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RUSSIAN NUCLEAR HISTORY

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INDEXPage

HISTORY ____________________________________________________ 3

PRESENT ______________________________________________________

TRATADOS INTERNACIONALES ____________________________________

ARSENAL NUCLEAR ______________________________________________

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HISTORYThe first national research russian centers were two and started in 1920, one of them in Ukraine (Ukrainian Physico-Technical Institute) and Moscow (Institute of Physical Chemistry of Moscow).

Igor Kurchatov was a soviet physicist and the leader of the first soviet atomic project. The russian NVKD (Naródniy komissariat vnútrennij) in 1943 got a copy of a British secret report on the feasibility of atomic weapons, after that Stalin created the start of a Soviet nuclear program.

In 1946 Russia created the first soviet nuclear reactor (the F1), and after that the first plutonium was obtained to create the first russian nuclear bomb.

Emil Fuchs was a German-born British theoretical physicist and atomic spy who in 1950 was convicted of supplying information from the American, British, and Canadian Manhattan Project to Soviet Union after the end of the Second World War. After that, when Fuchs obtained the papers of Manhattan Project, the russians built the first atomic bomb (the RDS-1):

After RDS-1, appeared the soviet proof RDS-2 which exploded with a force of 38 kilotons in 1951, and at the same year the Russians threw the first atomic bomb

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dropped from a Tupolev Tu-4 bomber. And They continued the development through the years to the RDS-9.

In 1953 the Russians tried their first hydrogen nuclear bomb, the RSD-6 who has an uranium 235 core surrounded by two alternating layers of lithium deuteride and natural uranium with a 200 kilotons of power. After that in 1955 appeared the RSD-37, an hydrogen bomb with the first thermonuclear device of two stages and with a 1.600 kilotons of power. RDS-37 H bomb:

Soviet Union, November 1953. The Politburo meets in one of the most important meetings since the death of Stalin. All present agree that the USSR should build an intercontinental missile (ICBM) capable of launching a nuclear weapon against the United States from Soviet territory. The USSR built a huge rocket much larger than necessary.

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Sakharov and fusion bomb

Sakharov was the prodigal child of the nuclear soviet program; he was a soviet cosmologist-physicist and a spokesman of the Nobel Peace Committee. He was the real mentor of the Soviet Hydrogen Bomb. Sakharov and his team designed the rocket who can transport the new nuclear fission weapon, but the problem was the weigh of the bomb, because the rocket could not transport it. The entire Soviet Politburo and industry expect the verdict to get to work as soon as possible. The commitment is inescapable: if the decision to build an intercontinental missile to know exactly how much will weigh a weapon of operational merger is delayed, it may be too late by then and the US already have a similar rocket. Sakharov became in one of the most important warriors of the democracy and defensor of the human rights, and helped to bring down the Stalin's Dictatorship. The builded missile was capable to be launch as a weapon from 5,5 tons to 9.000 km.

But engineers Sakharov's report leaves them completely stunned. By then, the most powerful Soviet missile was the R-5, a derivative of V-2 / A-4 German with a range of only 1200 kilometers and a payload of 1.4 tons. The new technical challenge before them was overwhelming. However, the calculation of Sakharov would be totally wrong. Physical overestimated the mass of the future Soviet hydrogen bomb and as a result of this error the first intercontinental missile in history would be much more powerful than expected.

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The born of R-7 Semiorka

First launched in 1957, the R-7 became the biggest leap in the world's rocketry since German A-4. The story of the first Soviet intercontinental missile dates back to 1947, when Korolev OKB-1, then known as NII-88- institute, he embarked on the R-3 project, a missile with a range of 3000 kilometers, ten times to the Nazi V-2 rocket.

The R-7 was 34 m long, 3.02 m in diameter and weighing 280 tons, had two stages, with rocket engines using liquid oxygen and kerosene and able to deliver its payload of up to 8,800 km, with a precision of about 5 km. A single thermonuclear warhead was performed with a nominal yield of 3 megatons of TNT. The initial launch was powered by four strap-on rocket liquid propellants forming the first stage engine 'sustaining' a feeding center through the first and second stage. Each strap-on booster includes two vernier thrusters and central scenario includes four. The inertial guidance system was with the radio control vernier thrusters.

That first Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, ICBM, the R-7 had grown obsolete as a weapon even before it started flying. Yet, as a launch-vehicle, it has continued serving the Russian space program more than half a century after it was originally conceived. In the 21st century, the R-7-derived space boosters have remained only vehicles delivering Russian manned spacecraft into orbit.

Korolyov and his deputy Vasily Mishin conceived the R-3 as the first step toward an intercontinental missile with a range of 8000 kilometers. But how to build it ? the first option was join three R-2 missiles together to simplify the development of the vehicle , the concept was a missile as a package. His team also calculated that a R-3 with two stages would be able to put an artificial satellite into orbit. In December 1950 the Soviet government formally approves the R-3 development and forms part of the N-1 program, while creating the N-2 and N-3 programs.

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The R-3 consists of a 'Package' of three missiles R-2 as proposed by Mikhail Tijonrávov (A. Shlyadinski)

The R-3 had a weakness: its engine. Being conceived as a single-stage rocket, Korolev needed a rocket engine with a thrust of 120 tons, a true giant leap compared to the engine of 25 tons of the V-2. Valentin Glushko, the head of the OKB-456 and in charge of the construction of engines for missiles of the OKB-1 engineer, tried to change his mind at Korolyov about their ambitious plans for the R-3. Simply, there was no way I could build such engine on schedule by Korolyov.

In 1951 the R-3 would cancel the project and began their efforts to build a smaller and shorter-range missile known as R-5, but the concept of package had flexibility when designing an ICBM. The missile depend on the maximum thrust of engines Glushko problematic. The February 13, 1953 the Council of Ministers of the USSR approved the construction of the first Soviet ICBM.

The January 30, 1954 the most outstanding leaders of aerospace engineers met to determine the final specifications of the new missile.

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The R-7 was an impressive machine that could easily reach the orbital speed of 8 km / s, a capability that Korolyov took advantage in their favor. Its load capacity left behind to the first American ICBMs, Atlas missile, rocket or small Vanguard with the US wanted to put the first artificial satellite.

The Vostok rocket was a variant of the R-7 three stages. On October 4, 1957 a modified R-7 placed in Earth orbit the first artificial satellite in history, the famous Sputnik. The R-7 was a magnificent space launcher, but a terrible strategic weapon and soon would be replaced by other projects of Soviet intercontinental missiles.

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PRESENTLA "EDAD MODERNA"

The technology of war progressed rapidly after the first trials. The dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombs were carried by bombers whose pilots were dropped on the cities. The first hydrogen bombs were so big they could not have a plane load. Within the next 10 years already he had successful trials of the first ICBM, reducing the size of the pumps, and finally incorporating loads thermonuclear missiles. Currently, a single missile unmanned, radar-directed by a computer inside, can cross the Atlantic Ocean carrying 10 nuclear bombs to be released a few kilometers before white follow different paths determined at that moment.

In analyzing the current structure of arsenal it is customary to distinguish between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Strategic weapons are those used by the United States to threaten the territory of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union to threaten the United States. Transport of strategic weapons is made by an intercontinental ballistic missile, manned by a large flight range aircraft or an unmanned vehicle type cruise. Tactical weapons are those that would be used in foreign territory (central Europe, for example) or naval battles. Its scope is less than 6000 kilometers. These weapons can be fired by artillery, by ballistic missiles of short and medium range, for manned aircraft or cruise type, or by boats and submarines. The difference between strategic and tactical weapons is becoming less clear.

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In 1984 it was estimated that the strategic US arsenal consisted of about 11 600 bombs and the Soviet Union, about 8 300. The total yield of these weapons was about 4000 and 7000 megatons, respectively. Tactical weapons totaling about 15 000 Americans scattered around the world, and a 7000 Soviet distributed on its territory and among the countries of the Warsaw Pact. US tactical weapons deployed in NATO countries is controlled by the United States, except France and Britain which have their own strategic and tactical arsenals.

Such is the variety of existing nuclear weapons in each of the great powers today that it is difficult to refer to the characteristics of each. We just explain briefly what the main elements of the current strategic and tactical weapons are.

The nuclear strategy is based on three main elements: intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from land or from submarines, and weapons released from aircraft. An intercontinental ballistic missile is an unmanned vehicle long range that can be fired either from a land base (ICBM) from a submarine as (SLBM). It is estimated that an ICBM launched from the Soviet Union would come to the US mainland in half an hour. The trajectory of these missiles is calculated by internal navigation systems and it is estimated that after a journey of 15 000 kilometers can fall within 100 meters of the desired point. The ICBM land today kept in silos are stored in specially constructed to withstand impacts of the magnitude that causes the pressure wave of a nuclear explosion. This is necessary because the location of the ICBM bases is known and if attacked be a favorite for the enemy targets. Among the ICBM in the US arsenal Titan, Minuteman and MX models are distinguished, totaling 1029 according to a congressional report in 1984. (This figure changed to 1021 in 1987 to retire and join the last Titan MX). The Soviet ICBM called (among US technical) SS-11, SS-13, SS-17, SS-18 and SS-20, totaling 1458 vehicles. A ballistic missile can carry one or more pumps (heads) nuclear inside to be released just before reaching its destination toward different goals. These vehicles equipped with multiple independent reentry systems are called MIRV and were originally created by the United States to increase its total power without passing the limit on the number of ICBM tax treaties. III Minuteman missile, for example, has three separate warheads of 170 kt each, and carries an SS-18 10 500 kt each. Taking this into consideration, the amount of bombs carried by ICBMs totals 2 l30 for the United States (18% of the US total) and 6012 for the USSR (Soviet 72% of total).

The strategic value of the weapons based on submarines is its unknown position to the enemy. The missiles in submarines called Poseidon and Trident in the United States and SS-N in the USSR. Each missile carries several nuclear warheads with loads between 50 kilotons and one megaton per head. SLBMs

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have ranges between 1400 and 9100 kilometers and can hit the target with less than 450 meters error. This accuracy is not sufficient to ensure that a silo attacked from a submarine to be destroyed. It is considered to submarines response as weapons capable of destroying any of the two powers after having received a first attack directed against the other two strategic elements (ICBMs and bombers). One third of American submarines and 15% of the Soviets are at sea at any time. 50% of US bombs (5728) and 24% of Soviet (1964) are based on submarines.

The third element in the strategic triad constitute the bombs carried by bombers. The United States has 300 aircraft B-52 and FB-11 can carry about 3800 pumps up to 1 Mt each. These pumps can be "serious", that is simply falling on the target after being released, or "short-range missiles", with instrumentation that allows them to define a path towards the target. The Soviet Union carries some 350 pumps the same previous characteristics in 150 called Bear and Bison bombers. This represents only 4% of all Soviet pumps, in contrast with the installation 32% of American aircraft bombs.

Inside the highlight tactical ballistic missiles arsenal of short and medium-range Pershing II and Cruise called, that were installed by the United States in Europe since 1983. Each of the 108 Pershing II located in Germany carries three warheads of 10-50 kilotons each and has a range of 1500 kilometers. The Soviet Union maintains that Moscow could be easily reached by any of them, but the Americans refuse. There are 464 cruise missiles spread across Europe. They each carry a pump, the same performance as the Pershing II. The NATO military commanders accepted the installation of this arsenal arguing that Europe and the United States must present a united front to the Soviet Union.

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INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT)The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely.  A total of 190 parties have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty's significance.  

The provisions of the Treaty, particularly article VIII, paragraph 3, envisage a review of the operation of the Treaty every five years, a provision which was reaffirmed by the States parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. 

To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between States parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of theInternational Atomic Energy Agency   (IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use. 

The 2010 Review Conference   of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) met at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 3 to 28 May 2010. A total of 172 States parties to the Treaty participated in the Conference. States parties agreed to a final document which included a review of the operation of the Treaty, reflecting the views of the President of the Conference, as well as agreed conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions. The action plan contains measures to advance nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and regional issues, including the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East

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The United States tested the first nuclear device at Alamogordo, New Mexico in the summer of 1945. Over the next 65 years, the international community has struggled with a basic dilemma: how to restrain the atom’s destructive effects while harnessing its vast potential for peaceful uses. The  earliest  efforts   to  address   this  dilemma achieved   little   success.   The  1946  U.S.-sponsored Baruch Plan sought to outlaw nuclear weapons and internationalize the use of nuclear energy. It failed,  and  by  1952,   three  states  had  nuclear  weapons.  The  1950s  and  early  1960s  saw U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace initiative, the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the development of IAEA safeguards, and the expansion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, two more countries exploded nuclear devices by 1964, and concern heightened that the spread of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes could not be divorced from the proliferation of  nuclear weapons.   In  March of  1963,  U.S.  President  John F.  Kennedy described  a  world  where  as  many   as   25   states  possessed  nuclear  weapons  as   “the   greatest possible danger and hazard.” By the early 1960s, efforts to achieve a legally binding agreement to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons began to show results. In 1961, the United Nations General Assembly approved a Resolution sponsored by Ireland calling on all states to conclude an agreement that would ban the further acquisition and transfer of nuclear weapons. In 1965, the Geneva disarmament conference began consideration of a draft nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The conference completed its negotiations in 1968, and on July 1, 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signature. The NPT entered into force on March 5, 1970, with 43 Parties, including three of the five nuclear-weapon states1 : the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Three Pillars The NPT’s grand bargain rests on   three   pillars:   nonproliferation,   the   peaceful   use   of   nuclear   energy,   and   disarmament. Nonproliferation: Under Article I of the NPT, nuclearweapon states pledge not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient or in any way assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state in the manufacture or acquisition of a nuclear weapon. 1 The NPT defines a nuclear-weapon state as a state that manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear device prior to 1 January, 1967. These states are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All other states are non-nuclear-weapon states under the  Treaty.  Under  Article   II   of   the  NPT,  non-nuclear-weapon   states  pledge  not   to  acquire  or exercise  control  over  nuclear  weapons  or  other  nuclear  explosive devices  and not  to  seek or receive assistance in the manufacture of such devices. Under Article III of the Treaty, non-nuclear-weapon states pledge to accept IAEA safeguards to verify that their nuclear activities serve only peaceful purposes. Peaceful Uses: NPT Article IV acknowledges the right of all Parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to benefit from international cooperation in this area, in conformity with their nonproliferation obligations. Article IV also encourages such cooperation. Disarmament: Under Article VI of the NPT, all Parties undertake to pursue good-faith negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race, to nuclear disarmament, and to general and complete disarmament. These pillars are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. An 

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effective   nonproliferation   regime  whose  members   comply  with   their   obligations   provides   an essential foundation for progress on disarmament and makes possible greater cooperation on the peaceful   use   of   nuclear   energy.  With   the   right   to   access   the   benefits   of   peaceful   nuclear technology   comes   the   responsibility   of   nonproliferation.   Progress   on   disarmament   reinforces efforts   to strengthen the nonproliferation regime and to  enforce compliance  with obligations, thereby also facilitating peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Los acuerdos SALT (siendo éstas las siglas de Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, en inglés «Conversaciones sobre Limitación de Armas Estratégicas») se refiere a dos encuentros de conversaciones bilaterales correspondientes a tratados internacionales entre la Unión Soviética y Estados Unidos -las superpotencias de la Guerra Fría- sobre el tema de control de armas, específicamente el de limitar las armas nucleares estratégicas y frenar la carrera armamentística. Hubo dos encuentros de conversaciones y acuerdos: SALT I y SALT II. Fueron firmados al final de cada una de las negociaciones llevadas a cabo entre Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética. Un tratado subsecuente fue START I.

SALT I[editar]

El Tratado sobre Misiles Anti-Balísticos o Tratado ABM fue un acuerdo entre Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética para limitar el número de sistemas de misiles antibalísticos (ABM) utilizados para defender ciertos lugares contra misiles con carga nuclear. El 26 de mayo de 1972 el presidente norteamericano Richard Nixon y el Secretario General del Comité Central del Partido Comunista, Leonid Brézhnev, firmaron este tratado, que estuvo en vigor durante 30 años, hasta 2002. El 13 de junio de 2002, seis meses después de anunciarlo, los Estados Unidos se retiraron del acuerdo.

El texto íntegro del Tratado ABM está disponible en WikiSource (en inglés).

Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/Treaty (SALT) I and II

SALT I

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During the late 1960s, the United States learned that the Soviet Union had embarked upon a massive Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) buildup designed to reach parity with the United States. In January 1967, President Lyndon Johnson announced that the Soviet Union had begun to construct a limited Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defense system around Moscow. The development of an ABM system could allow one side to launch a first strike and then prevent the other from retaliating by shooting down incoming missiles.

Johnson therefore called for strategic arms limitations talks (SALT), and in 1967, he and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin met at Glassboro State College in New Jersey. Johnson said they must gain “control of the ABM race,” and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara argued that the more each reacted to the other’s escalation, the more they had chosen “an insane road to follow.” While abolition of nuclear weapons would be impossible, limiting the development of both offensive and defensive strategic systems would stabilize U.S.-Soviet relations.

Nixon and Brezhnev during the latter’s visit to the U.S. in 1973. (Nixon Presidential Library)

Johnson’s successor, Richard Nixon, also believed in SALT, and on November 17, 1969, the formal SALT talks began in Helsinki, Finland. Over the next two and a half years, the two sides haggled over whether or not each nation should complete their plans for ABMs; verification of a treaty; and U.S. concern that the Soviets continued to build more Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and interim SALT agreement on May 26, 1972, in Moscow.

For the first time during the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union had agreed to limit the number of nuclear missiles in their arsenals. SALT I is

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considered the crowning achievement of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of détente. The ABM Treaty limited strategic missile defenses to 200 interceptors each and allowed each side to construct two missile defense sites, one to protect the national capital, the other to protect one ICBM field. (For financial and strategic reasons, the United States stopped construction of each by the end of the decade.)

SALT II[editar]

Se denomina SALT II a las negociaciones entre Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética para firmar acuerdos que limitaron la producción del Misil balístico intercontinental (ICBM) cargadas con armas nucleares se iniciaron oficialmente en Helsinki en noviembre de 1969.

Tras arduas negociaciones, Leonid Brézhnev en nombre de la URSS y Richard Nixon por los EE.UU. firmaron en Moscú los acuerdos SALT en mayo de 1972. Este tratado ponía límite a la construcción de armamentos estratégicos y fijaba un número para los misiles intercontinentales (ICBM) y los lanzadores de misiles instalados en submarinos (SLBM) que poseían la URSS y los EE. UU. También prácticamente prohibía el establecimiento de sistemas de defensa antimisiles. Paradójicamente, estos acuerdos llevaban el "equilibrio del terror" al absurdo, para que la disuasión consiga impedir la guerra era necesario que las dos superpotencias no trataran de defender a sus poblaciones de un ataque nuclear. La "mutua destrucción asegurada" era la única forma de impedir el conflicto.

De cualquier manera, los acuerdos SALT simbolizan la distensión. Es el fin de lo que los estadounidenses denominaron brinkmanship (la política de al borde del abismo) y la búsqueda de relaciones estables con el adversario-socio. Fueron también la consagración de la bipolaridad: los estadounidenses reconocieron definitivamente el acceso a la paridad de la URSS.

Breznev y Jimmy Carter firmaron en Viena unos nuevos acuerdos, conocidos como SALT II. Este acuerdo limitaba el número y el tipo de misiles nucleares intercontinentales para las dos potencias.

Sin embargo, en el nuevo contexto de la invasión soviética de Afganistán y de las crisis de los "euromisiles", el Senado estadounidense se negó a ratificar los acuerdos SALT II, juzgados como muy favorables para la URSS.

El nuevo rearme promovido por Reagan (la Iniciativa de Defensa Estratégica ponía fin a la prohibición para establecer sistemas de defensa antimisiles) llevó al fin de los acuerdos SALT. En 1986, los EE.UU. se desvincularon oficialmente de esos tratados.

SALT II

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Negotiations for a second round of SALT began in late 1972. Since SALT I did not prevent each side from enlarging their forces through the deployment of Multiple Independently Targeted Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs) onto their ICBMs and SLBMs, SALT II initially focused on limiting, and then ultimately reducing, the number of MIRVs. Negotiations also sought to prevent both sides from making qualitative breakthroughs that would again destabilize the strategic relationship. The negotiations spanned the Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter administrations.

At the November 1974 Vladivostok Summit, Ford and Brezhnev agreed on the basic framework of a SALT II agreement. This included a 2,400 limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) for each side; a 1,320 limit on MIRV systems; a ban on new land-based ICBM launchers; and limits on deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms.

Even after the Vladivostok agreements, the two nations could not resolve the two other outstanding issues from SALT I: the number of strategic bombers and the total number of warheads in each nation’s arsenal. The first was complicated by the Soviet Backfire bomber, which U.S. negotiators believed could reach the United States but which the Soviets refused to include in the SALT negotiations. Meanwhile, the Soviets attempted unsuccessfully to limit American deployment of Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs). Verification also divided the two nations, but eventually they agreed on using National Technical Means (NTM), including the collection of electronic signals known as telemetry and the use of photo-reconnaissance satellites. On June 17, 1979, Carter and Brezhnev signed the SALT II Treaty in Vienna. SALT II limited the total of both nations’ nuclear forces to 2,250 delivery vehicles and placed a variety of other restrictions on deployed strategic nuclear forces, including MIRVs.

However, a broad coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats grew increasingly skeptical of the Soviet Union’s crackdown on internal dissent, its increasingly interventionist foreign policies, and the verification process delineated in the Treaty. On December 17, 1979, 19 Senators wrote Carter that “Ratification of a SALT II Treaty will not reverse trends in the military balance adverse to the United States.” On December 25, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and on January 3, 1980, Carter asked the Senate not to consider SALT II for its advice and consent, and it was never ratified. Both Washington and Moscow subsequently pledged to adhere to the agreement’s terms despite its failure to enter into force. Carter’s successor Ronald Reagan, a vehement critic of SALT II during the 1980 presidential campaign, agreed to abide by SALT II until its expiration on December 31, 1985, while he pursued the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and argued that research into the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) adhered to the 1972 ABM Treaty.

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El START I (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Tratado de Reducción de Armas Estratégicas) era un tratado entre EE. UU. y la Unión Soviética que consistió en autolimitar el número de misiles nucleares que poseía cadasuperpotencia. Fue propuesto por el entonces presidente norteamericano Ronald Reagan, y finalmente firmado por George H. W. Bush . Por parte soviética el firmante fue Mijaíl Gorbachov. Inicialmente se llamó simplemente START; se le cambió el nombre a START I de forma retrospectiva cuando se aprobó una actualización del mismo, el START II.

Fue firmado el 31 de julio de 1991, cinco meses antes del colapso de la Unión Soviética. El tratado establecía limitaciones en la cantidad de varios tipos de vehículos y cabezas nucleares que ambos países podían poseer. Pero afectó también a algunas de las nuevas repúblicas desmembradas de la URSS, como Bielorrusia, Kazajistán y Ucrania. Actualmente, estos tres últimos países han desmantelado completamente su capacidad nuclear.

El tratado perdió vigencia el 5 de noviembre de 2009. Los países del Tratado esperan firmar un nuevo acuerdo en enero de 2010 que supondrá "una reducción radical de las cabezas atómicas" (Sergei Lavrov, Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores ruso).

El START II (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Tratado de Reducción de Armas Estratégicas) es un acuerdo firmado por George H. W. Bush y Borís Yeltsin el 3 de enero de 1993,1 que prohibía el uso de los ICBMs de cabezas múltiples (MIRV). Es el sucesor del START I.

Este histórico acuerdo empezó a forjarse el 17 de junio de 1992, con la firma del "Entendimiento Mutuo" por parte de ambos presidentes. La firma oficial de START II tuvo lugar del 3 de enero de 1993. Fue ratificado por elSenado de Estados Unidos (EEUU) el 26 de enero de 1996, por un margen de votos de 87 a 4. Sin embargo, la ratificación de dicho tratado ha estado bloqueado en la Duma durante varios años. Se pospuso en varias

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ocasiones en protesta por las acciones militares norteamericanas en Irak y Kosovo y por la ampliación de la OTAN a los países del este.

A medida que pasaron los años, el tratado perdió relevancia y ambas partes perdieron interés en él. Para los americanos, el mayor problema era la modificación del tratado ABM (que prohibía los escudos antimisiles) para permitir a EEUU el desarrollo de un sistema de interceptación de misiles balísticos (conocido popularmente como la Guerra de las Galaxias), algo a lo que Rusia se opuso fervientemente. El 14 de abril de 2000, la Duma aprobó finalmente el tratado, dando un paso simbólico para intentar preservar el tratado ABM, lo cual ya estaba claro que EEUU no iba a hacer.

El START II fue oficialmente reemplazado por el tratado SORT, acordado por George W. Bush y Vladímir Putin en una reunión bilateral en noviembre de 2001 y firmado en Moscú el 24 de mayo de 2002. En este tratado ambas partes se comprometieron a abandonar las líneas generales del anterior tratado, que había establecido una limitación específica del número de misiles. En su lugar se comprometieron a recortar unilateralmente la cantidad de cabezas nucleares.

El START III (Tratado de Reducción de Armas Estratégicas, en inglés: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty; en ruso:Договор между Российской Федерацией и Соединёнными Штатами Америки о мерах по дальнейшему сокращению и ограничению стратегических наступательных вооружений, СНВ-III, SNV-III) o Nuevo START, es un acuerdo firmado por el Presidente de los Estados Unidos, Barack Obama y el Presidente de Rusia, Dmitri Medvédev, el 8 de abril de 2010 en Praga, y ratificado por ambos países en diciembre de 2010 y enero de 2011, por el que ambos países dieron por concluido el periodo de la denominada Guerra Fría y superaron los acuerdos estratégicos START I ySTART II (vencido en enero de 2010) por el que las partes se comprometieron a reducir su arsenal atómico en dos tercios, lo que suponía limitar a 1.550 ojivas el arsenal de cada una de las partes y a 800 lanzaderas de misiles intercontinentales balísticos no desplegados (ICBM), lanzaderas submarinas para misiles balísticos (SLBM) y bombarderos pesados equipados con armamento nuclear. Este nuevo tratado también limitó el número de ICBM, SLBM y bombarderos nucleares desplegados u operativos reduciéndolo a 700 unidades operativas.1 El límite que impuso el nuevo tratado fue un 74% más bajo que el establecido en el tratado START de 1991, y un 30% más bajo que el límite de ojivas listas en el tratado de Moscú firmado en 2002.2

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Éstas obligaciones serían aplicadas durante 10 años a partir de la fecha en el que el nuevo tratado entrase en vigor, y probablemente sea efectivo hasta el 8 de abril del 2020, cuando un tratado superior le suceda.3

MILESTONES: 1969–1976

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NUCLEAR ARSENAL

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Russia: According to the March 2015 New START numbers, Russia has 1,582 strategic warheads deployed on 515 ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers [1]. The Federation of American Scientists estimates Russia has several thousand nondeployed strategic warheads and approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear warheads. An additional 3,700 are awaiting dismantlement.

Modern Russia is not the Soviet Union. While the USSR adhered to a no first use policy for nuclear weapons, modern Russia dropped that pledge in November 1993. In fact, Moscow reserves the right to use its nuclear arsenal during any conflict under a doctrine it paradoxically calls “de-escalation.”

The reason for that is because while the Soviet military was confident it could win a conventional fight against all comers, the modern Russian military is a shambolic mess. While some units are well equipped and well trained, much of the Russia’s conventional forces are composed of poorly trained conscripts using antiquated hardware from the Soviet-era.

Therefore, Russia has to rely on its nuclear forces to offset NATO’s overwhelming conventional military superiority. As such, Russia is investing heavily in modernizing its nuclear forces—strategic and tactical.

Here are five Russian nuclear systems— think not just nuclear weapons but systems that have a “nuclear component”— that pose a threat to the United States.

Borei-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine:

Ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable part of a country’s nuclear deterrent. The Soviet Union maintained a fleet of Delta and Typhoon-class

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boomers, but those boats are aging and need to be replaced. The successor to the Delta and Typhoon-class boats are the new Project 955 Borei-class nuclear submarines.

Considerably smaller than the massive Project 941 Akula— also known as the Typhoon—the new boats are still larger than the U.S. Navy’s Ohio-class boomers. Based on a project conceived towards the end of the Soviet-era, the Borei-class boomers are capable submarines that can carry 16 Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The boats are quiet and have efficient hydrodynamics.

Three of the boats have been completed, there are three more being built—some of which are an improved derivative that some reports have suggested carry 20 missiles. Russia hopes to build 10 Borei-class boats—but there are questions as to whether they afford to pay for those vessels.

Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles

The Borei-class boomers would be useless without their nuclear armament. The submarines are armed with the new RSM-56 Bulava solid-fuel submarine-launched ballistic missile. While the Russian had a lot of trouble developing this weapon—a good number of the missiles exploded or experienced other failures during testing due to quality control issues. Most of those problems appear to have been solved, but only time will tell for sure.

On paper, the Bulava is a capable weapon. The 37-ton missile has a range of 6,200 nautical miles and can carry as many as 10 150-kiloton nuclear warheads. Normally, however, the missiles are only fitted with six warheads.

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Project 855 Yasen-class attack submarine

The Yasen-class attack submarines are part of a new generation of Russian attack submarine. While the first boat was laid down in 1993, Russia couldn’t afford to complete the boat until September 2011. Nonetheless, the Severodvinsk—the first Yasen-class boat— is an impressive machine. So impressive that the head of the U.S. Navy’s submarine development program had a model of it built for his office.

“We’ll be facing tough potential opponents. One only has to look at the Severodvinsk, Russia’s version of a [nuclear guided missile submarine] (SSGN). I am so impressed with this ship that I had Carderock build a model from unclassified data.” Rear Adm. Dave Johnson, Naval Sea Systems Command’s (NAVSEA) program executive officer (PEO) submarines said during the Naval Submarine League’s symposium in Falls Church, Va., late in 2014. “The rest of the world’s undersea capability never stands still.”

Russia is building improved versions of the Project 855 boats that incorporate lessons learned since 1993. The Yasen-class boats are not strategic nuclear weapons carrying vessels, however, they could be armed with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles.

Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Arsenal:

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While the Russian tactical nuclear arsenal is not as large as what Soviet Union once maintained, the country is believed to have at least 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons deployed, but it could have as many as 5,000 such warheads when non-deployed weapons are taken into account. The Soviet Union was believed to have between 15,000 and 25,000 tactical nukes.

Russia uses these tactical nuclear weapons to offset the relative weakness of its conventional forces—but it is not clear exactly how many of these types of weapons they have. It should be noted that tactical nuclear weapons are not covered by the START treaties.

There are a number of ways Russia can deliver tactical nuclear warheads to their targets—one such method would be the 9K720 Iskander short-range ballistic missile. That weapon could be deployed to places like the Kaliningrad Oblast on the Baltic coast to attack U.S. ballistic missile defense sites in Poland, for example.

RS-24 Yars ICBM

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NUCLEAR ARSENAL

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