Russian Urban Tactics

7/30/2019 Russian Urban Tactics

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STRATEGICFORUM

INSTITUTEFOB

NATIONAL

STRATEGIC

STUDIES

RussianUrbanTactics:

Lessons

from

theBattle

fo rGrozny

by

Lester

W .

Grau

,

ForeignMilitaryStudiesOffice

Note

Background

Conclusions

Initial

Troubles

Whenth eChechen troublesbegan,

the

Russian rmyhadbeenoperatingwith

little

money

and

bare

bones

logisticalsupport.It

had

not

conducted

a

regiment-or

division-scalefield

training

exercise

in

over

tw o

years,

an d

its battalionswere

lucky

toconduct

field

training

once

ayear.Most

battalions

weremanned

at

55 %

or

less.

Approximately

85% of

Russian

youthwere

exempt

or

deferred

fromth edraft,forcingthearmy

to

acceptconscriptswithcriminalrecords,healthproblemsor

mental

incapacity.

The

Russian rmylackedhousing

fo r

its

officers

an d

hadtroubleadequately

feeding

an d

paying

itssoldiers.

It

invaded

Chechnya

with

a

rag-tagcollection

of

various

units,withoutan

adequate

support

base.

When

the

Chechens

stood

their

ground,

th e

sorry

state

of

the

Russian rmybecame

apparenttothe

world.

Beforeinvadingwith

regular

forces,the

Russians

had

trained

an d

supplied

therebelChechen

forces

that

werehostiletotheincumbentChechen

government.

A

forceof 5,000Chechen

rebels

and85Russian

soldiers

with

17 0Russiantanks

attempted

to

overthrow

th e

Chechen

government

with

a

oup

de

m in

by capturingGroznyfromthe

march

astheyhadin

years

pastcaptured

Prague

an d

Kabul.They

failed

an d

lost

67

tanks

in

city

fighting.

ASecond

Mistake Insteadofregrouping

an d

waitingtoregainsurprise,Russian

leaders

orderedthe

army

into

Chechnya

with

no

fully

ready

divisions.

The

Russian rmy

was

forcedtocombine

small

units

an d

sendthemtofight.Infantryfightingvehicleswent

to

warwiththeircrews,but withlittleorno

infantry

on

board.

In

some

cases,

officers

drove

because

soldiers

were

not

available.

Intelligenceon

the

situation in Grozny

was

inadequate.

Onlyafew

large-scale

mapswere

available,

an d

therewere

no

maps

available

to

tacticalcommanders.To

make

matters

worse,

because

th ecity

was

not

surrounded

an d

cu t

off,th eChechengovernment

was

able

toreinforceits

forces

throughout

the

battle.

When

theRussiansfirstattempted

toseize

Grozny

th elast

day

of

1994,theytried

to

doitwith

tanksan d

personnel

carriers

but withoutenough

supporting

infantry.

The

available

infantryhadjust beenthrown

together,

an d

many

di d

notknow

even

th e

last

namesof theirfellow

soldiers.

They

were

told

thatthey

werepartofapoliceaction.

Somedid not

have

weapons.

Manywere

sleeping

in the

carriers

even

as

th e

columnsrolled

into

Grozny.

Tank

crews

had

no

machinegun

ammunition.

L ax

preparationfor

this

lof


2/5

Strategie

Forum38

assault

reflected

the

attitude

of

the

defense

minister,

GeneralPavel

Grachev,

who

had

boastedearlier

that

monththat

he

couldseizeGroznyin

twohourswithoneparachuteregiment.SotheRussiansdrove

into

Grozny

expecting

to

capture

thecity

center

and

seatof

government

with

only

token

resistance.

But,

tanks

and

personnelcarriers,

inthe

city

without

dismounted

infantrysupport,wereeasy

targets

to

antitank

gunnersfiring

from

theflanks

or

from

above.

The

initial

Russian

armored

columns

were

swallowedup

inthecity

streets

an d

destroyedby

Chechen

gunners.

After

losing105of 12 0tanksan d

personnelcarrierstheRussians

fell

back

toconsolidateforthelong,

building-by-building

battle.

Planning

for

Urban

Combat

Russianintelligencemissed

the

rapid

construction

of

robustChechen

defenses

inGrozny.

Th e

Russian

columns,

moving

on

parallel

but

nonsupporting

axes,

were

cut

of f

an d

destroyed

byChechenforces.Russianplannersconcludedthathigh-tempomountedthruststoseize

defended

cities

are

both

ineffective

an d

unjustified

in

terms

ofthe

attrition

of

personnel

an d

equipment.

They

concluded

that

contemporary

urban

combat

requires

the

following

steps.

1

ll

approaches

to

thecity

must

be

sealed

off

whiledetailed

reconnaissance

proceeds.

2.

ey

installations

an d

buildings

onthe

outskirts

of

thecity

must

be

taken

once

artillery

has

suppressed

defendersan d

assault

positions

havebeenoccupied.

3.

he

city'sresidential,industrial

and

central

sections

mustbetakensuccessively.

4.rappedenemy

unitsmustbeeliminated,minescleared,weaponscollected

an d

militarycontrol

an dcurfewestablished.

These

steps

obviouslysuggestto

planners

thatthe

firstobjective

shouldbe

major

industrial

plantson the

outskirtsof cities

covering

axesintothecity.Becausesuchplants,withtheirconcrete

an d

stonewalls

and

underground

rooms

an dpassages,

are

ideal

for

a

lengthy,stubborn

defense

they

must

be

captured

beforethecitycanbeattacked.

Within

thecity,attackingforcesmustanticipate(1 )defendingtanksand

direct-fire

artillery

in

corner

buildings

or

behind

breaksinwalls,(2 )

dismounted

infantry

on

an ystoryof

buildings,(3 )snipers

an d

artillery

observers

in

high-rise

buildings,attics,

and

towers.

Collateraldamage,no t

a

majorconsiderationwhenfightingonforeign

soil,

becomes

a

particularworry

whenfightingin

your

owncitieswhere

your

own

peoplelive.

Intelligence

Preparationof

th eBattlefield The

Russiansdid

their

initial

planning

on

1:50,000

and

1:100,000scalemaps.

They

lacked

necessary,detailed,larger-scalemapsinscale

1:25,000

or

1:12,500.

Essential

aerial

photographs

were

no t

available

for

planning,

because

Russian

satellites

had

beenturned

off tosave

money

andfewaerial

photography

missionswereflown.

Lower-level

troopcommanders

never

received

vitalaerialphotographsandlarge-scale

maps.

Despitetheunclearintelligencepicture,plannersfailedtotakeelementaryprecautionsortoforecasthow

the

Chechens

might

defend

the

city.

As

the

Russian

columns

moved

to

Grozny,

they

weresurprised

by

snipers,

road

blocksand

other

signsof

Chechen

determinationto

defend

thecity.

StormGroupsandDetachments Soviet

an d

Russian

tactical

methodology

called

for

organizing

storm

groups

an d

storm

detachments

for

cityfighting.

A

stormgroupis

usually

a

motorized

rifle

company

reinforced

with

a

tankplatoon,artillerybattery,mortarplatoon,AGS-17automaticgrenadelauncher

platoon,

engineer

platoon

an d

chemical

troops.It

advances

withacoveringan d

consolidation

group(a

motorized

rifleplatoonreinforced

with

antitank

guns,grenadelaunchersand82mm

mortars)an d

an

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obstacle

clearing

party(combat

engineers

an d

mine-sweeping

tanks).

A

storm

detachment

is

usuallya

motorized

rifle

battalion

reinforcedwith

at

least

a

battalion

of

artillery,

a

tank

company,

an

engineer

company,an air

defense

platoon,flamethrowersquads

an d

smoke

generatorpersonnel.Artilleryan d

air

supportareavailable

from

division

assets.

Although

storm

groups

an d

detachments

were

formed

fo r

urban

combat

following

th e

New

Year's

E ve

defeat,

theirformation

was

oftencounterproductive

becauseitdestroyed

whatunitintegrityexisted

in

platoons,companies

an d

battalionsan d

gave

commanders

more

assets

thantheycould

readilydeploy

an d

control.Itwould

have

been

better

to

us e

the

standard

tactical

unit,thenreinforceit

with

select

weaponssystems

where

needed.For

example,

amotorizedrifle

platoon

could

field

storm

squads

an d

cover

an d

support

squads,

an d

a

motorized

rifle

companycould

field

storm

platoons

an d

coveran d

supportplatoons.

The

cover

an d

supportunits

would

pin

theenemydown

by firewhilethe

storm

unit

attacked.

fter

theattack,

the

cover

an d

supportunit

wouldbecome

a

reserve.

arly

Lessons The

Russians

successfullyused

direct-fire

artillery,

RPGs,

automatic

grenadefirean d

machinegu nfiretopin down

theChechenswhileattacking

throughsmoke

to

seizea

building.

They

tossed

grenades

throughwindows

an d

doors

before

entering.

Engineers

effectivelyblew

entrywaysinto

th e

walls.Two

three-man

combat

teams

cleared

each

room.

Oncea

building

was

captured,

itwa sprepared

fo rdefense.

Sewerapproaches

an d

enemy

approach paths

weremined

an d

booby

trapped.

Since

th e

battle

fo r

a

city

continues

non-stop,

the

Russians

learned

that

they

neededfreshtroops

an d

adequate

reserves.Soviet

doctrine

called

fo r

a

4: 1

advantage

in

troopsfo rurban

combat.Some

60,000

Russians

an d12,000

Chechens

foughtin

Grozny,

ye tthe

Russian's

5:1

advantage

was

sometimes

not

enough,

because

theyha dto

guard

everybuilding

that

they

took.

The

Russians

also

learnedthat

troopsneedtowear

something

distinctive

(and

easily

changeable)

during

the

assaulttoavoid

fratricide.

Tact ics Techniquesand

Procedures Sovietan dRussian

tacticsspecifiedthat tanks

would

lead

th e

assault

in

city

fighting

followed

by

infantry

fighting

vehicles

an d

dismounted infantry.

Tank

columns

would

movein

herringboneformationalongcitystreets.Thisproved

disastrous

in

Grozny

whereth e

highdensityofantitank

weapons

threatened

armored

vehicles,

while

th e

depression

an d

elevation

limitations

of

Russian

tankguns

kept

themfrom

engaging

targetslocated

in basements

or

in

th e

upper

floorsof multi storied buildings.Antiaircraft

guns,

such

as

th e

ZSU23-4

an d2S6,

were

effective

against

these

targets.

In

Grozny,

tanks

an d

personnel

carriers

were

formedintoarmored

groupsused

tosealoff

captured

areas,

serveasacounterattackforce,provide

security

fo r

rearinstallations

an d

support

advancinginfantry

from

outside

the

range

of

enemy

antitank

weapons.

The

Russians

began to

take

special

precautionstoprotect

theirtanks

an d

personnel

carriers.

Besides

keeping

thembehind

the

infantry,

they

outfitted

some

with

a

cage

of

wire

mesh

some

25-30

centimeters

away

from

th e

hull

armor.

These

cages

can

defeat

the

shaped

charge

of

th e

RPG-7

antitank

grenade

launcher,as

well

as

protecting

th e

vehiclefrom

a

Molotov

cocktailor abundle

of

antitankgrenades.The

Chechensfieldedantitank

hunterkiller

teams

whichmoved

toward

the

sound

of

engine

noiseto kill

armored

vehicleswith

volley

RPG-7

antitank

firefrom

above,

th e

flanks

an d

behind.The

Russians

learned

to

counter

these

teams

by establishingambusheson

al l

approachroutesan dthenrunning

vehiclesintoselected

areas

as

bait.

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CityfightinginGrozny

required

muchlargerstocksof handgrenades,

smokegrenades,demolition

chargesan d

disposable,one-shot

antitank

grenadelaunchers(similar

to

the

U.S.

light

anti-ankweapon)

thanexpected.

Eachinfantry

soldier

needed

a

ropewith

a

grappling

hook

for

enteringbuildings.

Light-weight

ladderswerealso

very

valuable

for

assaulting

infantry.

Trained

snipers

were

essential,

but

wereinshortsupply.

Tank-mounted

anddismountedsearchlightswereusefulfornightassault

in

thecity.Searchlights

(as

well

as

pyrotechnics)

temporarily

blinded

enemy

night-vision

equipment

and

dazzled

enemy

gunners.

They

produced

a

psychologicalattack

againsttheenemy,whilehelpingpreventfratricidein

theassault.

Artillery Th e

Russians

learned

that

conventional

artilleryfiresare

best

used

while

approaching

the

city

an d

whilecapturing

the

city

outskirts.Then,they

woulddeploy

the

bulk

of theirself-propelledartillery

in

direct-fire

support

of

tanks

an d

infantry.

Because

massed

artillery

firescreate

rubble

intheveryareas

through

which

a

forcewantstoadvance,direct-fireispreferable.

Direct

fire

canbeconductedbyguns,

howitzers,

multiple

rocket

launchers

andthe82mmVasilek

automatic

mortar.

When

Russian

forces

arrived

atGrozny,they

hadfew

fire

supportcoordinatorsandforward

air

controllers.Motorized

rifle

officerswerenotskilledin

adjusting

indirect

artillery

fire,

but

could

readily

aim and

adjust

direct

fire.

AirPower The

Russians

usedalotof

fixed-wing

aircraft,

but

they

were

of

limited

tactical

valuein

Grozny.Theywereused

to

providesupportwhileartillery

was

moved

into

range.

Becauseair

strikes

could

no tbe

precisely

targeted,

attack

fighterbombers

concentrated

onlarge free-fire zones.

Fixed-wing

aircraftprovedof

more

valueinattackingtargetsoutsidethecity.

Helicopter

gunshipswere

of

much

morevalue.

They

were

used

againstsnipersan d

weapons

in

the

upper

floors.The

helicopters

flew

inbehind

captured

high-rise

buildings

and

would

pop-up toengage

these

targets,buthad

tofly

toan dfromtheengagementarea

using

theshelterof capturedbuildings.

Smoke

and

Tear-Gas.

Smokeand

white

phosphorusroundswere

usefulinGrozny.White

phosphorus,

whichburnsupon

explosion,

createsasmokescreen

and,

because

smokeisessential

for

movement

in

city

fighting,

every

fourth

or

fifth

Russian

artillery

or

mortar

round

fired

was

a

smoke

or

white

phosphorus

round.

The

Russians

pointouta

side

benefit

of

white

phosphorus

is

that

white

phosphorus

smokeistoxicand

readily

penetratesprotective

mask

filters.Whitephosphorusisno t

banned

byany

treaty.

Tear

gas

grenadeswere

also

useful

inthe

fighting

in

Grozny.

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A.Report

Title:

RussianUrban Tactics:essons

from

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Grozny

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Russian Urban Tactics