Rules 72-73 SCRA Principles Only

8/10/2019 Rules 72-73 SCRA Principles Only

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University of CebuCollege of Law

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

READING ASSIGNMEN!"or Nove#ber $%& '($)*

CASES+

$, Pa-i.- /an0ing Cor1, v, CA& G,R, No, $(2343& Mar-5 '(& $226 7')'SCRA )2'8

Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special proceeding, Chief Justice Moran states:" 11

Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the preventionor redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which one sees to establish the status or right of a party, or aparticular fact! ence, action is distinguished from special proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by oneagainst another, while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact! #here a party litigant sees torecover property from another, his remedy is to file an action! #here his purpose is to see the appointment of a guardian

for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment ofguardianship!

Considering this distinction, a petition for li$uidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified a special proceeding and not an ordinaryaction! %uch petition does not see the enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party! &t does notpray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be enforced against anyperson!

#hat it sees is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be able to file their claims in thesettlement of the corporation's debts and obligations! (ut in another way, the petition only sees a declaration of the corporation's debts andobligations! (ut in another way, the petition only sees a declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant right ofcreditors and the order of payment of their claims in the disposition of the corporation's assets!

Contrary to the rulings of the )ourteenth *ivision, li$uidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for interpleader! )or one, an action for

interpleader involves claims on a subject matter against a person who has no interest therein! + -his is not the case in a li$uidation proceedingwhere the .i$uidator, as representative of the corporation, taes charge of its assets and liabilities for the benefit of the creditors! +/ e is thuscharged with insuring that the assets of the corporation are paid only to rightful claimants and in the order of payment provided by law!

0ather, a li$uidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state of deceased persons under 0ules 1/ to 2+ of the 0ules ofCourt! -he two have a common purpose: the determination of all the assets and the payment of all the debts and liabilities of the insolventcorporation or the estate! -he .i$uidator and the administrator or e3ecutor are both charged with the assets for the benefit of the claimants! &nboth instances, the liability of the corporation and the estate is not disputed! -he court's concern is with the declaration of creditors and theirrights and the determination of their order of payment!

)urthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in proceedings for li$uidation of an insolvent corporation!

&n 4!0! 5o! ++22+ 6the case of the %tocholders7&nvestors8, the .i$uidator's notice of appeal was filed on time, having been filed on the /rdday of receipt of the order granting the claims of the %tocholders7&nvestors! owever, the .i$uidator did not file a record on appeal with theresult that he failed to perfect his appeal! As already stated a record on appeal is re$uired under the &nterim 0ules and 4uidelines in specialproceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are allowed! -he reason for this is that the several claims are actually separate ones and adecision or final order with respect to any claim can be appealed! 5ecessarily the original record on appeal must remain in the trial court whereother claims may still be pending!

-he 9nion's contention is untenable! &n li$uidation proceedings, the function of the trial court is not limited to assisting in the implementation ofthe orders of the Monetary oard! 9nder the same section 6;28 of the law invoed by the 9nion, the court has authority to set aside thedecision of the Monetary oard "if there is a convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith!"

', Re1ubli- v, CA& G,R, No, $939()& May 9& '((67)6% SCRA '((8

%ince -itle CEE*&54 &5 -E )AM&.= .A#, contains the following provision, interalia:

Art! /?! 9nless modified by the %upreme Court, the procedural rules in this -itle shall apply in all casesprovided for in this Codesre$uiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technicalrules.6Emphasis and underscoring supplied8

there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc re$uired, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the )amily Code, not a specialproceeding under the 0evised 0ules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a 0ecord on Appeal! &t being a summary ordinaryproceeding, the filing of a 5otice of Appeal from the trial court@s order sufficed!

>n the alleged procedural flaw in petitioner@s petition before the appellate court! (etitioner@s failure to attach to his petition before the appellatecourt a copy of the trial court@s order denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its 5otice of Appeal is not necessarily fatal, forthe rules of procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense! 4iven the issue raised before it by petitioner, what the appellate court shouldhave done was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule!


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3, :;a, ;e Reyes v, CA& G,R, No, L


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-he determination of which court e3ercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent!

&nasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the .ate (astor =! .im are in the possession of and are registered inthe name of private respondent corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and distinct from their stocholders, and inthe absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondentsshould stand undisturbed!

&t is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it! &t may not generally beheld liable for that of the persons composing it! &t may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stocholders or those of the entitiesconnected with it!?

0udimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality distinct and separate from its stocholders or members! &n thesame vein, a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character aliento the persons comprising it!

5onetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible! -hus, in FIRST PHILIPPI! IT!R"TI#"L $"% vs!'RT #F "PP!"LS2, #eenunciated:

! ! ! #hen the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an e3istingobligation, the circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a monopoly or generally the perpetration of navery orcrime, the veil with which the law covers and isolates the corporation from the members or stocholders who compose it will be liftedto allow for its consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals! ! ! !

(iercing the veil of corporate entity re$uires the court to see through the protective shroud which e3empts its stocholders from liabilities thatordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a seemingly separate one, were it not for the e3isting corporatefiction!/I

-he corporate mas may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a corporation is just but the alter ego of a person or of anothercorporation! #here badges of fraud e3ist, where public convenience is defeatedH where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporatefiction or the notion of legal entity should come to naught!/+

)urther, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is as follows: +8 Control, not mere majorityor complete stoc control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transactionattaced so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or e3istence of its ownH 68 %uch control musthave been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonestand unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal rightH and 6/8 -he aforesaid control and breach of duty must pro3imately cause the injury orunjust loss complained of! -he absence of any of these elements prevent "piercing the corporate veil"!/

Mere ownership by a single stocholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stoc of a corporation is not of itself a

sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities!//

Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established! &tcannot be presumed!/B

4ranting arguendothat the 0egional -rial Court in this case was not merely acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, petitionernonetheless failed to adduce competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction! -ruly, the reliancereposed by petitioner on the affidavits e3ecuted by -eresa .im and .ani #enceslao is unavailing considering that the aforementioneddocuments possess no weighty probative value pursuant to the hearsay rule! esides it is imperative for us to stress that such affidavits areinadmissible in evidence inasmuch as the affiants were not at all presented during the course of the proceedings in the lower court! -o put itdifferently, for this Court to uphold the admissibility of said documents would be to relegate from >ur duty to apply such basic rule of evidence ina manner consistent with the law and jurisprudence!

%, Consoli;ate; /an0 v, IAC& G,R, No, 46($4& =une 3& $22$ 7$2% SCRA3)8

uestions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by 0ule B of the 0evised 0ules of Court! &t is said that the laying ofvenue is procedural rather than substantive! &t relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter! (rovisionsrelating to venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant and not between the court and the subject matter! Nenue relates totrial not to jurisdiction, touches more of the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case!

-he action in the present case pertains to the probate of the intestate estate of the late *on Nicente Madrigal, in which case a regional trialcourt properly has jurisdiction over the case, both under the Judiciary Act of +2B?, %ec! BB 6e8 and under ( +2, %ec! +26B8!

>bjection to improper venue should be made in a motion to dismiss! 9ntil this is done, venue cannot truly be said to have been improperly laid!

0egrettably,

therefore, whale #e agree with the petitioner that venue in this case should have been laid in ueGon City, petitioner's inaction haswored against it:

&t is wellsettled in this jurisdiction that wrongvenue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and such waiver may occur bylaches ! ! ! 69riarte v! C)& of 5egros >cc!, 4!0! 5os! .+2/?/2, >ctober 2, +21I, // %C0A F at p! +8

)oregoing considered, #e agree with the Court of Appeals that indeed, petitioner has waived its right to contest the $uestion of venue!

2, =ao v, CA& G,R, No, $'%3$)& May '2& '((' 73%' SCRA )(48

-he main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had in (ampanga, where the decedents had their permanentresidence, or in ueGon City, where they actually stayed before their demiseO
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0ule 1/, %ection + of the 0ules of Court states:

(here estate of deceased persons be settled! P &f the decedent is an inhabitant of the (hilippines at the time of his death, whether acitiGen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of )irst &nstance inthe province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of )irst &nstance ofany province in which he had estate! -he court first taing cogniGance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall e3ercisejurisdiction to the e3clusion of all other courts! -he jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence ofthe decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, e3cept in an appeal from that court, in theoriginal case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record! 6underscoring ours8

Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the (hilippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted in the proper court located in theprovince where the decedent resides at the ti)e of his death!

(etitioner 0odolfo invoes our ruling in the case of !usebio v* !usebio, et al*,+Bwhere we held that the situsof settlement proceedings shall bethe place where the decedent had his permanent residence or domicile at the time of death! &n determining residence at the time of death, thefollowing factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had: 6a8 capacity to choose and freedom of choiceH 6b8 physical presence at theplace chosenH and 6c8 intention to stay therein permanently!+F#hile it appears that the decedents in this case chose to be physically present inueGon City for medical convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted ueGon City as their permanent residence! +wphi+*n-t

-he recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus properly considered and presumed to be correct by thecourt a .uo! #e agree with the appellate court@s observation that since the death certificates were accomplished even before petitioner andrespondent $uarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the t ime of their parents@ death!

-he death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents@ residence at the time of death,over the numerous documentary evidencepresented by petitioner! -o be sure, the documents presented by petitioner pertained not toresidence at the time of death,as re$uired by the

0ules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile! &n /arcia0Fule v* &ourt of "ppeals,+we held:

333 333 333 the term "resides" connotes ex vi ter)ini"actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile!" -his term"resides", lie the terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of thestatute or rulein which it is employed! &n the application of venue statutes and rules P %ection +, 0ule 1/ of the 0evised 0ules ofCourt is of such nature P residence rather thandomicile is the significant factor! Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still itis construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense! %ome cases mae a distinction between the terms"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fi3ing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaningas the term "inhabitant!" &n other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actualor physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode! &t signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat!&n this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile! 0esidencesimply re$uires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile re$uires bodily presence in that place and also anintention to mae it one@s domicile! 5o particular length of time of residence is re$uired thoughH however, the residence must be morethan temporary!+1

&t does not necessarily follow that the records of a person@s properties are ept in the place where he permanently resides! 5either can it bepresumed that a person@s properties can be found mostly in the place where he establishes his domicile! &t may be that he has his domicile in aplace different from that where he eeps his records, or where he maintains e3tensive personal and business interests! 5o generaliGations canthus be formulated on the matter, as the $uestion of where to eep records or retain properties is entirely dependent upon an individual@s choiceand peculiarities!

At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in specialproceedings! &n Ray)ond v* &ourt of "ppeals+2and $e1er v* &ourt of "ppeals,Iwe ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and that for specialproceedings have one and the same meaning! As thus defined, "residence", in the conte3t of venue provisions, means nothing more than aperson@s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency!+All told, the lower court and the Courtof Appeals correctly held that venue for the settlement of the decedents@ intestate estate was properly laid in the ueGon City court!

$(, >eirs of San;e?as v, Lina& G,R, No, $)$93)& "ebruary 6& '(($

736$ SCRA $%38#hen a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or effectivity can tae place only if and when the condition happens or isfulfilled!++-hus, the intestate court's grant of the Motion for Approval of the sale filed by respondent resulted in petitioners' obligation to e3ecutethe *eed of %ale of the disputed lots in his favor! -he condition having been satisfied, the contract was perfected! enceforth, the parties werebound to fulfil what they had e3pressly agreed upon!

Court approval is re$uired in any disposition of the decedent's estate per 0ule ?2 of the 0ules of Court! 0eference to judicial approval, however,cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of heirs to dispose of their own pro indiviso shares in the coheirship or coownership! +&n otherwords, they can sell their rights, interests or participation in the property under administration! A stipulation requiring court approval doesnot affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may be taen outofcustodia legis, but only with the court!s permission.1"It would seem that the suspensive condition in the present conditional salewas imposed only for this reason.

ecause petitioners did not consent to the sale of their ideal shares in the disputed lots, the CA correctly limited the scope of the 0eceipt to theproindiviso share of Eliodoro %r! -hus, it correctly modified the intestate court's ruling by e3cluding their shares from the ambit of thetransaction!

! #e hold that %ection ? of 0ule ?2 allows this action to proceed! -he factual differences alleged by petitioners have no bearing on the intestatecourt's jurisdiction over the approval of the subject conditional sale! (robate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates60ules 1B Q ?2+8 and the probate of wills 60ules 1F118 of deceased persons, including the appointment and the removal of administratorsand e3ecutors 60ules 1??F8! &t also e3tends to matters incidental and collateral to the e3ercise of a probate court's recogniGed powers such asselling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate! &ndeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in aspeedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries! +

(etitioners contend that under said 0ule ?2, only the e3ecutor or administrator is authoriGed to apply for the approval of a sale of realty underadministration! ence, the settlement court allegedly erred in entertaining and granting respondent's Motion for Approval!+wphi+*n-t


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#e read no such limitation! %ection ?, 0ule ?2 of the 0ules of Court, provides:

"%EC! ?! (hen court )ay authori2e conveyance of realty which deceased contracted to convey* otice* !ffect of deed* 00 #here thedeceased was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed real property, or an interest therein, the court having jurisdiction ofthe estate may, on application for that purpose, authoriGe the e3ecutor or administrator to convey such property according to suchcontract, or with such modifications as are agreed upon by the parties and approved by the courtH and if the contract is to convey realproperty to the e3ecutor or administrator, the cler of the court shall e3ecute the deed! 3 3 3!"

-his provision should be differentiated from %ections and B of the same 0ule, specifically re$uiring only the e3ecutor or administrator to filethe application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estate for the purpose of paying debts, e3penses and legacies6%ection 8H+2or for authority to sell real or personal estate beneficial to the heirs, devisees or legatees and other interested persons, althoughsuch authority is not necessary to pay debts, legacies or e3penses of administration 6%ection B8! I%ection ? mentions only an application toauthoriGe the conveyance of realty under a contract that the deceased entered into while still alive! #hile this 0ule does not specify who shouldfile the application, it stands to reason that the proper party must be one !who is to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one who is to beentitled to the avails of the suit!+

(etitioners aver that the CA's computation of Eliodoro %r!'s share in the disputed parcels of land was erroneous because, as the conjugalpartner of 0emedios, he owned one half of these lots plus a further one tenth of the remaining half, in his capacity as a one of her legal heirs!ence, Eliodoro's share should be ++7I of the entire property! 0espondent poses no objection to this computation!

>n the other hand, the CA held that, at the very least, the conditional sale should cover the one half 6+78 pro indiviso conjugal share of Eliodoroplus his one tenth 6+7+I8 hereditary share as one of the ten legal heirs of the decedent, or a total of three fifths 6/7F8 of the lots inadministration!/

(etitioners' correct! -he CA computed Eliodoro's share as an heir based on one tenth of the entire disputed property! &t should be based only on

the remaining half, after deducting the conjugal share!B

-he proper determination of the sellerheir's shares re$uires further e3planation! %uccession laws and jurisprudence re$uire that when amarriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the decedent's entire estate under the concept of conjugal properties of gains must be divided e$ually, with one half going to the surviving spouse and the other half to the heirs of the deceased!FAfter the settlement of thedebts and obligations, the remaining half of the estate is then distributed to the legal heirs, legatees and devices! #e assume, however, thatthis preliminary determination of the decedent's estate has already been taen into account by the parties, since the only issue raised in thiscase is whether Eliodoro's share is ++7I or /7F of the disputed lots!

$$, :;a, ;e Manalo v, CA& G,R, No, $'2')'& =anuary $9& '(($ 73)2SCRA $368

&t is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments +Fand the character of the relief

sought+in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling! A careful srutiny of the (etition for &ssuance of .etters ofAdministration, %ettlement and *istribution of Estatein %(! (0>C! 5o! 2/ belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature ofan ordinary civil action! -he said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts re$uired in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceasedperson such as the fat of death of the late -roadio Manalo on )ebruary +B, +22, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of hissaid death! -he fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within he country are foundation facts upon which all the subse$uentproceedings in the administration of the estate rest!+1-he petition is %(!(0>C 5o! 2/ also contains an enumeration of the names of hislegal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings! &n addition,the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein 6private respondents herein8to see judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, -roadio Manalo!

&t is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate ofthe late -roadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition! &t must be emphasiGed that the trial court, sitingas a probate court, has limited and special jurisdictionIand cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properlythreshed out only in an ordinary civil action! &n addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as theconcomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer! &f it were

otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem! +%o itshould be in the instant petition for settlement of estate!

-he argument is misplaced! erein petitioners may not validly tae refuge under the provisions of 0ule +, %ection , of the 0ules of Court tojustify the invocation of Article of the Civil Code of the (hilippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of thedeceased -roadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough! -o wit:

Art! ! 5o suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward acompromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article I/F6underscoring supplied8!

-he above$uoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions! -his is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action byone person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for theredress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in e$uity! /A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, wherebya party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong!Besides, an e3cerpt form the 0eport of the Code

Commission unmistaably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to mae that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which areessentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:

&t is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family! &t is necessary thatevery effort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family! &t is now thatlawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than stranger!F

&t must be emphasiGed that the oppositors 6herein petitioners8 are not being sued in %(! (0>C! 5o! 2/ for any cause of action as in factno defendant was imploded therein! -he (etition for issuance of letters of Administration, %ettlement and *istribution of Estate in %(! (0>C!5o! 2/ is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein see to establish a status, a right, or aparticular fact!the petitioners therein 6private respondents herein8 merely see to establish the fat of death of their father and subse$uently tobe duly recogniGed as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly e3ercise their right to participate in the settlement andli$uidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court! +wphi+*n-t


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$', In t5e Matter of t5e Intestate Estate of Is#ael Reyes& G,R, No,$326%4& Nove#ber ''& '((( 73)6 SCRA 6)$8

-he jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of deceasedpersons, and the appointment and removal of administrators, e3ecutors, guardians and trustees!+?-he $uestion of ownership is as a rule, ane3traneous matter which the (robate Court cannot resolve with finality!+2-hus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property shouldor should not be included in the inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination isprovisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title! I

%ettled is the rule that the 0egional -rial Court acting as a probate court e3ercises but limited jurisdiction, thus it has no power to taecogniGance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all otherparties having legal interest in the property consent, e3pressly or impliedly, to the submission of the $uestion to the (robate Court foradjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced!

$3, PCI/ v, CA& G,R, No, $(3$)2& Nove#ber $6& '((( 73)) SCRA6298

(etitioner claims that it was not given sufficient opportunity to file an answer in opposition to the application for preliminary injunction due to itsbelated receipt of the complaintinintervention! %uch contention is untenable! %ince it received a copy of the complaintinintervention on5ovember /, +22I, there was ample time to prepare an answer for the hearing set on *ecember B, +22I! Moreover, petitioner was dulynotified of the hearing on the application for the writ! &n fact, the hearing had been reset and appropriate notices given to the parties! -he recordfurther showed that petitioner@s counsel attended the hearing on *ecember B, +22I, but decided not to tae part in the proceedings when hismotion for e3tension of time to file responsive pleading was denied!

-hus, ade$uate opportunity was given to petitioner to oppose the application for the writ as well as to file its answer to the complaintinintervention! (etitioner may not presume that its motion for e3tension would be granted as a matter of course! -he grant of an e3tension of timeto file a responsive pleading is discretionary on the part of the court!

Contrary to petitioner@s contention, the 0ules of Court do not re$uire that issues be joined before preliminary injunction may issue! (reliminaryinjunction may be granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, ordering a party or a court, agency or aperson to refrain from a particular act or acts!+)or as long as the re$uisites for its issuance are present in the case, such issuance is valid!

(etitioner@s contention that the writ of injunction issued by the trial court effectively adjudicated ownership of the mortgaged property in favor ofrespondent lan$uita Ang is misplaced! &t is only upon e3piration of the redemption period, without the judgment debtor having made use of hisright of redemption, that ownership of the land sold in a foreclosure sale becomes consolidated in the purchaser!-he probate court issued thewrit to enjoin petitioner and other concerned parties from performing any act which would directly or indirectly enforce the effects of the e3trajudicial foreclosure of decedent@s property caused by petitioner ban, in order to preserve the estate of the decedent! Consolidation of title

would have the conse$uence of transferring ownership since the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the propertypurchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale! /-herefore, at the time the writ was issued therewas yet no issue regarding ownership because the period for redemption had not lapsed!

5evertheless, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which may or may not be included in theestate proceedings, but such determination is provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title! B-hus,the allegations of lan$uita Ang that her signatures on the real estate mortgage documents were forged may be ventilated in a separateproceeding, re$uiring the presentation of clear and convincing evidence!

$), De Leon v, CA& G,R, No, $'%4%$& August 9& '((' 73%9 SCRA '$98

A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding,

can only pass upon $uestions of title provisionally!/

-he rationale therefor andthe proper recourse of the aggrieved party are e3pounded in 3i)ene2 v* &ourt of "ppeals:

"-he patent reason is the probate court@s limited jurisdiction and the principle that $uestions of title or ownership, which result ininclusion or e3clusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action!

"All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventoryor list of properties to be administered by the administrator! &f there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and theadministrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate courtcannot do so!"B

-he Court held in 4alero 4da* de Rodrigue2 v* &ourt of "ppealsthat the order of e3clusion 6or inclusion8 is not a final orderH that it isinterlocutory in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the subject lotsH that the prevailing rule is that for the purpose ofdetermining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto butsuch determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the

parties!

-he elevation of the records of %pecial (roceedings 5o! C+12 to the Court of Appeals for the purpose of petitioners@ appeal from the orderremoving the administratri3 is unnecessary where a record on appeal is allowed under the 0ules of Court! -he court a .uoloses jurisdictionover the subject of the appeal upon the approval of the record on appeal and the e3piration of the time to appeal of the other partiesH but retainsjurisdiction over the remaining subject matter not covered by the appeal!/

$6, Uy v, Ca1ulong& A,M, No, R=


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Every judge should be cogniGant of the basic principle that when $uestions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate of adeceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by titleadverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such $uestions cannot be determined in the courts of administration proceedings! -he trialcourt, acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the trial court in the e3ercise of itsgeneral jurisdiction! -he failure of respondent judge to apply this basic principle indicates a manifest disregard of wellnown legal rules!

&n cancelling the titles of complainants over their properties on mere motion of a party and without affording them due process, respondentJudge violated her sworn obligation to uphold the law and promote the administration of justice! &t has been held that if the law is so elementary,not to now it or to act as if one does not now it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law!

-he foregoing transgressions of respondent Judge are further aggravated by her refusal to abide by the *ecision of the Court of Appealsannulling her >rder of 1 June +2?2 which directed the cancellation of the titles of complainants! %he was in fact specifically enjoined fromproceeding against them, yet, despite this *ecision, respondent Judge sill authoriGed the subse$uent transfer or alienation to other persons ofproperties titled in the name of complainants to the detriment of the latter! -his utter disrespect for the judgment of a higher court constitutesgrave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the public, the bench and the bar!

$9, En;eres v, CA& G,R, No, $'%6'6& De-e#ber $4& $222 73'$ SCRA$4%8

&njunction may issuependente lite only in cases of e3treme urgency, where the right to the possession, during the pendency of the main case,of the property involved is very clearH where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in favor of the complainant seeing thepossession of the propertypendente liteH where there was willful and unlawful invasion on plaintiff's right, over his protest and remonstrance,the injury being a continuing one! #

efore an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following re$uisites be present: 6+8 there must be a right in esseor the e3istence of aright to be protectedH and 68 the act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right! 1$

#e agree with the findings of the %EC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that petitioners failed not only to establish a threatened violation of aright but they also failed to discharge the burden of clearly showing the right to be protected! ++ >n the mere contention that the shareholdingsof private respondents belong to the estate of the late *r! >rtaReG which is still the subject of settlement before the 0egional -rial Court ofueGon City, petitioners had not established their clear legal rights to obtain injunctive relief against private respondents! &njunction, whetherpreliminary or final, is not designed to protect contingent or future rights!

&n support of their position, petitioners cited in their reply the issuance of an >rder by the intestate court declaring that the shares of stoc of(hilinterlife belong to the estate! &t is admitted that the special proceedings are still pending before the court and the estate had not beenpartitioned and distributed! 5otwithstanding the proceedings being conducted by the intestate court, the petitioners' rights or interests over theestate or over the assailed shareholdings in the name of private respondents are still future and unsettled rights which cannot be protected bythe writ of injunction! -he rule is well settled that the jurisdiction of the regional trial court as a probate or intestate court relates only to matters

having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not e3tend to the determination of $uestions ofownership that arise during the proceedings! 1%

-he intestate court may pass upon the title to a certain property for the purpose of determining whether the same should or should not beincluded in the inventory but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to final decision in a separate action regarding ownership whichmay be constituted by the parties! 1&-he court in charge of the intestate proceedings cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimedto be a part of the estate and which are e$ually claimed to belong to outside parties! 1'-herefore, the possibility of irreparable damage withoutproof of violation of an actually e3isting right of petitioners over the shareholdings presently in the possession of private respondents is noground for an injunction being a mere da)nu) abs.ue in1uria! 1(

Contrary to the contentions of petitioners, the %EC found that private respondents are bona fideowners of shares of stoc in (hilinterlifeconstituting the majority thereof or 2BS of the outstanding capital stoc of the company! 0ecords show that they have been stocholders of(hilinterlife since +2?/ up to the present! &t was only in +22B that petitioners sought the annulment of the shareholdings of private respondentsbefore the %EC! -he grant of the writ of injunction against private respondents by restraining them from e3ercising their rights as stocholderswould in effect dispose of the main case without a trial! -he %EC acted correctly in denying the issuance of the writ until the merits of the case

can be heard! )urther, it is a basic procedural postulate that a preliminary injunction is not proper where its purpose is to tae the property out ofcontrol or possession of one party and transfer the same to the hands of another who did not have such control at the inception of thecase 2$and whose title has not been clearly established by law! 21

$4, Cortes v, CA& G,R, No, $$4)$4& Se1te#ber '$& '((( 73)( SCRA4$68

-he long standing rule is that probate courts, or those in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine titleto properties claimed to be part of the estate and which are clai)ed to belong to outside parties*%tated otherwise, "claims for title to, or right ofpossession of, personal or real property, made by the heirs themselves, by title adverse to that of the deceased, or )ade by third persons,cannot be entertained by the 5probate6 court*"1

&n the present case, however, private respondent Menandro A! 0eselva, who refused to vacate the house and lot being eyed as part of the

estate of the late -eodoro -! 0eselva, cannot be considered an "outside party" for he is one of the three compulsory heirs of the former! Assuch, he is very much involved in the settlement of -eodoro's estate!?y way of e3ception to the abovementioned rule, "when the parties areall heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the $uestion of title to property!"2ere, the probate court iscompetent to decide the $uestion of ownership! More so, when the opposing parties belong to the poor stratum of society and a separate actionwould be most e3pensive and ine3pedient!+I+wphi+

&n the same way, when the controversy is whether the property in issue belongs to the conjugal partnership or e3clusively to the decedent, thesame is properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court, which necessarily has to li$uidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine theestate of the decedent which is to be distributed among the heirs!+

$%, Solivio v, CA& G,R, No, %3)%)& "ebruary $'& $22( 7$%' SCRA $$28
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/sep2000/gr_117417_2000.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/sep2000/gr_117417_2000.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/sep2000/gr_117417_2000.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/sep2000/gr_117417_2000.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/sep2000/gr_117417_2000.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/sep2000/gr_117417_2000.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/sep2000/gr_117417_2000.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/sep2000/gr_117417_2000.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/sep2000/gr_117417_2000.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/sep2000/gr_117417_2000.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/sep2000/gr_117417_2000.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/sep2000/gr_117417_2000.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/sep2000/gr_117417_2000.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/sep2000/gr_117417_2000.html#fnt12


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After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the 0egional -rial Court, ranch , laced jurisdiction toentertain Concordia Nillanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr! while the probateproceedings 6%pl, (roc! 5o! FBI8 for the settlement of said estate are still pending in ranch / of the same court, there being as yet no ordersfor the submission and approval of the administrati3's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminatingthe proceedings 6p! /+, 0ecord8!

&n the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere withprobate proceedings pending in a coe$ual court! -hus, did we rule in /uilas v* 3udge of the &ourt of First Instance of Pa)panga, L07889:,3anuary ;+, +9rtuGar, ?2 (hil!1/I, 1B+1BH -imbol v! Cano, supra=Jingco v! *aluG, .F+I1, April B, +2F/, 2 (hil! +I?H 0oman Catholic v! Agustines, .+B1+I, March 2, +2I, +I1 (hil! BFF, BIB+H Emphasis supplied8

-he probate proceedings are proceedings in re)*5otice of the time and place of hearing of the petition is re$uired to be published 6%ec! /,

0ule 1 in relation to %ec! /, 0ule 12, 0ules of Court8! 5otice of the hearing of Celedonia's original petition was published in the "Nisayan-ribune" on April F, May and 2, +211 6E3h B, p! +21, 0ecord8! %imilarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition of May , +211 for thesettlement of the estate was, by order of the court, published in "agong Tasanag" 65ew .ight8 issues of May 1, June / and +I, +211 6pp!+?/IF, 0ecord8! -he publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive notice to the whole world! Concordia was not deprived ofher right to intervene in the proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of the same!

Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the third degree on his )other>s sidewas not false! Moreover,it was made in good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, asEsteban's nearest surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them! &t would have been selfdefeating and inconsistent with herclaim of sole heirshipif she stated in her petition that Concordia was her coheir! er omission to so state did not constitute e3trinsic fraud!

)ailure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one's own claim or defense is not suche3trinsic fraud as will justify or re$uire vacation of the judgment! 6B2 C!J!%! B?2, citing =oung v! =oung, %E d H )irst5ational an Q -rust Co! of Ting City v! owman, +F %# d ?BH (rice v! %mith, +I2 %# d ++BB, ++B28

Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr!, is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr! was not an ascendant, but thedescendant of his mother, %alustia %olivio, from whom he inherited the properties in $uestion! -herefore, he did not hold his inheritance subjectto a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia %olivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side! -he reservatroncalapplies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 2 brother or sister! &t doesnot apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article ?2+!

owever, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother, %alustia %olivioNda! de Javellana 6from whom the estate came8, an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to 0eopen and7or 0econsider>rder dated April /, +21?" which she filed in %pl! (roceeding 5o! FBI:

B! -hat !!!prior to the filing of the petition they 5petitioner &eledonia Solivio and )ovant &oncordia 3avellana6 have agreed to)a?e the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely nown each other due to their filiation to thedecedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away for 6sic8 each other! 6p! /B, 0ecordHEmphasis supplied8

she is bound by that agreement! &t is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree toplace all of Esteban's estate in the "%alustia %olivio Nda! de Javellana )oundation" which Esteban, Jr!, during his lifetime, planned to set up tohonor his mother and to finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well!

er admission may not be taen lightly as the lower court did! eing a judicial admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented toprove the agreement 6Cunanan v! Amparo, ?I (hil! 1H 4ranada v! (hilippine 5ational an, .I1BF, %ept! , +2, +? %C0A +H %ta! Ana v!Maliwat, ./I/, Aug! /+, +2?, B %C0A +I+?H (eople v! Encipido, 4!0!1II2+, *ec! 2, +2?, +B %C0A B1?H and 0odillas v!%andiganbayan, 4!0! F?F, May I, +2??, ++ %C0A /B18!

$2, :ita v, Montano& G,R, No, L", ">+", ">+A", ">+", and ">+C"8, the parcel of land covered by -a3 *eclaration 5o! B 6old8 was a paraphernalproperty of his wife &sidra Montanano while the parcels of land covered by -a3 *eclaration 5os! 1 6old8 and 1/ wereconjugal properties of the spouses Edilberto Nita and &sidra Montanano as they were donated to the latter by )rancisca Asiloduring their marriage! &t is the contention of the plaintiff that upon the death of &sidra Montanano, her husband Edilberto Nitaac$uired ownership of these properties!

-his contention of the plaintiff in effect corroborates the claim of the defendants and intervenors that an the three 6/8 parcelsof land, subjectmatter of the complaint, including all the parcels of land being claimed by them in the intervenor's


9/9

counterclaim, were all paraphernal properties of &sidra Montanano! -he two 68 parcels of land supposedly received asdonation by &sidra Montanano during her marriage with Edilberto Nita should be classified as her paraphernal properties, itbeing ac$uired by her through lucrative title 6Art! +B?, Civil Code8! >n the other hand, plaintiffs testimony that the third parcelof land covered in the complaint was inherited by Edilberto Nita from &sidra Montanano is an admission that the said propertywas the paraphernal property of the latter!

-he defendants and intervenors claim that the abovestated three 6/8 parcels of land and the properties covered in theircounterclaim were donated to them by &sidra Montanano by virtue of two 68 deeds of donation she e3ecuted on 5ovember, +2/? and *ecember I, +2BI! -hey presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove that &sidra Montananoac$uired all these parcels of land, either by inheritance or donation, from her father *omingo Montanano, her aunt )ranciscaAsilo and her uncle Juan Asilo! Aside from this, the ta3 declarations covering the properties involved in the complaint and

counterclaim are mostly in the name of &sidra Montanano, e3cept one each in the name of her father *omingo Montanano,her aunt )rancisca Asilo and her nephew Jose %amonte! -he court is convinced, therefore, that all the properties involved inthis litigation were the paraphernal properties of the deceased &sidra Montanano!

#hatever merit there may be in plaintiffappellant's claim that upon the death of &sidra Montanano, the ownership of these parcels ofland 6e3cept with respect to the parcel of land covered by -a3 *eclaration 5o! +F/ 6B, old8 which was validly donated to defendantsappellants and intervenorsappellants by &sidra Montanano, as #e shall discuss later8 are vested upon Edilberto Nita by operation oflaw, subject only to the right of her nephew and nieces, li$uidation of the conjugal partnership of &sidra Montanano and Edilberto Nitamust be undertaen prior to the adjudication of properties to the heirs 6Nicente J! )rancisco,The Revised Rules of &ourt in thePhilippines, +21I Edition, p! +28! &n this connection, contrary to the trial court's ruling, it is not necessary to file a separate proceedingin court for the proper disposition of the estate of &sidra Montanano! 9nder 0ule 1/, %ection of the 0ules of Court, if both spouseshave died, the conjugal partnership shall be li$uidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either! &n the present case, therefore,the conjugal partnership of &sidra Montanano and Edilberto Nita should be li$uidated in the testate proceedings of the latter!

&t is e3plicit in Article 1F )of the Civil Code that acceptance is necessary in a donation! -his applies to all inds of donation because the law

does not mae any distinction! -he rationale behind the re$uirement of acceptance is that nobody is obliged to receive a benefit against his will6Arturo M! -olentino, &o))entaries and 3urisprudence on the &ivil &ode of the Philippines, Nolume &&, +21 Edition, p! F+8! #e uphold the trialcourt that 6p! FI, 0ecord on Appeal8:

! ! ! notwithstanding the fact that from the secondary evidence presented, the said deed of donation mortis causa of5ovember , +2/? seems to have been legally and validly e3ecuted, it cannot be given force and effect as the acceptancethereof by the donees is void and illegal in as much 6sic

8 as they were made at the time of the e3ecution of the document,not after the death of the donor &sidra Montanano! A donation mortis causa taes effect only after the death of the donor,conse$uently it is only after the latter's death that its acceptance maybe made!

-he $uoted provision in the second deed of donation should be understood in its entirety! -hus, based on the first part of theparagraph which states " 'nDa bagaman at sa asulatang ito ay lubusan ng ibinibigay at ipinag?a?aloobsa bawat isa ! ! ! na iyon aypatuluyan nang ngayo>y iginagawad sa ?anila ng walang pasubali, na )agagawa na nila ang buong ?arapatan ngayon bilang tunayna )ay0ari! ! ! " 6Emphasis supplied8, supra,it was obviously the intention of &sidra Montanano to grant a donation inter vivos todefendantsappellants and intervenorsappellants! Although the rest of the paragraph states "'gayon man, ay ami pa ring magasawaang mananatili sa pagmamayari, paiinabang at pamomosision, PP na anianiyang pagaaring dito'y ipinagaaloob, sa buongpanahon na ang bawat isa sa amin magasawa'y nabubuhay, at ung ailan bawian ami ng hiram na buhay, ay saa at saa palamang maaring matamo nila ang ganap na pagmamayari at paiinabang sa mga pagaaring iyan ! ! ! supra," #e have adjudged inthe case of eirs of Juan onsato, et al! v! Court of Appeals, et al!, 2F (hil! B?+, B??:

&t is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase "that after the death of the donor the aforesaiddonation shall become effective!" ! ! ! owever, said e3pression must be construed together with the rest of the paragraph,and thus taen, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donor's death, the donation will tae effect so as to mae thedonees the absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens and encumbrancesH for it must be remembered thatthe donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated! %uch reservation constituted a charge orencumbrance that would disappear upon the donor's death, when full title would become vested in the donees!

As #e have ruled in Concepcion, et al! v! Concepcion, 2+ (hil! ?/, ?/I:

! ! ! even if he 6donor8 says it 6the donation8 is to tae effect after his death, when from the body of the instrument or donationit is to be gathered that the main consideration of the donation is not the death of the donor but rather services rendered tohim by the donee or his affection for the latter, then the donation should be considered as inter vivos,! ! ! and the conditionthat the donation is to tae effect only after the death of the donor should be interpreted as meaning that the possession andenjoyment of the its of the property donated should tae place only after donor's death!

'(, Eastern S5i11ing v, Lu-ero& G,R, No, L

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