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A Financial Examination of Intercity Passenger Rail in the United States

UP256 Transportation Economics, Finance, and Policy

Spring 2015

Professor Wachs

Ryan Sclar

June 5, 2015

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Introduction

Passenger intercity railroad service has existed in the United States for nearly 200 years.

During this time, the country has undergone several technological, economical, and social

changes and the role of rail has adjusted as a result. The status of passenger service has been

greatly influenced by its financial successes and pitfalls, especially as these economic matters

become intertwined with politics. This study offers an examination of the financial history of

American intercity passenger rail service and analyzes its current state of affairs.

The Goals of Amtrak

Determining the appropriate objectives for America’s passenger rail system is the

subject of considerable debate. The National Railroad Passenger Rail Corporation, commonly

known as Amtrak, manages basically all intercity passenger rail service in the United States.

Some policy advocates believe Amtrak should be treated like a business, with the primary goal

of maximizing profits. Others argue that Amtrak is a public service, serving a vital public interest

and adding redundancy to the transportation system. Outspoken libertarian Randal O’Toole has

published several reports and articles through the CATO Institute, advocating for the

privatization of Amtrak and the end to government subsidies (O’Toole, 2008, 2012, and 2013).

According to his research, the per passenger subsidies are several times higher for railroads

than for air travel and roads (9 and 20 times higher respectively) and offer no advantages over

alternatives. Elliot Sclar, a notable opponent of privatizing Amtrak, argues that it is perfectly

acceptable for Amtrak to run at a financial loss, because of the indirect benefits it provides to

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the economy. Amtrak literature states that the railroad provides an annual economic benefit of

$12.2 billion, far surpassing their $1.3 billion federal subsidy. Amtrak also claims they more

than repay their subsidy through the 116,500 jobs they support, which contribute $1.6 billion in

taxes each year (Amtrak Budget and Business Plan, 2015). The derivation and validity of these

figures, however, is highly debated by O’Toole and other critics. There is little consensus on the

best philosophical aim of Amtrak.

In light of these debates, Amtrak balances two often contradictory objectives –

providing equitable service and providing efficient service (Puentes, Adie, and Joseph, 2013).

Amtrak’s officially states its goals as, “safety and security, customer focus, and financial

excellence” (Amtrak Annual Report, 2013; Amtrak Budget and Business Plan, 2015). Promises of

“customer focus” allude to attempts to make Amtrak more accessible to more people, and

“financial excellence” speaks to maximizing efficiency. Since accessibility and equity are far

more subjective than economic efficiency, this study mainly focuses on what characteristics

make Amtrak routes cost effective.

History of Intercity Railroad Finance in the United States

The Pre-Amtrak Era

Intercity railroads played a significant role in shaping American history. The introduction

of railroads in the early 19th century rapidly changed the transportation spectrum. Trains could

carry people in a fraction of the time and at 60% less cost than previous carriage trips (“Early

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American Railroads”). Spurred by

government lending and aggressive land

incentives, private American railroad

companies quickly expanded their

networks. In 1835 the country had 1,000

miles of track. By 1865 the national rail

system grew to over 30,000 track miles,

exploding to 100,000 before the end of

the century (Slotman, 2012). Tracks were

laid all over the east as well as the west, meeting in Promontory, Utah in 1869 to form the first

dependable transcontinental link across the country (Slotman, 2012). The treacherous and time

consuming voyages on covered wagon were replaced by relatively quick and reliable train rides.

Railroads provided more destinations with more accessibility, bolstering connections between

cities and dramatically opening up the American frontier (“Early American Railroads”). Towns

sprouted around stations in the countryside, and urban centers industrialized around railroad

lines. By the 1890’s rail travel accounted for 95% of all intercity passenger traffic (Morrison,

1990). Trains played a prominent role in the evolution of transportation and the empowerment

of the American physique.

With the proliferation of automobile and airplane travel in the early 20th century,

passenger rail struggled. Track miles of service peaked in 1916 with passenger miles peaking in

1920 (Puentes et. al, 2013). The 1920’s witnessed a dramatic decrease in ridership, with

passenger miles plunging to a third of their 1920 level by the end of the decade (Morisson,

Image 1: Railroad construction in the 1860’s Source: Alfred A. Hart, www.railroad.lindahall.org/

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1990). Railroad travel did dramatically increase during World War II; however the postwar

expansion of air infrastructure and the interstate road network brought rail ridership back to

all-time lows.

The private railroad companies, who were required by federal law to maintain

passenger service, often found it difficult to stay in business. In recognition of these fiscal

challenges, congress passed the Transportation Act of 1958, providing $500 million in loans to

railroads and loosening their passenger service requirements. As a result, most American

railroad companies shifted their resources to the more profitable freight industry, and steered

away from passenger service. In the 13 years following the Transportation Act of 1958, 75% of

all passenger train mileage in the United States disappeared (Puentes et. al, 2013).

The Creation of Amtrak

With private railroads struggling to finance passenger rail service, congress passed the

Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970. This act established the National Railroad Passenger

Corporation (most commonly known as Amtrak) to operate the entire intercity passenger rail

network in the country (“Amtrak’s History”). Private railroads were no longer obligated to

provide any passenger services, but were required to give Amtrak priority over freight trains on

their tracks (Puentes et. al, 2013). This act led to essentially zero private passenger rail services,

as Amtrak took over the duties of roughly two dozen railroads (“Amtrak’s History”).

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The funding for Amtrak has been, since its inception, very political. Amtrak originally

planned routes based on their profitability and ridership, with a system centering on the

population centers

of the country

(Puentes et. al,

2013).

Congressional

approval, however,

required placating

the wishes of its

members. Since

members of

congress represented a broad geographic range, Amtrak was only politically feasible after the

addition and extension to several of the planned routes. On May 1, 1971 Amtrak began service

with 21 routes serving 43 states (“Amtrak’s History”).

The Amtrak Era

The political feasibility of creating Amtrak came at the expense of its economic

feasibility. Despite being established as a for-profit corporation, Amtrak never operated at a

profit (Amtrak Annual Report, 2013). In the years after its inception, many prominent

politicians, including President Ronald Regan, repeatedly proposed defunding the system

Image 2: Amtrak service map on first day of operation Source: National Association of Rail Road Passengers

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(Puentes et. al, 2013). After record financial losses and crumbling ridership in the 1990’s,

Congress passed the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act in 1997. This act required Amtrak to

be operationally self-sufficient within five years, and allowed for more discretion in rerouting

certain train lines. After the five-year period elapsed, the Amtrak Reform Council concluded,

“Amtrak is no closer to self-sufficiency today than it was in 1997.” While Amtrak did increase

ridership, it completely failed to meet the mandates outlined in the act. As a result, the council

proposed privatizing operations and dividing up Amtrak’s routes into different entities.

Although these suggestions represented a prudent economic decision, congress ignored the

recommendations for political reasons, stating it was against the intentions of the original Rail

Passenger Service Act of 1970 (Puentes et. al, 2013).

Congress again attempted to shore up Amtrak’s financial situation with the 2008

Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act (PRIIA). This legislation gave states more

authority and responsibility in Amtrak, by calling for states to develop five year rail plans,

establish a central authority, and seek consultation from private authorities. PRIIA also raised

the amount of Amtrak funding supplied by the states and regional government entities. These

investments go directly into the local, short distance routes (less than 750 miles) which pass

through the state. Additionally, PRIIA established metrics and benchmarks that Amtrak is

required to meet, with the threat of withholding funds if not achieved. While divergent

opinions exist, PRIIA is generally viewed as a relative success by Amtrak policy makers (TRB1;

Puentes et. al, 2013). An extension of PRIIA was passed earlier this year by the US House of

1 Transportation Research Board

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Representatives Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, although its final approval is still

pending (TRB).

The Current State of Amtrak2

Intercity rail travel in the United States is presently a shell of its former self. Even

without adjusting for population growth, Amtrak carries less than a fifth of the passengers it did

during its peak in 1920 (Amtrak Comprehensive Business Plan, 2013). Simply put, people rarely

travel by train in the United States. Each year, the average American flies 2,000 miles, travels on

interstates 3,000 miles, and rides Amtrak only 20 miles (O’Toole, 2012). In fact, the typical

American annually walks over 45 times farther than they travel by Amtrak (Parker-Pope, 2010).

A system which used to be run at a profit by private railroads now requires over one billion

dollars a year in government subsidies to stay afloat.

Despite intercity rail’s fall from grace, some believe current trends provide reasons for

optimism. By some measures, Amtrak is currently doing better than ever; however, other

indicators do not provide as much encouragement. Amtrak currently attracts 31.9 million

annual riders, a number which has steadily climbed for several years (Amtrak Comprehensive

Business Plan, 2013). In fact, Amtrak has posted ten ridership records in the past eleven years

(Amtrak Annual Report, 2013). Since 1997, these ridership increases have far surpassed

population growth (55.1% and 17.1% respectively) (Puentes et. al, 2013). Amtrak opponents,

however, point out that the numbers paint a much less cheerful picture if analyzed in a wider

2 All current facts and figure in this report are based on 2013 numbers, the latest year in which they are available.

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time frame. Ridership growth on Amtrak since 1991, for example, is only 8% (O’Toole, 2013).

Financially, Amtrak experienced their fifth consecutive year of revenue growth and their eighth

year of growth in the past nine (Amtrak Budget and Business Plan, 2015). Amtrak states that

they now cover 93% of operating costs. Opponents, however, criticize Amtrak’s

nonconventional definition of operating revenue, which include state funding as a “revenues”

and shifts routine maintenance to capital costs (O’Toole, 2013). Despite rising revenues and

recently cutting debt to less than half of 2004 levels, Amtrak fails to cover its total expenses and

currently requires a federal subsidy of $1.3 billion per year (Amtrak Annual Report, 2013).

Asymmetry and the Northeast Corridor

While system-wide statistics are informative, they must be considered with the

understanding that Amtrak’s ridership and revenue are incredibly asymmetrical. Amtrak

currently offers service in 46 states, with over 40 routes, but the majority of activity occurs on

just a small portion of this network (Puentes et. al, 2013). More than half of all ridership, 52%, is

carried on just four routes. These same four routes are also responsible for 30% of vehicle

100 Largest

Metropoli-tian Areas

64%

Other Regions

36%

Share of US Population

100 Largest

Metropoli-tian Areas

88%

Other Regions

12%

Share of Amtrak Ridership

Figure 1: Urban Bias in Amtrak Ridership Source: Puentes et. al, 2013

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revenue hours, 31% of vehicle revenue miles, and 57% of all total revenue (Appendix A)3.

Amtrak ridership is also disproportionately urban (Figure 1). Out of the 500 plus stations

serviced by Amtrak, the 77 located in the country’s 100 largest metropolitan areas account for

87.8% of total ridership. Furthermore, ten metropolitan areas account for almost two thirds of

all Amtrak passengers (Puentes et. al, 2013). As with many other public transit agencies, Amtrak

is imbalanced, with a few key routes accounting for the bulk of patronage and revenue.

When discussing Amtrak’s asymmetry, the North East Corridor (NEC) stands out above

all others as the most significant stretch of track in the national system. Spanning from Boston

to Washington DC via New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, the NEC links together the densest

and most

economically

productive mega-

region in the

country (Amtrak

Vision for NEC). The

NEC houses two

routes, the

Northeast Regional

and the limited stop express train, Acela. Between these two routes, the NEC carries

sustainably more passengers than any other line in the Amtrak system. The next busiest

3 These measurement metrics were chosen because they are commonly used by the National Transit Database to

analyze public transportation systems.

0

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8

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Northeast Corridor All Other Routes Combined

Rid

ers

hip

(M

illio

ns)

Amtrak Ridership

Figure 2: The Dominance of the NEC Source: Amtrak Annual Report, 2013

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corridor, connecting San Diego to Los Angeles and coastal Central California, carries less than

one forth the passengers of the NEC (Appendix A). People living in the northeast United States

take the train twice as much as the average American, and it is the only corridor in the country

where annual train passengers outnumber those who fly (although travel by automobile still

captures the bulk, 89%, of the market) (O’Toole, 2012). In the late 1990’s the NEC accounted for

over half of all Amtrak trips. While this proportion has since waned slightly, the NEC still

constitutes a substantial portion of national ridership (Figure 2).

The NEC is also unique within Amtrak for its ability to turn an operational profit. As

Figure 3 shows, only three Amtrak routes are able to operationally break even - the two NEC

routes, as well as the Carolinian, which operates a substantial portion of its service (32%) within

the NEC (Amtrak System Timetables). Not only do the Northeast Regional and Acela recoup

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Figure 3: Operating Profit or Subside per Route, Excluding State Support Source: Amtrak Annual Report, 2013

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their operational expenses, they are the only two lines which generate a substantial operational

surplus (combined $399 million). For perspective, this surplus is large enough to cover the

operational deficits of 27 other routes, and it almost doubles the revenue supplied to Amtrak

by every state combined ($125 million) (Amtrak Comprehensive Business Plan, 2013). The NEC

is Amtrak’s proverbial 800 pound gorilla.

Capital Financing

Just as Amtrak’s ridership is skewed asymmetrically, so are its current and proposed

capital expenditures. The NEC has historically always received more money for rail

improvements than any other line. In 1965, six years before Amtrak ran its first train, congress

passed the High-Speed Ground Transportation Act, funding and advancing rail technology for

NEC passenger trains. This funding led to the introduction of the Metroliner, one of the fastest

and most sophisticated trains in the world at that time (“Amtrak’s History”). After decades of

incremental track improvement projects, the Acela express train was introduced in 2000

(Amtrak Budget and Business Plan, 2105). Currently, Amtrak is partnering with local

government agencies on a NEC Five-Year Capital Plan. This plan calls for incremental increases

in capital expenditure (reaching $4 billion by the 2020 fiscal year) to rebuild ageing tunnels and

bridges, and renovate several stations (Jaffe, 2015). Longer term plans envision upgrading Acela

to a next generation high speed rail, capable of operating at 220 miles per hour (Amtrak Vision

for NEC). There are many skeptics to this proposal; however, Amtrak insists that the density of

riders in the NEC will allow this upgrade to fully cover operational and capital costs and produce

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an operational surplus of $1.7 billion by 2040 (in 2011 dollars) - more than the entire existing

annual Amtrak subsidy. While few of these capital proposals are currently fully funded, the

historical precedence and the fact that over half of all Amtrak federal improvement funds go to

the NEC demonstrate the asymmetry in Amtrak’s capital funding.

Amtrak routes outside of the NEC have historically not received much capital spending,

but this may be changing. While the NEC is proposing the use of next generation high speed rail

cars, the most typical car currently in Amtrak’s non-NEC fleet was introduced more than 40

years ago, in 1974 (Amtrak Fleet Strategy). The NEC receives 52% of all capital funding, while

the most funded non-NEC route receives less than 4% (Amtrak Budget and Business Plan,

2015). Routes outside of the NEC clearly receive less capital support; however, this dynamic

may be shifting. Currently 8% of the current fleet of train cars is set to be replaced by the end of

the fiscal year (Amtrak Fleet Strategy). PRIIA 2008, and the pending PRIIA 2015, are geared

towards increasing the influence of states on their local Amtrak routes. While state money goes

mostly into covering operation costs, the PRIIA mandated state rail plans provide the

opportunity for local governments to think more critically about strategic rail improvement

projects they may want to support on their regional Amtrak routes (Puentes et. al, 2013).

Additionally, a lot of state interest was sparked by the 2009 American Recovery and

Reinvestment Act. While this act focused its $8 billion specifically towards high speed rail, many

of the projects received money for general rail infrastructure improvements, which benefit

existing Amtrak services. The future for major Amtrak capital projects outside of the NEC is yet

to be determined.

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Amtrak and Freight

The NEC is also unique because of its track ownership. In the early 1970’s, around the

inception of Amtrak, the federal government bought out struggling Penn Central

Transportation, a private railroad operating along the NEC. In its place, congress created a for-

profit freight entity, the Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) (Puentes et. al, 2013). As part

of this deal, the federal government gained ownership to most of the tracks between Boston

and Washington. Although Conrail was eventually privatized, Amtrak continues to own the

tracks in the NEC. Besides from a 90 mile stretch of track near Chicago, the NEC corridor is the

only area Amtrak runs where it owns the majority of the right-of-way (Krier, 2014). Despite a

1973 law requiring freight trains on any track throughout the country to give Amtrak trains

priority, this law is subject to lackluster compliance. Krier (2014) found that, “individual freight

railroads had important effects on Amtrak delays” (p. 173). Since Amtrak owns the tracks on

the NEC, Acela and the Northeast Regional are able to avoid schedule conflicts with freight

trains. Trains on the NEC feature an on-time performance rate of 80%, while other Amtrak

trains are often on-time for less than 55% of their routes. The Sunset Limited, for example,

averages a 58 minute delay per train (Lowell and Seamonds, 2013).

The Role of Distance

In general, shorter routes attract more riders than longer routes. Figure 4 displays the

relationship between the distance traveled by the average rider on each route, and ridership

levels. The data suggest that shorter distance routes correlate with higher levels of ridership.

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This relationship is significant, with a relatively high R2 value of 0.57.4 In fact, the factors of

distance and ridership relate with a greater R2 value than any of the other variables analyzed in

this study. The ten busiest routes all feature average rider distances of less than 200 miles.

Additionally, routes with total end-to-end distances less than 400 miles account for 82.9% of

system ridership (Puentes et. al, 2013). Analysis of these routes using different measurements

of ridership and distance (such as trips per revenue hour and total route distance) also

corroborate these findings (Appendix B). It is clear that, on average, ridership levels are higher

on shorter routes and lower on longer routes.

4 R

2 levels are based on an analysis of linear, exponential, logarithmic, and power function trendlines to determine

the function of best fit.

Figure 4: Average Rider Distance vs Riders per Mile Source: Amtrak Comprehensive Business Plan, 2013

R² = 0.57

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Average Rider Distance vs Riders per Mile

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Not only do shorter Amtrak routes have more riders than long routes, they are also

increasing their share of new riders faster. Since Amtrak’s turbulence in the mid 1990’s, the gap

between ridership levels of short routes and long routes has widened. Out of Amtrak’s 55.1%

increase in ridership since 1997 (the year of the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act), 90.3%

is attributed to routes of less than 400 miles (Puentes et. al, 2013). Short routes are

accountable for almost all of the recent ridership growth in the system. This trend may be

partially explained by the dramatic decline in short and medium distance airline ridership in the

country since the 1990’s (Schwieterman et. al, 2014). In general, public intercity ground

transportation (trains as well as buses) has seen a noticeable uptick in recent years for short

routes, due to their savings over airfare. These savings, however, dramatically diminish for trips

over 250 miles, perhaps explaining the relative flatlining of ridership on the long distance lines.

The relationship between route distance and cost effectiveness is not absolutely clear.

Shorter routes

do tend to have

slightly higher

farebox

recovery ratios;

however this

association is

weak, with a

statically

R² = 0.04

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Average Rider Distance vs Cost Effectiveness

Figure 5: Average Rider Distance vs Cost Effectiveness Source: Amtrak Comprehensive Business Plan, 2013

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negligible R2 value (Figure 5). Nevertheless, most of the cost effective routes are the shortest

routes. Four out of the top five financially efficient routes carry passengers less than 200 miles,

as do seven of the top ten. For the shortest of trips there may be a small connection between

distance and economic efficiency, but this trend does not continue consistently throughout the

Amtrak network.

Shorter routes do present a noticeable cost advantage to Amtrak when one considers

state subsidies. Long distance routes (defined by Amtrak as over 750 miles) do not receive any

direct state support, but 20 out of the 26 short routes are subsidized by states. This nonfederal

aid ranges from $200,000 on the Northeast Regional, to $32.8 million on the San Joaquins.

These contributions are defined as revenue streams by Amtrak, and can constitute anywhere

from 0.03% to 69.09% of total revenue for a route. This can make a significant impact; there are

R² = 0.34

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Average Rider Distance vs Cost Effectiveness (Including State Funding)

Figure 6: Average Rider Distance vs Cost Effectiveness (Including State Funding) Source: Amtrak Comprehensive Business Plan, 2013

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five routes which receive more state revenue than actual ticket revenue. Figure 6 shows the

cost effectiveness of routes when these state subsidies are factored in to the farebox recovery

ratio. Route distances are over eight times more correlated with cost effectiveness under this

model than they were with Figure 5. Shorter routes are more financially successful from

Amtrak’s perspective, but the intrinsic ability for short routes to operate efficiently is

debatable.

Amtrak’s Two Divisions

Amtrak essentially runs two different services. Almost everyone agrees with this reality,

on both sides of the aisle, from O’Toole to Sclar. On one hand, there are the short routes, which

tend to capture the most riders, offer the most frequent service, and (to a greater or lesser

extent) operate the most economically. The second type of train service are the long hauls,

characterized by significantly less ridership, more subsidies, almost no local government

support, worse on-time performances, and low frequencies. These two groups are defined by

Amtrak as routes under and over 750 miles. Puentes et al. (2013) argues this division should be

closer to 400 miles, O’Toole believes the division is essentially the NEC versus everything else,

but one way or another, most policy advocates view Amtrak as providing two categories of

service.

Annual Ridership Operating Profit or Subsidies (Millions $)

Short Distance Trains

25,732,158 263.5

Long Distance Trains

4,789,684 (597)

Table 1: Short v Long Distance Trains Source: Amtrak Budget and Comprehensive Business Plan, 2013

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The importance of this second category, the long distance routes, raises the most

controversy. The data are clear that these routes attract the least amount of ridership and

account for a larger portion of the operating deficit. Sclar, and other advocates of Amtrak as a

public service, argue that these long routes are worthwhile because they make the system

more equitable. The task of defining equity is deserved of its own comprehensive study, and

exists outside the scope of this report. With this in mind, the amount of people within close

proximity to

stations is

often used as

a proxy for

equity (Sclar,

2003; NARP5).

Figure 7

shows that

distance

correlates

positively with

the amount of

people in a 25-mile service catchment area6. That being said, the five routes serving the highest

populations all travel less than 1500 miles, which is less than the long distance route average

5 National Association of Railroad Passengers

6 25 miles is commonly used by the National Association of Railroad Passengers in determining the appropriate

service catchment area.

R² = 0.44

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Route Distance

Route Distance vs Population in Service Area

Figure 7: Route Distance vs Population in Service Area Source: Amtrak Comprehensive Business Plan, 2013

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(Amtrak Comprehensive Business Plan, 2013). Critics also argue that intercity bus systems serve

larger coverage areas than Amtrak, and buses provide faster, more frequent, more convenient

service than Amtrak’s long routes (Lowell and Seamonds, 2013). There are roughly 500 Amtrak

station, compared to approximately 3800 stops served by Greyhound, America’s primary

intercity bus operator. Despite arguments over the utility of long distance Amtrak routes, these

lines are unlikely to be abandoned; congress has consistently rejected eliminating these trains

and the 1970 Passenger Service Act specifically requires long distance routes, spanning from

coast to coast and connecting north and south. Long distance Amtrak trains are likely to remain

in service due to the nature of congressional politics.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that intercity passenger trains used to play a crucial role in American

society. It is equally clear that trains now take a subservient position in the movement of

people in the United States. Amtrak’s current existence is the result of congressional political

will – the idea that the United States must have a national train system, even if operates at a

loss and does not generate substantial ridership. Given the political status-quo, it seems

unlikely that the federal government will abandon Amtrak anytime in the near future.

Nevertheless, officials should fully understand the asymmetrical characteristics of Amtrak if

they desire to make American trains more competitive with other modes of transportation.

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21

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22

Appendix A: Amtrak Data Chart Source: Amtrak Budget and Business Plan, 2013; NARP; Puentes et. al, 2013; Amtrak System Timetable

23

Appendix A (Continued): Amtrak Data Chart

24

Appendix A (Continued): Amtrak Data Chart

25

Appendix A (Continued): Amtrak Data Chart

26

Appendix B: Auxiliary Figures Source: Amtrak Budget and Business Plan, 2013; NARP; Puentes et. al, 2013; Amtrak System Timetable

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Four Busiest Routes All Other Routes Combined

Rid

ers

hip

(M

illio

ns)

Amtrak Ridership

0

5

10

15

20

25

Ten Busiest Routes All Other Routes Combined

Rid

ers

hip

(M

illio

ns)

Amtrak Ridership

27

Appendix B (Continued): Auxiliary Figures

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70

An

nu

al R

ide

rsh

ip (

Mill

ion

s)

Average Speed (MPH)

Train Speed vs Ridership

0

50

100

150

200

250

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000Un

linke

d P

asse

nge

r Tr

ips

pe

r V

eh

icle

Re

ven

ue

Ho

ur

Route Distance (Miles)

Distance vs Riders per Hour

28

Appendix B (Continued): Auxiliary Figures

0

50

100

150

200

250

0 200 400 600 800 1000

Un

linke

d P

asse

nge

r Tr

ips

pe

r V

eh

icle

Re

ven

ue

Ho

ur

Average Rider Distance (Miles)

Average Rider Distance vs Riders per Hour

0

50

100

150

200

250

0 10 20 30 40 50

Un

linke

d P

asse

nge

r Tr

ips

pe

r V

eh

icle

Re

ven

ue

Ho

ur

Average Rider Population of Service within 25 Miles (Millons)

Population in Service Area vs Riders per Hour

29

Appendix B (Continued): Auxiliary Figures

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

0 10 20 30 40 50

Un

linke

d P

asse

nge

r Tr

ips

pe

r V

eh

icle

Re

ven

ue

Mile

Average Rider Population of Service within 25 Miles (Millons)

Population in Service Area vs Riders per Mile

0

50

100

150

200

250

35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70Un

linke

d P

asse

nge

r Tr

ips

pe

r V

eh

icle

Re

ven

ue

Ho

ur

Average Train Speed

Train Speed vs Riders per Hour

30

Appendix B (Continued): Auxiliary Figures

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70

Un

linke

d P

asse

nge

r Tr

ips

pe

r V

eh

icle

Re

ven

ue

Mile

Average Train Speed

Train Speed vs Riders per Mile

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2

0 10 20 30 40 50

Fare

bo

x R

eco

very

Rat

io

Population of Service within 25 Miles (Millions)

Population in Service Area vs Cost Effectiveness

31

Appendix B (Continued): Auxiliary Figures

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2

30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70

Fare

bo

x R

eco

very

Rat

io

Average Train Speed (MPH)

Average Speed vs Cost Effectiveness

($100)

($50)

$0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

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dy

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Operating Profit (Black) or Subsidy (Red) per Route Including State Subsidies