SAFE MOVEMENT OF TRAINS Railway Safety Publication

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First published by the Health and Safety Executive, 2003

ISBN 07176 2727 6

Second edition published by the Office of Rail Regulation, 2007

This guidance is issued by the Office of Rail Regulation. Following the guidance is not compulsory and you are free to take other action. But if you do follow the guidance you will normally be doing enough to comply with the law. Railway inspectors seek to secure compliance with the law and may refer to this guidance as illustrating good practice.

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Contents Foreword 5

Acknowledgements 6

Introduction 7

The objectives of this guidance

Scope of the work

Structure of the work 8

Application

Application to tramways

Application to heritage systems

Audience

Responsibilities 9

Staff competence and fitness

Communication

Secondary risk

Review

SECTION 1 Requirements for the safe movement of trains 10

Principle 1.1 Train preparation

Principle 1.2 Starting trains 12

Principle 1.3 Speed of trains

Principle 1.4 Routing of trains 14

Principle 1.5 Detention of trains at the end of their movement authority on running lines 15

Principle 1.6 Shunting

Principle 1.7 Dangerous goods 17

Principle 1.8 Operation of train movement control systems 19

Principle 1.9 Operation of level crossings

Principle 1.10 Permissive working 20

Principle 1.11 Safe movement of trains during engineering work 22

Principle 1.12 Movements on running lines where the driver is not at the leading end 24

Principle 1.13 Defective infrastructure 25

Principle 1.14 Trains stopped on running lines which require protection and which may require assistance by another train 26

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Principle 1.15 Defective on-train safety systems, equipment or components or unsafe loads 27

Principle 1.16 Temporary loss of functionality of train movement control systems 28

Principle 1.17 Low wheel/rail adhesion 29

Principle 1.18 Weather and other environmental conditions 30

Principle 1.19 Vandalism 31

Principle 1.20 External hazards 32

Principle 1.21 Dealing with fires on trains 34

SECTION 2 Specific operating arrangements 36

Principle 2.1 Authorising movements when the normal train movement control system is not used

Principle 2.2 Examination of the line

Principle 2.3 Wrong direction movements 37

Principle 2.4 Single line working on double or multiple track railways 38

Principle 2.5 Working of single line railways during loss of functionality of the train movement control system 39

Principle 2.6 Protection of the line immediately following accident, obstruction or discovery of defective infrastructure 40

Principle 2.7 Operation of trolleys

Principle 2.8 Operation of passenger communication apparatus 41

Principle 2.9 Train evacuation or escape 42

Appendix 1 Glossary 44

References 45

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Foreword

I have great pleasure in introducing this revised version of Safe movement of trains. It has been necessary to revise the document to take account of the implementation of the Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006. There have been no changes to the technical substance of the document. In the main the changes reflect terminology used in the new Regulations.

The document sets out essential principles and guidance regarding the operational aspects of rail safety, as opposed to those concerning the design or construction of railway infrastructure or vehicles. It is concerned with the risks affecting the movement of trains, for example collisions between trains or with obstructions on the line. It presents good practice in safe train operation which, when implemented, will contribute to the mitigation of such risks. This is the first time in its history that HM Railway Inspectorate has established guidance in this area.

The guidance is primarily aimed at those who are responsible for the safe movement of trains within the organisations of infrastructure managers and transport undertakings. It will also be particularly helpful in the preparation of applications for safety certificates or authorisations (as required by the Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006), the development of operational rules and standards and as an aid in the training of personnel in safe railway operation.

The task of developing the guidance has fallen to a working group led by Mike Harwood of HMRI and including representation and expertise from all sections of the railway industry likely to be affected. The members of the working group and other contributors are listed on page vii. The emerging text has also been subjected to an independent evaluation and wide consultation with interested parties. Many positive and constructive comments were received as a result. I would like to take this opportunity to say a personal thank you to Mike and to all those who have been involved in the development of Safe movement of trains.

I commend this guidance to you. I believe that it has an important role to play in ensuring that the risks inherent in any guided transport system are properly controlled.

Linda Williams HM Chief Inspector of Railways

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Acknowledgements

The guidance on Safe movement of trains, first published in 2003, was developed by a working group composed of experts in safe railway operations, representative of all sections of the railway industry likely to be affected. We thank the individuals and organisations for their contributions as members of the group for some, or all of the meetings (with their employer at the time of their main involvement in the working group):

Chair and author: Michael Harwood Health and Safety Executive (HMRI)

Members: David Woodhouse Heritage Railway Association

Bill Scott Nexus Ltd

John White Health and Safety Executive (HMRI)

Tom Birch Carillion Rail

David Sawer Health and Safety Executive (HMRI)

Steve Bence Association of Train Operating Companies

Nigel Murphy Railtrack, later WS Atkins

Mike Sadler English, Welsh and Scottish Railway

Philip Dee National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers

Myles Sibley Health and Safety Executive (HMRI)

Richard Evans Railway Safety

Daniel Howarth London Underground Ltd

Steve Roberts Railtrack, later Railway Safety

Alan Tordoff HSE (HMRI), later Great North Eastern Railway Ltd

Mark O’Neill National Express Group

Ron French London Underground Ltd

Other contributions from: Paul Abbott Railtrack

David Thornton Health and Safety Executive (HMRI)

David Keay Health and Safety Executive (HMRI)

Michaela Wadsworth Tram Operations Ltd (Croydon Tramlink)

Chris Carr Health and Safety Executive (HMRI)

Independent evaluation undertaken by:

Paul Grant Consultant

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Introduction

Legislative background

The Health and Safety at Work etc Act 19742 places general duties on employers to ensure that employees and others who may be affected by the work of their undertaking, are not, so far as is reasonably practicable, exposed to risks to their health and safety.

The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (MHSW Regulations)3 require employers to undertake suitable and sufficient assessments of the risks that their activities present to their employees and others, including contractors and the public. Measures developed from such risk assessments will need to encompass suitable arrangements and procedures for the safe operation of the activities. This present guidance is underpinned by the requirements for risk assessment derived from the MHSW Regulations.

The Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 20064 require infrastructure managers and transport undertakings to establish and maintain safety management systems which must include procedures to meet relevant operational standards.

Note: The terms “infrastructure manager” and “transport undertaking” are used in this document and have the same meaning as in the Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 20064 but for the purpose of this document the term “transport undertaking” shall include any person who operates a train within an engineering possession.

Aspects of road traffic law and the Highway Code are also relevant where a tramcar is operating on a highway or other road.

The objectives of this guidance This guidance:

• sets out the principles and factors that should be considered to enable the safe movement of trains; and

• can be used as the basis for developing operational safety rules and standards for use by employees of infrastructure managers or transport undertakings.

Scope of the work Safe movement of trains is principally concerned with the risks affecting the movement of trains, for example collisions between trains or with obstructions on the line, but some guidance on the wider aspects of the conveyance of dangerous goods by rail and on the operational aspects of evacuation and escape from trains in an emergency is included. Guidance regarding the risk of railway workers and others being struck by trains, and the management of train accidents, are generally outside the scope of the document.

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Structure of the work Safe movement of trains establishes high-level principles which are set out as objectives to be achieved. Each principle is accompanied by an overview and factors to consider to achieve the principle. These represent non-prescriptive guidance and good practice. A ‘Note’ is provided where there is a need to remark upon exceptions and interpretations.

Safe movement of trains is divided into two sections. The first is headed ‘Requirements for the safe movement of trains’. This section contains all the principles with related guidance. Section 2 contains guidance on a number of specific operating arrangements which may be used to achieve one or more of the principles. A Glossary is provided to give the particular meaning of terms as used in this guidance.

Application The principles and guidance apply as appropriate to all guided transport systems including heavy rail, mass transit, light rail, tramway and heritage systems. In this document the term “train” has a wide meaning embracing all types of rail vehicles. (See the Glossary).

Parts of the guidance set out in this volume are inter-related and circumstances may require the application of more than one principle, eg the operation of the passenger communication apparatus (2.8) may result in the need for protection of the line (2.6) or the need for a fire on the train to be dealt with (1.21).

Application to tramways

The principles and guidance have been drafted for railways but may also apply to tramways. Where there are differences in application, the extent of the application to tramways is indicated either within the text or in a ‘Note’.

Application to heritage systems

The means by which the principles are achieved may differ from heavy rail and modern light rail/tramways because of restrictions in the way that heritage systems operate, such as lower speeds and the overall intention to preserve the historical nature of the operation.

Audience This guidance is primarily aimed at those who are responsible for managing the safe movement of trains within the organisations of infrastructure managers and transport undertakings. The guidance may assist in the preparation of applications for safety certificates or authorisations (as required by the Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 20064. It may also be used as an aid in the training of personnel in safe railway operation.

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Responsibilities Unless otherwise stated, the responsibility for achieving the principles set out in this document should be borne by infrastructure managers or transport undertakings as appropriate. In certain cases, especially where achievement of the principle depends on cooperation between the relevant infrastructure manager and transport undertaking, the text makes explicit reference to the parties concerned.

Staff competence and fitness The safe movement of trains can only be achieved if the staff involved are competent and fit to carry out their functions. The Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 20064 include duties on persons controlling the carrying out of safety critical work on transport systems. Typical elements of competence required for the safe movement of trains are:

• knowledge of relevant rules, regulations and instructions; and

• route knowledge, traction knowledge and train handling skills.

Developing and maintaining staff competence1 describes the principles and factors that should be considered in any competence management system and sets out good practice in establishing and operating such systems. Safe movement of trains therefore does not seek to establish principles and guidance regarding the need for staff to be competent and fit, nor systems designed to achieve that.

Communication Effective communication is necessary to ensure the safe movement of trains and is a key element in all the guidance contained in this document. Where particular aspects of communication are considered to be important to a topic these have been specifically referred to in the text.

Secondary risk It will be necessary for infrastructure managers and transport undertakings to develop and implement procedures to achieve the principles applicable to them. In determining such procedures both primary and secondary risks should be considered.

Review The arrangements and procedures required by this guidance should be reviewed regularly for continuing effectiveness and safety.

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SECTION 1: Requirements for the safe movement of trains

Principle 1.1: Train preparation

PRINCIPLE

Trains should be prepared to enable them to be moved safely.

OVERVIEW

Train preparation involves (a) ascertaining the status of individual vehicles within a train, the physical features of a train as a complete entity, and its safety systems; and (b) determining the operating characteristics for a train. The frequency and scope of these checks should be determined by the risks involved. The train crew should obtain or be advised of relevant information as to the safe movement of their train.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

(a) Vehicles

The condition of all vehicles should be checked to determine that they are safe for movement. This should include checks to ensure the loads carried by freight vehicles are safely loaded and secured.

(b) Train

The following features of the train as an entity should be checked and found to be safe for movement:

• brake continuity;

• a means of indicating that the train is complete;

• formation/marshalling of vehicles;

• proportion/position of vehicles on which the automatic brake is not in use;

• coupling of vehicles; and

• sufficient traction power for anticipated gradients.

(c) Safety systems and equipment

The presence or functionality of relevant safety systems and equipment on the train should be checked. Relevant safety systems and equipment may include:

• braking systems (including track brakes, handbrakes and, where appropriate, provision of wheel scotches);

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• train protection systems;

• communication systems, eg public address, driver/signaller radio, passenger communication apparatus;

• internal and external lighting systems;

• equipment monitoring systems;

• vigilance and reminder devices;

• door safety systems;

• emergency equipment and signage;

• horn/bell/whistle and speedometer;

• fire detection systems;

• sanding equipment;

• tilt authorisation systems;

• track circuit actuators.

(d) Frequency and scope of checks

The frequency and scope of the various checks to be carried out should be determined taking account of the risks to the safety of the train. For example, some checks may only be required before a train leaves a maintenance depot; others may be required before a train commences each new journey or if the formation of a train is changed.

(e) Operating characteristics

The following characteristics of the train should be established:

• total weight;

• number of vehicles and formation;

• length;

• available brake force;

• maximum permitted speed;

• presence of dangerous goods;

• compatibility with the routes over which it is to travel (see Principle 1.4 Routing of trains);

• such other characteristics as may be required by the train movement control system.

(f) Communication of information

The train crew should obtain or be advised of (a) relevant information arising from the preparation of their train, and (b) relevant operating characteristics for their train. The operating characteristics and identity of each train should be available to the relevant infrastructure manager.

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Principle 1.2: Starting trains

PRINCIPLE

Trains should not be moved until it is established it is safe for them to do so.

OVERVIEW

Before a train starts to move certain requirements should be met. Additional requirements should be met when the train starts from a passenger platform or freight loading facility.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

(a) Starting from any location

The train crew should be aware of all relevant information for the safe movement of the train and should be satisfied that the train is safe to move. The driver should obtain authority for the movement of the train, eg hand signal exhibited, fixed signal cleared, token received, or appropriate cab indication received.

(b) Additional requirements when starting from a passenger platform or freight loading facility

Station work should be complete and any passengers embarking or disembarking the train should have done so. In the case of freight or engineering trains, all connections between the train and the loading facility for the loading and discharge of freight should have been removed and on-train equipment properly stowed and secured.

All external doors, other than any necessary for the use of on-train staff, should be free of obstruction, closed and secured.

Principle 1.3: Speed of trains

PRINCIPLE

Trains should not operate at speeds in excess of those permitted by their characteristics, the characteristics of the infrastructure, or other conditions or circumstances.

Note: This Principle is relevant where speed is a) manually controlled; b) manually controlled but supervised and the supervisory system is capable of being overridden; or c) automatically controlled only.

OVERVIEW

The permissible speed of trains is governed both by the characteristics of the vehicle(s) and by the constraints of the infrastructure. Operational arrangements are required to ensure train drivers regulate speed so that their trains are able to stop when required to do so, and operate within permissible speeds. Routes should be risk assessed to enable drivers to be advised of appropriate driving techniques.

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FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

(a) Characteristics of the infrastructure

The infrastructure manager should determine and publish the permissible speed for all types of trains, on all lines under its control. Trains should not exceed the applicable permissible speed, except where specially authorised by the infrastructure manager.

Details of the permissible speed for each section of line for the types of train permitted should be provided or made available to all staff who require them. The relevant infrastructure manager and transport undertaking should establish the means by which this information is supplied to train drivers.

Where the condition of the infrastructure does not meet the required standard to allow the normal permissible speed for some or all types of train, the speed should be restricted to ensure the safe movement of trains. The infrastructure manager and the transport undertaking should have procedures to advise train drivers of all speed restrictions, whether planned or unplanned, temporary or permanent, along with any applicable conditions.

(b) Characteristics of the train

The transport undertaking should ensure that the train is assessed for its maximum speed, weight, length and sufficiency of brake force for the route to be taken.

The train should not be operated in excess of its permissible speed except where specially authorised by the infrastructure manager.

The transport undertaking should ensure that train drivers are aware of the maximum speed of their train.

The infrastructure manager should specify and publish the braking requirements necessary to allow trains to travel over each section of line under its control.

(c) Operational requirements

The transport undertaking should have processes in place to ensure that routes over which its trains operate are risk assessed so that drivers can be advised of appropriate driving techniques to employ, in particular to stop their trains at the limit of a movement authority or at any other place at which the train is required to stop.

The infrastructure manager should have arrangements to provide timely advice of changes to permissible speeds or the imposition of speed restrictions to transport undertakings and train drivers who may be affected.

The transport undertaking should have procedures to ensure that trains are not operated, or that the speed of trains is reduced appropriately, when defects or other failure modes require this to be done.

In any situation where drivers are required to drive on line of sight, eg tramways, permissive working, or travelling to provide assistance to failed trains, drivers should be required to regulate speed to avoid collisions or derailments.

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Principle 1.4: Routing of trains

PRINCIPLE

Trains should travel only along routes on which it is safe for them to do so.

OVERVIEW

Operational arrangements should be in place to prevent trains from travelling along routes on which they are unsafe. Such arrangements should ideally be implemented when train routing is being planned, but in any event should be capable of preventing unsafe routing of trains during operation.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

(a) Characteristics of trains and routes

All routes should be assessed to establish permissible limits for the following train characteristics:

• vehicle/load gauge;

• total weight;

• heaviest individual axle-weight;

• maximum speed;

• minimum brake-force;

• dangerous goods;

• traction system;

• on-train systems;

• train length;

• radio systems; and

• train movement control and train protection systems.

A train which is incompatible with the limits established for one or more of these characteristics should not be planned or allowed to proceed unless suitable special conditions are applied. These include:

• the special examination of the loads of specific vehicles;

• applying speed restrictions or prohibitions on the use of particular lines in the route; or

• blocking lines to allow the train to pass structures or other trains, which would be foul.

(b) Advice of specified conditions of travel to train crews and signallers or others controlling movements

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Train crews should be advised of the details of any specified conditions of travel where these are required. Relevant signallers or others controlling movements should be informed about specific routing requirements for such trains.

Principle 1.5: Detention of trains at the end of their movement authority on running lines

PRINCIPLE

Signallers should be reminded of the presence of trains when they are detained at the end of their movement authority on running lines.

Note: This principle may not apply to line of sight tramway operations.

OVERVIEW

When trains are detained at the end of their movement authority on running lines, signallers should be reminded of their presence after a suitable period of time and should not allow other trains to use the occupied portion of line, except where authorised. Procedures should be designed to prevent the signaller overriding interlocking systems in error to permit trains to enter portions of line already occupied by detained trains.

Note: A train detained at a fixed signal, where provided, is the equivalent of a train detained at the end of its movement authority.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

(a) Communication between drivers or other persons in charge of trains, and signallers

Drivers or other persons in charge of a detained movement should ensure, by the most appropriate means, that the controlling signaller is aware of the detention after a suitable period of time and both parties are aware of the reason for it.

(b) Prevention of conflicting movements or the operation of protecting signals

Means should be provided to remind signallers that there is a detained movement, to prevent a conflicting movement authority being issued, and to prevent signal(s) which are providing protection to the detained movement being operated.

Principle 1.6: Shunting

PRINCIPLE

The shunting of trains or vehicles should be undertaken safely.

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OVERVIEW

Shunting is the movement of trains or vehicles other than the normal passage of trains on running lines. It may take place on running lines, in yards and sidings or within engineering possessions and may be controlled by fixed signals, hand signals, radio communication, audible signals or by the establishment of shunt authority limits. Shunting movements may be controlled from other than the leading end and may involve approaching other vehicles and obstructions, entering/leaving buildings, working in depots, or requiring to stop at or before reaching a specific location. The primary control of the risks associated with shunting is the need for all personnel involved to have a complete understanding of the purpose of each movement and how it is to be made.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

(a) Responsibility

A person should be designated to be responsible for the control of a shunting movement.

(b) Communication

Before a shunting movement takes place, the driver and any other person involved should clearly understand the scope and nature of the movement to be made and have a clear understanding as to who will control it and how it will be controlled.

Information regarding the scope and nature of a shunting movement should derive from any or all of: the train working diagram, a signaller/handsignaller, or a person in charge of shunting at the location.

(c) Movement

Before a shunting movement takes place, the route over which it is to travel should be clear, all facing points should be set correctly and any fixed signals cleared where necessary or other shunt authority issued for the train.

At all times a shunting movement should be carried out at low speed and the person who has control of the train brake should be able to bring the movement to a stand at the correct location to avoid collisions and derailments.

Where the driver is not at the leading end of the movement, the person who has control of the brake should be able to stop the movement in a manner appropriate to the location and the risks involved.

Where a shunting movement is required to enter/leave buildings, or takes place within buildings or at locations where people not directly involved in the movement are present, eg in sidings, depots or engineering possessions, a suitable method of working should be in place which takes full account of the risks involved.

Suitable and sufficient controls should be in place to ensure that a shunting movement can be brought to a stand at the correct location and to avoid collisions and derailments.

When a shunting movement has been completed and vehicles are to be left unattended, suitable means should be provided to ensure that they remain stationary and in a position and condition that minimises the risk of collision.

Where a shunting movement is made on a running line, it may enter a block section already occupied by another train for the purpose of attaching, detaching or removing vehicles where movement authority is provided.

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A shunting movement should not be permitted to exceed the limits of any shunt authority issued.

Trains should be divided only at locations where the risk of derailment, collision or runaway can be adequately controlled.

Principle 1.7: Dangerous goods

PRINCIPLE

Dangerous goods should be properly identified and contained, the risks involved fully assessed and appropriate control measures put in place before they are carried by rail.

OVERVIEW

The carriage of dangerous goods by rail is subject to a wide range of legislation. It is recommended that a discrete safety management system with internal quality procedures be developed within organisations with responsibilities in this field of operation to address fully the risks involved.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

(a) Acceptance

Transport undertakings should ensure that dangerous goods are subject to an acceptance process which identifies that:

• carriage by rail is permitted and not subject to particular restrictions on any part of the intended route;

• they conform to legislative and industry standard requirements for carriage; and

• specialist advice contact details are provided.

(b) Hazard marking

There should be a system to verify that all packages, vehicles, tank wagons and load units are labelled in accordance with legislative requirements. Proper marking/placarding for identification of hazards assists implementation of a safe and appropriate on-site response to incidents and accidents, by rail and emergency services personnel.

(c) Facility operations

Facilities used for the loading and unloading of dangerous goods should be subject to a process of certification which measures compliance with legislative and industry requirements and guidance for design, construction and safe operation.

The method of working at a facility covering rail operations should be based on an assessment of the risks and agreed by the transport undertaking with the facility operator and the infrastructure manager.

(d) Loading and unloading

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There should be a system to ensure that vehicles, tank wagons or load units are suitable for the dangerous goods they are intended to carry. Loading and unloading of dangerous goods should be carried out under controlled conditions and protected from other train or shunting movements and hazards presented by traction current supplies. A handover arrangement should be in place between the party responsible for loading and the transport undertaking which documents that vehicles are safe to be moved and travel.

(e) Marshalling

The risks associated with the carriage of different classes of dangerous goods on the same train should be assessed. Arrangements should be applied to the marshalling of trains which recognise the hazard potential of specific dangerous goods and the risk that, through loss of containment, they could interact with other dangerous goods on the same train. Such goods should either be separated or prohibited from carriage on the same train.

(f) Information

The transport undertaking should have systems for ensuring that accurate information is provided to the infrastructure manager, for example concerning:

• the formation of the train;

• the identity, and position of dangerous goods on the train;

• the nature of the dangers to which the goods being carried give rise, and the action needed in an emergency involving them; and

• the identity of the specialist advice contact for each wagon or load unit.

This information, which should be provided before movement of a train, should also be carried by the train crew. Failure to provide this information has implications for the safety of personnel as well as for the safe management of any subsequent incident or accident.

(g) Movement

When train loads of major hazard dangerous goods eg inflammable gases or liquids are involved, the transport undertaking should agree with the infrastructure manager a route which seeks to minimise the potential impact of an accident on anyone who may be affected.

Emergency response arrangements for the dangerous goods involved should be established by the transport undertaking in full consultation with:

• the infrastructure manager and/or the facility operator, recognising the roles of these parties in the rail industry coordination of accident management;

• the consignor (or their agents) who are responsible for the provision of specialist dangerous goods advice; and

• the emergency services.

(h) Transhipment

Transhipment of dangerous goods in abnormal conditions should only be carried out when the risks and necessary controls together with the means of undertaking the transfer (method statement) have been identified, assessed, agreed and documented by those involved.

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Principle 1.8: Operation of train movement control systems

PRINCIPLE

Train movement control systems should be operated in such a way to ensure the safe movement of trains.

OVERVIEW

The way in which train movement control systems are operated during all reasonably foreseeable conditions, should be determined and published.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

(a) General operation

Safe working procedures for the operation of the train movement control system should include:

• the operation of the train control system equipment (eg interlockings, tokens, radio);

• methods of communicating the state of, and changes in, train movement and the state of the railway and the train movement control system itself (eg use of bells, indicators, telephones, alarms);

• arrangements where the availability of the railway is restricted (eg single line working) or where it is necessary to establish the conditions for safe movement (eg examination of the line);

• arrangements where the train movement control system is defective or disconnected; and

• arrangements where emergency or restricted movements cannot be wholly controlled by the system (eg admission of a second train into a portion of line normally occupied by only one train).

(b) Local and special operation

Where local circumstances are such that non-standard operation of the train movement control system is required, such operation may be determined and procedures published following a risk assessment and the application of alternative controls where necessary.

Principle 1.9: Operation of level crossings

Note: This guidance should be read in conjunction with the the relevant regulatory requirements and other appropriate published guidance.

PRINCIPLE

Level crossings should be operated to ensure the safe movement of trains.

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OVERVIEW

The working arrangements at a level crossing should provide for the safe movement of trains and where normal working is adversely affected alternative procedures should ensure that control measures protect train movements and mitigate the risk of conflict with road users.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

(a) Methods of operation

Methods for operating level crossings should:

• be determined in advance;

• take account of all reasonably foreseeable circumstances, in particular, when a level crossing is not capable of being operated normally, including:

(i) disconnection or failure of equipment, eg road/pedestrian traffic signals and other warning signs; controlling systems, including closed circuit television; and telephones, signals or indicators;

(ii) exceptional circumstances, eg large, low or slow moving vehicles or animals on the hoof; road maintenance; wrong direction train movements; railway engineering possessions; movement of trolleys or on-track machines; and equipment not guaranteed to initiate the level crossing closure sequence;

• be published in advance; and

• be distributed to those who need to know them.

(b) Records

Appropriate records of the ways in which level crossings are operated should be kept.

Principle 1.10: Permissive working

PRINCIPLE

Block sections should not normally be occupied by more than one train at the same time. Exceptionally, this may be authorised where justified by risk assessment for (a) the working of passenger trains on passenger platform lines; or (b) the working of freight trains on passenger or goods lines.

Notes:

1. Permissive working authority is not required for tramways where line of sight operations are in place.

2. Where (a) in the principle applies, permissive working may be permitted for passenger or empty stock trains, parcels trains or light locomotives only.

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3. Where (b) in the principle applies, permissive working may be allowed for any train except passenger trains.

OVERVIEW

It is recognised that in certain circumstances it is necessary for more than one train, other than a shunting movement (for which see principle B.1.6), to occupy a block section at the same time. Where it is proposed to introduce such an arrangement the additional risks presented should be fully assessed and the proposal should only be implemented if justified.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

(a) Authority

Where permissive working is authorised it should be stated in the operating publications used by drivers and signallers. These should indicate:

• the type of permissive working authorised;

• the precise locations between which the authority applies; and

• the reason for and any limitations in the authority, eg for attaching/detaching purposes only.

(b) Passenger platform lines

Where permissive working is authorised on passenger platform lines, the train movement control system and operating methods should facilitate the following:

• A movement authority should not be issued for a train to enter the section if a movement authority has already been issued for another train to move within it or leave it.

• A movement authority should not be issued for a train to leave the section if a movement authority has already been issued for another train to enter it.

• A movement within the section should not be made until specific authority has been received from the signaller, or the movement is in immediate connection with a coupling/uncoupling activity and is for a short distance only.

• A movement authority should not be issued for a second or subsequent train unless the signaller is certain that all passenger doors in use can be accommodated at the platform.

(c) Goods lines

A system should be provided to enable the signaller controlling each end of a block section used for permissive working to know how many trains are occupying the section.

(d) All lines

Where permissive working is authorised, drivers of trains entering occupied sections should be made aware of the fact and be prepared to stop short of the preceding train.

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Principle 1.11: Safe movement of trains during engineering work

PRINCIPLE

When railway infrastructure is subject to maintenance, repair or renewal to the extent that one or more lines are required to be blocked to normal train movement, suitable arrangements should be made to ensure the safe operation of trains operated in connection with the work and any trains which are required to pass on an affected line or a line adjacent to the work.

OVERVIEW

When lines are required to be blocked to enable engineering work to take place, the work and the train working arrangements should be properly planned to reduce risks to trains. Lines should be blocked by arranging suitable protection, or by taking possession of the line concerned. In the latter case, designated personnel should control the movement of trains to, through, or from the line under possession and full details of the arrangements should be given in advance to signallers, train crews of trains operated in connection with the work and others involved. Communications between all personnel involved in the arrangements should be robust and the speed of trains within possessions should be appropriate to the circumstances.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

(a) Planning the work and train working arrangements

• (i) Engineering work requiring one or more lines to be blocked should, if possible, be planned to take place during the time that trains are not running. Alternatively, trains should be diverted away from the route affected.

• (ii) If neither of these options is reasonably practicable then trains may run on lines adjacent to the work under modified train control arrangements where necessary.

• (iii) Plans should be made:

to protect the line to prevent trains approaching the work; or

where it is required to operate trains on the affected line in connection with the work, to implement a possession of the affected portion of line; and

to protect any adjacent line where there is a risk of any train using such line colliding with any plant or equipment being used in connection with the work.

• (iv) Where a possession is to be taken, details of its location and the train working arrangements should be given in advance to signallers and train crews of trains operated in connection with the work. In the case of tramways, agreement should be reached with the highway or roads authorities and/or the police.

• (v) Where a section of electrified line is isolated, arrangements should be made to prevent electric trains from entering the affected section of line.

(b) Arrangements for protecting the line

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Arrangements to prevent the approach of trains onto the affected line should be implemented before work commences. A designated person should have responsibility for implementing the arrangements.

Note: Additional arrangements for the protection of the workers involved should be implemented as necessary.

(c) Taking possession of the line

Where trains are required to operate in connection with the work on the line to be blocked for the normal passage of trains, a possession of that line should be taken. Before the possession is taken the limits of the possession should be clearly identified on the ground and a suitable means of preventing or warning trains from erroneously passing into or out of the line under possession should be provided at or before those points. In addition, within the possession, each work site should be clearly marked on the ground and a suitable means of preventing or warning trains erroneously passing into or out of each work site should be provided.

Note: A possession of the line may be taken where engineering trains are not involved but where the nature or duration of the reason for the blockage makes such an arrangement appropriate, for example, the severance of the line.

(d) Authorities for movement when a possession of the line is taken

Normal train control arrangements should be suspended in block sections containing any part of a possession. Procedures should be in place to authorise movements to, through or from a possession safely. A designated person should have responsibility for safe movement of trains within each work site or other sections of line within a possession.

(e) Communications

Suitable communication equipment should be available to all those involved to facilitate the passing of messages to coordinate work activities and train movements.

(f) Speed of movements

The movement of trains within possessions should be made at a speed appropriate to the circumstances.

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Principle 1.12: Movements on running lines where the driver is not at the leading end

PRINCIPLE

Trains should not normally be operated on running lines where the driver is not at the leading end of the movement. Exceptionally, this may be authorised when appropriate controls are in place.

Note: This principle does not apply when the train is being remotely controlled.

OVERVIEW

A risk assessment should be undertaken for each proposed movement on a running line where the driver is not at the leading end unless the movement complies with the conditions of an existing authority. Authorities can be applied generically, that is, where the movement is required as a result of a defined circumstance. Suitable controls should be in place to ensure that the movement can stop when required. Authority for each movement (whether generic or specific) should only be issued on the basis that appropriate controls and limitations will be applied.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

(a) Risk assessment

A risk assessment should be undertaken for any proposed movement on a running line where the driver is not at the leading end unless the movement complies with a generic authority. The risk assessment should take account of all relevant factors, for example, the distance to be travelled, the train length, the curvature of the line, lighting conditions, the train movement control system in place, and the type of train concerned.

(b) Controls

Controls should be in place to ensure that any movement on a running line where the driver is not at the leading end can be stopped short of any obstruction or other specified point, for example, automatic level crossing actuating equipment. These may include:

• a person responsible for communicating with the driver to enable the movement to be controlled safely, by using, for example, hand or audible signals or radio; and

• a person responsible for the operation of the brake in an emergency.

(c) Authority

Authority for a movement on a running line where the driver is not at the leading end should only be granted where it can be shown, for defined circumstances, that the application of suitable controls will reduce the risks to as low as is reasonably practicable. Authorities should be stated in the operating publications issued to train drivers, signallers and other staff involved. Each authority should indicate:

• the defined circumstances or precise locations between which it applies; and

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• any limitations, for example, on the type and/or the length of train, to be applied as a result of the risk assessment.

Principle 1.13: Defective infrastructure

PRINCIPLE

When any part of railway infrastructure may have become defective such that the safety of trains may be impaired, trains should be prevented from entering the affected portion of line until the risks to trains have been mitigated.

OVERVIEW

When elements of the railway infrastructure become defective to the extent that the safety of trains may be affected, trains should be prevented from entering the affected portion of line. However, where appropriate, procedures should be in place to ensure movements through the affected area take place under controlled conditions. During such movements effective communication between all concerned is essential.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

(a) Defective railway track, structures, earthworks, embankments or cuttings

If such elements of railway infrastructure may have become unsafe, trains should immediately be prevented from entering the affected portion of line. Normal working should not then resume (or working under modified train control arrangements on the affected or adjacent lines should not then start) until an assessment of the infrastructure concerned has been made to confirm that it is safe to do so.

Infrastructure managers should develop and implement procedures and establish criteria to determine when normal working may resume or working under modified train control arrangements may start.

(b) Defective train movement control systems

See Principle 1.16 Temporary loss of functionality of train movement control systems.

(c) Defective electrification systems

Where the traction supply system becomes defective so that electric trains cannot operate, arrangements should be made to prevent such trains from entering the affected portion of line. If the traction supply system has, or may have, been damaged then all types of train should be prevented from entering the line concerned until it can be established which, if any, types of train can use the affected line safely.

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Principle 1.14: Trains stopped on running lines which require protection and which may require assistance by another train

PRINCIPLE

Trains which become incapable of movement (failed trains), or are otherwise stopped out of course on running lines, should be protected against collision from other movements, and any assistance required to move the train should be provided only by another train such that further movement can be carried out safely.

OVERVIEW

Suitable arrangements should provide for the protection of the train concerned against collision with other movements, including trains which are to provide assistance. Assistance should normally be provided to enable control of power and braking from the leading cab of the combined movement. Otherwise limiting conditions should be imposed on the combined movement. There should be a clear understanding by all concerned, including in particular any arrangements for overriding any train protection system.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

(a) Protection

• (i) Procedures should provide for the protection of the train concerned against collision from other movements.

• (ii) In particular, procedures should provide for any assisting train to be moved safely towards the failed train.

• (iii) It may be necessary for train protection systems to be overridden to permit assistance to be provided or for the assisted train to proceed.

(b) Control of movement

Any assisting train should have the technical capacity to assist the failed train. Assistance should be provided in such a way that control of the power and brake can be undertaken from the leading end of the combined train. In exceptional circumstances where this cannot be achieved, the movement should take place at a suitably reduced speed to the first point at which alternative arrangements can be made for dealing with the failed train. In these circumstances arrangements should be made to ensure that the combined train can be stopped at any time when required.

(c) Communication

There should be a clear understanding by all concerned regarding the location of the failed train, how it is being protected, and, if it is to be assisted:

• (i) the direction from which assistance will approach the failed train;

• (ii) the status of safety-related equipment on the combined train;

• (iii) the conditions under which the assisted movement is to proceed;

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• (iv) the limiting point of the assisted movement; and

• (v) how the train movement control system will be operated, in particular when train protection systems have to be overridden.

Principle 1.15: Defective on-train safety systems, equipment or components or unsafe loads

PRINCIPLE

Trains should not operate with defective on-train safety systems, equipment or components or unsafe loads unless measures have been taken to enable consequential risks to be controlled.

Note: In this principle, the term ‘defective’ includes isolated or missing.

OVERVIEW

On-train safety systems, equipment or components should be identified, and procedures should be in place so that if such systems, equipment or components become defective, any risks which may arise can be controlled. These procedures should take account of the routes over which trains operate and should be agreed by relevant transport undertakings and infrastructure managers. Similarly, procedures should determine the action to be taken when loads become unsafe.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

(a) Identification of on-train safety systems, equipment or components

All on-train safety systems, equipment or components which when defective could affect the safe movement of trains should be identified.

(b) Consequential risks

The risks associated with defective on-train safety systems, equipment or components or unsafe loads should be fully understood.

(c) Procedures

Procedures should be in place to enable risks to be controlled when on-train safety systems, equipment or components become defective or when loads become unsafe. Relevant transport undertakings and infrastructure managers should agree such procedures. The procedures should take account of safety systems provided on particular routes. As appropriate, procedures should include requirements for:

• detection and reporting of defective on-train safety systems, equipment or components or unsafe loads;

• prohibiting trains from being operated;

• restricting the normal operation of trains, eg by the imposition of a reduction in speed, or re-routing;

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• taking trains out of operation;

• turning or re-marshalling trains;

• de-training or moving passengers to unaffected parts of trains;

• providing competent persons to accompany drivers;

• communicating the actions to be taken to all concerned, including operations controllers, train drivers and signallers;

• providing real time expert advice to the train crew;

• moving vehicles with defective safety related on-train equipment or components;

• applying warning or reminder indications; and

• re-securing or transhipping of loads.

Principle 1.16: Temporary loss of functionality of train movement control systems

PRINCIPLE

Arrangements to maintain the safe movement of trains should be developed for use in circumstances where there is a loss of functionality in the train movement control system.

OVERVIEW

Arrangements to maintain the safe movement of trains where there is a loss of functionality of the train movement control systems should be determined for all foreseeable circumstances and procedures published. These arrangements should make use of, so far as is reasonably practicable, the security of any residual functionality available from the train movement control system in conjunction with the relevant operating procedures. Conversion from one method of operation to another should be authorised; all concerned should be aware of and fully understand the arrangements and these should ensure the same levels of safety, so far as is reasonably practicable, as the normal control arrangements. The infrastructure manager should determine these arrangements in conjunction with relevant transport undertakings and others who may be affected.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

(a) Controls

The infrastructure manager should determine the arrangements for ensuring the safe movement of trains when there is a loss of functionality in the train movement control system.

Where some of the functions of the normal train movement control system are still available, these should be used where it is practicable to do so, and their use should be identified in working instructions.

All relevant staff should be informed of the arrangements.

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(b) Authority

The arrangements to be adopted should be authorised by the infrastructure manager or, in the case of on-street operation, the highway authority or the police.

(c) Documentation

Arrangements should be published for use in appropriate circumstances and instructions provided to all relevant staff.

(d) Communication

The infrastructure manager should have procedures to provide timely advice of the altered method of working to transport undertakings and and train crews who may be affected.

Principle 1.17: Low wheel/rail adhesion

PRINCIPLE

The risks arising from low wheel/rail adhesion should be controlled so that trains may be operated safely.

OVERVIEW

Defined processes to ensure that low wheel/rail adhesion can be controlled should be documented and available for use.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

Processes

Infrastructure managers and transport undertakings should have documented processes in place that:

• identify sources and locations of potential low wheel/rail adhesion;

• assess the risk arising;

• determine and apply measures to prevent or mitigate the risks;

• provide advice and information to drivers who may be affected about locations of potential low/wheel rail adhesion including foreseeable transient conditions; and

• ensure effective liaison and cooperation. For example, when a transport undertaking becomes aware of a low wheel/rail adhesion site, timely advice should be given to the infrastructure manager.

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Principle 1.18: Weather and other environmental conditions

PRINCIPLE

Where weather or other environmental conditions could affect the safe movement of trains, suitable arrangements should be made to ensure safety.

OVERVIEW

Plans should be in place to ensure that the risk to the safe movement of trains arising from the effects of weather or other environmental conditions can be effectively controlled. Plans should cover the need to obtain forecasts and the arrangements to be put in hand when the safety of train movements is likely to be affected. Infrastructure managers and transport undertakings should liaise in the development of their plans to enable a coordinated approach. Procedures should be developed to specify actions to be taken to eliminate or mitigate risks.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

(a) Planning

Infrastructure managers and transport undertakings should have plans in place to deal with the impact of weather and other environmental conditions on the safety of train movements. The range of conditions and their potential impact is large and includes:

• high temperatures which may cause de-hydration and effect concentration;

• extremely low temperature conditions which may cause freezing brake gear, etc;

• fog or falling snow which may cause difficulties in sighting signals or in line of sight driving;

• ice formation, leaf fall or fuel spillage which may cause low adhesion;

• high wind speeds which may cause trees to fall on the line or damage to overhead line equipment;

• extremely high temperatures which may cause buckled rails; and

• flash floods or sea erosion which may cause damage to track and structures.

Plans should include the need to obtain weather forecasts or other information, eg flood warnings, and the arrangements to be instigated when the information received indicates that the safety of train movements is likely to be affected. Plans should cater for both substantial and prolonged impact of weather conditions and rapid change.

(b) Coordination and cooperation

Infrastructure managers and transport undertakings should liaise in the development and application of their plans to enable a coordinated approach.

(c) Procedures

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Procedures should be in place specifying the action to be taken in the event of particular types of weather or environmental conditions occurring, to eliminate or control the risk arising. Where possible these should specify the limits beyond which train movements may only continue with restrictions imposed, for example a reduction in train speed, and those beyond which train movements should cease. Procedures should also require other appropriate actions such as increased inspections or maintenance of works, plant and equipment; increased staff vigilance; or deployment of special equipment. Procedures should also set out the conditions that should apply before normal working can resume.

Principle 1.19: Vandalism

PRINCIPLE

The risks associated with vandalism should be controlled so that the safe movement of trains is not jeopardised.

Note: Vandalism includes any malicious act which may endanger the safety of trains.

OVERVIEW

Infrastructure managers and transport undertakings, in conjunction with the police authorities, should seek to control risks which may arise from vandalism. They should work together in developing joint initiatives to reduce the opportunity for vandalism. The assistance of outside agencies should be sought.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

(a) Cooperation

Infrastructure managers and transport undertakings, in conjunction with the police authorities, should share information and intelligence concerning issues associated with vandalism.

(b) Planning

Infrastructure managers and transport undertakings and their contractors should develop strategies to prevent opportunities for vandalism which may endanger the safety of trains. These should be coordinated and other agencies, eg the police, should be involved as appropriate.

(c) Controls

Consideration should be given to the following:

Education

Establish and maintain liaison with schools to educate children about the hazards and risks associated with railways.

Removal or securing of material which might be used by vandals

Good housekeeping practice in respect of scrap material and materials not in use.

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Patrolling/surveillance

Use of CCTV cameras. Deployment of security personnel. Targeting of known hotspots.

Liaison with police

Targeting resources on known hotspots.

Fencing

Prevention of unauthorised access to the railway.

Note: The duties of people in control of transport systems in relation to prevention of unauthorised access are set out in the Railway Safety (Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 1997.5

Signs

Information to public. Warnings to highlight risks.

Design of on-train equipment*

Strength of cab windows. Security of on-board emergency equipment.

Stations

Control of access to the track from platforms, platform end barriers, appropriate signage.

Bridges

Control of track access at these locations, fencing to prevent missile throwing and the hanging of objects from bridges.

Principle 1.20: External hazards

PRINCIPLE

Risks to the safe movement of trains from hazards external to the railway should be controlled.

OVERVIEW

Activities and conditions external to the railway have the potential to cause danger to the safe movement of trains, through incident or emergency or through new development or activities close to the railway. Infrastructure managers and transport undertakings should jointly, or with external parties where appropriate, ensure that the hazards are identified, risks arising are assessed and suitable and sufficient control measures are provided.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

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(a) Identification of hazards

Hazards which may arise from activities adjacent or near to the railway and which can cause risk to the safe movement of trains should be identified. These include:

• fire or smoke;

• landslips or subsidence;

• gas/vapour discharge (eg from a nearby chemical plant);

• vegetation;

• new development (whether temporary or permanent) which could interfere with signal sighting;

• inappropriate use (by way of volume or nature of traffic) of level crossings;

• incursion from other transport systems including highways and other railways;

• work on adjacent roads, buildings, services or construction sites;

• discharge of substances from pipelines;

• external lighting including lights from road vehicles;

• incursion by emergency services responding to incidents, including security alerts; and

• incursion of low-flying aircraft

(b) Risk assessment

The risks arising from external hazards should be assessed, if necessary with assistance from the party responsible for the hazard, so that appropriate control measures can be put in place.

(c) Control measures

Railway companies should cooperate with each other and external parties to ensure appropriate control measures are implemented. These include:

• fixed equipment to warn trains. These may be activated by an outside party (eg emergency signals approaching aircraft runways);

• a means to provide early or prompt warning of actual or potential adverse effects on the railway;

• operating procedures to caution or stop trains entering affected areas;

• measures to ensure that planning applications for new developments are scrutinised and, where appropriate, representation made to the relevant authority; and

• remedial measures to improve signal sighting.

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Principle 1.21: Dealing with fires on trains

PRINCIPLE

The risks from fires on trains should be effectively controlled.

OVERVIEW

Fires on trains should be extinguished without delay and, where this cannot be achieved, affected trains should be stopped as quickly as appropriate. Consideration should be given to the possible need to move passengers to a safe part of the train or, where necessary, to leave the train and move to a safe place, and for external assistance to be obtained. There should be procedures for the isolation of traction equipment, electrical supplies, heating, ventilation and air-conditioning systems, for the separation of burning vehicles from unaffected vehicles where possible and for the protection of the train against the risk of being struck by other trains. Communication protocols should be in place for requesting external assistance, to ensure a coordinated approach from all railway staff involved, to provide suitable information to passengers on trains as to the action they should take on discovering a fire, and for the provision of accurate information regarding any dangerous goods being conveyed on the train to enable appropriate action to be taken.

FACTORS

The factors for consideration include:

(a) Procedures

Procedures should be in place:

• (i) for train crews to assess the source and nature of a fire and their ability to extinguish it without delay using the equipment provided. If this cannot be achieved the train should be stopped as quickly as appropriate. Ideally this should be at a location which is safe for the evacuation of passengers and accessible to emergency services;

• (ii) for the evacuation of passengers from affected vehicles to a safe part of the train or, where necessary, to a safe place outside the train (see specific operating arrangement 2.9 for guidance regarding the operational aspects of train evacuation or escape);

• (iii) for the isolation of traction equipment, fuel supplies, electrical supplies (including external traction current supply if necessary), heating, ventilation and air-conditioning systems;

• (iv) for the separation of burning vehicles from unaffected vehicles; and

• (v) for the protection of the train concerned from being struck by other trains (see principle 1.14 ‘Trains stopped on running lines which require protection and which may require assistance by another train’).

(b) Communications

Communication protocols should be in place:

• (i) for requesting assistance from external emergency services;

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• (ii) for prompt, disciplined and accurate communications between members of the train crew, train crew and signallers or others outside the train, and from train crew to passengers;

• (iii) for the provision of information to passengers about the actions they should take if they discover a fire or become aware of fire through smoke or fumes entering passenger accommodation; and

• (iv) for the provision of accurate information regarding any dangerous goods carried and the actions required in case of fire, to train crew, signallers and others responsible for controlling train movements, and the emergency services. See Principle 1.7 ‘Dangerous goods’, including requirements for the provision of information essential to the safe management of incidents.

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SECTION TWO: Specific operating arrangements

Principle 2.1: Authorising movements when the normal train movement control system is not used

Note: This specific operating arrangement does not apply to line of sight tramway operation.

GUIDANCE

(a) Objective

When movement authorities are granted using other than the normal train movement control system, eg giving verbal authority to pass a fixed signal at danger, procedures should be in place to ensure that such movements are carried out safely.

(b) Planning

The circumstances in which a movement authority under an alternative train movement control system may be granted should be established and procedures developed for use whenever these circumstances arise.

Procedures should be agreed by relevant infrastructure managers and transport undertakings and should be made available to all railway staff who are required to use them.

(c) Procedures

Procedures should ensure that:

• the line ahead is safe for the movement to take place, and arrangements are made to prevent conflicting movements;

• all concerned have a clear understanding of what is required, how far the movement is to proceed and any special instructions to be observed; and

• the train proceeds at a speed appropriate to the circumstances.

Principle 2.2: Examination of the line

GUIDANCE

(a) Objective

If a portion of railway may no longer be safe for the normal passage of trains, or whenever it is otherwise necessary to ascertain the status of the line, a method of operation should be put in place to examine the affected portion of railway.

(b) Planning

• The infrastructure manager should put in place procedures for the examination of the line which can be implemented when required.

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• Procedures should be made available to all staff who are likely to become involved in the examination of the line.

(c) Procedures

Procedures for the examination of the line should include:

• the circumstances which may make it necessary to examine the line;

• the method to be adopted to examine the line depending on the circumstances;

• the conditions under which a train (of any or a specified type) may be used to enable examination of the line;

• the method of working to be used to enable trains to be worked over the section of line to be examined and adjacent lines;

• the circumstances in which train drivers of examining trains may have to be accompanied;

• the communication protocols to be used by the staff involved; and

• the actions to be taken when information about the status of the line is received from the examination.

Principle 2.3: Wrong direction movements

GUIDANCE

(a) Objective

Trains should not make wrong direction movements unless the circumstances in which such movements may be permitted have been authorised by the infrastructure manager, and in the case of a tram on the highway or public road, the police. Appropriate controls should be in place to prevent a collision and/or derailment.

(b) Planning

Infrastructure managers should identify and risk assess the circumstances in which a wrong direction movement may be made. The circumstances in which such movements are authorised and the procedures for their control should be made available to all railway staff who are likely to become involved in such movements.

(c) Procedures

Procedures for making wrong direction movements should cover:

• the correct setting and securing of the route, including catch points, and ensuring that it is clear for the full extent of the movement;

• the prevention of conflicting movements;

• the operation of stations and level crossings on the route;

• alternative operations on the highway for tramways;

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• the communications protocols necessary between the staff involved so that the nature, extent and safety requirements of the movement are fully understood; and

• the speed at which the movement is to be undertaken.

Principle 2.4: Single line working on double or multiple track railways

Note: Single line working should only be brought into operation if the line(s) in one direction is blocked because of planned work or an emergency, and it is necessary to continue running trains in that direction.

GUIDANCE

(a) Objective

During single line working, arrangements should be made to ensure conflicting movements or derailments are prevented.

(b) Planning

Infrastructure managers should develop procedures to be implemented whenever single line working becomes necessary. These should be agreed with relevant transport undertakings.

Procedures should be made available to all railway staff who are likely to become involved in single line working.

(c) Procedures

Procedures for single line working should cover:

• the method of operation;

• suspending the normal operation of the train movement control system where necessary;

• the correct setting and securing of the route, including catch points, and ensuring that it is clear for the full extent of the movement;

• the prevention of conflicting movements;

• authorising trains to enter the single line;

• the control of trains when on or leaving the single line;

• communications;

• operating stations and level crossings on the single line;

• alternative operations on the highway for tramways;

• the speed of trains on the single line;

• signalling trains towards the locations at each end of the single line;

• assisting a failed train on the single line; and

• withdrawing single line working.

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Principle 2.5: Working of single line railways during loss of functionality of the train movement control system

Note: This specific operating arrangement also applies to portions of double line railway where the track is interlaced.

GUIDANCE

(a) Objective

When there is a loss of functionality of the train movement control system affecting control of a single line railway over which trains can normally run in either direction, the line should not be used unless a method of operation is put in place to prevent conflicting movements or derailments.

(b) Planning

Procedures for working single line railways during loss of functionality of the train movement control system should be developed by infrastructure managers.

Procedures should be agreed with relevant transport undertakings and should be made available to all railway staff who are required to use them.

(c) Procedures

Procedures for the working of trains over single line railways during loss of functionality of the train movement control system should cover:

• the method of operation;

• suspending the normal operation of the train movement control system;

• the correct setting and securing of the route, including trap points, and ensuring that it is clear for the full extent of the movement;

• the prevention of conflicting movements;

• authorising trains to enter the single line, for example by the appointment of a person for the purpose;

• the instructions which should be given to the driver of each train before entering the single line;

• communications;

• the speed of trains on the single line;

• special requirements to be applied when running on the single line, for example, at ground frames;

• assisting a failed train on the single line; and

• the withdrawal of the revised method of operation.

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Principle 2.6: Protection of the line immediately following accident, obstruction or discovery of defective infrastructure

GUIDANCE

(a) Objective

Trains should be prevented from entering a portion of line which may have become unsafe following an accident, obstruction or the discovery of defective infrastructure.

(b) Planning

Infrastructure managers should develop procedures to be implemented whenever it becomes necessary to prevent trains from entering an affected portion of line. These should be agreed with relevant transport undertakings.

(c) Procedures

Procedures should ensure that train drivers are directed to stop their train before reaching an affected portion of line unless the train will be diverted to a safe route. These should include:

• the use of radio communication from signaller/controller to the drivers of the trains concerned; and

• the use of other methods of directing drivers of the trains involved eg by use of handsignals or the withdrawal of a movement authority.

The selection of the most effective procedures to prevent trains entering an affected portion of line and the order in which these procedures are applied will depend on the circumstances at the time and infrastructure managers, transport undertakings and others should provide guidance to staff, eg signallers, regarding priorities.

Principle 2.7: Operation of trolleys

GUIDANCE

(a) Objective

A trolley should be placed on the line only when arrangements have been made to prevent it affecting the normal operation of the train detection system, becoming involved in a collision or running out of control.

(b) Planning

The infrastructure manager and the operator of trolleys should put in place procedures to ensure the safe operation of trolleys on the line.

The procedures should be made available to all staff who may be involved in such operations.

(c) Procedures

The procedures should include:

• how and when a trolley is authorised to be placed on the line;

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• the communications protocols between staff involved in placing and operating a trolley on the line and others who are involved in ensuring the protection of a trolley, and the signalling of trains;

• the establishment of the limits between which a trolley may be used;

• the arrangements to avoid irregular operation of train detection or level crossing equipment;

• the safe operation of a trolley, in particular taking into account the load, gradients and braking capacity of a trolley;

• how a trolley is removed from the line; and

• the secure storage of trolleys to prevent any unauthorised use.

Principle 2.8: Operation of passenger communication apparatus

Note: This guidance applies to the operation of passenger communication apparatus on trains and stations.

GUIDANCE

(a) Objective

In the event of the operation of passenger communication apparatus, action should be taken to ensure the safety of trains.

(b) Planning

Procedures should be developed and implemented to ensure railway personnel take suitable action whenever passenger communication apparatus is operated. The procedures should be agreed by all infrastructure managers and transport undertakings concerned and distributed to all personnel involved.

Transport undertakings should provide instructions to passengers regarding the operation of passenger communication apparatus. The instructions should be clear and relevant to the type of apparatus in use.

(c) Procedures

Procedures should ensure that:

• the reason for the operation of the apparatus is established so that appropriate action can then be taken; and

• when it is necessary for a train to be stopped it should, if possible, be stopped in a suitable position to enable access by emergency vehicles and/or train evacuation, if necessary. However, if the apparatus is operated as the train is departing from a platform the train should be stopped immediately.

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Principle 2.9: Train evacuation or escape

GUIDANCE

(a) Objective

In the event of a train being involved in an emergency, the overall objective should be to minimise any further risk to the passengers and staff on the train. This may be achieved by a variety of means including:

• the provision of suitable information to inform passengers (multi-lingual where appropriate) of the action to take in an emergency; and

• enabling those at risk to move to a safe part of the train or, where necessary, to leave the train and move to a place of safety.

(b) Evacuation

Evacuation is the controlled egress of passengers from a train to a place of safety. Such evacuation will be supervised by railway or emergency services personnel.

• (i) Planning: Plans should be in place which include arrangements for safe evacuation of passengers from trains to a place of safety in the event of an emergency occurring. Transport undertakings should develop such plans in consultation with other relevant bodies including the emergency services. Plans should cover the evacuation of disabled passengers.

• (ii) Training: All staff likely to be involved in train evacuation should be familiar with the factors they should consider and the actions they should take. The plans developed to achieve safe evacuation should be used as the basis for the training of staff. Training should be arranged periodically to ensure that staff and others likely to be involved, for example the emergency services, remain familiar with their roles and the use of emergency equipment. Practical evacuation exercises are a useful means of achieving this.

• (iii) Procedures: Procedures should be developed for use in the event of a train evacuation becoming necessary, including arrangements for:

communication between railway staff on the train;

communication between railway staff and passengers on the train;

communication between the train and the train movement control centre;

communication between railway staff and any necessary emergency services;

the train to be stopped, where possible, in a suitable place for evacuation and external assistance, eg not in a tunnel or on a viaduct;

the blockage of all lines affected on which trains could approach;

the isolation and discharge of traction current;

the identification and use of a safe place clear of all lines, for the assembly of evacuated passengers; and

aisles and passageways on the train to be kept clear of obstructions, for example luggage and bicycles.

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(c) Escape

Escape in an emergency is the unsupervised egress of passengers from a train. In these circumstances passengers may follow the advice of train signage and instructions provided, and may use on-board emergency equipment, emergency door release devices, or any emergency exit windows.

Passengers should be advised that escape from the train should only be attempted as a last resort since harm may arise from the act of alighting from the train, from live electrical equipment or from other trains which may be passing.

Note: ‘Railway staff on the train’ means train crew and other staff on the train who are required to assist in train evacuation.

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Appendix 1: Glossary For the purpose of this document the following terms have the meaning shown:

Block section means a section of line used for the purpose of achieving train separation. Catch points means points provided to derail vehicles running back on rising gradients.

Driver see ‘Train driver’.

Egress means exit.

Infrastructure means track, structures, train movement control systems, communication systems, electrification systems and plant, necessary for the safe movement of trains.

Line of sight means that the train is operated in such a way and at such a speed to enable drivers to stop within the distance they can be seen to be clear ahead.

Movement authority means any authority for the movement of a train, for example a handsignal exhibited, a fixed signal cleared, a token received or an appropriate cab indication received.

On-train safety systems, equipment or components means any on-train systems or equipment designed to control the risks arising from the movement of a train, or any component of a train which if defective could give rise to danger.

Passenger communication apparatus means any apparatus provided on trains or stations for use by passengers or others to stop trains in emergency.

Place of safety means a place safe from the effects of the emergency and other immediate hazards, eg an unaffected vehicle on the train or a place well away from railway lines.

Possession means an arrangement whereby a portion of line between defined limiting points is temporarily outside the normal method of train control and may be used by engineering trains.

Railway includes tramway or other guided transport systems tramway or other guided transport system.

Running lines means lines other than sidings.

Siding means a line for the stabling of vehicles or where loading/unloading, servicing, etc, is performed clear of running lines.

Single line railway means a railway on which only one running line is provided.

Single line working means, where two or more running lines are provided, a method of operating trains in either direction over one running line (the single line) which is signalled in one direction only between the locations where the method of working is required.

Track means rails, fishplates, fastenings, sleepers and ballast or other foundation.

Train means any vehicle or combination of vehicles which run on a railway. It includes on-track machines, engineers’ trolleys, cranes and other plant while operating on a railway (commonly referred to as on-track plant or machines) and road/rail vehicles when operating in rail mode. For tramways, ‘train’ means a tramcar, or two or more tramcars coupled together, and includes non-passenger vehicles.

Train crew means any person on a train whose duties involve the safe movement of the train. This may be the driver only.

Train driver means the person with responsibility for the control of the speed of the train. This responsibility can be discharged remotely.

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Train movement control system means any system for authorising trains to move including lineside systems, in-cab systems, automatic control systems and verbal, written or hand signalling systems.

Trap points means points provided at a converging junction to derail an unauthorised movement before reaching the point of conflict.

Trolley means all portable unpowered vehicles or equipment intended for movement along the rails.

Unsafe load means a load which is not contained, not secured, above the weight limit for the wagon concerned or unevenly distributed.

Wrong direction means a direction opposite to the normal direction and for which signals are not provided.

References 1 Developing and maintaining staff competence [HSG197 HSE Books 2002 ISBN 0 7176 1732 7]

2 Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 Ch37 The Stationery Office 1974 ISBN 0 10 543774 3

3 The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 SI 1999/3242 The Stationery Office 1999 ISBN 0 11 085625 2

4 The Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006 SI 2006/599 The Stationery Office 2006 ISBN 0 11 074307 5

5 The Railway Safety (Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 1997 SI 1997/553 The Stationery Office 1997 ISBN 011 064052 7

While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the references and web addresses listed in this publication, their future availability cannot be guaranteed.