Ruud Welten !From Marx to Christianity, and Back 1

Michel Henry’s Philosophy of Reality !!!!‘Marx is one of the most important Christian thinkers in the West.’ (Michel Henry) !Recently, two volumes of miscellaneous articles and papers on politics and Christianity by French philosopher Michel Henry (1922-2002) came out. Today, Henry is chiefly known for 2

his phenomenology of Christianity, but during the 1965-1975 period he closely and exclusively focused on Marx. Such a career—from Marx to Christianity—might lead one to imagine that the Montpellier philosopher and writer underwent some radical conversion during the last ten years of his life. However, as I will demonstrate in this contribution nothing is further from the truth and, on the contrary, Marx inspired Henry’s philosophy of Christianity which reveals an intrinsic bond between Marxism and Christianity. !When Michel Henry re-reads Karl Marx’ oeuvre in the 1970s, his approach is phenomenological. That is to say, he brackets off all Marx’ dogmatism in order to reveal a phenomenological foundation that is primordial all through Marx’ philosophy and that cannot be reduced to mere theory or political ideology. The last sentence before the conclusion of Henry’s text reads: ‘Marx is one of the most important Christian thinkers in the West.’ It is 3

therefore not a surprise, that Henry finds an identical primordial slant in Christian discourse at his alleged turn to theology in the 1990s. Superficially, reading Henry’s work might convey 4

the impression that this turn to theology was radical indeed: what bigger difference is there, than the one between Marx’ atheist philosophy on the one hand, and Christianity on the other? !The philosophical implications of a study comparing Henry’s Marx with his later phenomenology of Christianity result in more than just a confidential academic representation of the German philosopher. Such a study might be a useful introduction before re-reading and re-appreciating Marx today. It might be used to parry all of the clichés about Marx’ so-called atheism and his totalitarian idealism, and the fact that he was casually dismissed after the collapse of Soviet communism in the early 1990s. And that is important because today, capitalism and liberalism claim victory over the political left (‘there’s no alternative!’) while there is no reason whatever to suppose that the basic motivation of Marx’ philosophy, the need for social reform, has been superseded. Henry, however, does not approach Marx

As published in Bijdragen: International Journal for Philosophy and Theology. Volume 66, Issue 4, 20051

Michel Henry, Phénoménologie de la vie, volume III : De l’art et du politique. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France 2

2004), [PV III]; and volume IV : Sur l’éthique de la religion. Paris : PUF 2004, [PV IV].

Michel Henry, Marx II. Une philosophie de l’économie. Paris : Gallimard 1976, [M II], p. 445.3

Michel Henry, C’est moi la vérité. Pour une philosophie du christianisme. Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1996, [MV]/ I Am the 4

Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity, (Stanford University Press, 2003), [IT].

politically. Later, at the time when the Soviet Union ceased to exist in the early 1990s, he would say that neither communism nor capitalism had succeeded in understanding the fundamentals of humanity. When they say that the so-called ‘victory over communism’ is a 5

step forward for humanity, Westerners speak too soon, and they are wrong. Marx, who was claimed as theirs by the communists for all the wrong reasons, writes about the basis of humanity, which is life rather, than about political agenda items. In I am the truth Marx is called, ‘one of the greatest thinkers of all times’: an early warning notice that in his later work regarding Marx, Henry is not going to be detached at all. 6!Marx, a Christian philosopher? Perhaps a matter of overzealous Christianisation? Perhaps a desperate attempt to charge the now unemployed German philosopher with a duty in a society that has stamped out communism, but has turned out ineradicably Christian in spite of many prophecies about the death of God? How are we to understand Henry’s remarkable observations? In other words, ‘what is the relation between the way Henry reads Marx and Henry’s phenomenology of Christianity?’ I would like to contribute to explaining that in his Marx, Henry does not just apply his phenomenology to a randomly chosen author. On the contrary: the entire blueprint of the phenomenology of life is set down in this meticulous study on the German philosopher. If that is so, it implies that Henry’s phenomenology of Christianity does not result from his turn to theology in the 1990s: perhaps even, that there actually has never been any tournant théologique française at all . It would also imply that the 7

relation between Marx and Christianity is of a totally different nature. This relation, that 20th century intellectual and political traditions have mostly ignored, offers two possibly prolific perspectives: resuming Marx on the one hand, and resuming Christianity on the other. To begin to understand their relationship, we must re-read Marx without the Marxism but also re-read Christianity without the theology—which neatly sums up the bulk of Henry’s oeuvre. !Back to Marx Henry’s Marx - two volumes filling over 900 pages - was published in 1976, when interest in Marx was dwindling. They are not studies on ‘Marxism’: that is a term that Henry actually uses to refer to the sum of misinterpretations about the German philosopher. Nothing we 8

thought we knew about Marx seems to be correct. Henry brackets off the immense Marxist tradition from Lenin to Althusser. This so-called ‘Marxism’, says Henry, has developed without any awareness of crucial Marx texts like the Manuscripts of 1844 or the German Ideology, because these have only been available since the early 1930s. Furthermore, 9

philosophers such as Althusser have severely underestimated the significance of these texts while others have understood Marx to be a political ideologist, sociologist or economist. In many respects, ‘Back to Marx’ means re-valuating Marx: instead of getting lost in the jungle of 20th century Marxist debate, Henry returns to the source text to discover a so far

Michel Henry, Du communisme au capitalisme. Théorie d’une catastrophe. Paris : Éditions Odile Jacob, 1990, [CC].5

MV 304/IT 244, Cf. CC 25.6

Dominique Janicaud, Le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française. Paris : Combas, 1991.7

Michel Henry, Marx I. Une philosophie de la réalité, p. 9. Paris : Gallimard 1976, [M I]. 8

M I, 12.9

undisclosed reality that, according to Henry, constitutes the very root of Marx. The latter’s comments on Hegel, Bauer, Stirner, the new-hegelians and many others, disclose a deeper reality , an original domain of experience that is called Life. 10 11!In his earlier The Essence of Manifestation, Henry showed how Western philosophy always took ‘phenomenological distance’ to be constitutive of essential phenomenality or manifestation. Manifestation is possible only, because the subject distances itself from the object. That which distances itself, only becomes manifest as a result of the distance, or it 12

might even integrate and disappear, which is what happens in Sartre’s description of consciousness as a néant. This quite definitely means that manifestation can only be 13

understood indirectly. Henry now asks himself the question whether there can be knowledge that cannot be reduced to ‘knowledge of something’ or knowledge that is only possible given a distance. From the point of view of the majority of Western philosophers, such knowledge remains shrouded in mystery because of the lack of distance. The difference involves an opposition that we find in many of Henry’s writings: the opposition between this original knowledge –which we need to specify further – and the reflective knowledge that depends on it. This very same difference is the basis of Marx’ entire oeuvre, and it recurs in Henry’s work on Christianity. !Labour The contrast between original knowledge and knowledge presupposing distance characterizes the two volumes of Marx: part one is called: ‘a philosophy of reality’ while part two is called: ‘a philosophy of economics’. Superficially, the two volumes follow Marx development historically. However, the analysis is not historical: the two titles indicate a fundamental difference between reality and economy, the former preceding and being prerequisite for the latter. They are not actually two separate, different domains of knowledge or action but rather one domain: reality and its tributary economy. The feasibility of economy is based upon a domain Henry calls reality, as is reflected by the title of Volume 1 (‘Une philosophie de la réalité’). Marx himself clearly uses this distinction, when he separates real labour (or konkrete Arbeit) from abstract labour (abstrakte Arbeit). Real labour first and foremost involves 14

physical effort. Marx’ reality is therefore not primarily philosophical. His reality consists of a life that continually experiences and generates itself, phrased in terms of labour. Marx is a reformer of the subjectivity notion, rather than a philosopher who thinks that labour is about a ‘regional ontology’. Labour refers to the direct experience of toiling and sweating, getting tired, hungry, thirsty. First and foremost, labour is subjective. Henry: ‘It is a concept that does not mean anything but ‘to feel one-self’, which is what life is. All life is subjective.’ So, life 15

CC 27.10

M I, 55.11

Cf. Michel Henry, L’Essence de la manifestation. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France 1963/902, [EM], § 9.12

Jean-Paul Sartre, L’être et le néant. Paris : Gallimard, 1943.13

M II, 138-175. Cf. Karl Marx, Werke Band 42, (‘Grundrisse’ ). Berlin : Dietz, 2005.14

CC 29. ‘…concept qui ne vise rien d’autre que le fait de se sentir soi-même, c’est-à-dire précisément la vie. 15

Tout vie est subjective.’

experiences itself. Second, life is a force, a productive force: not because labouring away life is productive, but because it brings forth itself: life creates itself. Third, life is always concrete and of a material nature. The fact that life labours to re-produce itself implies that it is physical. ‘Reality’ is thus ‘reality of life’ and it is precisely this kind of reality that is contained in the notion ‘labour’. !Western economics theorizes the material subjective life experience that is the basis of humanity. Thus, a derivative notion of truth is created, which is alienated from live labour. Western type labour does not express itself in procreation or self-generation, effort or fatigue, but through the working hours and the economic system of values linked to them. Economic working hours no longer represent a physical experience: they are transformed into pay. Time spent labouring, however, is directly experienced as physical fatigue. So spending time is a direct experience. Moreover, it is the personal, singular experience of an individual, every 16

single time. By contrast, abstract labour transforms this spending time into economic terms. Measurable time takes the place of individual effort. ‘Spent time’ means: the amount of economically qualified time that is spent. In his earlier work especially, for instance in the 17

Manuscripts of 1844, Marx continues to emphasize the ‘essential and detrimental separation’ between worker and capitalist. The worker labours, experiences and lives while the capitalist 18

calculates. He turns the worker into an object, alienated from the work. !Life as a labour process is not really a notion, but rather pure experience. At work, labour first of all perceives itself. Economy, however, reduces labour to a product, for in trade, the labour itself is not the issue: only its revenues are. But even before labour is reduced to a mere product or valued by means of its perceptible manifestation, it creates itself. Living labour (Marx’ words) is self-generative: producing itself by labour and perceiving itself. Labour is the manifestation of life itself: not of the life of something else, a product, but of itself. Originally then, labour is physical and personal. That is why initially, Marx joins up with Feuerbach, who described the body as the basis of personality. According to Henry, Marx is 19

a philosopher that considers human subjectivity to be more than just sheer spirituality. Marx’ implicit idea’s on effort are close to the descriptions of Henry’s philosophy in his early Philosophy and phenomenology of the body, in which he explains Maine de Biran. Labour bears all the characteristics of the effort: ‘As far as labour is living, individual and real, it is nothing but an enduring effort.’ Both Maine de Biran and Marx claim that the subject 20

includes the living body and subjectivity, which Henry calls ‘une subjectivité pathétique’. 21! Michel Henry Philosophie et phénoménologie du corps. Essai sur l’ontologie biranienne, Paris, PUF, 1965/20014. Cf. M I, 16

342 on Biran and Marx.

M II, 161ev.; Cf. M I, 460. 17

Karl Marx, Ökonomisch-philosopische Manuskripte, Leipzig: Reclam 1974, [ÖpM], (Economic and Philosophical 18

Manuscripts of 1844), I/15, (translations taken from www.marxists.org).

M I, 72.19

Michel Henry, Auto-donation: entretiens et conférences. Montpellier : Prétentaine 2002, p. 27. ‘Dans la mesure où il 20

est vivant, individuel et reél, le travail n’est rien d’autre qu’un effort souffrant.’

Ibidem. 21

Praxis The ‘language’ of experience, is experience itself. The ‘knowledge’ of experience is therefore not the kind of knowledge we express in scientific or economic terms, as it is individual: consisting only of life itself. In his early, pre-1845 work, Marx also uses the term praxis in its original Aristotelian meaning: to describe living, true labour. Aristotle distinguishes between praxis and poièsis: the former refers to the activity towards a goal--like making music--the latter refers to the goal as an external end product. Praxis is thus a sensory, self-expressive activity, whereas poièsis presupposes an externalisation. Because praxis manifests itself--22

and is thus independent of any transcendental constitution--Henry calls it a primary immanence. Praxis is therefore not conceived as transcendent nor as a product set by detachment, reflexion, visibility or calculability, but as life experiencing itself. The term 23

‘immanence’ indicates immediate [sensory] self-experience (épreuve de soi) that fully coincides with life. To Marx, praxis is neither thought nor a [vision unfolding in the phenomenal world]. In this respect, says Henry, praxis does not set forth ‘into the world’. 24

Praxis is an action réelle. !According to traditional phenomenology, perception focuses on an object, ‘intuition sees the object, it discovers it and contemplates it’. However, Henry goes on to say, ‘action does not do anything of the sort’. Apparently, this notion of praxis flies in the face of the Leninist 25

interpretation of it, which is that actually, praxis—in accordance with Marx’ famous eleventh thesis on Feuerbach—involves taking action in the world as opposed to mere thinking, analysing or contemplating. To Henry however, praxis is precisely the subjective experience of effort, in short: labour. The world we live in is an economy that equals our individual experiences to the experiences of other people by economic conciliation. However, this world ‘attests to the initial truth of being’. The category ‘being’ is thus understood as a production—but not a production of something. Reducing this production to a product lands us deep in economics, the initial ontology lost. “It must be said that the interpretation of praxis implies an overturning of the traditional concept of truth”, says Henry, for it implies disassociation 26

from theory: in favour of taking action. A theory of truth always uses the notion ’truth’ predicative: ‘truth’ is always ‘truth of’. Such an externalisation is not involved in this new notion of praxis as truth. Praxis remains itself, praxis does not ‘know’ but praxis ‘acts’. And so, this self-experiencing [action] is what Marx called ‘labour’. Marx’ famous words on

Aristotle Ethica Nicomachea, First book.22

M II, 152.23

Cf. Michel Henry, ‘Le concept de l’être comme production’, in PV III, pp. 11-40 [CEP], p. 30./ ‘The Concept 24

of Being as Production’, (translated by Pierre Adler), Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, Volume 10, Number 2, pp. 3-28 [CBP], p. 19.

CEP 30/19. ‘Elle découvre et le contemple’, ‘l’action ne fait rien de tout cela’.25

CEP 38/26. ‘L’interprétation de l’être comme praxis implique—nous devons le dire pour terminer—un 26

renversement du concept traditionnel de la vérité.’

labour: ‘Sie wissen es nicht, aber sie tun es’, which [Georg] Lukács applied to the artist, specifically express this sensory ‘knowledge’. 27

!Alienation Economy is the science of trade. But trade is only possible when labour is theorised and transformed into measurable units, so economic reality always remains indebted to an original notion of labour. Marx’ economy is dual, says Henry: he first comments on economists such as Ricardo and Smith and goes on to criticize the entire capitalist society. This Marx is the one so prominent in Marxist tradition, but there is a second critical ploy: economy itself is dependent and indebted to life. Marx himself speaks of economy’s fundamental ‘Unselbständigkeit’. Now the question arises: what exactly is the relation of the domain that Henry (following a young Marx) describes as life, to the worldly domain that is secondary to it? Henry takes this relation for completely and solely phenomenological. The former domain is an épreuve de soi without which there cannot be any phenomenological distance (Husserlian intentionality or Heideggerian [ecstasy/eke-stasis] ). This self-experience does 28

not reveal itself, does not appear the way the objects and phenomena do. !In his Manuscripts of 1844, Marx says: ‘The more the worker exerts himself in his work, the more powerful the alien, objective world becomes that he creates beside himself, the poorer he and his inner world become, and the less they belong to him.’ This ‘inner World’ is what 29

Marx calls life--which is the life of the worker. Alienation consist in labourers externalising their life; transforming it into a ‘Gegenstand’: an object. ‘The worker puts his life in the object; it now no longer belongs to him, but to the object,’ says Marx. He has not created 30

himself, but he has produced a component part of economics, which is a transformation of the experience of the worker into a computable product with market value. It is this particular process that Marx calls externalisation, Entäußrung. Marx: ‘The worker’s externalisation in his product not only implies that his labour becomes an object, an external existence, but that his labour exists outside him, independently of him and alien to him, is starting to confront him as an autonomous power; it means that the life which he has placed in the service of the object now confronts him as hostile and alien.’ The externalisation, therefore, is the 31

transformation of life into an alien, even hostile existence. It is not only a matter of Verdinglichung, the archetype of all social relationships according to Lukács, but of an aspect

Cf. Ruud Welten, ‘Het lichaam vergeet niet. Fenomenologie van de prereflectieve, alledaagse 27

lichaamsbewegingen bij Maine de Biran, Merleau-Ponty en Henry’, in: Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, jrg. 95, nr. 3, 2003, p. 157-173.

Cf. Henry, L’Essence de la manifestation, o.c. 28

ÖpM 152=I/XXII. ‘Je mehr der Arbeiter sich ausarbeitet um so mächtiger wird die fremde, gegenständliche 29

Welt, die er sich gegenüber schafft, um so ärmer wird es selbst, seine innere Welt, um so weniger gehört ihm zu eigen.’

ÖpM 152 (=I/XXII), ‘Der Arbeider legt sein Leben in den Gegenstand; aber nun gehört es nicht mehr ihm, 30

sondern dem Gegenstand.’

ÖpM 152 (=I/XXII), ‘Die Entäußrung des Arbeiders in seinem produkt hat die Bedeutung, nicht nur, daß seine 31

Arbeit zu einem Gegenstand, zu einer äußern Existenz wird, sondern daß sie außer ihm, unabhänging, fremd von ihm existiert und eine selbständige Macht ihm gegenüber wird, daß das Leben, was er dem Gegenstand verliehn hat, ihm feindlich und fremd gegenübertritt.’

that surpasses the objective domain: that is, the subjective domain of life itself. Sinnlichkeit ought to be ‘fundamental to all sciences’: not computation. The difference between live 32

labour and economics is the phenomenological difference between affects and sensory experience on the one hand, and mathematisation on the other. Here we come across the roots of Husserlian analysis as put forward in The Crisis of European Sciences, which identifies Galileo as the founding father of the mathematisation of the originally phenomenological domain. 33

!The Entäußrung of labour results in labourers that are alienated from their soul. Production (‘Entfremdung der Sache ’), first alienated from labour itself, is to blame for a fundamental 34

Entäußrung of labour from the labourer. Marx calls this second kind of alienation die Selbstentfremdung. The fact that labour is external (äußerlich) to the worker – means that it does not belong to his essential being; that he, therefore, does not assure himself in his work, but denies himself, feels miserable and not happy, does not develop free mental and physical energy (freie physische und geistige Energie), but mortifies his flesh and ruins his mind. Hence, the worker feels himself only when he is not working; when he is working, he does not feel himself (Der Arbeiter fühlt sich daher erst außer der Arbeit bei sich und in der Arbeit außer sich).” This difference between ‘außer der Arbeit bei sich’ and ‘der Arbeit außer sich’ 35

presupposes an initial notion of ‘labourer’ in which the labourer ‘bejaht’, assures the self by labouring. Naturally, this initial notion is not alienated, not ‘außer sich’, but with itself. It is, in accordance with the quote, a ‘freie physische und geistige Energie’. It is Life itself. The fact that Marx calls it spiritual here by no means implies that the labour is not physical. Marx mentions ‘the worker’s own physical and mental energy, his personal life’ , and adds: ‘for 36

what is life but activity? – as an activity directed against himself, which is independent of him and does not belong to him.’ 37

!Apparently Marx does indeed understand the initial non-alienated domain as ‘Life sticking to itself’, as not externalising--though he hardly ever enlarges on the subject. This is the life of the labourer asserting life by his labours. Remember Nietzsche’s famous words in Gay Science on the self-affirmation of life: of life wanting itself. Besides, Henry’s conclusion does not exclude Lukács’ thesis that such non-alienating labour is primarily artistic labour. On a more practical level we can imagine the labourer carrying out even the simplest of tasks with undivided attention and love, but in that case it must be unpaid labour: the labour of a child

ÖpM 194 (=III/IX).32

Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern 33

University Press 1970, p. 23; Michel Henry, La barbarie, Paris, 1987 (Grasset), 2001(PUF, “Quadrige”).

ÖpM 156 (=I/XXIV).34

ÖpM 155 (=I/XXIII). ‘Daß die Arbeit dem Arbeiter äußerlich ist. d.h. nicht zu seinem Wesen gehört, daß er 35

sich daher in seiner Arbeit nicht bejaht, sondern verneint, nicht wohl, sondern unglücklich fühlt, keine freie physische und geistige Energie entwickelt, sondern sein Physis abkasteit und seinem Geist ruiniert. Der Arbeiter fühlt sich daher erst außer der Arbeit bei sich und in der Arbeit außer sich.’

ÖpM 156 (=I/XXIV). ‘…die eigene physische und geistige Energie des Arbeiters, sein persönliches Leben’.36

Ibidem, ‘…denn was ist Leben anderes als Tätigkeit—als eine wider ihn selbst gewendete, von ihm unabhängige, 37

ihm nicht gehörige Tätigkeit.’

building a tree house. This kind of labour is therefore not included in the economy for the benefit of the capitalist. The point is not so much that we need to revert to some initial type of labour—a live, joyous kind of labour--but that any economy presupposes such live labour. Henry’s interpretation does not so much aim to abolish the secondary domain of economy, but rather to save it from oblivion in order to reassess human experience. We simply live in a manifest world and have to deal with each other and there is nothing wrong with that—unless economy becomes normative. If this is the point both Marx and Henry propagate, it will radically alter our image of Marx: he is no longer primarily an economic or political reformer, but criticises the economics of his day to uncover the initial immanent domain of life. !Marxist tradition--including Soviet communism—has made the economic domain absolute and attached political consequences to it as well, thus severing its connection with the domain of Life. Marx calls this alienation even in his early texts. Instead of implementing Marxist ideas, Marxists have turned them around and set aside the point Marx initially tried to make! This is nowhere more obvious than in the work of Althusser, whom systematically ignores the early Marx[]. Henry spots a radical criticism of economizing in Marx’ later texts especially38

—from 1857 onward, that is: texts in which he expounds on his economic theory (Grundrisse and Das Kapital). According to Henry, in his early writings Marx never quite succeeds in shaking off Hegel. Though he is critical of Althusser, Henry agrees that the later Marx is more important, though on completely different grounds. Althusser believes that the later Marx gets round to developing a pointed theory of economics. Henry believes that the later Marx always presupposes that economy is subject to living labour. So this is not about vitalism or about a new understanding of ‘life’, ‘life’ is the épreuve de soi. Indeed, life withdraws when faced with conceptualisation. Conceptualising life will immediately alienate it from experience. The only touchstone is the experience of life itself, and in this respect, the approach is phenomenological. When re-reading Marx, Henry is taking the famous German Ideology phrase seriously: ‘Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.’ 39

!Christianity and atheism Henry’s re-reading of Marx is dominated by this dual theme of life and the alienated domain, which also dominates his later work on Christianity. All of Marx’ notions reappear in the language of Christianity: life, alienation, practice, pathos. I do not, however, primarily want to address Henry’s later studies on Christianity, but intend to approach Christianity by means of Henry’s interpretation of Marx, taking into account what Henry says about Christianity in his later work. Marx seems to take an explicit atheist stand in his early texts especially. His 40

comments on Christianity are taken from Feuerbach (The Essence of Christianity) and Bruno Bauer (On the Jewish Question). The younger Marx links the economic domain of abstracted labour to religion, over and over again. When he introduces the theory of alienation in the Manuscripts of 1844, he writes: ‘It is as in religion: the more man puts his life in God, the less

Althusser, Pour Marx, Paris : Maspero, 1965. 38

M I, 401-2. Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, New York, Prometheus Books, 1998, [GI], p. 42. 39

Karl Marx, Werke, Band 3 (Deutsche Ideologie), p. 27: ‘Nicht das Bewusstsein bestimmt das Leben, sondern das Leben bestimmt das Bewusstsein’.

Cf. Ruud Welten, ‘God is Life. On Michel Henry’s Arch-Christianity’, in: Peter Jonkers and Ruud Welten (eds.), 40

God in France. Eight Contemporary French Thinkers on God. Leuven, Peeters, 2005, p. 119-142.

he keeps to himself’. So he draws a parallel between criticising economics and criticising 41

religion. Just as capital is the abstract representation of living labour, religion is the abstract representation of living human beings. In keeping with Feuerbach’s understanding of religion as a mirror of humanity, Marx finds that human beings externalise in religion. Paraphrasing 42

Feuerbach, he writes: ‘Humanity looked for a superhuman being in the fantastic reality of heaven and found nothing there but the reflection of itself.’ 43

!The relation between religion and life is therefore transcendental, or according to Marx: ‘Religious suffering is at the same time the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering.’ Also, the critical analysis of religion is aimed at abolishing it: ‘The abolition 44

of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness.’ 45

Marx criticises religion because it is the ‘imaginary realization of human essence, because the human essence possesses no true reality’. So, religion is within the realm of illusions - ‘it is 46

the opium of the people’ – within the realm of dreams that everlastingly promise to come true. According to Henry, this is Marx’ approach of reality. A single foundation carries both his comments on nineteenth century capitalist society and his critique of religion. !This means a critique of the kind of religion that is indeed a projection and nothing more. The realm of illusions has no reality of its own. As long as religion is understood as devotional, it will alienate humanity from reality. However, Christianity also emphasizes reality, real Life. It is in this perspective that Marx speaks highly of Luther: ‘Luther, we grant, overcame 47

bondage out of devotion by replacing it by bondage out of conviction. […] He freed man from outer religiosity because he made religiosity the inner man.’ Here, the transformation of devotion, which always presupposes a phenomenological distance, to the spiritual domain of conviction, is crucial. ‘The recognition of the spiritual meaning of Lutheran thought leads us to the origins of dialectics, to a living experience’, says Henry. This living experience is not 48

a devotional experience, so it is not outside itself and needs no exteriority. This allows us to understand religion as a way of experiencing ourselves, instead of experiencing externalisation [and alienation]. !Marx of course rejects Luther’s solution but praises his perceptivity on the transformation of devotion into conviction. Protestantism revealed the problems of the critique of religion

ÖpM 152 (=I/XXII). ‘Es ist ebenso in der Religion. Je mehr der Mensch in Gott setzt, je weniger behält er 41

sich selbst.’

Cf. Ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, Leipzig 1849/ Stuttgart 1994, (‘Reclam’).42

Karl Marx, Werke, Band I (‘Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie’), p. 378. (transl from 43

www.marxists.org).

Idem 378/9.44

Ibidem.45

Ibidem.46

M I, 131.47

M I, 147, ‘La reconnaissance de la signification spirituelle de la pensée luthérienne nous reconduit à l’origine de 48

la dialectique, à l’expérience vécue’.

without having a hope of coming up with the right solutions. Marx: ‘But, if Protestantism was not the true solution of the problem, it was at least the true setting of it.’ So, Luther wanted 49

to free religion of its Feurbachian mirror function. Marx’s critique of religion has the same purpose and is part of his crusade against alienation. !The fact that Marx’ early critique of religion does indeed rely on an original domain, which is life, is supported by two important early texts in which he discusses atheism: Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and On the Jewish Question. In the latter, Bruno Bauer asks Christians and Jews to distance themselves from their religions so they may become real citizens that may reach political unity, build a rational state. Marx however denies that Bauer’s dialectics hit the mark, as they remain alien to reality. Replacing religion with the 50

state just does not solve the problem, though Lenin and Stalin thought so. Marx: ‘In the state […] where man counts as a species-being, he is an imaginary participant in an imaginary sovereignty, he is robber of his real life and filled with an unreal universality.’ A simple 51

change of focus is not what’s at stake here. !Christianity ought to be experience, not devotion or religion as mere representationalism. This is not a moral or hypothetical imperative, but precisely what ‘Christian experience’ means: a re-turn to life, understood as self-experience, without the alienation, without disassociation of the self. It is a life of acting without ‘knowing’. As Henry already says in Marx, Christ is the metaphysical expression of experienced life itself: ‘The passion and the sacrifice of Christ reveal the metaphysical law of fundamental affectedness of Life itself.’ And so, Henry’s 52

notion of Christ is defined by inner experiences that are understood phenomenologically instead of psychologically: ‘What Christ teaches is the purity of the heart, an internal and unlimited love. But what is love, that is not ‘realized’ and does not act? This however does 53

not imply a withdrawn mystique: ‘It is no longer an issue of dreaming of some interior perfection that relies on itself, nor even of sketching a harmonious system of actions in which this perfection would be possible. Nothing can be done within a person, no change capable of affecting his real being that does not presuppose as its precondition a real change in the world—a world whose true essence is not primarily natural but social. There is a frequently cited statement by the young Marx: “Philosophers have only interpreted the world in a different way; what matters is to transform it.”’ Consequently, reducing Henry’s philosophy to 54

mysticism or unwordliness would be a mistake. Life is not an abstract notion, it simply and solely must be lived, which means that essentially, it is defined by real activity involving, for instance, labour, physicality and ethics. Christianity’s ethical ideals - love of others, solidarity,

Karl Marx, Werke, Band I, p. 386.49

M I, 122.50

Karl Marx, Werke, Band I (‘Zur Judenfrage’), p. 355, (transl. from www.marxists.org).51

M I, 143, ‘Dans la passion du Christ et dans son sacrifice se révèle et s’exprime la loi métaphysique de la vie 52

pour autant qu’elle trouve son essence dans l’affectivité.’

MV 295/IT 236, ‘Ce que le Christ enseigne, c’est la pureté du cœur c’est un amour intérieur et sans limites. 53

Mais qu’est-ce qu’un amour qui ne se ‘réalise’ pas, qui n’agit pas ?’

MV 296/IT 237.54

generosity, justice, and so on – simply must be realised. So Christianity is truly a Marxist 55

praxis in two senses of the word. First, there is no ideology that must be put into practice and second, life manifests itself in human performances. Ultimately, Christianity is the performance of invisible life , which is consistent with the way Henry interprets the Marxist 56

notion of praxis. !It is not like there are two separate realities, one true and one alienated. ‘According to Christianity there exists only one Life, the unique essence of all that lives’, which entails: 57

‘This thesis is that there exists only one reality, that of Life.’ Praxis, action, the épreuve de 58

soi, thus mean that there are no two separate domains but that there is one reality of Life. Even alienation remains subject to the initial manifestation of life. Some Henry interpreters 59

speak of Michel Henry’s gnosis but there can be no such thing when gnosis refers to the unbridgeable duality of reality. True, Henry uncovers a primordial domain in both Marx’ and 60

Christianity’s focus on Life, but there is no doomed worldly domain that is totally separate from Life—though some old Gnostic systems are controlled by such stringent dualism. Christianity teaches that the imperceptible domain is the only reality, rather than that there is the perceptible domain that is totally separate from the imperceptible domain. The illusive, the mirror that is central to Marx’ critique of religion, is dependent and alienated from the reality of life itself. ! As Henry’s interpretations make clear, Marx’ philosophy is therefore primarily a philosophy of incarnation. The human subject is not mere spirit, as was held by German idealism, but is and always will be a material labouring subject. It is the incarnated subject that is prerequisite in Marx´s eleventh proposition on Feuerbach. In Henry’s language, Marx teaches us that humanity is subjectivité pathétique and understands labour as effort souffrant. The premises of a materialist conception of history, as Marx calls it in German Ideology, are not philosophical abstractions, but ‘They are the real individuals’. ‘The first premise of all 61

human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals.’ And he goes on to say: ‘This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the production of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production.’ This is 62

MV 297/IT 237-8.55

MV 216/IT 171.56

MV 72/IT 54. ‘Selon le christianisme il n’existe qu’une seule Vie, l’unique essence de tout ce qui vit.’ 57

MV 297/IT 238.58

MV 297/IT 238.59

Oa. Jad Hatem, Le sauveur et les viscères de l’être. Sur le gnosticisme et Michel Henry, Paris : L’harmattan, 2004.60

GI 37.61

GI 37.62

the theory of immanent incarnation in which a human being is not a spiritual being that may realise its potential at will, but an essentially material physical creation. Merleau-Ponty has reproached Christianity with not drawing the obvious conclusions of incarnation and insisting that ultimately, God is eternal spirit. Remarkably, discerningly, he understands Marxism to 63

correct the ambiguity. Henry, too, denies that God is spirit first and body later. For Christianity actually teaches that Christ and God are inseparable. !The Iconoclast Marx Reading Marx keeps one continually aware of the parallel between his critique of economy and his critique of religion. This parallel results from his unrelenting focus on the domain of immanent life, which is presupposed by both externalisations. The obvious question is, how Christianity managed to result in utter externalisation and alienation, when it is primarily understood to be the incarnated pathos of life itself. A possible answer can be found in the text ‘Difficile démocatie’ , in which Henry argues that human religiosity must not be understood 64

as a possible mode of expression, but as one that is rooted in the fundamental human experience of not being one’s own foundation. The experience is not simply one among many other experiences, but basic to human existence. This might lead one to suspect that this basic human experience of the relation between humanity and God is transcendental from the very beginning. This would make God the object of theology, as the giver of life that transcends humanity. According to Henry, however, such theologising is secondary to the primal, basic experience of Life, which must experience itself before it is capable of objectifying itself, as it is by itself, experiencing itself. Calling God ‘the creator’ irrevocably leads to the Feurerbachian alienation and externalisation mentioned before. The archaic experience of sanctity, says Henry, is not transcendent but immanent. The experience itself is immanent, as it does not depend on anything external. !Michel Henry’s oeuvre as a whole takes a new course towards Marxism: a new Marxism that welcomes Christianity’s objection against alienation as an ally. But let us not underestimate him: Henry also radically and unorthodoxly re-evaluated Christianity (to say the least) in a way un-thought-of in Christian tradition and theology. Implicitly, Henry’s ‘Christianity’ does not refer to the external religion normally called ‘Christianity’. He is not out to distinguish two kinds of Christianity, inner mysticism versus ecclesiastic tradition, either. Christianity is One, and it uses the word ‘God’ to refer to Life. Life is One, just like God is One. So Henry hardly ever mentions Church-approved Christianity and dogmatic theology. Essentially, according to Feuerbach-Marx analysis, Christianity is neither a collection of external rituals nor a series of dogmas, but a religion that is basically characterized by illusory externalisation. Like Marxism, Christianity actually teaches that self-manifestation precedes every mode of externalisation. !‘Rituals’ are always rituals of Life itself: they must be realised in daily life and take the place of conventional church service. Now, can we understand these rituals as fundamentally physical practice? Henry finds himself outside the precast scope of convention: his philosophy is no conventional Marxism, no Christianity, no conventional religion. His

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘Foi et bonne foi’, in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Sens et non-sens, Paris : Gallimard 1996.63

Michel Henry, ‘Difficile démocatie’, in PV III 167-182.64

philosophy allows only one single touchstone, has no rational genesis, is created by day-to-day contact with the realities of Life itself. The immediate vitality of Life, therefore, is not externalised. Here, religion does not equal expression or, more specifically, does not equal worship and is not representative. The basis of religion does not consist of ‘believing in something’, for instance ‘in God’. God is not an object of faith, God is not a mirror either, but God is the immanent vitality of Life itself. Henry develops this idea in C’est moi la vérité but in Marx, he already specified it as immanent reality. God is the only reality that is not objectified but that is self-generating and self-experiencing Life. !Religious practices cannot be reduced to objectifying routines, for that would mean religion renders immaterial, unanimated appearances absolute. Religion would then become an aesthetically structured objectification. Modern Christian culture is mainly characterised by externalisation, so it is no surprise to find that that today, religious art has totally ceased to exist, because the works of art of religion have been relocated to museums and galleries. Religious works of art, such as icons, are no longer identified as artworks because they externalise a devotion[]. In today’s world, they are primarily appreciated for their price, or 65

for the aesthetic thrill they offer. Perhaps we could say that, at least since the second century, Christian tradition has ignored one of the most important commandments: ‘Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image’. For that commandment certainly seems to explicitly forbid us to make a representation, externalisation, alienation of the divine! That is to say, God cannot be represented, no picture of Him can exist, precisely because the word ‘God’ refers only to initial self-revelation experiencing itself without externalisation, in other words: to Life itself. Life does not allow representation, portrayal, just as labour does not allow 66

economising. Economised labour is alienated labour, alienated from Life. !Approaching Christianity through Marx’ atheism allows us to understand Henry’s interpretation of it as a critique. For Christianity, as in ‘European Christian Democrats’ for instance, seems to have degenerated into an economy itself. Christianity, or so it seems, has lost all contact with its roots. For that matter, such a critique of Christianity is no novelty in phenomenologist circles. Early in his Cartesianische Meditationen, Edmund Husserl makes insinuations about the contemporary position of Christianity being externalised into lifeless conventions. In modern times, faith has fallen into “Unechtheit und Verkümmerung”. In 67

other words, faith has deteriorated into a resigned convention that is no longer alive, no longer experienced, only persists in outward show. Martin Heidegger later also reproached Christianity: with becoming a cultural practice that is not “aus der Wurzel aufgestellt”. In 68

this sense, it is fair to say that today’s Christianity has lost all contact with its radical

Cf. Ruud Welten, Fenomenologie en beeldverbod bij Emmanuel Levinas en Jean-Luc Marion, Budel: Damon, 2001. p. 65

127-152.

Cf. MV 71ff.66

Edmund Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und pariser Vorträge, Hrsg. S. Strasser, 1950, (Husserliana : Edmund 67

Husserl Gesammelte Werke. The Hague: Martinus Nijhof ,Volume 1), p. 46.

Martin Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), (Gesamtausgabe Band 65), Vittorio Klostermann, 68

Frankfurt am Main, 1989, p. 117.

beginnings (radix), beginnings that are not lost in the mists of time but that simply lie in Life itself . !The tradition of historical Christianity and also the so-called ‘Christian Democratic’ political systems that represent a large part of the population in most European countries today, actually represent nothing but the tradition itself, when they ought to guarantee contact with Life itself instead. In contrast with the former Communist states, Henry admits, capitalist governments respect the rights of¨ the individual but at the same time, modern capitalist societies are more than ever subject to Marx´ criticism on the assumed autonomy of the economy. True, capitalist respects the individual. However, ‘presenting capitalism as the only contemporary alternative for the collapse of socialism nevertheless means forgetting that under cover of illusive appearances, agony is hiding.’ Communism and capitalism are therefore ‘deux figures de la mort.’ In this respect, Henry adopts Marx´ atheism, which he 69

feels does not actually destroy Christianity, but rather shows that life cannot be understood through religion as something that is transcendental, externalised and imaginary from the very beginning—which is exactly what Christianity teaches, too. !!!!!

CC 23, ‘Lorsqu’on présente aujourd’hui le capitalisme comme le seul recours devant l’effondrement du 69

socialisme, on oublie toutefois que, sous des dehors qui font encore illusion, il est lui-même à l’agonie.’, Cf. PV III, 123.

Summary: Ruud Welten, From Marx to Christianity, and back. Michel Henry’s philosophy of reality !In the 1990s, the French phenomenologist philosopher Michel Henry (1922-2002) gets interested in Christianity—but does not join the theological debate. Inspired by Marx—who is usually considered an atheist thinker—Henry develops a radical phenomenology of immanent self-affection. In this paper, I want to explore Henry’s writings on Marx to find out how Henry understands and constructs relations between Marx’ philosophy of reality on the one hand, and Christianity on the other.

Ruud Welten (1962) is Ph.D. in philosophy. His thesis treats the role of iconoclasm in the phenomenologies of Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Marion. He reads philosophy at the Catholic Theological University of Utrecht, and social philosophy at the University of Tilburg. He has written several books and many articles on French phenomenology and on Jean-Paul Sartre’s political thought.