Ryskamp v. Commissioner Appellant Brief Ninth Circuit 14-73059

7/26/2019 Ryskamp v. Commissioner Appellant Brief Ninth Circuit 14-73059

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R E G E l V E D

gotty c DWYER CLERK

U.s. co6nT ()F AFFEALS

N0V 1 2 2216

Appeal No. 14-73059

ILED

DOGKETED - ----

ATE INITI

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN RYSICAMP,

Petitioner-Appellant,

COMMISSIONER 0F INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent-Appellee.

On Appeal 9om the United States Tax Court

No. 8888-13 (Nega, J.)

OPENING BRIEF OF PETITIONERXPPELLANT

Jolm Ryskamp

1677 Arch Street

Berkeley, Califonlia 94709

(510) 848-6898

[email protected]

Case: 14-73059, 11/18/2014, ID: 9323993, DktEntry: 4-1, Page 1 of 36

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CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULGGS, AND RELATED CASES

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 28(a)(1), Appellant makes the following certilcate:

A. Parties and Amici

Jolm Ryskamp, Petitioner-Appellant

1677 Arch St.

Berkeley, CA 94709

(510) 848-6898

Commissioner of lnternal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee

Curtis Pett

Tax Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice

P.O. Box 502

Washington, D.C. 20044

The Commissioner of lntemal Revenue appeared in the Tax Court and is a party

in this Court. No amici appeared in the ''Pax Court.

B . Rulings Under Review

The ruling at issue in tllis appeal isthe Order and Order of Dismissal and

March 27, 2014, panting Respondent-

ecision of Judge Joseph Nega entered on

Appellee's Motion for to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution.

Related Cases

4 This case has not previously been brought before this Court.

f î to

.

l ;

n

t -

John Ryskamp i

Dated: November 18, 2014


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS AND RELATED CASES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

IV

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

ARGUMENT

1. The Tax Court committed reversibleerror in ruling that there was lack of

prosecution, because a trial could not have been held.

II. A trial could not have been held because, once the docketed Tax Court was

illegally transferred by the Commissioner to the Appeals Oftice, the Appeals Oftice

was legally required to-and did not-issue a Notice of Determination, responding to

the argtzments in the petition.

111. A trial could not have been held because, in cormection with the Notice of

Determination, the Appeals Office was legally required to-and did not--obtain

verification 9om the Secretary that the requirements of any applicable 1aw or

administrative procedure had been met.

lV. A trial could not have been held because the failure of the Tax Court to

compel issuance of a Notice of Determination prevented the Court from ruling

on the merits.


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A trial could not have been held because the inability of the Tax Court to rule on

the medts precluded a 26 USC 6330(d)(1) judicial review of determination, so there

could not be a lack of prosecution.

VI. A trial could not have been held because the Tax Court violated its own Article l

CONCLUSION

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

30

31

111


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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

21uczek v

.

Commissioner,

143 T.C. No. 16 (Oct. 6, 2014)

Cox v. Commissioner,

Custom Stairs v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2011-155 (201 1) 22, 26

L jntfçcy v. hïormet,

405 U.S. 56 (1972) 8

*Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178; 26

*lhornberry v. Commissioner,

136 T.C. No. 16 (2011)

Vïnatieri v. Commissioner,

5, 17-22, 26-27

133 T.C. No. 16 (2009) 22, 26-27

West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,

300 U.S. 379 (1937) 8

*West Virginia State Board ofEducation v. Barnette,

319 U.S. 624 (1943) 8


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STATUTES

*26 USC Section 6330

26 USC Section 6320 (b)

4, 6, 10 cf seq.

11-28

OTHER AUTHORITWS

#U.S. Const. art 1

*U.S. Const. amend. V

4, 5, 18 et seq.

3, 5, 6, 16, 18, 27

Chief Counsel Notice CC-2012-003

Intemal Revenue Manual, 8.4.1.6.2

Intemal Revenue Manual, 35.3.23.5.1

*collection Financial Standards,

hdpr//- .irs.gov%dividuals/collection-Finrcial-standards

ARTICLES

G. Edward White, dtHistoricizing Judicial Scrutiny,''

hûp://law.bepress.coeuvalwps/uva publiclaw/art3l.

16-20

24-25

5, 16-1 7

2, 5 et seq.

25

*Authorities upon which I clliefly rely are marked with astedsks.


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JURISDICTIONM Z STATEMENT

Under 26 U.S.C. j 74824$, the courts of appeals other than the Federal Circuit

have exclusive jurisdiction to review Tax Court decisions in actions to redetermine tax

liability. See also Meruelo v. Comm 'r, 691 F.3d 1 108, 1 1 14 (9th Cir. 2012) (exercising

tllis Court has jurisdiction

over the instant case.


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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

When a docketed TM Court case is illegally transferred to the Appeals Office,

must the Appeals Offce issue a Notice of Determination?

What is the law of the Collection Financial Standards in conjunction with


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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The petition was filed on April 23, 2013.On July 30, 2013, and without the

permission of Petitioner-Appellant the Commissioner transferred the docketed case to

the Appeals Office. On October 28, 2013, the Appeals Office asserted that it had dtsole

settlement authorityy'' that it was ççseparate from-and independent the

Commissioner, and that it would çtreview'' the case çûusing the 1aw and court decisions to

weigh the facts.'' On November 2, 2013, Petitioner-Appellant demanded that the Appeals

Office çccite a11 laws and authorities pursuant to which this case has allegedly been

(refen-ed' to the Appeals Office.'' On November 6, 2013, the Appeals Oftice

acknowledged that the above-descdbed actions of the Appeals Office are (soffered as a

voluntary option on every docketed U.S. Tax Court case.'' On December 11, 2013, the

illegally transferred docketed Tax Court case was returned by the Appeals Office to the

Commissioner, the Appeals Office stating that it had dttried to settle this case and avoid

trial.'' Petitioner-Appellant did not participate in any of the actions taken by the Appeals

Office with respect to the docketed Tax Court case. On December 1 1, 2013, Petitioner-

Appellant moved the Tax Court for atl order requiring the Appeals Office issue a Notice

of Determination. The motion was denied. On December 17, 2013, Petitioner-Appellant

sezved a letter on the Appeals Office, demanding that it issue a Notice of Determination.

No Notice of Determination has ever been issued. On September 9, 2013, the Notice was

issued setting the ttial for February 10, 2014. On September 12, 2013, Petitioner-

Appellant moved to void the Notice on gounds that the docketed case had been illegally


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transferred to the Appeals Offce.The motion was denied.On November 9, 2013,

Petitioner-Appellant filed the Pretrial Memorandum, again telling the Court that it Kçmust

not attempt to hold a trial'' because the illegal transferred meant that the Appeals Office

had not provided the 26 USC 6330(c)(1) veriscation, no trial could be held where the

requirements of any applicable 1aw or admiistrative procedure had not been met, and

that the illegal transfer was a violation of the Tax Court's jurisdiction. The motion was

denied. On November 4, 2013, Petitioner-Appellant filed a motion f0r summazy

judgment, asserting a right to the issuance of a Notice of Determination and that no tlial

could be held without one. The motion was denied. The Order was issued on Mareh 27,

2014, in which the Court warned Petitioner-Appellant that diadvancing frivolous and

voundless arguments in the future may lead to the impositionof a penalty on him

pursuant to section 6673(a)(1).

4


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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This case shows clearly illegal conduct on the part of the Commissioner and the

Appeals Offce, working together to deny taxpayer rights, and admitting that they are

doing so. There can be no question that the Sçtrial'' could not have been held, that it was

not a trial for purposes of the Constitmion, and that there was no lack of prosecution. I

tedly moved for and demanded my legal rights, a11 of wllich had to be vindicated inepea

der for a Constitmional trial to be held. The Tax Court-its jurisdiction repeatedlyr

violated by the Commissioner and the Appeals Offce-refused, either on request or sua

sponte, to assert its jurisdiction by way of righting the Constitutional wrongs. ln doing

so, it violated its own judsdiction, and the Article I requirement that it be a Court. The

non-, mis- and malfeasance of the Tax Court, the Commissioner and the Appeals Courq

both separately and in combination, are clear, convincing-indeed, beyond dispute.

The question is, what is this Court's duty once the case is remanded to the Tax

Court for proceedings which meet Constitutional requirements? For U.S. Const. amend.

(ççdue process'') and Artide I purposes, when the Commissioner transferred the

docketed Tax Court case to the Appeals Office, he treated the petition as-for purposes

of the Appeals Office's jurisdiction-a Request for a Collection Due Process Headng.

(Normally, tllis is done on Form 121534 l have never requested a Collection Due Process

Hearing in tllis case.)A Notice of Determination was required which answered the

arguments in the petition, just as, in a nonual case, the Appeals Office is required under

Thornberly v. Commissioner to answer the arguments in the Request for a Collection Due

Process Hearing. So in this case the Appeals Oflice must issue a Notice of Determination

5


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at this Court's order. But that only reveals the unsettled state of the 1aw which is at the

heart of this case. It is a state of affairs which has 1ed the Commissioner himself, in the

Internal Revenue Manual, tocall the substantive and procedural dghts of taxation a

(tdeveloping area of law'' (Internal Revenue Manual, 35.3.23.5.1), in his section devoted

to ççMotion to Dismiss for Lack of Judsdiction When CDP Hearing Request Denied

Under IR.C 6330(g).'' In so stating, he is referring precisely to another case by the

Petitioner-Appellant which is currently on file at at the D. C. Circuit Appeals Court @o.

14-1042).

lt is this Court which must tell us in what direction the law is developing. As will

become clear, what is needed from this Court in order to provide fu11 relief under the law,

is a statement of the 1aw of Collection Due Process in conjunction with the Collection

Financial Standards (CFS) promulgated by the Intemal Revenue Service. The Standards,

by their own terms, are çiused to help determine a taxpayer's ability to pay a delinquent

tax liability. Allowable living expenses include those expenses that meet the necessary

expense test. The necessary expense test is desned as expenses that are necessary to

provide for a taxpayer's tand llis or her fnmily's) health and welfare and/or production of

income.'' hlpr//- .irs.covedividuals/collection-Finrcial-strdrds.ne CFS

encompass a wide range of facts, and there is no question that there is a due process right

to assert the CFS facts and listed amounts, in the context of a Collection Due Process

headng under 26 USC Section 6330. But to what extent may those rights be invoked,

and when, and what are related rights, and when may they be invoked, in the context of

al1 tax process including the tax rates themselves? That is the 1aw wllich is çûdeveloping.''

6


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The complexities can be seen in comparatively the enormous docket in the Tax Court

case 9om which No. 14-1042 is appealed: Tax Court Case No. 013681-11L was filed in

201 1, and involves only my demand that the Commissioner, or the Appeals Office, or the

Tax Court, say what is the 1aw of the Collection Financial Standards in conjunction with

Collection Due Process. Simple enough-but it has gone on for over four years. The

answers are not simple in that Court, and they are not simple in this one.

The present cases case exempliûes the sittlation we are in: a Commissioner, an

Appeals Office, and a Tax Court which are çtbetween two stools''-pushed by the logic of

the cases to find a unification of tax procedural and substantive Due Process, yet

engaging in contradictory rulings by a resistance to that same logic, and engaging in

illegal actions to which they a11 admit, with respect to docketed Tax Court cases. Why?

Because the Court can see that the petition in No. 8888-13, from which this appeal is

taken, is made up of none other than the Report which the Tax Court Judge ordered filed

in No. 013681-1 1L. Thus, this Court faces the same substantive issues in this appeal as

the D.C. Court faces in No. 14-1042. As will be clear from the Report in No. 01368 1-

1 1L, I asserted that the Collection Financial Standards in conjunction with Collection

Due Process, are the promulgation by the United States of an individually enforceable

entitlement in the general public-a fundamental right, applicable to the States through

the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. nmend. M'V-to the maintenance of Collection

Financial Standm'ds facts. Among other questions the Court must answer is: are the items

mentioned in the Standards (for example, housing), treated by the United States as facts?

as goals? as policies? Obviously, if there is an individually enforceable right to the


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maintenance of housing with respect to taxation, then housing enjoys a level of scrutiny

higher than the minimum scrutiny accorded to it in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56

(1972). Apply that to the other facts of the CFS, and a host of other cases maintaining

that various facts of the CFS enjoy only minimum scrutiny, come to be seen as having

been superseded by the çfdeveloping'' 1aw of Collection Due Process. Indeed, we call into

question the continuation of the so-called çtscrutin/' regime of West Coast Hotel Co. v.

Parrish, 30O U.S. 379 (1937). The facts show that the reason the Urlited States put so

many facts in the Collection Financial Standards is that the United States applied to them

the test of West Virginia State Board ofEducation v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), with

its famous test for determining whether a fact is what might be called ççimportant.''

According to the Barnette Court, in a test which this Court is bound to apply, an

important fact is

1. a fact of human experience

which history demonstrates

is unaffected by assaults upon it.

That is, it is a robust, resilient, and recurrent fact of human experience. Such a fact,

according to Barnette, is an individually enforceable dght, it enjoys a higher level of

scrutiny than minimum scrutiny, and it is removed from the political process-where the

individual has no direct power over it-in to the Court, where the individual has absolute

power over it. Thus, the çtdeveloping'' law of Collection Due Process is toward

recognizing that the Kçscrutiny'' regime is over, and that we are now in the <tmaintenance''

Constitutional regime, which has one doctrine only: the 1aw does only one thing-it


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ARGUMENT

1. The Tax Court committed reversible error in ruling that there was lack of

prosecution, because a trial could not have been held.

Standing in the present case is conferred by USC 26 Section 6330(d)(1). USC 26

Section 6330 (ççsection 6330') has been the subject of much litigation and speculation.

(a) Requirement of notice before Ievy

(1) In general - No levy may be made on any property or light to property of any

person unless the Secretary has notitied such person in writing of their right to a hearing

under this section before such levy is made. Such notice shall be required only once for

the taxable peziod to which the unpaid tax specified in parapaph (3)(A) relates.

(2) Time and method for notice - The notice required under parapaph (1) shall bo-

(A) given in person;

(B) left at the dwelling or usual place of business of such person; or

(C) sent by certitied or registered mail, ret'ul'n receipt requested, to such person's last

known address'

not less than 30 days before the day of the first levy with respect to the amount of the

unpaid tax for the taxable period.

(3) Information included with notice - The notice required under paragraph (1) shall

include in simple and nontechnical terms-

(A) the amount of unpaid tax;

(B)

(2); and

the right of the person to request a hearing during the 30-day period under paragraph

(C) the proposed action by the Secretary and the rights of the person with respect

action, inoluding a brief statement whieh sets forth-

(i) the provisions of this title relating to levy and sale of property;

(ii) the procedures applicable to the levy and sale of property under this title;

(iii) the administrative appeals available to the taxpayer with respect to such levy and sale

and the procedures relating to such appeals;

(iv) the alternatives available to taxpayers which could prevent levy on property

(including installment aveements under section 6159), and

(v) the provisions of this title and procedures relating to redemption of property and

to such

release of liens on property.

10


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(b) ltight to fair hearing

(1) ln general - lf the person requests a hearing in writing under subsection (a)(3)(B)

and states the grounds for the requested hearing, such hearing shall be held by the

lnternal Revenue Service Office of Appeals.

(2)

A person shall be entitled to only one hearing under this section with respect to the

taxable period to which the unpaid tax specified in subsection (a)(3)(A) relates.

One hearing per period

The hearing under this subsection shall be conducted by an officer or employee who has

had no prior involvement with respect to the unpaid tax specifed in subsection (a)(3)(A)

before the first hearing under this section or section 6320. A taxpayer may waive the

requirement of this paragraph.

(c) Matters considered at hearing

In the case of any headng conducted under this section-

Requirement of investigation

The appeals officer shall at the hearing obtain verification from the Secretary that the

requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met.

(2)

(A) ln general - The person may raise at the hearing any relevant issue relating to the

unpaid tax or the proposed levy, including-

(i) appropriate spousal defenses'

(ii) challenges to the appropdateness of collection actions' and

(iii) offers of collection altematives, which may include the posting of a bond, the

substimtion of other assets, an installment aveement, or an offer-in-compromise.

(B) Underlying liability

The person may also raise at the hearing challenges to the existence or amount of the

underlying tax liability for any tax period if the person did not receive any statutory

notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not othenvise have ala Opportunity to

dispute such tax liability.

Issues at headng

(2) Basis for the determination

The determination by an appeals ofticer under this subsection shall take into


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consideration-

(A) the verification presented tmder paragraph (1);

(B) the issues raised under parapaph (2); and

(C) whether any proposed collection action balances the need for the efûcient collection

of taxes with the legitimate concern of the person that any collection action be no more

intnzsive than necessary.. ...

(d) Proceeding after hearing

(1) Judicial review of determination

The person may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, appeal such

detennination to the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to

such matter).

The Court of Appeals reviews de novo the decisions of the Tax Court. See, for example,

Andantech L.L.C. v. Comm 'r, 331 F.3d 972, 976 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

is undisputed that the invocation of the AppealsOoce's judsdiction is

exclusively the taxpayer's.

to request a hearing.'' 26 USC Section 7123(a) says:

(a) Early referral to appeals procedures

The Secretary shall prescribe procedures by which any taxpayer may request earlyreferral of 1 or more unresolved issues 9om the examination or collection division to the

Internal Revenue Service Oflce of Appeals.

26 USC Section 6330(a)(B) speaks of Stthe right of the person

Emphases added.

It is also undisputed that this exclusive voluntary invocation is extended to docketed Tax

Court cases. Thus, Appeals Office's says to me that sending the docketed Tax Court case

to the Appeals Oflice is Kça voluntary option.''

Oflice is not telling the truth, because the lnternal Revenue Manual reveals an entirely

different, illegal procedure. EVERY docketed Tax Court case is transferred to, and

Appendix at 36. However, the Appeals


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evaluated by, the Appeals Office, whether or not requested by taxpayers. Taxpayer or no

taxpayer, within 10 days of service of the petition, the Commissioner ûûtransmitgsl

docketed files to Appeals.'' Manual 8.4.1.6.2. Compounding the legal violation, the

Commissioner maintains, in the Manual (8.4.1.4), that once the case is in Appeals, and

unless procedures require the case be returned to Counsel, (çgtqhe Offce of Chief Counsel

(or the Associate Chief Counsel with subject matter judsdiction over the case or issues)

may, aher consulting with the Chief, Appeals and the appropriate Area Counsel,

determine that a case, or an issue or issues in a case, not be considered by Appeals. ln

such a situation, Appeals foregoes settlement authority on the case or issues.''

This means that even where, as in the present, the taxpayer does not participate in

any way, the Commissioner and the Appeals Office collude to determine what the

outcome of the case should be, or even that the Appeals Office should not participate in

the case (the Appeals Oftice in the latter case, violating its own legal mandate). The

sections quoted above show that the Commissioner and the Appeals Office conduct a

çdtrial'' of the case in which there is no taxpayer participation, where, as in the present

case, the taxpayer has not requested the transfer of the docketed Tax Court case and has

not participated in any way in the activities of the Commissioner and the Appeals Oftice

while the case is in the Appeals Office.

lt should go without saying that the subsequent ûdtdal,'' insisted on by the Tax

Coult violated every law relating to a tdal. The case 1aw shows that the 1aw relating to

Tax Court trials is exactly the law the Appeals Courts impose on themselves in evaluating


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whether, under the facts of the case, a Constitmional trial eould have been held. lf not,

then there is no lack of prosecution. The Cox v. Commissioner, 514 F.3d 1 1 19 (10th Cir.

2008) Court said:

The purpose of section 6330. . .is to provide tupayers with similar due process protection

tçin dealing with the IR.S that. . .they would have in dealing with any other creditor.'' S.

Rep. No. 105-174, at 67. Central to that purpose is the taxpayer's fundnmental right to an

impartial appeals officer, no different than the right to an impartial decisionmaker in any

other due process context. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975) ($$gA1 fair

tlc una ls a aslc requlrement-o-f-du-e-p'ro- . gati - - --

which adjudicate as well as to courts. Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally

unacceptable but our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the

probability of unfaimess.'') (citations and internal quotations omitted).

At 1 123.

These factors must also be present if a Tax Court trial is held-and 1et us not forget that

al1 the violations of the Commissioner and the Appeals Office were jurisdictional, could

not be waived, and must have, as a matter of law, been corrected sua sponte by the Tax

Court in canying out its Article l mandate to be a Court. The Tax Court did not correct

the violations, sua sponte or on motion or any other way, because the Tax Court insisted

on colluding with the Commissioner and the Appeals Office.Thus, in the present case

the Tax Court was star chamber. The court accepted the Ssblack box'' secrecy of the

deliberations of the Commissioner and Appeals Oftice, without even a wlitten conclusion

by the The Tax Court çdtlial'' was necessarily

arbitrary and capricious, inherently biased, unfair and prejudiced. lt was not a trial

because it could not, Constitutionally, have been one. Thus the case could not have been

Commissioner and Appeals Offce.

dismissed for lack of prosecution, because the case was not conducted in a

14


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Constitutional manner by the Tax Court. This is a due process case in which l could not

know what facts to present in order to bring myself into compliance with the law, because

the case was illegally evaluated by the Appeals Oftice and the Commissioner without my

participation and without my knowing what 1aw wms applied by them to what facts.

lI. A trial could not have been held because, once the docketed Tax Court was

illegally transferred by the Commissioner to the Appeals Office, the Appeals Office

was legally required to-and did not-issue a Notice of Determination, responding

to the arguments in the petition.

It is undisputed that the 26 USC 6330(b)-4d) hearing is what the Appeals Office

conducts with respect to docketed Tax Court cases which are illegally transferred to it. It

engages in a Section 6330 hearing, but 0ne which violates the law. According to the

Manual it consults the arguments of the Commissioner and determines the case:

tdconsulting with the Chief, Appeals and the appropriate Area Counsel, detennine that a

case, or an issue or issues in a case, not be considered by Appeals.'' Note that it makes a

Gdeterml-nation-'' According to the letters sent to me, giving us some more glimpses

into this illegal çtblack box'' headng, it uses t<the 1aw and judicial decisions to weigh the

facts,'' it then proceeds to Streview'' the case, and to Kçconsider the facts in Ethe) case.''

Appendix at 7. It arrogates to itself ççsole settlement authority'' (Appendix at 22) in this

illegal proceeding, and claims that it is içseparate from-and independent of-the division

of the Internal Revenue Service proposing the action you disapee withi'' tinally, it

decides itl after its illegal proceeding, it must <trefer your case to the Oftice of Area

Counsel to prepare your case for trial.'' Appendix at 22. The Appeals Oftice took a11

1 5


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these actions in the instant case.

In shorq in the illegal transfers of docketed Tax Court cases, the Appeals Offce

subjects itself to the requirements of 26 USC Section 6330(b)-(d), one requirement of

which is the issuance of a Notice of Determination. Thus, in the instant case the Appeals

Office was required to issue a Notice of Determination. No trial could have been held

without a Notice of Determination, because Section 6330(d)(1) refers explicitly to the

Notice of Determination as being that which the Tax Court reviews. Thus, there

could have been no failure to prosecute, because in spite of my repeated calls for it (see

Appendix), and my repeated motions to the Tax Court not to hold a tdal without a Notice

of Detemrination (see Appendix), the Appeals Office would not issue a Notice of

Determination and the Tax Court would not order it to issue one. According to the law, 1

could not have prosecuted the Tax Court case without the Notice of Determination. But

keep the real issue in sight: the Tax Court, the Commissioner and the Appeals Oftice

committed these illegal acts in order to avoid having to say that the scrtltiny regime is

over. This Court must say that.

111. A trial could not havebeen held because, in connection with the Notice of

Determination, the Appeals Office was legally required to-and did not-obtain

verification from the Secretary that the requirements of any applicable law or

administrative procedure had been met.

Section 6330(c)1 and (c)3 are explicit that the Appeals Office secure, as part of

the hearing, a verification that the requirements of any applicable 1aw or adminstrative

procedttre have been met, and that the Notice of Determination note that that veriscation


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has been obtained. Since the Notice of Determination is what the Tax Court must

consider in a trial, there could have been no trial because there was no verification and

notation of a vedfication.

lV. A trial could not have been held because the failure of the Tax Court to compel

issuance of a Notice of Determination prevented the Court from ruling on the

merits.

Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing, the Appealsn response to a

Oflce must issue a Notice of Determination answering the arguments in the Request. In

the instant casey the Appeals Oftice took on itself the responsibility of holding a Section

6330 Collection Due Process Hearing. In the illegal transfer of the docketed case, and for

purposes of Section 6330, the petition served as the ttRequest.'' For purposes of Sedion

6330, the letter of December 11, 2013, âom the Appeals Ofsce to me, was a Notice of

Determination which illegally failed to respond to the arguments in the petition, or

Sçlkequest.'' Appendix at 46.

Thus, the December 1 1 letter was, in tenns of Thornberry v. Commissioner, l 36

T.C. No. 16 (201 1) a Csdisregard determination,'' an unconstitutional boilemlate response

which did not meet the requirements of Fifth Amendment Due Process. Thornberry is

precisely on point and dispositive as to whether the Appeals Office was required to issue

a Notice of Determination responding to the azgtlments in the petition ftmctioning for

purposes of the 1aw as a Request for a Collection Due Process Headng. ln Thornberry,

the Appeals Office rejected a Request without responding to any of the arguments. The

Tax Court found this to be a due process violation, and what is more, found that the Tax


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Court's failure to fmd judsdiction in such a case was a U.S. Const. art 1 (ddArticle 1')

violation, it was a defiance of the Tax Court's jurisdiction, and the Tax Court could not

violate its own judsdiction.The Tax Court is obliged to ;nd jurisdiction when there is

jurisdiction the prejudice of its own judges cannot be a basis for denying jurisdiction.

A failure to tind judsdidion is an abuse of discretion, a due process violation, and an

Article 1 violation.

The Thornberry court makes it cleaz what the Notice of Determination must

include, and why:

Thus, the notification (in

enough information to allow the taxpayer to identify the portion or portions of the request

that need to be withdrawn. A taxpayer who is notified that a portion of the request is

based on a position identified by the Secretary as frivolous under section 67024c) can

easily identify the offending portion by reference to the Secretary's published list.

However, a taxpayer who is notifed that an unspecifed portion of the request, while not

based on a published frivolous position, reflects a desire to delay or impede the

administration of Federal tax laws may not be able to identify and withdraw that portion

without further explanation. ...gT)he settlement officer was required to make a specitic

determination that portions of petitioners' requests for a heming either are based on

positions listed. . .or reflect a desire to delay or impede the administration of Federal tax

laws. The boilemlate determination letters sent to petitioners stated that the AppealsOftice had determined that petitioners' disapeement was: a ççspecifed frivolous

position'', identised by the IR.S in Notice 2008-14 (for Notice 2008-14, refer to the 1RS

Internet website at hdp://- .irs.gov/newsrooealicle/o..id=l77slgsoo.html).

the instant case, the Notice of Determinationq should provide

Thornberry at 22-23.

And sure enough, 1 got that same boilerplate: the December 1 1 letter only says that the

Appeals Office ççtried'' to deal with the case. lt doesn't say what was dttried,'' and this

Court will not be able to find out. The Appeals Office does not say what it opposed in

the petition, wllich ftmctioned, in the Appeals Office's own estimation, as the ççRequest.''

18


(23 of



Thus, the letter was clearly in violation of Thornberty.This was repeatedly pointed out

to the Tax Court in the instant case, and the Tax Court refused to order the Appeals

Office to issue a Notice of Determination which complied with the law. See Appendix.

Again, Section 6330 is clear that a Notice of Determination is a part of what the

Tax Court reviews in a trial. Since there was no Notice of Determination, there could

have been no trial. Since there could have been no trial, there could not have been a

failure to prosecute.

V. A trial could not have been held because the inability of the Tax Court to rule on

the merits precluded a 26 USC 6330(d)(1) judicial review of determlnation, so there

could not be a Iack of prosecution.

Again, Section 6330 is clear that the Tax Court is obliged, in the trial, to rule on

the merits including the Notice of Detennination. Since there was no Notice

Determination, and no trial comporting with the requirements of Section 6330 could have

been held without it, the Tax Court could not have ruled on the merits. Since a dismissal

for failure to prosecute is a ruling on the medts, the Order is unconstitmional and

reversible error.

VI. A trial could not have been held because the Tax Court violated its own Article

l jurisdiction.

The Appeals Offce functions as a tdal court in the Section 6330 protocol. Its

Notice of Determination is its ttopinion,'' reversible by the Tax Court. Thus, the Appeals

Office has a Section 6330 duty to the Tax Court to issue a Notice of Detenuination which

responds to arguments in the Request, so that the Tax Court can perform its mandated

1 9


(24 of



review function. Without responses to arguments in the Request, the Tax Court calmot

legally ftmction and there can be no legal trial-there is nothing to try. The Tax Court

must decide if the Appeals Ofsce and the Commissioner complied with the law. The Tax

Court cannot perform its Article 1 function to be a court, where the document it

evaluates-the letter in this case--does not fulfll the requirements of a Notice of

Detennination. Nor can tllis Court of Appeals function with respect to determining

hether the arguments made in the Request are valid, for the simple reason that it does

not know what are the Appeals Office's responses to them. The entire case calls out for

remand to the Tax Court under orders by tllis Court which amount to continuous

monitoring of the Commissioner, the Appeals Office and the Tax Court to see that they

perform their duties under a variety of provisions of law, including Section 6330,

Thornberty, Article 1, and due process. 'The failure of the Appeals Office to issue a valid

Notice of Determination, violates every one of these provisions of law. The Tax Court

calmot have ruled that there was a lack of prosecution, because the Tax Court did not

have the facts or legal arguments before it-it did not have before it the responses of the

Appeals Office to the arguments in the Request. It did not have before it what was in the

(Cblack box'' comprising the illegal transfer of a docketed Tax Court case to the Appeals

Office without my permission.

Why then, this Court will ask, does the Tax Court conspire in these illegal

transfers of docketed cases? It is because the Appeals Ofsce subscdbes to the

Commissioner's Chief Counsel Notice, the now notorious CC-2012-003, in which the


(25 of



Commissioner refuses to acquiesce in Thornberry.

directs, in the Manual, that there continue to be defance to Thornberry in the Service's

practice. Check this out:

What is more, the Commissioner

35.3.23.5.1

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction When CDP Hearing Request Denied Under

IRC 63304g)

IRC 6330(g) permits the Service to disregard any portion of a CDP hearing request that

contains frivolous positions or reflects a desire to delay or impede the administration of

Federal tax laws. ln Thornberry v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 356 (2011), the Tax Court

held that it has judsdiction to review a petition filed 9om the denial of a hearing under

IRC 6330(g). Counsel's position is that the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction, and attorneys

should continue to f-le motions to dismiss for Iack of jurisdiction under these

circumstances. The attorney should obtain a copy of the hearing request and

independently verify that a headng was properly denied. lf denial was improper, the

attorney should still seek dismissal but state in the motion that Appeals will be instructed

to offer a hearing to address any non-frivolous issues raised in the CDP hearing request

and release any levies. Following that hearing, Appeals will issue a notice of

determination that would be subject to judicial review.

(07-25-20 l 2)

lf there is litigation concerning whether the taxpayer has a right to a hearing, issues

involving motions to restrain and continued levies might also arise. If the trial attorney

verifies that a hearing was properly denied, levies should continue, and any motions to

restrain should be defended on the pound that the court has no jurisdiction.

Because this is a developing area of law, consult with the Office of the Associate Chief

Counsel (P&A), Branch 3 or 4 before filing a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or

if you encounter the sittzation described in the prior parap-aph.

Emphasis added.

Finally, in 14-1042, the Commissioner is asking that Ihornberty be overturned, although

in Buczek v. Commissioner, 143 T.C. No. 16 (Oct. 6, 2014), the Tax Court just refused to

overturn it. It should be obvious to this Court that Thornberry stands for the proposition

that the scrutiny regime is over; if it is not obvious, then this Court must go baek to law


(26 of



school. The Commissioner, the Appeals Office, and the Tax Court were acting under the

CC-2012-003 order to disobey the law, and the Tax Court lcnew that they were acting

under this order to obey the law, and the TM Court knew that this wa.s why the case was

illegally transferred.The Tax Court didnot simply commit reversible en-or in this

caso-it was an active conspirator with the Appeals Offce and the Commissioner in this

Ihornberry violation. 'Fhere is no dispute about the facts of this. Why, this Court will

ask, did the Tax Court 1et the Appeals Office get away with it? Why didn't the Court call

the Appeals Office on the illegal transfer? It is also the Section 6330 duty of the Tax

Court to show that the Commissioner, the Appeals Office and the Tax Court itself,

complied with the law. Condoning violations of the law, does not exempt the Tax Court

from obeying the law. Tllis should go without saying, but it has to be said when the Tax

Court epegiously and persistently cormives to violate the law. The Court failed to order

the Appeals Oftice to respond to the arguments in the Request because the Court itselfks

de:dng Ihornbcrry.Clearly, the Tax Court has gotten into the business of deciding

which aspects of taxation-âom the rates on through to assessment and collection-are

going to be used to advance which policies. But it doesn't know which policies. In

Custom Stairs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2O1 1-155 (201 1), it forgives failure to make

tax payments when such payments threaten a business--cleady an enforcement of the

Collection Financial Standards' policies of Ecproduction of income.'' In Vinatieri v.

Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 16 (2009), the Tax Court forgives failure to file tax returns

when the taxpayer has a right to have a levy lifted. ln Thornberry, the Court makes

responding to arguments in a Request, a due process right and an Artiole l duty of the

22


(27 of



Court to require.

to lirlk tration in al1 of its aspects, to the facts of taxpayers' lives. ln pmicular, the facts

contained in the Collection Financial Standards, and above all, i.n the policy of those

The Tax Court has found that there is an individually enforceable right

Standards. There is no question that thereare due process rights in the Collection

Financial Standards, because every govenunent action must comport with due process,

and as already stated, the Standards, including its policy, may be invoked and litigated in

the Tax Court-and this is done constantly. And look at the vast range of that policy

(emphasis added):

Collection Financial Standards are used to help determine a taxpayer's ability to pay a

delinquent tax liability. Allowable living expenses include those expenses that meet the

necessary expense test. The necessary expense test is defined as expenses that are

necessary to provide for a taxpayer's (and his or her family's) health and welfare and/or

production of income. National Standards for food, clothing and other items apply

nationwide. Taxpayers are allowed the total National Standards amount for their family

size, without questioning tlze amount actually spent.

National Standards have also been established for minimum allowances for out-of-pocket

health care expenses. Taxpayers and their dependents are allowed the standard amount on

a per person basis, without questioning the amount actually spent.

Maximum allowances for housing and utilities and transportation, known as the Local

Standards, vary by location. In most cases, the taxpayer is allowed the amount actually

spent, or the local standard, whichever is less.

Generally, the total number of persons allowed for necessary living expenses should be

the same as those allowed as exemptions on the taxpayer's most recent year income tax

return. If the IRS detennines that the facts and circumstances of a taxpayer's situation

indicate that using the standards is inadequate to provide for basic living expenses, we

may allow for actual expenses. However, taxpayers must provide documentation that

supports a determination that using national and local expense standards leaves them an

inadequate means of providing for basic living expenses.

Emphases added.


(28 of



Can there in law be a tçliability'' or a 'sdelinquent'' one, or even a legal rate or assessment

or collection step, which does not harmonize with this policy, a policy which is

unquestionably one a taxpayer may invoke in his or her defense? What discretion does

the United States have, in setting rates, or in assessment or collection, when tlzis policy

may be invoked by taxpayers?

'Fhe illegal transfer of the docketed Tax Court was jurisdictional and cannot be

waived. The Tax Court does not have discretion to defy the Tax Court's own

jurisdiction. The Order based on a fnding of a lack of prosecution, was simply the Tax

Court's way of condoning the illegal ads of the Appeals Office and is reversible because

it is a violation of the Tax Court's Article l jurisdiction.

24


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CONCLUSION

This Court is unaware of the extent of legal violations committed, as a matter of

practice and memorialized in the Manual, by the Tax Court, the Appeals Offce and the

Commissioner in Collection Due Process, conspiring together to violate rights. Docketed

Tax Court cases are always transferred to and acted on by the Appeals Oftice without

first securing taxpayer permission. Thus, every docketed Tax Court case which has come

before this Court on appeal, has been illegally decided. Did tllis Court know the practice

of illegal transfer was going on? What did this Court know and when did this Court

know it? The violation of 1aw by the Tax Court in this case occurred because the Tax

Court is ûçbetween two stools''-understanding that there are new rights, but opposed to

the logical implications of those rights.

This Court must have a hand in itdeveloping'' the law of the new regime. Even

the Commissipner vants that this is so when it states that the f'undamental law, the

Constitutional regime, is (sdeveloping.'' So, Court, don't be AFRAID. There have been

several Constitutional regimes, and to get its comfort level up for the task it now has to

perform, this Court can do no better than consult G. Edward White's Sildistoricizing

Judicial Scrutiny,'' http://law.bepress.coeuvalN s/uva publiclaw/mol. The scnztiny

regime is dead. It can never be revived, either by the Tax Court Court's issuing blatantly

illegal rulings as in this case, or by the Tax Court whilzing or wringing its hands. This

section of the Brief is misnamed, because there is no ttconclusion''-this appeal is the

beginning, not the conclusion, of this case.

This Court on remand must:

25

Get ready for the long haul: as initial relie:


(30 of



say what is the law of the Collection Financial Standards in conjunction with

Collection Due Process, comprehending the procedural due process tends of Vinatieri,

Thornberry arld Custom Stairs, the substantive due process policy and mandate of the

Collection Financial Standards to maintain what is ççnecessary to provide for a taxpayer's

(and his or her family's) health and welfare and/or production of income'' and the

doctrine that taxation does one thing only: it maintains important facts. is

emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.''

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178;

vacate the Order of the Tax Court;

order the Tax Court to forthwith order the Appeals Office to file and serve, within

20 days of the Tax Court's order, a Notice of Determination in which the Appeals Office

responds to the arguments in the petition;

order me to file, within 20 days of the filing and selving of the Notice of

Determination, a report responding to that Notice, and in particular proposing further

orders of the Appeals Court to the Tax Court;

5. order the Commissioner to file, within 20 days of the filing and serving of my brief, a

report in response, and in particular proposing further orders of the Appeals Court to the

Tax Court; and

order me to file, within 5 days of the filing and serving of the report in response, a

reply report, and in particular proposing further orders of the Appeals Court to the Tax

Court.

From the facts of this case and No. 14-1042, it should be obvious that the Tax Court the

26


(31 of



Commissioner and the Appeals Oftice have to be kept on a shol't leash, like little dogs,

especially as the new Constitmional regime is enforced. The Court must not forget that

Vinatieri and Thornberry are about the Tax Court correcting its own errors in

ilmumerable cases. These errors extend to this Court as well. Taxpayer rights in Section

6330 Collection Due Process are completely circumvented by an illegal conspiracy

between the Chief Counsel and the Appeals Office: by means of illegal transfers of

docketed cases, and without participation by the taxpayer, the Appeals Oflice and Chief

Counsel decide what issues the case presents, and whether or not to address those issues.

This (tprocedure'' is an obvious violation of due process, a Section 6330 violation, as well

as an Article l violation, and a Thornbely violation, since no Notice of Determination is

issued by the Appeals Office when the case is (çreturned'' to Chief Counsel.

But there is more on this point; note that since every docketed case goes to the

Appeals Office, every docketed case appealed to this Court has a non-waivable violation

committed by the United States, and not addressed by this Court..

Furthermore, the disposition in evely docketed Tax Coul't case is now tlzrown into deubt

because, virtually from the moment of tiling, taxpayer l'ights have been violated (and the

violations are jurisdictional and calmot be waived) by the illegal actions of the Chief

Counsel and the Appeals Office. So this Court must also confront these problems:

1. Which of its own orders and decisions is it going to vacate?

2. What did this Court know of this illegal practice of Ssreferring'' docketed Tax Court

cases to the Appeals Office without the authorization of taxpayers?

3. Was this Court aware of the agreements being made by the Appeals Offce and

27


(32 of



the Chief Counsel without the participation of taxpayers?

4. And if it was aware of this practice, why has not the Court of Appeals sua sponte

put an end to the practice?

The intent of Conpess in Section 6330 is that the Tax Court not substitute its response to

arguments in the Request, for the response of the Appeals Office to arguments in the

Request. The intent of Conpess in Section 6330 is that the Cllief Counsel not substitme

its response to arguments in the Request, for the response of the Appeals Office to

arguments in the Request. The intent of Congress in Section 6330 is that the Appeals

Office remain independent, and that this independence is a legal duty the Appeals Office

owes to itself, to the Chief Counsel, to the Tax Court, and to the taxpayer. This duty has

been recorized by the Commissioner himself: çslndependence f'rom other IR.S oftices is

critical for Appeals to accomplish this important mission.''

hûp://- .irs.covdndividualssndependence-of-Appeals. It should go without saying-

but cannot, given Court errors with resped to Collection Due Process-that the violation

of the Appeals Office in this case is also a violation of 26 USC Section 63201).

Conpess took specific steps to ensure that Appeals review was independent, both in

reality and in perception. One main guarantor of independence is Section 632009, which

requires that a CDP hearing be before an ççimpartial'' Appeals employee. When the

Appeals Oftice allows itself to evaluate cases without complying with due process, it is

attempting to enforce a prejudice. An Appeals Office employee who displays prejudice,

is not an Esimpartial'' Appeals employee. The facts show that the entire Appeals Oflce is

this ççemployee,'' and so the Appeals Office can no longer ftmction except under


(33 of



supervision of tllis Court.

The Appeals Offce's legal

legal integrity of taxation, and that is why fu11 relief involves exploration of the due

process component of every aspect of taxation, from rate-setting through tax trial on

error, compounded by the Tax Court, is about the

through collection.

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John Rysknmp

1677 Arch St.

Berkeley, CA 94709

(510) 848-6898

[email protected]

November 18, 2014

29


(34 of



CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 32(a)

Certmcate of Compliance With Type-volume Limitation,

Typefact Requirements, and Type Style Requirements

This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.

32(a)(7)(B) because this brief contains 8665 words, excluding the parts of the

brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).

This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5)

and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this brief has

been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using MicrosoR Word Times

New Roman 12.

Dated November 18, 2014.

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Johrt Rysknmp

M

1677 Arch St.

Berkeley, CA 94709

(510) 848-6898

[email protected]

30


(35 of



CERTIFICATE OF SERWCE

1 certify that 2 copies appellant's operling brief with appendix were served upon appellee

by U.S. mail, first-class postage prepaid, to his attonzey of record on November 1 8, 20 1 4,

addressed as follows:

Curtis Pett

U.S. Department of Justice

Tax Division, Appellate Section

PO Box 502

Washington, DC 20044

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Jolm Rysknmp

1677 Arch St.

Berkeley, CA 94709

(510) 848-6898

[email protected]

Dated November 18, 2014


(36 of



Appeal No. 14-73059

UNITED STATES COURT OF M PEALS

FOR THE NWTH CIRCUIT R E c E l V E D

MOLLY . aWYER. CLERK

U.s.coURToF APPEALS

N0V 1 2 2011

FILED

DGGKETED (etitioner-Appellant

nATE lk1TIb

COMMISSIONER OF TNTEM AL REVENUE,

Respondent-Appellee.

On Appeal 9om the United States Tax Court

No. 8888-13 (Nega, J.)

APPENDIX

Jolm Ryskamp

1677 Arch Street

Berkeley, Califonlia 94709

(510) 848-6898

[email protected]


(37 of



U: TXWV'W V14-1114

RECEIVED

SEP 12 2013

08:30 PM

Document #1504649 Filed: 07/24/2 zs> agXFTAK-OURT

+ l eFILED

JMM 5

.

sEP 12 2013

JOHN HENRY RYSKAMP

Petitionerts)

ELECTRONICALLY FILED

Docket No. 8888-13

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent

MOTION TO VOID NOTICE SETTING CASE FOR TRIAL


(38 of



US TAx-coBr se #14-1114

RECEIVED

SEP 12 2013

08:30 PM

Doctlment #1504649 F7 1 1 e d . 0 712 412 O 14 P a (-) t? 1- C 7 r.) F - : ' ;

UNRTED STATES Tu COURT

John Ryskamp

Petitioner,

Docket No. 8888-13

MOTION TO VOID NOTICE SEW ING

CASE FOR TRIAL

(Rules 38 and 131)

Commissioner of lnternal Revenue,

Respondent.

Tlais motion is before the Chief Judge,

A1l the docp'ments and pleadings in this case are incozporated herein by this reference.

Rule 131 states: tçEach case, when at issue, wi11 be placed upon a calendar for trial in

accordance 'GIII Rule 140. The Clerk shall nottfA ' the padies of the place aud time for witich the

calendar is set'' Rule 38 Mates: RA case shall be deemed a: issue upon the ftling of tlw

Mswer. .. .'' The Notice Setting Case for Trial, a copy of which is attached and incozporated

herein by iis reference, was served September 12, 2013.

The answer in the instant case was filed on Jtme 21, 2013. Subsequenl to that, the

Commissioner filed a copy of both my petition an.d his Rnnwer witll the Philadelpllia Camplzs

Appeals Offce and both documents are on in the lile of the Philadelphia Csmpus Appeals

Office. In addhion, the Commissioner , in violation of the law, ordered the Appeals Oftice to

regard the petilion as a Request (which it is not, for I have not requested a Collection Due

Process hearing), refuse to hold a Colleetion Due Process hearing %4th respect to the so-ealled

Request, which the Comnnissioner has treated and does treat as a Request, and which the Appeals

1

2


(39 of



USCA Case 414-1114 Document #1504649 Filed: 07/24/2014 Page 20 Of 63

Offke, at the order of the Commissioner, has keated and does keat ms a Reques't. The

Commksioner ordered the Appeals O/ce not to consider any argument made i.n eitber the

Request or the Commîssioner's own ans-wer. These actions were taken by the Commissioner

puzsuant to CC-2012-003,deny1g tllis Court'sjudsdiction.

According to the Commissioner, for puzposes of Filh Amendment Due Process and

'--

-lllm-rn-bery-tlre-pelition- ' ' -f ' .0- -

hearing. On July 30, 2012, the Appeals Ooce wrote to me tlzat it had Hreceived'' the so-called

Requesty çtin the Philadelpllia Cmnpus Appeals Oftice.'*

As of the date of tllis motiona September 12, 2013, the Appeals Ofike is plvportedly, but

not actually, considering the Request. Nevvrtheless, the Court went ahead arld issued the Notice

1 > ,

Setdng Case for Tdal. Although repeatedlylb

rought to the Court s attention, the Commissioner s

illegal conducthms not been acted on by the Cotut

:? ,

ccordlg to Thornberzy v, Commtssioner in the Cotut s Order of April 19, 201 1,

Gtsection 6330(g) requires the Appeals Office to determine the specitk portlons of petitioners'

request for a hearing that are regazded as frivolous or reflect a desize to delay or impede rhe

adminùtation of Federal tax laws, leaving for hearing only tlze legitimate and bona fide issues

petitioners raised. The Appeals Office has not yet done this'' and no notice setting case for tI'iZ

was issued before the Cotu't issued its order of April 19, the Court Tequiring the Appeals Oflke

to detezmine the specification porticms of tlze petitilm Rbefore taking further action hz tizis case.''

A copy of the docket in Thornberzy is attached hereto and incorporaled hezein by this referenceu

As of September 12, 2013, the Appeals OYce ha.s not determined, ill tlze instant case, the

specisc portions of the Request that are rqgarded as frivolous or reflect a desire to delay or

impede the arlmirlistration of Federal tax laws, leaving f0r hendng only the legitimate and bona


(40 of



USCA Case #14-1114 Doctlment $61504649 Fi Ied : 07/24/2 O 14 P a () f? )? 1 r'': f t'9 '.

5de issues raised in the Request. 'Fhe Court has issued the Notice illegally as a Fiûh

Amendment Due Process and Article I N'iolation attempt to evade stafng tlle law. Note that the

Court made no mention of tb.e Appeals Ooce's July 30 letter, although it was repeatedly brought

to the attention of the Court.

For Fifl:h Amendment Due Process purposes and Thornberry purposes, the case is not Sçat

--

'' here the Commlssioner as teate a pe on an answer-acs-a-Ae-que-st-for'a'ro 'ssue w

Due Process hearing and 170th the Commissioner and the Appeals Office az'e treating the Request

a.s pending at the time the Court issues a Notice Setting Case for Trial. Thtks, no Notice may be

issued uader Rules 38, 13 1 or any other provision of law. Under tlwse facts, it is an abuse of

discretion, a Fift.h Amendment Due Prccess violation, an Article 1 violation, a Section 6330

violation acd a 'l-honaben-y' violation, for the Court to issue a Notice Setting Case for Trial and

the Notice is a Disregard Determination. The so-called SNotice'' has been given its legal titte on

the attached copy.

Where the Tax Court purports to act as the Appeals Ooce, issuing Disregard

Determinations, then it takes on itself the Constitutional duty to determine the specific portions

of the Request (also krlow'n as tlle answer, in tlte instant case) that it regards as frivolous or

retlect a desire to delay or impede the Administration of Federal tax laws, leaving only the

legjtimate and bona fide issues raised in the Request. ln issuing the Notice, this Colm ha.s

decided to treat the Request now on Gle in the Philadelphia Cnmpus Appeals Office, çtas if it had

not been submitted.'' Then, also under Thorzlben'y, it must ltmake a specifc determination that a

portion of a tmxpayer's request for a hearing either is based on a position listed in Notice 2008-

14. ..or reflects a desire to delay or impede the administration of Federal tax laws.'* This is what

4


(41 of



USCA Case #14-1114 Document #1504649 Filed: 07/24/2014 Page 22 Of 63

comes ef this Court acting intemperately :vithout considering the legal issues involved in the

actions of the Commissioner.

nerefore I move for an order voiding the Notice Setting Case for Trial an.d mnking a

stmement binding on the Commissioner, of the 1aw of the Collection Financial Standazds in

conjunction wit.h Collection Due Process. In its intemperate act of issuing the Notice, this Coun

11 n (z f5 lrefhar

am

.

pl. inntnrl l'tq-lfan--c onstitudn'nn 1 4n' nlatinns, 'Whe - ' ' - til lrtt

end?

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John Rysksrnp -

1677 Arch St., Berkeley, CA 94709, (510) 843-6898

[email protected]

Dated: September 12, 2013

5


(42 of



USCA Case #14-1114 Document #1504649 F 1 I ed : 0 7 2 4/2 0 14 P a (' i:? -2 - ;) t'3 5 ':'' . 'i

xwxe. >

, +

.? t S #

w

*

iolm HeN Ryskamp,

U N I T E D S T A T E S T A X C O U R T


September 12, 2013

P<itioner

888:-13.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.

Rospondent

Trial At: Room 2-1408. Fe.dml Building

Md U. S. Collrthouse

450 Golden Gate Avenue N,

C iM CA 94102 A ' 'an ranc

, j

a. u s

4,: q y yyy yyyyh , p .0

.

1I

'IYe paztie.s are hereby notified tbat this case ks set for trial at ttte Tzial Session beginning a 1

0:K AM on

Mondayx

fernarv 10.2

014 . Tlze calendar for that Sœsion VII be called at that dntn and time, and the partir.s are

expected to be present and to be preNcd to try tke caase. Your alhxre to appear may rexnlt in (lismimqnl of he case

and entzy of deoision agninKt you.

Tlte Cotut wiE set the time for each trinl at the end of the calendar call. In setting trial times the Court

attempts to accommodate tlle pare. but the Snal determinxtion oftrial times resls in tlze Courtys (Iiscretion.

Your attention is called to tlze reqllirements set out in the Standing Prelrinl Order that is served with thjs

notix incllldimg tlle followingt

stipulation of Facfx Iftlle C'aK cammt be settled, the parlies. before trial, must agree in writisg to allfacts and all donnments aboutwhich there should be no disagreement. The stipulation sigled by all parties

sltould be subrnited at tlle calendar call on Februaw 10. 2014 .

Exchanze of Dtmuments. No Iater fhqn Janwqzy 27. 2014 . each party mast provide to the cGer a11 the

documents or mAerials thqt the party expects to ofer into evidencc at *1 and th1 are not included in the

stipuladoa

Prefrial Memoradum and Witn- Idenfmcation. No laterthan Januarv 27. 2014 yeach party must

me on the otber p'trty and flle aqretrial memorandtzm that among other tlkingsy identzes the witnoses

that the party intends to call to testlfy at trial.

ne paees should contact each other promptly and cooperate fully so that the nervtuazy steps = l)e taken

to comply with these t'eqttirementq. Ycur failure to cooperate may also result in dhmissal of the ca,se and entry

of decision against ycu.

llobert R. Ehi Trolio

Clerk of tllc Couzt

SERVED Sep 12 2013


(43 of




Irteroxl Revenue se-ce Departmeot of the Trem ry

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céive 'ut n>-v,. for cunéid-fion in . é/laddplti caupw Appeau osce.p re m

Whe W* Sné: We Dm *na ?@w We RGé* axe, . - ' .

Ap- s ls azaie fromz and iddkpendmtof, ttz lnt Rev=ie%ervfce (IP.S) ofsce

tnting tNe aV tlzat you disa#/ with. We % ew and r 1% dlsputes in a fai* ànd

' '

is th làW andjtzidal'dedstons to d1-the facts. Ourretiewsmpartial mxnn by ingv e

m==:.11y condu by telephoné o: mail. lf you prefer a f t&face rv'vfew at ie

Ape s omce clo to yourresid=ce orbxlm-n-kaddrauyp e 1+ us kaow within l 5

days from tlie a--of 's lettcwe will tmnecr youz case to th propriate Apmals

seld omce forn-nid 'on. . :--j- * v '

'

N'e C' * l *

f You ca Ex- C''t V 'ha .

we win nwq ke wery atteznpt o contadmu ms quickly as N iblm We 'n nnnsider tim

fad' in yétsr caseud try to wet:e -zspute.we niay ask Foû for ad 'nnal

Gonuàtion tù ekplih or su :iiffocna:oh in your rzle.

.

o; ' ., '

Tf otzr office determlnes tlzat you e the lRSxle Iaw >uires a charge for in est Imtil

you pay ele muotmt 8<u owe In Tfie amoust you owe iadudo penaltio, Yonal

.peéalty.e6imts.màygavrn uldi 1ïn ' ybu##in full. If ytm owe dr potendally we tax,

interwt aaeor > tew you miy e a payment u'any time;

Wbat You C.w m)

. If you are msked to Ad addido infomlafom *ly promptly.

.

.

.

.

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: ' . '' . . . ' ' : gjjj ' ' lf y6u wLG to stop oi MIA idte ùnyait & an o/the. èlance du% you catt

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send tax paAents to thk ' s o ce W'ökking yof;è o.w.

l

J . If you save que ons about the App s

prœess or how 8ou = prYare for your

'

hemdng r.nrum tmicate *1t11 i:e Xon ' Peruonn Iistd aMvek '

l


(44 of



USCA Case #14-1114 Document #1504649

@ Aa attomey, Cgrtifed Public A=mtant ()r a mrson e=lle to pradiObefore

the mS may rves=t you. HowAer, mu mustsubmit a Fo= 2<, Power of

Arorle

y orDetlaradon'ofRepresentatîve, ot similar writtm authnriyation. If you

' ne mote info-atioa almt the zeqùlrementq fok xvrœmtlg taxpayea ycu

maybbYn a copy of Treasurya lrlment Cimular 230 available at most IRS

omcea.

-

.

lf the lRS ma11u a legal notic to disallow mur claimv you Oould mo/tor mur

dmdline for 511: S'G

Additkmal Ixformaqon

Vsit our website at www.irs.gov/appeals for additional informadon.

At the condasion of the Appeals procœsr you may be asked to particimte in an AppOls

customc satisfadion survey. Yor partiulpation is voMtary and the survey will not ask

for v onal or rmnndal information of any klmd. The re:1:1,.s of the survey *11 be 'rwl to

improve the Aplxals procos and service to oœ custcmers.

Sizm- ly.

t

Vemdda Smders

Ape s'remn Manager

Enclosures:

Publication 4227 Wdcome to Appeals

Publi=don 4167 Intrvudion to Al'z- tive Dispute R=lmlon

No6ce 1016'How to Stop Intelvst on your Acunt

I

8

Filed: 07/24/2014 Page 25 Of 63


(45 of



Vlev?xetgoWe't V(uVr)4 Document #1504649 Filed: 07/24/2014 Pagesjqot j/aj

()0 to hh Docket Inquirv Hnmq. Docket Number. lndiyidual Party Name, Coporate Name Keyword

Docket Inquiry - lndex

Docket No.: 000580-10 L Caption:James Bruce & Laura Alme Thornberry

Petition rjoams l / ul Respondent Counsel J Bar No: MJ221 l Joel D

McMahan

ar No: PRO SE g k

No: 1 - o: 2 400 w. Bay skeet

f . j

-

suite 240

charles Bennett Fos

/ <:f /y-a (1 Jacksonvflle, pt 322c2

f-rnuzztzzzzlzk'zyz'r'à'n' . - ...-. . , .x,t..to,.- . * See the Abbreviations List for definitions of ecrtain

( L I , ' .acr#x

e

m. .r abbreviations on the docltet record

: , -. - .

.. ..

'

.

Sec Parties tor additional parties and atlornel's in a casc

Utl to p hdex, Parties. Participants

Max. Results per Page: 25 Page 1 of 2 - - ' > >>

Ak-fabbostatus sewed oocumeùA

Filed Filings and Proceedings saje

î

v

01/06/201 OPETITION Filed:Fee Waived R0:/12/20lûN/A NxA

01/12/20100RDER for Filing Fee on 02/26/10. B0t/l2/2Ol0(XjewJ $

01/25/2010REQlJEST for place of Trial at Tnmpa, FL 801/26/20 1 ON/A Et

MOTION by resp. to dismiss for LOJ wxxhs. op

.

o (jxypoyxj ) 'à

02/24/2010 yC/S 2/23/1 0) ï

APPLICATION by Petn for waiver of flling fee & scgzojjl scyslacjgx/a '

02/25/2010 GR 0

affdavit

NOTICE of Filing mot. to dismiss. Obj. to be stcagxjcx/x

02/26/2010sl

ed; 321d/l0.

RESPONSE by petr. to mot. to dismiss for LOJ.

5/24/20 l 0 N/A

(C/S 3/18/10)

O6/02/2010ORDER that case is aasigrled to Judge Dawson. 806/03/20 lûgvie-w-j

OIIDER Resp. by 7-l 9-10 Kle reply to response to yj /,cj gjwiewy6/10/20 10 B06

mot to dismlss.

REPLY by Resp. to Pet's response to mot to

7/20/2010 N/A

dismiss. wcxs. (C/S 7/19/10)

RESPONSE by pet. to resp. reply to response to

19/2010 . . R0826/201ûN/A

t. t .

T.C. OPmION, Judge Dawson 136 T.C. No. 16 jpaaj j jvjewy4/1920 1 1 B04/

(An appropdate order will be issated)

ORDER petr. by 5/20/1 1 flle report. Resp. mot. to stpawx j ryjewg4/20/20 1 1

dismiss is denied.

RESPONSE by pels. to courts ozder dated

05/1 8/20 l 14/20/1 1

.

06/09/201 I ANSWER (C/S 6/9/20 1 1).

R05/31/20 l IN/A

hosr//- .usucoud.govrstcDocknqrockerimiay.cpx?DocketNo=loooos8o 9/1250 1 3


(46 of



tloei7ëljcèllzièè) 4 Document #1504649 Filed: 07/24/2014 Pagt') /- 7 (7f 6 ''ge 2 b?2

ORDER pet/s. by 7/1 1/1 1 Sle a response to this

06/15/20 1 1

order.

806/17/201 l f'Vkwj

file reports. Cmse is sca/ts/xl Iwiuw)

ooce of appeals.

REPORT by resp. w/Exlnq. (C/S 9/29/11) N/A9/29/2011

1 IORDER resp. by 12/5/1 1 ftle fllrther reports. B10/1 1201 l Wicwq0/06/20

0/07/201 IREPORT by pet. (C/S 9/29/1 1) N/A

ORT by resp. (C/S 12/5/1 1) N/A2/05/201 IREP

ER resp. by 3/31/12 5le farther steatus report. B l 2/07/201 llview'l2/06/201 10RD

17QTmnRT by Teqp. (CV /23/12) - N/A

ORDER time witbin which resp. shall isgue a stp/aaaolztvjewj4/03/20 l 2

. uon fs extended to 7/3/12. -etermlna

Page 1 of 2 > i >'Q

RESPONSE by petrs. to7/11Q01 1

6/15/1 1. (C/S 7/5/1 1)

ORDER pnrties by 9/30/1 1

08/03/201 1 ,remanded to resp s.

court's order dated

Generated by Blackstone ... The Judicial System

C) 2013 A1l Rights Reserved, CMC Softwrare

To contact the Webm%ter for technical issues nr problems wilh the Web site, send an e-mail to

webnnasterettstaxcourt.jtov. For your information, no documents can be Iiled with the Court at this

F a.ll ou-teclmical questions including procedural case-related orr any other e

-

mail address. or n , . ,

general questions about tlze Courq you must contact tlze Ooce of the Clerk of tlle Cotul at (202) 521

-

0700 or by posfal mail at U.S. Tax Court, 400 Second Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20217.

Attenkon: Ooce of the Clerk of the Court.

hos:///v.lveustucoMegovxstcDocklnqrocketDiz#ay.aspx?DockeGo=loooos8o 9/1 2/20 1 3


(47 of



USCA Case //14-1114 Document #1504649 Filed: 07/24/2014 Page 28 Of 63

US TAX COURT

RECEIVED

SEP 25 2013

W C

% O ES N +

* tn

,

îz o

e

N == l.

D v w

*

US TAX COURT

eFILED

SEP 25 2013

JOHN HENRY RYSKAMP

Petitionerts)


Docket No. 8888-13


Respondent

SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION TO VOID

NOTICE SETTING CASE FOR TRIAL

SERVED Oct 18 2013


(48 of



(6-g:$.4-1114 Document #1504649S

RECEIVED

SEP 25 2013

04:27 PM

Jolm Ryskamp

Peti:oner,

Filed: 07/24/2014 Page 29 Of 63

UNITED STATES Tu COURT

Docket N0. 8888-13

SW PLEMENT TO MOTION TO VOID

NOTICE SETM G CASE FOR TRIAL

(Rules 38 and 131)

Commissioner of Internal Revenuey

Respondent.

l

Tlais motion is before the Chief Judge.

A11 the documents and pleadings in this case are incorporated herein by this referezme.

The Denial of the Motion for Sllmmary Jadgment is, for Fifth Amendment Due Process

purposes. a second Disregard Deterncination; it is identifed as such ilz this pleading, and a'dached

hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. It was issued in violadon of the Court's duty to

rule on judsdiction. The illegal transfer of tltis case to the Appeals Ooce is a continuing Fifth

Amendment Due Process violadon. The facts show the individual income tnx rates are

unconstitutional. The Commissioner has waived opposition to the petition and the molion for

sllrnmar

.

y judpnenta by illegally transferring the case to the Appeals Ooce. The Court is acting

in violation of Article I in denying the Motion for Surrtmary Judrenta just as it acted

violation of Article I in issuing the Notice, when it ltnew in both cases that the case had been

illegally tansferred to the Appeals Oëce. The Denial therefore :mntions, for Constimtional

purposes, as a second Disregard Detennination, ratifying the Commissioner's illegal conduct.

1

12


(49 of



USCA Case #14-1114 Document #1504649 Filed: 07/24/2014 Page 30 oî 63

ne Co< il No. 013681-1 IQ has fotmd that the individual income tax rates are

unconstitutional, but due to outside pressure, it will not rule on the motion for summary

judgment izt that case. That failure to rule is azz ongoing Fifth Amendment Due Process

violakon, and for pumoses of the instant case, is a Disregard Determination.

Why is tlze Court acting ms a b= ch of the Intemal Revenue Service? Judge three. strike

tbme. Yet anoier idiot judge. Do you seriousl/-th wl et you get away wt your l eg -

ctivity? Tiiink again.

1

J Ryskam

1677 Arch St.; Berkeley, CA 94709, (510) 848-6298

[email protected]

Dated: September 25a 20 13

2


(50 of




*1P.S >b +

.

â> ,.x %

% 5MM 'p

2 zg 3EP 1

US TAX COURT

eFILED

US TAX COURT

RECEIVED

SEP 12 2013

03:13 PM

JOHN HENRY RYSKAMP

Petitionerts)

ELKTRONICALLY FILED

Dccket No. 0688-13


Respondent

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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SEP 25 2013 $

(Sigaed) Joseph W. Nega

Judge

SERVED Sep 25 2043

14


(51 of



USCA Case #' 14-1114 Document #1504649

US TAX COURT

RECEIVED

SEP 12 2013

03:13 PM

Filed: 07/24/2014 Page 32 Of 63

John Rysknmp

Petitioner, MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JIJDGMENT

Filed Electronically

Commissioner of lntemal Revenue,

Respocdem.

l

Ctlt is emphatically the province and duty of theludicial deprment to say what the 1aw is.''

-

Marbury v. Madison

The pleadings on f'le in the instaht case are incorporatcd herein by this reference.

Just so we bave a clear tmderstanding of where the abuse of dîscretion andcs of this

Coul and tlte Due Process violations of the Commissicner, have piaced this case, tet's recapa

shall we?

ne Commissioner has sent me a Notice of Assessment which is unconstitutional because

the individtlsl tax rates aa tmconstitutional. The Cotu't is going to conclude that ia No. 01368 -

1 1L, but the Court won't m'le on the Comlm-ssioner's motion for sllmmaryjudgment 'in rhst case

because the Judge in that case (who has had the motion ander subrnission since Apzil 20 I 3 ), is

irorartt/golpid/tmder illegal outside pressure nct to Jule.


(52 of



?


OK. next the Commissioner illegalty moves the instarlt caze to the Appeals Oftkea

pursuam to its illegal CC-2012-003, purpcrtedly denying this Court's jurisdiction. See the letrer

to me o:t Sle in the inlrrlot r-e-e.

nen tl:e Cour't denies a motion on the plenrlings although the Commissioner's illegal

move, denying this Court's judsdicticma is inconsistent -vith filing an answer in the instant case

and the individual income tax rates are unconstitutional. For Fifth Amendmen: Due Pracess

purposesa the illegal move of the case to the Appeals Ofrice is a withdrawal of the answer in khe

icstant case because it is inconsistent witll ftling an snnwer the answer is eithez false or filed in

bad faith. Therefore, I am entitled to s'lmmaryjudgment because the Ccmmissioner has failed to

file an answer. And in any event I am entitled to stlmmary judgmeht becatuse the individual

income tax rates aze urlconsdtutîonal (us't agk Mark Holmes. who is too frightened to say so: ask

blm in the gs-ge where the Watergate lnfnrmant talked to the reporters' itls safe there, but huny

befoze they tear it down ).

Let this ridiculous Court-which refused to address AN Y of the arguments in the motion

for an order Uust ms it l'tad refused to discuss any zf the law and facts in my previous motions)-

discuss the legal mennlng of the Commissioner's illegal rnovè of the instant case to the Appeais

Offce. The Couzt has no discussiort to offer, because it doesn't know enough about F'ifth

Amendment Due Process to discuss the illegal move of tile instant case to the Appeals Offict. tt

has no idea what is the legal meaning of tbe lerter sent to me stating chat the Appeals Office had

txzeceived'' my case. R is silent on the point because it is unconsftutionally prejudiced irj favor

of the Ccmmfzsioner. M cf the date of tlti s sling, the Comrnissioner STILL mngntains that the

instam case is ln the Appeals Office-it is a contintling Fifth Amendment Due Process viclation.

2

16


(53 of



#

USCA Case //14-1114 Document #1504649 Filed: 07/24/2014 Page 34 Of 63

This iittle slap in the face to this Colm by the Commissioner, doesn't bother this Court at all,

because it is too igpnorant an.d stupid to uow what to make of it-

So the denial of the motion for a'n order, wmq also an abuse of discretilm. nere are no

factual issues to tzy in this case. The Notice of Assesàment *&s sent and received. No one

denies that- The only issue is fLs legal status. Its legal status is that it is void because the

indivîdual income tax rates are tmconstituticnal. That ig what is to be found inNo. 013681-1 1L,

thè relevant pleadings of wbich are cn 5le in tlle instant cmse az.e incozpozated herein and the

allegations öf witich are nmqerted hereim But the Court won*t discuss thbse argument.s in tlze

instant case because it is stupid/irorant/under outside presstlre not to do so.

As the Couzt will note, the same argumentz were made in the Request for a Collecttcn

Due Process hearlng in No. 01 368 i-1 1L.f was ORDERED by this Court to make that Request.

Irj violation of Tllomben'y (issued by this Court-remember??), the Appeals Offke teftssed to

discuss ANY of tlze argllments Ltz the Request even thougl'l 'Fhornberry rtquired it to do so alzd

even thoul the Court in No. 01 3681-1 IL ordered it to do so.

Thc facts show that this Court and the Commissioner conspire to refuse to annwer ANY

of the arguments made in the Request. Those argtzments are the spme ones made ic this case,

and in No. 01368 1-11L. They are the arg'lments on which this Cou'rt, in No. 013681-11L,

refuses to rule, bccause it will then have to discuss them.

Thw, this Cotu't is violadng, and has violated, 'rhornberry, wbich is its owrt decision.

This Court is intemperate

So grant this motioc for stmarn.ary judment refaln juriàdiction of the case, and issue an

order saying what is the law of the Collectlon Financial

Standards in cocjunction with Collectiou


(54 of




Due Process and ordezing the Cornmissioner to respond wii a pl= to enforce tlne Court's

statement of the law.

Who is stongrtrmlng you not to discuss the argaments made .in 'the l-nmct case and ùn

No. 013681-11L?

John Rybl-llrr p

1677 Arch St., Berkeleya CA 94709, (510) 848-6898

[email protected]

Dated: September I2, 2013

18


(55 of



.

USCA Case //14-1114 Document #1504649

US TAX COURT

RECEIVED

NOV 01 2013

Filed: 07/24/2014 Page 36 Of 63

xwxegzk US TAX COURTJ +

ALS

.q t eFjuEo

S i

* NOV 01 2013

JOHN HENRY RYSKAMP

Petitionerls)


Docket No. 8888-13


Respondent

SECOND SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION TO VOID NOTICE

SETTING CASE FOR TRIAL

SERVED Nyy 07 2013


(56 of



USCA Case #14-1114 Document #1504649

US TAX COURT

RECEIVED

NOV 01 2013

03:17 PM

Jolm Rysknmp

Peudoner,

Filed: 07/24/2014 Page 37 Of 63


Docket No. 8888-13

SECOND SUPPLEMRNT TO MOTION

TO VOm NOTICE SETTING CASE

Filed Eleckoically

Commissioner of Tntemal Revenues

Respmdent.

/

'Ihe attached letler fzom the Appeals Ooce, and my response, are incorporated herein by

this reference. The Internal Revenue Manucl provides as follox:

8.4.1.4 (10-26-2001

Appeals Authority Over Docketed Cases

Appeis has settlement authority in conj=ction vvitll Colmnel over docketed cases. This

authori'ty remsinn in Appeals unless mocedtzres reqtlire the case be refalrned to Courlsel.

2. 'l'he Ooce ef Chief CollnKel (or the Associate Claief Counsel with subject mattcr

judsdicdon over tlze case or issues) may, after constllting with the Cllief, Appeals and the

appropriate Area Coploqel. determine that a case, or an issue or issues in a cue, not be

considered by Appeals. In such a situationx Appeals foregoes settlement atztllority on the

cmse or issues.

'Fhe Manual ba. no legal or precedendal autllority. This section, and the actions referred to in

the letter, are violations of F4'f1b Amendment Dtze Process. I have never zequested that this case

be moved to the Appeals Ooce and there is no proWsion in law giving the Appeals Oxce

authority or jtuisdicfon over this cœse, or the Commissioner aulhority or judsdiction to confer

1

20


(57 of



USCA Case #14-1114 Document #1504649 Filed . 07/24/2014 Page 3 é? r. f f.1 -:)

authority on or jurisdiction over this case. A11 law sazppozts the proposikon tkat the

Commissioner and the App-ln Ooc,e tansfer a case to tlm Appeals Ooce only when there is a

taxpayer request that thal be done. Secdon 6330(a)(3)@) spm-qt:q of Slthe zight of the mrson to

request a hearing.n Secfon 7123 (a) speaks of a situadon in wllich the Gxpayer i'may request

early refen'al of 1 or more tmresolved issues âom tlze exnminaion or collection division to the

Intemal Revenue Serdce Ooce of AppealitvE' ases a . - - '

'I'he reason for the reqirement in law that the taxpayer make a requesq is obviotu: if the

case is in the Appeals Office wititoùt a requesty the Apmals Ooce is not independenta and t'hat is

a Fifth Amendmenl Due Process violation. The Commissioner and 'the Appeals Occe act a.q one

irl the tçreferral'' and ççreceipt'' arzd Lirettunf' of docketed cues. ne secdon of the manual quoted

abovey is clea'r lat, with zegard to the procedures it describes, the Appeals Office is not

independent In lieu of a taxpayer requestv these procedures violate Fifth Amendment Due.

'Ihe actions referred to izl the letter are alz mssertion by the Comrnissionër and the Appeals

Ooce that the Tax Court laclcs judsdicdon in this case. and so are Womberry violations. The

usertion by the Commissioner is a waiver of opposition to the petYon, nere being facts in

support of the petifon, the Court must void the notice setting trial. say , in an order binding on

the Commissioner, what is tlle law of the maizrtenance of important facts per the peftion.

'

î J

è

JohnlRysksmp

1677 Arch St.. Berkeleyy CA 94709, (510) 848-6898

philneozool@yahoovcom

Dated: Novembc'r 1, 2013


(58 of



USCA Case #14-1114 Document 41504649

Intemal Revenue Sewice

Philadelphia Campus Appeals

600 Arch Street

Room 6448

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Filed: 07/24/2014 Page 39 Of 63

Department of the Treasuœ

Person to Contact:

James Hesler

Employee ID Numbec 0945362

TeI: 215-861-1487

Fax: 215-861-1661

In Re:

Income Tax Liability

Docket Numberl

8888-13

Tax Periodls) Ended:

12/2010

Date: October 28v 2013

JOHN HENRY RYSKAMP

1677 ARCH ST

BERKELEY CA 94709

You have filed a petition with the United State Tax court regarding your income tax for

the tax periods shown above. It beneRs us both to settle the issuets) in your case

without Mal. Therefore, your case has been referred to this Appeals Office to try to

resolve the unagreed issues. For a Iimited time, our office has sole settlement

authority. Appeals is seqarate from - and independent of - the division of the Intemal

Revenue Sewice proposlng the adion you disagree with. We review and resolve

disputes taxpayers have 'th the Intemal Revenue Service. We do this in a fair and

impartial way by using the Iaw and coud decisions to weigh the facts- If we do not

reach an agreement with you, we must refer your case to the Office of Area Counsel to

prepare your case for Mal.

In order to consider your posltion, I will need additional information. Please submit a

copy of your Petition, as originally filed wlth the Tax Court. Please submit a copy of a

promsed 2010 tax retum. I can then consider the retum for the process of settlement.

Please respond to this Ietter by Monday, November 18, 2013. lf you have questions, or

wish to discuss the case, please c,a11 me at the number Iisted above. lf l have not

recelved a response by November 18, 1 will forward the case to counsel for trial

preparation. It would then be necesury for you to appear in tax coud to continue your

appeal.

Sincerely,

James Hesler

Appeals Omcer

22


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VTDBIDbt f $25 22251 lEpdvn f 01.1$261 575 1 f' ' ' ' icjrhe i 1 8T. 51 1 25' : ' ; f.'? r- -

November 2, 7-G13

James Hesler

Appeals Offfcer

IRS

600 Arch St.

Room 6448

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Re: 8888-13, Tax Period 2010

Dear Mr. Heiler:

With regard td your letter of 10/28/2013, cite aII laws and authorities pursuant to whkh this

case has allegedly been 'freferred'' to the Appeals Omce. Cite the Iaw or authority pursuantlo

which the Appeals Office allegedly has ''sole settlement authorit/' over thîs case or authorityto

e'forward'' this case.

At-tach to your reply a copy of aII documen'ts in the Appeals Office relating to thts case, including

bu1 not Iimited to notes, memoranda, electronic and any other form of communication, forms,

pleadings and Ietters.

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John Ryskamp

23


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US TAX COURT .%*%*'% US TAX COURT

ALS J &à eFluEnECEIVED s g

% -UNDAY

NoV 03 2013 * NOV 04 2013

JOHN HENRY RYSKAMP

Petitionerls)


Docket No. 8888-13


Respondent

MOTION FOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT

7 Us TAX COUR'' '

l D E N I E D

i

NOV 12 2013

SERVED Nov 12 2013 2

4

(Signed) Joseph W. Nega

Judge


(61 of



l éf ' 4225 lEpdvn f ot1$261 575: lqrhe, 1 81511 25 lobhf 53':.47 4 / o

RECEIVED

NOV 03 2013

05:35 PM

John Rysknmp

Peutioner,


Docket N.. 8:88-13

MOTION FOR SIFMMARY

JUDGNGNT


Comnaissioner of Intemal Revenue,

Respondent.

/

There rll-e not, and have never been. any facts at issue in this casea which is why the

notion of a trial is ridiculous. The sole issue is the legal status of the Notice and the letters

Hreferring'' this case to the Apmals Officea which letters are on file in this case and are

incorporated herein by this reference. But this Court can no more deal with that lhan can Mark

Holmes deal with the legal stams of the Commissioner's Thornberry violations in the companion

case to thjs one. No. 01368 1- 1 1 L. The reason is that the Court is so mired in unconstitutional

complicity with the Commissioner and the Appeals Ofice-from failing over decades to sua

sponte confront the jurisdictional violations raised in Vinatieri v. Commissioner and Thomberry

v. Commissioner to failing to confront the jurisdictional violations of the 'Yeferrals'' by the

Commissioner of cases to the Appeals Office without requests from tupayers--that

pronounce on the Iegai issues involves the Court extinguishing itself for its systematic failure to

act ms an Article 1 Court. The Judge reading this knows thatjust as well as Mark Holmes. Idiots.

25


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VTDBIDbt f $ 25.2225 Epdvn f 0d$261575: Qrhe' 18151125 C*hf 54 p474

The pleadings in this case are reasserted and incomorated herein by th1 reference. In

addition tc tlaere only being a legal issue in this case, now we have a new farce from the

Commissioner and tMs Court precluding any trial.

Due to the illegal actions of the Commissioner. the Appeals Oftke and this Court, it is

impossible to go to tlial, and the only action remaining is for this Court to p'ant surama:y

--

judgment an say, m t e orm o an or er in 1ng (l-n--tlle-re= k ' ' '

Collection Financial Standards in conjunction with Collection Due Process, încluding the

unconstitutionality of the individual income tax rates. Here are the reuons:

because the Commissioner and the Appeals Oflce illegally f'transferredf' the case to

the Appeals Oflke. I have a Fiftb Amendment Due Process right to a Notice of

Determinauon; there can be no trial until one is issued;

1

2. however, due to these snnae illegal actiorls. as a matter of Fifth Amendrnent Due

Process the Appeals Office carmot issue a Notice of Determination because 1 did not

request a transfer of this case to the Appeals Office.

This ridiculous situation, the product of endless violations of Fifth Amendment Due Process

which implicate the entire taxation process to and including the individual income tax rates. is

entrenched in the Cornmissioner's process, to the point of being fonnalized and institutionalized

in the lntemal Revenue Manual, as follows:

8.4.1.4 (10-26-2*7)

Appeals Authority Over Docketed Cases

Appeals has settlement authority in conjtmction with Counsel over docketed cces. This

authodty remains in Appeals unless procedures require the case be retumed to Counsel.

ne Ooce of Chief Counsel (or the Associate Chief Counsel with subject matter

jurisdiction over the case or issues) may, after consulting with the Chiet Apmals and the

appropdate Area Colmsel, determine that a cmse. or an issue or issues in a cmse, not be

2

26


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VTDBIDbt f $25. 2225 lEpdvn f 0d$261575* llqrhe. 1 81511 25 lcYhf ,55'p9/ 74

considered by Appeals. In such a situation. Appeals foregoes settlement authorie on the

case or ismzts.

Obviously. the Manual has no legal or precedential authority. What it shows. instead, is

conclusive cvidence of defiance of this Court's jurisdiction cocpled with this Court's failure to

exercise sua sponte it.s power over jurisdiction. ne Court hms for decades sanctioned this

OZS 'RIXWWZWW ' ' ' ' ' 'mC Siox P-FIVRSG .--- -

violations right under the Court's nose, with not a word from this Court. Nauseating.

Needless to say. I have never requested that this case be moved to the Appeals Offke and

there is no provision in law giving the Appeals Office authority or jurisdiction over this cre. or

the Commissioner authority or jurisdiction to confer authority on or jurisdiction over this case.

Al1 Iaw suppms the proposition that the Commissioner and the 'Appeals Office eansfer a case to

the Appeals Office only when there is a tupayer request that that be done. Section

6330(a)(3)(B) speaks of ççthe right of the person to request a headng.'f Section .7123 (a) smnkK

of a situation in which tlle taxpayer Gmay request early referral of 1 or more unresolved issues

from the examination or collection division to the Interrlal Revenue Service Office of Appeals.''

Emphases added. The Commissioner and the Appeals Office act as one in the çtreferral'' and

Rreceipf' and 'Yetum'' of docketed cases- The section of the manual quoted abovev is cleaz that.

with regard to the procedures it describesa the Appeals Office is not indemndent. In lieu of a

taxpayer-request, these procedures violate Fifth Amendment Due.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED

26 USC 6330 (d)(2) provides that %q-ite Internal Revenue Service Office of Apmals shall

retain jurisdiction with respect to any determination made under this section. ...>* This provision

is unconstitutional as applied to t*refen-als'' in the absence of tupayer request, as violative öf

3

27


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VTDBIDbt f $25.2225 lllllEpdvn f 0d$261575. Qrhe; 18151125 C.bhf 56 p474

Fifth Amendment Due Process and Collection Due Process in conjunction with the Collection

Financial Stcdards.

FACIALLY UNCONSHTUHONAL

26 USC 6330(a)(l ) provides: 1Wo levy may be made on any property or right to promrty

of any person unless the Secretary has notified such person in writing of their right to a hearing

un er ls sectlon ore suc evy ls ma e. p'r e-'t --

includes the power of distraint and seizure by any means.'' 26 USC 6331 (a) provides: ''If any

person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same within 10 days after notice and

dcmands it shall be lawf'ul for the Secretary to collect such tax (and such further sum as shall be

suftkient to cover the expenses of the Ievy) by levy upon aIl property and rights to property

(except such property as is exempt under section 6334) belonging to such person or on which

9

there is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax-'' The facts show that for

purposes of Fifth Amendment Due Prœess and Collection Due Process in conjunction with the

Collection Financial Standardsv the ttlevy'' of 26 UCS Seections 6330, 6331 and 7701 is an illegal

f'referralf' and therefore the èçlevye' is unconstitutional on its face.

By the way. the case remains in the Appeals Office as of this filingv even though the

Coun knows that this illegal gçreferral'' occurred. Note, however, that the defiance of this Coun 's

jurisdiction, and thusv the Due Process violation, do not end by the ççreturn'' of the case from the

Appeals Office to the Commissioner, because as the Manual says. it is the assertion of the

Appeals Office and the Commissioner that ççAppeals has settlement authodty in conjunction

with Counsel over docketed cnms.'' Apmals asserts that it has some legal authority even after

violating the Iaw by participating in the *4referral'' process with the Commissioner without a

request from tlae taxpayer. This is. nmong other violations. a violation of Section 6330, and an

4

28


(65 of



assertion that this Court does not have Fifth Amendment Due Process jurisdicdon over the case.

Md this Court has always known about this, has never sua sponte raised judsdictionv and has

incorporated this illegal action in innumerable opinions. Disgusting.

The reeson for the requirement in 1aw that the taxpayer make a request. is obvious: if the

case is in the Appeals Office without a request. the Appeals Offce is not independent, and thaL is

also a violaion of Collection Due Process in conjunction with the Collection Financial

Standards, both of which are conjoined not only by the Code sections but also by Fifth

Amendment, and the joint CDP-CFS is conjoined through Fifth Amendment Due Process to the

individual income tax rates. 'Fhey a1l fail for, among reasons, the persistent violations revealed

by the fireferral'' to the Appeals Oflce without taxpayer request that that be done. Here we see

#

'

why Mark Holmes cannot act in No. 013681-1 1L: the Fifth Amendment Due Process

implications are too numerous for his weak, comzpt. supercilious mind to handle. So he sits

there and does nothing while Constitutional violations against me continue.

ne Commissioner and the Appeals Oflke act ms one in the Gtreferral'' and ççreceipt'* and

ttreturn'' of docketed cases. 'rhe section of the manual quoted abovev is clear that, with regard to

the procedures it describes, the Appeals Oftke is not independent.

these procedures violate Fifth Amendment Due.

In lieu of a taxpayer requesq

ne actions referred to in the letter are an assertion by the Commissioner and the Appeals

Office that the TM Court lacks jurisdiction in this case, and so are Tholmberl'y vîolations. The

assertion by the Commissioner is a waiver of opposition to the petition. There being facts in

support of the mtition, the result can only be summary judgment in my favor, in the fonn of an

5

29

+ Y '- ''- -'-


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order binding on the Commissioner, saying what is the law of the mnintenance of important facts

Nr the petition.

You will notice that this is predsely the same issue in my other case, No. 013681-1 lL.

The Commissioner's summary judgment in that matler still hasnft been decided, even though it

has been under submission since April. Now we know the reason. Jurisdiction is always at

-

aww m s.uj a.x .ssue

,

an ls o e asser .

jurisdictional violation in this unconstitutional practice of çlreferring'' cases to the Apmals Oftice

where no taxpayer request has been made. Note that jurisdicdon was an issue in b0th Vinatieri

and Thornberry and the Court failed to sua sponte raise jurisdiction. This Court is irretrievably

mired in Due Process violations.

The result is that the Courq the Commissioner and the Appeals Oftke have engaged in a

criminal conspiracy, involving an enormous number of cases stretching over a long yriod of

time, in a continuing Fifth Amendment Due Process violation of tnxpayer rights. Of coursev the

Court's illegal role in this is an Article I violation. The Court must act as a Court in order to

11t111 its Article l duty. That involves finding jurisdictional violations. and here it is obvious that

the Court has know'n of and sanctioned this illegal *treferring'' practice.

nis is thc reason the Court cannot rule in No. 01368 l - 1 1L. There have been so many

illegal jurisdictional violations by tMs Court, so many' abuses of discretion (nmong others, the

marly thousands which preceded the decisions in Vinatieri v. Commissioner and Thomberry v.

Commissioner), that if the Court ruled on No. 0 13681-1 1Lv it would have to extinguish itself as a

Court for Article 1 violations.

Now the Court is faced with declaring the individual income tax rates unconstitutional

because that is the inescapable Due Process conclusion of CDP in conjtmction with CFS . ne

6

30


(67 of



rates are irrational, no fact-s support them-artd that is also the gravamen of the Fifth Amendment

Due Process complaint; the Thornben'y, Vinatieri and Hreferral'' violations are irrational. ney

do not comport with Collection Due Prœess in conjunction with the Collection Financial

Standards.

For just one example of the irrationality of the individual income tax rates, I pointed out

orthudt-warfrrate ' anduludentqe .

Commissicner denied itv and lo and behold, then prœeeded to include them in tlle Collection

Financial Standards. The Comrnissioner denied that there were Fifth Amendment Due Process

Iights in the CFS, but state taxes and student loans are litigable in this Court in the context of

CDP in conjunction with CFS. and that litigability is a Fifth Amendment Due Process right.

Of course the individual income tax rates are irrational. Of course they must be declared

unconstitutional as part of a statement of the law by this Court of the law of CFS in conjunction

with CDR.

The only question is whether the particularjudge reading the present document (and there

have been several in this case, each of whom has committed innumerable abuses of discretion

pre-Thomberry arld in the matter of çsreferring'' cases with no taxpayer request-you, readery

have done the same thing) is sufticiently sane to reach the conclusion the facts and Iaw mandate.

ê)

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7

.

-

)

John Rysknmp

1677 Arch St.. Berkeley, CA 94709, (510) 848-6898

philneozœl @yahoo,com

Dated; November 3. 2013

7

31


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*

. . . . . -.... . . - ...

VTDBIDbt f $25.2225 lllllEpdvn f 0d$261575: Iqrhe' 181511 s, hf * # COURT 4+s Tu COURT

,

g c,rj ayjuEoECEIVED

RMu : o

. Nov 13 2043ov 13 2013

12:44 PM

JOHN HENRY RYSKAMP

Petitionerts)


Docket No. 8888-13


Respondent

SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SERVED Nr 13 2013


(69 of



UNI'FED STATES Tu COW T

Jolm Ryskanp

Pedtioner,

Docket No. 8888-13

SW PLEMENT TO MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

M.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue,

Respondent.


The Commissioner and the Appeis Oftice have covrmed the Fifth Amendment Due

Process violation which 1 pointed out in t'he recent motion for summary judgment w'hich, in an

abuse of discetion and in violation of Article 1, was dezlied by Judge Nega. 'The allegations of

that motion are incorporated herein artd realleged by this reference.

See tite letter of November 6, 2013 Cthe letter'') attached hereto and incoporated herein

by this reference, in which the Commissioner and the Appeals Offce ask if I wish to çtcooperate''

and to t<provide'' information, thus affirming that 1 have not asked that the case be çGreferred'' to

the Appeals Ofdce. The letter also states that tb.e Sçreferral'' is 'lvoluntary.'' This proves that the

Commissioner arld the Appeals Office know that I have to request that the tile be referred to the

Apptals Office before it can be referred. It also shows that my Fifth Amendment Due Process

analysis, in the motion dertied by Judge Negaa of the violation, is correct.

The consequence of this violation is that 1 could not obtxin a Collection Due Process

hearing, or reach a settlement, or have a trial, which complies with Flft h Ameneent Due

33


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VTDBIDbt f $25.2225 lEpdvn f 0d$261575* lql'he' 18151125 llc.bhf 62 p474

Process. The Court conspires w1t.1: the CommiAsioner and the Appeals Ovce to violate Due

Processa and nornberzy, which is the Court's own decision. Obviously, there have been

innllrnerable cases in which this Court has failcd to sua sponte exercise its jttrisdiction-as is

required by Fifth Amendment Due Process-to order cases back to the Commissioner which

have been tçrefcrred'' to the Appeals Oftke without taxpayer request. The independence of the

- ''

Agpe'al 'e zr- ,

cnnnot Constittdonally asess individual income taxation because the facts show that his intent

is not to do so-his intent is to violate trpayer rights.

The case is STILL in the Appeals Office as of this filing, this Court having lkiled to order

it back to the Commissioner. There could not be a fair trial in this matter because I never

received a Fifth Amendment Due Process opportunity to contest the Notice. nat right was

denied be by the illegal conspiracy of the Courq the Commissioner and the Appeals Oflice.

Thus, the ietter is, for Fiflh Amendment Due Processs a levy and 1 have given it its legal

title. Therefore, it violates Section 6330, Fifth Amendment Due Process and Arricle 1.

Again, as 1 claimed before and as this letter now proves, there can be no trial in this case

which could under any circumstances meet the demands of Fif'th Amenclmem Due Process.

Agaiw as 1 clnirned before and as this letter now proves, the Court must forthwith gra'nt

sllmmazy judgment and say what is th.e 1aw of Collecion Due Process in conjunction with the

Collection Financial Standards. The indvidual income tax rates are unconstimtional because

they have not been shown to be in compliance Vth this law.

nusy this case stands in exactly the same posture as No. 013621-1lL, which is exactly

what I have always alleged, and now the facts show that I qm correct.

34


(71 of



The facts show that Judge Nega acted on prejudice, and not on my facts, in denyicg the

motion for sllmmaryjudpnent. For this reuon, remove him fzom the case.

Your supercilious, police s'tate, ridiculous, ignorant judges persis't in their

Constitudonal violations. ne entire Court is in violation of Article 1, it fails to act as a Court

Jolm Rysknmp

1677 Arch St., Berkeley, CA 94709, (5 l 0) 848-6898

[email protected]

Dated: November 13a 20 l 3

35


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VTDBIDbt f $25.2225 Epdvn f 0d$261575: Qrhe, 18@5T125 (>hf 64 pj74

Internal Revenue Service Depadment of the Treasury

Philadel ' Campus Appeals

600 Arch St t Person to Contact;

Room 6448 James Hesler

Philadelphia, PA ..1

9106 Employee ID Number: 0945362

TeI: 215-861-1487

Fax: 215-861-1661

Date: November 6, 201: Refer Reply to:

AP:COCPHC:JEH

.

-

.

.

-

jj r:j j:il:,t:,r ::

.OHN HENRY RYSKAMP N lncome Tax Liability

1677 ARCH ST . Tax Perlodts) Ended:

BERKELEY CA 94709 Y 12/2010

x

1

D r Mr John Henry Ryskamp:a . .

%

X

%

The sewice of the Appeals division is offered as a voluntary option on every docketed

U.S. Tax Coud case. You do not need tb cooperate with the Appeals division if you do

not wish to. '.

I will keep your file open until Monday, Noveïber 18, 2013. If you wish to provide

information for my consideration, you may do sb. Otherwise, l will send your 5le to Area

Counsel. '

X

Slhcerelyy

>

.l

James Hesler

Appeals qfficer

36


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AkTé@ijAS $25.2225 1 lEpdvn f 0ù$261575: llQlfle,' 181511 .. hf T# COURTS T . +

RECEIVED Rs ? C3 % QFILED

ka J

NOV 19 2013 * NOV 19 2013

04:26 PM

JOHN HENRY RYSKAMP

Petîtionerls)


Docket No. 8888-13


Respondent

PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM

SERVED j#v 21 2013


(74 of



us T T Y $25.2225 lEpdvn f otl$261 575' llqrhe' 18151125 lltbhf 66 pj74

RECEIVED

NOV 19 2013

04:26 PM

Trial Calendar: SAN FM NCISCO, CALIFORNXA

Date: Monday, February i0, 2014

PRETRIAL O MORANDUM FOR Jolm Ryskamp

NAc OF CASE: Ryskamp v. Commissioner

ATTORNEYS:

Docket No. 8888-13

e I oner; o ''RyKemp spon . w . ---.-

510 8486898 415 547-3800

AMOUNTS EN DISPUTE;

Yers

2010

STATUS OF CASE: See Attachment to Pretriz Memorandum

CURRENT ESTN ATE OF TR1A1.: See Attachment to Pretrial Memorandum

MOTIONS YOU EU ECT TO MAKE: See Machment lo Pretrial Memorandlzm

STATUS OF STVULATION OF FACTS: Set Attachment to Pretrial Memorarldum

ISSUES: See Attachment to Prekial Memormdum

WITNESSES YOU EXPECT TO CALL: See Attachment to Pretrial Memorandam

SUMMARY OF FACTS: See Attachment to Pretrial Memorandum

BIUEF S> OPSIS OF LEGAL AUTHOIUTIES: See Pretrial Memorandum

EVIDEN'IRMW PROBLEMS: See Pretrial Memorandtun

Defciency

4771

Penally

1342

Date: 1 1/1972013

John Rysknmp, Petitioner

Trial Judge: Judge Joseph W. Nega

United States Tax courq R.00m322

400 Second St., N.W.


(202) 521-0640

38


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VTDBIDbt f $ 5.2225 Epdvn f 01.1$261575. Q*e,' 18œ5œ125 œhf 671pj74

'l-he doczlments aud pleadings in this case aze incorporated herein by this reference. The

Commissioner 'trefarred'' tliis case to the Appeals Office and the Appeals Office

'*received'' this case in an illegal act without my request-a FiRh Amendment Due

Process, Thornberry v. Commissioner, Section 6330 and Article I violation. I.n a letter to

me, the Appeals Omce admitted the propam was ftvolunlaty'' and that I had not

requested the 'Greferral.'' For reasons Mated in the motion for sllmmary judgmentv this

çlreferral'' deseoyed the independence of the Appeals Office which is the intent of the law

requiring that taxpayers reques't the refezral to the Appeals Ooce. Tilis i.s also the

tmders4snding of the Commissioner and the Appeals Oflice in admitting that the program

is voluntazy.

Section 6330(c)(1) provides that a Nerifkation âom the Secretary that the requizements of

any applicable law or adrniniskative procedure have been met'' must be obtained by the

Apyeals Office. The Appeals Office cannot obtain, and the Secretary cnnnot provide. a

venficafon, because my perml'ssion was not obtained to Sçrefer'* to the case to the

Appeals Office. nus, the trial csnnot be held, because the verification cannot be

prasented to the Cour't.

Entirely apart âom the issue of the verification, no trial can proceed where the

zequirement of any applicable lawe or administrative procedure have not been met and

the ltrefeaal-' means that Fifth Amendment Due Process, Section 6330, Thornberry v.

Commissioner and Article 1 requirements have not been met.

This sittzalion is the result of the fatl ure of tllis Cotll't to exercise sua sponte its

jurisdiction in this violation of the Court's jurisdiction. In an untold number of cases, this

Court has approved this illegi çtreferral,'' just as, in at'l untoid number of cases, it

approved violations of Vinatieri v. Commissioner arld Thornben'y v. Cona missioner,

nese violations of the Court show the Court in a knowing and systematic jllegal

collusion with the Commisioner and the Appeals Office to violate Constittztionz rights of

taxpayers. nus, the Court is in violadon of Article I that it be a Court For this reason

as well, the trial cnnnot be held there is, for purposes of Arricle 1 and Fifth Amendment

Due Process-no Court ia wltich to hold it.

The Court must not attempt to hold a trial, but must instead gram summary judoent,

pm of wlzich is an order bindirg on the Commissioner, saying what is the law of

2

39


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VTDBIDbt f $25.2225 Epdvn f 0:$261575: qf'he' 18œ51125 (>hf 68 pj74

Collection Due Process in conjunction with the Collection Finnncbal Standards.This is

exactly the relief requested in No. 013681-1 1L.

The Court must also inform the Convess that it is no longer able to fnnction as an Micle1 Courq the facts showing that it.s untold Constilutional violations pre-nornbeny and

with respect to lmrequested ç*referrals''y are conclusive evidence of a knowing pattern of

collusion by the Court with the Commissioner and the Appeals Ooce to violate taxpayer

dghts.

40


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VTDBIDbt f $25.2225 1 lllEpdvn f 0ù$261575: qrhe' 181511 . hf A COURT * +

US TAX COURT ,# % eFILEDLc

% 8 jECEIVED

. DEc 11 2013

DEC 11 2013

08:01 PM

JOHN HENRY RYSKAMP

Petitionerls)


Docket No. 8888-13

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE?

Respondent

MOTION FOR AN ORDER


(78 of



VTDBIDM f $25 2225 Epdvn f 0d$261575:

Us TAX CöURT

RECEIVED

rhe' 1 E3 (15 65 (E5 1 2 65 h f t5' p j 7 2)

DEC 11 2013

08:01 PM

Jobn Ryskamp

LWI'I'ED STATES Tytx COURT

Dockd No. 8888-13

MOTIONFORAN ORDER

Filed Electonically

Commissioner of Intern? Revenue,

I move the Coud for a z order that the Appeals Omce issue and serve on me. no later thsn

December 26, 2013, a Notice of Determination and tbnt pursllrmt to 26 USC 7482(a)(2)(A), the

Court hclude i:l its order a statement that a contolling question of law is involved with respect

to wllich there is a substantial vound for difference of opinion and that an immediate appea

from tllat order may materially advance the uttimate termination of the liligadon.

J

.

> A

-

Jolm Rysk'arnp

1677 Arch St, Berkeley, CA 94709, (510) 848-6898

[email protected]

Dated: December 1 1, 2013

42


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VTDBIDbt f $25.2225 Epdvn f 0d$261575: Qrhe' 181511 .t .... hf Ué COURT -'+

AX COURT L? SG QFILEDs T I

RECEIVED RMM

w DEC 17 2013

DEC 17 2013

12:13 PM

JOHN HENRY RYSKAMP

Petitionerls)


Docket No. 8888-13


Respondent

SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION FOR ORDER

SERVED qjc 19 2013


(80 of



VT DB lDbt f $25. 2225 IE pdv n f ot1$26 1 575* I lqrhe' 1 8151 1 25 . f ltbhf 672 'pj ,-4

US TAX COURT

RECEIVED

DEC 17 2013

12:13 PM

UNI'I'ED STATES Tu COURT

O FS MIP OC e 9. -

SUPPLEG NT TO MOTION FOR AN

ORDER (re: Notice of Determination)

Filed Electzonically

Commissioner of Internal Revenue,

Resoondect. l

The letter of December 22, 2013, from the Appeals Office to me, and the lettez of

December 17, 2013, from me to the Appeals Oflce, are attached hereto and irtcozporated herein

by this reference.

Jolnn Rysksrmp

1677 Arch St., Berkeley, CA 94709. (510) 842-6898

philneozool@yalnoo-com

Daled: December 17, 2013

44


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VTDBIDbt f $ 25.2225 lEpdvn f 0:$261575: Qrhe' 18151125 lltyhf 73 p474

December l 7. 2O1 3

IRS


600 Arch St.

Room 6448

Philadelphia, PA l 9106

To the Appeals Office:

Your December 1 1, 2013, letter is, for Section 6330 and Fifth Amendment Due Process

purposes, a levy, and 1 have identised it as such and rettzrn it to you. It is an illegal ievy

in violation of Section 6330 artd Fifth Amendment Due Process.

'Fhe letter is a lie abotzt your own conduc't. lndependent of it.s stams as an illegal levy, it

is a Section 6330 and Fifth Amendment Due Process violation 'as an act in furtherarlce of

an illegal conspiracy with the Office of Chief Counsel to violate Section 6330 and Fiflh

Amendment Due Process.

You have arl admitted, irl a letter to me on file in the Tax Couzt, that you had no legal

right to 'treceive'' my case and that the Office of Chief Counsel had no legal right to

klrefer'' it to you, because 1 never requested that the case be sent to the Appeals Ofâce.

So you 1ie when you say you Qried to settle this case.'' Apart from these aca, iere is no

Stcase'' to 'ttry to settle'' because the iudividual income tax rates are in 'dolation of

Coilection Due Process in conjunction with the Collection Finrmcial SOndards, and you

are aware that there is no law tmder which this ucase'' can be tzied since, on July 25,

2012, inie Manual you conceded that the law is G%developing.''

Jn t'receiving'' the t'referral'' of this cmse, you destroyed tile independence of the Appeals

Oflice, and the Office of Chief Colmsel conspired with you to do so. You have denied

me the possibility of a trial which meets Fifth Amendment Due Process requirements

I

carmot avail myself of my Section 6330 rights because mu have destroyed your

independence. The Ofâce of Chief Counsel cazmot legally prosecute this case because it

has no credibility, having conspired to destroy the independence of the Appeals Oftice;

the Ooce of Chief Cotmsel cnnnot obtain verification that applicable laws and

procedures were complied with, because the O/ce of Citief Collnqel conspired with you

to destroy the independence of the Appeals Office.

Forthwith serve on me the Notice of Determination.

John Ryskamp

1 677 Arch St.

Berkeley, CA 94709

45


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vTDB Dbt f $25.2225 Epdvn f 0:$261575. t Qrhe' 18T5T 1 25 ' i''(..i:)L# ' C .1 ;', ' - ?

Internal Revenue Service Depadment of the Treasury


60O Arch Street Person to Contact:

Room 6448 James Hesler

Phîladelphia PA 19106 Employee ID Number: 0945362

x

w

x

Tel: 215-861-1487

X Fax; 215-861-1661

Date: XE J

)(. 2/r-. . Refer Reply to:

x

x AP:CO:PHC:JEH

N

N

.

In Re:

JOHN HENRY RYSKAMP Income Tax Llability

1677 ARCH ST Docket Number:

BERKELR CA 94709 8888-13

r Petitioner:

C

o. ,

John Henry Ryskamp

IJ ' r l Tax eeriodts) Ended:

a.-a' k-s

12/2010

Dear Mr. John Henry Ryskamp:

We tried to settle this case and avoid trial. Unfortunately, we did not reach a basis for

sedlement and have, therefore, referred the case to Area Counsel to prepare for trial

lf you have any questions, please contact the peaon whose name and telephone

number are shown above.

,7

Sin ely, z

e-

Verneida Sanders

Appeals Team Manager


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Documents

Ryskamp v. Commissioner Appellant Brief Ninth Circuit 14-73059