following training camp Plante was enamoured with the protection the mask provided him and claimed

that the mask did not impair his vision. The Canadiens allowed Plante to wear the mask during practice,

but told him that wearing it in a game would be a bad idea and that it would compromise his chances of

winning a record fifth straight Vezina Trophy (i.e., the trophy awarded to the NHL’s top goaltender) and

would compromise the Canadiens chances at winning a fifth straight Stanley Cup (Hynes & Smith, 2008).

Due to the scrutiny and pressure put on Plante by his employers, Plante did not wear the mask until he

suffered another injury.

Goalies were still critical of the mask even following Plante’s successful trial, however many

warmed up to the idea over time. It is hypothesized that the mask would not have caught on if Plante had

not won games while wearing it. Plante stated, “I had to show good results to keep the mask” (Hynes &


Smith, 2008, p. 50). The 1960’s began with two goalies wearing masks, but by the end of the decade, only

a few goalies had not adopted the innovation (Hynes & Smith, 2008). Coaches and manager’s began to

view the masks not as an indicator of cowardice, but as tool to protect their investments (Hynes & Smith,

2008). After managers and owners began to see that masks did not negatively affect performance, they

were anxious to cut down on injuries and some teams (e.g., New York Rangers) even demanded that all

the goalies on the junior teams in their system wear masks.

The goalie mask evolved and the subsequent designs offered more protection and fit better than

the original masks. Several mask makers emerged and the players chose which design they were going to

wear. Chicago’s Dave Dryden continued to wear a mask that he made himself, and in 1960, Seth Martin

of the St. Louis Blues created his own mask after sustaining an injury to the face. In 1963, while

competing for the Canadian National Team, Martin became one of the first goalies to wear a mask in

international play. Martin was responsible for the spread of the goalie mask overseas and made masks for

goalies in Sweden, Russia, Czechoslovakia, and in other European countries (Hynes & Smith, 2008). In

the NHL in the 1960’s, some goalies still refused to wear a mask; however, by 1975 all goalies in the

NHL wore a mask. Pittsburgh’s Andy Brown claimed that masks hindered his vision and only wore one

during practices. At the end of the 1974 season Brown retired and so ended the era of barefaced goalies in

the NHL.

The Hockey Helmet

In 1927, at the NHL’s annual meeting, Russell Stanley’s helmet prototype was rejected.

However, the following year a former college football player, George Owen, began wearing his leather

football helmet while playing for the Boston Bruins (Virgintino). The players and league officials seemed

content to go on playing without the use of helmets, and it was not until a serious injury in 1933 that head

injuries and helmets received more attention in the league. After he was tripped by Toronto’s King

Clancy, Eddie Shore retaliated and hit Toronto’s Ace Bailey from behind causing Bailey’s head to hit the


ice with such impact that a priest at the game offered last rites (Virgintino). Bailey survived the injury,

but his playing career was over. Following the incident Arthur Ross, a former player and one of the initial

inductees to the Hockey Hall of Fame, designed a new helmet. In a game between the Boston Bruins and

the Montreal Canadiens most of the players wore the helmet, but in subsequent games Eddie Shore was

one of the only Bruins to continue wearing the helmet. Most players did not want to deal with the verbal

abuse of teammates, opposing players, the media, and the fans, and therefore resisted the adoption of the

helmet. In the 1930’s, the Toronto Maple Leafs demanded that their players wear helmets, but many of

the players removed them after being taunted by the fans (Virgintino).

In Sweden, the use of helmets began in the 1950’s. A 1961 insurance survey found that the

incidence of serious head injuries was increasing in hockey and the use of Swedish Hockey Association

certified helmets became mandatory in 1963 (Odelgard, 1989). In North America, the NHL continued to

leave the decision to adopt up to the players, and the majority of the players continued to risk injury and

play without helmets. During the famous 1972 Summit Series, the entire Russian team wore helmets

while Paul Henderson was the only Canadian player to use a helmet. Players wearing helmets in

European countries did not encounter the same negative stereotypes as did the North American players,

and as international players became more prevalent in the NHL, the percentage of NHL players wearing

helmets increased.

In 1965, the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association (CAHA) mandated that all non-adult players

wear helmets (Stoner & Keating, 1993), and the Amateur Hockey Association of the United States

(AHAUS) followed shortly after. However, despite the use of helmets, two teenaged ice hockey players

in Canada died from injuries sustained during games (Fekete, 1968). The helmets worn in the late 1960’s

were ill fitting and protected only the upper part of the skull (Fekete, 1968). Following the deaths of the

two hockey players, the CAHA requested that the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) form a

technical committee for approving helmets, and in 1975 all CAHA players were required to wear CSA

approved helmets (Biasca et al., 2002; Fekete, 1968).


On January 13, 1968, Bill Masterton of the Minnesota North Stars fell backwards awkwardly

after being checked and landed head first on the ice (Hockey Hall of Fame). Masterton was carried off the

ice unconscious, and never awoke from his coma. Two days later Masterton died of his injuries and

became the first NHL player to die directly from an injury sustained on the ice. In the NHL, Masterton’s

death sparked much discussion on the safety of the players, and resulted in more aggressive lobbying for

a league mandate that all players wear helmets. At the time of Masterton’s death, helmets were

uncommon in the NHL, and they did not become mandatory until the 1979-1980 season (Stoner &

Keating, 1993). Players that had signed professional contracts prior to June 1, 1979, could play without

the use of a helmet, but all rookies from that point on were required to wear helmets. Craig MacTavish of

the St. Louis Blues was the last player to play without a helmet, and since his retirement in 1997, all

players have worn helmets.

Facial Protection: Visors

In 1972, facial protectors were developed to reduce the incidence of eye injuries in hockey

(Biasca et al., 2002). Goalies wore plastic and fibreglass masks and other players used wire-grid face

protectors (Stoner & Keating, 1993). Studies show that full-facial protection (FFP) reduces overall facial

injuries, and offers significantly more protection against facial injuries and lacerations when compared

with half-facial protection (HFP; Asplund, Bettcher, & Borchers, 2009). A prospective cohort study

conducted with 642 Canadian male university hockey players found that players wearing HFP missed

significantly more practices and games following a concussion than players wearing FFP (Benson, Rose,

& Meeuwisse, 1999), and players wearing HFP are 2.31 times more likely to sustain a facial laceration

when compared with those wearing FFP (Benson, Mohtadi, Rose, & Meeuwisse, 1999). Research

suggests that the use of FFP reduces the severity of concussion and recovery time (Benson et al., 2002,

Stevens et al., 2006). To reduce the incidence of injuries, the National Collegiate Athletic Association

(NCAA) mandated the use of a full-face protector at the onset of the 1977-1978 season for all levels of

collegiate hockey in the United States (Walsh, 1989).


In the past, despite information regarding the benefits of utilizing facial protection, the majority

of players in the NHL refrained from using facial protection. Players claim that the visor impairs their

peripheral vision, it has a tendency to fog up, and that wearing the facial protection made them feel like a

target for the opposition (Stuart et al., 2002). However, in the 1974-1975 NHL season it was reported that

there were 43 blinded eyes and the puck caused 38% of the injuries (Pasby, 1993). Today players

continue to suffer eye injuries, and some aren’t as lucky as the Edmonton Oilers captain Ethan Moreau

was in 2009 (Canadian Press, 2009). After 771 professional hockey games without wearing a visor,

Moreau got a high stick in the eye and suffered a scratched cornea and bleeding behind the eye (Canadian

Press, 2009). Moreau was fortunate that he did not lose the vision in his right eye, and when he returned

to the league, he wore a visor for the first time since his junior career in the Ontario Hockey League

(OHL). In interviews following his injury Moreau explained that he grew up watching his idols play

without visors, and “when you make it to the NHL you kind of feel like a warrior and you choose not to

wear one. You can’t get too in depth about why you don’t wear one because there’s no good reason. You

just choose not to” (Canadian Press, 2009). Similar to the goalie mask and the helmet, players resist

adoption of the visor due to the stigma accompanying SPI’s.

Statistical and injury data on 787 NHL players from the 2001-2002 NHL season was compiled

and 181 (23.0%) players wore visors (Stevens et al., 2006). Forty-five players (4.5%) suffered

concussions, 19 (2.4%) suffered non-concussion head injuries, and 10 had eye injuries (1.3%). Stevens et

al. (2006) found that eye injuries were sustained at a significantly lower rate than non-visor wearers and

no players wearing visors suffered eye injuries. The authors propose that visors be mandated by the NHL

to reduce the incidence of eye injuries and non-concussion head injuries. The National Hockey League

Players Association (NHLPA) is educating players on the risks of not wearing facial protection, and claim

that the use of visors is at an all-time high with approximately 68% of players wearing visors in 2011

(Gelston, 2011). However, following the American Hockey League’s (AHL) 2006-2007 season mandate


that all players wear a visor; the NHL remains the only professional hockey league in North America that

does not require players to wear some form of facial protection.

Case Analysis

The diffusion of innovation is the process by which an innovation “is communicated through

certain channels over time, among the members of a social system” (Rogers, 1962, p. 5). The four key

elements in the diffusion process are; the innovation, channels of communication, time, and the social

system (Mahajan & Peterson, 1978; 1985). Using the four elements of the diffusion process found in

Rogers’ definition, we compare and contrast the diffusion of the three SPI’s researched in the NHL case

study; the goalie mask, helmet, and visor (see Table 1). We also list the inventors and the initial adopters

(i.e., the innovators) of each SPI.

Diffusion of Safety Product Innovations (SPI’s)in the National Hockey League (NHL)

Innovation Goalie Mask Helmet VisorInventor Bill Burchmore (Fibreglass

Canada Ltd.)Russell Stanley (Hockey

Hall of Famer)Delbert Louch

Innovator Jacques Plante (Montreal Canadiens)

George Owen (Boston Bruins)

Unknown

Channelsof Communication

Interaction between players League mandate – grandfather clause

(1979-1980)

NHL Players Association (NHLPA)

Time(Innovator to 100%

adoption)1959-1974 1928-1997 N/A

Social System NHL NHL NHLTable 1. Diffusion of Safety Product Innovations in the National Hockey League

The literature on workplace safety suggests that SPI’s are introduced in response to injuries in the

workplace. In the logging industry safety boots and goggles were introduced following injuries sustained

by loggers (Klen & Vayrynen, 1983), and in 1945, more than half of the injuries sustained by miners in

England were to the hand and foot (Buxton, 1946). After thousands of injuries, the Safety in Mines

Research Board emphasized the importance of protective equipment, and the use of steel-capped boots


and gloves were recommended. Throughout the history of the National Hockey League (NHL), goalie

masks, helmets, and visors were introduced following head injuries sustained by players. Jacques Plante

adopted the goalie mask after receiving numerous pucks to the face; George Owen wore his football

helmet after observing injuries sustained by teammates; and the visor was adopted following eye injuries.

Proposition 1: Safety product innovations (SPI’s) are introduced to the workplace following

injuries in the workplace.

Research on the mandate of SPI’s in the workplace suggests that safety product innovations

(SPI’s) are mandated by the employer following repeated injuries in the workplace. The Mine Safety and

Health Administration (MSHA) mandated that all miners carry breathing devices following a series of

mining disasters in the United States (Stout & Linn, 2002). An employer often mandates the use of a SPI

after the SPI is found to decrease the incidence of injuries sustained by employees using the SPI. In the

National Hockey League (NHL), goalie masks and helmets were innovated following traumatic injuries

(e.g., Jacques Plante being hit by a puck in the face, and the death of Bill Masterton after his bare head hit

the ice). Following years of serious injuries in the NHL, the president of the NHL mandated that all

players signing contracts after June 1, 1979, wear a helmet after research showed that wearing a helmet

decreased the incidence of head injuries.

Proposition 2: Following repeated injuries in the workplace, employers mandate the use of a

safety product innovation (SPI) that decreases the incidence of injury sustained by employees

using the SPI.

Inventors and manufacturers invent and diffuse SPI’s in the workplace to meet the safety needs of

the workplace. Bill Burchmore, a hockey fan and fibreglass sales manager, created the first fibreglass

facemask after witnessing Plante suffer a puck to the face. Burchmore eventually approached Jacques

Plante with a proposal to fit him for fibreglass goalie mask, and Plante eventually agreed. Another

inventor by the name of Delbert Louch sent his clear plastic face protectors (i.e., the precursor to the


visor) to each of the starting six goalies in the NHL. Both Burchmore’s and Louch’s inventions were

altered by players and inventors following the first innovators to use the SPI’s. Incremental changes to the

SPI’s take place over time until a dominant design emerges.

Proposition 3: SPI inventors and manufacturers present SPI’s directly to the workers, and alter

the product to meet the needs of the workers.

Labour unions represent workers and are responsible for guaranteeing the rights of the workers

are met. The National Hockey League Players Association (NHLPA) guides players in their development

and represents the players in all matters dealing with their working conditions and rights as employees of

the NHL. The NHLPA is responsible for ensuring that the players work in a safe environment, and like

other labour unions, the NHLPA is expected to assist the players in choosing proper safety product

innovations (SPI’s). Several times each year the NHLPA discusses lobbying for a league visor mandate;

however, the NHLPA has not made an effort to enforce the use of visors. Employees of the NHL continue

to suffer eye injuries while not wearing facial protection at work, and this wanton disregard of workplace

safety by the NHLPA is concerning. Both NHL officials and NHLPA representatives are aware of the

facial injuries suffered by the players, however as evidenced by coaches’ and owners’ perceptions of

early adopters of both the goalie mask and the helmet, there still exists a stigma that players wearing

visors are not as tough as those players not wearing visors. Aside from the stigma of using facial

protection and the claims that visors reduce visibility, there is no research suggesting that mandating

visors in the NHL would have a negative impact on player safety. Perhaps the NHL is concerned that

scoring would decrease, or that a visor mandate might negatively affect the entertainment factor of the

sport.

Proposition 4: The employer initiates the mandate of a SPI when the SPI reduces the incidence of

injury without negatively affecting employee task performance or revenue.

Discussion


Limitations and Future Research

The main limitation of this paper is the data the propositions were based upon. As previously

mentioned, there exists a gap in the literature on the adoption of SPI’s, and therefore we were forced to

use non-conventional data to build our case. Future research should compile data on the adoption of SPI’s

in the NHL. A dataset including the number players using a SPI each year following the SPI’s

introduction to the NHL should more accurately portray the diffusion of SPI’s in the NHL. Future

researchers could watch film from each taped game and record the players using SPI’s and evaluate

whether or not players alter their usage of SPI’s throughout games, seasons, or careers. In addition, film

would show the number of players on each team using the SPI, and adoption trends could be observed

between players on different teams, and from different hometowns. Future research could also examine

the adoption of other SPI’s such as mouth-guards. Researching the adoption of performance enhancing

equipment in the NHL during the same time period as the diffusion of SPI’s could determine if adoption

rates differ between SPI’s and performance enhancing products.

Conclusion

Concussions are currently one of the most popular topics within the world of sports. This research

is very timely as many professional athletes are currently experiencing the negative effects of head

injuries, and the incidence of concussions continues to rise in professional sports. The aim of this paper is

to provide information on the adoption of safety product innovations (SPI’s) in work environments using

the National Hockey League (NHL) as an example. This paper is a proposal designed to promote the

future research of SPI’s in the workplace, and to investigate the reasons for differing adoption rates of

SPI’s. The NHL case study investigates the adoption of safety equipment by professional hockey players,

and provides a history of SPI adoption in the NHL.

This research shows that NHL officials have traditionally left the decision to adopt SPI’s up to

the players, and therefore the players have been the “innovators” in the NHL. It is also evident that SPI’s


are gradually adopted by players the NHL, and that the NHL has traditionally taken a long time to

mandate SPI’s. Using the diffusion of SPI’s in the NHL as a model, it is evident for an SPI to be adopted

by a work group it must appeal to the individual workers. After the workers recognize the benefits of a

SPI and that their task performance will not be negatively affected by using it, adoption occurs. The

negative stigma that often accompanies SPI’s can deter some workers from adopting the product, and

diffusion of the SPI can slow down considerably following the “early adopters”.

We call for future researchers to further investigate the diffusion of SPI’s in the NHL and to

compile a comprehensive dataset with the number of players using each SPI year by year. Injuries in the

workplace are not tolerated in other industries, and therefore more research needs to be done to reduce the

incidence of injuries sustained by employees of the NHL. If SPI’s reduce the likelihood that workers

sustain injuries, then further research on the most productive ways to diffuse SPI’s in the NHL must be

conducted.


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